Modifying a Shopping Mall Mortgage

Timothy McCandless Esq. and Associates
Offices Statewide

(909)890-9192
(925)957-9797
FAX (909) 382-9956
tim@Prodefenders.com

http://www.timothymccandless.com

(Adapted from the October 30, 2009 Policy Statement on Prudent Commercial Real Estate Loan Workouts)

Introduction

In response to the residential mortgage crisis, and in anticipation of the looming commercial mortgage crisis of much greater potential magnitude, the federal banking regulators got together and issued a policy statement to encourage lenders to modify commercial mortgages and other loans secured by commercial real estate. Attachment 1 to the Policy Statement featured six example scenarios to help lenders to understand that the question isn’t whether you modify a loan, but rather how you modify a loan, that may result in regulatory penalization.

From the statement: “[t]he regulators have found that prudent CRE loan workouts are often in the best interest of the financial institution and the borrower. Examiners are expected to take a balanced approach in assessing the adequacy of an institution’s risk management practices for loan workout activity. Financial institutions that implement prudent CRE loan workout arrangements after performing a comprehensive review of a borrower’s financial condition will not be subject to criticism for engaging in these efforts even if the restructured loans have weaknesses that result in adverse credit classification. In addition, renewed or restructured loans to borrowers who have the ability to repay their debts according to reasonable modified terms will not be subject to adverse classification solely because the value of the underlying collateral has declined to an amount that is less than the loan balance. ”

What follows is the regulator’s example of modifying a shopping mall mortgage.

Note:

* The financial regulators consist of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), and the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) State Liaison Committee (collectively, the regulators).

BASE CASE: A lender originated a 36-month $10 million loan for the construction of a shopping mall to occur over 24 months with a 12-month lease-up period to allow the borrower time to achieve stabilized occupancy before obtaining permanent financing. The loan had an interest reserve to cover interest payments over the three-year term of the credit. At the end of the third year, there is $10 million outstanding on the loan, as the shopping mall has been built and the interest reserve, which has been covering interest payments, has been fully drawn.

At the time of origination, the appraisal reported an “as stabilized” market value of $13.5 million for the property. In addition, the borrower had a take-out commitment that would provide permanent financing at maturity. A condition of the take-out lender was that the shopping mall had to achieve a 75 percent occupancy level. Due to weak economic conditions, the property only reached a 55 percent occupancy level at the end of the12-month lease up period and the original takeout commitment became void. Mainly due to a tightening of credit for these types of loans, the borrower is unable to obtain permanent financing elsewhere when the loan matured in February (i.e., due to market factors and not due to the borrower’s financial condition).

SCENARIO 1: The lender renewed the loan for an additional year to allow for a higher lease-up rate and for the borrower to seek permanent financing. The extension is at a market rate that provides for the incremental credit risk and on an interest-only basis. While the property’s historical cash flow was insufficient at 0.92x debt service ratio, recent improvements in the occupancy level now provides adequate coverage. Recent improvements include the signing of several new leases with other leases currently being negotiated.

In addition, current financial statements reflect that the builder, who personally guarantees the debt, has sufficient cash on deposit at the lender plus other liquid assets. These assets provide sufficient cash flow to service the borrower’s global debt service requirements on a principal and interest basis, if necessary. The guarantor covered the initial cash flow shortfalls from the project and provided a good faith principal curtailment of $200,000 at renewal. A recent appraisal on the shopping mall reports an “as is” market value of $10 million and an “as stabilized” market value $11 million.

Classification: The lender internally graded the loan as a pass and is monitoring the credit. The examiner agreed with the lender’s internal loan grade. The examiner concluded that the project continues to progress and now cash flows the interest payments. The guarantor currently has the ability and demonstrated willingness to supplement the project’s cash flow and service the borrower’s global debt service requirements. The examiner concurred that the interest-only terms were reasonable because the renewal was short-term and the project and the guarantor have demonstrated repayment capacity. In addition, this type of loan structure is commonly used to allow a project to achieve stabilized occupancy, but any subsequent loan terms should likely have a principal amortization component. The examiner also agreed that the LTV should be based on the “as stabilized” market value as the lender is financing the project through the lease-up period.

Nonaccrual Treatment: The lender maintained the loan on accrual status as the guarantor has sufficient funds to cover the borrower’s global debt service requirements over the one-year period of the renewed loan. Full repayment of principal and interest is reasonably assured from the project’s and guarantor’s cash flow despite a decline in the collateral margin. The examiner concurred with the lender’s accrual treatment.

TDR Treatment: The lender concluded that while the borrower has been affected by declining economic conditions, the level of deterioration does not warrant TDR treatment. The borrower was not experiencing financial difficulties because the borrower and guarantor have the ability to service the renewed loan, which was prudently underwritten at a market rate of interest, plus the borrower’s other obligations on a timely basis, and the lender’s expectation to collect the full amount of principal and interest from the borrower’s or guarantor’s sources (i.e., not from interest reserves). The examiner concurred with the lender’s rationale and TDR treatment.

SCENARIO 2: The lender restructured the loan on an interest-only basis at a below market rate for one year to provide additional time to increase the occupancy level and thereby enable the borrower to arrange permanent financing. The level of lease-up remains relatively unchanged at 55 percent and the shopping mall projects a debt service coverage ratio of 1.02x based on the preferential loan terms. At the time of the restructuring, the lender inappropriately based the selection of the below market interest rate on outdated financial information, which resulted in a positive cash flow projection even though file documentation available at the time of the restructuring reflected that the borrower anticipates the shopping mall’s income stream will decline due to rent concessions, the loss of a tenant, and limited prospects for finding new tenants. Current financial statements indicate the builder, who personally guarantees the debt, is highly leveraged, has limited cash or liquid assets, and has other projects with delinquent payments. A recent appraisal on the shopping mall reports an “as is” market value of $9 million, which results in a LTV ratio of 111 percent.

Classification: The lender internally graded the loan as substandard. The examiner disagreed with the internal grade and classified the amount not protected by the collateral value, $1 million, as loss and required the lender to charge-off this amount. The examiner did not factor costs to sell into the loss classification analysis, as the source of repayment is not reliant on the sale of the collateral at this time. The examiner classified the remaining loan balance, based on the property’s “as is” market value of $9 million, as substandard given the borrower’s uncertain repayment capacity and weak financial support.

Nonaccrual Treatment: The lender determined the loan did not warrant being placed on nonaccrual status. The examiner did not concur with this treatment because the partial charge-off is indicative that full collection of principal is not anticipated and the lender has continued exposure to additional loss due to the project’s insufficient cash flow and reduced collateral margin, and the guarantor’s limited ability to provide further support.

TDR Treatment: The lender reported the restructured loan as a TDR because (a) the borrower is experiencing financial difficulties as evidenced by the high leverage, delinquent payments on other projects, and inability to meet the proposed exit strategy because of the inability to lease the property in a reasonable timeframe; and (b) the lender granted a concession as evidenced by the reduction in the interest rate to a below market rate. The examiner concurred with the lender’s TDR treatment.

SCENARIO 3: Current financial statements indicate the borrower and the guarantor have minimal other resources available to support this credit. The lender chose not to restructure the $10 million loan into a new single amortizing note of $10 million at a market rate of interest because the project’s projected cash flow would only provide a 0.88x debt service coverage ratio as the borrower has been unable to lease space. A recent appraisal on the shopping mall reported an “as is” market value of $9 million, which results in a LTV of 111 percent. Therefore, at the original loan’s maturity in February, the lender restructured the $10 million debt into two notes. The lender placed the first note of $7.2 million (i.e., the A note) on monthly payments that amortize the debt over 20 years at a market rate of interest that provides for the incremental credit risk. The project’s debt service coverage ratio equals 1.20x for the $7.2 million loan based on the shopping mall’s projected net operating income. The lender placed the second note of the remaining principal balance of $2.8 million (i.e., the B note) into a 2 percent interest-only loan that is scheduled to reset in five years to an amortizing payment. The lender then charged-off the $2.8 million note due to the project’s lack of repayment capacity and to provide reasonable collateral protection for the remaining on-book loan of $7.2 million. Since the restructuring, the borrower has made payments on both loans for more than six consecutive months.

Classification: The lender internally graded the on-book loan of $7.2 million as a pass credit due to the fact that the borrower has demonstrated the ability to perform under the modified terms. The examiner agreed with the lender’s grade as the lender restructured the original obligation into A and B notes, the lender charged off the B note, and the borrower has demonstrated the ability to repay the A note. Using this multiple note structure with the charge-off of the B note enables the lender to recognize interest income and limit the amount reported as a TDR in future periods. If the lender had restructured the loan into a single note, the credit classification and the nonaccrual and TDR treatments would have been different.

Nonaccrual Treatment: The lender restored the on-book loan of $7.2 million to accrual status as the borrower has the ability to repay the loan, has a record of performing at the revised terms for more than six months, and full repayment of principal and interest is expected. The examiner concurred with the lender’s accrual treatment. Interest payments received on the off-book loan have been recorded as recoveries because, in this case, full recovery of principal and interest on this loan was not reasonably assured.

TDR Treatment: The lender reported the restructured on-book loan of $7.2 million as a TDR. The lender determined that the on-book loan should be reported as a TDR, consistent with the regulatory reporting guidance because (a) the borrower is experiencing financial difficulties as evidenced by the borrower’s high leverage, delinquent payments on other projects, and failure to meet the proposed exit strategy because of the inability to lease the property in a reasonable timeframe and the unlikely collectibility of the charged-off loan; and (b) the lender granted a concession. The concessions included a below market interest rate and protracted payment requirements on the charged-off portion of the debt and extending the on-book loan beyond expected timeframes.

If the borrower continues to perform according to the modified terms of the restructured loan, the lender plans to stop reporting the on-book loan as a TDR after the regulatory reporting defined time period expires because it was restructured with a market rate of interest. For example, since the restructuring occurred in February, the $7.2 million on-book loan should be reported as a TDR on the lender’s March, June, September, and December regulatory reports. The TDR reporting could cease on the lender’s following March regulatory report if the borrower continues to perform according to the modified terms. The examiner concurred with this planned treatment.

SCENARIO 4: Current financial statements indicate the borrower and the guarantor have minimal other resources available to support this credit. The lender restructured the $10 million loan into a new single note of $10 million at a market rate of interest that provides for the incremental credit risk and is on an amortizing basis. The project’s projected cash flow reflects a 0.88x debt service coverage ratio as the borrower has been unable to lease space. A recent appraisal on the shopping mall reports an “as is” market value of $9 million, which results in a LTV of 111 percent. Based on the property’s current market value of $9 million, the lender charged-off $1 million immediately after the renewal.

Classification: The lender internally graded the remaining $9 million on-book portion of the loan as a pass credit because the lender’s analysis of the project’s cash flow indicated a 1.05x debt service coverage ratio when just considering the on-book balance. The examiner disagreed with the internal grade and classified the $9 million on-book balance as substandard due to the borrower’s marginal financial condition, lack of guarantor support, and uncertainty over the source of repayment.

Nonaccrual Treatment: The lender maintained the remaining $9 million on-book portion of the loan on accrual, as the borrower has the ability to repay the principal and interest on this balance. The examiner did not concur with this treatment. The examiner instructed the lender to place the loan on nonaccrual status. Because the lender restructured the debt into a single note and had charged-off a portion of the restructured loan, the repayment of the interest and principal contractually due on the entire debt is not reasonably assured.

The loan can be returned to accrual status if the lender can document that subsequent improvement in the borrower’s financial condition has enabled the loan to be brought fully current with respect to principal and interest and the lender expects the contractual balance of the loan (including the partial charge-off) will be fully collected. In addition, interest income may be recognized on a cash basis for the partially charged-off portion of the loan when the remaining recorded balance is considered fully collectible. However, the partial charge-off cannot be reversed.

TDR Treatment: The lender reported the restructured loan as a TDR according to the requirements of its regulatory reports because (a) the borrower is experiencing financial difficulties as evidenced by the high leverage, delinquent payments on other projects, and inability to meet the original exit strategy because the borrower was unable to lease the property in a reasonable timeframe; and (b) the lender granted a concession as evidenced by deferring payment beyond the repayment ability of the borrower. The charge-off indicates that the lender does not expect full repayment of principal and interest, yet the borrower remains obligated for the full amount of the debt and payments, which is at a level that is not consistent with the borrower’s repayment capacity. Because the borrower is not expected to be able to comply with the loan’s restructured terms, the lender would likely continue to report the loan as a TDR. The examiner concurs with reporting the renewed loan as a TDR.

Modifying a Commercial Office Building Mortgage

Timothy McCandless Esq. and Associates
Offices Statewide

(909)890-9192
(925)957-9797
FAX (909) 382-9956
tim@Prodefenders.com

http://www.timothymccandless.com

(Adapted from the October 30, 2009 Policy Statement on Prudent Commercial Real Estate Loan Workouts)

Introduction

In response to the residential mortgage crisis, and in anticipation of the looming commercial mortgage crisis of much greater potential magnitude, the federal banking regulators got together and issued a policy statement to encourage lenders to modify commercial mortgages and other loans secured by commercial real estate. Attachment 1 to the Policy Statement featured six example scenarios to help lenders to understand that the question isn’t whether you modify a loan, but rather how you modify a loan, that may result in regulatory penalization.

From the statement: “[t]he regulators have found that prudent CRE loan workouts are often in the best interest of the financial institution and the borrower. Examiners are expected to take a balanced approach in assessing the adequacy of an institution’s risk management practices for loan workout activity. Financial institutions that implement prudent CRE loan workout arrangements after performing a comprehensive review of a borrower’s financial condition will not be subject to criticism for engaging in these efforts even if the restructured loans have weaknesses that result in adverse credit classification. In addition, renewed or restructured loans to borrowers who have the ability to repay their debts according to reasonable modified terms will not be subject to adverse classification solely because the value of the underlying collateral has declined to an amount that is less than the loan balance. ”

What follows is the regulator’s example of modifying a mortgage on a commercial office building.

Note:

* The financial regulators consist of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), and the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) State Liaison Committee (collectively, the regulators).

BASE CASE: A lender originated a $15 million loan for the purchase of an office building with monthly payments based on an amortization of 20 years and a balloon payment of $13.6 million at the end of year three. At origination, the loan had a 75 percent loan-to-value (LTV) based on an appraisal reflecting a $20 million market value on an “as stabilized” basis, a debt service coverage ratio of 1.35x, and a market interest rate. The lender expected to renew the loan when the balloon payment became due at the end of year three. The project’s cash flow has declined, as the borrower granted rental concessions to existing tenants in order to retain the tenants and compete with other landlords in a weak economy.

SCENARIO 1: At maturity, the lender renewed the $13.6 million loan at a market rate of interest that provides for the incremental credit risk and amortized the principal over the remaining 17 years. The borrower had not been delinquent on prior payments and has sufficient cash flow to service the market rate terms at a debt service coverage ratio of 1.12x. A review of the leases reflects the majority of tenants are now stable occupants with long-term leases and sufficient cash flow to pay their rent. A recent appraisal reported an “as stabilized” market value of $13.1 million for the property, reflecting an increase in market capitalization rates, which results in a 104 percent LTV.

Classification: The lender internally graded the loan pass and is monitoring the credit. The examiner agreed, as the borrower has the ability to continue making payments on reasonable terms despite a decline in cash flow and in the market value of the collateral.

Nonaccrual Treatment: The lender maintained the loan on an accrual status. The borrower has demonstrated the ability to make the regularly scheduled payments and, even with the decline in the borrower’s creditworthiness, cash flow appears sufficient to make these payments and full repayment of principal and interest is expected. The examiner concurred with the lender’s accrual treatment.

TDR Treatment: The lender determined that the renewed loan should not be reported as a TDR. While the borrower is experiencing some financial deterioration, the borrower has sufficient cash flow to service the debt and has no record of payment default; therefore, the borrower is not experiencing financial difficulties. The examiner concurred with the lender’s TDR treatment.

SCENARIO 2: At maturity, the lender renewed the $13.6 million loan at a market rate of interest that provides for the incremental risk and amortized the principal over the remaining 17 years. The borrower had not been delinquent on prior payments. The building’s net operating income has decreased and current cash flow to service the new loan has declined, resulting in a debt service coverage ratio of 1.12x. Some of the leases are coming up for renewal and additional rental concessions may be necessary to keep the existing tenants in a weak economy. However, the project’s debt service coverage is not expected to drop below 1.05x. A current valuation has not been ordered. The lender estimates the property’s current “as stabilized” market value is $14.5 million, which results in a 94 percent LTV. In addition, the lender has not asked the borrower to provide current financial statements to assess the borrower’s ability to service the debt with cash from other sources.

Classification: The lender internally graded the loan pass and is monitoring the credit. The examiner disagreed with the internal grade and listed the credit as special mention. While the borrower has the ability to continue to make payments, there has been a declining trend in the property’s income stream, continued potential rental concessions, and a reduced collateral margin. In addition, the lender’s failure to request current financial information and to obtain an updated collateral valuation represents administrative deficiencies.

Nonaccrual Treatment: The lender maintained the loan on an accrual status. The borrower has demonstrated the ability to make regularly scheduled payments and, even with the decline in the borrower’s creditworthiness, cash flow is sufficient at this time to make payments and full repayment of principal and interest are expected. The examiner concurred with the lender’s accrual treatment.

TDR Treatment: The lender determined that the renewed loan should not be reported as a TDR. While the borrower is experiencing some financial deterioration, the borrower is not experiencing financial difficulties as the borrower has sufficient cash flow to service the debt, and there was no history of default. The examiner concurred with the lender’s TDR treatment.

SCENARIO 3: At maturity, the lender restructured the $13.6 million loan on a 12-month interest-only basis at a below market rate of interest. The borrower has been sporadically delinquent on prior payments and projects a debt service coverage ratio of 1.12x based on the preferential terms. A review of the leases, which were available to the lender at the time of the restructuring, reflects the majority of tenants have short-term leases and that some were behind on their rental payments to the borrower. According to the lender, this situation has not improved since the restructuring. A recent appraisal reported a $14.5 million “as stabilized” market value for the property, which results in a 94 percent LTV.

Classification: The lender internally graded the loan pass and is monitoring the credit. The examiner disagreed with the internal grade due to the borrower’s limited ability to service a below market rate loan on an interest-only basis, sporadic delinquencies, and the reduced collateral position, and classified the loan substandard.

Nonaccrual Treatment: The lender maintained the loan on accrual status due to the positive cash flow and collateral margin. The examiner did not concur with this treatment because the loan was not restructured with reasonable repayment terms, the borrower has limited capacity to service a below market rate on an interest-only basis, and the reduced estimate of cash flow from the property indicates that full repayment of principal and interest is not reasonably assured.

TDR Treatment: The lender reported the restructured loan as a TDR because the borrower is experiencing financial difficulties: the project’s ability to generate sufficient cash flows to service the debt is questionable, the lease income from the tenants is declining, loan payments have been sporadic, and collateral values have declined. In addition, the lender granted a concession (i.e., reduced the interest rate to a below market level and deferred principal payments). The examiner concurred with the lender’s TDR treatment.

Commercial Mortgage Modification: What They Are and How to Get One




Image Source:  © Copyright 2009  Roy Tennant
Introduction
This article will discuss, in basic terms, the process for obtaining a commercial mortgage modification.  For more detailed information, contact an attorney in your area competent in this specialized field of law. This article is not meant to be construed as legal advice, and is for educational and informative purposes only.
Definition of Commercial Mortgage Modification
First off, the term “Commercial Mortgage Modification” refers to a renegotiation in payment terms of a mortgage secured by real property that is not 1-4 unit residential real estate.  Commercial mortgages can be secured by hotels, golf courses, shopping malls, apartment complexes, office buildings, shipping warehouses, or any other type of commercial property (that is, not 1-4 unit residential).
The Best Circumstances for a Commercial Mortgage Modification
The circumstances under which commercial mortgage modification negotiations occur include any foreseeably pending default by the commercial mortgage borrower.  These circumstances will fall into one of two categories: debt service default, or balloon payment default.
“Debt service default” arises where a borrower does not have the monthly cash flow to continue to pay the monthly mortgage payment during the life of the loan (usually, 3, 5, or 7 years).  “Balloon Payment default,” on the other hand, occurs at the end of the life of the commercial mortgage, when the borrower must pay back the majority of the loan principal to the lender in a single lump sum (or, “balloon payment”).  Either debt service default or balloon payment default can lead to a borrower request for commercial mortgage modification.
The Process of Obtaining a Commercial Mortgage Modification
Obtaining a commercial mortgage modification from your lender is essentially a 3-step process that involves first a pre-negotiation agreement or letter your bank will send you upon your request to negotiate, a process of supplying information for your bank to review in consideration of your commercial mortgage modification request, and finally, negotiation of the terms of your commercial mortgage modification.
Pre-negotiation letter. The pre-negotiation agreement or letter which accompanies most negotiations for commercial mortgage modifications is usually an agreement about the negotiation process itself.  A pre-negotiation agreement will set the ground rules regarding whether each party reserves or waives certain legal rights during negotiation, such as the common law duty of good faith and fair dealing. It is very important to read, understand, and if necessary, negotiate the terms of the pre-negotiation agreement itself, so that you do not unwittingly waive potential rights or claims.
Informing your bank. The process of informing your bank will be similar to your original loan application.  You will provide your bank with tax and income information for consideration of whether you qualify for new terms.  Tax returns, profit and loss schedules, and proof of accounts receivable are common items the bank will want to see.  If you are a landlord, the bank may require you to provide information as to the nature of your leases and their respective payment histories.
Negotiating Terms. The final stage of the process, negotiating the terms of your commercial mortgage modification, involves the give-and-take process during which you set, for example, a new loan duration, interest rate, balloon amount, or other concessions for you to avoid defaulting on your mortgage and going into foreclosure.
Who to Call
You should always rely on a skilled professional whenever you are going to sign any legal documents, and so it is highly recommended that you contact an attorney in your area familiar with lending laws, banking regulations, and best practices in the field of commercial mortgage modification.  Conclusion
Commercial Mortgage Modification should be a consideration for anyone who owns a business and who is likely to default on a commercial mortgage obligation in the foreseeable future.  The process can be relatively simple, but involves highly complex legal documents for which a skilled professional should be sought.

Southern California (909)890-9192 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting              (909)890-9192      end_of_the_skype_highlighting      end_of_the_skype_highlighting in Northern California(925)957-9797

Home Affordable Modification Plan – Checklist For Approval

Are you applying for HAMP Program which is also known as Home Affordable Modification Program? The program is federally subsidized and that would pay lenders over and above servicers to modify eligible loans using the consistent terms state with the Treasury Department. What are the advantages of this loan workout programs and what are the necessities to partake?

“Obama’s HAMP loan modification program is part of the $75 billion dollar housing stimulus program that is planned to help out around 4 million homeowners out of foreclosure.”

The advantages of Obama’s HAMP loan modification program include:

  • Trim down payments to equal 31% of monthly total earnings
  • Stopping foreclosure procedure
  • Let off late fees and penalties
  • Include past outstanding payments in new loan
  • Lower interest rate as low as 2%*
  • Lengthen loan term to forty years
  • Defer or forgive principal balance

Unfortunately, not everyone could get eligible for aid under this program, nevertheless if you can meet the necessary eligibility requirements you can submit a loan modification program request for consideration. Here’re the requirements to apply for a loan workout:

  • Individual should stay in the home as your primary residence
  • Loan amount should be less than $729,750
  • Present payment equals more than 31% of monthly total income
  • Facing financial hardship

Majority lenders as well as servicers are contributing in Obama’s home affordable modification program, and concerned homeowners are positive to start the application process. Only borrowers who can prove they meet the appropriate guidelines would be accepted for a lower mortgage payment. There is a standard formula that lenders make use of to decide who would get eligible for approval. Homeowners can use a software program that uses this very similar program to help out them to organizing an exact and suitable application. Just input income and expenses, and the debt ratio, new target payment with new interest rate, disposable income and additional calculations are done automatically. Save hours of frustration and pass up mistakes.

Act Now – To Apply For Bad Credit Mortgage Refinance Loan »

mass joinder litigation complaint

And the first “meaty” part of the complaint….

5. The fraud perpetrated by the Countrywide Defendants from 2003 through 2007, including by BofA starting no later than 2007, was willful and pervasive. It begin with simple greed and then accelerated when Countrywide founder and CEO Angelo Mozilo (“Mozilo”) discovered that Countrywide could not sustain its business, unless it used its size and large market share in California to systematically create false and inflated property appraisals throughout California. Countrywide then used these false property valuations to induce Plaintiffs and other borrowers into ever-larger loans on increasingly risky terms. As Mozilo knew from no later than 2004, these loans were unsustainable for Countrywide and the borrowers and to a certainty would result in a crash that would destroy the equity invested by Plaintiffs and other Countrywide borrowers.

In other words, Countrywide is alleged to not only have made bad loans, but also to have intentionally inflated appraisals.

6. Hand-in-hand with its fraudulently-obtained mortgages, Mozilo and others at Countrywide hatched a plan to “pool” the foregoing mortgages and sell the pools for inflated value. Rapidly, these two intertwined schemes grew into a brazen plan to disregard underwriting standards and fraudulently inflate property values – county-by-county, city-by-city, person-by-person – in order to take business from legitimate mortgage-providers, and moved on to massive securities fraud hand-in-hand with concealment from, and deception of, Plaintiffs and other mortgagees on an unprecedented scale.

Oh, that’s rich. So not only (it is alleged) did Countrywide bamboozle borrowers, they also bamboozled investors.

9. It is now all too clear that this was the ultimate high-stakes fraudulent investment scheme of the last decade. Couched in banking and securities jargon, the deceptive gamble with consumers’ primary assets – their homes – was nothing more than a financial fraud perpetrated by Defendants and others on a scale never before seen. This scheme led directly to a mortgage meltdown in California that was substantially worse than any economic problems facing the rest of the United States. From 2008 to the present, Californians’ home values decreased by considerably more than most other areas in the United States as a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ scheme set forth herein. The Countrywide Defendants’ business premise was to leave the borrowers, including Plaintiffs, holding the bag once Countrywide and its executives had cashed in reaping huge salaries and bonuses and selling Countrywide’s shares based on their inside information, while investors were still buying the increasingly overpriced mortgage pools and before the inevitable dénouement. This massive fraudulent scheme was a disaster both foreseen by Countrywide and waiting to happen. Defendants knew it, and yet Defendants still induced the Plaintiffs into their scheme without telling them.

There’s the base of it all….

24. Defendants have gone to great lengths to avoid producing documents in this litigation because they know that such documents will establish all details of the massive fraud they perpetrated on Plaintiffs and other Californians. PennyMac, the Granada Network and Defendants’ overseas operations are used by Defendants to systematically hide documents. By delaying production of documents, the Defendants are buying time as they (a) accept the benefits of the scheme described herein, (b) cover up their fraud, and (c) make it materially more expensive and difficult for Plaintiffs and their counsel to obtain a just result.

Of course there’s the famous “let’s hide Waldo” game once the gig is pretty much up. After all, if we have to produce the documents, well, our goose might be cooked – and that would be bad.

So what else is presented in here? Oh, all sorts of good stuff. Here’s a sampling:

275. Defendant CT REAL ESTATE SERVICES, INC. is a California corporation – corporation number C0570795 – and is a resident of Ventura County, California. Defendant CT REAL ESTATE SERVICES has acted alongside and in concertwith BofA in carrying out the concealment described herein and in continuing to conceal from Plaintiffs, from the California general public, and from regulators the details of the securitization and sale of deeds of trust and mortgages (including those of Plaintiffs herein) that would expose all Defendants herein to liability for sale of mortgages of California citizens – including all Plaintiffs herein – for more than the actual value of the mortgage loans. The sale and particularly the undisclosed sale of mortgage loans in excess of actual value violates California Civil Code, §§ 1709 and 1710, and California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1641 et seq. and other applicable laws.

That sounds like a problem to me……

290. At the time of entering into the notes and deeds of trust referenced herein with respect to each Plaintiff, the Countrywide Defendants were bound and obligated to fully and accurately disclose:

a. Who the true lender and mortgagee were.

b. That to induce a Plaintiff to enter into the mortgage, the Countrywide Defendants caused the appraised value of Plaintiff’s home to be overstated.

c. That to disguise the inflated value of Plaintiff’s home, Countrywide was orchestrating the over-valuation of homes throughout Plaintiff’s community.

d. That to induce a Plaintiff to enter into a mortgage, the Countrywide Defendants disregarded their underwriting requirements, thereby causing Plaintiff to falsely believe that Plaintiff was financially capable of performing Plaintiff’s obligations under the mortgage, when the Countrywide Defendants knew that was untrue. One way they systematically disregarded the underwriting requirements was through the use of the Granada Network, another fact which Defendants systematically failed to disclose to any California borrower.

Ding ding ding ding ding ding!

One of the keys to this mess is that the lenders knew full well that the borrowers could not pay “as agreed”, yet made the loans anyway.

i. The sales would include sales to nominees who were not authorized under law at the time to own a mortgage, including, among others, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc., a/k/a MERSCORP, Inc. (“MERS”), which according to its website was created by mortgage banking industry participants to be only a front or nominee to “streamline” the mortgage re-sale and securitization process;

ii. Plaintiff’s true financial condition and the true value of Plaintiff’s home and mortgage would not be disclosed to investors to whom the mortgage would be sold;

iii. Countrywide intended to sell the mortgage together with other mortgages as to which it also intended not to disclose the true financial condition of the borrowers or the true value of their homes or mortgages;

iv. The consideration to be sought from investors would be greater than the actual value of the said notes and deeds of trust;

and

v.The consideration to be sought from investors would be greater than the income stream that could be generated from the instruments even assuming a 0% default rate thereon;

You mean basically everything important about the loans, their quality, who they were going to be sold to, why and how was all bogus? And in addition, the price to be sought from investors exceeded the income stream that could be achieved even if nobody defaulted at all?

Heh, that’s a good gig if you can get it – and if you can find a way to do it legally.

Are there some facts behind this? Oh it appears there are…

The credit losses experienced by Countrywide in 2007 not only were foreseeable by the proposed defendants, they were in fact foreseen at least as early as September 2004. [¶ 33 (Emphasis in original)]

. . .

The credit risk described in the September 2004 warning worsened from September 2004 to August 2007. [¶ 35 (Emphasis in original)]

. . .

By no later than 2006, Mozilo and Sambol were on notice that Countrywide’s exotic loan products might not continue to be saleable into the secondary market, yet this material risk was not disclosed in Countrywide’s periodic filings. [¶ 45]

. . .

Mozilo and Sambol made affirmative misleading public statements in addition to those in the periodic filings that were designed to falsely reassure investors about the nature and quality of Countrywide’s underwriting. [¶ 91]

Oh my. 2004 eh? I seem to remember tAngelo on CNBS making multiple appearances talking about how his company was going to take market share from all these subprime lenders that collapsed, and this was going to be great for his company. Indeed, I remember chortling at the time that I believed he was a lying SOB, and of course the so-called “Fantastic Mainstream Media” lapped it up – and helped support his stock price.

It appears that the intrepid attorneys who filed this action remember that too…. and the pages surrounding 100 in the complaint document a whole bunch of them, including statements in 10Ks and 10Qs that, it is alleged, were flatly false.

And, of course, there’s this one, which I have referred to many times over the last three and a half years:

363. In the January 30, 2007 earnings conference call, Mozilo attempted to distinguish Countrywide from other lenders by stating “we backed away from the subprime area because of our concern over credit quality.” On March 13, 2007, in an interview with Maria Bartiromo on CNBC, Mozilo said that it would be a “mistake” to compare monoline subprime lenders to Countrywide. He then went on to state that the subprime market disruption in the first quarter of 2007 would “be great for Countrywide at the end of the day because all of the irrational competitors will be gone.”

I distinctly remember the cheesy suits and ties, not to mention the sprayed-on-looking tan.

370. In fact, the appraisals were inflated. Countrywide did not utilize quality underwriting processes. Countrywide’s financial condition was not sound, but was a house of cards ready to collapse, as Countrywide well knew, but Plaintiffs did not. Further, Plaintiffs’ mortgages were not refinanced with fixed rate mortgages and neither Agate nor Countrywide ever intended that they would be.

As I have repeatedly pointed out, the entire intent of these loans was not to be a mortgage at all. It was, I allege, more akin to an asset-stripping scheme where the borrower would be effectively forced to come back to the lender after a couple of years when the teaser expired or the inevitable reset or recast occurred and effectively hand over his accumulated “appreciation” in price through yet more fees to be paid to the “lender.”

I believe that for all intents and purposes, from the lender’s point of view, this was nothing more than renting the house, as passing of a clear title to the buyer was never part of what was contemplated by the lender – but of course the borrower wasn’t told this in advance – or at all.

There’s much more in the complaint, but this will do for a start.

Incidentally, the banks tried to get this removed to Federal Court and kill it, and were rebuffed, so it appears that it’s headed to trial. Plaintiff’s Bar 1, Banksters 0 thus far – I will be providing updates on this case as I become aware of them. Southern California (909)890-9192 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (909)890-9192 end_of_the_skype_highlighting in Northern California(925)957-9797

Why modify

California Loan Modification Lawyer

(Effective October 11, 2009  The McCandless Firm complies with SB 94)

By now, you may have made your own attempts at loan modification. You now know what we have known: Despite all the government and media hype, the voluntary loan modifications are not the silver bullet to the foreclosure crisis. Even after President Obama introduced the HAMP program, only about 8% of the anticipated 9 million loan modification applications have been considered. Never forget that lenders and loan servicers are in the business of making money for their shareholders, not solving people’s financial problems. Despite the incentives created by the government, loan servicers remain inconsistent, negligent, understaffed, arrogant and just plain indifferent to the financial plight of most folks. If you’ve ever wondered why the bank doesn’t seem to care? Consider that it is the investor, not loan servicer, takes the financial hit when a property is foreclosed. Loan servicers make more money when a borrower falls into foreclosure. Servicers have an incentive to drag out the foreclosure and loan modification process. Despite what the government and the lenders may say, the loan modification or short sale process is not as quick and easy as has been portrayed.

VIOLATIONS CAN GIVE YOU LEVERAGE to secure a “SETTLEMENT”, not a LOAN MODIFICATION.

Whether hiring a lawyer will increase your chances for success a little or a lot depends on whether the lender has done something wrong. This is why Attorney Roberts encourages every client to commission an audit of the original loan documents, review the appraisal and take measure of any agency relationships between the broker, the lender, the appraiser, the escrow and the title companies. Anecdotally, Attorney Roberts believes that your chances of success increase fourfold if there is litigation or bankruptcy. Hiring a lawyer to review your options and handle the process makes sense. Your chances of obtaining a substantial loan modification will be greatly improved if the lender has violated the law…but how will you ever know? A lawyer can help you gain negotiating leverage on your behalf by finding violations of the law or capitalizing on provisions of the bankruptcy code.

FRONT DOOR LOAN MODIFICATIONS

A loan modification can still be secured even where violations do not exist or the borrower chooses to ignore them. In California, SB94 was recently signed into law effectively banning advance fee loan modification services by even lawyers. Attorney Roberts operates in full compliance of the new law. If you hire a lawyer to provide loan modification services rather than to pursue a violation of your rights, special rules now apply and specific disclosures must be made letting you know that you can do the loan modification yourself and avoid fees.

It’s true; you can pursue a loan modification yourself, just as you have the right to represent yourself in court. And to be honest, even with a lawyer, unless a violation has occurred, you are at the mercy of the loan servicer’s interpretation and analysis of your situation. If the servicer loses your paperwork, berates you, keeps you on hold for hours, ignores you, or simply denies the loan modification without explanation…you have NO RECOURSE. You are not entitled to a loan modification and you have no right to sue if denied. Even if the lender ignores the guidelines of the government’s HAMP program, you can’t sue. When you apply for a front door loan modification, you are asking for a break. It is you and not the lender, who seeks to break the mortgage contract. You have no leverage. You cannot force the lender to give you any consideration, whatsoever. Even if you clearly qualify for a loan modification under the printed guidelines of the government HAMP program, if the lender believes that it would make more money in the long run by foreclosing, you can legitimately be denied.

Why pay a lawyer to work on your loan modification? A lawyer adds attention to detail and diligence to the process, as well as a better idea of the location of each loan servicers’ “sweet spot”. Experience and daily contact with the loan servicers provides some advantage as well. The law firm may act as a force to counter act the incompetence built into the lender’s process. Attorney Roberts and his staff simply assume that the loan mod process will be screwed up by the lender, repeatedly. The firm expects that the lenders will lose paperwork, fail to respond and provide conflicting information. The firm is not shocked when a home is improperly sold despite an approval of a loan modification as it happens all the time. The Law Office of The McCandless Firm is there to respond to these constant lender screw ups and bear the brunt of your frustration.

The The McCandless Firm is always prepared to react to the latest bank screw-up or client crisis. One of the favorite tricks of the lenders is to wait to the very last minute before the sale to approve or deny a postponement or a loan modification. This game of chicken may happen every month as the loan modification process drones on. The firm is always ready with a PLAN B if the lender, in its sole discretion, denies the modification. Having the ability to plan and execute a contingency plan, whether it be Chapter 7, 11, 13, a short sale or a federal lawsuit, is truly the firm’s core strength.

A foreclosure relief company or real estate agent is unqualified to provide you with any of this legal insight – but a California loan modification lawyer at the The McCandless Firm has the knowledge and experience to help. California attorney Joseph Arthur “Joe” Roberts can act as your legal counselor and help you get out of the financial situation that you find yourself in. With offices located in Newport Beach, attorney Roberts helps clients throughout California, including Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside County and the surrounding areas.

Loan Modification Attorney in Los Angeles, Orange and Riverside County, California

In California, voluntary loan modification programs of different companies vary. Most loans are owned in pools by “trusts” and not by the servicing agent with whom you deal. The contract between the trust and the servicing agent, called a PSA, limits the number of loans that can be modified in a given pool. Typically, the PSA limits the number of loans that can be modified in a given pool at 5%. However, that restriction is lifted in the event of a bankruptcy or litigation.

Most servicing agents are understaffed, overwhelmed and for the most part…simply don’t care about you. The servicing companies typically make more money off of late fees, costs and penalties when you remain in default. If the property gets foreclosed on, it becomes the trust’s problem, not necessarily the service agent’s. The application process can take months and usually involves rejection or a token change in the loan terms. Amid the flood of modification requests, mistakes frequently get made and the ball gets dropped. In the meantime, the countdown to foreclosure sale continues. Homeowners already under distress get left with little time to act if a modification is not granted. You need to have a backup plan in place in case the lender’s process fails.

Loan modification is driven by income and complicated when there is a second mortgage company involved. If you lack the income to fund whatever plan the lender is willing to give you, you will be denied. Even if the first mortgage company is willing to modify your loan, it doesn’t mean that the second mortgage company will play ball. In the absence of litigation or bankruptcy, the loan modifications have economic limits. A reduction in principal balance is rare. A mortgage holder will not reduce the principal balance below the value of the property. Interest rate adjustments and recapitalization of back payments are more common. However, don’t expect to get an interest only or negative amortization loan. The very best you can hope for is a fixed rate amortized over 30 years at a decent rate based on the current value of the house. Finally, if the lender “cancels” some of your debt, it may still be considered taxable income by the IRS, despite the passage of the limited Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007. Only debt from buying or improving the property is covered by the new law.

How a California Loan Modification Lawyer Can Help

loan modification process can be complex, and it is easy for a lender or servicing agent to take advantage of you. Using an experienced lawyer to assert your rights gets you to the front of the line in this process. The possibility of litigation or bankruptcy may increase your negotiating leverage with your lender. Lenders are forced to get their own lawyers involved in your case, not just an administrative person from the loss mitigation department. We welcome you to contact our firm to discuss your loan, your budget and the benefits of attorney negotiated loan modification.

Contact  loan modification attorney The McCandless Firm today! Northern California 925-957-9797and in Southern California 909-890-9192

Rather Than Investigating Foreclosure Fraud, House Republicans Vow To Investigate Loans To Poor People


Posted 7 hours ago by Neil Garfield on Livinglies’s Weblog

COMBO Title and Securitization Search, Report, Documents, Analysis & Commentary COMBO Title and Securitization Search, Report, Documents, Analysis & Commentary

Editor’s Note: THAT’S IT. BLAME THE POOR PEOPLE — THE ONES WHO KNOW THE LEAST ABOUT FINANCE AND MORTGAGES.

It is not as ominous as it sounds. No matter where they look they are going to find that the mortgages, notes and obligation are hopelessly obscured. Finding loans to “poor people” or people who are NOW poor because of the mortgage fraud and foreclosure fraud by the banks is going to lead back to shady practices, predatory lending and invalid liens. It will also lead back to the fact that there was NO LOAN by the originator who appears on the mortgage documents. Politicians will TRY to do the bidding of the banks by diverting attention away from their own fraud, errors, perjury, forgery and fabrication, but the horse is already out of the barn.

by Pat Garafolo, Over the weekend, the Washington Post provided some more details about the ongoing foreclosure fraud scandal, noting that “virtually everyone involved – loan servicers, law firms, document processing companies and others – made more money as they evicted more borrowers from their homes, creating a system that was vulnerable to error and difficult for homeowners to challenge.” A bevy of Democratic lawmakers have called for examinations of the banks’ potentially fraudulent activities, while the Attorneys General of all fifty states have pledged a coordinated investigation.

Republicans, however, have been largely silent on the issue. And according to Rep. Darrell Issa (R-CA), who is slated to take over the House Committee on Government and Oversight should the Republicans gain a majority, the GOP is not really interested in the banks’ malpractice. Instead, Issa wants to “launch aggressive inquiries” into whether the government helped poor people buy houses they couldn’t afford:

The conservative Republican from California, who would become chairman of the powerful House oversight and government reform committee, said hearings would focus on whether the federal government should be involved at all in sponsoring home loans for the poor.

Such hearings would evidently “centre on the roles of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,” which Republicans have blamed for the financial collapse of 2008, despite the overwhelming evidence to the contrary. As the Wonk Room explains, Issa’s pronouncement is part of an ongoing conservative effort to scapegoat homeowners and government for Wall Street’s malfeasance.

While the GOP likes to blame homeowners for the country’s economic woes, in the last decade, as the Center for American Progress has documented, banks were still systematically charging minorities higher costs for loans and pushing them into expensive subprime mortgages, making government policies to ensure fair access to credit a necessary step. It says a lot about the Republican mindset that banks evicting homeowners who aren’t in foreclosure doesn’t merit an investigation, but a low-income family receiving a mortgage in a traditionally under-served community does.

The Robo-Signing Mess Is Just the Tip of the Iceberg, Mortgage Putbacks Will Be the Harbinger of the Collapse of Big Banks that Will Dwarf 2008!

The Robo-Signing Mess Is Just the Tip of the Iceberg, Mortgage Putbacks Will Be the Harbinger of the Collapse of Big Banks that Will Dwarf 2008!

Today, October 12, 2010, 1 hour ago | Reggie MiddletonGo to full article


Now that the Robo-Signing scandals have achieved full notoriety through the media, it is time to address the real issues facing investors in bank stocks. I also believe that the media is staring at the wrong target. Each major media outlet is copying what is popular or what the next outlet broke as a story versus where the true economic risks actually lie – which is essentially the real story and where the meat actually is. Here’s what’s truly at stake – the United States is now at risk of losing its hegemony as the financial capital of the world! Why? Because when we had the chance to put the injured banks to sleep and redirect resources to into new productivity, we instead allowed politics to shovel 100′s of billions in tax payer capital into zombie institutions as they turned around and paid much of it right back out as bonuses. As a result, significant capital has been destroyed, the original problem has metastized, and the banks are still in zombie status, but with share prices that are multiples of the actual values of the entities that they allegedly represent – a perfect storm for a market crash that will make 2008 look like a bull rally! For those who feel I am being sensationalist, I refer you first my track record in making such claims.

The Japanese tried to hide massive NPAs in its banking system after a credit fueled bubble burst by sweeping them under a rug for political reasons. Here’s a newsflash – it didn’t work, it hasn’t worked for 20 years, and despite that Japan is embarking on QE v3.3 because it simply doesn’t believe that it is not working. Here are the steps the US is consciously taking it its bid to enter a 20 year deflationary spiral like Japan, and may I add that these steps were clearly delineated on BoomBustBlog ONE YEAR ago (Bad CRE, Rotten Home Loans, and the End of US Banking Prominence? Thursday, November 12th, 2009), so no one can say this is a surprise.

Step one: Hide the Truth!

fasb_mark_to_market_chart.png

Step two: Formulate intricate lies to placate the masses

In this case, the US bank stress tests: You’ve Been Bamboozled, Hoodwinked and Lied To! Here’s the Proof. What Are You Going to Do About It?. We have government complicity in the purposeful opacity of the values of the mortgage assets (see the FDIC “Prudent Commercial Real Estate Loan Workouts” guidance issued Oct 30th, as reported by the WSJ: Banks Hasten to Adopt New Loan Rules and the new FDIC guidance that states performing loans “made to creditworthy borrowers” will not require write downs “solely because the value of the underlying collateral declined”).

Step three: Being forced to face the music

This is where we are now, and I will go through this in more detail below

Step four: The eradication of US banks from global prominence

Not the floundering of the banks that I predicted in 2007 and 2008, but the outright collapse of many (and probably most) of the big ones, or at the very least significant shrinkage. Does this sound outrageous to you? For those of you who believe that the government’s “pretend and extend” policy has any chance in hell of working, or better yet, that we are not following in the footsteps of Japan, let’s take a pictorial trip through recent history. There are practically no Japanese banks in the top 20 bank category on  global basis by 2003 – NONE (save potentially Nomura, which arguably survived in name, alone). As you can see, they literally dominated 90% of the space in 1990!

Click to enlarge…

top_20_banks.jpg

Source: Cap Gemini Banking M&A

The European banks are not faring much better than the US banks,either – reference the Pan-European Sovergein Debt Crisis, as I see it. This is so much more serious than robo-signing scandals, and I have been shouting about this non-sense of 3 years straight. Well, are we following the Japanese “Lost Path”? Notwithstanding the damning evidence of hide the truth and hide amongst lies linked to above, ponder the following rather dated, but still quite poignant data…

 

 

housing_price_futures.jpg

Source: Nomura on Balance Sheet Recessions

Keep in mind that the US housing futures data above is based on the unrealistically optimistic Case Shiller index – reference Those Who Blindly Follow Housing Prices Without Taking Other Metrics Into Consideration Are Missing the Housing Depression of the New Millennium.

Robo-Signing: What is the  real issue at hand?

The Robo-Signing issues have arisen because some mortgage servicers have been signing off foreclosure documents without actually reading them, or doing so without the presence of a notary. Thus, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) has directed seven of the US’ biggest lenders — BAC, JPM, WFC, Citi, HSBC, PNC and UBS  — to review their foreclosure processes. Consequently, Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase and GMAC Mortgage have suspended foreclosure cases in 23 states after noting their employees may have mishandled foreclosure documents. Goldman Sachs is following suit via their Litton Loans arm. It should also be noted that the document forgery issues penetrate much farther than just distressed properties and foreclosures. Evidence has surfaced that all types of forgeries and misrepresentations are abound in all types of mortgage paperwork. 4closureFraud (a sight where I sourced a lot of the recent robo-signing scandal info from) has a post that actually shows  President Obama’s mortgage paperwork as a “Victim to Chase Robo-Signer” This mess, in and of itself, will be difficult to untangle.

For those who didn’t notices, this is a regulatory “hold it” to the MERS system and an alert to its constituency, many of whom are subjects of extensive BoomBustBlog forensic analysis. Major MERS shareholders include:

These companies will start infighting as their myriad interest start to conflict with each other. Title insurers will balk at insuring what could be defective title, banks will fight insurers who will try to renege on insurance and/or put back loans through the warranties and representations clause as losses to investors mount though either increased expenses to work out the paperwork mess or outright losses due to fraud.

Make no mistake, the amount of litigation that is being thrown at these banks and service companies is significant, and they are shining lights on aspects of the banking world that were most conveniently kept secret, as in this class action suit that outlines the contradictory wording in the MERS paperwork (reference pages 10, 11 and 15). Pages 15 on makes issue of fraudulent assignments, of Robo-Signing fame – see for yourself;

Here is a deposition of one of the “said” secretaries from another suit in New Jersey…

#000000;”>Does MERS have any salaried employees?
A No.
Q Does MERS have any employees?
A Did they ever have any? I couldn’t hear you.
Q Does MERS have any employees currently?
A No.
Q In the last five years has MERS had any
employees
?
A No.
Q To whom do the officers of MERS report?
A The Board of Directors.
Q To your knowledge has Mr. Hallinan ever
reported to the Board?
A He would have reported through me if there was
something to report.
Q So if I understand your answer, at least the
MERS officers reflected on Hultman Exhibit 4, if they
had something to report would report to you even though
you’re not an employee of MERS, is that correct?
MR. BROCHIN: Object to the form of the
question.
A That’s correct.
Q And in what capacity would they report to you?
A As a corporate officer. I’m the secretary.
Q As a corporate officer of what?
Of MERS.
Q So you are the secretary of MERS, but are not
an employee of MERS?
A That’s correct.

#000000;”>etc…
How many assistant secretaries have you
appointed pursuant to the April 9, 1998 resolution; how
many assistant secretaries of MERS have you appointed?
A I don’t know that number.
Q Approximately?
A I wouldn’t even begin to be able to tell you
right now.
Q Is it in the thousands?
A Yes.
Q Have you been doing this all around the
country in every state in the country?
A Yes.
Q And all these officers I understand are unpaid
officers of MERS
?
A Yes.
Q And there’s no live person who is an employee
of MERS that they report to, is that correct, who is an
employee?
MR. BROCHIN: Object to the form of the
question.
A There are no employees of MERS.

And even more damning, this particular suit gets right to the heart of the matter from an economic AND legal perspective (something that the previous suits have not) and that is that the banks were complicit in overvaluing both the lender and the collateral at the point of underwriting, and doing so on a broad basis. This is the notion behind my premise that a wave of losses and litigation will be coming any minute now as investors and the insurers facing claims from those investors attempt to put back loans on a wide scale and near universal basis as the rampant fraud of the real estate bubble of the new millenium is exposed and litigated throughout the court system.Those entities that swallowed loan mills such as Wachovia, Countrywide, Nationwide, Lehman, Bear Sterns, Merrill Lynch and WaMu will be feeling their indigestion.

I read through portions of a couple of filings and there appears to be some technical errors and maybe even a slight misunderstanding of the banking business, but if these guys (the plaintiff’s attorneys) get their act together in terms of coordinating with each other and getting some real expertise on the subject matter to bolster their filings, I really don’t see how this will not – at the very least – materially drive the expense ratios of both the banks and the investment pools, and at worst hasten the inevitable demise of those entities that underwrote or bought the bad paper then paid the gift of US taxpayer capital (TARP,ZIRP, PPIP, etc. ) out as bonuses versus alleviating the matter at hand.

Impact on RMBS and CDOs

Most analysts believe that a break in foreclosures will not be an optimistic sign for Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBS).  This is because RMBS portfolios that contain the foreclosure loans will likely experience higher loss severities due to longer liquidation timelines.  Additionally, the RMBS market is expected to witness a large number of repurchases as well as higher monetary losses and ratings downgrades if it is proved that loans were not serviced in accordance with regulatory guidelines. Of course, I believe that servicing is the minor issue. It is the faulty underwriting that is the canary in the goldmine here, and the servicing issues is simply the impetus that will shine the light on the premise that at least half of the high LTV loans written were done so on a fraudulent basis.

GMAC Mortgage Class Action Lawsuit Complaint Filed Over Alleged … Oct 4, 2010 GMAC Homeowners In Maine File Class Action Lawsuit Complaint Against GMAC Mortgage Over Alleged False Foreclosure Documents, Affidavits and.
classactionlawsuitsinthenews.com/classactionlawsuits/gmac-mortgage-classactionlawsuit-complaint-filed-over-alleged-false-foreclosure-docu…Cached

Wrongful Foreclosure Class Action « Timothymccandless’s Weblog

Jan 15, 2010 13 Responses to “Wrongful Foreclosure Class Action” I would like to be included in your class action lawsuit. I am a victim of predatory
timothymccandless.wordpress.com/…/wrongful-foreclosureclassaction/

o    According to Canadian rating agency DBRS “The recent findings could have far reaching implications throughout the industry with hundreds of thousands of homeowners contesting foreclosures that are in process or have been completed; ultimately causing servicers to face losses due to expensive litigation and class action lawsuits. The biggest uncertainty remains on how the courts will view the “legality” of foreclosures that have already taken place and what actions, if any, will be taken to remedy the situation.

DBRS believes that servicers will be able to quickly correct and refile any deficient affidavits in addition to implementing the appropriate controls to ensure there is not another breakdown in process. However, RMBS that contain these loans will likely experience higher loss severities due to longer liquidation timelines, negative rating actions and the potential for loans to be repurchased out of the transaction due to breaches of representation and warranties if it is proven that they were not serviced in accordance with applicable guidelines. DBRS will continue to monitor the impact of this situation on its rated transactions and take any rating actions as necessary” (Source: http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2010/10/05/360811/from-robo-signing-to-rmbs/)

o    Researchers at DBRS also highlighted that the robo-signing debacle will likely lead to a large number of residential mortgage-backed securities repurchases as well as higher monetary losses and continual ratings downgrades if it is proven that loans were not serviced in accordance with federal guidelines. (Source: http://foreclosureblues.wordpress.com/2010/10/04/rmbs-buybacks-expected-to-increase-due-to-robo-signing-dbrs/)

Every material development is impetus for the potential for putbacks due to breaches of representation and warranties Uncertainty in the RMBS market in terms of actual valuation is a result of rampant and provable inflation of appraisal prices during the underwriting of said mortgages and not so much falsification of documents since in many cases those documents can be cured, but misrepresentation cannot! You do not hear this in the media circuits, but it is a fact. Thus, the underwriting banks face the chance of systemic losses. I have warned of this about a year ago – Banks Swallow Another $30 billion or So in More Losses as Their Share Prices Surge (Again). You see, banks often allowed for the inflation of appraisal values and/or income/assets, but the broker channel did it as par for the course.

This is the part that everybody seems to be overlooking…

All you really need to do is find the banks that accepted a lot of broker business, factor in the expense of the class action suit litigation that is popping up in nearly every state (try Googling it, you will be amazed as big firms and store front lawyers alike are throwing their hats in the ring), and you will see the easiest way out of a potentially tough bind for investors is the put back. Where does this land? Squarely on the balance sheet of the banks – who, BTW have the money to attract even more predatory lawyers. A forensic review of high LTV loans between 2003 and 2007 should find that at the very least 30% were aggressively valued, with a more realistic number coming in at about 60%. Ask anyone who was in in the business at that time, I doubt they will disagree.

When I warned of this LAST YEAR, it was not taken very seriously. I suggest all should think again – Reggie Middleton on JP Morgan’s “Blowout” Q4-09 Results. Let’s reminisce…

I pointed out an anomaly in JP Morgan’s “blowout” quarterly earnings release – #1f1f1f;”>Reggie Middleton on JP Morgan’s “Blowout” Q4-09 Results#000000;”>. Let’s reminisce…

#1f1f1f;”>

#333333;”>Warranties of representation, and forced repurchase of loans

#333333;”>JP Morgan has increased its reserves with regards to repurchase of sold securities but the information surround these actions are very limited as the company does not separately report the repurchase reserves created to meet contingencies. However, the Company’s income from mortgage servicing was severely impacted by increase in repurchase reserves. Mortgage production revenue was negative $192 million against negative $70 million in 3Q09 and positive $62 million in 4Q08.

Counterparties who are accruing losses from bad loans, (ex. monoline insurers such as Ambac and MBIA, see A Super Scary Halloween Tale of 104 Basis Points Pt I & II, by Reggie Middleton circa November 2007,) are stepping up their aggression in pushing loans that appear to breach certain warranties or smack of fraud. I expect this activity to pick up significantly, and those banks that made significant use of brokers and third parties to place mortgages will be at material risk – much more so than the primarily direct writers. I’ll give you two guesses at which two banks are suspect. If you need a hint, take a look at who is increasing reserves for repurchases! JP Morgan and their not so profitable acquisition, WaMu!

https://i0.wp.com/boombustblog.com/images/stories/regional_banks/32bustedbanks/thumbnails/thumb_image020.png

As I said, losses should be ramping up on the mortgage sector. Notice the trend of housing prices after the onset of government bubble blowing: If Anybody Bothered to Take a Close Look at the Latest Housing Numbers…

PNC Bank and Wells Fargo are in very similar situations regarding acquiring stinky loan portfolios. I suggest subscribers review the latest forensic reports on each company to refresh as the companies report Q4 2009 earnings. Unlike JPM, these banks do not have the investment banking and trading fees of significance (albeit decreasing significance) to fall back on as a cushion to consumer and mortgage credit losses.

#1f1f1f;”>

Well, it looks as if I was onto something. From Bloomberg:

 

March 5 (Bloomberg) – Fannie Mae andFreddie Mac may force lenders includingBank of America Corp.JPMorgan Chase & Co.Wells Fargo & Co. and Citigroup Inc. to buy back $21 billion of home loans this year as part of a crackdown on faulty mortgages.

That’s the estimate of Oppenheimer & Co. analyst Chris Kotowski, who says U.S. banks could suffer losses of $7 billion this year when those loans are returned and get marked down to their true value. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, both controlled by the U.S. government, stuck the four biggest U.S. banks with losses of about $5 billion on buybacks in 2009, according to company filings made in the past two weeks.

 

The surge shows lenders are still paying the price for lax standards three years after mortgage markets collapsed under record defaults. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are looking for more faulty loans to return after suffering $202 billion of losses since 2007, and banks may have to go along, since the two U.S.- owned firms now buy at least 70 percent of new mortgages.

 

 

Freddie Mac forced lenders to buy back $4.1 billion of mortgages last year, almost triple the amount in 2008, according to a Feb. 26 filing. As of Dec. 31, Freddie Mac had another $4 billion outstanding loan-purchase demands that lenders hadn’t met, according to the filing. Fannie Mae didn’t disclose the amount of its loan-repurchase demands. Both firms were seized by the government in 2008 to stave off their collapse.

 

….

 

The government’s efforts might be counterproductive, since the Treasury and Federal Reserve are trying to help banks heal, FBR’s Miller said. The banks have to buy back the loans at par, and then take an impairment, because borrowers usually have stopped paying and the price of the underlying homehas plunged. JPMorgan said in a presentation last month that it loses about 50 cents on the dollar for every loan it has to buy back.

 

Striking a Balance

 

“It’s a fine line you’re walking, because the government’s trying to recapitalize the banks, not put them in bankruptcy, and then here’s Fannie and Freddie putting more pressure on the banks through these buybacks,” FBR’s Miller said. “If it becomes too big of an issue, the banks are going to complain to Congress, and they’re going to stop it.” [Of, course! Let the taxpayer eat the losses borne from our purposefully sloppy underwriting]

 

Bank of America recorded a $1.9 billion “warranties expense” for past and future buybacks of loans that weren’t properly written, seven times the 2008 amount, the bank said in a Feb. 26 filing. A spokesman for Charlotte, North Carolina- based Bank of America, Scott Silvestri, declined to comment.

 

JPMorgan, based in New York, recorded $1.6 billion of costs in 2009 from repurchases, including $500 million of losses on repurchased loans and $1 billion to increase reserves for future losses, according to a Feb. 24 filing.

 

“It’s become a very meaningful issue, and it will continue to be a meaningful issue for the next couple of years,” Charlie Scharf, JPMorgan’s head of retail banking, said at a Feb. 26 investor conference. He declined to say when the repurchase demands might peak.

 

 

“I can’t forecast the rates at which they’re going to continue,” she said. Her division lost $3.84 billion last year, as the bank overall posted a $6.28 billion profit. “The volume is increasing.”

 

Wells Fargo, ranked No. 1 among U.S. home lenders last year, bought back $1.3 billion of loans in 2009, triple the year-earlier amount, according to a Feb. 26 filing. The San Francisco-based bank recorded $927 million of costs last year associated with repurchases and estimated future losses.

 

 

Citigroup increased its repurchase reserve sixfold to $482 million, because of increased “trends in requests by investors for loan-documentation packages to be reviewed,” according to a Feb. 26 filing.

 

“The request for loan documentation packages is an early indicator of a potential claim,” New York-based Citigroup said.

 

According to a WSJ analysis, the RMBS market may have a balanced impact with the junior bondholders typically at the bottom of the credit structure could actually end up better off than expected. Senior bondholders, typically at the top, could end up worse off.  This is because when houses that have been packaged into a mortgage bond are liquidated at a foreclosure sale—the very end of the foreclosure processes—the holders of the junior, or riskiest debt, would be the first investors to take losses. But if a foreclosure is delayed, the servicer must typically keep advancing payments that will go to all bondholders, including the junior debt holders, even though the home loan itself is producing no revenue stream. In addition, how the allocation of cost of re-processing the foreclosed loans, which could be significant also, remains a key concern. (Source: http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2010/10/07/363876/updating-the-us-foreclosure-scandal/)

However, some analysts and bond traders have a contrarian view that the “Robo-signing” issues will not have a significant effect on the RMBS valuations, as most RMBS investments have been made after stringent performance modeling (Yeeeahhh, right! Just like the HPA (perpetual housing price appreciation assumptions utilized by Fitch during the boom to dole out AAA ratings on subprime trash! This is total and absolute BULLSHIT, but I am including it so as to be as balanced as possible). More so, they believe that the actual impact on RMBS valuations will depend on how long it takes for banks to tackle the problem.

  • According to a RMBS manager at one capital market group, “the majority of investors currently involved in trading RMBS performed stringent performance modeling. Anyone who bought RMBS from 2006 and 2007, vintages from when presumably these robo-signed foreclosures were inked, would have run the collateral through extended resolution scenarios”. He also expects that bond rally will continue, and that problem would not emerge unless the robo-signing issue is not resolved in less than six months. As per the RMBS manager, “RMBS right now is trading like stocks. Besides, in the year-end, the book always goes up, it’s window dressing the portfolio.
  • Another bond trader, who is also has a bullish view for the market, believes that every single major servicer will face problems similar to Ally and JPMorgan, but still expects RMBS to remain well-valued considering overall loss severities are level and constant repayment rates remain healthy (source: http://www.housingwire.com/2010/10/01/robo-signers-dont-scare-the-mortgage-bond-market).
  • According to Brett Schaffer, the president of Phoenix Capital Inc. and Phoenix Analytics Services Inc, “it’s premature to determine how big of a hit the “robo-signing” scandal will have on servicing valuations. Much depends on how long it takes for servicers to address the problem. If this gets resolved in fairly short order within a month or six weeks and … there isn’t any critical flaw in the mortgage servicers’ practices in general, then I don’t think it has really any impact,” On the other hand, if it is determined that there is a material flaw and there is going to be long-term foreclosure halts, then it probably would have a material impact on those particular firms. It’s not just a blanket statement for the market.”
  • According to Robert Lee, senior vice president at Mortgage Industry Advisory Corp. in New York, “Servicing costs are going to rise regardless of how long it takes for the issue to be resolved, as companies hire employees to work through the documents and the foreclosure process is delayed. But the impact of those higher costs on mortgage servicing asset values may be minimal because many servicers have been conservative in their estimates. Servicing rights themselves right now are weaker than where the cash flow values are.” He also estimated the hit to most portfolios’ value from the fallout of the documentation scandal will be less than 10 basis points. (Servicing values are expressed as a percentage of the unpaid principal balance of the loans in a portfolio).

Overall, we at the BoomBust believe that the uncertainty on the impact of robo-signing on RMBS valuation will remain until the banks give clarity on how long the foreclosures are expected to remain suspended. We also believe that the media is staring at the wrong target. Each major media outlet is copying what is popular or what the next outlet broke as a story versus where the true economic risks actually lie – which is essentially the real story and where the meat actually is. Watch the W&R number over the next two quarters for those banks that purchased cesspool portfolios such as Countrywide, National City, Wachovia and WaMu, and let me know if they start to skyrocket.


In the meantime, I will be updating my forensic valuations of the big banks that I have covered right about the time they report in the upcoming weeks. These updates will include Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, PNC, Wells Fargo, and JP Morgan. I will put them through the realistic stress test scenarios that our government failed to and have the results available to paying subscribers. Of course, I will factor in the very real probability of a surge in W&R activity, just as I warned last year. This is something that is just not found in banking analysis that I see on the Street. Below is an example of what was done last year for PNC…….

#ffffff;”>For those of you want to know what the stress tests results of the big banks were if they used the NY Fed/FDIC official loss data, I have run the numbers for you. It doesn’t look very pretty in some cases. This content is paid subscriber-only, except for the two links that have public-lite and public excerpt included! Let’s walk through the PNC free data, in light of how misleading their latest quarterly report was (see For those that didn’t notice – Reggie Middleton on PNCl Q3-09 Results and then be sure to read At What Point Does Accounting Gimmickery Become an Outright Lie? Let’s Ask PNC).

#ffffff;”>Click any of these graphics to enlarge…

pnc_stress1.png

#ffffff;”>Notice the amount of leverage that PNC is using if one were to use the NY Fed and FDIC data in lieu of what PNC has proffered through their take home test.

#ffffff;”>pnc_stress2.png

#ffffff;”>As you can see from above, there is a significant difference between what the government’s SCAP tests reveal PNC will lose and what the government’s NY Fed and FDIC call sheet data says PNC will lose – a very significant difference. Solely as a result of looking at this chart, one should be willing to demand a second round of considerably more stringent stress testing.

#ffffff;”>pnc_stress3.png

#ffffff;”>If one were to granularly break down the foreseen losses to PNC’s portfolio using the government data…

#ffffff;”>pnc_stress4.png

#ffffff;”>As you can see, going through each major loan category in PNC’s books reveals a much LESS optimistic scenario than ANY portrayed in their SCAP take home test results…

#ffffff;”>In an act of near unprecedented generosity, I have included the PNC valuation along with the Blackrock contribution in the free PNC lite public download below (in alphabetical order).

#ffffff;”>


Subscriber content that reveals what the banks REALLY needed in terms of capital and cushions to whether the true rate of losses and unemployment to come. You may subscribe here to access this content.#ffffff;”>Goldman Sachs Stress Test Professional Goldman Sachs Stress Test Professional 2009-04-20 10:06:45 4.04 Mb

Goldman Sachs Stress Test Retail Goldman Sachs Stress Test Retail 2009-04-20 10:08:06 720.25 Kb

MS Simulated Government Stress Test MS Simulated Government Stress Test 2009-05-05 11:36:25 2.49 Mb

MS Stess Test Model Assumptions and Stress Test Valuation MS Stess Test Model Assumptions and Stress Test Valuation 2009-04-22 07:55:17 339.99 Kb

PNC SCAP Results recast using FDIC and NY Fed data - Pro PNC SCAP Results recast using FDIC and NY Fed data – Pro 2009-05-15 07:31:21 455.37 Kb

PNC SCAP Results recast using FDIC and NY Fed data - Retail PNC SCAP Results recast using FDIC and NY Fed data – Retail 2009-05-15 07:30:25 395.18 Kb

PNC Stress Test Pro PNC Stress Test Pro 2009-04-13 02:10:17 3.11 Mb

PNC Stress Test update - Professional PNC Stress Test update – Professional 2009-04-21 15:55:56 3.00 Mb

PNC Stress Test Retail PNC Stress Test Retail 2009-04-13 02:11:08 323.51 Kb

PNC Stress Test update - Retail PNC Stress Test update – Retail 2009-04-21 15:53:52 777.50 Kb

PNC stress test write up - public lite PNC stress test write up – public lite 2009-07-27 02:37:11 995.30 Kb

Sun Trust Banks Simulated Government Stress Test Sun Trust Banks Simulated Government Stress Test 2009-05-05 11:37:13 1016.17 Kb

JPM Public Excerpt of Forensic Analysis Subscription JPM Public Excerpt of Forensic Analysis Subscription 2009-09-22 14:33:53 1.51 Mb

 

BofA Finds Foreclosure Document Errors

BofA Finds Foreclosure Document Errors

 

By DAN FITZPATRICK

Bank of America Corp. for the first time acknowledged finding some mistakes in foreclosure files as it begins to resubmit documents in 102,000 cases.

The Charlotte, N.C., lender discovered errors in 10 to 25 out of the first several hundred foreclosure cases it examined starting last Monday. The problems included improper paperwork, lack of signatures and missing files, said people familiar with the results. In certain cases, information about the property and payment history didn’t match.

Some of the defects seem relatively minor, according to the bank, and bank officials said they haven’t uncovered any evidence of wrongful foreclosures. There was an address missing one of five digits, misspellings of borrowers’ names, a transposition of a first and last name and a missing signature on one document “underlying” an affidavit, a bank spokesman said.

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But the bank uncovered these mistakes while preparing less than 1% of the first foreclosure files that it intends to resubmit to the courts in 23 states. As the nation’s largest mortgage lender, the bank is under pressure to show that its mortgage process isn’t flawed amid revelations that many banks used “robo-signers” to approve large numbers of foreclosure documents without reading them closely.

State and federal agencies launched investigations into the allegations, and some officials, including Iowa’s attorney general, said they wouldn’t necessarily trust the banks’ self-assessments.

Several statements from bank officers about foreclosure practices have come under scrutiny. Wells Fargo & Co. Chief Executive John Stumpf on Oct. 20 said: “I don’t know how other companies do it, but in our company the affidavit signer and the reviewer are the same team member.” Days later a deposition emerged from a bankruptcy case indicating that Wells Fargo had in fact used a robo-signer who didn’t verify documents she approved.

A Wells Fargo spokeswoman said “we don’t believe any of those cases or depositions should be taken out of context. If we find some errors and need for improvements we will take that action.”

Bank of America in several recent public comments about the foreclosure issue hadn’t previously acknowledged even minor errors. Yet last week it uncovered a group of mistakes as it prepared to resubmit the first batch of documents and shared the information internally, according to people familiar with the matter. Executives are briefed twice daily about what was found.

When the bank announced Oct. 18 that it would lift a freeze on foreclosure sales in 23 states, it emphasized the accuracy of its internal review. “Our initial assessment findings show the basis for our foreclosure decisions is accurate,” the company said in a statement.

That conclusion, it turns out, was based on an earlier sample of fewer than 1,000 files. The bank found no mistakes in the sample, a spokesman said, but it decided to make changes to its affidavit approval procedures before going through all 102,000 cases. Now, for example, a notary will sit next to the signer of the affidavit as the documents are being reviewed.

The day after the bank began its comprehensive review of all documents, CEO Brian Moynihan told analysts on an Oct. 19 conference call that “the teams reviewing the data have not found information which was inaccurate, which would affect the plain facts of the foreclosure” such as whether the customer was actually delinquent on the loan. The errors uncovered so far support Mr. Moynihan’s statement, bank officials said, and all mistakes are being corrected before the bank resubmits documents to the courts.

Barbara Desoer, president of home loans for Bank of America, said Sunday that Mr. Moynihan’s Oct. 19 comments were “consistent” with the review findings. “The basis for the foreclosure decisions have been accurate and correct,” she said.

Trial Mods or forbearance agreements may be a waiver of Foreclosure

Trial Mods or forbearance agreements may be a waiver of Foreclosure

Waiver or Estoppel to Claim Payment or Default

May a client call me to say they where making there trial loan mod  payments but the lender foreclosed anyway. The trustor may deny that any amount is owed at that particular time, or may deny that the prescribed amount demanded is owed, if the beneficiary has waived the time requirements contained in the obligation by accepting late payments or if the beneficiary has accepted payments smaller than that permitted in the contract.

A waiver is unlikely to be construed as permanent in the absence of a writing or new consideration. A permanent waiver is, in effect, a change in the agreement equivalent to a novation requiring new consideration. [E.g., Hunt v. Smyth, supra, 25 Cal.App.3d 807, 819; Bledsoe v. Pacific Ready Cut Homes, Inc. (1928) 92 Cal.App. 641, 644-45; 268 P. 697.] The beneficiary and trustor may modify their payment schedule in writing without new consideration. [See Civ. Code §§1698(a), 2924c (b)(1).] The beneficiary’s conduct, however, may constitute a temporary waiver.

The beneficiary cannot declare the trustor in default of the terms of the obligation where the beneficiary has temporarily waived such terms — until the beneficiary has given definite notice demanding payment in accord with the obligation and has provided the trustor a reasonable length of time to comply. In addition, the beneficiary must give the trustor definite notice that future payments must comply with the terms of the obligation. [E.g., Hunt v. Smyth. supra, 25 Cal.App.3d 807, 822-23; Lopez v. Bell (1962) 207 Cal.App.2d 394, 398-99; 24 Cal.Rptr. 626; Bledsoe v. Pacific Ready Cut Homes, Inc., supra, 92 Cal.App. 641, 645.] Even if the beneficiary’s conduct does not constitute a knowing relinquishment of rights, it may create an equitable estoppel. [See e.g., Altman v. McCollum (1951) 107 Cal.App.2d Supp. 847; 236 P.2d 914.]

LOAN MODIFICATIONS: IS THIS WHAT I’M SUPPOSED TO BELIEVE??

IS THIS WHAT I’M TO UNDERSTAND?

You don’t need to hire anyone to help you negotiate with your bank for a loan modification.

You don’t need an attorney, you don’t need a mortgage expert, and you don’t need a fraud examiner.

All of those people, the lawyers, the mortgage experts, the fraud examiners… they’re all scammers because they CHARGE for their services.

And everyone knows that loan modifications are FREE… like water in a stream, or the air that we breathe.

Banks, on the other hand, have plenty of lawyers, mortgage experts, credit specialists, underwriters, and professional negotiators.

You, however, should come alone.

Who says you should come alone? The banks say so, that’s who.

The banks are looking out for you. The banks are going to help you. The banks are on your side. You can trust the banks.

The same banks that put you into mortgages where the payments double as soon as the prepayment penalty period ends.

The same banks that blame you, the borrowers, for the meltdown, and have already foreclosed on millions of homes.

The same banks that just lobbied congress to kill the bankruptcy reform bill that would have allowed judges to modify mortgages in bankruptcy so that people going bankrupt could have a chance to keep their homes.

The same banks that just lobbied congress asking for a top allowable interest rate of 500%, and got 390%, while they charge you 29% on your credit card.

The same banks that fraudulently packaged mortgage backed securities as AAA rated bonds and in doing so destroyed the bond market, and left the world’s financial systems in ruin.

The same banks that paid their executives untold billions in compensation and bonuses as the entire country was sliding into the deepest recession since the 1930s.

The same banks that have received TRILLIONS OF DOLLARS in taxpayer money. TRILLIONS.

Those same banks are now going to help you … as long as you come alone to the negotiation. Don’t hire anyone to help you… and they’ll help you.

And our President and our government agrees.

But the FACT is that banks are REQUIRED BY LAW to negotiate in the banks best interest, not yours. The law says that the bank MUST do what’s in the bank’s best interest, not yours.

It’s called a “fiduciary duty,” and it means that the banks MUST do what’s in the best interests of their shareholders, or their shareholders can SUE them for lots of money.

Those are the facts. And while you are entitled to your own opinion, you are not entitled to your own set of facts.

Here’s another fact: The banks don’t want you to have representation. They’d prefer you come alone… without help… without an attorney… without a mortgage expert. They’d much rather negotiate with people who are scared, emotional, and unknowledgeable. It makes it easier and better for them.

But the 5th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution state that:

No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

This can be viewed as a person’s rights to fair governing.

In the United States of America there are two types of due process of law, “procedural” and “substantive”.

Procedural due process of law means that the procedures used by government in making, applying, interpreting, and enforcing laws be reasonable and consistent. Substantive due process of law means that the government cannot make laws that apply to situations in which the government has no business interfering. It means that the “substance” or purpose of laws be constitutional.

The Fourteenth Amendment continues and later talks about the “equal protection clause”. It states that no state may “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” The Fourteenth Amendment’s original purpose was to create a society in which all people were treated equally.

There have been three Taxpayer Bill of Rights passed by the United States Congress in the last 20 years. Here’s what the first right in the first Taxpayer Bill of Rights states:

Taxpayers have the right to legal representation similar to that of a criminal defendant. Taxpayers have the right to have the IRS processes explained to them. Taxpayers have the right to sue the government for damages caused by IRS officials.

Shouldn’t taxpayers have the same rights as homeowners when negotiating with their banks to avoid foreclosure and keep their homes?

How many scammers are there? No one knows. How many mortgages have been successfully modified with the help of a private sector law firm or mortgage firm? No one knows.

The government says we must protect homeowners from “scammers,” because homeowners can’t tell whether a given firm is a “scammer” or not. So, the banks and the government say they are all “scammers,” and you can tell because they charge a fee or retainer in advance of the work being completed… which is exactly the way all attorneys charge for every single case they take on.

Is it the scammers who cause the scam, or is it the homeowner who is in a panic? It’s the panic.

And who is causing the homeowner to be in a panic? Who defrauded the financial system and caused the housing meltdown and worst recession since The Great Depression? Who broke the bond market by selling bonds that were fraudulently packaged and sold to investors? Who put homeowners into loans they did not understand and could not afford?

The banks did all of that. The banks caused the panic. The panic leads to the scams.

SO, WHO ARE THE REAL SCAMMERS HERE?

Yes… that’s right.

SO, MAYBE IT’S TIME WE STOPPED LISTENING TO THEM. GET YOUR OWN REPRESENTATION BEFORE NEGOTIATING WITH YOUR BANK OVER A LOAN MODIFICATION. NO MATTER WHAT ANYONE TELLS YOU.

USE YOUR HEAD. THIS MESS WASN’T YOUR FAULT. POOR PEOPLE WHO WANTED HOMES DIDN’T CAUSE THE WORLD’S BANKING SYSTEM AND WALL ST. TO FAIL.

DON’T BE A SUCKER FOR THE BANKS… AGAIN.

In a related story…

Wells Fargo Bank killed a man recently. The man was in jeopardy of losing his home to foreclosure. He had raised his family there. He lived there with his wife. They lived in Agora, CA. He was trying to handle the negotiations himself. Because that’s what he was told to do…

The bank was refusing to work with him. They wouldn’t modify his loan. They told him he had to come up with tens of thousands of dollars or he’d have to get out. They were nasty with him. It was taking a toll on him. The stress must have been unbearable. He couldn’t stand the thought of losing what he had worked his entire life to protect.

Nothing worked. Now there was only ONE WEEK before his home would be sold in a foreclosure sale. He couldn’t stand it.

He had a massive heart attack.

He was 62 years old.

His widow buried him. She was scared that she would have to move from their home.

She hired the law firm of Serge, Rodnunsky & Jones in Woodland Hills. They called Wells Fargo and today they got the bank to agree to delay the sale until September. They’re confident they will be successful in obtaining a loan modification for the widow.

That’s all they needed… a loan modification.

But he is gone. Someone’s husband of decades. Someone’s father. Someone’s grandfather. A life ended.

Because the bank couldn’t modify the loan. A few dollars.

He worked his entire life in this country. His tax dollars made it possible for Wells Fargo to get bailed out by the government. And they killed him. And they didn’t and don’t care one bit.

And I will never forgive Wells Fargo or any of the banks for this. Never.

Taxpayers Bailout the Banks Nobody Bailsout the taxpayer!

Pain on Main Street

As lawmakers continue paying out the 17 trillion it will ultimately cost taxpayers to bailout the banks and lenders on Wall Street, the foreclosure machine grinds on and the mortgage crisis at the heart of the problem continues to worsen.

Every day, people show up looking for help at the modest offices of United Communities Against Poverty, a housing counseling agency in Prince George’s County, Md., in suburban Washington. Homes are going into foreclosure at one of the fastest rates in the nation here, and to chief counselor Caprice Coppedge, it’s hardly surprising that the bailout bill doesn’t have much in it to help them.

“I’m not shocked,” she said. “Each one of these so-called rescues hasn’t done much to help homeowners. There has to be a little bit more of a solid plan. I don’t understand why they [Congress and the Treasury Dept.] are not getting a clear understanding of what’s going on on the ground level — with homeowners.”

When it comes to the bailout, homeowners understand one thing for sure: They aren’t too big to fail. A long-sought measure that might help some of them — changing federal law to allow bankruptcy judges to modify mortgages — faces tough odds, with the lending industry strongly opposed to it.

Even if gets approved, some borrowers can’t afford bankruptcy attorneys or don’t want to file. Still, housing groups estimate the change would keep some 600,000 families in their homes, which is why they have been pushing the idea.

To help even more, Senate Democrats want the government to modify as many of the loans it buys as possible. But just because the government owns all those bad mortgages doesn’t mean it can do a massive restructuring to make them more affordable.

In taking on toxic loans, the government faces a huge Humpty-Dumpty problem — mortgage-backed securities were sliced into pieces and sold that way to investors around the globe. Spending all that taxpayer money to buy those securities still won’t ensure the government can own or control them all, so it can’t redo loans on a large scale. Even $700 billion won’t be enough to put all the pieces back together again, said Adam Levitin, a Georgetown University law professor and expert on the credit industry.

The small percentage of loan modifications that might get done will be “random and arbitrary,” and not based on the merit’s of a homeowner’s case, he said. Not to mention that second mortgage holders regularly refuse to do loan modifications, and many subprime homeowners took out two mortgages.

Given all this, the bailout ends up rewarding the most egregious of the subprime lenders — the ones who made the most abusive and predatory loans and who disproportionately targeted minority borrowers — since they’ll be the ones with the most toxic securities to buy. Banks that didn’t do as much subprime lending won’t need to sell off as many loans, and they won’t get as much government money, Levitin said.

And don’t count on banks being subject to tighter regulation in return for their bailout, he added. It’s possible that banks and lenders in a few years might use the same taxpayer dollars that rescued them to stave off regulatory reform of the financial markets, the ultimate irony of the bailout effort.

The banks seem to be escaping the consequences of their past lending behavior.

“It’s pretty insidious,” Levitin said. “We’re bailing out banks that got us into this mess because of years of abusive and predatory loans. And there’s no price to pay. I find that deeply troubling.”

No where is it more troubling than places like Prince George’s County, the nation’s wealthiest black suburb, which has been hard hit by subprime loans and foreclosures. Credit scores here rank at or above the national average, but the community has more than its share of subprime loans, with almost twice as many homeowners holding high-cost mortgages as the national average.

That pattern holds true elsewhere. In majority black and Latino communities nationwide, nearly half of all mortgages made in 2006 were subprime loans. All during the housing boom, racial differences became more pronounced as income increased — so middle-to-high income black and Latino borrowers were more likely than non-minority borrowers with modest incomes to have subprime mortgages.

Iris Pulliam, 51, a social worker in the District of Columbia public schools, refinanced her Prince George’s County home with a 9.5 percent Countywide loan three years ago. She tried to do some research before refinancing and refused the adjustable rate mortgage the lender first offered.

Looking back, Pulliam said she wasn’t aware she could have had a real estate attorney with her at the closing, and didn’t comprehend all the additional fees included in the loan before she signed. Still, she kept up the payments until her husband died almost two years ago, leaving her with just one income to pay the mortgage and take care of her 15-year-old son.

Pulliam began falling behind on her mortgage, and tried working out a loan modification with Countrywide. But the lender agreed only to a repayment plan that would increase her monthly payments.

She stood in a long line in the July heat to try to get a loan restructuring through the Neighborhood Assistance Corp. of America, a housing advocacy group. But Countrywide still hasn’t approved it. A Countrywide representative called her recently to discuss her case, but she called back again and again and couldn’t get through to anyone.

At this point, Pulliam has taken on a part-time job in addition to her full-time position and has dipped into most of her retirement savings to keep up with the mortgage. Her day starts at 5 a.m., and she gets home around 8 p.m. She’s thinking of trying to refinance again, if possible. One thing she’s well aware of: The bailout plan isn’t going to do a thing for her.

“It’s not taking the average homeowner into consideration, to me,” she said. “I feel that they’re putting all this money out for all these big money industries, investment companies and firms, and they should do something more for the average homeowner, to try to make sure we keep our homes.

“I think the scales are tipped toward the mortgager who has billions of dollars. For the little person, we might as well be off the scales.”

Modifying bankruptcy laws won’t help her, Pulliam said. She wouldn’t be able to afford a bankruptcy attorney. Congress could make a difference by forcing subprime lenders in future to be “upfront and above board,” she said. She’s not convinced that will happen.

To Coppedge, the housing counselor, part of the problem is that people need the sort of help neither Congress nor the Treasury Dept. is talking about. Coppedge, a former mortgage banker, is well aware that keeping credit flowing will help people in the long run to buy homes or take out loans — in that sense, she sees the need for a bailout.

But the people who come to her could use help too, like emergency assistance to cover even a month or two of mortgage payments to stay in their homes. For along with subprime loans, Coppedge noted, higher gas and food prices are cutting into the ability of the elderly and other homeowners on fixed incomes to pay their mortgages.

“I see a lot of clients who are not your typical five or six months behind on their mortgage,” Coppedge said. “I see some individuals, especially the elderly and the handicapped, who were preyed upon and asked to refinance their mortgages to make repairs or whatever the case may be. And these people just need one or two months of mortgage assistance to catch up, and catch their breath, and be able to get back on track.”

As part of the bailout, Democrats in the House and Senate want government agencies like the Federal Housing Admin. to expand their lending programs and help more homeowners, building on an effort included in the mortgage rescue bill. Under that program, the FHA will provide $300 billion in guarantees for lower-rate mortgages refinanced by lenders willing to accept a loss on the loans.

The program, which begins Oct. 1, is voluntary, and no one seems sure how well it will work. Coppedge noted that most of her clients either don’t have enough income or owe so much more on their mortgages than their homes are worth that they usually don’t qualify for FHA or other government programs.

On Capitol Hill, some lawmakers and economists are questioning whether the bailout plan will do enough to ease the credit crunch and to hold off a recession. But to groups like the Center for Responsible Lending, they are asking the wrong questions. Unless any bailout also deals with the problems of people facing foreclosures, it can’t fix the economy.

“The bailout will not solve our economic problems because it will do virtually nothing to stop the foreclosure epidemic,” the center said in a statement. “Continuing foreclosures will drag down the economy even further.”

John Taylor, president of the National Community Reinvestment Coalition, which represents housing advocacy groups, called it “unconscionable” for Congress to approve a plan that never addresses the underlying problem behind the crisis. His group met with Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke on Monday to complain that the government should first help homeowners facing foreclosure, before shoring up Wall Street.Its the classic case privatizing the profits of Bear Sterns and The Gang of Five and Socializing Losses.And you think it’s an accident, some “natural order of things? That’s what the super wealthy want us to think. And profit-driven establishment, celebrity media to plays along, because it’s a good deal for them. Ain’t it grand? I’m gonna be like that some day, so we better not tax them…. that would be spreading the wealth…. in the wrong direction.

Pulliam says the bailout for Wall Street mostly means that she’s on her own to save her home. Does anyone in power understand what she’s going through?

“The CEO of Countrywide wouldn’t know,” Pulliam said. “Or the vice president of Countrywide; or the Bank of America. They’re all out buying up other banks while the consumers have trouble keeping their houses.”
Pulliam grew up in a house with a white picket fence, and she wants that same sense of the benefits of homeownership for her son. She’s thinking about taking in a roommate to help pay the mortgage. Her sister is also facing foreclosure, and they’re considering sharing a household to solve both of their difficulties.
“I’ll do everything possible that’s legal and above board to keep my home,” Pulliam said. “That’s what I want for my son — a stable neighborhood environment.”

Like other troubled borrowers dealing with a crisis that seems far removed from the political posturing on Capitol Hill, Pulliam seems willing to pay whatever price it takes to keep it.

Nearly 50 percent leave Obama mortgage-aid program

Nearly 50 percent leave Obama mortgage-aid program
Obama mortgage-aid effort is struggling to stem the rising number of foreclosures in US
ap

FILE – In this file photo taken July 21, 2010, a “bank owned” sign is seen on a home that is listed as a foreclosure on a HUD website, in Hawthorne, Calif. Nearly half of the homeowners who enrolled in the Obama administration’s flagship mortgage-relief program have fallen out. (AP Photo/Reed Saxon, file)
Martin Crutsinger, AP Economics Writer, On Friday August 20, 2010, 10:18 pm EDT

WASHINGTON (AP) — Nearly half of the 1.3 million homeowners who enrolled in the Obama administration’s flagship mortgage-relief program have fallen out.

The program is intended to help those at risk of foreclosure by lowering their monthly mortgage payments. Friday’s report from the Treasury Department suggests the $75 billion government effort is failing to slow the tide of foreclosures in the United States, economists say.

More than 2.3 million homes have been repossessed by lenders since the recession began in December 2007, according to foreclosure listing service RealtyTrac Inc. Economists expect the number of foreclosures to grow well into next year.

“The government program as currently structured is petering out. It is taking in fewer homeowners, more are dropping out and fewer people are ending up in permanent modifications,” said Mark Zandi, chief economist at Moody’s Analytics.

Besides forcing people from their homes, foreclosures and distressed home sales have pushed down on home values and crippled the broader housing industry. They have made it difficult for homebuilders to compete with the depressed prices and discouraged potential sellers from putting their homes on the market.

Approximately 630,000 people who had tried to get their monthly mortgage payments lowered through the government program have been cut loose through July, according to the Treasury report. That’s about 48 percent of the those who had enrolled since March 2009. And it is up from more than 40 percent through June.

Another 421,804, or roughly 32 percent of those who started the program, have received permanent loan modifications and are making their payments on time.

RealtyTrac reported that the number of U.S. homes lost to foreclosure surged in July to 92,858 properties, up 9 percent from June. The pace of repossessions has been increasing and the nation is now on track to having more than 1 million homes lost to foreclosure by the end of the year. That would eclipse the more than 900,000 homes repossessed in 2009, the firm says.

Lenders have historically taken over about 100,000 homes a year, according to RealtyTrac.

Zandi said the government effort will likely end up helping only about 500,000 homeowners lower their monthly payments on a permanent basis. That’s a small percentage of the number of people who have already lost their homes to foreclosure or distressed sales like short sales — when lenders let homeowners sell for less than they owe on their mortgages.

Zandi predicts another 1.5 million foreclosures or short sales in 2011.

“We still have a lot more foreclosures to come and further home price declines,” Zandi said. He said home prices, which have already fallen 30 percent since the peak of the housing boom, would drop by another 5 percent by next spring.

Many borrowers have complained that the government program is a bureaucratic nightmare. They say banks often lose their documents and then claim borrowers did not send back the necessary paperwork.

The banking industry said borrowers weren’t sending back their paperwork. They also have accused the Obama administration of initially pressuring them to sign up borrowers without insisting first on proof of their income. When banks later moved to collect the information, many troubled homeowners were disqualified or dropped out.

Obama officials dispute that they pressured banks. They have defended the program, saying lenders are making more significant cuts to borrowers’ monthly payments than before the program was launched. And some of the largest mortgage companies in the program have offered alternative programs to those who fell out.

Homeowners who qualify can receive an interest rate as low as 2 percent for five years and a longer repayment period. Those who have successfully navigated the program to reach permanent modifications have seen their monthly payments cut on average by about $500.

Homeowners first receive temporary modifications and those are supposed to become permanent after borrowers make three payments on time and complete all the required paperwork. That includes proof of income and a letter explaining the reason for their troubles. But in practice, the process has taken far longer.

The more than 100 participating mortgage companies get taxpayer incentives to reduce payments. As of mid-June only $490 million had been spent out of a potential $75 billion the government has made available to help stem the wave of foreclosures.

AP Real Estate Writer Alan Zibel in Washington and Alex Veiga in Los Angeles contributed to this report.

A Homeowners’ Rebellion: Could 62 Million Homes be Foreclosure-Proof?

62 MILLION HOMES ARE LEGALLY FORECLOSURE -PROOF

Posted 7 hours ago by Neil Garfield on Livinglies’s Weblog

EDITOR’S NOTE: YES IT MEANS WHAT IT SAYS — WHICH IS WHAT I HAVE BEEN SAYING FOR THREE YEARS. BUT JUST BECAUSE SOME JUDGES REALIZE THAT THIS IS THE ONLY CORRECT LEGAL INTERPRETATION DOESN’T MEAN ALL OF THEM WILL ABIDE BY THAT. QUITE THE REVERSE. MOST JUDGES REFUSE TO ACCEPT AND CAN’T WRAP THEIR BRAINS AROUND THE FACT THAT THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY THAT SET THE LEGAL STANDARDS FOR PERFECTING A SECURITY INTEREST IN RESIDENTIAL HOME MORTGAGES COULD HAVE SCREWED UP LIKE THIS.

THE ANSWER OF COURSE IS THAT THEY DIDN’T — WALL STREET DID IT. I KNOW FOR A FACT AND HAVE SEEN THE INTERNAL MEMORANDUM WRITTEN IN 2003-2006 THAT LAWYERS WHO WERE PREPARING THE SECURITIZATION DOCUMENTS KNEW AND INFORMED THEIR CLIENTS THAT THIS COULD NOT WORK.

THIS DOES NOT MEAN YOU GET A FREE HOUSE. BUT IT DOES MEAN THAT AT THE MOMENT ANY HOUSE IN WHICH MERS WAS INVOLVED DOES NOT HAVE A PERFECTED SECURITY INTEREST AS AN ENCUMBRANCE. AND THAT MEANS THAT ANY FORECLOSURE BASED UPON DOCUMENTS OR PRESUMPTIONS REGARDING MERS ARE VOID. AND THAT MEANS THAT IF YOU FALL INTO THIS CLASS OF PEOPLE — AND MOST PEOPLE DO — IT IS POSSIBLE AND EVEN PROBABLE THAT YOU COULD BE AWARDED QUIET TITLE ON A HOME THAT WAS FORECLOSED AND SOLD EVEN YEARS AGO.

BUT BEWARE: JUST BECAUSE THEY SCREWED UP THE PAPERWORK AND THEY DON’T HAVE THE REMEDY OF FORECLOSURE IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE DOESN’T MEAN THAT NOBODY LENT YOU MONEY NOR DOES IT MEAN THAT YOU DON’T OWE ANY MONEY NOR DOES IT MEAN THAT THEY COULD NOT CREATE AN EQUITABLE LIEN ON YOUR PROPERTY THAT COULD AMOUNT TO A MORTGAGE THAT COULD BE FORECLOSED. BUT THAT IS STRICTLY A JUDICIAL PROCESS EVEN IN SO-CALLED NON-JUDICIAL STATES.

WE ARE NOW CLOSING IN ON THE REALITY. THE INEVITABLE OUTCOME IS PRINCIPAL REDUCTION WHETHER THE BANKS LIKE IT OR NOT. EVEN IF THEIR LIEN WAS PERFECTED AND ENFORCEABLE THEY STILL CANNOT GET ANY MORE MONEY THAN THE HOUSE IS WORTH. WITHOUT THE ENCUMBRANCE, THEY ARE FORCED TO NEGOTIATE A WHOLE NEW PATH WITH ONLY THE PARTIES THAT ARE NOW LEFT HOLDING THE BAG ON THE LOSS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ORIGINAL LOAN ON YOUR PROPERTY, AFTER ADJUSTMENTS FOR PAYMENTS RECEIVED BUT NOT RECORDED OR ALLOCATED.

IN ORDER TO HOLD THEIR FEET TO THE FIRE, YOU HAVE TO KNOW THE ORIGINAL SECURITIZATION SCHEME AND INSIST ON PROOF OF WHAT HAPPENED AFTER THE INITIAL SECURITIZATION PLAN WAS PUT IN PLACE. REMEMBER THAT THIS IS NOT A FIXED EVENT. THIS IS SINGLE TRANSACTION BETWEEN THE BORROWER AND AN ONGOING PROCESSION OF SUCCESSORS EACH OF WHOM HAS QUESTIONABLE RIGHTS TO THE NOTE, MORTGAGE OR EVEN THE OBLIGATION SINCE THEY WERE ONLY ASSIGNED A RECEIVABLE FROM A PARTY WHO WAS NEITHER THE BORROWER NOR THE ORIGINATING LENDER.

A Homeowners’ Rebellion: Could 62 Million Homes be Foreclosure-Proof?

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Ellen Brown
Web of Debt
August 20, 2010

Over 62 million mortgages are now held in the name of MERS, an electronic recording system devised by and for the convenience of the mortgage industry. A California bankruptcy court, following landmark cases in other jurisdictions, recently held that this electronic shortcut makes it impossible for banks to establish their ownership of property titles—and therefore to foreclose on mortgaged properties. The logical result could be 62 million homes that are foreclosure-proof.

Victims of predatory lending could end up owning their homes free and clear—while the financial industry could end up skewered on its own sword.

Mortgages bundled into securities were a favorite investment of speculators at the height of the financial bubble leading up to the crash of 2008. The securities changed hands frequently, and the companies profiting from mortgage payments were often not the same parties that negotiated the loans. At the heart of this disconnect was the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, or MERS, a company that serves as the mortgagee of record for lenders, allowing properties to change hands without the necessity of recording each transfer.

MERS was convenient for the mortgage industry, but courts are now questioning the impact of all of this financial juggling when it comes to mortgage ownership. To foreclose on real property, the plaintiff must be able to establish the chain of title entitling it to relief. But MERS has acknowledged, and recent cases have held, that MERS is a mere “nominee”—an entity appointed by the true owner simply for the purpose of holding property in order to facilitate transactions. Recent court opinions stress that this defect is not just a procedural but is a substantive failure, one that is fatal to the plaintiff’s legal ability to foreclose.

That means hordes of victims of predatory lending could end up owning their homes free and clear—while the financial industry could end up skewered on its own sword.

California Precedent

The latest of these court decisions came down in California on May 20, 2010, in a bankruptcy case called In re Walker, Case no. 10-21656-E–11. The court held that MERS could not foreclose because it was a mere nominee; and that as a result, plaintiff Citibank could not collect on its claim. The judge opined:

Since no evidence of MERS’ ownership of the underlying note has been offered, and other courts have concluded that MERS does not own the underlying notes, this court is convinced that MERS had no interest it could transfer to Citibank. Since MERS did not own the underlying note, it could not transfer the beneficial interest of the Deed of Trust to another. Any attempt to transfer the beneficial interest of a trust deed without ownership of the underlying note is void under California law.

In support, the judge cited In Re Vargas (California Bankruptcy Court); Landmark v. Kesler (Kansas Supreme Court); LaSalle Bank v. Lamy (a New York case); and In Re Foreclosure Cases (the “Boyko” decision from Ohio Federal Court). (For more on these earlier cases, see here, here and here.) The court concluded:

Since the claimant, Citibank, has not established that it is the owner of the promissory note secured by the trust deed, Citibank is unable to assert a claim for payment in this case.

The broad impact the case could have on California foreclosures is suggested by attorney Jeff Barnes, who writes:

This opinion . . . serves as a legal basis to challenge any foreclosure in California based on a MERS assignment; to seek to void any MERS assignment of the Deed of Trust or the note to a third party for purposes of foreclosure; and should be sufficient for a borrower to not only obtain a TRO [temporary restraining order] against a Trustee’s Sale, but also a Preliminary Injunction barring any sale pending any litigation filed by the borrower challenging a foreclosure based on a MERS assignment.

While not binding on courts in other jurisdictions, the ruling could serve as persuasive precedent there as well, because the court cited non-bankruptcy cases related to the lack of authority of MERS, and because the opinion is consistent with prior rulings in Idaho and Nevada Bankruptcy courts on the same issue.

What Could This Mean for Homeowners?

Earlier cases focused on the inability of MERS to produce a promissory note or assignment establishing that it was entitled to relief, but most courts have considered this a mere procedural defect and continue to look the other way on MERS’ technical lack of standing to sue. The more recent cases, however, are looking at something more serious. If MERS is not the title holder of properties held in its name, the chain of title has been broken, and no one may have standing to sue. In MERS v. Nebraska Department of Banking and Finance, MERS insisted that it had no actionable interest in title, and the court agreed.

An August 2010 article in Mother Jones titled “Fannie and Freddie’s Foreclosure Barons” exposes a widespread practice of “foreclosure mills” in backdating assignments after foreclosures have been filed. Not only is this perjury, a prosecutable offense, but if MERS was never the title holder, there is nothing to assign. The defaulting homeowners could wind up with free and clear title.

In Jacksonville, Florida, legal aid attorney April Charney has been using the missing-note argument ever since she first identified that weakness in the lenders’ case in 2004. Five years later, she says, some of the homeowners she’s helped are still in their homes. According to a Huffington Post article titled “‘Produce the Note’ Movement Helps Stall Foreclosures”:

Because of the missing ownership documentation, Charney is now starting to file quiet title actions, hoping to get her homeowner clients full title to their homes (a quiet title action ‘quiets’ all other claims). Charney says she’s helped thousands of homeowners delay or prevent foreclosure, and trained thousands of lawyers across the country on how to protect homeowners and battle in court.

Criminal Charges?


Other suits go beyond merely challenging title to alleging criminal activity. On July 26, 2010, a class action was filed in Florida seeking relief against MERS and an associated legal firm for racketeering and mail fraud. It alleges that the defendants used “the artifice of MERS to sabotage the judicial process to the detriment of borrowers;” that “to perpetuate the scheme, MERS was and is used in a way so that the average consumer, or even legal professional, can never determine who or what was or is ultimately receiving the benefits of any mortgage payments;” that the scheme depended on “the MERS artifice and the ability to generate any necessary ‘assignment’ which flowed from it;” and that “by engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity, specifically ‘mail or wire fraud,’ the Defendants . . . participated in a criminal enterprise affecting interstate commerce.”

Local governments deprived of filing fees may also be getting into the act, at least through representatives suing on their behalf. Qui tam actions allow for a private party or “whistle blower” to bring suit on behalf of the government for a past or present fraud on it. In State of California ex rel. Barrett R. Bates, filed May 10, 2010, the plaintiff qui tam sued on behalf of a long list of local governments in California against MERS and a number of lenders, including Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase and Wells Fargo, for “wrongfully bypass[ing] the counties’ recording requirements; divest[ing] the borrowers of the right to know who owned the promissory note . . .; and record[ing] false documents to initiate and pursue non-judicial foreclosures, and to otherwise decrease or avoid payment of fees to the Counties and the Cities where the real estate is located.” The complaint notes that “MERS claims to have ‘saved’ at least $2.4 billion dollars in recording costs,” meaning it has helped avoid billions of dollars in fees otherwise accruing to local governments. The plaintiff sues for treble damages for all recording fees not paid during the past ten years, and for civil penalties of between $5,000 and $10,000 for each unpaid or underpaid recording fee and each false document recorded during that period, potentially a hefty sum. Similar suits have been filed by the same plaintiff qui tam in Nevada and Tennessee.

By Their Own Sword: MERS’ Role in the Financial Crisis

MERS is, according to its website, “an innovative process that simplifies the way mortgage ownership and servicing rights are originated, sold and tracked. Created by the real estate finance industry, MERS eliminates the need to prepare and record assignments when trading residential and commercial mortgage loans.” Or as Karl Denninger puts it, “MERS’ own website claims that it exists for the purpose of circumventing assignments and documenting ownership!”

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MERS was developed in the early 1990s by a number of financial entities, including Bank of America, Countrywide, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac, allegedly to allow consumers to pay less for mortgage loans. That did not actually happen, but what MERS did allow was the securitization and shuffling around of mortgages behind a veil of anonymity. The result was not only to cheat local governments out of their recording fees but to defeat the purpose of the recording laws, which was to guarantee purchasers clean title. Worse, MERS facilitated an explosion of predatory lending in which lenders could not be held to account because they could not be identified, either by the preyed-upon borrowers or by the investors seduced into buying bundles of worthless mortgages. As alleged in a Nevada class action called Lopez vs. Executive Trustee Services, et al.:

Before MERS, it would not have been possible for mortgages with no market value . . . to be sold at a profit or collateralized and sold as mortgage-backed securities. Before MERS, it would not have been possible for the Defendant banks and AIG to conceal from government regulators the extent of risk of financial losses those entities faced from the predatory origination of residential loans and the fraudulent re-sale and securitization of those otherwise non-marketable loans. Before MERS, the actual beneficiary of every Deed of Trust on every parcel in the United States and the State of Nevada could be readily ascertained by merely reviewing the public records at the local recorder’s office where documents reflecting any ownership interest in real property are kept….

After MERS, . . . the servicing rights were transferred after the origination of the loan to an entity so large that communication with the servicer became difficult if not impossible …. The servicer was interested in only one thing – making a profit from the foreclosure of the borrower’s residence – so that the entire predatory cycle of fraudulent origination, resale, and securitization of yet another predatory loan could occur again. This is the legacy of MERS, and the entire scheme was predicated upon the fraudulent designation of MERS as the ‘beneficiary’ under millions of deeds of trust in Nevada and other states.

Axing the Bankers’ Money Tree

If courts overwhelmed with foreclosures decide to take up the cause, the result could be millions of struggling homeowners with the banks off their backs, and millions of homes no longer on the books of some too-big-to-fail banks. Without those assets, the banks could again be looking at bankruptcy. As was pointed out in a San Francisco Chronicle article by attorney Sean Olender following the October 2007 Boyko [pdf] decision:

The ticking time bomb in the U.S. banking system is not resetting subprime mortgage rates. The real problem is the contractual ability of investors in mortgage bonds to require banks to buy back the loans at face value if there was fraud in the origination process.

. . . The loans at issue dwarf the capital available at the largest U.S. banks combined, and investor lawsuits would raise stunning liability sufficient to cause even the largest U.S. banks to fail . . . .

Nationalization of these giant banks might be the next logical step—a step that some commentators said should have been taken in the first place. When the banking system of Sweden collapsed following a housing bubble in the 1990s, nationalization of the banks worked out very well for that country.

The Swedish banks were largely privatized again when they got back on their feet, but it might be a good idea to keep some banks as publicly-owned entities, on the model of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia. For most of the 20th century it served as a “people’s bank,” making low interest loans to consumers and businesses through branches all over the country.

With the strengthened position of Wall Street following the 2008 bailout and the tepid 2010 banking reform bill, the U.S. is far from nationalizing its mega-banks now. But a committed homeowner movement to tear off the predatory mask called MERS could yet turn the tide. While courts are not likely to let 62 million homeowners off scot free, the defect in title created by MERS could give them significant new leverage at the bargaining table.

CLASS ACTION VIDEO

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YRGr9sGlIpg&feature=player_embedded

Southern California (909)890-9192 in Northern California(925)957-9797

GMAC FORECLOSING ON GM FAMILIES

Posted on August 3, 2010 by Foreclosureblues
GM, GMAC & the US Government… Have You No Shame?
Today, August 03, 2010, 2 hours ago | MandelmanGo to full article

Southern California (909)890-9192 in Northern California(925)957-9797

In 1984, General Motors and Toyota entered into a joint venture, and they called it the NUMMI plant in Freemont California. Up until May of 2010, NUMMI built an average of 6000 vehicles each week, or nearly eight million cars and trucks. GM saw the joint venture as an opportunity to learn about manufacturing from the Japanese company.

Then the financial meltdown of Wall Street came. Bankers constructed bonds that were designed to default, took advantage of holes in the ratings agencies systems, sold them around the world, leveraged themselves 30:1 and more, and profited immensely by betting against them with credit default swaps. It wasn’t the fault of the employees at GM’s NUMMI plant, they had nothing to do with it, but they were about to pay a steeper price than the Wall Street bankers would pay.

GM pulled out of the venture in June 2009, and several months later Toyota announced plans to pull out by March 2010. Roughly 5,000 people, many of whom had worked at the plant for twenty years would lose their jobs, their retirement plans… everything.

At 9:40am on April 1, 2010, the plant produced its last car, a red Toyota Corolla S. Production of Corollas in North America was moved to Canada. It was over.

The faces of the NUMMI plant.

Of course, it wasn’t the first time a GM plant had closed leaving thousands of workers without jobs, far from it. But this time it was different.

The NUMMI plant is in the Central Valley of California, the part of the state with the lowest literacy rates, and a favorite of home builders and Wall Street’s bankers. Billions of dollars were poured into the Central Valley and tens of thousands of homes were built and sold there during the real estate bubble. It would become Ground Zero of the foreclosure crisis.

The workers at the NUMMI plant were quite familiar with GMAC, because the mortgage lender was the only mortgage lender given access to the plant employees to sell them on refinancing their homes. “Put your cars, your credit cards… everything into a GMAC mortgage,” they were told at the numerous seminars held at the plant, “that way you won’t be in debt.”

GMAC actually had a booth inside the NUMMI plant… you could stop by for brochures 24/7 and 365 days a year. GMAC’s salespeople were on site at least two to three times a month to sell mortgages to plant workers. “GM employees pay no fees and no points with GMAC loans,” the workers were sold… I mean told. Everyone took out GMAC loans, it was like GMAC’s own personal gold mine.

Joe Phillippi, principal of AutoTrends, a consulting firm in Short Hills, N.J. said: “The thing that brought down GMAC was its sub-prime mortgage business.” GMAC lost $16.5 billion in its mortgage business from 2007 to 2009.

According to Bloomberg… GMAC Chief Executive Officer (for a month and a half of last year), and former Citibank executive, Michael Carpenter, was paid $1.2 million plus restricted stock options. He replaced former CEO Alvaro de Molina in mid-November of 2009, who received a $3.7 million salary.

But that’s not all… not even close. GMAC paid Chief Risk Officer Sam Ramsey $7.7 million, $5.7 million to Tom Marano, CEO of mortgage unit Residential Capital LLC. $4.9 million to finance chief Robert Hull, and Chief Marketing Officer Sanjay Gupta received about $4 million.

GMAC lost money in nine of the past 10 quarters. The company hasn’t reported earning a profit since the final quarter of 2008. The company posted a record $3.9 billion loss in the fourth quarter of 2009, and lost $10.3 billion for the year.

The Congressional Oversight Panel, in March of 2010 said that despite three separate bailouts of GMAC totaling $17.3 billion, GMAC Financial Services “continues to struggle with its troubled mortgage liabilities.”

The U.S. government now owns 56.3 percent of GMAC, which serves as the primary source of dealer and car buyer financing for GM and Chrysler. The Obama administration currently estimates that taxpayer losses on the GMAC bailout may be at least $6.3 billion.

The Congressional Oversight Panel said that bankruptcy, and merging GMAC back into GM, could have put GMAC on a sounder footing. Instead, the panel said, Treasury treated GMAC more like large banks such as Citigroup and Bank of America.

I just spent hours getting to know a couple that worked at the NUMMI plant for roughly twenty years. I don’t want to release their real name, so maybe we should just call them “THE DIRT FAMILY,” because that’s exactly how they’ve been treated by GMAC as they tried to apply for a loan modification.

They began their application for a loan modification in July 2009, they were current and had excellent credit… something in the FICO 750 range.

So, first they were told they had to be delinquent. Then, when they went delinquent, they were declined because the husband was told that he made enough to make the mortgage payment. They applied again… and were declined because he was told that he didn’t make enough to qualify for the loan modification.

Are we having fun yet?

They turned to Bruce Marks’ traveling tent show of an non-profit organization, NACA, for help. NACA said they’d put them at the front of the line, but months went by and nothing from NACA. A sale date was set and NACA told the DIRTS they would have to file bankruptcy to stop the sale, so they did, but within days GMAC filed for the removal of the stay, although no new sale date was scheduled.

NACA wanted to wait until MR. DIRT actually lost his job, saying that this would make obtaining the modification easier. GMAC sent a letter to the DIRT’S bankruptcy attorney saying that they couldn’t negotiate unless the lawyer signed a letter saying it was okay to speak directly with the DIRTS. Apparently GMAC was aware of California Civil Code 2923.5, which says the bank must engage in meaningful discussions with a homeowner about alternatives to foreclosure before they foreclose.

The bankruptcy lawyer signed the letter. GAMC never contacted the DIRTS to talk about anything. GMAC won’t tell them if there’s another sale date set. GAMC says they never got anything from NACA.

Next thing they hear is that they’re house is being auctioned in a matter of days. They hire a law firm to try to stop the sale. The DIRTS and their new law firm ask GMAC who is the owner of their loan. GMAC says its GMAC. As it turns out it’s Fannie Mae.

GMAC won’t postpone the sale. Why? Not enough time. GMAC says the DIRT’S waited until the last minute… they procrastinated… they’re procrastinators, shame on them.

He worked 21 years at the NUMMI plant. Four more years and he would have earned his retirement pension. She worked at the plant until she was injured on the job… GM’s work comp doctor said the pain was all in her head… until she needed multiple back and shoulder surgeries… didn’t sue GM because he was going to make supervisor. They raised three children. Next year will be twenty years of a loving marriage. Hard work, but his life was in that plant… until it wasn’t.

And GMAC sold their home. They couldn’t wait. Apparently the Central Valley needs another empty foreclosed home. Here’s the letter they found on their door the next day. It was from Steve Ewing of Keller Williams Realty in the Central Valley of California:

Steve Ewing
Keller Williams Realty
2291 West March Lane, Suite D-210
Stockton, CA 95207
THE NINES TEAM AT KELLER WILLIAMS, CENTRAL VALLEY

We all need a little help in difficult times…

We have been hired by the new owners of this property to bring it to market as quickly as possible. This bank owned property must be sold VACANT.

It is possible that we may be able to provide some financial help for your immediate move.

TIME IS NOT ON YOUR SIDE, PLEASE DON’T MISS THIS OPPORTUNITY!!

PLEASE CONTACT STEVE EWING
PHONE: 209-625-8231 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting              209-625-8231      end_of_the_skype_highlighting
FAX: 866-790-8285
EMAIL: STEVE@THENINESTEAM.NET

ALL OF OUR CONVERSATIONS ARE CONFIDENTIAL

Are they, Steve? You scavenger piece of crap. Are all of your conversations confidential? Just between us girls, is that what you were thinking would be the case? Well, surprise, Steve-O, because I hate secrets. And it’s no secret that you are an inconceivably inconsiderate and insensitive jackass who doesn’t deserve to stand within a hundred yards of anyone in this family.

Do you even know what a real day’s work is Steverino? Because the father in this family definitely does, while you… you puny pompous paper pusher in search of his next commission… obviously doesn’t. How dare you leave a letter like that on their door, and then weasel away in your Mercedes, or whatever kind of import car I’m betting you scamper around in. Did you even know there was a GM plant near by? Did you ever stop to care about the people that worked hard there… that gave their lives there?

No, Mr. Earwhig, I’m telling you that you didn’t care then, and you care even less now. These are people in your community that need your help… your empathy… your understanding… not your asinine “time is not on your side” threatening notes.

So, I have a suggestion for you and Keller Williams… leave this family alone. Don’t go knocking on their door… in fact, don’t bother them at all. They’ve already been inconceivably and undeservedly been treated like DIRT by GM, GMAC and my federal government, they certainly don’t need to concern themselves with the likes of you.

Besides, they’re filing a lawsuit asap, so don’t plan on selling that house anytime soon anyway.

And GMAC… I have only just begun to uncover what unethical, incompetent, money-grubbing, greedy predatory pigs you guys are. You haven’t heard anywhere near the last of me… no you haven’t… I’m just warming up, as far as you’re concerned.

Now you want to be known as “Ally Bank?” Because you actually think that’s how we’re going to think of you? Like our “ally”? Well, bang up job so far, you ally you. With allies like you, who needs the axis?

Now… GMAC, GM, and the Obama Administration… you have a responsibility to these people whose lives you’ve so carelessly thrown by the wayside. These are people that built 8 million cars and trucks in and for this country, so the way I see it, they are responsible for creating a whole lot more jobs in this country than this or any administration has, I’ll say that for sure. So, Mr. President, its time to do the right thing.
GMAC has to act human here. Taxpayers bailed them out to the tune of $17.3 billion. And for what? Was GMAC was too PIG to fail?
LIKE A ROCK, RIGHT?
Well, you’re going to just LOVE this!

Here’s GMAC Corp. contact information, which is found on their Website here:
https://www.gmacmortgage.com/About_Us/Company_Info/OperatingCenters.html
It shows the following under “About Us” and Company Info:
GMAC Mortgage Corporate Headquarters
1100 Virginia Drive
Fort Washington, PA 19034
(215) 734-8899

SEE WHAT HAPPENS WHEN YOU CALL THE NUMBER… COME ON… IT’S REALLY WORTH IT, I SWEAR IT IS. GRAB YOUR CELL RIGHT NOW AND CALL THE CORPORATE NUMBER FOR GMAC AFTER WE TAXPAYERS PUT $17.3 BILLION INTO IT. IT ONLY TAKES A MINUTE…
LIKE A ROCK! SING IT WITH ME… LIKE A ROCK!

Now, here’s a song performed by one of the unemployed workers from NUMMI:

Mandelman OUT!
Southern California (909)890-9192 in Northern California(925)957-9797

TERRY MABRY et al., opinion 2923.5 Cilvil code

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

TERRY MABRY et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE COUNTY,

Respondent;

AURORA LOAN SERVICES, et al.,

Real Parties in Interest.

G042911

(Super. Ct. No. 30-2009-003090696)

O P I N I O N

Original proceedings; petition for a writ of mandate to challenge an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, David C. Velazquez, Judge. Writ granted in part and denied in part.
Law Offices of Moses S. Hall and Moses S. Hall for Petitioners.
No appearance for Respondent.
Akerman Senterfitt, Justin D. Balser and Donald M. Scotten for Real Party in Interest Aurora Loan Services.
McCarthy & Holthus, Matthew Podmenik, Charles E. Bell and Melissa Robbins Contts for Real Party in Interest Quality Loan Service Corporation.
Bryan Cave, Douglas E. Winter, Christopher L. Dueringer, Sean D. Muntz and Kamae C. Shaw for Amici Curiae Bank of America and BAC Home Loans Servicing on behalf of Real Parties in Interest.
Wright, Finlay & Zak, Thomas Robert Finlay and Jennifer A. Johnson for Amici Curiae United Trustee’s Association and California Mortgage Association.
Leland Chan for Amicus Curiae California Bankers Association.

I. SUMMARY
Civil Code section 2923.5 requires, before a notice of default may be filed, that a lender contact the borrower in person or by phone to “assess” the borrower’s financial situation and “explore” options to prevent foreclosure. Here is the exact, operative language from the statute: “(2) A mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall contact the borrower in person or by telephone in order to assess the borrower’s financial situation and explore options for the borrower to avoid foreclosure.” There is nothing in section 2923.5 that requires the lender to rewrite or modify the loan.
In this writ proceeding, we answer these questions about section 2923.5, also known as the Perata Mortgage Relief Act :
(A) May section 2923.5 be enforced by a private right of action? Yes. Otherwise the statute would be a dead letter.
(B) Must a borrower tender the full amount of the mortgage indebtedness due as a prerequisite to bringing an action under section 2923.5? No. To hold otherwise would defeat the purpose of the statute.
(C) Is section 2923.5 preempted by federal law? No — but, we must emphasize, it is not preempted because the remedy for noncompliance is a simple postponement of the foreclosure sale, nothing more.
(D) What is the extent of a private right of action under section 2923.5? To repeat: The right of action is limited to obtaining a postponement of an impending foreclosure to permit the lender to comply with section 2923.5.
(E) Must the declaration required of the lender by section 2923.5, subdivision (b) be under penalty of perjury? No. Such a requirement is not only not in the statute, but would be at odds with the way the statute is written.
(F) Does a declaration in a notice of default that tracks the language of section 2923.5, subdivision (b) comply with the statute, even though such language does not on its face delineate precisely which one of the three categories set forth in the declaration applies to the particular case at hand? Yes. There is no indication that the Legislature wanted to saddle lenders with the need to “custom draft” the statement required by the statute in notices of default.
(G) If a lender did not comply with section 2923.5 and a foreclosure sale has already been held, does that noncompliance affect the title to the foreclosed property obtained by the families or investors who may have bought the property at the foreclosure sale? No. The Legislature did nothing to affect the rule regarding foreclosure sales as final.
(H) In the present case, did the lender comply with section 2923.5? We cannot say on this record, and therefore must return the case to the trial court to determine which of the two sides is telling the truth. According to the lender, the borrowers themselves initiated a telephone conversation in which foreclosure-avoidance options were discussed, and there were many, many phone calls to the borrowers to attempt to discuss foreclosure-avoidance options. According to the borrowers, no one ever contacted them about nonforeclosure options. The trial judge, however, never reached this conflict in the facts, because he ruled strictly on legal grounds: namely (1) that section 2923.5 does not provide for a private right of action and (2) section 2923.5 is preempted by federal law. As indicated, we have concluded otherwise as to those two issues.
(I) Can section 2923.5 be enforced in a class action in this case? Not under these facts. The operation of section 2923.5 is highly fact-specific, and the details as to what might, or might not, constitute compliance can readily vary from lender to lender and borrower to borrower.
II. BACKGROUND
In December 2006, Terry and Michael Mabry refinanced the loan on their home in Corona from Paul Financial, borrowing about $700,000. In April 2008, Paul Financial assigned to Aurora Loan Services the right to service the loan. In this opinion, we will treat Aurora as synonymous with the lender and use the terms interchangeably.
According to the lender, in mid-July 2008 — before the Mabrys missed their August 2008 loan payment — the couple called Aurora on the telephone to discuss the loan with an Aurora employee. The discussion included mention of a number of options to avoid foreclosure, including loan modification, short sale, deed-in-lieu of foreclosure, and even a special forbearance. The Aurora employee sent a letter following up on the conversation. The letter explained the various options to avoid foreclosure, and asked the Mabrys to forward current financial information to Aurora so it could consider the Mabrys for these options.
According to the lender, the Mabrys missed their September 2008 payment as well, and mid-month Aurora sent them another letter describing ways to avoid foreclosure. Aurora employees called the Mabrys “many times” to discuss the situation. The Mabrys never picked up.
It is undisputed that later in September, the Mabrys filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy and Aurora did not contact the Mabrys while the bankruptcy was pending. (See 11 U.S.C. § 362 [automatic stay].) The Mabrys had their Chapter 11 case dismissed, however, in late March 2009.
According to the lender, Aurora once again began trying to call the Mabrys, calling them “numerous times,” including “three times on different days.” Meanwhile, in mid-April the Mabrys sent an authorization to discuss the loan with their lawyers.
According to the lender, finally, in June, the Mabrys sent two faxes to Aurora, the aggregate effect of which was to propose a short sale to the Mabrys’ attorney, Moses S. Hall, for $350,000. If accepted, the short sale would have meant a loss of over $400,000 on the loan. Aurora rejected that offer, and an attorney in Hall’s law office proposed a sale price of $425,000, which would have meant a loss to the lender of about $340,000.
It is undisputed that on June 18, 2009, Aurora recorded a notice of default. The notice of default used this (obviously form) language: “The Beneficiary or its designated agent declares that it has contacted the borrower, tried with due diligence to contact the borrower as required by California Civil Code section 2923.5, or the borrower has surrendered the property to the beneficiary or authorized agent, or is otherwise exempt from the requirements of section 2923.5.” Aurora sent six copies of the recorded notice of default to the Mabrys’ home by certified mail, and the certifications showed they were delivered.
It is also undisputed that on October 7, the Mabrys filed a complaint in Orange County Superior Court based on Aurora’s alleged failure to comply with section 2923.5.
According to the borrowers, no one had ever contacted them about their foreclosure options. Michael Mabry stated the following in his declaration: “We have never been contacted by Aurora nor [sic] any of its agents in person, by telephone or by first class mail to explore options for us to avoid foreclosure as required in CC § 2923.5.”
The complaint sought a temporary restraining order to prevent the foreclosure sale then scheduled just a week away, on October 14, 2009. Based on the allegation of no contact, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order, and scheduled a hearing for October 20.
But exactly one week before the October 20 hearing, the Mabrys filed an amended complaint, this one specifically adding class action allegations and seeking injunctive relief for an entire class. This new filing came with another request for a temporary restraining order, which was also granted, with a hearing on that temporary restraining order scheduled for October 27 (albeit the order was directed at Aurora only).
The first restraining order was vacated on October 20, the second on October 27. The trial judge did not, however, resolve the conflict in the facts presented by the pleadings. Rather he concluded: (1) the action is preempted by federal law; (2) there is no private right of action under section 2923.5 — the statute can only be enforced by members of pooling and servicing agreements; and (3) the Mabrys were required to at least tender all arrearages to enjoin any foreclosure proceedings.
The Mabrys filed a motion for reconsideration and a third request for a restraining order based on supposedly new law. The new law was a now review-granted Court of Appeal opinion which, let us merely note here, appears to have been quite off-point in regards to any issue which the trial judge had just decided. So it is not surprising that the requested restraining order was denied. The foreclosure sale was now scheduled for November 30, 2009. Six days before that, though, the Mabrys filed this writ proceeding, and two days later this court stayed all proceedings. We invited amicus curiae to give their views on the issues raised by the petition, and subsequently scheduled an order to show cause to consider those issues.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Private Right of Action? Yes
1. Preliminary Considerations
A private right of action may inhere within a statute, otherwise silent on the point, when such a private right of action is necessary to achieve the statute’s policy objectives. (E.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago (1979) 441 U.S. 677, 683 [implying private right of action into Title IX of the Civil Rights Act because such a right was necessary to achieve the statute’s policy objectives]; Basic Inc. v. Levinson (1988) 485 U.S. 224, 230-231 [implying private right of action to enforce securities statute].)
That is, the absence of an express private right of action is not necessarily preclusive of such a right. There are times when a private right of action may be implied by a statute. (E.g., Siegel v. American Savings & Loan Assn. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 953, 966 [“Before we reach the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies, we must determine, therefore, whether plaintiffs have an implied private right of action under HOLA.”].)
California courts have, of recent date, looked to Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287 (Moradi-Shalal) for guidance as to whether there is an implied private right of action in a given statute. In Moradi-Shalal, for example, the presence of a comprehensive administrative means of enforcement of a statute was one of the reasons the court determined that there was no private right of action to enforce a statute (Ins. Code, § 790.03, subd. (h)) regulating general insurance industry practices. (See Moradi-Shalal, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 300.)
There is also a pre-Moradi Shalal approach, embodied in Middlesex Ins. Co. v. Mann (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 558, 570 (Middlesex). (The Middlesex opinion itself copied the idea from the Restatement Second of Torts, section 874A.) The approach looks to whether a private remedy is “appropriate” to further the “purpose of the legislation” and is “needed to assure the effectiveness of the provision.” (Middlesex, supra, 124 Cal.App.3d at p. 570.)
Obviously, where the two approaches conflict, the one used by our high court in Moradi-Shalal trumps the Middlesex approach. But we may note at this point that as regards section 2923.5, there is no alternative administrative mechanism to enforce the statute. By contrast, in Moradi-Shalal, there was an existing administrative mechanism at hand (by way of the Insurance Commissioner) available to enforce section 790.03, subdivision (h) of the Insurance Code.
There are other corollary principles as well.
First, California courts, quite naturally, do not favor constructions of statutes that render them advisory only, or a dead letter. (E.g., Petropoulos v. Department of Real Estate (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 554, 567; People v. Stringham (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 184, 197.) Our colleagues in Division One of this District nicely summarized this point in Goehring v. Chapman University (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 353, 375: “The question of whether a regulatory statute creates a private right of action depends on legislative intent . . . . In determining legislative intent, ‘[w]e first examine the words themselves because the statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent . . . . The words of the statute should be given their ordinary and usual meaning and should be construed in their statutory context. . . . These canons generally preclude judicial construction that renders part of the statute “meaningless or inoperative.”’” (Italics added.)
Second, statutes on the same subject matter or of the same subject should be construed together so that all the parts of the statutory scheme are given effect. (Lexin v. Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1050, 1090-1091.) This canon is particularly important in the case before us, where there is an enforcement mechanism available at hand to enforce section 2923.5, in the form, as we explain below, of section 2924g. Ironically though, the enforcement mechanism at hand, in direct contrast to the one in Moradi-Shalal, is one that strongly implies individual enforcement of the statute.
Third, historical context can also shed light on whether the Legislature intended a private right of action in a statute. As noted by one federal district court that has found a private right of action in section 2923.5, the fact that a statute was enacted as an emergency statute is an important factor in determining legislative intent. (See Ortiz v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc. (S.D. 2009) 639 F.Supp.2d 1159, 1166 [agreeing with argument that “the California legislature would not have enacted this ‘urgency’ legislation, intended to curb high foreclosure rates in the state, without any accompanying enforcement mechanism”]; cf. County of San Diego v. State of California (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 580, 609 [admitting that private right of action might exist, even if the Legislature did not imply one, if “‘compelling reasons of public policy’” required “judicial recognition of such a right”].) Section 2923.5 was enacted in 2008 as a manifestation of a felt need for urgent action in the midst of a cascading torrent of foreclosures.
Finally, of course, there is recourse to legislative history. Alas, in this case, there is silence on the matter as regards the existence of a private right of action in the final draft of the statute, and we have been cited to nothing in the history that suggests a clear legislative intent one way or the other. (See generally J.A. Jones Construction Co. v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1568, 1575 (J.A. Jones) [emphasizing importance of clear intent appearing in legislative history].) To be sure, as we were reminded at oral argument, an early version of section 2923.5 had an express provision for a private right of action and that provision did not make its way into the final version of the statute. And we recognize that this factor suggests the Legislature may not have wanted to have section 2923.5 enforced privately.
On the other hand, the bottom line was an outcome of silence, not a clear statement that there should be no individual enforcement. And silence, as this court pointed out in J.A. Jones, has its own implications. There, we cited Professor Eskridge’s work on statutory interpretation (see Eskridge, The New Textualism (1990) 37 U.C.L.A. L.Rev. 621, 670-671 (hereinafter “Eskridge on Textualism”)) to recognize that ambiguity in a statute may itself be the result of both sides in the legislative process agreeing to let the courts decide a point: “[I]f there is ambiguity it is because the legislature either could not agree on clearer language or because it made the deliberate choice to be ambiguous — in effect, the only ‘intent’ is to pass the matter on to the courts.” (J.A. Jones, supra, 27 Cal. App.4th at p. 1577.) As Professor Eskridge put it elsewhere in his article: “The vast majority of the Court’s difficult statutory interpretation cases involve statutes whose ambiguity is either the result of deliberate legislative choice to leave conflictual decisions to agencies or the courts.” (Eskridge on Textualism, supra, 37 UCLA L.Rev. at p. 677.)
We have a concrete example in the case at hand. Amicus curiae, the California Bankers Association, asserts that if section 2923.5 had included an express right to a private right of action, the association would have vociferously opposed the legislation. Let us accept that as true. But let us also accept as a reasonable premise that the sponsors of the bill (2008, Senate Bill No. 1137) would have vociferously opposed the legislation if it had an express prohibition on individual enforcement. The point is, the bankers did not insist on language expressly or even impliedly precluding a private right of action, or, if they did, they didn’t get it. The silence is consonant with the idea that section 2923.5 was the result of a legislative compromise, with each side content to let the courts struggle with the issue.
With these observations, we now turn to the language, structure and function of the statute at issue.
2. Operation of Section 2923.5
Section 2923.5 is one of a series of detailed statutes that govern mortgages that span sections 2920 to 2967. Within that series is yet another long series of statutes governing rules involving foreclosure. This second series goes from section 2924, and then follows with sections 2924a through 2924l. (There is no section 2924m . . . yet.)
Section 2923.5 concerns the crucial first step in the foreclosure process: The recording of a notice of default as required by section 2924. (Just plain section 2924 — this one has no lower case letter behind it.)
The key text of section 2923.5 — “key” because of the substantive obligation it imposes on lenders — basically says that a lender cannot file a notice of default until the lender has contacted the borrower “in person or by telephone.” Thus an initial form letter won’t do. To quote the text directly, lenders must contact the borrower by phone or in person to “assess the borrower’s financial situation and explore options for the borrower to avoid foreclosure.” The statute, of course, has alternative provisions in cases where the lender tries to contact a borrower, and the borrower simply won’t pick up the phone, the phone has been disconnected, the borrower hides or otherwise evades contact.
The contrast between section 2923.5 and one of its sister-statutes, section 2923.6, is also significant. By its terms, section 2923.5 operates substantively on lenders. They must do things in order to comply with the law. In Hohfeldian language, it both creates rights and corresponding obligations.
But consider section 2923.6, which does not operate substantively. Section 2923.6 merely expresses the hope that lenders will offer loan modifications on certain terms. By contrast, section 2923.5 requires a specified course of action. (There is a reason for the difference, as we show in part III.C., dealing with federal preemption. In a word, to have required loan modifications would have run afoul of federal law.)
As noted above, other steps in the foreclosure process are set forth in sections 2924a through 2924l. The topic of the postponement of foreclosure sales is addressed in section 2924g.
Subdivision (c)(1)(A) of section 2924g sets forth the grounds for postponements of foreclosure sales. One of those grounds is the open-ended possibility that any court of competent jurisdiction may issue an order postponing the sale. Section 2923.5 and section 2924g, subdivision (c)(1)(A), when read together, establish a natural, logical whole, and one wholly consonant with the Legislature’s intent in enacting 2923.5 to have individual borrowers and lenders “assess” and “explore” alternatives to foreclosure: If section 2923.5 is not complied with, then there is no valid notice of default, and without a valid notice of default, a foreclosure sale cannot proceed. The available, existing remedy is found in the ability of a court in section 2924g, subdivision (c)(1)(A), to postpone the sale until there has been compliance with section 2923.5. Reading section 2923.5 together with section 2924g, subdivision (c)(1)(A) gives section 2923.5 real effect. The alternative would mean that the Legislature conferred a right on individual borrowers in section 2923.5 without any means of enforcing that right.
By the same token, compliance with section 2923.5 is necessarily an individualized process. After all, the details of a borrower’s financial situation and the options open to a particular borrower to avoid foreclosure are going to vary, sometimes widely, from borrower to borrower. Section 2923.5 is not a statute, like subdivision (h) of section 790.03 of the Insurance Code construed in Moradi-Shalal, which contemplates a frequent or general business practice, and thus its very text is necessarily directed at those who regulate the insurance industry. (Insurance Code section 790.03, subdivision (h) begins with the words, “Knowingly committing or performing with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice any of the following unfair claims settlement practices: . . . .”; see generally Moradi-Shalal, supra, 46 Cal.3d 287.)
Rather, in order to have its obvious goal of forcing parties to communicate (the statutory words are “assess” and “explore”) about a borrower’s situation and the options to avoid foreclosure, section 2923.5 necessarily confers an individual right. The alternative proffered by the trial court — enforcement by the servicer of pooling agreements — involves the facially unworkable problem of fitting individual situations into collective pools.
The suggestion of one amicus that the Legislature intended enforcement of section 2923.5 to reside within the Attorney General’s office is one of which we express no opinion. Our decision today should thus not be read as precluding such enforcement by the Attorney General’s office. But we do note that the same individual-collective problem would dog Attorney General enforcement of the statute. To be sure (which is why the possibility should be left open), there might, ala Insurance Code section 790.03, subdivision (h), be lenders who systematically ignore section 2923.5, and their “general business practice” would be susceptible to some sort of collective enforcement. Even so, the Attorney General’s office can hardly be expected to take up the cause of every individual borrower whose diverse circumstances show noncompliance with section 2923.5.
3. Application
We now put the preceding ideas and factors together.
While the dropping of an express provision for private enforcement in the legislative process leading to section 2923.5 does indeed give us pause, it is outweighed by two major opposing factors. First, the very structure of section 2923.5 is inherently individual. That fact strongly suggests a legislative intention to allow individual enforcement of the statute. The statute would become a meaningless dead letter if no individual enforcement were allowed: It would mean that the Legislature created an inherently individual right and decided there was no remedy at all.
Second, when section 2923.5 was enacted as an urgency measure, there already was an existing enforcement mechanism at hand — section 2924g. There was no need to write a provision into section 2923.5 allowing a borrower to obtain a postponement of a foreclosure sale, since such a remedy was already present in section 2924g. Reading the two statutes together as allowing a remedy of postponement of foreclosure produces a logical and natural whole.
B. Tender Full Amount of Indebtedness? No
The right conferred by section 2923.5 is a right to be contacted to “assess” and “explore” alternatives to foreclosure prior to a notice of default. It is enforced by the postponement of a foreclosure sale. Therefore it would defeat the purpose of the statute to require the borrower to tender the full amount of the indebtedness prior to any enforcement of the right to — and that’s the point — the right to be contacted prior to the notice of default. Case law requiring payment or tender of the full amount of payment before any foreclosure sale can be postponed (e.g., Arnolds Management Corp. v. Eischen (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 575, 578 [“It is settled that an action to set aside a trustee’s sale for irregularities in sale notice or procedure should be accompanied by an offer to pay the full amount of the debt for which the property was security.”]) arises out of a paradigm where, by definition, there is no way that a foreclosure sale can be avoided absent payment of all the indebtedness. Any irregularities in the sale would necessarily be harmless to the borrower if there was no full tender. (See 4 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (2d ed. 1989) § 9:154, pp. 507-508.) By contrast, the whole point of section 2923.5 is to create a new, even if limited right, to be contacted about the possibility of alternatives to full payment of arrearages. It would be contradictory to thwart the very operation of the statute if enforcement were predicated on full tender. It is well settled that statutes can modify common law rules. (E.g., Evangelatos v. Superior Court
44 Cal.3d 1188, 1192 [noting that Civil Code sections 1431 to 1431.5 had modified traditional common law doctrine of joint and several liability].)
C. Preempted by Federal Law? No — As Long
As Relief Under Section 2923.5 is Limited to Just Postponement
1. Historical Context
A remarkable aspect of section 2923.5 is that it appears to have been carefully drafted to avoid bumping into federal law, precisely because it is limited to affording borrowers only more time when lenders do not comply with the statute. To explain that, though, we need to make a digression into state debtors’ relief acts as they have manifested themselves in four previous periods of economic distress.
The first period of economic distress was the depression of the mid-1780’s that played a large part in engendering the United States Constitution in the first place. As Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes would later note for a majority of the United States Supreme Court, there was “widespread distress following the revolutionary period and the plight of debtors, had called forth in the States an ignoble array of legislative schemes for the defeat of creditors and the invasion of contractual obligations.” (Home Building and Loan Ass’n. v. Blaisdell (1934) 290 U.S. 398, 427 (Blaisdell).) Consequently, the federal Constitution of 1789 contains the contracts clause, which forbids states from impairing contracts. (See Siegel, Understanding the Nineteenth Century Contract Clause: The Role of the Property-Privilege Distinction and ‘Takings’ Clause Jurisprudence (1986) 60 So.Cal. L.Rev. 1, 21, fn. 86 [“Although debtor relief legislation was frequently enacted in the Confederation era, it was intensely opposed. It was among the chief motivations for the convening of the Philadelphia convention, and the Constitution drafted there was designed to eliminate such legislation through a variety of means.”].)
The second period of distress arose out of the panic of 1837, which prompted, in 1841, the Illinois state legislature to enact legislation severely restricting foreclosures. The legislation (1) gave debtors 12 months after any foreclosure sale to redeem the property; and (2) prevented any foreclosure sale in the first place unless the sale fetched at least two-thirds of the appraised value of the property. (See Bronson v. Kinzie (1843) 42 U.S. 311 (Bronson); Blaisdell, supra, 290 U.S. at p. 431.) In an opinion, the main theme of which is the interrelationship between contract rights and legal remedies to enforce those rights (see generally Bronson, supra, 42 U.S. at pp. 315-321), the Bronson court reasoned that the Illinois legislation had effectively destroyed the contract rights of the lender as regards a mortgage made in 1838. (See id. at p. 317 [“the obligation of the contract, and the rights of a party under it, may, in effect, be destroyed by denying a remedy altogether”].)
The third period of distress was, of course, the Great Depression of the 1930’s. In 1933, the Minnesota Legislature enacted a mortgage moratorium law that extended the period of redemption under Minnesota law until 1935. (See Blaisdell, supra, 290 U.S. at pp. 415-416.) But — and the high court majority found this significant — the law required debtors, in applying for an extension of the redemption period — to pay the reasonable value of the income of the property, or reasonable rental value if it didn’t produce income. (Id. at. pp. 416-417.) The legislation was famously upheld in Blaisdell. In distinguishing Bronson, the Blaisdell majority made the point that the statute did not substantively impair the debt the way the legislation in Bronson had: “The statute,” said the court, “does not impair the integrity of the mortgage indebtedness.” (Id. at p. 425.) The court went on to emphasize the need to pay the fair rental value of the property, which, it noted, was “the equivalent of possession during the extended period.”
Finally, the fourth period was within the living memory of many readers, namely, the extraordinary inflation and high interest rates of the late 1970’s. That period engendered Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Association v. de la Cuesta (1982) 458 U.S. 141 (de la Cuesta). Many mortgages had (still have) what is known as a “due-on-sale” clause. As it played out in the 1970’s, the clause effectively required any buyer of a new home to obtain a new loan, but at the then-very high market interest rates. To circumvent the need for a new high rate mortgage, creative wrap-around financing was invented where a buyer would assume the obligation of the old mortgage, but that required the due-on-sale clause not be enforced.
An earlier decision of the California Supreme Court, Wellenkamp v. Bank of America (1978) 21 Cal.3d 943, had encouraged this sort of creative financing by holding that due-on-sale clauses violated California state law as an unreasonable restraint on alienation. Despite that precedent, the trial judge in the de la Cuesta case (Edward J. Wallin, who would later join this court) held that regulations issued by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, by the authority of the Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933 preempted state law that invalidated due-on-sale clause. A California appellate court in the Fourth District (in an opinion by Justice Marcus Kaufman, who would later join the California Supreme Court) reversed the trial court. The United States Supreme Court, however, agreed with Judge Wallin’s determination, and reversed the appellate judgment and squarely held the state law to be preempted.
The de la Cuesta court observed that the bank board’s regulations were plain — “even” the California appellate court had been required to recognize that. (de la Cuesta, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 154). On top of the express preemption, Congress had expressed no intent to limit the bank board’s authority to “regulate the lending practices of federal savings and loans.” (Id. at p. 161.) Further, going into the history of the Home Owners’ Loan Act, the de la Cuesta court pointed out that “mortgage lending practices” are a “critical” aspect of a savings and loan’s “‘operation,’” and the Home Loan Bank Board had issued the due-on-sale regulations in order to protect the economic solvency of such lenders. (See id. at pp. 167-168.) In what is perhaps the most significant part of the rationale for our purposes, the bank board had concluded that “the due-on-sale clause is ‘an important part of the mortgage contract,’” consequently its elimination would have an adverse effect on the “financial stability” of federally chartered lenders. (Id. at p. 168.) For example, invalidation of the due-on-sale clause would make it hard for savings and loans “to sell their loans in the secondary markets.” (Ibid.)
With this history behind us, we now turn to the actual regulations at issue in the case before us.
2. The HOLA Regulations
Under the Home Owner’s Loan Act of 1933 (12 U.S.C. § 1461 et seq.) the federal Office of Thrift Supervision has issued section 560.2 of title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations, a regulation that itself delineates what is a matter for federal regulation, and what is a matter for state law. Interestingly enough, section 560.2 is written in the form of examples, using the “ejusdem generis” approach of requiring a court to figure out what is, and what is not, in the same general class or category as the items given in the example.
On the preempted side, section 560.2 includes:
— “terms of credit, including amortization of loans and the deferral and capitalization of interest and adjustments to the interest rate” (§ 560.2(b)(4));
— “balance, payments due, or term to maturity of the loan” (§ 560.2(b)(4)); and, most importantly for this case,
— the “processing, origination, servicing, sale or purchase of, or investment or participation in, mortgages.” (§ 560.2(b)(10), italics added.)
On the other side, left for the state courts, is “Real property law.” (12 C.F.R. § 560.2(c)(2).)
We agree with the Mabrys that the process of foreclosure has traditionally been a matter of state real property law, a point both noted by the United States Supreme Court in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1994) 511 U.S. 531, 541-542, and academic commentators (e.g., Alexander, Federal Intervention in Real Estate Finance: Preemption and Federal Common Law (1993) 71 N.C. L. Rev. 293, 293 [“Historically, real property law has been the exclusive domain of the states.”]), including at least one law professor who laments that diverse state foreclosure laws tend to hinder efforts to achieve banking stability at the national level. (See Nelson, Confronting the Mortgage Meltdown: A Brief for the Federalization of State Mortgage Foreclosure Law (2010) 37 Pepperdine L.Rev. 583, 588-590 [noting that mortgage foreclosure law varies from state to state, and advocating federalization of mortgage foreclosure law].) By contrast, we have not been cited to anything in the federal regulations that govern such things as initiation of foreclosure, notice of foreclosure sales, allowable times until foreclosure, or redemption periods. (Though there are commentators, like Professor Nelson, who argue there should be.)
Given the traditional state control over mortgage foreclosure laws, it is logical to conclude that if the Office of Thrift Supervision wanted to include foreclosure as within the preempted category of loan servicing, it would have been explicit. Nothing prevented the office from simply adding the words “foreclosure of” to section 560.2(b)(10).
D. The Extent of Section 2923.5?
More Time and Only More Time
State law should be construed, whenever possible, to be in harmony with federal law, so as to avoid having the state law invalidated by federal preemption. (See Greater Westchester Homeowners Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1979) 26 Cal.3d 86, 93; California Arco Distributors, Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 349, 359.)
We emphasize that we are able to come to our conclusion that section 2923.5 is not preempted by federal banking regulations because it is, or can be construed to be, very narrow. As mentioned above, there is no right, for example, under the statute, to a loan modification.
A few more comments on the scope of the statute:
First, to the degree that the words “assess” and “explore” can be narrowly or expansively construed, they must be narrowly construed in order to avoid crossing the line from state foreclosure law into federally preempted loan servicing. Hence, any “assessment” must necessarily be simple — something on the order of, “why can’t you make your payments?” The statute cannot require the lender to consider a whole new loan application or take detailed loan application information over the phone. (Or, as is unlikely, in person.)
Second, the same goes for any “exploration” of options to avoid foreclosure. Exploration must necessarily be limited to merely telling the borrower the traditional ways that foreclosure can be avoided (e.g., deeds “in lieu,” workouts, or short sales), as distinct from requiring the lender to engage in a process that would be functionally indistinguishable from taking a loan application in the first place. In this regard, we note that section 2923.5 directs lenders to refer the borrower to “the toll-free telephone number made available by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to find a HUD-certified housing counseling agency.” The obvious implication of the statute’s referral clause is that the lender itself does not have any duty to become a loan counselor itself.
Finally, to the degree that the “assessment” or “exploration” requirements impose, in practice, burdens on federal savings banks that might arguably push the statute out of the permissible category of state foreclosure law and into the federally preempted category of loan servicing or loan making, evidence of such a burden is necessary before the argument can be persuasive. For the time being, and certainly on this record, we cannot say that section 2923.5, narrowly construed, strays over the line.
Given such a narrow construction, section 2923.5 does not, as the law in Blaisdell did not, affect the “integrity” of the basic debt. (Cf. Lopez v. World Savings & Loan Assn. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 729 [section 560.2 preempted state law that capped payoff demand statement fees].)
E. The Wording of the Declaration:
Okay If Not Under Penalty of Perjury
In addition to the substantive act of contacting the borrower, section 2923.5 requires a statement in the notice of default. The statement is found in subdivision (b), which we quote here: “(b) A notice of default filed pursuant to Section 2924 shall include a declaration that the mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent has contacted the borrower, has tried with due diligence to contact the borrower as required by this section, or that no contact was required pursuant to subdivision (h).” (Italics added.)
The idea that this “declaration” must be made under oath must be rejected. First, ordinary English usage of the word “declaration” imports no requirement that it be under oath. In the Oxford English Dictionary, for example, numerous definitions of the word are found, none of which of require a statement under oath or penalty of perjury. In fact, the second legal definition given actually juxtaposes the idea of a declaration against the idea of a statement under oath: “A simple affirmation to be taken, in certain cases, instead of an oath or solemn affirmation.” (4 Oxford English Dict. (2d. ed. 1991) at p. 336.)
Second, even the venerable Black’s Law Dictionary doesn’t define “declaration” to necessarily be under oath. Its very first definition of the word is: “A formal statement, proclamation or announcement, esp. one embodied in an instrument.” (Black’s Law Dict. (9th ed. 2009) at p. 467.)
Third, if the Legislature wanted to say that the statement required in section 2923.5 must be under penalty of perjury, it knew how to do so. The words “penalty of perjury” are used in other laws governing mortgages. (E.g., § 2941.7, subdivision (b) [“The declaration provided for in this section shall be signed by the mortgagor or trustor under penalty of perjury.”].)
And, finally — back to our point about the inherent individual operation of the statute — the very structure of subdivision (b) belies any insertion of a penalty of perjury requirement. The way section 2923.5 is set up, too many people are necessarily involved in the process for any one person to likely be in the position where he or she could swear that all three requirements of the declaration required by subdivision (b) were met. We note, for example, that subdivision (a)(2) requires any one of three entities (a “mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent”) to contact the borrower, and such entities may employ different people for that purpose. And the option under the statute of no contact being required (per subdivision (h) ) further involves individuals who would, in any commercial operation, probably be different from the people employed to do the contacting. For example, the person who would know that the borrower had surrendered the keys would in all likelihood be a different person than the legal officer who would know that the borrower had filed for bankruptcy.
The argument for requiring the declaration to be under penalty of perjury relies on section 2015.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but that reliance is misplaced. We quote all of section 2015.5 in the margin. Essentially the statute says if a statement in writing is required to be supported by sworn oath, making the statement under penalty of perjury will be sufficient. The key language is: “Whenever, under any law of this state . . . made pursuant to the law of this state, any matter is required . . . to be . . . evidenced . . . by the sworn . . . declaration . . . in writing of the person making the same . . . such matter may with like force and effect be . . . evidenced . . . by the unsworn . . . declaration . . . in writing of such person which recites that it is . . . declared by him or her to be true under penalty of perjury . . . .” (Italics added.) The section sheds no light on whether the declaration required in section 2923.5, subdivision (b) must be under penalty of perjury.
F. The Wording of the Declaration:
Okay If It Tracks the Statute
In light of what we have just said about the multiplicity of persons who would necessarily have to sign off on the precise category in subdivision (b) of the statute that would apply in order to proceed with foreclosure (contact by phone, contact in person, unsuccessful attempts at contact by phone or in person, bankruptcy, borrower hiring a foreclosure consultant, surrender of keys), and the possibility that such persons might be employees of not less than three entities (mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent), there is no way we can divine an intention on the part of the Legislature that each notice of foreclosure be custom drafted.
To which we add this important point: By construing the notice requirement of section 2923.5, subdivision (b), to require only that the notice track the language of the statute itself, we avoid the problem of the imposition of costs beyond the minimum costs now required by our reading of the statute.
G. Noncompliance Before Foreclosure
Sale Affect Title After Foreclosure Sale? No
A primary reason for California’s comprehensive regulation of foreclosure in the Civil Code is to ensure stability of title after a trustee’s sale. (Melendrez v. D & I Investment, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1249-1250 [“comprehensive statutory scheme” governing foreclosure has three purposes, one of which is “to ensure that a properly conducted sale is final between the parties and conclusive as to a bona fide purchaser” (internal quotations omitted)].)
There is nothing in section 2923.5 that even hints that noncompliance with the statute would cause any cloud on title after an otherwise properly conducted foreclosure sale. We would merely note that under the plain language of section 2923.5, read in conjunction with section 2924g, the only remedy provided is a postponement of the sale before it happens.
H. Lender Compliance in This Case?
Somebody is Not Telling the Truth
and It’s the Trial Court’s Job to
Determine Who It Is
We have already recounted the conflict in the evidence before the trial court regarding whether there was compliance with section 2923.5. Rarely, in fact, are stories so diametrically opposite: According to the Mabrys, there was no contact at all. According to Aurora, not only were there numerous contacts, but the Mabrys even initiated a proposal by which their attorney would buy the property.
Somebody’s not telling the truth, but appellate courts do not resolve conflicts in evidence. Trial courts do. (Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 697, fn. 23 [“Moreover, Diaz and Bezemek concede the proffered evidence is disputed; appellate courts will not resolve such factual conflicts.”].) This case will obviously have to be remanded for an evidentiary hearing.
I. Is This Case Suitable for
Class Action Treatment? No
As we have seen, section 2923.5 contemplates highly-individuated facts. One borrower might not pick up the telephone, one lender might only call at the same time each day in violation of the statute, one lender might (incorrectly) try to get away with a form letter, one borrower might, like the old Twilight Zone “pitchman” episode, try to keep the caller on the line but change the subject and talk about anything but alternatives to foreclosure, one borrower might, as Aurora asserts here, try to have his or her attorney do a deal that avoids foreclosure, etcetera.
In short, how in the world would a court certify a class? Consider that in this case, there is even a dispute over the basic facts as to whether the lender attempted to comply at all. We do not have, under these facts at least, a question of a clean, systematic policy on the part of a lender that might be amenable to a class action (or perhaps enforcement by the Attorney General). This case is not one, to be blunt, where the lender admits that it simply ignored the statute and proceeded on the theory that federal law had preempted it. We express no opinion as to any scenario where a lender simply ignored the statute wholesale — that sort of scenario is why we do not preclude, a priori, class actions and have not expressed an opinion as to whether the Attorney General or a private party in such a situation might indeed seek to enforce section 2923.5 in a class action.
Consequently, while we must grant the writ petition so as to allow the Mabrys a hearing on the factual merits of compliance, we deny it insofar as it seeks reinstatement of any claims qua class action. By the same token, in light of the limited right to time conferred under section 2923.5, we also deny the writ petition insofar as it seeks reinstatement of any claim for money damages.
IV. CONCLUSION
Let a writ issue instructing the trial court to decide whether or not Aurora complied with section 2923.5. To the degree that the trial court’s order precludes the assertion of any class action claims, we deny the writ. If the trial court finds that Aurora has complied with section 2923.5, foreclosure may proceed. If not, it shall be postponed until Aurora files a new notice of default in the wake of substantive compliance with section 2923.5.
Given that this writ petition is granted in part and denied in part, each side will bear its own costs in this proceeding.

SILLS, P. J.
WE CONCUR:

ARONSON, J.

IKOLA, J.

non-judicial sale is NOT an available election for a securitized loan

Posted 6 days ago by Neil Garfield on Livinglies’s Weblog
NON-JUDICIAL STATES: THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FORECLOSURE AND SALE:

FORECLOSURE is a judicial process herein the “lender” files a lawsuit seeking to (a) enforce the note and get a judgment in the amount owed to them (b) asking the court to order the sale of the property to satisfy the Judgment. If the sale price is lower than the Judgment, then they will ask for a deficiency Judgment and the Judge will enter that Judgment. If the proceeds of sale is over the amount of the judgment, the borrower is entitled to the overage. Of course they usually tack on a number of fees and costs that may or may not be allowable. It is very rare that there is an overage. THE POINT IS that when they sue to foreclose they must make allegations which state a cause of action for enforcement of the note and for an order setting a date for sale. Those allegations include a description of the transaction with copies attached, and a claim of non-payment, together with allegations that the payments are owed to the Plaintiff BECAUSE they would suffer financial damage as a result of the non-payment. IN THE PROOF of the case the Plaintiff would be required to prove each and EVERY element of their claim which means proof that each allegation they made and each exhibit they rely upon is proven with live witnesses who are competent — i.e., they take an oath, they have PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE (not what someone else told them),personal recall and the ability to communicate what they know. This applies to documents they wish to use as well. That is called authentication and foundation.

SALE: Means what it says. In non-judicial sale they just want to sell your property without showing any court that they can credibly make the necessary allegations for a judicial foreclosure and without showing the court proof of the allegations they would be required to make if they filed a judicial foreclosure. In a non-judicial state what they want is to SELL and what they don’t want is to foreclose. Keep in mind that every state that allows non-judicial sale treats the sale as private and NOT a judicial event by definition. In Arizona and many other states there is no election for non-judicial sale of commercial property because of the usual complexity of commercial transactions. THE POINT is that a securitized loan presents as much or more complexity than commercial real property loan transactions. Thus your argument might be that the non-judicial sale is NOT an available election for a securitized loan.

When you bring a lawsuit challenging the non-judicial sale, it would probably be a good idea to allege that the other party has ELECTED NON-JUDICIAL sale when the required elements of such an election do not exist. Your prima facie case is simply to establish that the borrower objects the sale, denies that they pretender lender has any right to sell the property, denies the default and that the securitization documents show a complexity far beyond the complexity of even highly complex commercial real estate transactions which the legislature has mandated be resolved ONLY by judicial foreclosure.

THEREFORE in my opinion I think in your argument you do NOT want to concede that they wish to foreclose. What they want to do is execute on the power of sale in the deed of trust WITHOUT going through the judicial foreclosure process as provided in State statutes. You must understand and argue that the opposition is seeking to go around normal legal process which requires a foreclosure lawsuit.

THAT would require them to make allegations about the obligation, note and mortgage that they cannot make (we are the lender, the defendant owes us money, we are the holder of the note, the note is payable to us, he hasn’t paid, the unpaid balance of the note is xxx etc.) and they would have to prove those allegations before you had to say anything. In addition they would be subject to discovery in which you could test their assertions before an evidentiary hearing. That is how lawsuits work.

The power of sale given to the trustee is a hail Mary pass over the requirements of due process. But it allows for you to object. The question which nobody has asked and nobody has answered, is on the burden of proof, once you object to the sale, why shouldn’t the would-be forecloser be required to plead and prove its case? If the court takes the position that in non-judicial states the private power of sale is to be treated as a judicial event, then that is a denial of due process required by Federal and state constitutions. The only reason it is allowed, is because it is private and “non-judicial.” The quirk comes in because in practice the homeowner must file suit. Usually the party filing suit must allege facts and prove a prima facie case before the burden shifts to the other side. So the Judge is looking at you to do that when you file to prevent the sale.

Legally, though, your case should be limited to proving that they are trying to sell your property, that you object, that you deny what would be the allegations in a judicial foreclosure and that you have meritorious defenses. That SHOULD trigger the requirement of re-orienting the parties and making the would-be forecloser file a complaint (lawsuit) for foreclosure. Then the burden of proof would be properly aligned with the party seeking affirmative relief (i.e., the party who wants to enforce the deed of trust (mortgage), note and obligation) required to file the complaint with all the necessary elements of an action for foreclosure and attach the necessary exhibits. They don’t want to do that because they don’t have the exhibits and the note is not payable to them and they cannot actually prove standing (which is a jurisdictional question). The problem is that a statute passed for judicial economy is now being used to force the burden of proof onto the borrower in the foreclosure of their own home. This is not being addressed yet but it will be addressed soon.

Latest ruling on Civil Code 2923.5

B. Perata Mortgage Relief Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.5

Plaintiffs’ second cause of action arises under the Perata Mortgage Relief Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.5. Plaintiffs argue U.S. Bank is liable for monetary damages under this provision because it “failed and refused to explore” “alternatives to the drastic remedy of foreclosure, such as loan modifications” before initiating foreclosure proceedings. (FAC PP 17-18.) Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege U.S. Bank violated Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.5(c) by failing to include with the notice of sale a declaration that it contacted the borrower to explore such options. (Opp’n at 6.)

Section 2923.5(a)(2) requires a “mortgagee, beneficiary or authorized agent” to “contact the borrower in person or by telephone in order to assess the borrower’s [*1166] financial situation and explore options for the borrower to avoid foreclosure.” For a lender which had recorded a notice of default prior to the effective date of the statute, as is the case here, § 2923.5(c) imposes a duty to attempt to negotiate with a borrower before recording a notice of sale. These provisions cover loans initiated between January 1, 2003 and December 31, 2007. Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.5(h)(3), (i).

U.S. Bank’s primary argument is that Plaintiffs’ claim should be dismissed because neither § 2923.5 nor its legislative history clearly indicate an intent to create a private right of action. (Mot. at 8.) Plaintiffs counter that such a conclusion is unsupported by the legislative history; the California legislature would not have enacted this “urgency” legislation, intended to curb high foreclosure rates in the state, without any accompanying enforcement mechanism. (Opp’n at 5.) The court agrees with Plaintiffs. While the Ninth Circuit has yet to address this issue, the court found no decision from this circuit [**15] where a § 2923.5 claim had been dismissed on the basis advanced by U.S. Bank. See, e.g. Gentsch v. Ownit Mortgage Solutions Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45163, 2009 WL 1390843, at *6 (E.D. Cal., May 14, 2009)(addressing merits of claim); Lee v. First Franklin Fin. Corp., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44461, 2009 WL 1371740, at *1 (E.D. Cal., May 15, 2009) (addressing evidentiary support for claim).

On the other hand, the statute does not require a lender to actually modify a defaulting borrower’s loan but rather requires only contacts or attempted contacts in a good faith effort to prevent foreclosure. Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.5(a)(2). Plaintiffs allege only that U.S. Bank “failed and refused to explore such alternatives” but do not allege whether they were contacted or not. (FAC P 18.) Plaintiffs’ use of the phrase “refused to explore,” combined with the “Declaration of Compliance” accompanying the Notice of Trustee’s Sale, imply Plaintiffs were contacted as required by the statute. (Doc. No. 7-2, Exh. 4 at 3.) Because Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.5, U.S. Bank’s motion to dismiss is granted. Plaintiffs’ claim is dismissed without prejudice.

2009-2010 livinglies recap

1. No governmental relief is in sight for homeowners except in isolated instances of community action together with publicity from the media.
2. State and federal governments continue to sink deeper into debt, cutting social and necessary services while avoiding the elephant in the living room: the trillions of dollars owed and collectible in taxes, recording fees, filing fees, late fees, penalties, financial damages, punitive damages and interest due from the intermediary players on Wall Street who created trading “instruments” based upon conveyance of interests in real property located within state borders. The death grip of the lobby for the financial service industry is likely to continue thus making it impossible to resolve the housing crisis, the state budget crisis or the federal budget deficit.
3. Using taxpayer funds borrowed from foreign governments or created through quantitative easing, trillions of dollars have been paid, or provided in “credit lines” to intermediaries on the false premise that they own or control the mortgage backed securities that have defaulted. Foreclosures continue to hit new highs. Total money injected into the system exceeds 8 trillion dollars. Record profits announced by the financial services industry in which power is now more concentrated than before, making them the strongest influence in Federal and State capitals around the world.
4. Toxic Titles reveal unmarketable properties in and out of foreclosures with no relief in sight because nearly everyone is ignoring this basic problem that is a deal-breaker on every transfer of an interest in real property.
5. Evictions continue to hit new highs as Judges continue to be bombarded with ill-conceived motions that do not address the jurisdiction or authority of the court. The illegal evictions are based upon fraudulent conveyances procured through abuse of the foreclosure process and direct misrepresentations and fraud upon the court and recording system in each county as to the documents fabricated for purposes of foreclosure — creating the illusion of a proper paper trail.
6. 1.7 million new foreclosed properties are due to hit the market according to published statistics. Livinglies estimate the number to be at least 4 million.
7. Downward pressure on both price and marketability continues with no end in sight.
8. Unemployment continues to rise, albeit far more slowly than at the beginning of 2009. Unemployment, underemployment, employment drop-outs, absence of entry-level jobs, low statistics on new business starts, and former members of workforce (particularly men) are harbingers for continued decline in median income combined with higher expenses for key components, particularly health care. The ability to pay anything other than rent is continuing its decline.
9. Concurrent with the increase in foreclosures and the decrease in housing prices, official figures put the number of homes underwater at 25%. Livinglies estimates that when you look at three components not included in official statistics, the figure rises to more than 45%. The components are selling discounts, selling expenses, and continued delusional asking prices that will soon crash when sellers realize that past high prices were an illusion, not a market fluctuation.
10. The number of people walking from their homes is increasing daily, including people who are not behind in their mortgages. This is increasing the inventory of homes that are not officially included in the pipeline because they are not sufficiently advanced in the delinquency or foreclosure process. This is a hidden second wave of pressure on housing prices and marketability.
11. With the entire economy on government life-support that is not completely effective in preventing rises in homelessness and people requiring public assistance, the likelihood of severe social unrest and political upheaval increases month by month. Increasing risks of unrest prompted at least one Wall Street Bank to order enough firearms and ammunition to start an armory.
12. Modification of mortgages has been largely a sham.
13. Short-sales have been largely a sham.
14. Quiet titles in favor of homeowners are increasing at a slow pace as the sophistication of defenses improves on the side of financial services companies seeking free homes through foreclosures.
15. Legislative Intervention has been ineffective and indeed, misleading
16. Executive intervention has been virtually non-existent. The people who perpetrated this fraud not only have evaded prosecution, they maintain close relationships with the Obama administration.
17. Judicial intervention has been spotty and could be much better once people accept the complexity of securitization and the simplicity of STRATEGIES THAT WORK.
18. Legal profession , slow to start went from zero to 15 mph during 2009. Let’s hope they get to 60 mph during 2010.
19. Accounting profession, which has thus far stayed out of the process is expected to jump in on several fronts, including closer scrutiny of the published financial statements of public companies and financial institutions and the cottage industry of examining loan documents for compliance issues and violations of Federal and State lending laws.
20. Prospects for actual economic recovery affecting the average citizen are dim. While there has been considerable improvement from the point of risk we had reached at the end of 2008, the new President and Congress have yet to address essential reforms on joblessness, regulation of financial services (including insurance businesses permitted to write commitments without sufficient assets in reserve to assure the payment of the risk. The economic indicators have been undermined by the intentional fraud perpetrated upon the world economic and financial system. Thus the official figures are further than ever from revealing the truth about about our current status. Without key acceptance of these anomalies it is inconceivable that the economy will, in reality, improve during 2010.
21. Real inflation affecting everyday Americans has already started to rise as credit markets become increasingly remote from the prospective borrowers. Hyperinflation remains a risk although most of us were off on the timing because we underestimated the tenacious grip the dollar had on world commerce. While this assisted us in moving toward a softer landing, the probability that the dollar will continue to fall is still very high, thus making certain non-dollar denominated commodities more valuable. This phenomenon could affect housing prices in an upward direction if the trend continues. However the higher dollar prices will be offset by the fact that the cheaper dollars are required in greater quantities to buy anything. Thus the home prices might rise from $125,000 to $150,000 but the price of a loaf of bread will also be higher by 20%.
22. GDP has been skewed away from including econometrics for actual work performed in the home unless money changes hands. Societal values have thus depreciated the value of child-rearing and stable homes. The results have been catastrophic in education, crime, technological innovation and policy making. While GDP figures are officially announced as moving higher, the country continues to move further into a depression. No actual increase in GDP has occurred for many years, unless the declining areas of the society are excluded from what is counted.
23. The stock market is vastly overvalued again based upon vaporous forward earnings estimates and completely arbitrary price earnings ratios used by analysts. The vapor created by a 1000% increase in money supply caused by deregulation of the private financial institutions together with the illusion of profits created by these institutions trading between themselves has resulted in an increase from 16% to 45% of GDP activity. This figure is impossible to be real. As long as it is accepted as real or even possible, public figures, appointed and elected will base policy decisions on the desires of what is currently seen as the main driver of the U.S. economy. The balance of wealth will continue to move toward the levels of revolutionary France or the American colonies.
24. Perceptible increases in savings and consumer resistance to retail impulse buying bodes well for the long-term prospects of the country. As the savings class becomes more savvy and more wealthy, they will, like their counterparts in the upper echelons of government commence exercising their power in the marketplace and in the voting booth.

Bankruptcy Court Wipes Out Mortgage Debt When Servicer Fails to Document Claim

10/26/2009 By: Darrell Delamaide

A federal bankruptcy judge in New York created new uncertainties for mortgage servicers when he expunged a mortgage debt after the servicer could not provide sufficient documentation that it had a claim on the home.

The ruling came earlier this month in bankruptcy court in the Southern District of New York in a case involving Mount Laurel, New Jersey-based PHH Mortgage and a property in White Plains, the New York Times reported.

Judge Robert Drain wiped out a $461,263 mortgage debt on the property, in another case of how things can go wrong when documentation does not keep up with transfers of mortgages in a world of securitized loans.

A recent ruling by the Kansas Supreme Court similarly denied the Mortgage Electronic Registration Service (MERS) rights to recovery in a foreclosure case, even though MERS often stands in for banks that actually hold the mortgage. As a consequence, the bank holding the mortgage lost out in the foreclosure.

In the PHH case, the homeowner, who was not identified, filed for bankruptcy and PHH claimed its mortgage debt.

When attempts by the homeowner’s lawyer to get PHH to modify the debt met with no success, he asked for proof of PHH’s standing and received a letter stating that PHH was the servicer of the loan but that the holder of the note was U.S. Bank, as trustee of a securitization pool.

When he then asked for proof that U.S. Bank was indeed the holder of the note, he received only an affidavit from an executive at PHH Mortgage, the Times reported.

Among the documents supplied to the court to support PHH’s assertion was a copy of the assignment of the mortgage, but this was signed by the same PHH executive identified this time as an official of MERS, and was dated March 26 of this year, well after the bankruptcy had been filed.

In the hearing, the PHH lawyer argued that in the secondary market, there are many cases where assignment of mortgages or assignment of notes don’t happen at the time they should – that this was standard operating procedure for many years.

Judge Drain rejected that argument, the Times reported. “I think that I have a more than 50 percent doubt that if the debtor paid this claim, it would be paying the wrong person,” the newspaper quoted him as saying. “That’s the problem. And that’s because the claimant has not shown an assignment of a mortgage.”

PHH is appealing Judge Drain’s decision.

The ruling also puts the homeowner in uncharted territory. “Right now I am in bankruptcy court with a house that has no discernible debt on it,” her lawyer told the Times, “yet I have a client with a signed mortgage. We cannot in theory just go out and sell this house because the title company won’t give a clear title on it.”

The lawyer’s options are to file an amended plan or sue to try to get clear title to the property.

SB 94 and its interferance with the practice

CA SB 94 on Lawyers & Loan Modifications Passes Assembly… 62-10

The California Assembly has passed Senate Bill 94, a bill that seeks to protect homeowners from loan modification scammers, but could end up having the unintended consequence of eliminating a homeowner’s ability to retain an attorney to help them save their home from foreclosure.

The bill, which has an “urgency clause” attached to it, now must pass the State Senate, and if passed, could be signed by the Governor on October 11th, and go into effect immediately thereafter.

SB 94’s author is California State Senator Ron Calderon, the Chair of the Senate Banking Committee, which shouldn’t come as much of a surprise to anyone familiar with the bigger picture. Sen. Calderon, while acknowledging that fee-for-service providers can provide valuable services to homeowners at risk of foreclosure, authored SB 94 to ensure that providers of these services are not compensated until the contracted services have been performed.

SB 94 prevents companies, individuals… and even attorneys… from receiving fees or any other form of compensation until after the contracted services have been rendered. The bill will now go to the Democratic controlled Senate where it is expected to pass.

Supporters of the bill say that the state is literally teeming with con artists who take advantage of homeowners desperate to save their homes from foreclosure by charging hefty fees up front and then failing to deliver anything of value in return. They say that by making it illegal to charge up front fees, they will be protecting consumers from being scammed.

While there’s no question that there have been some unscrupulous people that have taken advantage of homeowners in distress, the number of these scammers is unclear. Now that we’ve learned that lenders and servicers have only modified an average of 9% of qualified mortgages under the Obama plan, it’s hard to tell which companies were scamming and which were made to look like scams by the servicers and lenders who failed to live up to their agreement with the federal government.

In fact, ever since it’s come to light that mortgage servicers have been sued hundreds of times, that they continue to violate the HAMP provisions, that they foreclose when they’re not supposed to, charge up front fees for modifications, require homeowners to sign waivers, and so much more, who can be sure who the scammers really are. Bank of America, for example, got the worst grade of any bank on the President’s report card listing, modifying only 4% of the eligible mortgages since the plan began. We’ve given B of A something like $200 billion and they still claim that they’re having a hard time answering the phones over there, so who’s scamming who?

To make matters worse, and in the spirit of Y2K, the media has fanned the flames of irrationality with stories of people losing their homes as a result of someone failing to get their loan modified. The stories go something like this:

We gave them 1,000. They told us to stop making our mortgage payment. They promised us a principal reduction. We didn’t hear from them for months. And then we lost our house.

I am so sure. Can that even happen? I own a house or two. Walk me through how that happened again, because I absolutely guarantee you… no way could those things happen to me and I end up losing my house over it. Not a chance in the world. I’m not saying I couldn’t lose a house, but it sure as heck would take a damn sight more than that to make it happen.

Depending on how you read the language in the bill, it may prevent licensed California attorneys from requiring a retainer in advance of services being rendered, and this could essentially eliminate a homeowner’s ability to hire a lawyer to help save their home.

Supporters, on the other hand, respond that homeowners will still be able to hire attorneys, but that the attorneys will now have to wait until after services have been rendered before being paid for their services. They say that attorneys, just like real estate agents and mortgage brokers, will now only be able to receive compensation after services have been rendered.

But, assuming they’re talking about at the end of the transaction, there are key differences. Real estate agents and mortgage brokers are paid OUT OF ESCROW at the end of a transaction. They don’t send clients a bill for their services after the property is sold.

Homeowners at risk of foreclosure are having trouble paying their bills and for the most part, their credit ratings have suffered as a result. If an attorney were to represent a homeowner seeking a loan modification, and then bill for his or her services after the loan was modified, the attorney would be nothing more than an unsecured creditor of a homeowner who’s only marginally credit worthy at best. If the homeowner didn’t pay the bill, the attorney would have no recourse other than to sue the homeowner in Small Claims Court where they would likely receive small payments over time if lucky.

Extending unsecured credit to homeowners that are already struggling to pay their bills, and then having to sue them in order to collect simply isn’t a business model that attorneys, or anyone else for that matter, are likely to embrace. In fact, the more than 50 California attorneys involved in loan modifications that I contacted to ask about this issue all confirmed that they would not represent homeowners on that basis.

One attorney, who asked not to be identified, said: “Getting a lender or servicer to agree to a loan modification takes months, sometimes six or nine months. If I worked on behalf of homeowners for six or nine months and then didn’t get paid by a number of them, it wouldn’t be very long before I’d have to close my doors. No lawyer is going to do that kind of work without any security and anyone who thinks they will, simply isn’t familiar with what’s involved.”

“I don’t think there’s any question that SB 94 will make it almost impossible for a homeowner to obtain legal representation related to loan modifications,” explained another attorney who also asked not to be identified. ”The banks have fought lawyers helping clients through the loan modification process every step of the way, so I’m not surprised they’ve pushed for this legislation to pass.”

Proponents of the legislation recite the all too familiar mantra about there being so many scammers out there that the state has no choice but to move to shut down any one offering to help homeowners secure loan modifications that charges a fee for the services. They point out that consumers can just call their banks directly, or that there are nonprofit organizations throughout the state that can help homeowners with loan modifications.

While the latter is certainly true, it’s only further evidence that there exists a group of people in positions of influence that are unfamiliar , or at the very least not adequately familiar with obtaining a loan modification through a nonprofit organization, and they’ve certainly never tried calling a bank directly.

The fact that there are nonprofit housing counselors available, and the degree to which they may or may not be able to assist a given homeowner, is irrelevant. Homeowners are well aware of the nonprofit options available. They are also aware that they can call their banks directly. From the President of the United States and and U.S. Attorney General to the community newspapers found in every small town in America, homeowners have heard the fairy tales about about these options, and they’ve tried them… over and over again, often times for many months. When they didn’t get the desired results, they hired a firm to help them.

Yet, even the State Bar of California is supporting SB 94, and even AB 764, a California Assembly variation on the theme, and one even more draconian because of its requirement that attorneys only be allowed to bill a client after a successful loan modification has been obtained. That means that an attorney would have to guarantee a homeowner that he or she would obtain a modification agreement from a lender or servicer or not get paid for trying. Absurd on so many levels. Frankly, if AB 764 passes, would the last one out of California please turn off the lights and bring the flag.

As of late July, the California State Bar said it was investigating 391 complaints against 141 attorneys, as opposed to nine investigations related to loan modifications in 2008. The Bar hasn’t read anywhere all of the complaints its received, but you don’t have to be a statistician to figure out that there’s more to the complaints that meets the eye. So far the State Bar has taken action against three attorneys and the Attorney General another four… so, let’s see… carry the 3… that’s 7 lawyers. Two or three more and they could have a softball team.

At the federal level they’re still reporting the same numbers they were last spring. Closed 11… sent 71 letters… blah, blah, blah… we’ve got a country of 300 million and at least 5 million are in trouble on their mortgage. The simple fact is, they’re going to have to come up with some serious numbers before I’m going to be scared of bumping into a scammer on every corner.

Looking Ahead…

California’s ALT-A and Option ARM mortgages are just beginning to re-set, causing payments to rise, and with almost half of the mortgages in California already underwater, these homeowners will be unable to refinance and foreclosures will increase as a result. Prime jumbo foreclosure rates are already up a mind blowing 634% as compared with January 2008 levels, according to LPS Applied Analytics.

Clearly, if SB 94 ends up reducing the number of legitimate firms available for homeowners to turn to, everyone involved in its passage is going to be retiring. While many sub-prime borrowers have suffered silently through this horror show of a housing crisis, the ALT-A and Option ARM borrowers are highly unlikely to slip quietly into the night.

There are a couple of things about the latest version of SB 94 that I found interesting:

1. It says that a lawyer can’t collect a fee or any other compensation before serivces have been delivered, but it doesn’t make clear whether attorneys can ask the client to deposit funds in the law firm’s trust account and then bill against thsoe funds as amounts are earned. Funds deposited in a law firm trust account remain the client’s funds, so they’re not a lawyer’s “fees or other compensation”. Those funds are there so that when the fees have been earned, the lawyer doesn’t have to hope his or her bill gets paid. Of course, it also says that an attorney can’t hold any security interest, but money in a trust account a client’s money, the attorney has no lien against it. All of this is a matter of interpretation, of course, so who knows.

2. While there used to be language in both the real estate and lawyer sections that prohibited breaking up services related to a loan modification, in the latest version all of the language related to breaking up services as applied to attorneys has been eliminated. It still applies to real estate licensed firms, but not to attorneys. This may be a good thing, as at least a lawyer could complete sections of the work involved as opposed to having to wait until the very end, which the way the banks have been handling things, could be nine months away.

3. The bill says nothing about the amounts that may be charged for services in connection with a loan modification. So, in the case of an attorney, that would seem to mean that… well, you can put one, two and three together from there.

4. Lawyers are not included in definition of foreclosure consultant. And there is a requirement that new language be inserted in contracts, along the lines of “You don’t have to pay anyone to get a loan modification… blah, blah, blah.” Like that will be news to any homeowner in America. I’ve spoken with hundreds and never ran across one who didn’t try it themselves before calling a lawyer. I realize the Attorney General doesn’t seem to know that, but look… he’s been busy.

Conclusion…

Will SB 94 actually stop con artists from taking advantage of homeowners in distress? Or will it end up only stopping reputable lawyers from helping homeowners, while foreclosures increase and our economy continues its deflationary free fall? Will the California State Bar ever finishing reading the complaints being received, and if they ever do, will they understand what they’ve read. Or is our destiny that the masses won’t understand what’s happening around them until it sucks them under as well.

I surely hope not. But for now, I’m just hoping people can still a hire an attorney next week to help save their homes, because if they can’t… the Bar is going to get a lot more letters from unhappy homeowners.

Pretender Lenders

— read and weep. Game Over. Over the next 6-12 months the entire foreclosure mess is going to be turned on its head as it becomes apparent to even the most skeptical that the mortgage mess is just that — a mess. From the time the deed was recorded to the time the assignments, powers of attorneys, notarization and other documents were fabricated and executed there is an 18 minute Nixonian gap in the record that cannot be cured. Just because you produce documents, however real they appear, does not mean you can shift the burden of proof onto the borrower. In California our legislator have attempted to slow this train wreck but the pretender lenders just go on with the foreclosure by declaring to the foreclosure trustee the borrower is in default and they have all the documents the trustee then records a false document. A notice of default filed pursuant to Section 2924 shall include a declaration from the mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent that it has contacted the borrower, tried with due diligence to contact the borrower as required by this section, or the borrower has surrendered the property to the mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent.
Invalid Declaration on Notice of Default and/or Notice of Trustee’s Sale.

The purpose of permitting a declaration under penalty of perjury, in lieu of a sworn statement, is to help ensure that declarations contain a truthful factual representation and are made in good faith. (In re Marriage of Reese & Guy, 73 Cal. App. 4th 1214, 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339 (4th Dist. 1999).
In addition to California Civil Code §2923.5, California Code of Civil Procedure §2015.5 states:
Whenever, under any law of this state or under any rule, regulation, order or requirement made pursuant to the law of this state, any matter is required or permitted to be supported, evidenced, established, or proved by the sworn statement, declaration, verification, certificate, oath, or affidavit, in writing of the person making the same, such matter may with like force and effect be supported, evidenced, established or proved by the unsworn statement, declaration, verification, or certificate, in writing of such person which recites that is certified or declared by him or her to be true under penalty of perjury, is subscribed by him or her, and (1), if executed within this state, states the date and place of execution; (2) if executed at any place, within or without this state, states the date of execution and that is so certified or declared under the laws of the State of California. The certification or declaration must be in substantially the following form:
(a) If executed within this state:
“I certify (or declare) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct”:
_____________________ _______________________
(Date and Place) (Signature)

For our purposes we need not look any farther than the Notice of Default to find the declaration is not signed under penalty of perjury; as mandated by new Civil Code §2923.5(c). (Blum v. Superior Court (Copley Press Inc.) (2006) 141 Cal App 4th 418, 45 Cal. Reptr. 3d 902 ). The Declaration is merely a form declaration with a check box.

No Personal Knowledge of Declarant
According to Giles v. Friendly Finance Co. of Biloxi, Inc., 199 So. 2nd 265 (Miss. 1967), “an affidavit on behalf of a corporation must show that it was made by an authorized officer or agent, and the officer him or herself must swear to the facts.” Furthermore, in Giles v. County Dep’t of Public Welfare of Marion County (Ind.App. 1 Dist.1991) 579 N.E.2d 653, 654-655 states in pertinent part, “a person who verified a pleading to have personal knowledge or reasonable cause to believe the existence of the facts stated therein.” Here, the Declaration for the Notice of Default by the agent does not state if the agent has personal knowledge and how he obtained this knowledge.
The proper function of an affidavit is to state facts, not conclusions, ¹ and affidavits that merely state conclusions rather than facts are insufficient. ² An affidavit must set forth facts and show affirmatively how the affiant obtained personal knowledge of those facts. ³
Here, The Notice of Default does not have the required agent’s personal knowledge of facts and if the Plaintiff borrower was affirmatively contacted in person or by telephone
to assess the Plaintiff’s financial situation and explore options for the Plaintiff to avoid foreclosure. A simple check box next to the “facts” does not suffice.
Furthermore, “it has been said that personal knowledge of facts asserted in an affidavit is not presumed from the mere positive averment of facts, but rather, a court should be shown how the affiant knew or could have known such facts, and, if there is no evidence from which the inference of personal knowledge can be drawn, then it is
¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬____________________________________________________________________________
¹ Lindley v. Midwest Pulmonary Consultants, P.C., 55 S.W.3d 906 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 2001).
² Jaime v. St. Joseph Hosp. Foundation, 853 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 1993).
³ M.G.M. Grand Hotel, Inc. v. Castro, 8 S.W.3d 403 (Tex. App. Corpus Chrisit 1999).

presumed that from which the inference of personal knowledge can be drawn, then it is presumed that such does not exist.” ¹ The declaration signed by agent does not state anywhere how he knew or could have known if Plaintiff was contacted in person or by telephone to explore different financial options. It is vague and ambiguous if he himself called plaintiff.
This defendant did not adhere to the mandates laid out by congress before a foreclosure can be considered duly perfected. The Notice of Default states,

“That by reason thereof, the present beneficiary under such deed of trust, has executed and delivered to said agent, a written Declaration of Default and Demand for same, and has deposited with said agent such Deed of Trust and all documents evidencing obligations secured thereby, and has declared and does hereby declare all sums secured thereby immediately due and payable and has elected and does hereby elect to cause the trust property to be sold to satisfy the obligations secured thereby.”

However, Defendants do not have and assignment of the deed of trust nor have they complied with 2923.5 or 2923.6 or 2924 the Deed of Trust, nor do they provide any documents evidencing obligations secured thereby. For the aforementioned reasons, the Notice of Default will be void as a matter of law. The pretender lenders a banking on the “tender defense” to save them ie. yes we did not follow the law so sue us and when you do we will claim “tender” Check Mate but that’s not the law.

Recording a False Document
Furthermore, according to California Penal Code § 115 in pertinent part:
(a) Every person who knowingly procures or offers any false or forged instrument to be filed, registered, or recorded in any public office within this state, which instrument, if genuine, might be filed, registered, or recorded under any law of this state or of the United States, is guilty of a felony.

If you say you have a claim, you must prove it. If you say you are the lender, you must prove it. Legislators take notice: Just because bankers give you money doesn’t mean they can change 1000 years of common law, statutory law and constitutional law. It just won’t fly. And if you are a legislator looking to get elected or re-elected, your failure to act on what is now an obvious need to clear title and restore the wealth of your citizens who were cheated and defrauded, will be punished by the votes of your constituents.

Countrywide complaint

countrywide_fin_class_action_defense_mdl

Homecomings TILA complaint GMAC

homecomingstila

Leman Tila complaint

Lemantilacomp

Lender class action

Mortgageinvestorgroupclass

Option One Complaint Pick a payment lawsuit

optionone

What is worse bankruptcy or foreclosure?

So what is worse, bankruptcy or foreclosure? Which will have the biggest impact on my credit score? Both bankruptcy and foreclosure will have serious negative affects on your personal credit report and your credit score as well. With re-established credit after a bankruptcy and/or foreclosure you can possibly qualify for a good mortgage once again in as little as 24 months. Therefore, it is very difficult to say one is worse than the other, but the bottom line is that they are both very bad for you and should be avoided if all possible.

Foreclosure is worse then bankruptcy because you are actually losing something of value, your home. Once you are in foreclosure you will lose any and all equity in your home. If there is no equity in the home you will be responsible for the remaining balance after the property auction. With chapter 7 bankruptcy all of your unsecured debts are erased and you start over and in most cases you will not lose anything other then your credit rating.

Many times qualifying for a mortgage after a foreclosure is more difficult than applying for a home after a bankruptcy. With that said, that could possibly lead you to believe that foreclosure is worse than bankruptcy. Most people who have a home foreclosed upon end up filing bankruptcy as well.

Bankruptcy and Foreclosure filings are public records, however no one would know about your proceedings under normal circumstances. The Credit Bureaus will record your bankruptcy and a foreclosure. Bankruptcies will remain on your credit record for 10 years while foreclosures can stay on your report for up to 7 years.

In some cases, one can refinance out of a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy with a 12 month trustee payment history and a timely mortgage history. It is much more difficult to obtain financing with a foreclosure on your record.

Foreclosure is worse because of the loss of value. You will not receive any compensation for the equity in your home if it proceeds to foreclosure.

Standing argument

judge-youngs-decision-on-nosek

Ameriquest’s final argument, that the sanctions are a
criminal penalty, is bereft of authority. Ameriquest cites F.J.
Hanshaw Enterprises, Inc. v. Emerald River Development, Inc., 244
F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2001), a case about inherent powers – not
Rule 11 –

This is an excerpt from the decision just this bloggers note the Hanshaw Case was my case. I argued this case at the 9th circuit court of appeals

http://openjurist.org/244/f3d/1128/fj-v-emeraldfj-v-emerald

If you will grasp the implications of this judge-youngs-decision-on-nosekdecision all or most all the evictions and  foreclosures are being litigated by the wrong parties that is to say parties who have no real stake in the outcome. they are merely servicers not the real investors. They do not have the right to foreclose or evict. No assignment No note No security interest No standing They do not want to be listed anywhere. They (the lenders) have caused the greatest damage to the American Citizen since the great depression and they do not want to be exposed or named in countless lawsuits. Time and time again I get from the judges in demurer hearings ” I see what you are saying counsel but your claim does not appear to be against this defendant” the unnamed investment pool of the Lehman Brothers shared High yield equity Fund trustee does not exist and so far can’t be sued.

President Signs Mortgage Bills

Carrie Bay | 05.20.09

President Barack Obama signed two housing bills into law on Wednesday afternoon – one that provides additional foreclosure relief and a second that targets mortgage fraud and other criminal activity related to federal assistance programs. The Helping Families Save Their Home Act will make vital changes to the Hope for Homeowners (H4H) program to encourage servicers to employ the plan as a means to help underwater homeowners under the administration’s Making Home Affordable program.

The bill also includes a servicer safe haven to provide lenders with liability protections from investors for the mortgage modifications they make. It provides for an additional $130 million to fund foreclosure prevention efforts, such as counseling and education, and establishes foreclosure protections for renters. In addition, the new law more than triples the FDIC’s line of credit with the Treasury to $100 billion – a measure intended to rebuild the agency’s depleted insurance fund while keeping lenders’ depository insurance fees at a minimum.

The act also permanently raises the insurance cap on individual bank accounts from $100,000 to $250,000.

The Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (FERA) grants new resources to help fight financial fraud and address the rapid rise in mortgage and foreclosure rescue scams. The legislation provides nearly $500 million for the investigation and prosecution of such criminal activity – a move that John A. Courson, president and CEO of the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) called “imperative in protecting vulnerable consumers as well as protecting the integrity of our housing finance system.” Of the funds provided under FERA, the majority will be allocated to the hiring of fraud prosecutors and investigators at the Justice Department and to increasing the number of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents devoted to mortgage fraud.

The money will also be used to expand the staff of the U.S. Attorney’s office and the Justice Department’s criminal, civil, and tax divisions. In addition, the legislation, for the first time, expands federal fraud statutes to also apply to independent mortgage companies and mortgage brokers that are not regulated or insured by the government.

Coalition sues lenders

Coalition Sues lenders

They are to give options to foreclosure 2923.5

(a) (1) A mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized
agent may not file a notice of default pursuant to Section 2924 until
30 days after contact is made as required by paragraph (2) or 30
days after satisfying the due diligence requirements as described in
subdivision (g).
   (2) A mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall contact
the borrower in person (and this does not mean agent for the foreclosure company) or by telephone in order to assess the
borrower's financial situation and explore options for the borrower
to avoid foreclosure. During the initial contact, the mortgagee,
beneficiary, or authorized agent shall advise the borrower that he or
she has the right to request a subsequent meeting and, if requested,
the mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall schedule the
meeting to occur within 14 days. The assessment of the borrower's
financial situation and discussion of options may occur during the
first contact, or at the subsequent meeting scheduled for that
purpose. In either case, the borrower shall be provided the toll-free
telephone number made available by the United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to find a HUD-certified housing
counseling agency. Any meeting may occur telephonically.
   (b) A notice of default filed pursuant to Section 2924 shall
include a declaration from the mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized
agent that it has contacted the borrower, tried with due diligence to
contact the borrower as required by this section, or the borrower
has surrendered the property to the mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary,
or authorized agent.
   (c) If a mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent had
already filed the notice of default prior to the enactment of this
section and did not subsequently file a notice of rescission, then
the mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall, as
part of the notice of sale filed pursuant to Section 2924f, include a
declaration that either:
   (1) States that the borrower was contacted to assess the borrower'
s financial situation and to explore options for the borrower to
avoid foreclosure.
   (2) Lists the efforts made, if any, to contact the borrower in the
event no contact was made.
   (d) A mortgagee's, beneficiary's, or authorized agent's loss
mitigation personnel may participate by telephone during any contact
required by this section.
   (e) For purposes of this section, a "borrower" shall include a
mortgagor or trustor.
   (f) A borrower may designate a HUD-certified housing counseling
agency, attorney, or other advisor to discuss with the mortgagee,
beneficiary, or authorized agent, on the borrower's behalf, options
for the borrower to avoid foreclosure. That contact made at the
direction of the borrower shall satisfy the contact requirements of
paragraph (2) of subdivision (a). Any loan modification or workout
plan offered at the meeting by the mortgagee, beneficiary, or
authorized agent is subject to approval by the borrower.
   (g) A notice of default may be filed pursuant to Section 2924 when
a mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent has not contacted a
borrower as required by paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) provided
that the failure to contact the borrower occurred despite the due
diligence of the mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent. For
purposes of this section, "due diligence" shall require and mean all
of the following:
   (1) A mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall first
attempt to contact a borrower by sending a first-class letter that
includes the toll-free telephone number made available by HUD to find
a HUD-certified housing counseling agency.
   (2) (A) After the letter has been sent, the mortgagee,
beneficiary, or authorized agent shall attempt to contact the
borrower by telephone at least three times at different hours and on
different days.  Telephone calls shall be made to the primary
telephone number on file.
   (B) A mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent may attempt to
contact a borrower using an automated system to dial borrowers,
provided that, if the telephone call is answered, the call is
connected to a live representative of the mortgagee, beneficiary, or
authorized agent.
   (C) A mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent satisfies the
telephone contact requirements of this paragraph if it determines,
after attempting contact pursuant to this paragraph, that the
borrower's primary telephone number and secondary telephone number or
numbers on file, if any, have been disconnected.
   (3) If the borrower does not respond within two weeks after the
telephone call requirements of paragraph (2) have been satisfied, the
mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall then send a
certified letter, with return receipt requested.
   (4) The mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall provide
a means for the borrower to contact it in a timely manner, including
a toll-free telephone number that will provide access to a live
representative during business hours.
   (5) The mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent has posted a
prominent link on the homepage of its Internet Web site, if any, to
the following information:
   (A) Options that may be available to borrowers who are unable to
afford their mortgage payments and who wish to avoid foreclosure, and
instructions to borrowers advising them on steps to take to explore
those options.
   (B) A list of financial documents borrowers should collect and be
prepared to present to the mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized
agent when discussing options for avoiding foreclosure.
   (C) A toll-free telephone number for borrowers who wish to discuss
options for avoiding foreclosure with their mortgagee, beneficiary,
or authorized agent.
   (D) The toll-free telephone number made available by HUD to find a
HUD-certified housing counseling agency.
   (h) Subdivisions (a), (c), and (g) shall not apply if any of the
following occurs:
   (1) The borrower has surrendered the property as evidenced by
either a letter confirming the surrender or delivery of the keys to
the property to the mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized
agent.
   (2) The borrower has contracted with an organization, person, or
entity whose primary business is advising people who have decided to
leave their homes on how to extend the foreclosure process and avoid
their contractual obligations to mortgagees or beneficiaries.
   (3) The borrower has filed for bankruptcy, and the proceedings
have not been finalized.
   (i) This section shall apply only to loans made from January 1,
2003, to December 31, 2007, inclusive, that are secured by
residential real property and are for owner-occupied residences. For
purposes of this subdivision, "owner-occupied" means that the
residence is the principal residence of the borrower.
  (j) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2013,
and as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted statute,
that is enacted before January 1, 2013, deletes or extends that da

No hope loan Mod’s

Today I am discussing a new law that you should be aware of…it has far reaching effects.


There are laws that are coming onto the books that affect our rights. They may seem to be good, but in reality they have bad effects.

And there are laws that seem to be good, but are really amounting to nothing.

Remember the Hope for Homeowners program? The Washington Post reported the other day that “lenders have balked at requirements that they cut some of the principal that borrowers owe. Only one homeowner has received a government-backed loan under the program so far.”

All that commotion. And only one homeowner has got a  loan from that program!

The Post reports that the new proposed law would pay servicers $2500 for each Hope for Homeowners loan they place.

We all know that we deal with loan servicers when we try to get a loan modified, lower the monthlies, and so forth.

Servicers handle foreclosure.

They handle incoming monthlies.

They are appointed by the actual investors who own the loans.

And now, the gubmint is proposing to let servicers mod loans without worrying about the contracts they have with the lenders.

The new proposals also involve seconds. The servicers who handle seconds will agree to drop the interest to 1%. And nothing the investors, the actual lenders, can do about it.

On the face of it, that’s a good thing you would think.But I do not think it is.

I think they will also work out a way to prohibit borrowers who have been screwed from suing the servicers and the lenders.

That is wrong. Huge crimes have been commited by lenders and servicers and it is wrong to make anyone immune from lawsuits that redress the problems.

Worse yet, the servicers are being paid to break contracts and simply stuff borrowers into loan mods no matter what.

What if the mods are no good? Homeowners will do practically anything to stay in their house. It may be in their worst interest. Meanwhile, the servicer gets thousands of dollars to pretend the loan mod will work out?

How long is this going to last? When will it too blow up? Does it remind you of the disgustingly high commish the lenders were collecting from subprime loans that never should have been made?

Now the gubmint is proposing paying enormous fees to get loan mods through that never should be made.


United First Class Action

On Saturday March 7,2009 a meeting was held for 200 plus victims of the United First equity save your house scam. At that meeting it was determined that a class action should be filed to recover the funds lost by the victims of the unconscionable contract.

As a first step an involuntary Bankruptcy is being filed today March 9, 2009. To be considered as a creditor of said Bankruptcy please Fax the Joint Venture agreement and retainer agreement to 909-494-4214.
Additionally it is this attorneys opinion that said Bankruptcy will act as a “stay” for all averse actions being taken by lenders as against said victims. This opinion is based upon the fact that United First maintained an interest in the real property as a joint venture to 80% of the properties value(no matter how unconscionable this may be) this is an interest that can be protected by the Bankruptcy Stay 11 USC 362.

The trap of Forbearance agreements

Obviously there are a lot of home owners in trouble. You need to warn them of a trap that has been set for them. I’ve given you some information concerning my case, but I would appreciate 5 minutes of “talk time” at your convenience.

The “trap” is the use of a forbearance agreement. I can go into greater detail and show you the proof if you have the time. Here is how it works:

My case sets legal precedent in the mortgage loan industry. With the recent Court decisions the loan servicer’s plan for stealing a home is as follows:

HOW TO STEAL A HOME BY ORANGE COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE ANDREW BANKS APPROVED PLAN

1. File a Notice of Default

2. Within the 90 calendar days allotted for the Notice, stall the consumer’s rights for information concerning debt validation. RESPA Section 6 requires a loan servicer’s response within 60 business days (excluding holidays and weekends) of receipt of a Qualified Written Request. Mathematically, (lay out a calendar to prove it to yourself) the 90 calendar days is only 5 days longer than 60 business days and less than that if a holiday falls within the 60 days. For the 60 day response to “beat” the expiration of the Notice of Default the consumer would have to write a letter the very day a Notice of Default is filed (the consumer is seldom aware of the day of filing or that one is even being filed) because the lag in “mail time” will erase the 5 day “cushion”.

3. Toward the end of the 90 day Notice of Default timeframe the loan servicer contacts the consumer and offers a Forbearance Agreement to “postpone” the sale “until the details of the discrepancy of the records can be worked out”. The consumer hesitates to sign an agreement that overstates the amount they owe. The loan servicer refers to the language of the agreement that declares that “Unless all payments are made in accordance with the agreement, the agreement may immediately terminate and revert to the terms of the Original Note.” The loan servicer explains that all the consumer has to do is not make a payment if they “aren’t satisfied” with the results of the verification or for any other reason. They go on to explain that “The forbearance agreement is only a ‘time out’, giving all parties the opportunity to get to the truth and avoid the sale of the property”.

4. Once the forbearance agreement is signed, according to the Court’s decision in my case, the debt is forever verified and the consumer has no further rights under RESPA Section 6 or Section 809 (b) of The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Apparently a few Courts disagree with Judge Banks and agree with me on questioning the validity of such agreements.

In Waters v. Min Ltd., the court framed the question as whether the contract

“was such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the

one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other.

” 412 Mass. at 66, 587 N.E.2d 231.

The court noted that “[i]n Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697 (1945), the Supreme Court addressed the question of waiver under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Court held that “a statutory right conferred on a private party, but affecting the public interest, may not be waived or released if such waiver or release contravenes the statutory policy”…“The public benefits from enforcement of TILA because it creates a system of disclosure that improves the bargaining posture of all borrowers.” Therefore, such a waiver is unenforceable with regards to the TILA. (I have many more references concerning our situation).

The legislation that must be enacted, with the least cost to the taxpayer or the government and quickest remedy for the consumers, is to allow a certified program of Mortgage Loan Auditors, under the affiliation with or supervision of one or more of the already established organizations like HOPE NOW. The borrower pays an upfront audit fee and presents all necessary documentation, (original note, cancelled checks, etc.) that is required to preform a verifiable loan audit. The auditor’s work is then compared with the information provided to the borrower from the loan servicer. If there is a discrepancy between the two positions and the loan servicer is overstating the amounts owing, the independent auditor’s information is presented to the loan servicer for verification and proof positive to substantiate the difference. If the difference cannot be proven by the loan servicer, according to the terms of the original note and subsequent signed modifications, the loan servicer must immediately adjust the balances and credit any and all related charges and credit the cost of the loan audit that was pre-paid by the consumer. The result of finding of the discrepancy of the loan records is reported to HUD and any other regulatory agency that monitors loan servicers so any patterns of abuse can be compiled.

This process provides the transparency we have all so desperately sought and finally makes the loan servicer accountable for their mistakes. It costs the government nothing, it prevents loan servicing abuse. It finally makes enforcement of the statutes that have been unenforceable for decades possible. It makes finally allows each of us little people live longer in the homes we love so dearly on “Main Street”. Thank you for your time and HOPE you will make this CHANGE!

California Issues Foreclosure Moratorium

Carrie Bay | 02.25.09

California Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger approved a bill appended to the state’s budget package last week that institutes a 90-day foreclosure moratorium throughout the Golden State. Introduced by Sen. Ellen Corbett (D-San Leandro), the moratorium applies to first mortgages recorded between January 1, 2003 and January 1, 2008.

State regulators, however, can deem loan servicers and lenders exempt from the new law if they have a mortgage modification program already in place that includes principal deferral, interest rate reductions for five years or more, or extended loan terms. The lender’s loan restructuring program also has to ensure new monthly payments are no more than 38 percent of the borrower’s income. The state’s stipulated debt-to-income ratio is significantly lower than the 31 percent target called for in the Obama Administration’s Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan.

Kevin Stein, associate director of the California Reinvestment Coalition, told the San Francisco Chronicle, “It was a step backward from where things were going from an industry standpoint and a federal standpoint.”

According to the Chronicle, Corbett herself said that she would have liked a bill with stronger enforcement for modifications but was limited from more aggressive measures by the state’s banking regulators.

Mortgageorb.com reported that California’s banking groups, including the California Bankers Association and the California Mortgage Bankers Association, have written strong oppositions to the bill, arguing the moratorium will negatively impact home sales and further delay recovery.

Beth Mills, a spokesperson for the California Bankers Association, told the Chronicle that struggling borrowers and their lenders already have more than enough time to search for mutual solutions. Mills pointed out that a state law passed in 2008 increased the required time span between first notification of foreclosure and final sale of the property by 30 days, to a total of 141 days. According to Mills, more time is not the silver bullet to every troubled loan, the Chronicle said.

Lenders Fighting Mortgage Rewrite Measure Targets Bankrupt Homeowners

Sen. Richard J. Durbin’s bill would allow bankruptcy judges to alter the terms of first mortgages for primary residences.
Sen. Richard J. Durbin’s bill would allow bankruptcy judges to alter the terms of first mortgages for primary residences. (By Alex Wong — Associated Press)

By Jeffrey H. Birnbaum
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, February 22, 2008; Page D01

The nation’s largest lending institutions are lobbying hard to block a proposal in Congress that would give bankruptcy judges greater latitude to rewrite mortgages held by financially strapped homeowners.

The proposal, which could come to a vote in the Senate as early as next week, is being pushed by Democratic congressional leaders and a large coalition of groups that includes labor unions, consumer advocates, civil rights organizations and AARP, the powerful senior citizens’ lobby.

The legislation would allow bankruptcy judges for the first time to alter the terms of mortgages for primary residences. Under the proposal, borrowers could declare bankruptcy, and a judge would be able to reduce the amount they owe as part of resolving their debts.

Currently, bankruptcy judges cannot rewrite first mortgages for primary homes. This restriction was adopted in the 1970s to encourage banks to provide mortgages to new home buyers.

The Democrats and their allies see the plan as an antidote to the recent mortgage crisis, especially among low-income borrowers with subprime loans. The legislation would prevent as many as 600,000 homeowners from being thrown into foreclosure, its advocates say.

“We should be giving families every reasonable tool to ensure they can keep a roof over their heads,” said Sen. Richard J. Durbin (Ill.), the Senate’s second-ranking Democrat and author of a leading version of the legislation.

But the banks argue that any help the proposal might provide to troubled homeowners in the short run would be offset by the higher costs that borrowers would have to pay to get mortgages in the future. The reason, banks say, is that they would pass along the added risk to borrowers in the form of higher interest rates, larger down payments or increased closing costs.
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If banks were unable to pass on the entire cost, they could be forced to trim their profits.

“This provision is incredibly counterproductive,” said Edward L. Yingling, president of the America Bankers Association. “We will lobby very, very strongly against it.”

The Durbin measure is part of a larger housing assistance bill being pushed by Democrats in the Senate. A separate version of the measure was approved late last year, mostly along party lines, by the House Judiciary Committee. The Bush administration has said that it opposes both provisions as overly coercive and potentially detrimental to the already strained mortgage market.

Lobbyists for major banks have made the proposal’s defeat a top priority. They have been meeting at least weekly to coordinate their efforts and have fanned out on Capitol Hill to meet with lawmakers and their staffs.

At least a dozen industry associations have banded together to fight the proposed legislation. They include the American Bankers Association, the Financial Services Roundtable, the Consumer Bankers Association and the Mortgage Bankers Association. These groups and others have signed joint letters to lawmakers on the issue.

In one of their letters, sent to Senate leaders last week, the groups wrote that the legislation would “have a very negative impact in the financial markets, which are struggling in part because of difficulties in valuing the mortgages that underlay securities [and] would greatly increase the uncertainty that already exists.”

Bank lobbyists have also gone online to make their case. The mortgage bankers have set up a Web site, http://www.mortgagebankers.org/StopTheCramDown, that can calculate how much mortgage costs might increase by state and by county if the Durbin measure were to become law. “Cram down” is the industry term for a forced easing of mortgage terms.

Supporters of the measure are also sending letters and meeting with lawmakers. A letter urging a quick vote on the proposal was delivered to Senate Majority Leader Harry M. Reid (Nev.) last week. It was signed by 19 organizations, including the Consumer Federation of America, the AFL-CIO, the National Council of La Raza, the U.S. Conference of Mayors and AARP.

The letter said, “The court-supervised modification provision is a commonsense solution that will help families save their homes without any cost to the U.S. Treasury, while ensuring that lenders recover at least what they would in a foreclosure.”

The Center for Responsible Lending, a pro-consumer watchdog group that backs Durbin’s effort, is trying to instigate voter e-mails to lawmakers on the subject. The group’s Web site includes a page that allows people to send electronic notes supporting the measure to their elected representatives with just a few clicks of a mouse.

AARP spokesman Jim Dau said his group will also ramp up its efforts. It may soon ask its activists to urge lawmakers to back the mortgage-redrafting legislation. AARP, which is the nation’s largest lobby group, has a list of 1.5 million volunteers whom it says it can call upon to contact lawmakers on legislative matters.

Lawyers that get it Niel Garfield list

Lawyers that get it Niel Garfield list
lawyers-that-get-it-02092

House Panel Votes for Modification Safe Haven, Hope Overhaul…Now maybe they will lower the principal balance

Austin Kilgore | 02.05.09

Mortgage servicers that have been reluctant to perform certain loan modifications for fear of lawsuits for violating service agreements may have some relief coming.

The House Financial Services Committee voted Wednesday to create a legal safe haven for mortgage servicers that modify mortgages regardless of the original service agreements so long as they are in compliance with the Homeowner Emergency Relief Act. The proposal would also require servicers to report modification activity to the Treasury Department.

There may also be some hope for the struggling Hope for Homeowners program. The committee’s resolution would also overhaul the $300 billion mortgage guarantee program that’s barely put a dent in reducing foreclosures.

When Congress passed the original Hope for Homeowners legislation, the program was expected to help as many as 400,000 homeowners, but since it was launched in October, there have only been 451 applicants and only 25 loans have closed.

Charles McMillan, president of the National Association of Realtors, said, “Hope for Homeowners, was designed to help families refinance into safer, more affordable mortgages, in many cases helping those families avoid a devastating foreclosure. Despite being well-intentioned, the Hope for Homeowners program has had limited success. Lenders have found the program difficult to participate in because of many of the program’s constraints.”

The changes would lower participation standards, and cut costs for lenders and borrowers.

Massachusetts Rep. Barney Frank told the House Financial Services Committee, “There have been a series of trials and errors here,” in the efforts to fix the program.

A third provision would make permanent the temporary increase in FDIC bank depositor insurance from $100,000 to $250,000 per account.

The legislation is expected to be considered by the full House next week.
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$8.4 Billion Countrywide Settlement… and why they only lower the interest!

I have gotten a number of calls asking if the home ownership retention program announced by Bank of America is likely to have an impact on foreclosures in CA. This program is a settlement with the CA Attorney General, Jerry Brown, and other state attorney generals that were suing Countrywide / Bank of America for predatory lending practices. It is expected to provide up to $8.4 Billion to 400,000 borrowers nationwide, with $3.5 Billion to 125,000 borrowers in CA.

While $8.4 Billion is a huge number – roughly 7.75% of BAC’s market cap today – it is literally a laughable amount. Problem is that it equals only $28,000 per loan in California. I compared that number to the average amount a California homeowner is upside down at the time of foreclosure – the average total debt is $26,200 more than they originally borrowed.(all that negative amortization) So in the best case scenario this puts borrowers back where they started, in loans they fundamentally can’t afford.So really it is nothing. The best thing is that it is admission of fault that could be used in individual cases against the lender in an individual action.

Note that they clearly state that principal balance reduction will only be available on a limited basis to restore negative equity from pay option ARMs – which makes sense given that they really don’t have enough money to do much more. Instead the primary goal is to ensure “modifications are affordable”. Given that they simply don’t have the money to lower principal balances to affordable levels, that means more artificially low payments… the exact thing that got us into this problem in the first place.

So back to the original question, will it likely impact foreclosures? Sort of, but only temporarily. It could impact your foreclosure if you were to copy the complaint and file your own case against countrywide at least you would not get a demur to the complaint. I posted the text of the complaint on Dec 31, 2008 California and everybody else V Countrywidecountrywide-complaint-form

They have graciously committed to not pursue foreclosure until they have contacted the owner and made a decision on program eligibility. So it appears to impact foreclosures, except that the recently passed SB1137 re codified as civil code 2923.5 and 2923.6 required them to do that anyway – so this claim is little more than spin.

Since this completely fails to address the underlying problem of the original loan amounts often exceeding current market value by $100k or more I’d also say the impact will only be temporary. Though that may still be a long time. In one case I recently reviewed Countrywide had a loan balance of over $900k on a home worth $550k – they modified the payment to 2% interest only for 5 years. The homeowner can afford it for now, but what happens in 5 years? Your’e kidding yourself if you think values are going back to those levels that quickly. Do we really still want to be cleaning this mess up 5 years from now?

Bottom line, Jerry Brown and the other state’s attorney generals have given Bank of America a gift. The opportunity to avoid litigation while getting the state’s endorsement for a plan that will never work and buying them precious time to find a way out of their dire predicament. Like the bailouts it’s possible it may help save this financial institution, but it will only delay our return to a stable and healthy real estate market.

I HAVE A PLAN If the foreclosure has occured and you are now facing Eviction I HAVE A PLAN

The next thing you can expect is a knock on your door. It will be the friendliest guy or gal that you would ever want to meet. Its the real estate agent with orders to get you out of the house. They may offer you cash for keys or whatever remember they are not your friend they have one purpose and one purpose only. TO GET YOU AND YOUR FAMILY OUT.
They may say things like don’t worry we can get you back in the house and you can buy it back. I had one Realtor promise that the people could buy back the house they just needed to move out over the weekend and the lender would work things out for them. They did only to find the Marshall had posted the house and nobody could get back in except a 3 hour period to get their stuff to the curb. Don’t let it happen to you.

In California tenants have 60 days and former owners 3 days before an eviction can be stated.

Step 1 send the party that gives you this notice a rental agreement showing someone as being a tenant in the house. (This will get you Sixty days)

Step 2 File a lawsuit for fraud and improper sale in that 2923.5 was not complied with prior to sale. sample-bank-final-complaint1
Step 3 File a Lis Pendenslisp-for-client

Step 4 Make motion to consolidate eviction with Superior court case.galejacksonconsolidation Alternative to Step 4 would be to apply for a temporary restraining order to hold the eviction till Fraud Case determined. Alternative to step 4 actually a Step 5 would be a motion in the unlawful detainer court for a stay of the judgment till the outcome of the Fraud case.

What will this do?

In the worst case it will keep you in your house and you may have to post a bond equaling the reasonable rental value of your house. Let me take that back just remember Judges have the power and the can disregard the law and the constitution and put you out without even a trial. This is the extreme and some days are extreme. The lenders lawyers are in front of that judge all the time, but as a whole you can expect a fair minded judge.

In the best case you could be in your house without having to post a bond and you will be offered the house back at today’s value and a low rate of interest.

San Marcos California Foreclosure mess thier Modification department is outsourced to India

by nowaq
(san marcos ca usa)

My mortgage is being service by Option One Mortgage co. It started with 6.14% and first reset 1-01-07 to 9.14%. I was behind on my payment on the first resetting I called Option to make arrangement payment but I was told that I’m not qualified bec. I’ve been late a month only and loan mod. is only for people who are behind for more than 2 mos. In my situation, a mortgage of $3655 plus a second mortgage loan of $378 is hard to come up with for 2 mos. Third mo. came I called again asking for loan modification but this time, I was dealing with people from India telling me to sell my house because I can’t afford it. I explained to him whats going on my side and requested to talk mitigation officer but this person said that he is the mitigation officer. I hung up on him. I received a notice of default after that. I have a sheriff sale on 8-07-07 but filed Bk 13 so I can keep my house and hoping that things will get better soon and be on track again. Don’t deal with sales rep. from other countries. Demand to talk with US reps that at least know whats going on here. Maybe if I was dealing with US reps. I was able to do loan mod. and not to go thru this foreclosure and BK. I’m hoping also that these mortgage cos. learned their lesson of not using sales reps from other countries. My situation was doable at the beginning but once past 2 mos. My loan reset again last 7-01-07 to 11.14% and by 1-01-08 it will be 13.14%. Also, if you have hard time paying with your credit card bills, don’t use debt settlement cos. The only time they can start negotiating for you is when you are in collection, they wont tell you up front. They will only tell you that it has to be bad in order to get better.

My plan for Loan Modifications i.e. Attorney loan mod

Recent Loan Modification studies have shown that a large percentage of traditional loan modifications put the borrowers more upside down than when they started.
Unfortunately many loan mods are leaving people with higher monthly payments. In many loan modifcation the money you did not pay gets tacked on to the back of the loan… Increasing your loan balance and making you more upside down. This is why over 50% of all loan mods are in default. They are not fixing the problem they are just postponing it.

Before you go into default on your loans at the advice of some former subprime loan seller, make sure you understand that absent finding some legal leverage over the lender you have a good chance of seeing your payments going up.

Our Loan Modification program includes

1. Upside Down Analysis

2. Qualified Written Request and offer of Loan Modification

3. Letter informing lender of clients election to pursue remedies carved out by recent California Law under 2923.6 and or Federal Programs under the Truth in lending Act and the Fair Debt collection practices Act.

4. Letter Disputing debt (if advisable)

5. Cease and Desist letters (if advisable)

6. Follow up, contact with negotiator, and negotiation by an attorney when needed.
By now many of you have read about all the Federal Governments Loan Modification Programs. Others have been cold called by a former loan brokers offering to help you with your Loan Modification. Its odd that many of the brokers who put people into these miserable loans are now charging people up front to get out of the them.

Before you spend thousands of dollars with someone, do an investigation:

1. Is the person licensed by the California Department of Real Estate? Or, the California State Bar?

2. Are your potential representatives aware that have to be licensed according to the DRE?

3. Are they asking you for money up front? They are violating the California Foreclosure Consultant act if they are neither CA attorneys nor perhaps Real Estate brokers in possesion of a no opinion letter from the California Department of Real Estate? Note… if a Notice of Default has been filed against your residence only attorneys acting as your attorney can take up front fees. Don’t fall for “attorney backed” baloney. Are you retaining the services of the attorney or not? Did you sign a retainer agreement ?

4. If your potential representative is not an attorney make sure he or she is a Real Estate Broker capable of proving their upfront retainer agreement has been given a no opinon letter by the DRE. (As of November 2008 – only 14 non attorney entites have been “approved by the DRE.)

5. If somone says they are attorney backed – ask to speak with the attorney. What does attorney backed mean? From what we have seen it is usually a junk marketing business being run by someone who can not get a proper license to do loan modifications.

6. Find out how your loan modification people intend to gain leverage over the lender.

7. If you are offered a loan audit or a Qualfied Written Request under RESPA letter – will an attorney be doing the negotiating against the lender? Will you have to hire the attorney after you pay for your loan audit? Doesn’t that put cart before the horse?

8. Will it do you any good to have a loan audit done if you later have to go out and retain an attorney. You want to retain their services of an attorney before you pay for the audit. The loan audit is the profit center; negotiation takes time.
9. What kind of results should you expect?

10. Who will be doing your negotiating?

11. Will the Loan Modification request go out on Legal Letterhead?

12. How much will you have to pay? Are you looking for a typical loan mod result or are you looking to leverage the law in the hopes of getting a better than average loan mod result.

13. What if your are not satisfied with the loan modification offered by the lender?

14. Should you go into default on both loans prior to requesting a loan modification? Why? What happens if the loan mod does not work out to your satisfaction? (very important question.)

15. Will an attorney review the terms of your loan modification with you? Will you have to waive your anti-deficiency protections if you sign your loan modification paperwork? Will an attorney help you leverage recent changes in California law in an attempt to get a substantial reduction in the principle?

2923.6 complaint

form29236complaint

Firm pursuing foreclosure might not be your lender

By PAULA LAVIGNE
REGISTER STAFF WRITER

Figuring out which company to deal with during a foreclosure can be daunting. Even if the original mortgage was with a company recognized by the borrower, that company may not be the one acting against the borrower in court.

For example: Wells Fargo filed more than 3,600 foreclosure lawsuits in Iowa from January 2005 to February 2008, more than any other company identified in Iowa court data. But the company could be taking legal action because it processed payments for another mortgage company or acted as a trustee for investors – not because it’s the original lender.

Two company names that often appear on Iowa foreclosures – Deutsche Bank and Mortgage Electronic Registration System, or MERS – can be even more puzzling to borrowers.

Deutsche Bank, a global financial services firm with headquarters in Germany, may be listed as a loan’s owner of record, but it likely doesn’t have an actual stake in foreclosure proceedings. The firm acts as a trustee for investors holding mortgage-backed securities.

A loan winds up in a mortgage- backed security after it is sold by the company that originated the note. An investment bank pools that loan with others. It then sells securities, which represent a portion of the total principal and interest payments on the loans, to investors such as mutual funds, pension funds and insurance companies.

MERS, meanwhile, is neither the servicer nor the lender. Companies pay the firm to represent them and track loans as they change hands.

So while MERS should be able to point borrowers to the appropriate contact in a foreclosure proceeding, Deutsche Bank urges borrowers to contact loan servicers instead.

A tip for borrowers facing a foreclosure action: Make sure the company bringing the foreclosure action has the legal right to do so.

University of Iowa law professor Katherine Porter led a national study of 1,733 foreclosures and found that 40 percent of the creditors filing the lawsuits did not show proof of ownership. The study will be published later this year.

Companies, she said, have been “putting the burden on the consumer – who is bankrupt – to try to decide whether it’s worth it to press the issue.”

Max Gardner III, a bankruptcy attorney in North Carolina and a national foreclosure expert, said the trend is spreading to other states. “You have to prove in North Carolina that you have the original note,” he said. “Judges have not (asked for) that very often, until the last five or six months.”

MERS and Deutsche Bank faced court challenges last year over whether they had legal standing to bring a foreclosure action, with mixed results.

A federal judge in Florida ruled in favor of MERS, dismissing a class-action lawsuit that claimed the company did not have the right to initiate foreclosures. But a federal judge in Ohio ruled against Deutsche Bank, dismissing 14 foreclosure lawsuits after Deutsche Bank couldn’t provide proof of ownership. The Ohio attorney general has not been successful in getting state judges to follow suit.

In Iowa, attorneys and lending experts say they haven’t seen similar rulings against Deutsche Bank

Truth In Lending Audit Checklist

tilaworksheet-21

HOEPA audit checklist

tilaworksheet-2

What Is Predatory Lending?

Predatory Lending are abusive practices used in the mortgage industry that strip borrowers of home equity and threaten families with bankruptcy and foreclosure.

Predatory Lending can be broken down into three categories: Mortgage Origination, Mortgage Servicing; and Mortgage Collection and Foreclosure.

Mortgage Origination is the process by which you obtain your home loan from a mortgage broker or a bank.

Predatory lending practices in Mortgage Origination include:
# Excessive points;
# Charging fees not allowed or for services not delivered;
# Charging more than once for the same fee
# Providing a low teaser rate that adjusts to a rate you cannot afford;
# Successively refinancing your loan of “flipping;”
# “Steering” you into a loan that is more profitable to the Mortgage Originator;
# Changing the loan terms at closing or “bait & switch;”
# Closing in a location where you cannot adequately review the documents;
# Serving alcohol prior to closing;
# Coaching you to put minimum income or assets on you loan so that you will qualify for a certain amount;
# Securing an inflated appraisal;
# Receiving a kickback in money or favors from a particular escrow, title, appraiser or other service provider;
# Promising they will refinance your mortgage before your payment resets to a higher amount;
# Having you sign blank documents;
# Forging documents and signatures;
# Changing documents after you have signed them; and
# Loans with prepayment penalties or balloon payments.

Mortgage Servicing is the process of collecting loan payments and credit your loan.

Predatory lending practices in Mortgage Servicing include:
# Not applying payments on time;
# Applying payments to “Suspense;”
# “Jamming” illegal or improper fees;
# Creating an escrow or impounds account not allowed by the documents;
# Force placing insurance when you have adequate coverage;
# Improperly reporting negative credit history;
# Failing to provide you a detailed loan history; and
# Refusing to return your calls or letters.
#

Mortgage Collection & Foreclosure is the process Lenders use when you pay off your loan or when you house is repossessed for non-payment

Predatory lending practices in Mortgage Collection & Foreclosure include:
# Producing a payoff statement that includes improper charges & fees;
# Foreclosing in the name of an entity that is not the true owner of the mortgage;
# Failing to provide Default Loan Servicing required by all Fannie Mae mortgages;
# Failing to follow due process in foreclosure;
# Fraud on the court;
# Failing to provide copies of all documents and assignments; and
# Refusing to adequately communicate with you.

CTX Mortgage Company, LLC / CTX Mortgage / Centex HomesCTX Mortgage Company / Centex Homes Predatory Lending Bait and Switch? Maitland Central Florida

September 2005, we signed a purchase contract and made a $12,000 deposit for a Centex Town Home in Oviedo, Florida. The builder’s mortgage company, CTX Mortgage, offered $3,000 in incententives so we decided to use them. We were given a Good Faith Estimate and interest rate of 6.25% but were told we could not lock in because it was too far off from the closing.

By late November 2005, we had heard nothing from CTX, so we contacted them to lock in a rate. We were again told that we needed to wait until the closing date was determined. We were given three new Good Faith Estimates with rates between 6.840% – 7.090% and were told they were the best CTX could offer, but we were approved for all three scenarios. We decided to shop around and received a Good Faith Estimate with a rate of 6.625% from Wells Fargo. A few days later, Centex contacted us to schedule the closing. We told them we were going to use Wells Fargo but were told that we could not change lenders after the completion of the framing inspection, which took place on October 21, 2005. We reviewed the contract and found a page this to be true. So we agreed to proceed with CTX but complained about the rate increases on the good faith estimates. Our file was transferred to a new loan officer, Jennifer Powell. According to her, our original loan officer had never ran our credit and we were not approved for any of the good faith estimates she provided to us.

Our closing was scheduled for Dec 28, 2005. Between December 8th and December 27th, we received five different good faith estimates from Jennifer (6.75% on December 8th, 7.75% on December 20th, 7.99% on December 21st, 9.125% on December 22th, and 9.375% on December 28th). Jennifer said my ‘low income’ made me high risk, which caused the rates to jump. We told Jennifer that the significant rate increase made the mortgage payments completely unaffordable for us and pleaded with her to either allow us to seek other financing or cancel the contract. She said either take the rate they gave us or lose our deposit of $12,000. We did not want to close on the property, but were not prepared to walk away empty-handed, so we asked for a loan program that would allow us to refinance without penalty. This is what made the rates jump up to 9.375% and 13.550% (an 80/20 loan).

The closing documents were not made available to us until 6:30 p.m. the night before our closing. We stayed in their office to review everything and noticed that my income on the application that CTX had prepeared was double my true income. We asked Jennifer why this was and she told us that in order to get approval, my income had to be ?stated?, meaning my income would not be verified by the lender. Please note in the above paragraph that we were told the rates were high because of my ‘low income’. After the closing, CTX immediately sold our loans, even before the first payment was due. There is only one reason why they offer mortgages and that is to rip people off!!!!

We have struggled for the past year and now have two liens against our property and our credit is ruined! We believe that what CTX Mortgage did is termed Predatory Lending. They tricked us, showing us good rates until it was too late for us to change lenders. We have two young daughters, a 5 year-old and a 3 month-old, and we are in jeopardy of losing our home. We are going to file a complaint with any and all agencies we can but would really like to hear from anyone else who has had this problem. I don’t know how these people sleep at night!

Constance
Oviedo, Florida
U.S.A.

Click here to read other Rip Off Reports on CENTEX (CAVCO HOMES)