Toxic Corpus no note no corpus

In a trust (all trusts) there is a grantor/trustor, Trustee and a Beneficiary/investor. Right? Well, there is one more vital element you need for every trust that most people do not look at. You always need a “corpus” or a body of the trust. Right?

Well, sit down! Take a deep breath and keep reading: A transaction that uses a ‘deed of trust’ involves a trust. There is a ‘grantor/trustor’, a ‘trustee’, a ‘beneficiary/investor’ . Please tell me what the ‘corpus’ IS for this type of a trust? Most people think it is the property—but hold on—it isn’t–the property has a deed to it and the deed to the property is ONLY used as security for the real corpus–the Promissory Note! And–that is why they call these notes “Toxic Assets”. Without the Promissory Note (asset and corpus) there CANNOT be a valid trust. Without a valid trust–there is no longer need for any security called the ‘deed of trust’. RIGHT?

This is soooo simple that it is overlooked by EVERYONE—but it IS the law!!! They NEVER talked about trust law in a fight with a deed of trust and foreclosure–but that is because the TRUSTOR/GRANTOR does not bring it up. It is the job of the Trustor/Grantor to bring this up, that the Trust does NOT exist any longer because the corpus of the trust IS NOT THERE!

Let me know your thoughts on this.

On the Isue of “tender”

See the matter of Diamont which is attached hereto: SEE UNDERLINED AREA AND SEE ANALYSIS. IF YOU ARE SUING FOR A LEGAL REMEDY THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT OF TENDER. MARK BRAJNIKOFF

81 Cal.App.4th 868

97 Cal.Rptr.2d 255

ANTHONY E. DIMOCK, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

EMERALD PROPERTIES LLC et al., Defendants and Respondents.

D032454

California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, First Division

June 21, 2000

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[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

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COUNSEL

Philip H. Dyson for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Cameron & Dreyfuss and Lawrence J. Dreyfuss for Defendants and Respondents T.D. Service Company and Commonwealth Trust Deed Services, Inc.

Roup & Loomis, Ronald D. Roup and Joan C. Spaeder-Younkin for Defendants and Respondents Lawrence Baber, Cecilia Baber, Robert Shawcroft and April Shawcroft.

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Kimball, Tirey & St. John and Mark A. Brody for Defendant and Respondent Emerald Properties LLC.

Suppa, Trucchi & Lee, Jerry Michael Suppa and Marjan Mortazavi for Defendants and Respondents Temple Inland Mortgage Corporation, Calmco Trustee Services, Inc., and Bankers Trust Company.

OPINION

BENKE, Acting P. J.—

By statute the Legislature has permitted the beneficiary of a deed of trust to substitute, at any time, a new trustee for the existing trustee. Under the governing statute the substitution is made by simply recording a document evidencing the substitution. (Civ. Code,[1] § 2934a, subd. (a).) By its terms the statute provides that after such a substitution has been recorded, “the new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority, and title granted and delegated to the trustee named in the deed of trust.” (§ 2934a, subd. (a) (4).)

Other than by recording a further substitution there are no other statutory means by which the effect of a substitution, once recorded, may be avoided. Moreover, notwithstanding the arguments of respondents, we are not disposed to create any nonstatutory means of doing so on the record presented here.

Because the respondent beneficiary in this case recorded a substitution of trustee, thereafter only the substituted trustee had the power to sell the trustor’s property at a foreclosure sale. Thus a later sale by the prior trustee was void. Accordingly we must reverse a judgment entered in favor of the respondents and direct that a judgment be entered quieting title in favor of plaintiff and appellant, the trustor under the deed of trust.

Factual Background

At all pertinent times, plaintiff and appellant Anthony E. Dimock owned a home in San Diego. In 1993 he borrowed $80,000 and gave a deed of trust on the home as security for the loan. Eventually, the note and deed of trust were purchased by defendant and respondent Bankers Trust Company (Bankers).

In June 1995 Dimock failed to make payments on the loan. In January 1996, the trustee under the deed of trust, defendant and respondent Commonwealth Trust Deed Services, Inc. (Commonwealth), recorded a notice of

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default. The notice of default was prepared and recorded for Commonwealth by its agent, defendant and respondent T.D. Service Company (TD).

In May 1996 Dimock entered into a forebearance agreement with defendant and respondent Temple Inland Mortgage Corporation (Temple), which was acting on behalf of Bankers. Under the forebearance agreement Bankers agreed it would not go forward with the foreclosure in return for a promise from Dimock to make regular payments on the loan which, over a period of time, would bring the loan current. However, after making the initial payment required under the forebearance agreement, Dimock made no further payments on the loan.

On August 15, 1996, Bankers recorded a substitution of trustee which substituted defendant and respondent Calmco Trustee Services, Inc. (Calmco), as the trustee of record in the place and stead of Commonwealth. The substitution was prepared by TD acting on Bankers’s behalf.

Also on August 15, 1996, TD, acting on behalf of Calmco, recorded a notice of default and election to sell. Consistent with statutory requirements, the notice of default stated: “No sale date may be set until three months from the date this notice of default may be recorded.”

According to an employee of TD, the recording of the Calmco substitution and the recording of the Calmco notice of default were mistakes. According to the TD employee, at the time these documents were recorded TD did not know that it had previously recorded a notice of default on Commonwealth’s behalf and that a foreclosure file already existed with respect to Dimock’s home. When a title company advised TD about the earlier Commonwealth notice of default, TD “abandoned” the Calmco file it had created to process the Dimock foreclosure and instead proceeded with the foreclosure using its earlier Commonwealth file.

Because it discovered the error shortly after recording the documents, TD did not send Dimock copies of either the Calmco substitution or the Calmco notice of default. However, other than abandoning its own file on the matter, TD did not record any document which expressly abandoned or otherwise vacated the Calmco substitution or Calmco notice of default.

Dimock did not discover the substitution of Calmco as trustee or the Calmco notice of default until after he initiated these proceedings.

On August 27, 1996, TD, acting on behalf of Commonwealth, recorded a notice of trustee’s sale which set September 18, 1996, as the date for a

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trustee’s sale. By its terms the notice of sale was given by Commmonwealth and stated that Commonwealth would be the seller at the trustee’s sale. The notice of sale was both mailed to Dimock and posted on the front door of his home.

On September 18, 1996, TD, again acting on behalf of Commonwealth, conducted the trustee’s sale and sold the property to defendant and respondent Emerald Properties LLC (Emerald) for the sum of $98,000. The sale price yielded $9,829.02 in funds in excess of what was needed to discharge Bankers’ note and the costs of foreclosure.

On September 23, 1996, Commonwealth gave Emerald a trustee’s deed and on October 1, 1996, the deed was recorded.

On September 24, 1996, Emerald initiated an unlawful detainer action against Dimock and obtained a judgment giving it possession of his home.

In response to the unlawful detainer proceedings, Dimock filed the instant action against Bankers, Commonwealth, Calmco and TD, among others. He alleged causes of action for declaratory and injunctive relief, quiet title and damages. He initially argued that he had not been given proper notice of the trustee’s sale. During the course of discovery he became aware of the Calmco substitution and argued that in light of it the sale by Commonwealth to Emerald was void.

TD filed an interpleader cross-complaint with respect to the excess funds it was holding by virtue of the trustee sale. TD argued that it did not know what to do with the funds because if Dimock was successful in having the sale to Emerald vacated, the excess funds would belong to Emerald.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted the defendants’ motions and denied Dimock’s. Thereafter it entered judgment in favor of the defendants and ordered that TD turn over the excess funds it was holding to Dimock. Dimock filed a timely notice of appeal.

I

A summary judgment motion “shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) “The defendant ‘must show that under no possible hypothesis within the reasonable purview of the allegations of the complaint is there a material question of fact which requires examination by trial.’ ”

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(Sanchez v. Swinerton & Walberg Co. (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1461, 1465 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 415].) If the defendant makes such showing, the court must look at the plaintiff’s papers to determine whether they “[demonstrate] the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” (AARTS Productions, Inc. v. Crocker National Bank (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1061, 1065 [225 Cal.Rptr. 203].) We review the record de novo. (Allan v. Snow Summit, Inc. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1365 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 813].)

II

There is no dispute Bankers, by its agent TD, recorded a document which substituted Calmco as trustee under the subject deed of trust. There is nothing on the face of the substitution which indicates it is other than a valid and bona fide substitution. There is also no dispute that the substitution of Calmco was never subject to any further recorded substitution by Bankers. Finally, there is no dispute that the deed conveying the property to Emerald was executed by Commonwealth, not Calmco. Given this record we have no choice but to reverse the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants and direct that the trial court enter a judgment quieting title in favor of Dimock, subject to such encumbrances as existed at the time of the purported sale by Commonwealth.

A. Calmco Had the Sole Power to Convey the Property

Under the unambiguous terms of section 2934a,[2] subdivision (a) (4), the recording of the substitution of trustee transferred to Calmco the exclusive

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power to conduct a trustee’s sale. This plain reading of the statute is consistent with the law as it existed before the predecessor statute was enacted in 1935 and the power to substitute a trustee depended solely on the express provisions of a deed of trust. (See Witter v. Bank of Milpitas (1928) 204 Cal. 570, 577-578 [269 P. 614]; Pacific S. & L. Co. v. N. American etc. Co. (1940) 37 Cal.App.2d 307, 309-310 [99 P.2d 355].) ” ‘ “Upon the appointment being made under the power, the new trustee becomes vested, ipso facto, with the title to the trust premises and is clothed with the same power as if he had been originally named ….” ‘ ” (Witter v. Bank of Milpitas, supra, 204 Cal. at p. 578.)

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Our reading of the statute is also consistent with practical necessity: there simply cannot be at any given time more than one person with the power to conduct a sale under a deed of trust. We would create inestimable levels of confusion, chaos and litigation were we to permit a beneficiary to appoint multiple trustees, each one retaining the power to sell a borrower’s property.

The defendants’ suggestion that TD, by simply “abandoning” its internal Calmco foreclosure file, could thereby effectively reinstate Commonwealth as trustee is similarly unsupported by any authority and is almost as impractical as the notion there could be multiple trustees with the power to convey. As Dimock points out, section 2934a only permits a substitution by way of a recorded document. The terms of the deed of trust itself do not provide any alternative means of making a substitution.[3] As a practical matter, were the validity of recorded substitutions subject to the undisclosed, undocumented and subjective decisions of agents of the beneficiary, the ability of successor trustees to provide marketable title would be severely hampered.[4]

In sum then, on this record Commonwealth had no power to convey Dimock’s property.

B. The Commonwealth Conveyance to Emerald Was Void

As Dimock points out, because Commonwealth had no power to convey his property its deed to Emerald was void as opposed to merely voidable. That is, the Commonwealth deed was a complete nullity with no force or effect as opposed to one which may be set aside but only through the intervention of equity. (See Little v. CFS Service Corp. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1354, 1358-1359 [233 Cal.Rptr. 923].)

The void nature of the Commonwealth deed derives in some measure from the fact that our courts have adopted a title theory of deeds of trust.

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(Bank of Italy etc. Assn. v. Bentley (1933) 217 Cal. 644, 655 [20 P.2d 940].) “[A] deed of trust differs from a mortgage in that title passes to the trustee in case of a deed of trust, while, in the case of a mortgage, the mortgagor retains title; that the statute of limitations never runs against the power of sale in a deed of trust, while it does run against a mortgage; and that a mortgagor has a statutory right of redemption after foreclosure [citation], while no such right exists under a deed of trust.” (Ibid.) Given that title to property is held by the trustee under a deed of trust, it is difficult to accept the notion that one who no longer has title could nonetheless convey effective title. Admittedly, however, the title theory of deeds of trusts does not control their treatment in all circumstances. (Id. at pp. 655-656.) In any number of cases the title theory has been ignored in order to afford borrowers with the protection provided to mortgagors. (Ibid.)

The more fundamental difficulty we have with the defendants’ contention that the Commonwealth deed was only voidable and not void, is that the particular circumstances which have permitted other courts to save defective foreclosure sales as voidable rather than void, do not exist here. In Little v. CFS Service Corp., supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at pages 1358-1359, the court reviewed the California cases which considered whether defects in notice made a foreclosure sale void or voidable. The court found: “Although the extent of the defect is not determinative, what seems to be determinative is the existence and effect of a conclusive presumption of regularity of the sale. A deed of trust, which binds the trustor, may direct the trustee to include in the deed to the property recitals that notice was given as required under the deed of trust and state that such recitals shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness and regularity thereof.” (Id. at p. 1359.) Where no such recitals as to the regularity of a sale appear in a deed and there was a defect in the notice to the trustor, the deed has been found void. (Ibid.) Where such recitals appear on the face of a deed but the deed also sets forth facts which are inconsistent with the recital of regularity, the deed has been found void on the basis that the deed showed that the recitals were not valid. (Ibid., citing Holland v. Pendleton Mtge. Co. (1943) 61 Cal.App.2d 570, 576-577 [143 P.2d 493].)

Only where recitals of regularity appear in the deed and no contrary recitals are made have notice defects been found to make a deed voidable, rather than void. (Little v. CFS Service Corp., supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 1359.) In such instances a trustor then bears the burden of showing that there are grounds for equitable relief from the deed, such as fraud or that the buyer was not a bona fide purchaser for value, and that there were also defects in notice. (Ibid.)

In addition, in the context of overcoming a voidable sale, the debtor must tender any amounts due under the deed of trust. (See Karlsen v. American

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Sav. & Loan Assn. (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 112, 117 [92 Cal.Rptr. 851]; Py v. Pleitner (1945) 70 Cal.App.2d 576, 582 [161 P.2d 393].) This requirement is based on the theory that one who is relying upon equity in overcoming a voidable sale must show that he is able to perform his obligations under the contract so that equity will not have been employed for an idle purpose. (Karlsen v. American Sav. & Loan Assn., supra, 15 Cal.app.3d at p. 118.)

Here, although the deed of trust Dimock executed states that a recital in a trustee’s deed “of any matters of fact shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof,” the deed Commonwealth gave Emerald following the foreclosure sale contains no statement that Commonwealth’s power to act as trustee had survived any recorded substitution. Rather, by its terms the Commonwealth deed merely conveyed to Emerald “such interest as Trustee has in” Dimock’s property.

The only factual recitals in the deed are to Commonwealth’s compliance with the requirements of section 2924 et seq. and the deed of trust. Section 2924 et seq. sets forth the notice which must be provided to the debtor and junior lienholders and the means by which the sale must be conducted; the deed of trust sets forth similar requirements with respect to notice and conduct of the sale. These factual recitals, relating to the notice given Dimock and the conduct of the sale, cannot be interpreted as making any representation as to whether a conflicting substitution of trustee had been recorded.

Because there was no recital in the Commonwealth deed to Emerald which undermined the Calmco substitution, the deed to Emerald did not create any conclusive presumption that Commonwealth continued to act as trustee. Accordingly, in attacking the Commonwealth deed Dimock was not required to rely upon equity in setting aside a merely voidable deed. (Little v. CFS Service Corp., supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 1359.) Rather, he could rely on the face of the record to show that the Commonwealth deed was void. (Ibid.)

Because Dimock was not required to rely upon equity in attacking the deed, he was not required to meet any of the burdens imposed when, as a matter of equity, a party wishes to set aside a voidable deed. (See Little v. CFS Service Corp., supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 1359.) In particular, contrary to the defendants’ argument, he was not required to tender any of the amounts due under the note.

Disposition

The summary judgments entered in favor of the defendants are reversed and the trial court is instructed to enter judgment quieting title in favor of

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Dimock subject to such encumbrances as existed at the time of the foreclosure sale. The trial court is further instructed to conduct such additional proceedings as are consistent with the views expressed herein and which, in its discretion, the trial court believes are necessary.

Appellant to recover his costs of appeal.

McDonald, J., and O’Rourke, J., concurred.

———

Notes:

[1] All statutory references are to this code unless otherwise stated.

[2] At all pertinent times section 2934a stated: “(a) (1) The trustee under a trust deed upon real property or an estate for years therein given to secure an obligation to pay money and conferring no other duties upon the trustee than those which are incidental to the exercise of the power of sale therein conferred, may be substituted by the recording in the county in which the property is located of a substitution executed and acknowledged by: (A) all of the beneficiaries under the trust deed, or their successors in interest, and the substitution shall be effective notwithstanding any contrary provision in any trust deed executed on or after January 1, 1968; or (B) the holders of more than 50 percent of the record beneficial interest of a series of notes secured by the same real property or of undivided interests in a note secured by real property equivalent to a series transaction, exclusive of any notes or interests of a licensed real estate broker that is the issuer or servicer of the notes or interests or of any affiliate of that licensed real estate broker.

“(2) A substitution executed pursuant to subparagraph (B) of paragraph (1) is not effective unless all the parties signing the substitution sign, under penalty of perjury, a separate written document stating the following:

“(A) The substitution has been signed pursuant to subparagraph (B) of paragraph (1).

“(B) None of the undersigned is a licensed real estate broker or an affiliate of the broker that is the issuer or servicer of the obligation secured by the deed of trust.

“(C) The undersigned together hold more than 50 percent of the record beneficial interest of a series of notes secured by the same real property or of undivided interests in a note secured by real property equivalent to a series transaction.

“(D) Notice of the substitution was sent by certified mail, postage prepaid, with return receipt requested to each holder of an interest in the obligation secured by the deed of trust who has not joined in the execution of the substitution or the separate document.

“The separate document shall be attached to the substitution and be recorded in the office of the county recorder of each county in which the real property described in the deed of trust is located. Once the document required by this paragraph is recorded, it shall constitute conclusive evidence of compliance with the requirements of this paragraph in favor of substituted trustees acting pursuant to this section, subsequent assignees of the obligation secured by the deed of trust, and subsequent bona fide purchasers or encumbrancers for value of the real property described therein.

“(3) For purposes of this section, ‘affiliate of the licensed real estate broker’ includes any person as defined in Section 25013 of the Corporations Code that is controlled by, or is under common control with, or who controls, a licensed real estate broker. ‘Control’ means the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of management and policies.

“(4) The substitution shall contain the date of recordation of the trust deed, the name of the trustor, the book and page or instrument number where the trust deed is recorded, and the name of the new trustee. From the time the substitution is filed for record, the new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority, and title granted and delegated to the trustee named in the deed of trust. A substitution may be accomplished, with respect to multiple deeds of trust which are recorded in the same county in which the substitution is being recorded and which all have the same trustee and beneficiary or beneficiaries, by recording a single document, complying with the requirements of this section, substituting trustees for all those deeds of trust.

“(b) If the substitution is effected after a notice of default has been recorded but prior to the recording of the notice of sale, the beneficiary or beneficiaries shall cause a copy of the substitution to be mailed, prior to the recording thereof, in the manner provided in Section 2924b, to the trustee then of record and to all persons to whom a copy of the notice of default would be required to be mailed by the provisions of Section 2924b. An affidavit shall be attached to the substitution that notice has been given to those persons and in the manner required by this subdivision.

“(c) Notwithstanding any provision of this section or any provision in any deed of trust, unless a new notice of sale containing the name, street address, and telephone number of the substituted trustee is given pursuant to Section 2924f, any sale conducted by the substituted trustee shall be void.

“(d) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 1998, and shall have no force or effect after that date, unless a later enacted statute, which is enacted before January 1, 1998, deletes or extends that date.”

[3] The deed of trust states: “Lender may, from time to time, by instrument in writing, substitute a successor or successors to any Trustee named in the Security Instrument or acting thereunder. Such instrument shall be executed and acknowledged by Lender and recorded in the office of the recorder of the county or counties where the Property is situated and shall be conclusive proof of the proper substitution of such successor Trustee or Trustees. Such successor Trustee or Trustees shall, without conveyance from the predecessor Trustee, succeed to all its title, estate, rights, powers and duties. The procedure herein provided for substitution of Trustee shall not be exclusive of other provisions for substitution permitted by law.”

[4] Other than recording a further substitution, the only means by which Commonwealth might arguably have been empowered to convey Dimock’s property would have been with Dimock’s consent. (See Pacific S. & L. Co. v. N. American etc. Co., supra, 37 Cal.App.2d at pp. 310-311.) However, because Dimock was not even aware of the substitution, there is no evidence in the record which would establish his consent to its abandonment.

Doan on “produce the Note”

Are Courts in California Truly Limited by Non-Judicial Foreclosure Statutes?

By Michael Doan on May 2, 2009 in Foreclosure Defense, Foreclosure News

Recently, many California Courts have been dismissing lawsuits filed to stop non-judicial foreclosures, ruling that the non-judicial foreclosure statutes occupy the field and are exclusive as long as they are complied with. Thus, in the case where a notice of default is recorded and a lawsuit then filed in response to stop the foreclosure since the foreclosing party does not possess the underlying note, all too often the Court will simply dismiss the case and claim “2924 has no requirement to produce the note.”

Thus, these Courts view the statutes that regulate non-judicial foreclosures as all inclusive of all the requirements and remedies in foreclosure proceedings. Indeed, California Civil Code sections 2924 through 2924k provide a comprehensive framework for the regulation of a nonjudicial foreclosure sale pursuant to a power of sale contained in a deed of trust. This comprehensive statutory scheme has three purposes: ‘“(1) to provide the creditor/beneficiary with a quick, inexpensive and efficient remedy against a defaulting debtor/trustor; (2) to protect the debtor/trustor from wrongful loss of the property; and (3) to ensure that a properly conducted sale is final between the parties and conclusive as to a bona fide purchaser.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Melendrez v. D & I Investment, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1249–1250 [26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 413].)

Notwithstanding, the foreclosure statutes are not exclusive. If someone commits murder during an auction taking place under Civil Code 2924, that does not automatically mean they are immune from criminal and civil liability. Perhaps this is where some of these courts are “missing the boat.”

For example, in Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal. 4th 1226, 1231 [44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 352, 900 P.2d 601], the California Supreme Court concluded that a lender who obtained the property with a full credit bid at a foreclosure sale was not precluded from suing a third party who had fraudulently induced it to make the loan. The court concluded that “ ‘the antideficiency laws were not intended to immunize wrongdoers from the consequences of their fraudulent acts’ ” and that, if the court applies a proper measure of damages, “ ‘fraud suits do not frustrate the antideficiency policies because there should be no double recovery for the beneficiary.’ ” (Id. at p. 1238.)

Likewise, in South Bay Building Enterprises, Inc. v. Riviera Lend-Lease, Inc. [*1071] (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1111, 1121 [85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 647], the court held that a junior lienor retains the right to recover damages from the trustee and the beneficiary of the foreclosing lien if there have been material irregularities in the conduct of the foreclosure sale. (See also Melendrez v. D & I Investment, Inc., supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1257–1258; Lo v. Jensen (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1095 [106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443] [a trustee’s sale tainted by fraud may be set aside].)

In looking past the comprehensive statutory framework, these other Courts also considered the policies advanced by the statutory scheme, and whether those policies would be frustrated by other laws. Recently, in the case of California Golf, L.L.C. v. Cooper, 163 Cal. App. 4th 1053, 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 153, 2008 Cal. App. LEXIS 850 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2008), the Appellate Court held that the remedies of 2924h were not exclusive. Of greater importance is that the Appellate Court reversed the lower court and specifically held that provisions in UCC Article 3 were allowed in the foreclosure context:

Considering the policy interests advanced by the statutory scheme governing nonjudicial foreclosure sales, and the policy interests advanced by Commercial Code section 3312, it is clear that allowing a remedy under the latter does not undermine the former. Indeed, the two remedies are complementary and advance the same goals. The first two goals of the nonjudicial foreclosure statutes: (1) to provide the creditor/beneficiary with a quick, inexpensive and efficient remedy against a defaulting debtor/trustor and (2) to protect the debtor/trustor from a wrongful loss of the property, are not impacted by the decision that we reach. This case most certainly, however, involves the third policy interest: to ensure that a properly conducted sale is final between the parties and conclusive as to a bona fide purchaser.

This is very significant since it provides further support to lawsuits brought against foreclosing parties lacking the ability to enforce the underlying note, since those laws also arise under Article 3. Under California Commercial Code 3301, a note may only be enforced if one has actual possession of the note as a holder, or has possession of the note not as a non-holder but with holder rights.

Just like in California Golf, enforcing 3301 operates to protect the debtor/trustor from a wrongful loss of the property. To the extent that a foreclosing party might argue that such lawsuits disrupt a quick, inexpensive, and efficient remedy against a defaulting debtor/trustor, the response is that “since there is no enforceable obligation, the foreclosing entity is not a party/creditor/beneficiary entitled to a quick, inexpensive, and efficient remedy,” but simply a declarant that recorded false documents.

This is primarily because being entitled to foreclose non-judicially under 2924 can only take place “after a breach of the obligation for which that mortgage or transfer is a security.” Thus, 2924 by its own terms, looks outside of the statute to the actual obligation to see if there was a breach, and if the note is unenforceable under Article 3, there can simply be no breach. End of story.

Accordingly, if there is no possession of the note or possession was not obtained until after the notice of sale was recorded, it is impossible to trigger 2924, and simple compliance with the notice requirements in 2924 does not suddenly bless the felony of grand theft of the unknown foreclosing entity. To hold otherwise would create absurd results since it would allow any person or company the right to take another persons’ home by simply recording a false notice of default and notice of sale.

Indeed, such absurdity would allow you to foreclose on your own home again to get it back should you simply record the same false documents. Thus it is obvious that these courts improperly assume the allegations contained in the notice of default and notice of sale are truthful. Perhaps these courts simply can not or choose not to believe such frauds are taking place due to the magnitude and volume of foreclosures in this Country at this time. One can only image the chaos that would ensue in America if the truth is known that millions of foreclosures took place unlawfully and millions more are now on hold as a result of not having the ability to enforce the underlying obligation pursuant to Article 3.

So if you are in litigation to stop a foreclosure, you can probably expect the Court will want to immediately dismiss your case. These Courts just can not understand how the law would allow someone to stay in a home without paying. Notwithstanding, laws can not be broken, and Courts are not allowed to join with the foreclosing parties in breaking laws simply because “not paying doesn’t seem right.”

Accordingly, at least for appeal purposes, be sure to argue that 2924 was never triggered since there was never any “breach of the obligation” and that Appellate Courts throughout California have routinely held that other laws do in fact apply in the non-judicial foreclosure process since the policies advanced by the statutory non-judicial foreclosure scheme are not frustrated by these other laws.

No hope loan Mod’s

Today I am discussing a new law that you should be aware of…it has far reaching effects.


There are laws that are coming onto the books that affect our rights. They may seem to be good, but in reality they have bad effects.

And there are laws that seem to be good, but are really amounting to nothing.

Remember the Hope for Homeowners program? The Washington Post reported the other day that “lenders have balked at requirements that they cut some of the principal that borrowers owe. Only one homeowner has received a government-backed loan under the program so far.”

All that commotion. And only one homeowner has got a  loan from that program!

The Post reports that the new proposed law would pay servicers $2500 for each Hope for Homeowners loan they place.

We all know that we deal with loan servicers when we try to get a loan modified, lower the monthlies, and so forth.

Servicers handle foreclosure.

They handle incoming monthlies.

They are appointed by the actual investors who own the loans.

And now, the gubmint is proposing to let servicers mod loans without worrying about the contracts they have with the lenders.

The new proposals also involve seconds. The servicers who handle seconds will agree to drop the interest to 1%. And nothing the investors, the actual lenders, can do about it.

On the face of it, that’s a good thing you would think.But I do not think it is.

I think they will also work out a way to prohibit borrowers who have been screwed from suing the servicers and the lenders.

That is wrong. Huge crimes have been commited by lenders and servicers and it is wrong to make anyone immune from lawsuits that redress the problems.

Worse yet, the servicers are being paid to break contracts and simply stuff borrowers into loan mods no matter what.

What if the mods are no good? Homeowners will do practically anything to stay in their house. It may be in their worst interest. Meanwhile, the servicer gets thousands of dollars to pretend the loan mod will work out?

How long is this going to last? When will it too blow up? Does it remind you of the disgustingly high commish the lenders were collecting from subprime loans that never should have been made?

Now the gubmint is proposing paying enormous fees to get loan mods through that never should be made.


Sample complaint template

this is the type of complaint to get the lender to the table sample-bank-final-complaint1-2

FORECLOSURE DEFENSE: CALIFORNIA SOMETIMES IT’S THE LITTLE THINGS THAT COUNT

As I continue through this journey through the maze created by lenders, investment bankers, title agents and closing/escrow agents I keep discovering things that end up being quite interesting.

For example: In California the requirements for posting Notice of sale are very clear and yet, I am told that they are routinely ignored. This would invalidate the notice of sale on the most basic of concepts “notice,” by definition and therefore could be attacked at any time as a defect of service and jurisdiction while at the same time bring your claims under TILA, usury, identity theft, fraud, etc. California requires public and private posting as do most other states. The public part is what they ordinarily ignore. see notice-of-the-sale-thereof-shall-be-given-by-posting-a-written-notice

With the new law changes Civil code 2923.5  that became effective Sept 6, 2008 it adds more procedures that are routinely not followed ie. a Declaration must be attached and recorded that recites that the lender has met and assessed the borrowers financial condition and made alternatives to forclosure ie. modification. First they don’t do it and second the declaration is not even under penalty of pujury. So on its face the sale could be set aside.

After the notice of default the lender routinely switches trustee’s and records a Substitution of trustee with an affidavit that is not under penalty of perjury. Again the sale could be set aside for this.

For example. MERS, whose legal status is dubious at best anyway inasmuch as it plainly violates the recording requirements of every state and which supposedly has not one but multiple corporate entities, one of which has been suspended from operation in California, is subject to specific instructions as to what to do with the “master Deed of Trust and what to do with the individual deed of trust, the procedures, language to be inserted etc. These too I am told are routinely ignored especially when it comes to (a) showing that you have provided a copy of the Master Deed of Trust and (b) having the proof as specifically required in the FNMA/Freddie instruction sheet.

As stated in my other posts, the entire MERS concept causes, in my opinion, a separation between the alleged security instrument and provisions, the Trustee’s authority and the note, all of which end up being different people who were all “real parties in interest” receiving fees and value not disclosed in the GFE or settlement statement. In all these closings the borrower is subjected to a series of documents that hide the true nature of the transaction, the true source of funds, the true lender, and the application of funds contrary to the terms of the note.

All of these new requirements create questions of fact, that if not correct, create a method to set aside the sale by way of court action. I guess that’s the point the lenders trustees and servicers are banking on the victims not fighting it.

Borrowers’ Defenses to Forclosure

A great source of information you can use, and since the Guy is in Washington I can give him all the credit
defensestoforeclosure

Doan deal 2

Mortgage Chaos? Add a Bankruptcy and its a Recipe for Disaster! Part II

My last article laid out the framework for the bankruptcy real estate cocktail. This article will attempt to predict how that cocktail will be served and its ramifications. Remember, this recipe for disaster requires two things: a “Non-Perfected” Mortgage and a Bankruptcy.

So far, about 70 to 80% of the mortgages I see in local Bankruptcy cases here in the Southern District of California Bankruptcy Court appear to be non-perfected. Despite my continued requests to the mortgage companies to produce either proof they possess the underlying note or proof of a recorded assignment, I have received neither. Instead I get the run around, “Yes we have the original note. Really, can I see? Actually no, I thought we had the original, but we have a copy…………Yes we have the assignment. Really, can I see? Sure, here you go. But that was not recorded. Oh…….” Its the same song and dance. So what becomes of this?

Chapter 7: The trustee will most likely put on his “544 hat” and now “strip the lien off the house.”

When he does this, he creates an unencumbered piece of real estate in most cases, with the exception of a small amount of past taxes and HOA fees remaining as liens on the property. The property is then sold and net profits held in trust. A notice is then sent to the creditors of the bankruptcy to submit a claim if they want to get paid.

The claims are then reviewed, and paid pro-rata or objected to with the Bankruptcy Court issuing the final ruling. The Claims process is a complex area too lengthy to discuss for this Blog, but suffice to say, many claims will be objected to as well, since most credit card debt and collection agents have similar problems in proving they too own their debts. Moreover, you might ask what happens to the mortgage lien which has now become a large unsecured debt? It might be paid, provided they can prove they own the note. However, it also may not. There is a Bankruptcy Code section, 11 USC 502(d) which states that a creditor may not be able to share in the distribution if they did not give up there lien when requested by the trustee under 544. So, it could be that any remaining monies may even go back to the debtor if the new unsecured mortgage claim is disallowed! But this remains a grey area, and time will tell.

But what if the debtor wants to keep the house? No problem. Time to make a deal with the trustee. Suppose that the House was bought for $650,000 in 2006 with 100% financing and now is worth $500,000. The debtor is negative $150,000 in equity. Upside Down! Now lets say a bankruptcy is filed. The Mortgage Note was not perfected so Bankruptcy Trustee avoids the lien. Now he has this $500,000 piece of real estate that he wants to sell, but the debtor wants to keep it. So the debtor makes an offer of $430,000 to keep the house and the Trustee agrees. Trustee agrees since he would only net $430,000 anyways after costs of sale, attorney fees, marketing, etc. Debtor gets the $430,000 from a new loan he might qualify for, have cosigned, or have a family member engage their credit. Trustee then takes the $430,000 and distributes to creditors, which include the debtor’

s non-dischargeable taxes, non-dischargeable child support obligations, and non-dischargeable student loans.

Wow! Lets get this straight: Mortgage reduced from $650,000 to $430,000, and over $100,000 in non-dischargeable bankruptcy debt consisting of student loans, taxes, and support obligations also paid, and all other debt wiped out? Sounds like the lemon just turned into lemonade! Also, time to also read the blog on why the credit score is much better after bankruptcy than before now.

Chapter 13: In Chapter 13, the Trustee does not liquidate assets. Instead, he administers a three to five year plan by distributing the monthly payments from the debtor to the creditors, and the avoidance powers of the Chapter 7 Trustee are given to the Debtor(at least here in the Ninth Circuit….western states in the US). This includes the power to remove unperfected liens such as unperfected mortgages.

So now the debtor can remove the mortgage just like a Chapter 7 Trustee.

But that might be a problem. The Chapter 13 Trustee may object now to the bankruptcy since the debtor has too many assets. Well, as discussed above, time to get another smaller mortgage, pay that money into the Chapter 13 plan, and again pay off the non-dischargeable debt. Even better, if not all the creditors filed claims, the money then reverts to the debtor!

In the alternative, the simple threat of litigating the issues to remove the mortgage sure makes for a great negotiating tool to deal with the lender and rewrite the mortgage…..knocking off possibly hundreds of thousands of dollars and also lowering the interest rate substantially.

Involuntary Bankruptcies? Is there such a thing? Unfortunately, YES. And this could be very problematic. If several creditors are owed substantial sums of money, say a SBA Loan, large Medical Bill, or even large credit cards, they could petition the court for an involuntary bankruptcy. The debtor has no control to stop it. Next thing the debtor knows, he is in a bankruptcy and all the property is being liquidated, less the property allowed by exemption law. Then steps up the Chapter 7 Trustee and discovers that the Mortgage is not perfected. Well, there goes the house now! Or does it?

Once again, a smart debtor would argue to the trustee that he will get a loan to pay the trustee as discussed above. Problem solved, and what appears to be disaster at first, may be a blessing in disguise. The debtor keeps his home with a much smaller mortgage and removes non-dischargeable debts. He is better off now than before, even though he did not want this!

So the Recipe for Disaster appears to only affect the Mortgage Companies. They are the losing parties here, and rightly so for getting sloppy…..attempting to save $14 per loan times thousands of loans. Why didn’t they compute losing hundreds of thousands of dollars per loan times thousands of loans? Couldn’

t they connect the dots? No…..like I said, lots of smart Real Estate Attorneys and lots of smart Bankruptcy Attorneys, but not too many Bankruptcy Real Estate Attorneys and none of them worked for the Mortgage industry.

But everyone else now seems to win. The debtor reduces his mortgage, gets a better interest rate, and eliminates the rest of his debts. The trustee makes a healthy profit on distributing such a large dividend to creditors. And the creditors who obey the law now share in a large dividend.

Of course, all the forgoing is Brand New. It has not been done yet in any cases I am aware of. But since talking with other Bankruptcy Attorneys across the Nation for the past couple weeks, its starting to catch on. I’

m told a few trustees back east have started this procedure now. And just today, I get an announcement from our local Chapter 7 Trustee that he is making new requirements concerning producing documents in all cases before him so that he can start avoiding these liens. Coincidentally, this also comes after three of our Local Bankruptcy Judges started denying relief to Mortgage Creditors when coming before the Bankruptcy Court during the past week! Its brand new…but catching on like wildfire.

Housing Bubble? Mortgage Bubble? Well now it’

s a Housing Mortgage Bubble disaster about to happen in Bankruptcy Court. Congress was not able to reform the predatory lending abuses. The Lenders certainly do not seem interested in workout programs. I guess its time for a Bankruptcy Cocktail!

Written by Attorney Michael G. Doan

ud summary judgment motion

These are issues that can be challenged in unlawful detainer after foreclosureud-summary-judgement

Unlawful detainer trial transcript

This is a trial that took place in San Francisco it presents the issues that a former homeowner must win to stay in the house ud-trial-transcript

90 days plus 90 foreclosure law

B. 90-DAY EXTENSION TO FORECLOSURE PROCESS
Q 83. What, in a nutshell, is the new law extending the foreclosure process by 90 days?
A Under the new California Foreclosure Prevention Act, lenders foreclosing on certain loans are prohibited from giving a notice of sale until the lapse of at least 3 months plus 90 days after the filing of the notice of default (see Question 88). A loan servicer can obtain an exemption from this requirement by demonstrating that it has a comprehensive loan modification program (see Questions 89 to 94).
Q 84. What is the purpose of this law?
A The purpose of this law is to try to stem the tide of foreclosures and their adverse consequences by providing additional time for lenders to work out loan modifications with borrowers as well as creating an incentive for lenders to establish comprehensive loan modification programs.
Q 85. When will this law be in effect?
A This bill was enacted into law on February 20, 2009 along with the state budget. Its provisions take effect on or about March 16, 2009.
More specifically, the law states that the appropriate commissioners must adopt regulations to carry out this law within 10 days of its enactment (see Cal. Civil Code § 2923.53(d)), which would be by March 2, 2009. The law also states that it will become operative 14 days after the issuance of such regulations (Cal. Civil Code § 2923.52(d)), which would be on or about March 16, 2009.
This law will stay in effect only until January 1, 2011 at which time it will be repealed, unless it is deleted or extended by statute (Cal. Civil Code § 2923.52(d)).
Q 86. How does this new law affect the foreclosure timeline?
A Under preexisting law, a lender who files a notice of default in the foreclosure process must wait at least 3 months before giving a notice of sale (Cal. Civil Code § 2924). The new law extends that 3-month period by an additional 90 days.
Also under preexisting law, the general rule of thumb is that the entire foreclosure process takes a minimum of 4 months from the filing of a notice of default until the final trustee’s sale. Under the new law, that general rule of thumb is extended by 90 more days for a total of about 7 months, unless the lender is exempt. For more information about the foreclosure process, C.A.R. offers a legal article entitled Foreclosure Timeline.
Q 87. Under the new law, is the minimum time frame from the filing of a notice of default to the notice of sale a total of 6 months or 180 days?
A Neither. The way the law is written, the minimum time frame from the filing of the notice of default to the notice of sale is technically “3 months plus 90 days.”
Q 88. What type of loan falls under the new law extending the foreclosure process by 90 days?
A Unless otherwise exempt, the 90-day extension to the foreclosure process applies to loans that meet all of the following requirements:
The loan was recorded from January 1, 2003 to January 1, 2008, inclusive;

The loan is secured by a first deed of trust for residential real property;

The borrower occupied the property as a principal residence at the time the loan became delinquent; and

A notice of default has been recorded on the property.
(Cal. Civil Code § 2923.52(a).)
Q 89. What are the exceptions to the new law extending the foreclosure process by 90 days?
A Most notably, a loan servicer is exempt from the 90-day extension to the foreclosure process if the loan servicer has obtained an order of exemption based on the implementation of a comprehensive loan modification program (Cal. Civil Code § 2923.53(a)) (see Questions 89 to 94). The order of exemption must be current and valid at the time the notice of sale is given (Cal. Civil Code § 2923.52(b)).
Other exceptions to the 90-day extension include the following:
Certain state or local public housing agency loans (Cal. Civil Code § 2923.52(c)).

When a borrower has surrendered the property as evidenced by a letter confirming the surrender or delivery of the keys to the property to the lender or authorized agent (Cal. Civil Code § 2923.55(a)).

When a borrower has contracted with any person or entity whose primary business is advising people who have decided to leave their homes on how to extend the foreclosure process and avoid their contractual obligations to the lenders (Cal. Civil Code § 2923.55(b)).

When a borrower has filed a bankruptcy case and the court has not entered an order closing or dismissing the case or granting relief from a stay of foreclosure (Cal. Civil Code § 2923.55(c)).
Q 90. What constitutes a comprehensive loan modification program?
A A comprehensive loan modification program that may exempt the loan servicer from the 90-day extension to the foreclosure process includes all of the following features:
The loan modification program is intended to keep borrowers whose principal residences are located in California in those homes when the anticipated recovery under loan modification exceeds the anticipated recovery through foreclosure on a net present value basis (Cal. Civil Code § 2923.53(a)).

It targets a 38 percent or less ratio of the borrower’s housing-related debt to the borrower’s gross income (Cal. Civil Code § 2923.53(a)). Housing-related debt is debt that includes loan principal, interest, property taxes, hazard insurance, flood insurance, mortgage insurance and homeowner association fees (Cal. Civil Code § 2923.53(k)(2)).

It includes some combination of loan modifications terms as specified (Cal. Civil Code § 2923.53(a)) (see Question 91).

The loan servicer seeks long-term sustainability for the borrower (Cal. Civil Code § 2923.53(a)).
Q 91. What are the loan modification terms that must be included in a comprehensive loan modification program?
A A comprehensive loan modification program that may qualify for exemption from the new law extending the foreclosure process by 90 days must include some combination of the following features:
An interest rate reduction, as needed, for a fixed term of at least five years;
An extension of the amortization period for the loan term to no more than 40 years from the original date of the loan;
Deferral of some portion of the unpaid principal balance until loan maturity;
Principal reduction;
Compliance with a federally mandated loan modification program; or
Other factors that the appropriate commissioner determines.
(Cal. Civil Code § 2923.53(a)(3).) See also Question 92.
Q 92. Does a loan servicer have to modify loans to get an exemption from the 90 day extension to the foreclosure process?
A No. A loan servicer is not required to modify a loan for a borrower who is not willing or able to pay under the modification. Furthermore, a loan servicer is not required to violate any contractor agreement for investor-owned loans. (Cal. Civil Code § 2923.53(i).)
Q 93. How does a loan servicer obtain an order of exemption from the new law extending the foreclosure process by 90 days?
A A loan servicer may apply to the appropriate commissioner (see Question 94) for an order exempting loans that it services from the new law extending the foreclosure process by 90 days (Cal. Civil Code § 2923.53(b)(1)). Upon receipt of an initial application for exemption, the commissioner must issue a temporary order exempting the mortgage loan servicer from the 90-day extension to the foreclosure process (Cal. Civil Code § 2923.53(b)(2)). Within 30 days of receipt of the application, the commissioner must make a final determination by issuing a final order exempting the loan servicer or denying the application (Cal. Civil Code § 2923.53(b)(3)). If the application is denied, the temporary order of exemption shall expire 30 days after the date of denial (Cal. Civil Code § 2923.53(b)(1)).
Q 94. To which commissioner does a loan servicer apply for exemption?
A A lender or loan servicer would apply for an exemption to the following commissioner as appropriate:
Commissioner of the Department of Financial Institutions for commercial and industrial banks, savings associations, and credit unions organized in California to service mortgage loans;

Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate for licensed real estate brokers servicing mortgage loans; and

Commissioner of the Department of Corporations for licensed residential mortgage lenders and servicers, licensed finance lenders and brokers, and any other entities servicing mortgage loans not regulated by the Department of Financial Institutions or Department of Real Estate.
(Cal. Civil Code § 2923.53(k)(1).)
Q 95. How does a homeowner ascertain whether his or her loan servicer is exempt from the 90-day extension to the foreclosure process?
A The Secretary of Business, Transportation and Housing must maintain a publicly-available Internet website disclosing the final orders granting exemptions, the date of each order, and a link to Internet websites describing the loan modification programs (Cal. Civil Code § 2923.52(f)) (see also Question 96).
Q 96. Does a loan servicer have to inform the borrower as to whether the loan servicer is exempt from the longer foreclosure timeframe?
A Yes. A notice of sale must include a declaration from the loan servicer stating both of the following:
Whether the loan servicer has obtained a final or temporary order of exemption from the 90-day extension to the foreclosure process that is current and valid on the date the notice of sale is filed; and
Whether the 90-day extension to the foreclosure process under the new law does not apply.
The law requires the loan servicer’s declaration of exemption on the notice of sale, even though it may have been more helpful for the borrower if the declaration was on the notice of default. This requirement will stay in effect only until January 1, 2011 at which time it will be repealed, unless it is deleted or extended by statute. (Cal. Civil Code § 2923.54.)

Q 97. What is the penalty for violating this law?
A Anyone who violates this law shall be deemed to have violated his or her license law as it relates to these provisions (Cal. Civil Code § 2923.53(h)).
Q 98. Where do I find this law?
A This law is set forth at sections 2923.52 to 2923.55 of the California Civil Code. The full text of this law is available at the California Legislative Counsel website at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov.

HOPE NOW: 134,000 Mortgages Modified in February

Carrie Bay | 03.31.09

HOPE NOW announced on Monday that its members and the larger mortgage lending industry modified 134,000 home loans in February that were in danger of foreclosure, a nine percent increase over the number of mortgages modified in January.

The industry alliance also said that modifications last month made up 55 percent of all workout solutions completed, representing the highest modification percentage since HOPE NOW began collecting data – a positive stat, considering HOPE NOW and its members have historically come under fire from consumer advocacy groups for employing primarily repayment plans, which some experts say are more susceptible to re-default.

In addition to the 134,000 modifications, HOPE NOW said 110,000 repayment plans were executed, meaning that last month, HOPE NOW members and the larger mortgage lending industry helped 244,000 at-risk homeowners avoid foreclosure. This is the first time since HOPE NOW began to compile data in July 2007 that the number of foreclosure preventions has exceeded 200,000 for six consecutive months.

According to Faith Schwartz, HOPE NOW’s executive director, the mortgage lending industry is working hard to provide multiple options for borrowers to avoid foreclosure. “We expect the trend to continue as many companies expand their offerings to include the administration’s Making Home Affordable refinance and modification programs,” she said. “The mortgage lending industry is responding to the needs of its customers and offering solutions that are appropriate to the current market and economic conditions,” Schwartz added.

Despite the positive monthly trend in mortgage workouts, HOPE NOW reported that the number of foreclosures started in February increased to 243,000, up from 217,000 in January. Completed foreclosure sales also increased, from 68,000 in January to 87,000 in February.

The HOPE NOW February data does not yet reflect the impact of the Obama administration’s recently announced, but not yet implemented, Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan.

Schwartz said, “Currently 5.5 percent of the total mortgage market is 60 days or more delinquent. Because of this, HOPE NOW members are working hard to help the administration implement its recently-announced foreclosure prevention initiative as well as working on additional ways we can be more efficient in helping at-risk homeowners.”

they-must-call-and-offer-to-work-it-out-2923.5

they-must-call-and-offer-to-work-it-out-29235

Eviction defense no declaration no valid sale no eviction

trial-brief-you-can-use-to-win-the-eviction-under-the-new-29235-we-beat-b-of-a-with-it

Plaintiff claims they have complied with civil code 2924 in paragraphs 4 thru 7 of their complaint that they have met the burden of proof in that a sale had occurred and the trustees Deed establishes this presumption that the sale was “duly Perfected” and Civil Code 2924 has been complied with.
Defendant would claim that they have not defendant will submit to the court a certified copy of the Notice of Trustees Sale and ask the court to take judicial notice of said document.
If the Trustees sale had occurred prior to Sept 6,2008 plaintiff would prevail but for other procedural defects in the assignment of the Deed of Trust in Civil code 2932.5 prior to sale.
For our purposes we need not look any farther than the Notice of Trustees Sale to find the declaration is not signed under penalty of perjury; as mandated by new Civil code 2923.5. (c) . (Blum v. Superior Court (Copley Press Inc.) (2006) 141 Cal App 4th 418, 45 Cal. Reptr. 3d 902 ) This lender did not adhere to the mandates laid out by congress before a foreclosure can be considered duly perfected.
As a general rule, the purpose of the unlawful detainer proceeding is solely to obtain possession, and the right to possession is the only issue in the trial. The title of the landlord is usually not an issue, and the tenant cannot frustrate the summary nature of the proceedings by cross-complaints or affirmative defenses.
A different rule applies in an unlawful detainer action that is brought by the purchaser after a foreclosure sale. His or her right to obtain possession is based upon the fact that the property has been “duly sold” by foreclosure proceedings, CC1161a (b) (3) and therefore it is necessary that the plaintiff prove each of the statutory procedures has been complied with as a condition for seeking possession of the property.
When the eviction is by a bona fide bidder at the sale the defendant has no defenses to eviction. However as in this case a beneficiary that is the plaintiff in the unlawful detainer action must prove that it has duly complied with each of the statutory requirements for foreclosure, and the trustor can put these questions in issue in the unlawful detainer proceeding. Miller and Star 3rd 10:220.

California Real esate blogs

California real estate blogs

United First Bankruptcy Stay

On March 9, 2009 an involuntary bankruptcy was filed by some of the victims of the unconscionable contract of United First Inc. While I make no warranty and you should seek the advise of counsel before undertaking this action. The Stay applicable to United First may be applicable to the 2000 plus victims of the United First Inc. there pending cases and pending evictions. See Notice of Stay Form united-first-bankruptcy-notice-of-stay

United First Class Action

On Saturday March 7,2009 a meeting was held for 200 plus victims of the United First equity save your house scam. At that meeting it was determined that a class action should be filed to recover the funds lost by the victims of the unconscionable contract.

As a first step an involuntary Bankruptcy is being filed today March 9, 2009. To be considered as a creditor of said Bankruptcy please Fax the Joint Venture agreement and retainer agreement to 909-494-4214.
Additionally it is this attorneys opinion that said Bankruptcy will act as a “stay” for all averse actions being taken by lenders as against said victims. This opinion is based upon the fact that United First maintained an interest in the real property as a joint venture to 80% of the properties value(no matter how unconscionable this may be) this is an interest that can be protected by the Bankruptcy Stay 11 USC 362.

Banks Refusing To Take Back Foreclosed Properties

NPR ^
Posted on Saturday, March 07, 2009 11:56:28 PM by Chet 99
All Things Considered, March 3, 2009 • Let’s say you’re one of the millions of Americans facing foreclosure. You made mistakes, borrowed more than you should have — or maybe you lost your job — and now have to walk away from your house. In some parts of the country, simply walking away isn’t so simple — especially if the bank doesn’t want your house.
At 8:30 nearly every Monday morning, employees from the Cuyahoga County Sheriff’s Office stand in a windowless room in Cleveland’s Justice Center to auction off hundreds of foreclosed houses.
Hoping to buy are a few investors, bargain hunters and the rare person trying to save his or her house. Most often, it’s lawyers from local law firms representing global financial institutions who claim property here. Although these days, that’s starting to change.
When there’s no bid, the lender can either try to sell at another sheriff sale or do nothing. Doing nothing means the foreclosure is not complete. And Cleveland foreclosure attorney Larry Rothenberg says doing nothing is becoming more popular.
Lenders Not Bidding
“Lately, lenders are finding that the costs to purchase property at the sheriff sale and resell it, and the likelihood of finding a buyer weigh against a decision to buy the property. And so it’s become more likely than before that lenders are not entering bids at sheriff sales,” Rothenberg says.
That changes the foreclosure equation. Rick Sharga of RealtyTrac says employees at his online foreclosure sales company have heard of other cities where lenders are walking away from foreclosures, and he worries it could spread.
“There are some urban areas where you’ve had rapid price depreciation, where you also have extreme unemployment issues, and nobody’s buying the properties,” Sharga says. “All those conditions need to be in place before a lender is going to be motivated to do what you’re seeing happen now.”
And when lenders don’t complete a foreclosure action at a sheriff sale, the house stays in the homeowner’s name.
‘It’s Not My House’
Sharon Little says she was shocked to find out she was still listed as the owner of a rental property on a busy Cleveland street. She walked away from the house in 2006 when she declared bankruptcy. Since then, thieves have stripped the house of siding, copper plumbing, and even windows. She found out her name was still on the deed only when she got a summons last October to appear in housing court.
“Eventually, they’re going to tear this house down,” Little says. “Somebody’s going to have to foot the bill, and frankly I think it should be the bank because it’s their house. It’s not my house really, so …”
Begging For Foreclosure
But the city of Cleveland is writing tickets for housing code violations to whomever is listed on the deed.
Bus driver Curley Jackson has been on the phone with his loan servicers trying to persuade them to foreclose on property he can no longer afford.
“I surrendered these properties back to you all. I said, ‘You keep leaving them in my name, I’m getting these tickets.’ They don’t care. They’re not getting a ticket. They’re not getting threatened with jail,” Jackson says.
Cleveland Housing Court officials say they are now seeing homeowners take matters into their own hands. Little, for instance, wrote up a deed and gave her house to her lender.
“That’s because it was their house from the jump, so that’s what we do — give it right back to them. You can keep your house. I don’t want it,” Little says.
Untouchable Real Estate
Bankruptcy attorney Richard Nemeth has asked state lawmakers to propose a bill that would force lenders to completely follow through with foreclosure or forgive the homeowner’s debt.
“It’s a really sad set of affairs when people don’t want to touch a piece of real estate with a 10-foot pole,” Nemeth says.
County officials in Cleveland hope a new land bank will help solve this problem by giving lenders a place to dump unwanted property. In the meantime, the city is forced to use scarce tax dollars to maintain or demolish some of these unwanted foreclosed houses.

Mortgage Chaos? Add a Bankruptcy and its a Recipe for Disaster!

There are many bright Real Estate Attorneys out there.  Likewise, there are many bright Bankruptcy Attorneys out there.  But I don’t think there are that many bright Bankruptcy Real Estate Attorneys out there.  And the few that do exist…..well, I don’t think they worked for the Mortgage Companies. Why?  Well if they did, the transfer of loans would not have existed the way that did for the past several years.  Lately, the big news in foreclosures has been the Ohio cases where Judge Boyko dismissed 14 foreclosures on October 31, 2007, and his Colleague, Judge Kathleen O’Malley of the same court, followed suite ordering another 32 dismissals on November 14, 2007.    But that’s only the beginning.  It gets worse.  Add a bankruptcy filing to the mix and its like adding gas to the fire.  The reason being, from a little bankruptcy code section called 11 USC 544.  Basically, that section allows a Trustee appointed by the Bankruptcy Court to avoid non-perfected liens.  Non-perfected liens are liens that exist, but are not fully noticed to everyone, sort of like secret liens.  Its like if someone loans you $50,000 and takes a lien out on your house, but never records their lien with the county recorder.  If that house sells, the lien is not paid since escrow was not aware of it.  Had it been recorded by a “deed of trust” or “mortgage,” the Title Company and Escrow Company would not have closed once they saw it, unless it was paid. Because of all the crazy real estate financing, securitization, and reselling of all the mortgages, sort of the same thing has happened with all the mortgages and trust deeds, but on a much larger scale.    Normally, most states require that when a mortgage or real estate loan is sold or transferred to another lender, certain things must happen to maintain perfection, that is, in order to make sure that lien gets paid at a later date.  Generally, the purchaser of the Mortgage has it recorded at the County Recorders Office.  This is usually done thru a recorded assignment of the underlying note and mortgage or a new Mortgage being recorded and transfer of the Note.The Note is the most important part of any Mortgage or Deed of Trust.  The Mortgage or Deed of Trust is useless without the Note, and usually can not exist without it.  It’s a negotiable instrument, just like a check.  So when its transferred, it needs to be endorsed, just like a check.  So essentially, all real estate has documents recorded to evidence the lien, and which are linked to the “checks.”  Well, this is where the problem lies.  In most of the Mortgage Transfers which took place recently, the Mortgage or Deed of Trust was transferred, but not the Note.  Whoops!  Why?  It was just too expensive to track down every note for every mortgage since they were all bundled up together and sold in large trusts, then resold, resold, etc.  Imagine trying to find 1 note among thousands, which were sold in different trust pools over time.  Pretty hard to do!  So shortcuts happened.  Soon enough, shortcuts were accepted and since there were very little foreclosures during the last 7 year real estate bubble, no one really noticed in the few foreclosures that took place.    Until recently. That’s where the Ohio cases come in. Times have now changed.  That little shortcut stopped the foreclosures in Ohio since the most basic element of any lawsuit is that the party bringing the lawsuit is the “real party in interest.”  That is, they are the aggrieved party, injured party, relief seeking party.  So in Ohio, the Judge dismissed all the cases since they did not possess the Notes or Assignments on the date of filing, and technically were not the real party in interest to file the suit at the time.  But that maybe only a temporary problem until they find the note or assignment.  At that point, they will probably just file the foreclosure lawsuit again.  So its just a delay.  But the bigger problem exists in Bankruptcy.  You see, once a Bankruptcy Case is filed, the Automatic Stay goes into effect.  Everything is frozen.  Mistakes can no longer be corrected.  And if the lender did not have the note or recorded assignment when the bankruptcy case was filed, they are no longer “perfected.” And this problem can not be fixed!  Finding the note or assignment at that point is simply too late.  That $12 shortcut may now have cost the lender a $500,000 mortgage!    The Bankruptcy Trustee now is in charge, puts his 11 USC 544 hat on, and voila, removes the mortgage!  Yes, that house that once had no equity worth $450,000 with $500,000 owed on it, is now FREE AND CLEAR!  He sells it, and disburses all the proceeds to the creditors.  Next Issue, I’ll explain the ramifications of this chaos….both beneficial and detrimental.

But the bigger problem exists in Bankruptcy.  You see, once a Bankruptcy Case is filed, the Automatic Stay goes into effect.  Everything is frozen.  Mistakes can no longer be corrected.  And if the lender did not have the note or recorded assignment when the bankruptcy case was filed, they are no longer “perfected.” And this problem can not be fixed!  Finding the note or assignment at that point is simply too late.  That $12 shortcut may now have cost the lender a $500,000 mortgage!    The Bankruptcy Trustee now is in charge, puts his 11 USC 544 hat 

2924.3. (a) Except as provided in subdivisions (b) and (c), a
person who has undertaken as an agent of a mortgagee, beneficiary, or
owner of a promissory note secured directly or collaterally by a
mortgage or deed of trust on real property or an estate for years
therein, to make collections of payments from an obligor under the
note, shall mail the following notices, postage prepaid, to each
mortgagee, beneficiary or owner for whom the agent has agreed to make
collections from the obligor under the note:
(1) A copy of the notice of default filed in the office of the
county recorder pursuant to Section 2924 on account of a breach of
obligation under the promissory note on which the agent has agreed to
make collections of payments, within 15 days after recordation.
(2) Notice that a notice of default has been recorded pursuant to
Section 2924 on account of a breach of an obligation secured by a
mortgage or deed of trust against the same property or estate for
years therein having priority over the mortgage or deed of trust
securing the obligation described in paragraph (1), within 15 days
after recordation or within three business days after the agent
receives the information, whichever is later

Sec. 2932.5

Where a power to sell real property is given to a
mortgagee, or other encumbrancer, in an instrument intended to secure
the payment of money, the power is part of the security and vests in
any person who by assignment becomes entitled to payment of the
money secured by the instrument. The power of sale may be exercised
by the assignee if the assignment is duly acknowledged and recorded.

FROM TIM MCLANDLESS
Most all foreclosures in California can be set aside. The power of sale by non judicial means is contained in the civil code 2932. In order to be valid the assignment must be recorded California civil code 2932.5. Most all notices of default recorded by the “Sub-Prime” lenders have not recorded an assignment till just before or just after the Trustee’s sale. They rely on the MERS agency agreement to protect them but under California law they are wrong.
Law Offices of
TIMOTHY McCandless
15647 Village Dr
Victorville, Ca 92392
TEL (760) 733-8885; FAX (909)494-4214

Sec. 2934

Any assignment of a mortgage and any assignment of the
beneficial interest under a deed of trust may be recorded, and from
the time the same is filed for record operates as constructive notice
of the contents thereof to all persons; and any instrument by which
any mortgage or deed of trust of, lien upon or interest in real
property, (or by which any mortgage of, lien upon or interest in
personal property a document evidencing or creating which is required
or permitted by law to be recorded), is subordinated or waived as to
priority may be recorded, and from the time the same is filed for
record operates as constructive notice of the contents thereof, to
all persons.

NOTE SECURED BY REAL ESTATE
HON. SAMUEL L. BUFFORD
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA
(FORMERLY HON.) R. GLEN AYERS
LANGLEY & BANACK
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTUTUTE
APRIL 3, 2009
WASHINGTON, D.C.
WHERE’S THE NOTE, WHO’S THE HOLDER
INTRODUCTION
In an era where a very large portion of mortgage obligations have been securitized, by assignment to a trust indenture trustee, with the resulting pool of assets being then sold as mortgage backed securities, foreclosure becomes an interesting exercise, particularly where judicial process is involved. We are all familiar with the securitization process. The steps, if not the process, is simple. A borrower goes to a mortgage lender. The lender finances the purchase of real estate. The borrower signs a note and mortgage or deed of trust. The original lender sells the note and assigns the mortgage to an entity that securitizes the note by combining the note with hundreds or thousands of similar obligation to create a package of mortgage backed securities, which are then sold to investors.
Unfortunately, unless you represent borrowers, the vast flow of notes into the maw of the securitization industry meant that a lot of mistakes were made. When the borrower defaults, the party seeking to enforce the obligation and foreclose on the underlying collateral sometimes cannot find the note. A lawyer sophisticated in this area has speculated to one of the authors that perhaps a third of the notes “securitized” have been lost or destroyed. The cases we are going to look at reflect the stark fact that the unnamed source’s speculation may be well-founded.
UCC SECTION 3-309
If the issue were as simple as a missing note, UCC §3-309 would provide a simple solution. A person entitled to enforce an instrument which has been lost, destroyed or stolen may enforce the instrument. If the court is concerned that some third party may show up and attempt to enforce the instrument against the payee, it may order adequate protection. But, and however, a person seeking to enforce a missing instrument must be a person entitled to enforce the instrument, and that person must prove the instrument’s terms and that person’s right to enforce the instrument. §3-309 (a)(1) & (b).
WHO’S THE HOLDER
Enforcement of a note always requires that the person seeking to collect show that it is the holder. A holder is an entity that has acquired the note either as the original payor or transfer by endorsement of order paper or physical possession of bearer paper. These requirements are set out in Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which has been adopted in every state, including Louisiana, and in the District of Columbia. Even in bankruptcy proceedings, State substantive law controls the rights of note and lien holders, as the Supreme Court pointed out almost forty (40) years ago in United States v. Butner, 440 U.S. 48, 54-55 (1979).
However, as Judge Bufford has recently illustrated, in one of the cases discussed below, in the bankruptcy and other federal courts, procedure is governed by the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy and Civil Procedure. And, procedure may just have an impact on the issue of “who,” because, if the holder is unknown, pleading and standing issues arise.
BRIEF REVIEW OF UCC PROVISIONS
Article 3 governs negotiable instruments – it defines what a negotiable instrument is and defines how ownership of those pieces of paper is transferred. For the precise definition, see § 3-104(a) (“an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, with or without interest . . . .”) The instrument may be either payable to order or bearer and payable on demand or at a definite time, with or without interest.
Ordinary negotiable instruments include notes and drafts (a check is a draft drawn on a bank). See § 3-104(e).
Negotiable paper is transferred from the original payor by negotiation. §3-301. “Order paper” must be endorsed; bearer paper need only be delivered. §3-305. However, in either case, for the note to be enforced, the person who asserts the status of the holder must be in possession of the instrument. See UCC § 1-201 (20) and comments.
The original and subsequent transferees are referred to as holders. Holders who take with no notice of defect or default are called “holders in due course,” and take free of many defenses. See §§ 3-305(b).
The UCC says that a payment to a party “entitled to enforce the instrument” is sufficient to extinguish the obligation of the person obligated on the instrument. Clearly, then, only a holder – a person in possession of a note endorsed to it or a holder of bearer paper – may seek satisfaction or enforce rights in collateral such as real estate.
NOTE: Those of us who went through the bank and savings and loan collapse of the 1980’s are familiar with these problems. The FDIC/FSLIC/RTC sold millions of notes secured and unsecured, in bulk transactions. Some notes could not be found and enforcement sometimes became a problem. Of course, sometimes we are forced to repeat history. For a recent FDIC case, see Liberty Savings Bank v. Redus, 2009 WL 41857 (Ohio App. 8 Dist.), January 8, 2009.
THE RULES
Judge Bufford addressed the rules issue this past year. See In re Hwang, 396 B.R. 757 (Bankr. C. D. Cal. 2008). First, there are the pleading problems that arise when the holder of the note is unknown. Typically, the issue will arise in a motion for relief from stay in a bankruptcy proceeding.
According F.R.Civ. Pro. 17, “[a]n action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.” This rule is incorporated into the rules governing bankruptcy procedure in several ways. As Judge Bufford has pointed out, for example, in a motion for relief from stay, filed under F.R.Bankr.Pro. 4001 is a contested matter, governed by F. R. Bankr. P. 9014, which makes F.R. Bankr. Pro. 7017 applicable to such motions. F.R. Bankr. P. 7017 is, of course, a restatement of F. R. Civ. P. 17. In re Hwang, 396 B.R. at 766. The real party in interest in a federal action to enforce a note, whether in bankruptcy court or federal district court, is the owner of a note. (In securitization transactions, this would be the trustee for the “certificate holders.”) When the actual holder of the note is unknown, it is impossible – not difficult but impossible – to plead a cause of action in a federal court (unless the movant simply lies about the ownership of the note). Unless the name of the actual note holder can be stated, the very pleadings are defective.
STANDING
Often, the servicing agent for the loan will appear to enforce the note. Assume that the servicing agent states that it is the authorized agent of the note holder, which is “Trust Number 99.” The servicing agent is certainly a party in interest, since a party in interest in a bankruptcy court is a very broad term or concept. See, e.g., Greer v. O’Dell, 305 F.3d 1297, 1302-03 (11th Cir. 2002). However, the servicing agent may not have standing: “Federal Courts have only the power authorized by Article III of the Constitutions and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto. … [A] plaintiff must have Constitutional standing in order for a federal court to have jurisdiction.” In re Foreclosure Cases, 521 F.Supp. 3d 650, 653 (S.D. Ohio, 2007) (citations omitted).
But, the servicing agent does not have standing, for only a person who is the holder of the note has standing to enforce the note. See, e.g., In re Hwang, 2008 WL 4899273 at 8.
The servicing agent may have standing if acting as an agent for the holder, assuming that the agent can both show agency status and that the principle is the holder. See, e.g., In re Vargas, 396 B.R. 511 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2008) at 520.
A BRIEF ASIDE: WHO IS MERS?
For those of you who are not familiar with the entity known as MERS, a frequent participant in these foreclosure proceedings:
MERS is the “Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc. “MERS is a mortgage banking ‘utility’ that registers mortgage loans in a book entry system so that … real estate loans can be bought, sold and securitized, just like Wall Street’s book entry utility for stocks and bonds is the Depository Trust and Clearinghouse.” Bastian, “Foreclosure Forms”, State. Bar of Texas 17th Annual Advanced Real Estate Drafting Course, March 9-10, 2007, Dallas, Texas. MERS is enormous. It originates thousands of loans daily and is the mortgagee of record for at least 40 million mortgages and other security documents. Id.
MERS acts as agent for the owner of the note. Its authority to act should be shown by an agency agreement. Of course, if the owner is unknown, MERS cannot show that it is an authorized agent of the owner.
RULES OF EVIDENCE – A PRACTICAL PROBLEM
This structure also possesses practical evidentiary problems where the party asserting a right to foreclose must be able to show a default. Once again, Judge Bufford has addressed this issue. At In re Vargas, 396 B.R. at 517-19. Judge Bufford made a finding that the witness called to testify as to debt and default was incompetent. All the witness could testify was that he had looked at the MERS computerized records. The witness was unable to satisfy the requirements of the Federal Rules of Evidence, particularly Rule 803, as applied to computerized records in the Ninth Circuit. See id. at 517-20. The low level employee could really only testify that the MERS screen shot he reviewed reflected a default. That really is not much in the way of evidence, and not nearly enough to get around the hearsay rule.
FORECLOSURE OR RELIEF FROM STAY
In a foreclosure proceeding in a judicial foreclosure state, or a request for injunctive relief in a non-judicial foreclosure state, or in a motion for relief proceeding in a bankruptcy court, the courts are dealing with and writing about the problems very frequently.
In many if not almost all cases, the party seeking to exercise the rights of the creditor will be a servicing company. Servicing companies will be asserting the rights of their alleged principal, the note holder, which is, again, often going to be a trustee for a securitization package. The mortgage holder or beneficiary under the deed of trust will, again, very often be MERS.
Even before reaching the practical problem of debt and default, mentioned above, the moving party must show that it holds the note or (1) that it is an agent of the holder and that (2) the holder remains the holder. In addition, the owner of the note, if different from the holder, must join in the motion.
Some states, like Texas, have passed statutes that allow servicing companies to act in foreclosure proceedings as a statutorily recognized agent of the noteholder. See, e.g., Tex. Prop. Code §51.0001. However, that statute refers to the servicer as the last entity to whom the debtor has been instructed to make payments. This status is certainly open to challenge. The statute certainly provides nothing more than prima facie evidence of the ability of the servicer to act. If challenged, the servicing agent must show that the last entity to communicate instructions to the debtor is still the holder of the note. See, e.g., HSBC Bank, N.A. v. Valentin, 2l N.Y. Misc. 3d 1123(A), 2008 WL 4764816 (Table) (N.Y. Sup.), Nov. 3, 2008. In addition, such a statute does not control in federal court where Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 and 19 (and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7017 and 7019) apply.
SOME RECENT CASE LAW
These cases are arranged by state, for no particular reason.
Massachusetts
In re Schwartz, 366 B.R.265 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007)
Schwartz concerns a Motion for Relief to pursue an eviction. Movant asserted that the property had been foreclosed upon prior to the date of the bankruptcy petition. The pro se debtor asserted that the Movant was required to show that it had authority to conduct the sale. Movant, and “the party which appears to be the current mortgagee…” provided documents for the court to review, but did not ask for an evidentiary hearing. Judge Rosenthal sifted through the documents and found that the Movant and thecurrent mortgagee had failed to prove that the foreclosure was properly conducted.
Specifically, Judge Rosenthal found that there was no evidence of a proper assignment of the mortgage prior to foreclosure. However, at footnote 5, Id. at 268, the Court also finds that there is no evidence that the note itself was assigned and no evidence as to who the current holder might be.
Nosek v. Ameriquest Mortgage Company (In re Nosek), 286 Br. 374 (Bankr D Mass. 2008).
Almost a year to the day after Schwartz was signed, Judge Rosenthal issued a second opinion. This is an opinion on an order to show cause. Judge Rosenthal specifically found that, although the note and mortgage involved in the case had been transferred from the originator to another party within five days of closing, during the five years in which the chapter 13 proceeding was pending, the note and mortgage and associated claims had been prosecuted by Ameriquest which has represented itself to be the holder of the note and the mortgage. Not until September of 2007 did Ameriquest notify the Court that it was merely the servicer. In fact, only after the chapter 13 bankruptcy had been pending for about three years was there even an assignment of the servicing rights. Id. at 378.
Because these misrepresentations were not simple mistakes: as the Court has noted on more than one occasion, those parties who do not hold the note of mortgage do not service the mortgage do not have standing to pursue motions for leave or other actions arising form the mortgage obligation. Id at 380.
As a result, the Court sanctioned the local law firm that had been prosecuting the claim $25,000. It sanctioned a partner at that firm an additional $25,000. Then the Court sanctioned the national law firm involved $100,000 and ultimately sanctioned Wells Fargo $250,000. Id. at 382-386.
In re Hayes, 393 B.R. 259 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2008).
Like Judge Rosenthal, Judge Feeney has attacked the problem of standing and authority head on. She has also held that standing must be established before either a claim can be allowed or a motion for relief be granted.
Ohio
In re Foreclosure Cases, 521 F.Supp. 2d (S.D. Ohio 2007).
Perhaps the District Court’s orders in the foreclosure cases in Ohio have received the most press of any of these opinions. Relying almost exclusively on standing, theJudge Rose has determined that a foreclosing party must show standing. “[I]n a foreclosure action, the plaintiff must show that it is the holder of the note and the mortgage at the time that the complaint was filed.” Id. at 653.
Judge Rose instructed the parties involved that the willful failure of the movants to comply with the general orders of the Court would in the future result in immediate dismissal of foreclosure actions.
Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Steele, 2008 WL 111227 (S.D. Ohio) January 8, 2008.
In Steele, Judge Abel followed the lead of Judge Rose and found that Deutsche Bank had filed evidence in support of its motion for default judgment indicating that MERS was the mortgage holder. There was not sufficient evidence to support the claim that Deutsche Bank was the owner and holder of the note as of that date. Following In re Foreclosure Cases, 2007 WL 456586, the Court held that summary judgment would be denied “until such time as Deutsche Bank was able to offer evidence showing, by a preponderance of evidence, that it owned the note and mortgage when the complaint was filed.” 2008 WL 111227 at 2. Deutsche Bank was given twenty-one days to comply. Id.
Illinois
U

Not all federal district judges are as concerned with the issues surrounding the transfer of notes and mortgages. Cook is a very pro lender case and, in an order granting a motion for summary judgment, the Court found that Cook had shown no “countervailing evidence to create a genuine issue of facts.” Id. at 3. In fact, a review of the evidence submitted by U.S. Bank showed only that it was the alleged trustee of the securitization pool. U.S. Bank relied exclusively on the “pooling and serving agreement” to show that it was the holder of the note. Id.
Under UCC Article 3, the evidence presented in Cook was clearly insufficient.
New York
HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Valentin, 21 Misc. 3D 1124(A), 2008 WL 4764816 (Table) (N.Y. Sup.) November 3, 2008. In Valentin, the New York court found that, even though given an opportunity to, HSBC did not show the ownership of debt and mortgage. The complaint was dismissed with prejudice and the “notice of pendency” against the property was canceled.
Note that the Valentin case does not involve some sort of ambush. The Court gave every HSBC every opportunity to cure the defects the Court perceived in the pleadings.
California
In re Vargas, 396 B.R. 511 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2008)
and
In re Hwang, 396 B.R. 757 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2008)
These two opinions by Judge Bufford have been discussed above. Judge Bufford carefully explores the related issues of standing and ownership under both federal and California law.
Texas
In re Parsley, 384 B.R. 138 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008)
and
In re Gilbreath, 395 B.R. 356 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008)
These two recent opinions by Judge Jeff Bohm are not really on point, but illustrate another thread of cases running through the issues of motions for relief from stay in bankruptcy court and the sloppiness of loan servicing agencies. Both of these cases involve motions for relief that were not based upon fact but upon mistakes by servicing agencies. Both opinions deal with the issue of sanctions and, put simply, both cases illustrate that Judge Bohm (and perhaps other members of the bankruptcy bench in the Southern District of Texas) are going to be very strict about motions for relief in consumer cases.
SUMMARY
The cases cited illustrate enormous problems in the loan servicing industry. These problems arise in the context of securitization and illustrate the difficulty of determining the name of the holder, the assignee of the mortgage, and the parties with both the legal right under Article 3 and the standing under the Constitution to enforce notes, whether in state court or federal court.
Interestingly, with the exception of Judge Bufford and a few other judges, there has been less than adequate focus upon the UCC title issues. The next round of cases may and should focus upon the title to debt instrument. The person seeking to enforce the note must show that:
(1) It is the holder of t his note original by transfer, with all necessary rounds;
(2) It had possession of the note before it was lost;
(3) If it can show that title to the note runs to it, but the original is lost or destroyed, the holder must be prepared to post a bond;
(4) If the person seeking to enforce is an agent, it must show its agency status and that its principal is the holder of the note (and meets the above requirements).
Then, and only then, do the issues of evidence of debt and default and assignment of mortgage rights become relevant.
Filed under: CDO, CORRUPTION, Eviction, Investor, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, bubble,foreclosure, securities fraud | Tagged: borrower, disclosure, foreclosure defense, foreclosure offense, fraud, Lender Liability, mortgage meltdown, predatory lending, securitization, trustee
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28 Responses to “This is it! WHERE’S THE NOTE, WHO’S THE HOLDER: ENFORCEMENT OF PROMISSORY NOTE SECURED BY REAL ESTATE”
Alina, on March 6th, 2009 at 2:41 PM Said:
Here is another interesting tidbit. Yesterday, I searched all recorded assignments in my county for the servicing company on my loan. The guy who signed the assignement as Asst. Sec. for MERS, has also signed as Document Control Officer for the servicing company and as either an asst. sec or Document Control Officer for other banks. Each signature was notarized by the same person and witnessed by the same persons acknowledging that this person is ________ of _________ company. Assignors and assignees all have the same address.
Additionally, same law firm and same company prepared the assignment, a company out of Missouri. Definitely smells of fraud, a big smelly fish.
This is right along the lines of the King County, NY decision.
Don’t know how to present this evidence to the Court. Any suggestions? I was thinking of doing a Request for Judicial Notice. Thanks.
MSoliman, on March 6th, 2009 at 12:44 PM Said:
The structure for the Real Estate Trust prohibits ownership of Assets. Depositor and the Pass-through enitities including custodial roles and Master Servicer. must remin bankrupt insulate. Otherwise its debt and a big hypotheication.
If the assets are detemined to be held by any of the above the affilliates the Trust falls apart (I assue that would begin with the Sponsor / Depositor who acts as the TRS in a REIT).
These loans are treated as recievables with no regard for regulatory requirements – NO CAN DO.
SEC and HUD are in conflict and markets remain confused. The security remains tied into the UCC filing and the investors interest is fractionalized as are the other interests in the cash flow.
I have been waiting for this and that is the governments intereference into the real determination of accountability. Bernake revealed a sweeping change to GAAP and FASB interpretations of accounting policy….accountability rests with IRS reporting under the appropriate method of accoounting,
In other words the combinations will pass through revenue or show income and earings on a profit and loss. Basis accountig for the assets and any gain or loss on sale / reversion will likley fall onto the Federal Saving Bank. This is a capital reserves maintenance crisis for the FSB’s who are sheltered uner this mess.
M Soliman admin@borrowerhotline.com
livinglies, on March 6th, 2009 at 1:51 AM Said:
Allan: File motion with the court declaring you have not been served. If you want, go to Florida Bar Website and file grievance.
Allan (still trying to understand “holder in due course”!), on March 5th, 2009 at 6:23 PM Said:
I recorded a lien back in 2004 that put everyone on notice that borrower lacked capacity, that her identity was stolen, that her signatures were forged.
In 2005, after I reinstated the mortgage, it got securitized and placed by WAMU in SASCO 2005 RF5.
USBank N.A. claims it is the trustee for SASCO certificate holders. When I attempt to track down SASCO, all I come up with is Barclay’s. How does one track if SASCO still exists?
The IMPORTANT question here is, in this scenario, with assignments unrecorded and hastily assembled well after the lawsuit, WHO is “holder in due course”? and what rights do they have?
Also, Florida Default Law Group has been engaging in unethical tricks, including scheduling hearings on Summary Judgment Motions WITHOUT notice to me, though it certifies to the Court it has sent copies to me. What to do with such antics? Is there a Board of Bar Overseers? Do they have any teeth?
RSVP
Allan
BeMoved@AOL.com
Bryan Brey, on March 4th, 2009 at 7:07 PM Said:
@ Alina
Brilliant Alina, brilliant!
Alina, on March 4th, 2009 at 6:09 PM Said:
Bryan,
My argument exactly. U.S. Bank would fall under the definition of a “business trust.”
The business trust and its assets are managed for the benefit of persons who hold transferable certificates issued by the trustees. The ownership shares into which the beneficial interest in the property is divided are called “shares of beneficial interest.” These shares can be issued in the names of the beneficiaries or held by the trustees in “bearer form” (no designated owner name for each share).
Both Willey and Corcoran deal with a trust trying to foreclose. Per Willey, the trust cannot bring suit without including the trustee(s).
And per Corcoran, no business trust can bring suit on a mortgage and note in the State of Florida without authorization from its original state.
In my case, the purported assignment is to the trustee, not the trust.
Still researching all this. Also, reseraching FTC Holder in Due Course.
Bryan Brey, on March 4th, 2009 at 4:56 PM Said:
@ Alina
Reading

 Consumer and Saxon lack standing to pursue this litigation. 2 It is well
established that a plaintiff must prove standing by showing: (1) injury in
fact; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the defendant’s
conduct; and (3) a likelihood that a favorable outcome will redress the
injury. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S. Ct.
2130, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992).
Consumer [*14] seeks, in essence, to “enforce the [Promissory] Note and
Deed of Trust if [Ms.] Hillery does not pay the Rescission Balance by a date
set by this Court.” Compl. P 27. Thus, as Consumer itself acknowledges, to
proceed with this action, it must demonstrate that it is the holder of not
only the deed of trust but also the promissory note. If not, it has no
injury in fact. See In re ForeclosureCases, 521 F. Supp. 2d 650, 653 (S.D.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMITTEE

WHERE’S THE NOTE, WHO’S THE HOLDER: ENFORCEMENT OF PROMISSORY NOTE SECURED BY REAL ESTATE

HON. SAMUEL L. BUFFORD
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

(FORMERLY HON.) R. GLEN AYERS
LANGLEY & BANACK
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTUTUTE
APRIL 3, 2009
WASHINGTON, D.C.

WHERE’S THE NOTE, WHO’S THE HOLDER

INTRODUCTION

In an era where a very large portion of mortgage obligations have been securitized, by assignment to a trust indenture trustee, with the resulting pool of assets being then sold as mortgage backed securities, foreclosure becomes an interesting exercise, particularly where judicial process is involved. We are all familiar with the securitization process. The steps, if not the process, is simple. A borrower goes to a mortgage lender. The lender finances the purchase of real estate. The borrower signs a note and mortgage or deed of trust. The original lender sells the note and assigns the mortgage to an entity that securitizes the note by combining the note with hundreds or thousands of similar obligation to create a package of mortgage backed securities, which are then sold to investors.

Unfortunately, unless you represent borrowers, the vast flow of notes into the maw of the securitization industry meant that a lot of mistakes were made. When the borrower defaults, the party seeking to enforce the obligation and foreclose on the underlying collateral sometimes cannot find the note. A lawyer sophisticated in this area has speculated to one of the authors that perhaps a third of the notes “securitized” have been lost or destroyed. The cases we are going to look at reflect the stark fact that the unnamed source’s speculation may be well-founded.

UCC SECTION 3-309

If the issue were as simple as a missing note, UCC §3-309 would provide a simple solution. A person entitled to enforce an instrument which has been lost, destroyed or stolen may enforce the instrument. If the court is concerned that some third party may show up and attempt to enforce the instrument against the payee, it may order adequate protection. But, and however, a person seeking to enforce a missing instrument must be a person entitled to enforce the instrument, and that person must prove the instrument’s terms and that person’s right to enforce the instrument. §3-309 (a)(1) & (b).

WHO’S THE HOLDER

Enforcement of a note always requires that the person seeking to collect show that it is the holder. A holder is an entity that has acquired the note either as the original payor or transfer by endorsement of order paper or physical possession of bearer paper. These requirements are set out in Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which has been adopted in every state, including Louisiana, and in the District of Columbia. Even in bankruptcy proceedings, State substantive law controls the rights of note and lien holders, as the Supreme Court pointed out almost forty (40) years ago in United States v. Butner, 440 U.S. 48, 54-55 (1979).

However, as Judge Bufford has recently illustrated, in one of the cases discussed below, in the bankruptcy and other federal courts, procedure is governed by the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy and Civil Procedure. And, procedure may just have an impact on the issue of “who,” because, if the holder is unknown, pleading and standing issues arise.

BRIEF REVIEW OF UCC PROVISIONS

Article 3 governs negotiable instruments – it defines what a negotiable instrument is and defines how ownership of those pieces of paper is transferred. For the precise definition, see § 3-104(a) (“an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, with or without interest . . . .”) The instrument may be either payable to order or bearer and payable on demand or at a definite time, with or without interest.

Ordinary negotiable instruments include notes and drafts (a check is a draft drawn on a bank). See § 3-104(e).

Negotiable paper is transferred from the original payor by negotiation. §3-301. “Order paper” must be endorsed; bearer paper need only be delivered. §3-305. However, in either case, for the note to be enforced, the person who asserts the status of the holder must be in possession of the instrument. See UCC § 1-201 (20) and comments.

The original and subsequent transferees are referred to as holders. Holders who take with no notice of defect or default are called “holders in due course,” and take free of many defenses. See §§ 3-305(b).

The UCC says that a payment to a party “entitled to enforce the instrument” is sufficient to extinguish the obligation of the person obligated on the instrument. Clearly, then, only a holder – a person in possession of a note endorsed to it or a holder of bearer paper – may seek satisfaction or enforce rights in collateral such as real estate.

NOTE: Those of us who went through the bank and savings and loan collapse of the 1980’s are familiar with these problems. The FDIC/FSLIC/RTC sold millions of notes secured and unsecured, in bulk transactions. Some notes could not be found and enforcement sometimes became a problem. Of course, sometimes we are forced to repeat history. For a recent FDIC case, see Liberty Savings Bank v. Redus, 2009 WL 41857 (Ohio App. 8 Dist.), January 8, 2009.

THE RULES

Judge Bufford addressed the rules issue this past year. See In re Hwang, 396 B.R. 757 (Bankr. C. D. Cal. 2008). First, there are the pleading problems that arise when the holder of the note is unknown. Typically, the issue will arise in a motion for relief from stay in a bankruptcy proceeding.

According F.R.Civ. Pro. 17, “[a]n action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.” This rule is incorporated into the rules governing bankruptcy procedure in several ways. As Judge Bufford has pointed out, for example, in a motion for relief from stay, filed under F.R.Bankr.Pro. 4001 is a contested matter, governed by F. R. Bankr. P. 9014, which makes F.R. Bankr. Pro. 7017 applicable to such motions. F.R. Bankr. P. 7017 is, of course, a restatement of F.R. Civ. P. 17. In re Hwang, 396 B.R. at 766. The real party in interest in a federal action to enforce a note, whether in bankruptcy court or federal district court, is the owner of a note. (In securitization transactions, this would be the trustee for the “certificate holders.”) When the actual holder of the note is unknown, it is impossible – not difficult but impossible – to plead a cause of action in a federal court (unless the movant simply lies about the ownership of the note). Unless the name of the actual note holder can be stated, the very pleadings are defective.

STANDING

Often, the servicing agent for the loan will appear to enforce the note. Assume that the servicing agent states that it is the authorized agent of the note holder, which is “Trust Number 99.” The servicing agent is certainly a party in interest, since a party in interest in a bankruptcy court is a very broad term or concept. See, e.g., Greer v. O’Dell, 305 F.3d 1297, 1302-03 (11th Cir. 2002). However, the servicing agent may not have standing: “Federal Courts have only the power authorized by Article III of the Constitutions and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto. … [A] plaintiff must have Constitutional standing in order for a federal court to have jurisdiction.” In re Foreclosure Cases, 521 F.Supp. 3d 650, 653 (S.D. Ohio, 2007) (citations omitted).

But, the servicing agent does not have standing, for only a person who is the holder of the note has standing to enforce the note. See, e.g., In re Hwang, 2008 WL 4899273 at 8.

The servicing agent may have standing if acting as an agent for the holder, assuming that the agent can both show agency status and that the principle is the holder. See, e.g., In re Vargas, 396 B.R. 511 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2008) at 520.

A BRIEF ASIDE: WHO IS MERS?

For those of you who are not familiar with the entity known as MERS, a frequent participant in these foreclosure proceedings:

MERS is the “Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc. “MERS is a mortgage banking ‘utility’ that registers mortgage loans in a book entry system so that … real estate loans can be bought, sold and securitized, just like Wall Street’s book entry utility for stocks and bonds is the Depository Trust and Clearinghouse.” Bastian, “Foreclosure Forms”, State. Bar of Texas 17th Annual Advanced Real Estate Drafting Course, March 9-10, 2007, Dallas, Texas. MERS is enormous. It originates thousands of loans daily and is the mortgagee of record for at least 40 million mortgages and other security documents. Id.

MERS acts as agent for the owner of the note. Its authority to act should be shown by an agency agreement. Of course, if the owner is unknown, MERS cannot show that it is an authorized agent of the owner.

RULES OF EVIDENCE – A PRACTICAL PROBLEM

This structure also possesses practical evidentiary problems where the party asserting a right to foreclose must be able to show a default. Once again, Judge Bufford has addressed this issue. At In re Vargas, 396 B.R. at 517-19. Judge Bufford made a finding that the witness called to testify as to debt and default was incompetent. All the witness could testify was that he had looked at the MERS computerized records. The witness was unable to satisfy the requirements of the Federal Rules of Evidence, particularly Rule 803, as applied to computerized records in the Ninth Circuit. See id. at 517-20. The low level employee could really only testify that the MERS screen shot he reviewed reflected a default. That really is not much in the way of evidence, and not nearly enough to get around the hearsay rule.

FORECLOSURE OR RELIEF FROM STAY

In a foreclosure proceeding in a judicial foreclosure state, or a request for injunctive relief in a non-judicial foreclosure state, or in a motion for relief proceeding in a bankruptcy court, the courts are dealing with and writing about the problems very frequently.

In many if not almost all cases, the party seeking to exercise the rights of the creditor will be a servicing company. Servicing companies will be asserting the rights of their alleged principal, the note holder, which is, again, often going to be a trustee for a securitization package. The mortgage holder or beneficiary under the deed of trust will, again, very often be MERS.

Even before reaching the practical problem of debt and default, mentioned above, the moving party must show that it holds the note or (1) that it is an agent of the holder and that (2) the holder remains the holder. In addition, the owner of the note, if different from the holder, must join in the motion.

Some states, like Texas, have passed statutes that allow servicing companies to act in foreclosure proceedings as a statutorily recognized agent of the noteholder. See, e.g., Tex. Prop. Code §51.0001. However, that statute refers to the servicer as the last entity to whom the debtor has been instructed to make payments. This status is certainly open to challenge. The statute certainly provides nothing more than prima facie evidence of the ability of the servicer to act. If challenged, the servicing agent must show that the last entity to communicate instructions to the debtor is still the holder of the note. See, e.g., HSBC Bank, N.A. v. Valentin, 2l N.Y. Misc. 3d 1123(A), 2008 WL 4764816 (Table) (N.Y. Sup.), Nov. 3, 2008. In addition, such a statute does not control in federal court where Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 and 19 (and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7017 and 7019) apply.

SOME RECENT CASE LAW

These cases are arranged by state, for no particular reason.

Massachusetts

In re Schwartz, 366 B.R.265 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007)

Schwartz concerns a Motion for Relief to pursue an eviction. Movant asserted that the property had been foreclosed upon prior to the date of the bankruptcy petition. The pro se debtor asserted that the Movant was required to show that it had authority to conduct the sale. Movant, and “the party which appears to be the current mortgagee…” provided documents for the court to review, but did not ask for an evidentiary hearing. Judge Rosenthal sifted through the documents and found that the Movant and the current mortgagee had failed to prove that the foreclosure was properly conducted.

Specifically, Judge Rosenthal found that there was no evidence of a proper assignment of the mortgage prior to foreclosure. However, at footnote 5, Id. at 268, the Court also finds that there is no evidence that the note itself was assigned and no evidence as to who the current holder might be.

Nosek v. Ameriquest Mortgage Company (In re Nosek), 286 Br. 374 (Bankr D Mass. 2008).

Almost a year to the day after Schwartz was signed, Judge Rosenthal issued a second opinion. This is an opinion on an order to show cause. Judge Rosenthal specifically found that, although the note and mortgage involved in the case had been transferred from the originator to another party within five days of closing, during the five years in which the chapter 13 proceeding was pending, the note and mortgage and associated claims had been prosecuted by Ameriquest which has represented itself to be the holder of the note and the mortgage. Not until September of 2007 did Ameriquest notify the Court that it was merely the servicer. In fact, only after the chapter 13 bankruptcy had been pending for about three years was there even an assignment of the servicing rights. Id. at 378.

Because these misrepresentations were not simple mistakes: as the Court has noted on more than one occasion, those parties who do not hold the note of mortgage do not service the mortgage do not have standing to pursue motions for leave or other actions arising form the mortgage obligation. Id at 380.

As a result, the Court sanctioned the local law firm that had been prosecuting the claim $25,000. It sanctioned a partner at that firm an additional $25,000. Then the Court sanctioned the national law firm involved $100,000 and ultimately sanctioned Wells Fargo $250,000. Id. at 382-386.

In re Hayes, 393 B.R. 259 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2008).

Like Judge Rosenthal, Judge Feeney has attacked the problem of standing and authority head on. She has also held that standing must be established before either a claim can be allowed or a motion for relief be granted.

Ohio

In re Foreclosure Cases, 521 F.Supp. 2d (S.D. Ohio 2007).

Perhaps the District Court’s orders in the foreclosure cases in Ohio have received the most press of any of these opinions. Relying almost exclusively on standing, the Judge Rose has determined that a foreclosing party must show standing. “[I]n a foreclosure action, the plaintiff must show that it is the holder of the note and the mortgage at the time that the complaint was filed.” Id. at 653.

Judge Rose instructed the parties involved that the willful failure of the movants to comply with the general orders of the Court would in the future result in immediate dismissal of foreclosure actions.

Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Steele, 2008 WL 111227 (S.D. Ohio) January 8, 2008.

In Steele, Judge Abel followed the lead of Judge Rose and found that Deutsche Bank had filed evidence in support of its motion for default judgment indicating that MERS was the mortgage holder. There was not sufficient evidence to support the claim that Deutsche Bank was the owner and holder of the note as of that date. Following In re Foreclosure Cases, 2007 WL 456586, the Court held that summary judgment would be denied “until such time as Deutsche Bank was able to offer evidence showing, by a preponderance of evidence, that it owned the note and mortgage when the complaint was filed.” 2008 WL 111227 at 2. Deutsche Bank was given twenty-one days to comply. Id.

Illinois

U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Cook, 2009 WL 35286 (N.D. Ill. January 6, 2009).

Not all federal district judges are as concerned with the issues surrounding the transfer of notes and mortgages. Cook is a very pro lender case and, in an order granting a motion for summary judgment, the Court found that Cook had shown no “countervailing evidence to create a genuine issue of facts.” Id. at 3. In fact, a review of the evidence submitted by U.S. Bank showed only that it was the alleged trustee of the securitization pool. U.S. Bank relied exclusively on the “pooling and serving agreement” to show that it was the holder of the note. Id.

Under UCC Article 3, the evidence presented in Cook was clearly insufficient.

New York

HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Valentin, 21 Misc. 3D 1124(A), 2008 WL 4764816 (Table) (N.Y. Sup.) November 3, 2008. In Valentin, the New York court found that, even though given an opportunity to, HSBC did not show the ownership of debt and mortgage. The complaint was dismissed with prejudice and the “notice of pendency” against the property was cancelled.

Note that the Valentin case does not involve some sort of ambush. The Court gave every HSBC every opportunity to cure the defects the Court perceived in the pleadings.

California

In re Vargas, 396 B.R. 511 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2008)

and

In re Hwang, 396 B.R. 757 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2008)

These two opinions by Judge Bufford have been discussed above. Judge Bufford carefully explores the related issues of standing and ownership under both federal and California law.

Texas

In re Parsley, 384 B.R. 138 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008)

and

In re Gilbreath, 395 B.R. 356 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008)

These two recent opinions by Judge Jeff Bohm are not really on point, but illustrate another thread of cases running through the issues of motions for relief from stay in bankruptcy court and the sloppiness of loan servicing agencies. Both of these cases involve motions for relief that were not based upon fact but upon mistakes by servicing agencies. Both opinions deal with the issue of sanctions and, put simply, both cases illustrate that Judge Bohm (and perhaps other members of the bankruptcy bench in the Southern District of Texas) are going to be very strict about motions for relief in consumer cases.

SUMMARY

The cases cited illustrate enormous problems in the loan servicing industry. These problems arise in the context of securitization and illustrate the difficulty of determining the name of the holder, the assignee of the mortgage, and the parties with both the legal right under Article 3 and the standing under the Constitution to enforce notes, whether in state court or federal court.

Interestingly, with the exception of Judge Bufford and a few other judges, there has been less than adequate focus upon the UCC title issues. The next round of cases may and should focus upon the title to debt instrument. The person seeking to enforce the note must show that:

It is the holder of this note original by transfer, with all necessary rounds;
It had possession of the note before it was lost;
If it can show that title to the note runs to it, but the original is lost or destroyed, the holder must be prepared to post a bond;
If the person seeking to enforce is an agent, it must show its agency status and that its principal is the holder of the note (and meets the above requirements).

Then, and only then, do the issues of evidence of debt and default and assignment of mortgage rights become relevant.

 Whether or not Saxon, the servicer of the loan, has standing in the instant
case rises and falls with whether or not Consumer has standing. See In re
Kang Jin Hwang, 393 B.R. 701, 712 (C.D. Cal. 2008)(indicating that a loan
servicer cannot bring an action without the holder of the promissory note).
That is, if Consumer can demonstrate that it is the owner of both the deed
of trust and the promissory note, then it was proper for Saxon to have been
named a plaintiff at the outset of the litigation along with Consumer.

The trap of Forbearance agreements

Obviously there are a lot of home owners in trouble. You need to warn them of a trap that has been set for them. I’ve given you some information concerning my case, but I would appreciate 5 minutes of “talk time” at your convenience.

The “trap” is the use of a forbearance agreement. I can go into greater detail and show you the proof if you have the time. Here is how it works:

–

My case sets legal precedent in the mortgage loan industry. With the recent Court decisions the loan servicer’s plan for stealing a home is as follows:

HOW TO STEAL A HOME BY ORANGE COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE ANDREW BANKS APPROVED PLAN

1. File a Notice of Default

2. Within the 90 calendar days allotted for the Notice, stall the consumer’s rights for information concerning debt validation. RESPA Section 6 requires a loan servicer’s response within 60 business days (excluding holidays and weekends) of receipt of a Qualified Written Request. Mathematically, (lay out a calendar to prove it to yourself) the 90 calendar days is only 5 days longer than 60 business days and less than that if a holiday falls within the 60 days. For the 60 day response to “beat” the expiration of the Notice of Default the consumer would have to write a letter the very day a Notice of Default is filed (the consumer is seldom aware of the day of filing or that one is even being filed) because the lag in “mail time” will erase the 5 day “cushion”.

3. Toward the end of the 90 day Notice of Default timeframe the loan servicer contacts the consumer and offers a Forbearance Agreement to “postpone” the sale “until the details of the discrepancy of the records can be worked out”. The consumer hesitates to sign an agreement that overstates the amount they owe. The loan servicer refers to the language of the agreement that declares that “Unless all payments are made in accordance with the agreement, the agreement may immediately terminate and revert to the terms of the Original Note.” The loan servicer explains that all the consumer has to do is not make a payment if they “aren’t satisfied” with the results of the verification or for any other reason. They go on to explain that “The forbearance agreement is only a ‘time out’, giving all parties the opportunity to get to the truth and avoid the sale of the property”.

4. Once the forbearance agreement is signed, according to the Court’s decision in my case, the debt is forever verified and the consumer has no further rights under RESPA Section 6 or Section 809 (b) of The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Apparently a few Courts disagree with Judge Banks and agree with me on questioning the validity of such agreements.

In Waters v. Min Ltd., the court framed the question as whether the contract

“was such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the

one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other.

” 412 Mass. at 66, 587 N.E.2d 231.

The court noted that “[i]n Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697 (1945), the Supreme Court addressed the question of waiver under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Court held that “a statutory right conferred on a private party, but affecting the public interest, may not be waived or released if such waiver or release contravenes the statutory policy”…“The public benefits from enforcement of TILA because it creates a system of disclosure that improves the bargaining posture of all borrowers.” Therefore, such a waiver is unenforceable with regards to the TILA. (I have many more references concerning our situation).

The legislation that must be enacted, with the least cost to the taxpayer or the government and quickest remedy for the consumers, is to allow a certified program of Mortgage Loan Auditors, under the affiliation with or supervision of one or more of the already established organizations like HOPE NOW. The borrower pays an upfront audit fee and presents all necessary documentation, (original note, cancelled checks, etc.) that is required to preform a verifiable loan audit. The auditor’s work is then compared with the information provided to the borrower from the loan servicer. If there is a discrepancy between the two positions and the loan servicer is overstating the amounts owing, the independent auditor’s information is presented to the loan servicer for verification and proof positive to substantiate the difference. If the difference cannot be proven by the loan servicer, according to the terms of the original note and subsequent signed modifications, the loan servicer must immediately adjust the balances and credit any and all related charges and credit the cost of the loan audit that was pre-paid by the consumer. The result of finding of the discrepancy of the loan records is reported to HUD and any other regulatory agency that monitors loan servicers so any patterns of abuse can be compiled.

This process provides the transparency we have all so desperately sought and finally makes the loan servicer accountable for their mistakes. It costs the government nothing, it prevents loan servicing abuse. It finally makes enforcement of the statutes that have been unenforceable for decades possible. It makes finally allows each of us little people live longer in the homes we love so dearly on “Main Street”. Thank you for your time and HOPE you will make this CHANGE!

SUMMARY JUDGEMENT MOTION IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER COURT…IE.. WIN YOUR CASE IN 5 DAYS

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California Issues Foreclosure Moratorium

Carrie Bay | 02.25.09

California Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger approved a bill appended to the state’s budget package last week that institutes a 90-day foreclosure moratorium throughout the Golden State. Introduced by Sen. Ellen Corbett (D-San Leandro), the moratorium applies to first mortgages recorded between January 1, 2003 and January 1, 2008.

State regulators, however, can deem loan servicers and lenders exempt from the new law if they have a mortgage modification program already in place that includes principal deferral, interest rate reductions for five years or more, or extended loan terms. The lender’s loan restructuring program also has to ensure new monthly payments are no more than 38 percent of the borrower’s income. The state’s stipulated debt-to-income ratio is significantly lower than the 31 percent target called for in the Obama Administration’s Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan.

Kevin Stein, associate director of the California Reinvestment Coalition, told the San Francisco Chronicle, “It was a step backward from where things were going from an industry standpoint and a federal standpoint.”

According to the Chronicle, Corbett herself said that she would have liked a bill with stronger enforcement for modifications but was limited from more aggressive measures by the state’s banking regulators.

Mortgageorb.com reported that California’s banking groups, including the California Bankers Association and the California Mortgage Bankers Association, have written strong oppositions to the bill, arguing the moratorium will negatively impact home sales and further delay recovery.

Beth Mills, a spokesperson for the California Bankers Association, told the Chronicle that struggling borrowers and their lenders already have more than enough time to search for mutual solutions. Mills pointed out that a state law passed in 2008 increased the required time span between first notification of foreclosure and final sale of the property by 30 days, to a total of 141 days. According to Mills, more time is not the silver bullet to every troubled loan, the Chronicle said.

Federal bill would let judges modify home mortgages

Orlando Business Journal – by Richard Bilbao

The proposed Helping Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2009, for the first time ever, would let judges modify the terms of a home mortgage for someone who’s filed for personal bankruptcy.

More specifically, Senate Bill 61 and its companion bill H.R. 200, introduced in the House and Senate on Jan. 6, would allow judges to:

• Modify or reduce the principle balance on a home mortgage to its current market value, as opposed to when the home was bought.

• Stretch out a home mortgage for up to 40 years to help lower payments.

• Reduce and change a variable mortgage interest rate to a fixed-rate.

However, not every distressed home falls under the guidelines of the bill.

Both the Senate and House bills — sponsored by Sen. Richard Durbin, D-Ill., and Rep. John Conyers , D-Mich., respectively — require homeowners who’ve filed for personal bankruptcy to have:

• Been informed, beforehand, that the home will be subject to a foreclosure.

• A mortgage created prior to the date the bill passes.

• Certification that they tried and failed to negotiate a loan modification with the lender 15 days before filing for bankruptcy. However, this requirement would be waived if the home faces foreclosure within 30 days.

Modifying a loan to help a property stay out of foreclosure is common in the commercial sector, such as hotels and office buildings, as well as in some consumer sectors, such as cars.

But it’s unheard of for bankruptcy courts to modify home mortgages, said Roy Kobert, a bankruptcy attorney for Broad and Cassel in Orlando. “The present inability to modify home mortgages for Americans is the holy grail in consumer bankruptcy — it’s virtually impenetrable.”

In commercial bankruptcies, “the code permits judges to modify the mortgage amount and the interest rate, but also allows commercial lenders to participate in the appreciation of the collateral on a sliding scale basis,” he said.

That provision for residential lenders is not included in the Senate bill, but is in the House version, he said.

Risky business

Central Florida businesspeople have mixed reactions to a proposed federal law that could tip the balance of power in personal bankruptcy cases in favor of homeowners over lenders.

At least one local Realtor likes the proposed Helping Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2009.

Keeping homes out of foreclosure would make them easier to sell, because prospective buyers typically don’t look at foreclosed properties, said Kathleen Gallagher McIver, a broker with Re/Max Town and Country Realty in Winter Springs.

But giving courts the power to restructure a loan may leave a bitter taste in lenders’ mouths that can backfire on homeowners, said Rob Nunziata, president of FBC Mortgage LLC, an Orlando-based mortgage broker.

The proposed law would introduce a whole new type of risk for lenders and investors, who would have to fear having a court judge change the amount of return the investor originally expected to get. “Mortgages in bankruptcy have been considered sacred, but this could change the ground rules” for lending, said Nunziata.

For example, although the plan is only for existing mortgages, this could cause lenders to raise rates on future mortgages in fear of the law being modified to include new mortgages, he said.

But the proposed law may also help lenders, said Chip Herron, an attorney with Wolff, Hill, McFarlin & Herron P.A. in Orlando. “Creditors will be better off when there’s an owner who wants [to stay in a distressed home] and continue taking care of it,” he said.

The bill, if passed, also could cause a dramatic drop in personal bankruptcy filings and foreclosures due to some homeowners wanting to work things out instead of walking away, said Herron.

“This goes a long way to solving the real estate crisis. Someone will be setting a floor to what these homes are worth instead of letting them continue to devalue.”

Lenders Fighting Mortgage Rewrite Measure Targets Bankrupt Homeowners

Sen. Richard J. Durbin’s bill would allow bankruptcy judges to alter the terms of first mortgages for primary residences.
Sen. Richard J. Durbin’s bill would allow bankruptcy judges to alter the terms of first mortgages for primary residences. (By Alex Wong — Associated Press)

By Jeffrey H. Birnbaum
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, February 22, 2008; Page D01

The nation’s largest lending institutions are lobbying hard to block a proposal in Congress that would give bankruptcy judges greater latitude to rewrite mortgages held by financially strapped homeowners.

The proposal, which could come to a vote in the Senate as early as next week, is being pushed by Democratic congressional leaders and a large coalition of groups that includes labor unions, consumer advocates, civil rights organizations and AARP, the powerful senior citizens’ lobby.

The legislation would allow bankruptcy judges for the first time to alter the terms of mortgages for primary residences. Under the proposal, borrowers could declare bankruptcy, and a judge would be able to reduce the amount they owe as part of resolving their debts.

Currently, bankruptcy judges cannot rewrite first mortgages for primary homes. This restriction was adopted in the 1970s to encourage banks to provide mortgages to new home buyers.

The Democrats and their allies see the plan as an antidote to the recent mortgage crisis, especially among low-income borrowers with subprime loans. The legislation would prevent as many as 600,000 homeowners from being thrown into foreclosure, its advocates say.

“We should be giving families every reasonable tool to ensure they can keep a roof over their heads,” said Sen. Richard J. Durbin (Ill.), the Senate’s second-ranking Democrat and author of a leading version of the legislation.

But the banks argue that any help the proposal might provide to troubled homeowners in the short run would be offset by the higher costs that borrowers would have to pay to get mortgages in the future. The reason, banks say, is that they would pass along the added risk to borrowers in the form of higher interest rates, larger down payments or increased closing costs.
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If banks were unable to pass on the entire cost, they could be forced to trim their profits.

“This provision is incredibly counterproductive,” said Edward L. Yingling, president of the America Bankers Association. “We will lobby very, very strongly against it.”

The Durbin measure is part of a larger housing assistance bill being pushed by Democrats in the Senate. A separate version of the measure was approved late last year, mostly along party lines, by the House Judiciary Committee. The Bush administration has said that it opposes both provisions as overly coercive and potentially detrimental to the already strained mortgage market.

Lobbyists for major banks have made the proposal’s defeat a top priority. They have been meeting at least weekly to coordinate their efforts and have fanned out on Capitol Hill to meet with lawmakers and their staffs.

At least a dozen industry associations have banded together to fight the proposed legislation. They include the American Bankers Association, the Financial Services Roundtable, the Consumer Bankers Association and the Mortgage Bankers Association. These groups and others have signed joint letters to lawmakers on the issue.

In one of their letters, sent to Senate leaders last week, the groups wrote that the legislation would “have a very negative impact in the financial markets, which are struggling in part because of difficulties in valuing the mortgages that underlay securities [and] would greatly increase the uncertainty that already exists.”

Bank lobbyists have also gone online to make their case. The mortgage bankers have set up a Web site, http://www.mortgagebankers.org/StopTheCramDown, that can calculate how much mortgage costs might increase by state and by county if the Durbin measure were to become law. “Cram down” is the industry term for a forced easing of mortgage terms.

Supporters of the measure are also sending letters and meeting with lawmakers. A letter urging a quick vote on the proposal was delivered to Senate Majority Leader Harry M. Reid (Nev.) last week. It was signed by 19 organizations, including the Consumer Federation of America, the AFL-CIO, the National Council of La Raza, the U.S. Conference of Mayors and AARP.

The letter said, “The court-supervised modification provision is a commonsense solution that will help families save their homes without any cost to the U.S. Treasury, while ensuring that lenders recover at least what they would in a foreclosure.”

The Center for Responsible Lending, a pro-consumer watchdog group that backs Durbin’s effort, is trying to instigate voter e-mails to lawmakers on the subject. The group’s Web site includes a page that allows people to send electronic notes supporting the measure to their elected representatives with just a few clicks of a mouse.

AARP spokesman Jim Dau said his group will also ramp up its efforts. It may soon ask its activists to urge lawmakers to back the mortgage-redrafting legislation. AARP, which is the nation’s largest lobby group, has a list of 1.5 million volunteers whom it says it can call upon to contact lawmakers on legislative matters.

Banking and Lender Liability – Is the Genie Slipping out of the Bottle?

Title: Banking and Lender Liability – Is the Genie Slipping out of the Bottle?
Date: March 1998
Publication: Commercial Lending UPDATE
Author(s): Kenneth M. Van Deventer
Area(s) of Practice: Financial Services, Litigation

Recent decisions from courts in the State of New Jersey and a new wave of lawsuits against financial institutions – particularly class action lawsuits – may be a signal that this is no time for complacency in banking. Plaintiffs’ lawyers have regrouped and are ready for a creative new wave of attacks on banking practices. The present case law may give the plaintiffs’ lawyers the openings they have been waiting for. A general survey of some of these developments follows:

Sons of Thunder – The Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

In Sons of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., the Supreme Court of New Jersey fundamentally altered generally accepted rules of contract construction. Before Sons of Thunder, if a party did not breach its contractual obligations it could not be liable for bad faith. In the banking context, this meant, among other things, that a bank could call a loan, refuse to fund, refuse to roll over a loan, set off accounts, etc., no matter how drastic the foreseeable consequences might be to the borrower/customer, so long as the bank acted within expressly granted rights under the controlling loan documents. That may no longer be the case.

In Sons of Thunder, one party (“Borden”) to a contract for the supply of clams exercised a termination clause in the contract with the knowledge that the foreseeable consequences of its action would be the demise of the other party (“Sons of Thunder”). The Supreme Court upheld a jury verdict that, even though Borden did not breach express obligations of the contract in terminating the contract, it did breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and was, therefore, liable to Sons of Thunder for consequential damages, including lost profits.

In other words, the Court found that Borden had breached the implied covenant of good faith in fair dealing in performing its obligations under the contract. Specifically the Court ruled:

Because its conduct destroyed Sons of Thunder’s reasonable expectations and right to receive the fruits of the contract, Borden also breached the implied covenant of good faith found in New Jersey’s common law.

Bankers should not take comfort in the fact that Sons of Thunder involved clams instead of dollars. In Maharaja Travel, Inc. (“Maharaja”) v. Bank of India (“BOI”) a federal judge ruled that, under New York law, a bank could be liable for breach of the implied covenant of good faith of fair dealing even if it performed correctly under the expressed terms of the contract. In Maharaja, BOI entered into a credit facility with Maharaja pursuant to which it would provide letters of credit and other arrangements necessary for Maharaja to operate its travel business. The commitment letter signed by the parties specifically stated that “[t]hese facilities are available at [BOI’s] discretion.” After BOI refused to provide funds to Maharaja, Maharaja’s business failed and the law suit ensued. As in Sons of Thunder, the court found that BOI had not breached its contractual obligations under the credit facility. Nevertheless, the court refused to dismiss Maharaja’s claim for breach of contract because it found that even where a party performs according to the express terms of the contract:

A party’s action implicates the implied covenant of good faith if it acts so directly to impair the value of the contract for another party that it may be assumed that they are inconsistent with the intent of the parties.

Read together, Sons of Thunder and Maharaja signal an erosion, if not an outright end to the general rule of contract construction that a party will not incur liability for simply exercising the rights it contracted for, even if the consequences of that action are harsh on the other party to the contract. Banks in particular will now have to consider both the express terms of its contractual obligations, as well as the consequences of its acts or failure to act. Indeed, banks should assume that in every loan document there is a covenant substantively providing as follows:

Notwithstanding any right granted herein to Bank, nor any obligations undertaken by borrowers/customer, Bank shall be obligated to take such action as necessary to carry out the purposes for which this Agreement was made and to refrain from doing anything that would destroy or injure borrowers/customers’ right to receive the reasonably anticipated benefits of this Agreement.

Fiduciary Duties/Duty to Disclose

Last year, the New Jersey Appellate Division issued two important opinions addressing the legal relationship between a bank and its borrower/customer. In United Jersey Bank, Central v. 914 Westfield Avenue Associates, et al., the borrower claimed that the bank had fraudulently induced him to borrow funds in order to purchase a business that was also a customer of the bank and which t he bank knew was in declining financial condition.

According to the court, the borrower’s contentions raised “novel and far-reaching issues concerning a bank’s relationship with a client/customer and whether such relationship carries some fiduciary obligations.” The court denied summary judgment to the bank on the theory that a duty to disclose may exist even in the absence of a fiduciary relationship. Here, where the allegation was that the bank officers did offer some opinion as to the viability of the business, the allegations were sufficient to state a prima facia case for common law fraud against the bank. United Jersey Bank v. Kensey, et al., the courts were presented with different facts but substantively the same issue. In Kensey, the borrower knew that it was borrowing money to purchase a business and some property from an individual who was also a borrower of the bank, but whose loans were in default and being handled by the work-out department. The bank did not disclose, however, that it had an appraisal in its files indicating that the value of the property/business was less than the purchase price the borrower was paying for the property/business. When the new borrower defaulted and litigation ensued, he claimed that the bank breached a fiduciary duty owed to him to disclose the value in the bank’s own appraisal. Once again, the Appellate Division saw the case as presenting “novel and far-reaching issues concerning a bank’s relationship with its customers.”

The court noted, however, “the growing trend to impose a duty to disclose in many circumstances in which silence historically sufficed.” According to the court, “the common thread running through them is that the lender encouraged the borrower to repose special trust or confidence in its advice, thereby inducing the borrower’s reliance.” Finding that factor to be absent in the case before it, the court reaffirmed the general rule that banks have no duty to disclose information they may have concerning the financial viability of the transactions their borrowers are about to enter into. Accordingly, summary judgment was entered for the bank.

Although Kensey was a win for the bank, it is troubling that the Kensey and 914 Westfield Avenue courts recognized a trend of cases imposing liabilities on banks that historically were only imposed in the context of fiduciary relationships.

Other Banking Litigation Developments

Class Actions. There is a trend, which we predict will grow, for class actions attacking any uniform bank practice. Earlier updates discussed the wave of collateral protection insurance class action lawsuits. Now, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Lemelledo v. Beneficial Management, has ruled that the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, which allows treble damages and recovery of attorney’s fees, applies to a financial institution’s sale of insurance in conjunction with loans. Also, in Noel v. Fleet Finance, Inc., a Federal Judge in the Eastern District of Michigan recognized, among other things, the viability of a class action claim against lenders and mortgage brokers under the Truth In Lending Act for failing to disclose the yield spread premium paid by the lender to mortgage brokers. And this year, after the Eleventh Circuit in Culpepper v. Inland Mtge ruled that yield spread premiums were prohibited referral fees under RESPA, plaintiffs instituted a RICO class action based on that practice. Finally, in Cannon v. Nationwide Acceptance Corporation, a Federal Judge in the Northern District of Illinois allowed a RICO class action to be maintained on the basic premise that the lenders’ solicitation of new business induced existing borrowers to refinance existing loans rather than going the cheaper route of just borrowing more funds.

Environmental. In CoreStates/New Jersey National Bank v. D.E.P., a New Jersey Administrative Law Judge ruled that a lender obtaining property through foreclosure may lose the protections otherwise provided to lenders under the Spill Act if, after obtaining the property, it acts negligently in its maintenance of the property.

ECOA. In Machis Savings Bank v. Ramsdell, the Maine Supreme Court ruled that wives who co-signed a series of loans to their husbands’ construction company could defeat summary judgment on a foreclosure action on the basis of the allegation that they had not signed the loan modification agreements and on the affirmative defense of ECOA violations.

Parole Evidence/Statute of Frauds. In Nation Banks of Tennessee v. JDRC Corporation, et al., the Court of Appeals of Tennessee ruled that an internal commercial loan memorandum could satisfy the Statute of Frauds and that such internal bank documents were admissible, notwithstanding the Parole Evidence Rule, to prove an oral modification to written loan documents.

Bankruptcy. In, In re: Shady Grove Tech Center Associates Limited Partnership, a federal bankruptcy court in Maryland found “cause” to lift a stay where the debtor had executed a pre-p etition stay waiver, even though the real estate mortgage lender was adequately protected. The case is particularly interesting for its thorough discussion of the enforceability of pre-petition stay waiver agreements.

Lawyers that get it Niel Garfield list

Lawyers that get it Niel Garfield list
lawyers-that-get-it-02092

Fannie, Freddie Suspend Foreclosures Pending Administration’s Housing Plan

Carrie Bay | 02.13.09

Mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac announced on Friday that they are suspending all foreclosure sales and evictions of occupied properties through March 6th, in anticipation of the Obama Administration’s national foreclosure prevention and loan modification program.

Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner touched on the idea of a national mortgage relief program when he outlined the new administration’s Financial Stability Plan on Tuesday, but did not divulge any details on the specifics of the program. Geithner promised congressional leaders in a follow-up hearing that the program would be finalized within the next three weeks.

In a concerted effort to offer the full spectrum of assistance to troubled borrowers facing foreclosure, a number of large lenders also committed to a temporary foreclosure moratorium this week – holding out for a March 6th deadline for the government’s housing and mortgage aid initiative.

Fannie and Freddie had previously put in place a suspension of foreclosure sales and evictions through January and extended the eviction freeze through the end of February. In addition, the companies adopted a national Real Estate Owned (REO) Rental Policy that allows renters of foreclosed properties to remain in their homes or receive transitional financial assistance should they choose to seek new housing.

Watch for the Substitution of Trustee if they are recorded late INVALID FORECLOSURE SALE

House Panel Votes for Modification Safe Haven, Hope Overhaul…Now maybe they will lower the principal balance

Austin Kilgore | 02.05.09

Mortgage servicers that have been reluctant to perform certain loan modifications for fear of lawsuits for violating service agreements may have some relief coming.

The House Financial Services Committee voted Wednesday to create a legal safe haven for mortgage servicers that modify mortgages regardless of the original service agreements so long as they are in compliance with the Homeowner Emergency Relief Act. The proposal would also require servicers to report modification activity to the Treasury Department.

There may also be some hope for the struggling Hope for Homeowners program. The committee’s resolution would also overhaul the $300 billion mortgage guarantee program that’s barely put a dent in reducing foreclosures.

When Congress passed the original Hope for Homeowners legislation, the program was expected to help as many as 400,000 homeowners, but since it was launched in October, there have only been 451 applicants and only 25 loans have closed.

Charles McMillan, president of the National Association of Realtors, said, “Hope for Homeowners, was designed to help families refinance into safer, more affordable mortgages, in many cases helping those families avoid a devastating foreclosure. Despite being well-intentioned, the Hope for Homeowners program has had limited success. Lenders have found the program difficult to participate in because of many of the program’s constraints.”

The changes would lower participation standards, and cut costs for lenders and borrowers.

Massachusetts Rep. Barney Frank told the House Financial Services Committee, “There have been a series of trials and errors here,” in the efforts to fix the program.

A third provision would make permanent the temporary increase in FDIC bank depositor insurance from $100,000 to $250,000 per account.

The legislation is expected to be considered by the full House next week.
Back To Top Print

FORECLOSURE TEMPORARY RESTAINING ORDER TRO

exparte-application-bfortro THIS WAS GRANTED

Been Evicted need a stay of execution till Fraud case against lender decided …?

Many a client call me when its toooooo late however sometimes something can be done it would envolve an appeal and this application for a stay. Most likely you will have to pay the reasonable rental value till the case is decidedex-parte-application-for-stay-of-judgment-or-unlawful-detainer2

$8.4 Billion Countrywide Settlement… and why they only lower the interest!

I have gotten a number of calls asking if the home ownership retention program announced by Bank of America is likely to have an impact on foreclosures in CA. This program is a settlement with the CA Attorney General, Jerry Brown, and other state attorney generals that were suing Countrywide / Bank of America for predatory lending practices. It is expected to provide up to $8.4 Billion to 400,000 borrowers nationwide, with $3.5 Billion to 125,000 borrowers in CA.

While $8.4 Billion is a huge number – roughly 7.75% of BAC’s market cap today – it is literally a laughable amount. Problem is that it equals only $28,000 per loan in California. I compared that number to the average amount a California homeowner is upside down at the time of foreclosure – the average total debt is $26,200 more than they originally borrowed.(all that negative amortization) So in the best case scenario this puts borrowers back where they started, in loans they fundamentally can’t afford.So really it is nothing. The best thing is that it is admission of fault that could be used in individual cases against the lender in an individual action.

Note that they clearly state that principal balance reduction will only be available on a limited basis to restore negative equity from pay option ARMs – which makes sense given that they really don’t have enough money to do much more. Instead the primary goal is to ensure “modifications are affordable”. Given that they simply don’t have the money to lower principal balances to affordable levels, that means more artificially low payments… the exact thing that got us into this problem in the first place.

So back to the original question, will it likely impact foreclosures? Sort of, but only temporarily. It could impact your foreclosure if you were to copy the complaint and file your own case against countrywide at least you would not get a demur to the complaint. I posted the text of the complaint on Dec 31, 2008 California and everybody else V Countrywidecountrywide-complaint-form

They have graciously committed to not pursue foreclosure until they have contacted the owner and made a decision on program eligibility. So it appears to impact foreclosures, except that the recently passed SB1137 re codified as civil code 2923.5 and 2923.6 required them to do that anyway – so this claim is little more than spin.

Since this completely fails to address the underlying problem of the original loan amounts often exceeding current market value by $100k or more I’d also say the impact will only be temporary. Though that may still be a long time. In one case I recently reviewed Countrywide had a loan balance of over $900k on a home worth $550k – they modified the payment to 2% interest only for 5 years. The homeowner can afford it for now, but what happens in 5 years? Your’e kidding yourself if you think values are going back to those levels that quickly. Do we really still want to be cleaning this mess up 5 years from now?

Bottom line, Jerry Brown and the other state’s attorney generals have given Bank of America a gift. The opportunity to avoid litigation while getting the state’s endorsement for a plan that will never work and buying them precious time to find a way out of their dire predicament. Like the bailouts it’s possible it may help save this financial institution, but it will only delay our return to a stable and healthy real estate market.

Make them stop CALLING !!!

If you are in debt and getting harassed by bill collectors, there is a way to help get the debt collector harassment calls to stop. You can send a copy of the letter found below filled out to the collector notifying them of your wish for them to terminate communications with you. This is option is available to you under the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act under 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1692c (FDCPA).

Under the FDCPA, if a consumer notifies a debt collector in writing that the consumer refuses to pay a bill or that the consumer wants the collection agency to cease from further communication with the consumer the bill collector can no longer communicate with the consumer except for the following cases:

1. To notify the consumer (debtor) that the bill collector or collection agency may invoke specified remedies which are ordinarily invoked by such a bill collector or credit agency. These include wage garnishment or lawsuit.

2. To let the debtor know that future attempts to collect the debt will be ended.

3. Only where applicable, to let the debtor know that the bill collector intends to invoke a certain remedy. If the consumer cease and desist notice is done by mail, it shall be complete upon receipt of the creditor (hint: send the letter by certified mail).

Once you hire an attorney all calls from the bill collector must be directed to the attorney. By the statutes of the FDCPA or Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the collector must follow these rules. If you do get a call from a bill collector just let them know that you have retained an attorney to handle the debt for you. Let them know to contact that attorney.

Most collection agencies will back off at this point and just call the attorney. If they do continue to call you, the creditor would potentially be subject to a $1,000 fine for violating the FDCPA. The creditors know this and probably will follow the proper rules.

Sample Cease and Desist Letter
Below, you will find an example of a Cease and Desist Letter to mail to a bill collector. Copy and paste into a word processor to edit it. Make sure that you change it according to your personal information. Then mail it certified mail so that the bill collector gets it and it is acknowledged by a received signature.

* Date: ________

(Your name)
(Your Address)

(Name(s) on the credit account)
(Account #)
(Creditor name)

To: (Collection Department, Creditor, Bill Collector – whichever applies)

Since approximately (date when you got the first call), I have received many phone calls and letters from you concerning my overdue account with the above-named creditor.

Accordingly, under 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1692c of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, this is my formal notice to you to cease and desist all further communications with me.

Sincerely,

(Sign it)

(Print Full Name)
(Full Address)
(Home phone)

The Doan deal

California Civil Code 2923.6 enforces and promotes loan modifications to stop foreclosure in the state. California Civil Code 2923.6 (Servicer’s Duty under Pooling Agreements) went into effect on July 8, 2008. It applies to all loans from January 1, 2003, to December 31, 2007 secured by residential real property for owner-occupied residences.

The new law states that servicing agents for loan pools owe a duty to all parties in the pool so that a workout or modification is in the best interests of the parties if the loan is in default or default is reasonably foreseeable, and the recovery on the workout exceeds the anticipated recovery through a California foreclosure based on the current value of the property.

Almost all residential mortgages have Pooling and Servicing Agreements (“PSA”) since they were transferred to various Mortgage Backed Security Trusts after origination. California Civil Code 2823.6 broadens and extends this PSA duty by requiring servicers to accept loan modifications with borrowers.

How does this law apply?

Attorney Michael Doan provides this example of how the new law applies in his article entitled “California Foreclosures: Lenders Must Accept Loan Modifications” on the Mortgage Law Network blog. We removed the borrower’s name from the example for the sake of privacy.

A California borrower’s loan is presently in danger of foreclosure. The house he bought 2 years ago for $800,000 with a $640,000 first and $140,000 second, has now plummeted in value to $375,000. The borrower can no longer afford the $9,000 per month mortgage payment. But, he is willing, able, and ready to execute a modification of his loan on the following terms:

a) New Loan Amount: $330,000.00

b) New Interest Rate: 6% fixed

c) New Loan Length: 30 years

d) New Payment: $1978.52

While this new loan amount of $330,000 is less than the current fair market value, the costs of foreclosure need to be taken into account. Foreclosures typically cost the lender $50,000 per foreclosure. For example, the Joint Economic Committee of Congress estimated in June, 2007, that the average foreclosure results in $77.935.00 in costs to the homeowner, lender, local government, and neighbors. Of the $77,935.00 in foreclosure costs, the Joint Economic Committee of Congress estimates that the lender will suffer $50,000.00 in costs in conducting a non-judicial foreclosure on the property, maintaining, rehabilitating, insuring, and reselling the property to a third party. Freddie Mac places this loss higher at $58,759.00.

Accordingly, the anticipated recovery through foreclosure on a net present value basis is $325,000.00 or less and the recovery under the proposed loan modification at $330,000.00 exceeds the net present recovery through foreclosure of $325,000.00 by over $5,000.00. Thus, California Civil Code 2823.6 would mandate a modification to the new terms.

This new law remains in effect until January 1, 2013. Restructuring your mortgage will stop foreclosure and lower mortgage payments. Depending on your circumstances, you may also be able to lower your interest rate, as well. Visit the “Get Started” page to find out if you can benefit from this new California law and avoid foreclosure.

I HAVE A PLAN If the foreclosure has occured and you are now facing Eviction I HAVE A PLAN

The next thing you can expect is a knock on your door. It will be the friendliest guy or gal that you would ever want to meet. Its the real estate agent with orders to get you out of the house. They may offer you cash for keys or whatever remember they are not your friend they have one purpose and one purpose only. TO GET YOU AND YOUR FAMILY OUT.
They may say things like don’t worry we can get you back in the house and you can buy it back. I had one Realtor promise that the people could buy back the house they just needed to move out over the weekend and the lender would work things out for them. They did only to find the Marshall had posted the house and nobody could get back in except a 3 hour period to get their stuff to the curb. Don’t let it happen to you.

In California tenants have 60 days and former owners 3 days before an eviction can be stated.

Step 1 send the party that gives you this notice a rental agreement showing someone as being a tenant in the house. (This will get you Sixty days)

Step 2 File a lawsuit for fraud and improper sale in that 2923.5 was not complied with prior to sale. sample-bank-final-complaint1
Step 3 File a Lis Pendenslisp-for-client

Step 4 Make motion to consolidate eviction with Superior court case.galejacksonconsolidation Alternative to Step 4 would be to apply for a temporary restraining order to hold the eviction till Fraud Case determined. Alternative to step 4 actually a Step 5 would be a motion in the unlawful detainer court for a stay of the judgment till the outcome of the Fraud case.

What will this do?

In the worst case it will keep you in your house and you may have to post a bond equaling the reasonable rental value of your house. Let me take that back just remember Judges have the power and the can disregard the law and the constitution and put you out without even a trial. This is the extreme and some days are extreme. The lenders lawyers are in front of that judge all the time, but as a whole you can expect a fair minded judge.

In the best case you could be in your house without having to post a bond and you will be offered the house back at today’s value and a low rate of interest.

San Marcos California Foreclosure mess thier Modification department is outsourced to India

by nowaq
(san marcos ca usa)

My mortgage is being service by Option One Mortgage co. It started with 6.14% and first reset 1-01-07 to 9.14%. I was behind on my payment on the first resetting I called Option to make arrangement payment but I was told that I’m not qualified bec. I’ve been late a month only and loan mod. is only for people who are behind for more than 2 mos. In my situation, a mortgage of $3655 plus a second mortgage loan of $378 is hard to come up with for 2 mos. Third mo. came I called again asking for loan modification but this time, I was dealing with people from India telling me to sell my house because I can’t afford it. I explained to him whats going on my side and requested to talk mitigation officer but this person said that he is the mitigation officer. I hung up on him. I received a notice of default after that. I have a sheriff sale on 8-07-07 but filed Bk 13 so I can keep my house and hoping that things will get better soon and be on track again. Don’t deal with sales rep. from other countries. Demand to talk with US reps that at least know whats going on here. Maybe if I was dealing with US reps. I was able to do loan mod. and not to go thru this foreclosure and BK. I’m hoping also that these mortgage cos. learned their lesson of not using sales reps from other countries. My situation was doable at the beginning but once past 2 mos. My loan reset again last 7-01-07 to 11.14% and by 1-01-08 it will be 13.14%. Also, if you have hard time paying with your credit card bills, don’t use debt settlement cos. The only time they can start negotiating for you is when you are in collection, they wont tell you up front. They will only tell you that it has to be bad in order to get better.

My plan for Loan Modifications i.e. Attorney loan mod

Recent Loan Modification studies have shown that a large percentage of traditional loan modifications put the borrowers more upside down than when they started.
Unfortunately many loan mods are leaving people with higher monthly payments. In many loan modifcation the money you did not pay gets tacked on to the back of the loan… Increasing your loan balance and making you more upside down. This is why over 50% of all loan mods are in default. They are not fixing the problem they are just postponing it.

Before you go into default on your loans at the advice of some former subprime loan seller, make sure you understand that absent finding some legal leverage over the lender you have a good chance of seeing your payments going up.

Our Loan Modification program includes

1. Upside Down Analysis

2. Qualified Written Request and offer of Loan Modification

3. Letter informing lender of clients election to pursue remedies carved out by recent California Law under 2923.6 and or Federal Programs under the Truth in lending Act and the Fair Debt collection practices Act.

4. Letter Disputing debt (if advisable)

5. Cease and Desist letters (if advisable)

6. Follow up, contact with negotiator, and negotiation by an attorney when needed.
By now many of you have read about all the Federal Governments Loan Modification Programs. Others have been cold called by a former loan brokers offering to help you with your Loan Modification. Its odd that many of the brokers who put people into these miserable loans are now charging people up front to get out of the them.

Before you spend thousands of dollars with someone, do an investigation:

1. Is the person licensed by the California Department of Real Estate? Or, the California State Bar?

2. Are your potential representatives aware that have to be licensed according to the DRE?

3. Are they asking you for money up front? They are violating the California Foreclosure Consultant act if they are neither CA attorneys nor perhaps Real Estate brokers in possesion of a no opinion letter from the California Department of Real Estate? Note… if a Notice of Default has been filed against your residence only attorneys acting as your attorney can take up front fees. Don’t fall for “attorney backed” baloney. Are you retaining the services of the attorney or not? Did you sign a retainer agreement ?

4. If your potential representative is not an attorney make sure he or she is a Real Estate Broker capable of proving their upfront retainer agreement has been given a no opinon letter by the DRE. (As of November 2008 – only 14 non attorney entites have been “approved by the DRE.)

5. If somone says they are attorney backed – ask to speak with the attorney. What does attorney backed mean? From what we have seen it is usually a junk marketing business being run by someone who can not get a proper license to do loan modifications.

6. Find out how your loan modification people intend to gain leverage over the lender.

7. If you are offered a loan audit or a Qualfied Written Request under RESPA letter – will an attorney be doing the negotiating against the lender? Will you have to hire the attorney after you pay for your loan audit? Doesn’t that put cart before the horse?

8. Will it do you any good to have a loan audit done if you later have to go out and retain an attorney. You want to retain their services of an attorney before you pay for the audit. The loan audit is the profit center; negotiation takes time.
9. What kind of results should you expect?

10. Who will be doing your negotiating?

11. Will the Loan Modification request go out on Legal Letterhead?

12. How much will you have to pay? Are you looking for a typical loan mod result or are you looking to leverage the law in the hopes of getting a better than average loan mod result.

13. What if your are not satisfied with the loan modification offered by the lender?

14. Should you go into default on both loans prior to requesting a loan modification? Why? What happens if the loan mod does not work out to your satisfaction? (very important question.)

15. Will an attorney review the terms of your loan modification with you? Will you have to waive your anti-deficiency protections if you sign your loan modification paperwork? Will an attorney help you leverage recent changes in California law in an attempt to get a substantial reduction in the principle?

TRO Granted v Downey Savings

weinshanktroorder

fighting the good fight

Hi & Thank You for all that you are doing,

We sent a letter to the Trustee company (Quality Loan Service) alerting them that they did not comply with Oregon statutes because they did not properly record the Trustee’s Notice of Sale in BOTH of the counties that the property is located in. The foreclosure auction scheduled for Tuesday 01/20/2009 was subsequently “Cancelled” by the Trustee company.

We know that we can expect them to re-file a new Trustee’s Notice of Sale. All the foreclosure paperwork dating back to 2004 (‘yes … we have been fighting the good fight’) and the original loan documents that were signed at closing state “Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc., as NOMINEE for Lime Financial”. My questions are:
1. If Lime Financial is out of business and no longer exists (according to their representatives via phone) who will MERS act as Nominee for?
2. We know that Lime Financial sold/securitized the loan to “US Bank N,A. as Trustee for the Registered Holders of Home Equity Asset Trust 2005-1”. Are they now the benficiary?
3. What actions (from A-Z) should we be taking NOW if our all consuming goal is to obtain “quiet title” and be mortgage free?

Any and all help that you can provide is sincerely appreciated.

Greg Lisa

________________________________________

2923.6 complaint

form29236complaint

Firm pursuing foreclosure might not be your lender

By PAULA LAVIGNE
REGISTER STAFF WRITER

Figuring out which company to deal with during a foreclosure can be daunting. Even if the original mortgage was with a company recognized by the borrower, that company may not be the one acting against the borrower in court.

For example: Wells Fargo filed more than 3,600 foreclosure lawsuits in Iowa from January 2005 to February 2008, more than any other company identified in Iowa court data. But the company could be taking legal action because it processed payments for another mortgage company or acted as a trustee for investors – not because it’s the original lender.

Two company names that often appear on Iowa foreclosures – Deutsche Bank and Mortgage Electronic Registration System, or MERS – can be even more puzzling to borrowers.

Deutsche Bank, a global financial services firm with headquarters in Germany, may be listed as a loan’s owner of record, but it likely doesn’t have an actual stake in foreclosure proceedings. The firm acts as a trustee for investors holding mortgage-backed securities.

A loan winds up in a mortgage- backed security after it is sold by the company that originated the note. An investment bank pools that loan with others. It then sells securities, which represent a portion of the total principal and interest payments on the loans, to investors such as mutual funds, pension funds and insurance companies.

MERS, meanwhile, is neither the servicer nor the lender. Companies pay the firm to represent them and track loans as they change hands.

So while MERS should be able to point borrowers to the appropriate contact in a foreclosure proceeding, Deutsche Bank urges borrowers to contact loan servicers instead.

A tip for borrowers facing a foreclosure action: Make sure the company bringing the foreclosure action has the legal right to do so.

University of Iowa law professor Katherine Porter led a national study of 1,733 foreclosures and found that 40 percent of the creditors filing the lawsuits did not show proof of ownership. The study will be published later this year.

Companies, she said, have been “putting the burden on the consumer – who is bankrupt – to try to decide whether it’s worth it to press the issue.”

Max Gardner III, a bankruptcy attorney in North Carolina and a national foreclosure expert, said the trend is spreading to other states. “You have to prove in North Carolina that you have the original note,” he said. “Judges have not (asked for) that very often, until the last five or six months.”

MERS and Deutsche Bank faced court challenges last year over whether they had legal standing to bring a foreclosure action, with mixed results.

A federal judge in Florida ruled in favor of MERS, dismissing a class-action lawsuit that claimed the company did not have the right to initiate foreclosures. But a federal judge in Ohio ruled against Deutsche Bank, dismissing 14 foreclosure lawsuits after Deutsche Bank couldn’t provide proof of ownership. The Ohio attorney general has not been successful in getting state judges to follow suit.

In Iowa, attorneys and lending experts say they haven’t seen similar rulings against Deutsche Bank

Unlawful detainer law and forclosure law colide

The Lender has already foreclosed on your house at the time they bring a Unlawful Detainer action against you. The Unlawful Detainer is just an eviction and not a foreclosure proceeding. If you want to stop the eviction, you have to claim that they have no right to evict because of a defective deed due to fact that they are not true lender, etc.

A qualified exception to the rule that title cannot be tried in an unlawful detainer proceeding [see Evid Code § 624; 5.45[1][c]] is contained in CCP § 1161a. By extending the summary eviction remedy beyond the conventional landlord-tenant relationship to include purchasers of the occupied property, the statute provides for a narrow and sharply focused examination of title.

A purchaser of the property as described in the statute, who starts an unlawful detainer proceeding to evict an occupant in possession,must show that he or she acquired the property at a regularly conducted sale and thereafter “duly perfected” the title [CCP § 1161a; Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 C3d 251, 255, 142 CR 414, 572 P2d 28 ]. To this limited extent, as provided by the statute, title
may be litigated in the unlawful detainer proceeding [ Cheney v. Trauzettel (1937) 9 C2d 158, 159, 69 P2d 832 ].

CCP § 1161
1. In General; Words and Phrases
Term “duly” implies that all of those elements necessary to valid sale exist. Kessler v. Bridge (1958, Cal App Dep’t Super Ct) 161 Cal App 2d Supp 837, 327 P2d 241, 1958 Cal App LEXIS 1814.
Title that is “duly perfected” includes good record title, but is not limited to good record title. Kessler v. Bridge (1958, Cal App Dep’t Super Ct) 161 Cal App 2d Supp 837, 327 P2d 241, 1958 Cal App LEXIS 1814.

Title is “duly perfected” when all steps have been taken to make it perfect, that is, to convey to purchaser that which he has purchased, valid and good beyond all reasonable doubt. Kessler v. Bridge (1958, Cal App Dep’t Super Ct) 161 Cal App 2d Supp 837, 327 P2d 241, 1958 Cal App LEXIS 1814.
The purpose of CCP 1161a, providing for the removal of a person holding over after a notice to quit, is to make clear that one acquiring ownership of real property through foreclosure can evict by a summary procedure. The policy behind the statute is to provide a summary method of ouster where an occupant holds over possession after sale of the property. Gross v. Superior Court (1985, Cal App 1st Dist) 171 Cal App 3d265, 217 Cal Rptr 284, 1985 Cal App LEXIS 2408.

unlawful-detainer-and-questions-of-title

Truth In Lending Audit Checklist

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HOEPA audit checklist

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What Is Predatory Lending?

Predatory Lending are abusive practices used in the mortgage industry that strip borrowers of home equity and threaten families with bankruptcy and foreclosure.

Predatory Lending can be broken down into three categories: Mortgage Origination, Mortgage Servicing; and Mortgage Collection and Foreclosure.

Mortgage Origination is the process by which you obtain your home loan from a mortgage broker or a bank.

Predatory lending practices in Mortgage Origination include:
# Excessive points;
# Charging fees not allowed or for services not delivered;
# Charging more than once for the same fee
# Providing a low teaser rate that adjusts to a rate you cannot afford;
# Successively refinancing your loan of “flipping;”
# “Steering” you into a loan that is more profitable to the Mortgage Originator;
# Changing the loan terms at closing or “bait & switch;”
# Closing in a location where you cannot adequately review the documents;
# Serving alcohol prior to closing;
# Coaching you to put minimum income or assets on you loan so that you will qualify for a certain amount;
# Securing an inflated appraisal;
# Receiving a kickback in money or favors from a particular escrow, title, appraiser or other service provider;
# Promising they will refinance your mortgage before your payment resets to a higher amount;
# Having you sign blank documents;
# Forging documents and signatures;
# Changing documents after you have signed them; and
# Loans with prepayment penalties or balloon payments.

Mortgage Servicing is the process of collecting loan payments and credit your loan.

Predatory lending practices in Mortgage Servicing include:
# Not applying payments on time;
# Applying payments to “Suspense;”
# “Jamming” illegal or improper fees;
# Creating an escrow or impounds account not allowed by the documents;
# Force placing insurance when you have adequate coverage;
# Improperly reporting negative credit history;
# Failing to provide you a detailed loan history; and
# Refusing to return your calls or letters.
#

Mortgage Collection & Foreclosure is the process Lenders use when you pay off your loan or when you house is repossessed for non-payment

Predatory lending practices in Mortgage Collection & Foreclosure include:
# Producing a payoff statement that includes improper charges & fees;
# Foreclosing in the name of an entity that is not the true owner of the mortgage;
# Failing to provide Default Loan Servicing required by all Fannie Mae mortgages;
# Failing to follow due process in foreclosure;
# Fraud on the court;
# Failing to provide copies of all documents and assignments; and
# Refusing to adequately communicate with you.

CTX Mortgage Company, LLC / CTX Mortgage / Centex HomesCTX Mortgage Company / Centex Homes Predatory Lending Bait and Switch? Maitland Central Florida

September 2005, we signed a purchase contract and made a $12,000 deposit for a Centex Town Home in Oviedo, Florida. The builder’s mortgage company, CTX Mortgage, offered $3,000 in incententives so we decided to use them. We were given a Good Faith Estimate and interest rate of 6.25% but were told we could not lock in because it was too far off from the closing.

By late November 2005, we had heard nothing from CTX, so we contacted them to lock in a rate. We were again told that we needed to wait until the closing date was determined. We were given three new Good Faith Estimates with rates between 6.840% – 7.090% and were told they were the best CTX could offer, but we were approved for all three scenarios. We decided to shop around and received a Good Faith Estimate with a rate of 6.625% from Wells Fargo. A few days later, Centex contacted us to schedule the closing. We told them we were going to use Wells Fargo but were told that we could not change lenders after the completion of the framing inspection, which took place on October 21, 2005. We reviewed the contract and found a page this to be true. So we agreed to proceed with CTX but complained about the rate increases on the good faith estimates. Our file was transferred to a new loan officer, Jennifer Powell. According to her, our original loan officer had never ran our credit and we were not approved for any of the good faith estimates she provided to us.

Our closing was scheduled for Dec 28, 2005. Between December 8th and December 27th, we received five different good faith estimates from Jennifer (6.75% on December 8th, 7.75% on December 20th, 7.99% on December 21st, 9.125% on December 22th, and 9.375% on December 28th). Jennifer said my ‘low income’ made me high risk, which caused the rates to jump. We told Jennifer that the significant rate increase made the mortgage payments completely unaffordable for us and pleaded with her to either allow us to seek other financing or cancel the contract. She said either take the rate they gave us or lose our deposit of $12,000. We did not want to close on the property, but were not prepared to walk away empty-handed, so we asked for a loan program that would allow us to refinance without penalty. This is what made the rates jump up to 9.375% and 13.550% (an 80/20 loan).

The closing documents were not made available to us until 6:30 p.m. the night before our closing. We stayed in their office to review everything and noticed that my income on the application that CTX had prepeared was double my true income. We asked Jennifer why this was and she told us that in order to get approval, my income had to be ?stated?, meaning my income would not be verified by the lender. Please note in the above paragraph that we were told the rates were high because of my ‘low income’. After the closing, CTX immediately sold our loans, even before the first payment was due. There is only one reason why they offer mortgages and that is to rip people off!!!!

We have struggled for the past year and now have two liens against our property and our credit is ruined! We believe that what CTX Mortgage did is termed Predatory Lending. They tricked us, showing us good rates until it was too late for us to change lenders. We have two young daughters, a 5 year-old and a 3 month-old, and we are in jeopardy of losing our home. We are going to file a complaint with any and all agencies we can but would really like to hear from anyone else who has had this problem. I don’t know how these people sleep at night!

Constance
Oviedo, Florida
U.S.A.

Click here to read other Rip Off Reports on CENTEX (CAVCO HOMES)

My one published case…. it would be for sanctions….

hanshaw

RESPA violations Washington Mutual wants to depublish

RESPA: Washington Mutual (i) charged hundreds of dollars in “underwriting fees” when the underwriting fee charged by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to WAMU was only $20 and (ii) marked up the charges for real estate tax verifications and wire transfer fees. The court followed Kruse v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (2d Cir. 2004) 383 F.3d 49, holding that marking up costs, for which no additional services are performed, is a violation of RESPA. Such a violation of federal law constitutes an unlawful business practice under California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) and a breach of contract. Plaintiffs also stated a cause of action for an unfair business practice under the UCL based on the allegation that WAMU led them to believe they were being charged the actual cost of third-party services.mckell_v_washingtonmutual

Usury is comming back as a viable cause of action

Loans
Loans (Photo credit: zingbot)

USURY: The trial court improperly granted a motion for summary judgment on the basis that the loan was exempt from the usury law.

1. The common law exception to the usury law known as the “interest contingency rule” provides that interest that exceeds the legal maximum is not usurious when its payment is subject to a contingency so that the lender’s profit is wholly or partially put in hazard. The hazard in question must be something over and above the risk which exists with all loans – that the borrower will be unable to pay.
2. The court held that the interest contingency rule did not apply to additional interest based on a percentage of the sale price of completed condominium units because the lender was guaranteed additional interest regardless of whether the project generated rents or profits.
3. The loan did not qualify as a shared appreciation loan, permitted under Civil Code Sections 1917-1917.006, because the note guaranteed the additional interest regardless of whether the property appreciated in value or whether the project generated profits.
4. The usury defense may not be waived by guarantor of a loan. (No other published case has addressed this issue.)wri_opportunityloans_v_cooper

Never sign a stack of papers…

FORGERY: This criminal case involves a conviction for forgery of a deed of trust. [NOTE: The crime of forgery can occur even if the owner actually signed the deed of trust. The court pointed out that “forgery is committed when a defendant, by fraud or trickery, causes another to execute a document where the signer is unaware, by reason of such trickery, that he is executing a document of that nature.” people_v_martinez