Bankruptcy for Countrywide or Liquidation for BofA?

From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Tuesday, October 25, 2011 2:27 PM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: Bankruptcy for Countrywide or Liquidation for BofA?

The LATimes reported that Bryan Moynihan wouldn’t rule out bankruptcy for Bank of America. Chris Whalen urged the bank to go bankrupt. Now rumors are swirling that BofA will try to dodge all Countrywide’s lawsuit liability by putting Countrywide into bankruptcy, saving BofA in the process.

Whether BofA succeeds in ducking Countrywide’s liabilities depends mostly on one question: will the bankruptcy court apply Delaware law, which prizes form over substance, or law like New York or California’s, which looks at substance over form? That choice of law factor is what got BofA off the hook of Countrywide liability in one case, and left it on the hook in another, as detailed by Isaac Gradman at the Subprime Shakeout. And if you think about it, the idea is incredibly galling.

Delaware is home to many corporations, because corporate law in Delaware is unusually pro-corporation. One way of being pro-corporation is to prize form over substance. Form—drafting documents in a certain way, invoking all the magic words in the right order—can force the world to treat a business as if it’s doing what it says it is doing, even though it’s not. The corporation is in control of how the law treats it.

See, if a corporation is really doing what it says in its documents, then an analysis of substance and form should get to the same place. The only time a form-versus-substance analysis ends in different places is when a corporation wants to invoke specific legal protections with magic words instead of earning them by acting accordingly.

The specific issue is this: Is Countrywide a separate company within BofA, or was it merged into BofA? The documents governing BofA’s acquisition of BofA surely treat it like a separate company, but myriad actions by BofA show it integrated Countrywide, made it part of the BofA borg. So will BofA’s words or its actions control the analysis?

If Delaware law applies, BofA can likely ditch its Countrywide problem, and corporate rigging of the legal system will have triumphed again.

Liability Beyond Countrywide

Not that ditching Countrywide’s liability solves BofA’s lawsuit problems. Consider, for example, Nevada Attorney General Catherine Masto’s lawsuit, charges that “The course of unlawful conduct described in this Complaint began with Countrywide…After acquiring Countrywide, Bank of America engaged in new, repeated and systematic violations of Nevada law…” (at paragraph 7; see also paragraphs 4-6 and the complaint generally.) Or consider that the Federal Housing Finance Authority sued Bank of America for its actions separate from that of Countrywide. Finally, bankruptcy of Countrywide can’t protect BofA from the MBIA case that has BofA on the hook for Countrywide (the New York law case above.)

Just how bad the MBIA case is for BofA may be determined at an October 5th hearing, reports Patrick Gallagher of Westfair Online. MBIA is suing BofA for the insurer’s losses on Countrywide securities. At issue on October 5 is just what MBIA has to prove to get paid by BofA.

Does MBIA simply have to prove that it would never have insured the securities if it knew the truth about the mortgages Countrywide was stuffing in them? Or does it have to prove Countrywide’s lies are why the securities tanked and the insurer lost so much? If MBIA has to prove the lies caused the losses, Countrywide has a chance to argue that the recession or other factors drove the securities’ collapse instead. According to analysts cited by Gallagher, what the judge says is worth about $9 billion to BofA.

Still, ditching Countrywide’s liability would be a huge relief to BofA. BofA, much less Countrywide, doesn’t have the assets to pay 100 cents on the dollar of every Countrywide litigation claim. As a result, if BofA succeeds in isolating those liabilities in a Countrywide bankruptcy, everyone Countrywide defrauded will get much less than they deserve. That is, homeowners, investors (including pension funds), insurers and all Countrywide’s other victims will be victimized again. That’s why I think that if BofA tries to put Countrywide into bankruptcy, the feds should liquidate BofA and all its assets in service of paying off those liabilities.

The feds can liquidate BofA anytime BofA meets the criteria in the Dodd-Frank Act, regardless of whether BofA or any of its subsidiaries, like Countrywide, are in bankruptcy. Now I realize if BofA tries to put Countrywide in bankruptcy, the Obama administration has probably signed off on it, if not actively pushed it. But that doesn’t mean the public need grin and bear it.

BofA Executives Punished in a Liquidation

If the feds decide to liquidate BofA, the Dodd-Frank process is swift, gratifyingly brutal to the executives, and effective: BofA would cease to exist, replaced with smaller companies not too big to fail. On paper, that is. If BofA is liquidated, no one really knows what would happen.

On paper, BofA’s executives would be fired, could be made to cough up the last two years of their compensation and could be held personally liable for damages. Even Angelo Mozillo, that Countrywide crook-in-chief, could be rendered virtually middle-class, because when the issue is fraud, executives’ and former executives’ compensation can be taken back for an unlimited number of years. More: any BofA shares executives own surely would be worthless; equity holders are at the bottom of the creditor list. Finally, any of these executives could be banned from the industry for life.

I say “on paper” because the fed track record for going after big bank execs is non-existent. So maybe the executives wouldn’t be taken to the cleaners, their ill-gotten massive compensation left untouched; maybe the feds wouldn’t even go after Mozillo’s money.

Broader Consequences of a BofA Liquidation

As grateful as I would be to see Mozillo and BofA management get hosed, I have to acknowledge that liquidating BofA would be a big risk. What would the markets think?

Perhaps liquidation would be Lehman like, causing cascading disruptions. For example, I hear corporate debt markets aren’t particularly liquid, though the financial sector section of the market is; would liquidating BofA cause the corporate debt market to freeze?

Maybe the market would view BofA as a one off case, and the consequences would be contained. BofA is certainly a type of worst-case scenario. Other big banks have similar problems, but perhaps to a meaningfully lesser degree. I’d be really interested to hear informed comments on what a BofA liquidation’s impacts would look like, if you know.

The only thing I’m certain of is this: if the Feds wanted to liquidate BofA, they could manufacture the power to do it right now.

What it Takes to Liquidate BofA

Here’s the checklist before the Feds could liquidate BofA (see Title II):

–Is BofA a “Covered Financial Company”? Check.

–Is BofA a “Systemic Risk”? Check, though the process for making that declaration has a high bar: 2/3 of the FDIC and the Federal Reserve each must vote yes, and then Geithner would have to speak with Obama and they would have to decide yes too. They have to document their decision, tell Congress, and let the GAO check their math, after the fact. So while common sense dictates that, by definition, a too big to fail bank poses systemic risk, I suppose it’s possible that not everyone will cooperate.

In justifying the decision, Geithner (the buck officially stops with him) has to find:

–BofA in default, or in danger of defaulting.

If BofA files for bankruptcy, this is met. Arguably—I’m persuaded—BofA’s lawsuit liability already has it in danger of defaulting. Hence BofA’s obsession with trying to minimize and settle its lawsuit exposure. Check. Or almost check, depending on the view the government wants to take.

–Letting BofA fail in the usual way would have “serious adverse effects on the financial system”.

Well, that’s the very definition of “too big to fail”, right? And everyone claimed BofA was, leading to its bailout. Check.

–No private sector alternative is available. Check. (Who would want to take on Countrywide?)

–The impacts on the financial system of letting BofA fail the regular way would be worse than using the liquidation authority. Check. Again, that’s the whole point of too big to fail and the liquidation authority.

–The proposed course of action would mitigate the impacts of a BofA failure. Check. Again, that’s the point.

–It’s been ordered by the government to convert its convertible debt into equity. This only applies if the government decides to require banks to hold debt that can be converted to equity at times of financial stress, meaning it helps the banks’ balance sheet while hurting equity holders. But if the feds require any bank to hold such debt, this factor isn’t really a hurdle; the government can simply order the conversion whenever it wants to liquidate. So at worst, this is checkable.

In sum, if the feds find the political will, they can liquidate BofA, punish the executives of it and Countrywide in meaningful ways, and make at least one big bank no longer too big to fail. Along the way they can help Countrywide and BofA’s victims get paid as best as possible.

Will the feds liquidate BofA? I doubt it, unless a) Bank of America fails to ditch its Countrywide liability; b) Bank of America’s other liabilities become overwhelmingly great; c) the markets panic because people start realizing just how much trouble the banks are in, d) people start rioting because they just can’t take the government’s pro-bank anti-person bias any longer or e) protest movements reach such a critical mass that Washington is scared into acting.

In the meantime, the lawsuits against BofA and Countrywide will continue to pile up. BofA and/or the feds will eventually be forced to do something. Let’s hope they do the right thing.

View article…

Lessons from Merkel in Germany Applied Here at Home: Why Can’t We Be Brave Like That?

by Neil Garfield

“We are paying way too high a price to protect the employment of those who didn’t do their jobs as fund managers for the investors who bought these bogus mortgage bonds.” Neil F. Garfield
The tension was so thick you could cut it with a knife. The Banks were, as usual, dictating the terms of their own bailout with threats that if they go down the whole system would go down. Sound familiar? This premise wasn’t true and Germany’s Merkel and France’s Sarkozy knew it. But most of the economic and foreign ministers in the EU were scared that it COULD be true. But the only ones in the room who really knew for sure were the Bankers themselves, some of whom had spread the lie so often in so many ways they were coming to believe it themselves.
The implicit threat was that if Europe didn’t capitulate, surrendering their list bit of dignity to the Banks, the system would fall and that the bankers as people would be just fine because they were rich bond words. I liken it to the Cuban Missile Crisis. Somebody had to blink. Merkel showed the guts we need from a national leader. She ordered the printing of Germany’s currency back into circulation and the printing presses went to work. She told the Bankers they either take a 50% haircut on this mess the bankers created or simply take the consequences of default of Greece, Spain, Italy et al.
It was obvious she meant it. And Sarkozy agreed. We’ll take our chances with the system, rather than surrender control to the Bankers. The result was easily predictable for those of us who are students of this remarkable moment in history. The Banks caved. 50% write-down is what they are accepting which means that they are willing to accept the responsibility of paying for 50% of the damage they created with bonds, pools, derivatives, credit default swaps etc. They caved because their threat did not have a thread of truth to it. If the big bankers go down the smaller bankers go up. That’s the way it is and always will be.
We have plenty of objective, quantifiable data to measure the damage here in America. The nominal amount of debt is beyond imagination because it literally exceeds all the money in the world by a factor of at least 2.5. Amount of nominal debt: $125 trillion, minimum. Amount of money in the world including all currencies: $50 trillion. Bankers here should get the same treatment that the Bankers in Europe received. You created this and you will pay for at least 50% of the damage. As we will see later, I actually have a plan to make that happen out in the trenches of the economic wars in the marketplace. More on that soon, very soon.
The trouble with pursuing any solution is that the business of America is now accounted for by measuring “financial services.” And if you really look at the corporate culture and behavior of these companies, their business is not any service at all. Their business is making executive bonuses and compensation as high as the sky will allow. I’m not talking about the whole income and wealth inequality debate here, I’m talking day to day business and the reason why we are not even close to a solution that will put America back on track, back in the game — never mind being the number one player.
Here is the obstacle to resolution: nobody is telling the truth because they are preserving their next bonus and their next raise. As long as the pension fund managers don’t report to their beneficiaries and the Board that they lost 50% of their assets, they keep their jobs, their bonuses and their compensation packages.
That is why Wall Street has created intermediaries to grab houses on which they made no loan — they know that in order for the pension fund to stop them, the pension fund manager would need to admit that there is a loss that was previously unreported. So even though the loss is getting larger and larger by allowing the servicing companies and banks to grab millions of free homes, the fund manager gets to keep one more bonus, one more year of compensation. “screw the pensioners…They’re going to die anyway.” (I actually heard that from someone who will go unnamed, for now).
This column has been an advocate of principal correction because, whether it’s a mortgage, credit card, auto loan or student loan debt, the amount was and remains too high, piled on high with absurd fees and accrued interest that once upon a time (30 years ago) was deemed criminal — you know, like you could be jailed as a loan shark for charging those rates. That was back in the days when we listened to economists instead of bankers as to what was good for the country. By listening to bankers we replaced real wages with debt and now there is simply no place left to insert debt, savings are near zero, consumer confidence is near zero, and joblessness is at an all-time high. Just what do you think is going to happen this holiday season?
Defaults are rising and will continue to rise because they have no place else to go except up. The tooth fairy won’t fix this one. Obama must develop the same set of cayungas that it took a woman to demonstrate — Merkel in Germany. He’s got to be willing to walk from the table and insist on extracting a very high price from bankers who sucked a very high price out of our society for the last 35 years. Specifically, the Market has set the bar, whether we agree with the level or not, at 50%. Requiring the Banks, investors (pension funds etc.) to tell the truth about the debt they are carrying on their books as assets, and requiring them to agree to reality — it isn’t worth more than half of the nominal value and in fact it probably isn’t worth more than 15% of nominal value. Anything the banks and investors get over 15% is gravy.
So correcting the loan principal on mortgages to less than 50% is merely reflecting reality. The value used at closing by the lender, in fact, certified by the lender, was a lie and the borrower depended upon it as did the investor whose fund manager doesn’t want to admit he never looked under the hood of the vehicle. Correcting the rest of consumer loans would similarly bring the debt in line with the value of the debt. We are paying way too high a price to protect the employment of those who didn’t do their jobs as fund managers for the investors who bought these bogus mortgage bonds.

This fraud; 70 times as bad as the Savings and Loan Crisis…and not ONE has gone to jail yet!!!

Delaware suing MERS Video

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26315908//vp/45070527#45070527

Delaware suing MERS video

Delaware AG’s MERS suit should strike fear in MBS industry

From: Jake Naumer

Lawyers for MBS investors and bond insurers have already poured untold hours into scrutinizing mortgage loan file documents for breach of contract cases against issuers. They’ve generally focused on whether the underlying mortgage pools live up to the representations and warranties MBS issuers made about things such as owner income and loan-to-value ratios. But imagine if they can argue, as the Delaware AG does in Thursday’s MERS suit, that trusts never owned the loans in MBS pools at all. We’re looking at a whole new world of put-back liability.

________________________________________

http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/ViewNews.aspx?id=31220&terms=%40ReutersTopicCodes+CONTAINS+%27ANV%27

http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/ViewNews.aspx?id=31220&terms=%40ReutersTopicCodes+CONTAINS+%27ANV%27

http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2011/10_-_October/Pauley_s_BofA_MBS_ruling_is_boon_to_New_York,_Delaware_AGs/


Jake Naumer
Resolution Advisors
3187 Morgan Ford
St Louis Missouri 63116
314 961 7600
Fax Voice Mail 314 754 9086

Delaware v. MERS Complaint

MERS-Complaint Delaware

United States of America v Allied Home Mortgage | Feds File Massive Fraud Case Against Allied Home Mortgage

Feds File Massive Fraud Case Against Allied Home Mortgage
by Tracy Weber and Charles Ornstein ProPublica,
Federal prosecutors sued Allied Home Mortgage Capital Corp. and two top executives Tuesday, accusing them of running a massive fraud scheme that cost the government at least $834 million in insurance claims on defaulted home loans.
Houston-based Allied and its founder and chief executive, Jim Hodge, were the subject of July 2010 stories by ProPublica [1], which detailed a trail of alleged misconduct, lawsuits and government sanctions spanning at least 18 states [2] and seven years. Borrowers recounted how they had been lied to by Allied employees, who in some cases had siphoned their loan proceeds for personal gain. Some lost their homes.
Despite years of warnings, the federal government had not — until this week — impaired the company’s ability to issue new mortgages.
The suit [3], filed Tuesday in U.S. District Court in Manhattan, seeks triple damages and civil penalties, which could total $2.5 billion. Simultaneously, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development suspended the company and Hodge from issuing loans [4] backed by the Federal Housing Administration. The company was also barred from issuing mortgage-backed securities through the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae).
Allied has billed itself as the nation’s largest privately held mortgage broker with some 200 branches. (At one point, the company operated more than 600.) The sprawling network made Hodge, a folksy Texan, a rich man [5] with properties in three states and St. Croix and two airplanes to get to them.
Allied and Hodge played the “lending industry equivalent of heads-I-win and tails-you-lose,” U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara said at a news conference Tuesday. “The losers here were American taxpayers and the thousands of families who faced foreclosure because they could not ultimately fulfill their obligations on mortgages that were doomed to fail.”
The government’s complaint alleges that between 2001 and 2010, Allied originated 112,324 home mortgages backed by the FHA, which typically go to moderate- and low-income borrowers. Of those, nearly 32 percent — 35,801 — defaulted, resulting in more than $834 million in insurance claims paid by HUD.
In 2006 and 2007, the company’s default rate was a “staggering” 55 percent, the complaint said.
In addition, another 2,509 mortgages are currently in default, which could result in another $363 million in insurance claims paid by HUD.
Borrowers told ProPublica last year that company employees falsified records to bolster their credit worthiness and lured them into unaffordable deals by lying about the terms.
The government’s complaint says: “Allied has profited for years as one of the nation’s largest FHA lenders by engaging in reckless mortgage lending, flouting the requirements of the FHA mortgage insurance program and repeatedly lying about its compliance.”
Tuesday’s action against Allied follows criticism that the government has been slow to act on rampant fraud and abuse in the mortgage market. In the case of Allied, the government had reams of evidence of possible misconduct. Among ProPublica’s findings last year:
• Allied had the highest serious delinquency rate [6] among the top 20 FHA loan originators from June 2008 through May 2010.
• Nine states sanctioned the firm from 2009 to mid-2010 for such violations as using unlicensed brokers and misleading a borrower.
• Federal agencies cited or settled with Allied or an affiliate at least six times since 2003 for overcharging clients, underpaying workers or other offenses.
• At least five lenders sued, claiming Allied tricked them into funding loans for unqualified buyers by falsifying documents and submitting grossly inflated appraisals, among other allegations.
Allied spokesman Joe James said the company was aware of the government lawsuit but had not received a copy of it and could not comment.
Hodge did not return a phone call and email seeking comment. But last year, he told ProPublica that the problems experienced at some of Allied’s branches should not tarnish his firm’s overall record. “If you look at the volume that we did or do,” he said, “it’s not significant.”
In an interview Tuesday, Helen Kanovsky, HUD’s general counsel, defended the time it took her department to take action.
“We had tried sanctions before,” she said. “We had assessed civil monetary penalties and that had not worked.
“The extraordinary remedy that we have — to be able to terminate somebody’s FHA capacity [and] basically put them out of business — requires a very high level of evidence and a high level of proof.”
The government’s 41-page lawsuit details an alleged scheme by Allied to deceive HUD about its employees and the risks associated with its loans. For years, it operated a network of “shadow” branches that were not approved by HUD and falsely certified that they met legal requirements.
Allied also disguised the high default rates of some branches, the complaint alleges, by tinkering with their addresses to apply for new HUD identification codes for the same offices. When HUD updated its system to prevent such manipulation, Allied simply moved all of its branches to a sister company and obtained new IDs, “thus again achieving a clean slate on its default rates,” the suit said. The sister firm, Allied Home Mortgage Corp., is also named as a defendant.
Hodge created a “culture of corruption,” the suit said. He “intimidated employees by spontaneous terminations and aggressive email monitoring, and silenced former employees by actual and threatened litigation against them.”
In one case, Hodge instructed his chief information officer to capture the password for the personal email account of Jeanne Stell, the company’s executive vice president and compliance officer. Then, he installed an electronic listening device under the information officer’s desk, the complaint alleges.
Allied also was employing felons, including a state manager who had been sentenced to 60 months in prison for distributing methamphetamine and a branch manager running the office under a falsely-assumed name, the suit said.
The government joined a whistleblower lawsuit filed by a former Allied branch manager in Massachusetts, Peter Belli. In addition to Allied and Hodge, the suit also names Stell as a defendant.
Belli had filed other suits against Hodge and Allied. He said Tuesday that, while his legal pursuit of his former employer had been long and hard, “I never really ever felt like quitting because I was married to the cause.”
Allied is also facing at least one federal criminal investigation into its now-shuttered Hammond, La., branch. In multiple lawsuits, borrowers allege that the office deceived them from 2005 through 2007 by misrepresenting loan terms, falsifying records, failing to pay off prior mortgages and diverting hundreds of thousands of dollars.
At his news conference, Bharara said Tuesday’s filing was a civil matter and that the investigation into Allied is continuing. “We will go wherever the facts lead us.”
Allied-Lawsuit

I believe it, don’t you?

Fourteen Servicers Begin Lengthy Foreclosure Review Process
By: Krista Franks 11/01/2011
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Federal Reserve Board both announced Tuesday that the independent foreclosure reviews of 14 large servicers issued in April are now under way.
About 4.5 million borrowers could have their loans reviewed and potentially be compensated for imposed financial hardship, according to a previous statement by the OCC.
According to the OCC, the review will take several months due to the volume of potential foreclosures to review.
The foreclosure review is part of a broader list of enforcement actions for the servicers to rectify missteps in the foreclosure process. The enforcement actions mandated by the OCC include improved borrower communications, greater oversight of third-party vendors, updated management information systems, and the elimination of “dual tracking” – which takes place when a servicer forecloses while a borrower is being considered for a modification.
The OCC issued enforcement actions to: Ally’s GMAC Mortgage, Aurora Bank, Bank of America, Citibank, EverBank, HSBC, JPMorgan Chase, MetLife, OneWest, PNC, Sovereign Bank, SunTrust, U.S. Bank, and Wells Fargo.
The Federal Reserve Board issued similar mandates in April and is also requiring the four large servicers it oversees – GMAC , HSBC, SunTrust, and JPMorgan’s EMC Mortgage – to appoint a single point of contact to certain distressed borrowers.
“The independent foreclosure review is a significant component of the mortgage servicers’ compliance with our enforcement actions,” said acting Comptroller of the Currency John Walsh. “These requirements help ensure that the servicers provide appropriate compensation to borrowers who suffered financial harm as a result of improper practices identified in our enforcement actions.”
Independent consultants will begin reviewing cases in which borrowers believe they suffered financial harm due to foreclosure actions that occurred between 2009 and 2010.
Servicers began mailing letters to borrowers Tuesday explaining the process of requesting a review, according to the OCC.
If independent reviewers determine a borrower did face financial harm due to misrepresentations or errors by the servicer, the servicer will be required to compensate the borrower.
“Borrowers are encouraged to carefully consider the information about the review program to determine if they should participate,” stated the Fed in its Tuesday announcement. “There are no costs associated with being included in the review.”
The Fed is also calling on independent reviewers to conduct a comprehensive examination of certain categories of foreclosures. For example, they will look for violations of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act and review all cases in which a borrower filed a complaint about their foreclosure proceeding.
Borrowers’ requests for reviews will be accepted through the end of April.

FHFA OIG Report

Click to access EVL-2011-004.pdf

Should be self-explanatory…

Litigation docs from Matt Weider

The cat is way out of the bag. The lenders and banks that brought our country to the verge of collapse with fraud, misrepresentation and lies have now brought these same practices into local courtrooms. Every day judges who sign foreclosure orders are confronted with legal pleadings that do not conform to the most basic requirements of professional standards, but who really cares about that…the real issue is that because the lenders cannot produce the evidence they need to proceed with their cases, they….produce the evidence they need to proceed with their cases.
I’ve previously posted about affidavit and assignment fraud…it comes in three areas:
1) False Affidavits of Service or False Affidavits That We Could Not Serve the Defendant. (See Sewer Service);
2)False Assignments of Mortgage (MERS assigns this Mortgage to Deutsche Bank who now has the right to foreclose);
3)False Affidavits of Amounts due and owing.
A Subpoena for Every Foreclosure!
Many times these documents are false on their face, but sometimes it takes a little digging to uncover the lies and misrepresentations….that’s where a subpoena comes in. The following is text of a subpoena I use. Next is a Motion to Strike Affidavit. Now there are going to be foreclosures that are proper (such as when original lenders foreclose) but in virtually every other case (especially when a pretender lender is a Plaintiff), when pressed, you’re going to find that the evidence submitted to the court is filled with mistakes lies or outright misrepresentations. Given what we’re learning about the scope of this problem…subpoenas should be dropped in every case for every fact witness, assignor, assignee and affiant. Please share results of your work with me! Together we’ll take my beloved courts back.
________________________________________

SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM FOR RECORDS WITH DEPOSITION
STATE OF FLORIDA:
TO:
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to appear before a person authorized by law to take depositions at the law offices of MATTHEW D. WEIDNER, P.A., 1229 Central Avenue, St. Petersburg, Florida 33705, on MONTH DAY, 2010, for the taking of your deposition in this action and to have with you at the above time and place the following:
1. All books, papers, records, documents and other tangible things kept by LITTON LOAN SERVICING, LP concerning the transactions alleged in the complaint against Annabel E. Montgomery.
2. Any and all other books, papers, records, documents or tangible things that relate to HSBC BANK, USA, ASSOCIATION AS TRUSTEE FOR THE ACE SECURITIES CORPORATION HOME EQUITY LOAN TRUST, SERIES 2005-AG1, ASSET BACKED PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES’ claim against ANNABEL E. MONTGOMERY.
3. All employment records that exist between Christopher Spradling and any employer who has employed Spradling within the last three years including current employers.
4. All records that purport to give Christopher Spradling the authority to sign or execute any documents on behalf of any person or entity.
5. All documents, records, books, evidence or instructions that you reviewed or relied upon in order to prepare the affidavit or assignment executed in this case.
These items will be inspected and may be copied at that time. You will not be required to surrender the original items. You have the right to object to the production pursuant to this subpoena at any time before production by giving written notice to the attorney whose name appears on this subpoena. You may condition the preparation of the copies upon the payment in advance of the reasonable cost of preparation.
If you fail to: (a) appear as specified, or (b) furnish the records instead of appearing as provided above; or (c) object to this subpoena you may be in contempt of Court. You are subpoenaed by the attorneys whose names appear on this subpoena, and unless excused from this subpoena by the attorney or the Court, you shall respond to this subpoena as directed.
DATED on XXXX X, 2010.
FOR THE COURT
Matthew D. Weidner, P.A.
1229 Central Avenue
St. Petersburg, FL 33705
By: ________________________________
Matthew D. Weidner
FBN: 0185957
Defendant’s Motion to Strike Affidavit of Christopher Spradling and for attorney’s fees and costs
COMES NOW, the Defendant Annabel E. Montgomery (hereinafter “Defendant”), by and through the undersigned counsel MATTHEW D. WEIDNER, and respectfully MOTIONS THIS COURT TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF CHRISTOPHER SPADLING AND FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS, pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. Pro. 1.510, and in support thereof states as follows:
FACTS
1. This is an action for foreclosure of real property owned by the Defendant.
2. The named plaintiff in this case is HSBC BANK, USA, NATIONAL ASSOCATION, AS TRUSTEE FOR THE ACE SECURITIES CORPORATION HOME EQUITY TRUST, SERIES 2005-AG1, ASSET BACKED PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATE (hereinafter “Plaintiff”).
3. On February 2, 2010 Plaintiff, by and through its counsel Florida Default Law Group, P.L. (hereinafter “Florida Default Law Group”), gave Notice of Filing of Affidavit as to Amounts Due and Owing and the accompanying Affidavit (hereinafter “Affidavit”).
4. The Affiant of the above-mention Affidavit was identified as Christopher Spradling (hereinafter “Spradling”). Spradling identified himself as a “Foreclosure Manager” for LITTON LOAN SERVICING, LP (hereinafter “Litton”). Litton, in turn, was identified as “the servicer of the loan…[Litton] is responsible for the collection of this loan transaction and pursuit of any delinquency in payments.”[1]
5. Spradling, based upon his personal knowledge, averred in the Affidavit that: (1) the Plaintiff or its assigns was owed a total of $408,809.30; (2) the Plaintiff was entitled to enforce the Note and Mortgage; and (3) Plaintiff was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.[2] The Affidavit does not contain any mention as to who owes the Plaintiff the sum alleged save for one sentences line which cryptically state “[s]pecifically, I have personal knowledge of the facts regarding the sums which are due and owing to Plaintiff or its assigns pursuant to the Note and Mortgage which is the subject matter of the lawsuit” and a second which states “I am familiar with the books of account…concerning the transactions alleged in the Complaint.”[3] Emphasis added.
6. Nowhere in the Affidavit was either Litton or Spradling identified as either the Plaintiff or the Plaintiff’s authorized agent.
7. Upon information and belief, Litton is simply a “middleman” of sorts who is responsible for the transfer of funds between the various assignees of the underlying Mortgage and Note and has no knowledge of the underlying transactions between the Plaintiff and Defendant.
8. Upon information and belief, Spradling, as employee of Litton and not the Plaintiff, has no knowledge of the underlying transactions between the Plaintiff and Defendant.
LEGAL REASONING IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
1. I. Plaintiff Failed to Attach Documents Referred to in the Affidavit
1. a. Failure to Attach Documents Violates Fla. Stat. §90.901 (1989)
Florida Statue §90.901 (1989) states, in pertinent part, that “[a]uthentication or identification of evidence is required as a condition precedent to its admissibility.” The failure to authenticate documents referred to in affidavits renders the affiant incompetent to testify as to the matters referred to in the affidavit. See Fla. R. Civ. Pro. 1.510(e) (which reads, in pertinent part, that “affidavits…shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein”); Zoda v. Hedden, 596 So. 2d 1225, 1226 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (holding, in part, that failure to attach certified copies of public records rendered affiant, who was not a custodian of said records, incompetent to testify to the matters stated in his affidavit as affiant was unable to authenticate the documents referred to therein.)
Here, Spradling affirmatively states in the Affidavit that he is “familiar with the books of account and have examined all books, records, and documents kept by LITTON LOAN SERVICING, LP concerning the transactions alleged in the Complaint.”[4] Furthermore, Spradling averred that the “Plaintiff or its assigns, is owed…$408,809.30.”[5] Nevertheless, Spradling has failed to attach any of the books, records or documents referred to in the Affidavit. In addition, Spradling does not meet the definition of “custodian,” which is “a person or institution that has charge or custody (of…papers).” See Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th ed. 2004, custodian. By Spradling’s own admission “[t]he books, records, and documents which [Spradling] has examined are managed by employees or agents whose duty it is to keep the books accurately and completely.”[6] Emphasis added. Thus, Spradling has only examined the books, records, and documents which he refers to in the Affidavit while the true custodians of these documents are the employees or agents whose duty it is to keep the books accurately and completely. In essence, Spradling averred to records which he did not submit nor could he testify for the authenticity of just as the affiant in Zoda did.
Spradling’s failure to attach the documents referred to in the Affidavit without being custodian of same is a violation of the authentication rule promulgated in Fla. Stat. §90.901 (1989), which renders him incompetent to testify to the matters stated therein as the Second District in Zoda held. Therefore, the Affidavit should be struck in whole.
1. b. Failure to Attach Documents Violates Fla. R. Civ. Pro. 1.510(e)
Fla. R. Civ. Pro. 1.510(e) provides, in part, that “[s]worn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith.” Failure to attach such papers is grounds for reversal of summary judgment decisions. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Pasco County, 660 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (reversing summary judgment granted below where the affiant based statements on reports but failed to attach same to the affidavit.)
As previously demonstrated, Spradling referred to books, records, and documents kept by Litton which allegedly concerned the transaction referred to in the Complaint against the Defendant. Nevertheless, as previously demonstrated, Spradling has not attached any of these books, records or documents. This failure to do so is a violation of Fla. R. Civ. Pro. 1.510(e) and is grounds for a reversal of a summary judgment decision in favor of the Plaintiff. Therefore, the Affidavit should be struck in whole.
1. II. Affidavit Was Not Based Upon Spradling’s Personal Knowledge
As a threshold matter, the admissibility of an affidavit rests upon the affiant having personal knowledge as to the matters stated therein. See Fla. R. Civ. Pro. 1.510(e) (reading, in pertinent part, that “affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge”); Enterprise Leasing Co. v. Demartino, 15 So. 3d 711 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); West Edge II v. Kunderas, 910 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); In re Forefeiture of 1998 Ford Pickup, Identification No. 1FTZX1767WNA34547, 779 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). Additionally, a corporate officer’s affidavit which merely states conclusions or opinion is not sufficient, even if it is based on personal knowledge. Nour v. All State Supply Co., So. 2d 1204, 1205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
The Third District, in Alvarez v. Florida Ins. Guaranty Association, 661 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), noted that “the purpose of the personal knowledge requirement is to prevent the trial court from relying on hearsay when ruling on a motion for summary judgment and to ensure that there is an admissible evidentiary basis for the case rather than mere supposition or belief.” Id at 1232 (quoting Pawlik v. Barnett Bank of Columbia County, 528 So. 2d 965, 966 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)). This opposition to hearsay evidence has deep roots in Florida common law. In Capello v. Flea Market U.S.A., Inc., 625 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993), the Third District affirmed an order of summary judgment in favor of Flea Market U.S.A as Capello’s affidavit in opposition was not based upon personal knowledge and therefore contained inadmissible hearsay evidence. See also Doss v. Steger & Steger, P.A., 613 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Mullan v. Bishop of Diocese of Orlando, 540 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); Crosby v. Paxson Electric Company, 534 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Page v. Stanley, 226 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969). Thus, there is ample precedent for striking affidavits in full which are not based upon the affiant’s personal knowledge.
Here, the entire Affidavit is hearsay evidence as Spradling has absolutely no personal knowledge of the facts stated therein. As an employee of Litton, which purports to be the servicer of the loan, he has no knowledge of the underlying transaction between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. Neither Spradling nor Litton: (1) were engaged by the Plaintiff for the purpose of executing the underlying mortgage transaction with the Defendant; or (2) had any contact with the Defendant with respect to the underlying transaction between the Plaintiff and Defendant. In addition, the Affidavit fails to set forth with any degree of specificity what duties Litton performs for the Plaintiff, save for one line which states that Litton “is responsible for the collection of this loan transaction and pursuit of any delinquency in payments.”[7] At best, Litton acted as a middleman of sorts, whose primary function was to transfer of funds between the various assignees of the underlying Mortgage and Note. Litton is not the named Plaintiff in this case, nor does the Affidavit aver that either Spradling or Litton is the agent of the Plaintiff.
Because Spradling has no personal knowledge of the underlying transaction between the Plaintiff and Defendant, any statement he gives which references this underlying transaction (such as the fact that the Plaintiff is allegedly owed sums of monies in excess of $400,000) is, by its very nature, hearsay. The Florida Rules of Evidence define hearsay as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Fla. Stat. §90.801(1)(c) (2007). Here Spradling is averring to a statement (that the Plaintiff is allegedly owed sums of money) which was made by someone other than himself (namely, the Plaintiff) and is offering this as proof of the matter asserted (that Plaintiff is entitled to enforce the Note and Mortgage and that Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.) At best, the only statements which Spradling can aver to are those which regard the transfer of funds between the various assignees of the Mortgage and Note.
The Plaintiff may argue that while Spradling’s statements may be hearsay, they should nevertheless be admitted under the “Records of Regularly Conducted Business Activity” exception. Fla. Stat. §90.803(6) (2007). This rule provides that notwithstanding the provision of §90.802 (which renders hearsay statements inadmissible), hearsay statements are not inadmissible, even though the declarant is available as a witness, if the statement is
[a] memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinion, or diagnosis, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make such memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, or as shown by a certification or declaration that complies with paragraph (c) and s. 90.902(11), unless the sources of information or other circumstances show lack of trustworthiness. Emphasis added.
There are, however, several problems with this argument. To begin, and as previously demonstrated, no memorandums, reports, records, or data compilation have been offered by the Plaintiff. Furthermore, the books, records, and documents referred to by Spradling in the Affidavit (which, of course, were not attached) were kept by Litton, who cannot be a person with knowledge as Litton does not have any personal knowledge of underlying transaction between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. Finally, Litton, as the source of this information, shows a lack of trustworthiness because Spradling failed to attach the books, records, and documents to the Affidavit and because neither Litton nor Spradling have knowledge of the underlying transaction between the Plaintiff and the Defendant.
Because Spradling’s statements in the Affidavit are not based upon personal knowledge, they are inadmissible hearsay evidence. As no hearsay exception applies to these statements, the Affidavit should be struck in whole.
1. III. Affidavit Included Impermissible Conclusions of Law Not Supported by Facts
An affidavit in support of a motion for summary judgment may not be based upon factual conclusions or opinions of law. Jones Constr. Co. of Cent. Fla., Inc. v. Fla. Workers’ Comp. JUA, Inc., 793 So. 2d 978, 979 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Furthermore, an affidavit which states a legal conclusion should not be relied upon unless the affidavit also recites the facts which justify the conclusion. Acquadro v. Bergeron, 851 So. 2d 665, 672 (Fla. 2003); Rever v. Lapidus, 151 So. 2d 61, 62 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963).
Here, the Affidavit contained conclusions of law which were not supported by facts stated therein. Specifically, Spradling averred that the Plaintiff was entitled to enforce the Note and Mortgage and that the Plaintiff was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, two legal conclusions, but did not support this conclusion with statements which referenced exactly who the Plaintiff was entitled to enforce the Note and Mortgage against. In fact there is no mention of any of the parties in question save for one cryptic line in where Spradling states that “[s]pecifically, I have personal knowledge of the facts regarding the sums which are due and owing to Plaintiff or its assigns pursuant to the Note and Mortgage which is the subject matter of the lawsuit” and another which states “I am familiar with the books of account…concerning the transactions alleged in the Complaint.”[8] Nowhere in the Affidavit does Spradling state that the Plaintiff is entitled to enforce the Note and Mortgage against the Defendant nor does Spradling state that the Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because the Defendant owes the Plaintiff money. At best the Affidavit accuses someone of owing the Plaintiff $408,809.30 and that the Plaintiff should be able to enforce some Note and Mortgage against that particular someone. By not clearly identifying the parties in question, Spradling has not adequately supported his two legal conclusions.
Because the Affidavit contained impermissible conclusions of law which were not supported by facts stated therein, the Affidavit should be struck in whole.
1. IV. Sanction of Attorney’s Fees is Appropriate
Fla. R. Civ. Pro. 1.510(g) reads, in full, that
[i]f it appears to the satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused the other party to incur, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. Emphasis added.
The undersigned counsel has expended considerable time and resources preparing to defend against an affidavit which has, on its face, no basis in law. Both Florida Default Law Group and the Plaintiff both knew that Spradling’s affidavit lacked authenticity and reliability yet still chose to file it with the Court. In addition, this is not Florida Default Law Group’s first time filing affidavits in bad faith. Recently, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida sanctioned both Florida Default Law Group and its client, WELLS FARGO, $95,130.45 for false representations made in affidavits in that court as well as other bankruptcy courts in Florida. See In re: Fazul Haque, Case No. 08-14257-BKR-JKO (Order Granting Wells Fargo, N.A.’s Motion for Relief from Stay and Imposing Sanctions for Negligent Practice and False Representations, Oct. 28, 2008). This is indicia of a modus operandi on Florida Default Law Group’s part to present misrepresentations and false affidavits to the Court which make an award of attorney’s fees and costs an appropriate sanction.
WHEREFORE, Defendant asks this Court to GRANT its MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF CHRISTOPHER SPRADLING and enter an ORDER granting ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS and any other relief the Court deems just and proper.
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[1] See Affidavit As to Amounts Due and Owing, pg. 1.
[2] Id, pgs. 1, 2.
[3] Id.
[4] See Affidavit As to Amounts Due and Owing, pg. 1.
[5] Id, pg. 2.
[6] See Affidavit As to Amounts Due and Owing, pg. 1.
[7] See Affidavit As to Amounts Due and Owing, pg. 1.
[8] See Affidavit As to Amounts Due and Owing, pg. 1.