Eviction could validate a void Foreclosure sooo……. Watch out !

Lorenzo VelezBecause an unlawful detainer action is a summary proceeding usually limited to the issue of immediate possession of real property, a judgment in such an action usually has  [21] limited res judicata effect “and will not prevent one who is dispossessed from bringing a subsequent action to resolve questions of title.” (Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251, 255 (Vella).) An exception to this rule is contained in Code of Civil Procedure section 1161a, which extends the summary eviction remedy beyond the conventional unlawful detainer suit brought by a landlord to include actions by certain purchasers of property. (Vella, at p. 255.) In these cases, title to the property may be an issue.

In Malkoskie, the court applied the exception to the rule that title cannot be tried in unlawful detainer in circumstances similar to the present case. There, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo), after purchasing real property at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale, brought an unlawful detainer action against the previous homeowners pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1161a, subdivision (b)(3). This subdivision permits an unlawful detainer action against a person who holds over and continues possession of real property after receiving a three-day written notice to quit the property, “[w]here the property has been sold in accordance with Section 2924 of the Civil Code, under  [22] a power of sale contained in a deed of trust executed by such person, or a person under whom such person claims, and the title under the sale has been duly perfected.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1161a, subd. (b)(3), italics added.) In a subsequent action by the previous homeowners seeking to set aside the nonjudicial foreclosure sale, the court held that the judgment in the unlawful detainer action “conclusively resolved” the validity of title to the property in Wells Fargo’s favor. (Malkoskie, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 974.)

Likewise, in the UD action, the complaint alleged that U.S. Bank purchased the property at a foreclosure sale in accordance with Civil Code section 2924, and that it was seeking possession of the property pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1161a, subdivision (b). Subdivision (b) sets forth five circumstances under which an unlawful detainer action may be commenced, all of which require the plaintiff to purchase the property and to duly perfect title. Subdivision (b)(3) appears to be the only circumstance which applies to the facts stated in the complaint. 10 The complaint in the UD action thus raised the issue of title to the property. (Malkoskie, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 974.)

Although the judgment in the UD action was obtained by default, the issue of title was necessarily and actually decided. By permitting their default in the UD action to be entered, the Sarkisians confessed the truth of all material allegations in the complaint, including U.S. Bank’s allegations that it purchased the property at a foreclosure sale and thereafter perfected its interest in the property. (Fitzgerald v. Herzer (1947) 78 Cal.App.2d 127, 131.) The Sarkisians therefore are collaterally estopped from denying that U.S. Bank holds title to the property. (Murray v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 860, 871 [“Even a judgment of default in a civil proceeding is ‘res judicata as to all issues aptly pleaded in the complaint and defendant  [24] is estopped from denying in a subsequent action any allegations contained in the former complaint’ “].)

Each of plaintiffs’ causes of action in this case rest on the premise that U.S. Bank did not acquire title to the property. Because U.S. Bank conclusively established in the UD action that it holds title to the property, the trial court correctly sustained the bank defendants’ demurrer to the FAC.

Pro Per wins in the First Apellate District against Bank of America

Intenganv.BAC Home Loans Servicing LP, 2013 Cal. App. LEXIS 225 (Copy citation)

Court of Appeal of California, First Appellate District, Division Five

March 22, 2013, Opinion Filed

A135782

Reporter: 2013 Cal. App. LEXIS 225 | 2013 WL 1180435

ARDEN M. INTENGAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING LP et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Notice:CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*

Prior History:  [1]Superior Court of San Mateo County, No. CIV 505111, Raymond Swope, Judge.

Core Terms

demurrer, judicial notice, borrower, trust deed, cause of action, foreclosure, notice, third amended complaint, notice of default, beneficiary, sustain a demurrer, wrongful foreclosure, due diligence, lender, default, modify, mortgage, trustee sale, telephone, foreclosure sale, trial court, recording of a notice, foreclose, purported

Case Summary

Procedural Posture
Plaintiff borrower’s third amended complaint sought to preclude corporate defendants from foreclosing on her property. Plaintiff contended that defendants lacked authority to foreclose under the relevant deed of trust and notice of default. The San Mateo County Superior Court, California, entered a judgment of dismissal after it sustained defendants’ demurrer to the third amended complaint without leave to amend.

Overview
Plaintiff alleged that defendants did not contact her or attempt to contact her with due diligence as required byCiv. Code, § 2923.5. The court held that judicial notice could not be taken of defendants’ compliance with§ 2923.5. While judicial notice could be properly taken of the existence of a declaration of compliance, it could not be taken of the facts of compliance asserted in the declaration, at least where plaintiff alleged and argued that the declaration was false and the facts asserted in the declaration were reasonably subject to dispute. Even if the “facts” stated in the declaration could be the subject of judicial notice, the declaration contained only a conclusory assertion that defendant bank complied with the statute; nowhere did it state when, how, or by whom the elements of due diligence were accomplished, or how the declarant knew if they were. The most these averments could do was create a factual dispute as to whether defendants complied with the statute. Because plaintiff stated a cause of action for wrongful foreclosure based on the purported failure to comply with§ 2923.5before recordation of the notice of default, it was error to sustain the demurrer.

Outcome
The judgment of dismissal was reversed.

LexisNexis® HeadnotesHide sectionHide

Civil Procedure > … > Responses > Defenses, Demurrers & Objections > Demurrers
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > De Novo Review
Evidence > Judicial Notice > General Overview
HN1 In its de novo review of an order sustaining a demurrer, the appellate court assumes the truth of all facts properly pleaded in the complaint or reasonably inferred from the pleading, but not mere contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law. The appellate court then determines if those facts are sufficient, as a matter of law, to state a cause of action under any legal theory. In making this determination, the appellate court also considers facts of which the trial court properly took judicial notice.  Shepardize – Narrow by this Headnote

Civil Procedure > … > Responses > Defenses, Demurrers & Objections > Demurrers
Evidence > Judicial Notice > General Overview
HN2 A demurrer may be sustained where judicially noticeable facts render the pleading defective, and allegations in the pleading may be disregarded if they are contrary to facts judicially noticed.  Shepardize – Narrow by this Headnote

Civil Procedure > … > Responses > Defenses, Demurrers & Objections > Demurrers
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > General Overview
HN3 In order to prevail on appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer, the appellant must affirmatively demonstrate error. Specifically, the appellant must show that the facts pleaded are sufficient to establish every element of a cause of action and overcome all legal grounds on which the trial court sustained the demurrer. The appellate court will affirm the ruling if there is any ground on which the demurrer could have been properly sustained.  Shepardize – Narrow by this Headnote

Real Property Law > Financing > Topic Summary ReportForeclosures > General Overview
HN4 As a general rule, a plaintiff may not challenge the propriety of a foreclosure on his or her property without offering to repay what he or she borrowed against the property. A valid tender of performance must be of the full debt, in good faith, unconditional, and with the ability to perform.Civ. Code, §§ 1486,1493,1494,1495.  Shepardize – Narrow by this Headnote

Real Property Law > Financing > Topic Summary ReportForeclosures > General Overview
HN5 SeeCiv. Code, § 2923.6.  Shepardize – Narrow by this Headnote

Real Property Law > Financing > Topic Summary ReportForeclosures > General Overview
HN6 Civ. Code, § 2923.6, does not grant a right to a loan modification. To the contrary, it merely expresses the hope that lenders will offer loan modifications on certain terms and conspicuously does not require lenders to take any action. In other words, there is no “duty” under§ 2923.6to agree to a loan modification.  Shepardize – Narrow by this Headnote

Real Property Law > Financing > Topic Summary ReportForeclosures > General Overview
HN7 Civ. Code, § 2923.5, subd. (a)(1), precludes a trustee or mortgage servicer from recording a notice of default until 30 days after the loan servicer has made initial contact with the borrower to assess the borrower’s financial situation and explore options for avoiding foreclosure, or has satisfied the due diligence requirements of the statute. Due diligence requires sending a letter by first class mail, making three attempts to contact the borrower by telephone, and sending a certified letter if no response is received within two weeks of the telephone attempts.§ 2923.5, subd. (e).  Shepardize – Narrow by this Headnote

Evidence > Judicial Notice > General Overview
Real Property Law > Financing > Topic Summary ReportForeclosures > General Overview
HN8 Civ. Code, § 2923.5, requires not only that a declaration of compliance be attached to the notice of default, but that the bank actually perform the underlying acts (i.e., contacting the borrower or attempting such contact with due diligence) that would constitute compliance. While judicial notice may be properly taken of the existence of the declaration, it may not be taken of the facts of compliance asserted in the declaration, at least where the borrower has alleged and argued that the declaration is false and the facts asserted in the declaration are reasonably subject to dispute.  Shepardize – Narrow by this Headnote

Civil Procedure > … > Responses > Defenses, Demurrers & Objections > Demurrers
HN9 A demurrer is not the appropriate procedure for determining the truth of disputed facts.  Shepardize – Narrow by this Headnote

Headnotes/SyllabusExpand SectionShow

Counsel: Arden M. Intengan, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Severson & Werson,Jan T. ChiltonandM. Elizabeth Holtfor Defendants and Respondents.

Judges: Opinion byNeedham, J., withJones, P. J., andBruiniers, J., concurring.

Opinion by: Needham, J.

Opinion

NEEDHAM, J.—Arden M. Intengan (Intengan) appeals from a judgment of dismissal entered after the court sustained the demurrer to her third amended complaint without leave to amend. Essentially, Intengan sought to preclude respondents from foreclosing on her property, contending they lack authority to do so under the relevant deed of trust and notice of default. In this appeal, Intengan argues that the demurrer should not have been sustained because she alleged facts sufficient to state a cause of action, including a claim based on respondents’ alleged failure to contact her or attempt with due diligence to contact her before recording the notice of default (Civ. Code, § 2923.5). She also contends the court should have ruled on her motion to strike the demurrer.

We will reverse the judgment. In the published portion of our opinion, we conclude that judicial notice could not be taken of respondents’ [2] compliance withCivil Code section 2923.5, and Intengan’s allegations that respondents did not comply with the statute were sufficient to state a cause of action for wrongful foreclosure. In the unpublished portion of the opinion, we conclude that Intengan failed to state any other cause of action and the court did not err in denying leave to amend.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORYOn June 26, 2006, Intengan borrowed $696,500 from Countrywide Bank, N.A. (Countrywide). The loan was secured by a deed of trust on Intengan’s real property in Daly City. Under the deed of trust, the beneficiary was Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), the trustee was respondent ReconTrust Company, N.A. (ReconTrust), and BAC Home Loans Servicing LP (BAC) serviced the note. BAC’s successor is respondentBank of America, N.A.

On or about December 28, 2010, MERS assigned its beneficial interest in Intengan’s deed of trust to “TheBank of New York Mellonfka TheBank of New York,as Successor Trustee toJPMorgan ChaseBank, N.A., as Trustee for the Holders of SAMI II Trust 2006-AR7, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-AR7” (Bank of New York).

On December 28, 2010, ReconTrust, as agent [3] for the beneficiary under the deed of trust, recorded a notice of Intengan’s default on Intengan’s loan; the notice of default and election to sell under deed of trust indicated that she was more than $46,000 in arrears.

Purportedly accompanying the notice of default was a declaration by Samantha Jones, “MLO Loan Servicing Specialist of BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP,” in which she states under penalty of perjury thatBank of America“tried with due diligence to contact the borrower in accordance withCalifornia Civil Code Section 2923.5.” The declaration does not provide any facts to support this conclusion, such as the specifics of any attempt to contact Intengan.

A notice of trustee’s sale was recorded by ReconTrust on April 5, 2011, setting a sale date of April 26, 2011. Intengan does not allege that the sale occurred, and the respondents’ brief represents that no sale took place and that Intengan has been in possession of the property for nearly two years without making payments on her loan.

A.Original, First Amended, and Second Amended ComplaintsOn April 25, 2011—the day before the scheduled foreclosure sale—Intengan filed a complaint against defendants, including BAC and ReconTrust, [4] asserting causes of action for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and an accounting. Before any defendant responded, Intengan filed a first amended complaint and then a second amended complaint.

BAC and ReconTrust filed a demurrer to Intengan’s second amended complaint. The court sustained their special demurrer to the first and second causes of action, with leave to amend in order to state a violation ofCivil Code section 2923.5. The court also sustained their general demurrer to the third cause of action for an accounting, without leave to amend.

B.Third Amended ComplaintIntengan filed her third amended complaint in January 2012 against BAC, ReconTrust, and others. This time, she purported to assert causes of action for wrongful foreclosure, fraud, intentional misrepresentation, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, slander of title, quiet title, declaratory relief, violation ofBusiness and Professions Code section 17200, unjust enrichment, and injunctive relief seeking to enjoin the pending foreclosure sale.

In February 2012, respondents filed a demurrer to the third amended complaint. Although the demurrer is central to the issues [5] on appeal, neither Intengan nor respondents include the demurrer in the record. The record does contain, however, respondents’ request for judicial notice in support of their demurrer, by which they sought judicial notice of the deed of trust on Intengan’s property, the notice of default, the assignment of the deed of trust toBank of New York,and the notice of trustee’s sale.

In June 2012, Intengan filed an opposition and “motion to strike” the demurrer, “on the grounds that Defendant[]Bank of America’sDemurrer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a demurrer, is uncertain, is ambiguous, is unintelligible, is irrelevant, is false, contains improper matters and/or is not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California.” She urged that the demurrer misstated facts and ignored the law, and therefore it should be stricken or denied. The purported motion was not accompanied by a notice of hearing.

The court granted respondents’ request for judicial notice and sustained their demurrer to the third amended complaint without leave to amend. A judgment of dismissal was entered on June 15, 2012.

This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSIONAs mentioned, Intengan argues that the court [6] erred in sustaining the demurrer and further erred in failing to rule on her motion to strike the demurrer.

A.DemurrerHN1 In our de novo review of an order sustaining a demurrer, we assume the truth of all facts properly pleaded in the complaint or reasonably inferred from the pleading, but not mere contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law. (Buller v. Sutter Health(2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 981, 985–986 [74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 47].) We then determine if those facts are sufficient, as a matter of law, to state a cause of action under any legal theory. (Aguilera v. Heiman(2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 590, 595 [95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 18].)

In making this determination, we also consider facts of which the trial court properly took judicial notice. (E.g.,Avila v. Citrus Community College Dist.(2006) 38 Cal.4th 148, 165, fn. 12 [41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299, 131 P.3d 383].)HN2 A demurrer may be sustained where judicially noticeable facts render the pleading defective (Evans v. City of Berkeley(2006) 38 Cal.4th 1, 6 [40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 205, 129 P.3d 394]), and allegations in the pleading may be disregarded if they are contrary to facts judicially noticed (Hoffman v. Smithwoods RV Park, LLC(2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 390, 400 [102 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72](Hoffman); seeFontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.(2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 264–265 [129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 467](Fontenot) [in sustaining [7] demurrer, court properly took judicial notice of recorded documents that clarified and to some extent contradicted plaintiff’s allegations]).

HN3 In order to prevail on appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer, the appellant must affirmatively demonstrate error. Specifically, the appellant must show that the facts pleaded are sufficient to establish every element of a cause of action and overcome all legal grounds on which the trial court sustained the demurrer. (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp.(1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 879–880 [6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 151].) We will affirm the ruling if there is any ground on which the demurrer could have been properly sustained. (Debro v. Los Angeles Raiders(2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 940, 946 [112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329].)

boa-billboard11.Wrongful Foreclosure (First Cause of Action)The first purported cause of action in Intengan’s third amended complaint is for “wrongful foreclosure.” Intengan alleges there was “an unauthorized Trustee, document irregularities, improper signatories, and [a] defective Notice of Default”; she further alleges that “due to the chain of assignments, it is now unknown and doubtful who is the current lender/beneficiary/assignee with legal authority and standing regarding the mortgage on [the] [8] subject property.” Intengan also claims that BAC and ReconTrust failed to comply with a number of Civil Code sections regulating nonjudicial foreclosures, including the requirement of contacting the borrower, or attempting to do so with due diligence, underCivil Code section 2923.5.

a.Failure to tenderHN4 CA(1) (1)As a general rule, a plaintiff may not challenge the propriety of a foreclosure on his or her property without offering to repay what he or she borrowed against the property. (Karlsen v. American Sav. & Loan Assn.(1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 112, 117 [92 Cal.Rptr. 851][judgment on the pleadings properly granted where plaintiff attempted to set aside trustee’s sale for lack of adequate notice, because “[a] valid and viable tender of payment of the indebtedness owing is essential to an action to cancel a voidable sale under a deed of trust”]; seeUnited States Cold Storage v. Great Western Savings & Loan Assn.(1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 1214, 1222–1223 [212 Cal. Rptr. 232][“the law is long-established that atrustoror his successor must tender the obligation in full as a prerequisite to [a] challenge of the foreclosure sale”];FPCI RE-HAB 01 v. E & G Investments, Ltd.(1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1018, 1021–1022 [255 Cal. Rptr. 157][tender rule is based on “the [9] equitable maxim that a court of equity will not order a useless act performed … [¶] … if plaintiffs could not have redeemed the property had the sale procedures been proper, any irregularities in the sale did not result in damages to the plaintiffs”].)

Intengan’s third amended complaint alleges her willingness “to tender the appropriate and reasonable mortgage payments.” That allegation, however, is plainly insufficient. A valid tender of performance must be of the full debt, in good faith, unconditional, and with the ability to perform. (Civ. Code, §§ 1486,1493,1494,1495.)

Intengan’s third amended complaint also asserts that “tender is not required inasmuch as there is [a] void foreclosure, not a voidable one.” (SeeDimock v. Emerald Properties(2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 868, 877–878 [97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 255].) However, Intengan does not allege that she was fraudulently induced into the loan; nor does she otherwise attack the validity of the debt. Nor do her allegations indicate a defect in the foreclosure procedure that would render a resulting sale voidon its face, particularly when considered in light of the documents that were judicially noticed. On the other hand, as we shall discusspost, Intengan has [10] alleged a defect in the foreclosure procedure—the failure to comply withCivil Code section 2923.5—which, if true, would render the foreclosure either void or voidable. Whether or not this would remove the need to allege tender is an issue we need not address, since an allegation of tender is unnecessary for another reason.

According to the allegations of the third amended complaint—as well as representations in the respondents’ brief—no foreclosure sale had occurred as of the time of the ruling on the demurrer. While the tender requirement may apply to causes of action toset asidea foreclosure sale, a number of California and federal courts have held or suggested that it does not apply to actions seeking toenjoina foreclosure sale—at least where the lenders had allegedly not complied with a condition precedent to foreclosure. (See, e.g.,Pfeifer v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.(2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1280–1281 [150 Cal. Rptr. 3d 673][failure to allege tender of full amount owed did not bar declaratory relief or injunctive relief based on wrongful foreclosure, where lenders had not yet foreclosed and borrowers alleged that lenders had not complied with servicing regulations that were a [11] condition precedent to foreclosure];Mabry v. Superior Court(2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 208, 225 [110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 201](Mabry) [borrower not required to tender full amount of indebtedness in seeking to enjoin foreclosure sale based on alleged failure to comply withCiv. Code, § 2923.5];Barrionuevo v. Chase Bank, N.A. (N.D.Cal. 2012) 885 F.Supp.2d 964, 969–970 & fn. 4(Barrionuevo) [no tender requirement where foreclosure sale had not yet occurred, in case where noncompliance withCiv. Code, § 2923.5was alleged].)

b.Wrongful foreclosure theoriesIntengan contends that the foreclosing beneficiary under the deed of trust,Bank of New York,has not been shown to have standing to foreclose. She alleges: “Defendants made transfers, assignments of the subject loan and that due to the chain of assignments, it is now unknown and doubtful who is the current lender/beneficiary/assignee with legal authority and standing regarding the mortgage on the subject property.”

Intengan fails to allege wrongful foreclosure on this ground. The records of which the court took judicial notice, without Intengan’s objection, identify the foreclosing beneficiary to be theBank of New York. [12] Specifically, the recorded deed of trust names MERS as the original beneficiary, the recorded assignment of the deed of trust assigns all beneficial interest under the deed of trust from MERS toBank of New Yorkas the new beneficiary, and the notice of trustee sale was dated and recorded afterBank of New Yorkbecame the beneficiary. (SeeFontenot, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at pp. 264–265[court may take judicial notice of the fact of the existence and legal effect of legally operative documents, such as the identity of the beneficiary designated in the deed of trust, where not subject to reasonable dispute];Scott v.JPMorgan ChaseBank, N.A.(Mar. 18, 2013, A132741) 214 Cal.App.4th ___ [2013 Cal.App.Lexis 211].) While Intengan’s pleading includes the unsupported conclusion that there was no assignment of the deed of trust in favor of “TheBank of New York Mellonfka TheBank of New Yorkas Trustee,” the recorded assignment of which the court took judicial notice shows there was, and Intengan neither alleges nor argues facts from which the assignment might be inferred to be invalid. (SeeFontenot, supra, at pp. 264–265.) Under these circumstances, the judicially noticed facts contradict the conclusory allegations [13] of the third amended complaint, and those allegations may be disregarded. (Id.at p. 265;Hoffman, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at p. 400.)1

Similarly, Intengan alleges that respondents could not provide a valid “chain of assignments” from previous [14] lenders including Countrywide. From the outset, however, MERS (not Countrywide) was the beneficiary under the deed of trust, and the assignment of the deed of trust shows that MERS assigned its interest toBank of New York.(SeeFontenot, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at pp. 264–265.)

Intengan also alleges the conclusion that the notice of trustee’s sale arose from an “unauthorized Trustee, document irregularities, [and] improper signatories.” Although she alleges that the substitution of ReconTrust as trustee was not recorded until February 17, 2011, the records of which the court took judicial notice—including the original deed of trust—show that ReconTrust was the trustee from the beginning and throughout the date of the notice of default and notice of trustee sale. (SeeFontenot, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at pp. 264–265.) Furthermore, both beneficiaries and trustees—and their agents—may record notices of default. (Civ. Code, § 2924, subd. (a)(1).) Thus, ReconTrust was authorized to record the notice of default as the trustee, and it was also authorized to record the notice of default as the agent of the beneficiary. Intengan’s allegations fail to state facts from which it may be inferred [15] that the notice of default or the notice of trustee’s sale was invalid on this ground.

Intengan further alleges that respondents did not comply with the requirements of Civil Code sections 2823.6,2923.5, or2923.6, before proceeding with the foreclosure. There is no Civil Code section 2823.6. Her allegations as toCivil Code section 2923.6are unavailing, but her allegation as toCivil Code section 2923.5suffice to state a cause of action.

CA(2) (2)In January 2012, when Intengan’s third amended complaint was filed, and June 2012, when it was dismissed,Civil Code section 2923.6provided:HN5 “It is the intent of the Legislature that the mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent offer the borrower a loan modification or workout plan if such a modification or plan is consistent with its contractual or other authority.” (Civ. Code, § 2923.6, former subd. (b).)2Intengan alleged that, pursuant to Civil Code section “2823.6”—which we take to mean “2923.6”—“Defendants are now contractually bound to implement the loan modification as provided therein.” ButHN6 Civil Code section 2923.6does not grant a right to a loan modification. To the contrary, it “merely expresses the hope that lenders will offer loan [16] modifications on certain terms” and “conspicuously does not require lenders to take any action.” (Mabry, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 222 & fn. 9, italics omitted.) In other words, “[t]hereis no ‘duty’ underCivil Code section 2923.6to agree to a loan modification.” (Hamilton v. Greenwich Investors XXVI, LLC(2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1602, 1617 [126 Cal. Rptr. 3d 174].)

HN7 CA(3) (3)Civil Code section 2923.5precludes a trustee (like respondent ReconTrust) or mortgage servicer (such as BAC/respondentBank of America) from recording a notice of default until 30 days after the loan servicer has made initial contact with the borrower to assess the borrower’s financial situation and explore options for avoiding foreclosure, or has satisfied the due diligence requirements of the statute. (Civ. Code, § 2923.5, subd. (a)(1).) Due diligence requires sending a letter by first-class mail, making three attempts to contact the borrower by telephone, and sending a certified letter if no response is received within two weeks of the telephone attempts. [17] (Civ. Code, § 2923.5, subd. (e).)

Intengan expressly alleged in her third amended complaint that respondents “did not complywith such contact and due diligence requirements pursuant toCivil Code section 2923.5.” (Italics added.) In support of their demurrer, respondents sought judicial notice of the notice of default, including the attached declaration of Samantha Jones, which averred thatBank of America“tried with due diligence to contact [Intengan] in accordance withCalifornia Civil Code Section 2923.5.” But in her opposition to the demurrer, Intengan argued that she had never spoken with Jones in person or over the telephone, heard any recording from Jones “over the telephone or any other method recorded by ‘Ms. Jones’, DefendantsBank of Americaor Mr. Julian,” or “communicated with ‘Ms. Jones’ by any method of communication whatsoever nor received any communication whatsoever from ‘Ms. Jones’ other than by the ‘Ms. Jones’ Declaration DefendantsBank of Americaand Mr. Julian have provided.”

Construing the allegations of the third amended complaint broadly (as we must on demurrer), we conclude that Intengan stated a cause of action for wrongful foreclosure based on respondents’ [18] alleged noncompliance withCivil Code section 2923.5. Intengan alleged that defendants did not contact her or attempt to contact her with due diligence as required by the statute. Although respondents sought judicial notice of Jones’s declaration regarding compliance with the statute, Intengan disputed the truthfulness of Jones’s declaration by denying that she was ever contacted or received any telephone message. She also argued at the demurrer hearing that it was inappropriate to turn the hearing into an evidentiary hearing—in other words, that a demurrer may not be sustained by resolving a conflict in the evidence. And in this appeal Intengan argues that, while judicial notice may be taken of the existence of a document such as a declaration, accepting the truth of itscontentspresents an entirely different matter.

CA(4) (4)Intengan is correct.HN8 Civil Code section 2923.5requires not only that a declaration of compliance be attached to the notice of default, but that the bank actually perform the underlying acts (i.e., contacting the borrower or attempting such contact with due diligence) that would constitute compliance. While judicial notice could be properly taken of theexistenceof Jones’s [19] declaration, it could not be taken of the facts of compliance assertedinthe declaration, at least where, as here, Intengan has alleged and argued that the declaration is false and the facts asserted in the declaration are reasonably subject to dispute. (See, e.g.,Joslin v. H.A.S. Ins. Brokerage(1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 369, 374–376 [228 Cal. Rptr. 878](Joslin) [facts disclosed in a deposition and not disputed could be considered in ruling on a demurrer, but facts disclosed in the deposition that were disputed could not be, since “ ‘judicial notice of matters upon demurrer will be dispositive only in those instances where there is not or cannot be a factual dispute concerning that which is sought to be judicially noticed.’ ”].) Indeed, respondents only sought judicial notice of the documents attached to its request, not the underlying fact of its attempt to contact Intengan.

Taking judicial notice that the bank actually performed certain acts that might constitute compliance with its statutory obligations, based solely on a declaration that avers compliance in a conclusory manner, would of course be vastly different than merely taking judicial notice that the declaration was signed and attached to the notice [20] of default (or, as discussedante, from taking judicial notice of the legal effect of a legally operative deed of trust that names its beneficiary). At least in this case, what the bank actually did to comply with the statute is reasonably subject to dispute and cannot be judicially noticed, even though the existence of the declaration (and the legal effect of a deed of trust) is not reasonably subject to dispute and can be judicially noticed. (SeeSkov v. U.S. Bank National Assn.(2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 690, 696 [143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 694](Skov) [where bank sought judicial notice of a notice of default declaration stating compliance withCiv. Code, § 2923.5, whether the bank “complied withsection 2923.5is the type of fact that is reasonably subject to dispute, and thus, not a proper subject of judicial notice”].)

Furthermore, even if the “facts” stated in Jones’s declarationcouldbe the subject of judicial notice, the declaration contains only a conclusory assertion thatBank of Americacomplied with the statute: nowhere does it state when, how, or by whom the elements of due diligence were accomplished, or how the declarant knew if they were.3More importantly, the most these averments could do is create a factual dispute [21] as to whether respondents complied with the statute. (SeeMabry, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at pp. 235–236[competing accounts as to possibility of compliance withCiv. Code, § 2923.5created conflict in the evidence].)HN9 A demurrer is “ ‘simply not the appropriate procedure for determining the truth of disputed facts.’ ” (Joslin, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at p. 374; seeSkov, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at pp. 696–697[assuming the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations, a disputed issue of compliance withCiv. Code, § 2923.5cannot be resolved at the demurrer stage]; see alsoBarrionuevo, supra, 885 F.Supp.2d 964, 976–977[borrowers’ allegation that bank did not contact them before filing the notice of default was sufficient to state a violation ofCiv. Code, § 2923.5, despite judicial notice taken of declaration in notice of default that asserted statutory compliance];Argueta v. J.P. Morgan Chase(E.D.Cal. 2011) 787 F.Supp.2d 1099, 1107(Argueta) [despite judicial notice of notice of default including declaration of compliance withCiv. Code, § 2923.5, plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient to preclude dismissal where plaintiffs alleged that they did not receive phone calls, [22] phone messages, or letters before the notice of default was recorded].)

On this basis, Intengan stated a cause of action for wrongful foreclosure based on the purported failure to comply withCivil Code section 2923.5before recordation of the notice of default. For this reason, it was error to sustain the demurrer.4

2.–10.* [23]

11.Intengan’s Other ArgumentsIntengan contends that the court’s ruling on the demurrer “is partial and therefore inconsistent with California statutory and case law,” “amounts to a constructive tax” in violation of her constitutional rights, violates her constitutional right to be free from illegal takings, resulted from a misapplication of law and ignorance of the facts, and violates her “Constitutional Right to separation of powers.” She contends that “[n]oevidence exists in the record that Judge Swope had any probable cause to institute any forfeiture action against Appellant Intengan [24] by the Wrongful Demurrer Ruling resulting in the loss of Appellant Intengan’s lawsuit.” She asserts that the “refusals” ofBank of Americaand the trial court “resemble an Orwellian conundrum.” She “further requests that this Court piece together Appellant Intengan’s Constitutional Right that Judge Swope and RespondentsBank of Americashattered Humpty Dumpty-like due to their acts of partiality, misapplication of law, ignorance of facts and unconstitutionality and by their refusals to contemplate the gravity of their decisionmaking before proceeding contrary to law.” Intengan additionally refers us to Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (1865). And she urges us to do justice and mercy in this case, providing numerous quotations from the Bible.

We have fully considered all of Intengan’s arguments in arriving at our disposition of her appeal. We conclude the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the third amended complaint, only in that Intengan adequately alleged a violation ofCivil Code section 2923.5, which might be pursued under her theory of wrongful foreclosure. Accordingly, the judgment of dismissal must be reversed, and the order sustaining the demurrer to the [25] third amended complaint must be reversed solely as to her purported cause of action for wrongful foreclosure, based exclusively on the alleged violation ofCivil Code section 2923.5, potentially providing relief only in the form of a postponement of the foreclosure sale.

B., C.*

III. DISPOSITIONThe judgment of dismissal is reversed. The order sustaining the demurrer is reversed, solely as to a cause of action for wrongful foreclosure based on allegations that respondents did not comply withCivil Code section 2923.5. Appellant shall recover her costs on appeal.

Jones, P. J., andBruiniers, J., concurred.

Must contact 2923.5

Barrionuevov.Chase Bank, N.A., 885 F. Supp. 2d 964 (Copy citation)

United States District Court for the Northern District of California

August 6, 2012, Decided; August 6, 2012, Filed

No. C-12-0572 EMC

Reporter: 885 F. Supp. 2d 964 | 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109935 | 2012 WL 3235953

JOSE BARRIONUEVO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CHASE BANK, N.A., et. al., Defendants.

Core Terms

notice, foreclosure, trust deed, beneficiary, chase, reconveyance, wrongful foreclosure, borrower, notice of default, mutual, cause of action, motion to dismiss, trustee sale, foreclose, default, mortgagee, deed, beneficial interest, voidable, void, subject property, nonjudicial, authorized agent, slander of title, irregularity, securitize, diligence, convey, entity, bus

Counsel: For Jose Barrionuevo, Flor Barrionuevo, Plaintiffs:Michael James Yesk, LEAD ATTORNEY, Law Offices of Michael Yesk, Pleasant Hill, CA.

For California Reconveyance Corporation, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. as acquirer of certain assets from Washington Mutual Bank, FA, Defendants:John Charles Hedger, Bryan Cave LLP, San Francisco, CA.

Judges: EDWARD M. CHEN, United States District Judge.

Opinion by: EDWARD M. CHEN

Opinion

[966] ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTSJP MORGAN CHASEBANK, N.A. AND CALIFORNIA RECONVEYANCE CO.’S MOTION TO DISMISS

(Docket No. 23)

I.INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Jose and Flor Barrionuevo (collectively “the Barrionuevos”) sued DefendantsJP Morgan ChaseBank (“Chase”) and California Reconveyance Corporation (“California Reconveyance”) on February 3, 2012, after California Reconveyance attempted to foreclose on a Deed of Trust (“DOT”) that the Barrionuevos executed for the purchase of a home in California. Pls.’ Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss (Docket No. 25) at 1. Chase is the successor in interest toWashington Mutual Bank(“Washington Mutual”), who executed the DOT with the Barrionuevos and funded the loan for the purchase of the subject property. In their amended complaint, the Barrionuevos assert claims against Defendantsfor wrongful foreclosure, slander of title, violatingCalifornia Civil Code § 2923.5, and violating California’s Unfair Business Practices Act (Cal. Bus. Prof. Code §§ 17200).SeePls.’ Am. Compl. (Docket No. 20). On February 23, 2012, the Barrionuevos movedex partefor a temporary restraining order barring Defendants from completing California’s nonjudicial foreclosure process, which this Court denied on February 29, 2012, after a hearing on the merits.SeePls.’ Mot. for TRO (Docket No. 5); Min. Entry Den. TRO (Docket No. 13). California Reconveyance and Chase thereafter filed a motion to dismiss pursuant toFed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).SeeDefs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (Docket No. 23). Having considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the instant Motion, the Court deems the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument.Fed. R. Civ. P. 78;Local Rule. 7-6. For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion isDENIED.

II.FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 28, 2006, the Barrionuevos entered into a DOT with Washington Mutual and California Reconveyance for the purchase of a single family home in Dublin, California. Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A. The DOT was recordedin Alameda County on March 3, 2006, against the subject property (known as 5931 Annadele Way) to secure a promissory note in favor of Washington Mutual for a loan of $1,720,000. Pls.’ Am. Compl. ¶ 9. The DOT conveys title and power of sale to California Reconveyance, and names Washington Mutual as both “Lender” and “Beneficiary.” Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A at 1-3. In the event of default or breach by the borrower, and after first having been given an opportunity to cure, the DOT grants to the Lender the power [967] “to require immediate payment in full of all sums secured by this security instrument without further demand,” and “the power of sale and any other remedies permitted by Applicable law.” Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A at 15.

In May of 2006, the Barrionuevos allege that Washington Mutual “securitized and sold Plaintiffs’ Deed of Trust to the WMALT Series 2006-AR4 Trust,” naming La Salle Bank as Trustee. Pls.’ Am. Compl. ¶ 10. In support of this allegation they point to a report prepared by Certified Forensic Loan Auditors, which apparently reaches the same conclusion.SeePls.’ Am. Compl., Ex. A – Property Securitization Analysis Report. In September of 2008, after the purportedsale of the Barrionuevos’ DOT, the U.S. Office of Thrift Supervision closed Washington Mutual and appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) as receiver.SeePls.’ Am. Compl. ¶ 11; Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 2. Shortly thereafter, Chase acquired certain assets of Washington Mutual from the FDIC.Id.Having been sold at an earlier point to the WMALT Series 2006-AR4 Trust, the Barrionuevos allege that any beneficial interest under their DOT could not have been purchased or obtained by Chase during this acquisition.SeePls.’ Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss at 3.

About a year later, California Reconveyance initiated nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings against the Barrionuevos regarding the subject property by recording a “Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under Deed of Trust” with the County of Alameda on April 7, 2009. Pls.’ Am. Compl., Ex. B – Notice of Default. The Notice of Default identified Washington Mutual as the beneficiary of record, and included a statement that “the beneficiary or its designated agent declares that it has contacted the borrower” or has “tried with due diligence to contact the borrower as required byCalifornia Civil Code 2923.5.”Id.at 2. TheBarrionuevos allege, contrary to this statement, that neither of the Defendants contacted Plaintiffs “at least 30 days prior to recording the Notice of Default” in violation of§ 2923.5.1SeePls.’ Am. Compl. ¶¶ 28, 32. Thereafter, California Reconveyance recorded three separate Notices of Trustee’s Sales regarding the subject property with the County of Alameda, the most recent having been filed with the County on February 2, 2012. Pls.’ Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13-14;see alsoDefs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. C, D, and E.2

The Barrionuevos initiated suit against Chase and California Reconveyance on February 3, 2012, with a complaint listing nine causes of action. Compl. (Docket No. 1). They have since filed an amended complaint listing only four causes of action, namely (1) Wrongful Foreclosure, (2) Slander of Title, (3) Violation ofCal. Civ. Code § 2923.5, [968] and (4) Violation of the California Unfair Business Practices Act (Cal. Bus. Prof. Code §§ 17200).SeePls.’ Am. Compl. Soon after Plaintiffs’ amended their complaint, Defendants jointly moved to dismiss the amended complaint “pursuant toRule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in its entirety, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Defs.’ Mot.to Dismiss at 1.

III.DISCUSSION

A.Legal Standard

UnderFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss based on the failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.SeeFed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).A motion to dismiss based onRule 12(b)(6)challenges the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged.SeeParks Sch. of Bus. v. Symington,51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995).In considering such a motion, the Court may consider facts alleged in the complaint, materials incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which the Court may take judicial notice.3Zucco Partners LLC v. Digimarc Corp.,552 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2009).A court must also take all allegations of material fact as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, although “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to avoid aRule 12(b)(6)dismissal.”Cousins v. Lockyer,568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009).Thus, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the “grounds” of his “entitle[ment]to relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007).

At issue in a12(b)(6)analysis is “not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims” advanced in his or her complaint.Scheuer v. Rhodes,416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1974). While “a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations . . . it must plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'”Cousins,568 F.3d at 1067 (9th Cir. 2009).”A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconductalleged.”Ashcroft v. Iqbal,556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009);see alsoBell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,550 U.S. at 556.”The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully.”Id.

B.Tender Rule

Chase and California Reconveyance argue as a threshold matter that “this Motion should be granted and Plaintiffs’ Complaint dismissed, in its entirety” because the Barrionuevos have failed to provide or allege a willingness to “tender the outstanding indebtedness owed under the promissory note and Deed of Trust.” Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 8.They argue that, absent an offer to tender the obligation in full, California law deprives plaintiffs of standing to challenge nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings.SeeId.at 7-8. [969] As this Court explained inTamburri v. Suntrust Mortgage, et. al.,No. C-11-2899 EMC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144442, 2011 WL 6294472 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2011), the exceptions and qualifications to California’s ‘tender rule’ counsel against such a mechanical application of the rule at the pleading stage.

“The California Court of Appeal has held that the tender rule applies in an action to set aside a trustee’s sale for irregularitiesin the sale notice or procedure and has stated that ‘[t]herationale behind the rule is that if plaintiffs could not have redeemed the property had the sale procedures been proper, any irregularities in the sale did not result in damages to the plaintiffs.'”Cohn v. Bank of America,No. 2:10-cv-00865 MCE KJN PS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3076, 2011 WL 98840, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2011)(quotingFPCI RE-HAB 01 v. E & G Invs., Ltd.,207 Cal. App.3d 1018, 1021, 255 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1989)). As Defendants rightly point out, it is a general rule that “an action to set aside a trustee’s sale for irregularities in sale notice or procedure should be accompanied by an offer to pay the full amount of the debt for which the property was security. This rule is premised upon the equitable maxim that a court of equity will not order that a useless act be performed.”Arnolds Mgmt. Corp. v. Eischen,158 Cal. App. 3d 575, 578-79, 205 Cal. Rptr. 15 (1984).

However, as this Court discussed at length inTamburri,”the tender rule is not without exceptions.”Tamburri,2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144442, 2011 WL 6294472 at *3. Several court have recognized a general equitable exception to applying the tender rule where “it would be inequitable to do so.”Onofrio v. Rice,55 Cal. App. 4th 413, 424, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 74 (1997)(internalcitations and quotations omitted);see e.g.Humboldt Sav. Bank v. McCleverty,161 Cal. 285, 291, 119 P. 82 (1911)(recognizing that there are “cases holding that, where a party has the right to avoid a sale, he is not bound to tender any payment in redemption;” adding that, “[w]hatevermay be the correct rule, viewing the question generally, it is certainly not the law that an offer to pay the debt must be made, where it would be inequitable to exact such offer of the party complaining of the sale”);Robinson v. Bank of Am.,12-CV-00494-RMW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74212, 2012 WL 1932842, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2012)(inequitable to apply tender rule in certain circumstances);Bowe v. Am. Mortg. Network, Inc.,CV 11-08381 DDP SHX, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80044, 2012 WL 2071759, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 8, 2012)(same);Giannini v. American Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc.,No. 11-04489 TEH, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12241, 2012 WL 298254, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb.1, 2012)(same).In the instant case, the Barrionuevos have a fairly strong argument that tender – or at least full tender – should not be required because they are contesting not only irregularities in sale notice or procedure, but the validity of the foreclosure in the first place.Courts have declined to require tender in just such circumstances.SeeIn re Salazar,448 B.R. 814, 819 (S.D. Cal. 2011)(“If U.S. Bank was not authorized to foreclose the [Deed of Trust] under Civil Codesection 2932.5, the foreclosure sale may be void, and Salazar would not need to tender the full amount of the Loan to set aside the sale.”);Sacchi v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.,No. CV 11-1658 AHM (CWx), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68007, 2011 WL 2533029, at *9-10 (C.D. Cal. June 24, 2011)(declining to require tender in wrongful foreclosure action because it “would permit entities to foreclose on properties with impunity”).

Further, a growing number of federal courts have explicitly held that the tender rule only applies in cases seeking to set aside a completed sale, rather than an action seeking to prevent a sale in the first place.See, e.g.,Vissuet v. Indymac Mortg. Services,No. 09-CV-2321-IEG (CAB), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26241, 2010 WL 1031013, at *2 (S.D. Cal. March 19, 2010)(“[T]heCalifornia ‘tender [970] rule’ applies only where the plaintiff is trying to set aside a foreclosure sale due to some irregularity.”);Giannini v. American Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc.,No. 11-04489 TEH, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12241, 2012 WL 298254, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Feb. 1, 2012)(“While it is sensible to require tender following a flawedsale – where irregularities in the sale are harmless unless the borrower has made full tender – to do so prior to sale, where any harm may yet be preventable, is not.”);Robinson v. Bank of Am.,12-CV-00494-RMW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74212, 2012 WL 1932842 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2012)(the court found it “inequitable to apply the tender rule to bar plaintiff’s claims” in part because “there has been no sale of the subject property”).4The cases cited by Defendants in support of applying the tender rule are distinguishable in that each of them addresses challenges levied against completed trustees’ sales, not pre-sale challenges as here.SeeU.S. Cold Storage of Calif. v. Great W. Savings & Loan Assn.,165 Cal. App. 3d 1214, 212 Cal. Rptr. 232 (1985)(plaintiff challenged irregularities in sale notice or procedure after trustee sale was held);Arnolds Mgmt. Corp. v. Eischen,158 Cal. App. 3d 575, 205 Cal. Rptr. 15 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)(action by junior lienor to set aside a completed trustee sale);Abdallah v. United Sav. Bank,43 Cal. App. 4th 1101, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 286 (1996)(action challenging validity of trustee sale after sale occurred);Karlsen v. Am. Sav. & Loan Assn.,15 Cal. App. 3d 112, 92 Cal. Rptr. 851 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971)(action to cancel a completed trustee sale under a deed oftrust).

Finally, as this Court explained in length inTamburri,”where a sale is void, rather than simply voidable, tender is not required.”Tamburri,2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144442, 2011 WL 6294472 at *4(citing Miller & Starr California Real Estate 3d § 10:212 (“When the sale is totally void, a tender usually is not required.”)).A sale that is deemed “void” means, “in its strictest sense [] that [it] has no force and effect,” whereas one that is deemed “voidable” can be “avoided” or set aside as a matter of equity.Little v. CFS Serv. Corp.,188 Cal. App. 3d 1354, 1358, 233 Cal. Rptr. 923 (1987)(internal quotation marks omitted).In a voidable sale, tender is required “based on the theory that one who is relying upon equity in overcoming a voidable sale must show that he is able to performhis obligations under the contract so that equity will not have been employed for an idle purpose.”Dimock v. Emerald Properties LLC,81 Cal. App. 4th 868, 878, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 255 [971] (2000).That reasoning does not extend to a sale that is voidab initio,since the contract underlying such a transaction is a “nullity with no force or effect as opposed to one which may be set aside” in reliance on equity.Id.at 876.InDimock,the California Court of Appeal held that where an incorrect trustee had foreclosed on a property and conveyed it to a third party, and the conveyed deed was not merely voidable but void, tender was not required.Id.at 878(“Because Dimock was not required to rely upon equity in attacking the deed, he was not required to meet any of the burdens imposed when, as a matter of equity, a party wishes to set aside a voidable deed…In particular, contrary to the defendants’ argument, he was not required to tender any of the amounts due under the note.”).For the purposes of the ‘tender rule,’ the Court findsDimockto be sufficiently analogous to the present case to counsel against its application here.

Moreover, the relevant documentation in this case supports the finding that the sale isvoid. Where a notice defect provides the basis for challenging a sale under a deed of trust, as is the case here with the Barrionuevos’ allegation of noncompliance withCal. Civ. Code § 2923.5, California courts examine in detail the deed of trust’s language to determine whether it contains “conclusive presumption language in the deed” regarding notice defects that would render the sale merely voidable as opposed to void.Little,at 1359.As was explained inTamburri,

when a notice defect is at issue, it is not the extent of the defect that is determinative.Rather, “what seems to be determinative” is whether the deed of trust contains a provision providing for a conclusive presumption of regularity of sale.Little,188 Cal. App. 3d at 1359, 233 Cal. Rptr. 923.”Where there has been a notice defect and no conclusive presumption language in the deed, the sale has been held void.”Id.(emphasis in original). In contrast, “[w]herethere has been a notice defect and conclusive presumption language in a deed, courts have characterized the sales as ‘voidable.'”Id.(emphasis added).

Tamburri,2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144442, 2011 WL 6294472 at *5.InLittle,the court considered a deed provision stating “[t]herecitals insuch Deed of any matters, proceedings and facts shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness and regularity thereof” to be conclusive presumption language.Little,at 1360.In this case, the Barrionuevos’ deed of trust provides no such conclusive presumption language. Therefore, “the Court cannot conclude, at least at this juncture, that the sale is merely voidable wherein tender would be required.”Ottolini v. Bank of America,No. C-11-0477 EMC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92900, 2011 WL 3652501, at *4 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 19, 2011);see alsoTamburri,2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144442, 2011 WL 6294472 at *5.

These exceptions and qualifications to the tender rule raise significant doubts as to whether it should be mechanically applied at the pleading stage under the allegations of the complaint herein. Thus, as inTamburri,the Court declines to dismiss the complaint on the basis of the Barrionuevos’ failure to allege tender.

C.Wrongful Foreclosure

The Barrionuevos’ cause of action for wrongful foreclosure is based upon their belief that “Cal Reconveyance cannot conduct a valid foreclosure sale on behalf of Defendant JP Morgan because it is not thetruepresent beneficiary under Plaintiffs’ Deed of Trust.” Pls.’ Am. Compl. ¶ 18. This belief is based upon thefollowing chain of events:

In May of 2006, shortly after Plaintiffs entered into the Deed of Trust, WaMu [Washington Mutual] securitized and sold the beneficial interest in the Deed [972] of Trust to the Series 2006-AR4 Trust. From that point on, the Series 2006-AR4 Trust became the onlytruebeneficiary under Plaintiffs’ Deed of Trust. Thus, whenJP Morgan [Chase]acceded to certain of WaMu’s assets in 2008, it could not have included the beneficial interest in Plaintiffs’ Deed of Trust as WaMu had already sold the beneficial interest two yearsprior,in 2006. Since WaMu no longer owned the beneficial interest in Plaintiffs’ Deed of Trust, it had nothing to convey to Defendant JP Morgan in 2008 and Defendant JP Morgan isnotthetruebeneficiary.Id.

Related to the allegation that Chase did not acquire Plaintiffs’ DOT from Washington Mutual, the Barrionuevos further base their wrongful foreclosure claim on the grounds that the Defendants have failed to comply withCalifornia Civil Code § 2932.5, in that they have not “recorded a document in the public chain of title reflecting from whom [they] acquired the beneficial interest in Plaintiffs’ Deed of Trust,” as required by the statute.Id.at 21.Section 2932.5provides as follows:

Where a power to sell real property is given to a mortgagee, or other encumbrancer, in an instrument intended to secure the payment of money, the power is part of the security and vests in any person who by assignment becomes entitled to payment of the money secured by the instrument.The power of sale may be exercised by the assignee if the assignment is acknowledged and recorded.

Cal. Civ. Code § 2932.5(emphasis added).

Chase and California Reconveyance question Plaintiffs’ assertion that the DOT for the subject property was securitized into the Series 2006-AR4 Trust.SeeDefs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 5 (“A careful analysis of the information provided in the prospectus for which the “Property securitization Analysis Report” provides a website address demonstrates the Loan at issue is not part of the WMALT Series 2006-AR4 Trust.”);see alsoDefs.’ Reply Br. ISO Mot. to Dismiss (Docket 26) at p. 2 (“As shown in the analysis of Defendant’s motion, there is no connection between the prospectus for the Series 2006-AR4 Trust and the Plaintiffs’ mortgage loan. There was no securitization.”). Neither the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, the Plaintiff’s ResponseBrief, nor the Defendant’s Reply Brief address the§ 2932.5element of the Barrionuevos’ wrongful foreclosure cause of action. The Court will, therefore, confine its analysis of the wrongful foreclosure claim to the Plaintiff’s argument that the Defendants are not the current beneficiaries under the DOT.

Plaintiffs properly assert that only the “true owner” or “beneficial holder” of a Deed of Trust can bring to completion a nonjudicial foreclosure under California law. Pls.’ Response Brief at 4.In California, a “deed of trust containing a power of sale…conveys nominal title to property to an intermediary, the “trustee,” who holds that title as security for repayment of [a] loan to [a] lender, or “beneficiary.”Kachlon v. Markowitz,168 Cal. App. 4th 316, 334, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532 (2008)(internal citations omitted). The “trustee in nonjudicial foreclosure is not a true trustee with fiduciary duties, but rather a common agent for the trustor5and beneficiary.”Id.335(internal citations omitted).The trustee’s duties “are twofold: (1) to “reconvey” the deed of trust to the trustor upon satisfaction of the debt owed to the beneficiary, resulting in a release of the lien created by [973] the deed of trust, or(2) to initiate nonjudicial foreclosure on the property upon the trustor’s default, resulting in a sale of the property.”Id.at 334(internal citations omitted).The beneficiary, ultimately, is the party that initiates nonjudicial foreclosure, since the trustee who records a Notice of Default pursuant toCal. Civ. Code § 2924does so as the authorized agent of beneficiary.SeeCal. Civ. Code § 2924(a)(1);see alsoKachlon,168 Cal. App. 4th at 334(“When the trustor defaults on the debt secured by the deed of trust,the beneficiarymay declare a default and make a demand on the trustee to commence foreclosure.”) (emphasis added).

Several courts have recognized the existence of a valid cause of action for wrongful foreclosure where a party alleged not to be the true beneficiary instructs a trustee to file a Notice of Default and initiate nonjudicial foreclosure.For example, the court inSacchi v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.,No. CV 11-1658 AHM (CWx), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68007, 2011 WL 2533029, at *9-10 (C.D. Cal. June 24, 2011), upheld a plaintiff’s wrongful foreclosure claimagainst an entity alleged to have “no beneficial interest in the Deed of Trust when it acted to foreclose on Plaintiffs’ home.” There, the court expressed dismay when confronted with counsel’s arguments suggesting that “someone . . . can seek and obtain foreclosure regardless of whether he has established the authority to do so.”2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68007, [WL] at *7. The court asked, if defendants’ argument that “the recording and execution date is inconsequential and in no way connotes that the DOT’s beneficial interest was transferred at that precise time” was accepted, “how is one to determine whether (and when) the purported assignment was consummated?How could one ever confirm whether the entity seeking to throw a homeowner out of his residence had the legal authority to do so?”2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68007, [WL] at *6.

Similarly, inJavaheri v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,CV10-08185 ODW FFMX, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62152, 2011 WL 2173786, at *5-6 (C.D. Cal. June 2, 2011), the court denied Defendant JPMorgan’s motion to dismiss a very similar wrongful foreclosure claim to the one at issue here when the plaintiff alleged that Washington Mutual, plaintiff’s original lender, had “transferred Plaintiff’s Note to Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corporation” priorto its closure by the U.S. Office of Thrift Supervision and JPMorgan’s subsequent acquisition of its assets.2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62152, [WL] at *5. The court took note of the fact that the plaintiff had produced specific “facts regarding the transfer of Plaintiff’s Note” suggesting that Washington Mutual had indeed alienated its beneficial interest to plaintiff’s deed of trust prior to JPMorgan’s later acquisition of Washington Mutual’s assets.Id.”Coupled with Plaintiff’s allegation that JPMorgan never properly recorded its claim of ownership in the Subject Property,” the court ruled that the “abovementioned facts regarding the transfer of Plaintiff’s Note prior to JPMorgan’s acquisition of [Washington Mutual]’s assets raise Plaintiff’s right to relief above a speculative level,” and held that plaintiff’s allegation “that JPMorgan did not own his Note and therefore did not have the right to foreclose” was sufficient to withstand JPMorgan’s motion to dismiss.2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62152, [WL] at *5-6.

Likewise inOhlendorf v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing,279 F.R.D. 575, 583 (E.D. Cal. 2010), the court recognized that, while “proof of possession of the note” is not necessary to “legally institute non-judicial foreclosure proceedings againstplaintiff,” the plaintiff still had a viable claim for wrongful foreclosure insofar as he argued that defendants “are not the proper parties to foreclose.”Id.at 583. “Accordingly,” the court denied “defendants motion to dismiss plaintiff’s wrongful foreclosure [claim]…insofar as it is premised [974] on defendants being proper beneficiaries.”Id.Finally, inCastillo v. Skoba,No. 10cv1838 BTM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108432, 2010 WL 3986953, at*2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2010), the court granted a preliminary injunction in a foreclosure case where it concluded that “Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim that neither Aurora nor Cal-Western had authority to initiate the foreclosure sale at the time the Notice of Default was entered.” There, the court ruled on the record before it that the applicable “[d]ocumentsdo not support a finding that either Cal-Western was the trustee or Aurora was the beneficiary on May 20, 2010 when the Notice of Default was recorded.”Id. See alsoRobinson v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,199 Cal. App. 4th 42, 46 Fn. 5, 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 811 (2011)(“a borrower who believes that the foreclosing entity lacks standing to do so” is not “without a remedy. The borrower can seek to enjoin the trustee’s saleor to set the sale aside.”);Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,192 Cal. App. 4th 1149, 1156, 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d 819 (2011)(upholding the dismissal of plaintiff’s wrongful foreclosure action, but noting as “significant” the fact that cases cited by plaintiff permitting wrongful foreclosure action “identified aspecific factual basisfor alleging that the foreclosure was not initiated by the correct party.[plaintiff] has not assertedanyfactual basis to suspect that [defendant] lacks authority to proceed with the foreclosure.”) (emphasis in original).

In the present case, the Barrionuevos allege that Chase and California Reconveyance recorded their April 7, 2009, Notice of Default without the legal right to do so, given that the prior alienation of Plaintiff’s DOT by Washington Mutual in 2006 precluded these Defendants from obtaining any beneficial interest in the DOT.SeeAm. Compl. ¶¶ 16-22; Pls.’ Response Brief at 3. In tandem to their § 2935.2 claim, Plaintiffs allege that this prior alienation of the DOT renders Defendants’ Notice of Default and subsequent Notices of Trustee’s Sales invalid. The allegation challenging the validity of Washington Mutual’s assignment of Plaintiffs’ DOT to Chase suggeststhat the foreclosing parties did not have authority to issue the Notices. Despite Defendants’ invitation to the contrary, further examination into the 2006 transaction would require a factual inquiry not suitable in a 12(b)(6) motion. Thus, insofar as Plaintiffs contend that the Notice of Default is invalid due to a lack of authority to foreclose, their wrongful foreclosure claim is similar to those advanced inSacchi, Javaheri, Ohlendorf, Skoba,and, of course, this Court’s ruling inTamburri.

Accordingly, this Court finds that the Plaintiffs have sufficiently stated a claim for wrongful foreclosure. Regardless of whether§ 2932.5applies, under California law a party may not foreclose without the legal power to do so. Plaintiff alleges that the wrong parties issued the Notice of Default. At the12(b)(6)stage, given the factual uncertainties underlying the parties’ arguments, Plaintiffs’ claim is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.

D.Slander of Title

The Barrionuevos next advance a cause of action for slander of title. In their amended complaint, they allege that Chase “acted with malice and a reckless disregard for the truth by simply assuming it was the beneficiary underPlaintiffs’ Deed of Trust” when it recorded a “Notice of Trustee’s Sale…that cannot lead to a valid foreclosure.” Am. Compl. ¶ 24. They further allege that “the recordation of the February 2, 2012 Notice of Trustee’s Sale was therefore false, knowingly wrongful, without justification, in violation of statute, unprivileged, and caused doubt to be placed on Plaintiffs’ title to the property,” and that the “recordation of the [975] foregoing documents directly impairs the vendibility of Plaintiffs’ property on the open market in the amount of a sum to be proved at trial.”Id.¶ 25. Neither Plaintiffs nor Defendants address this cause of action in any of the papers accompanying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

The California Court of Appeals for the Fifth District recently outlined the elements required to successfully bring a cause of action for slander of title. InSumner Hill Homeowners’ Assn., Inc. v. Rio Mesa Holdings, LLC,the court explained that “slander or disparagement of title occurs when a person, without a privilege to do so, publishes a false statement that disparages title to property and causes the owner thereof some special pecuniary loss or damage.”205 Cal. App. 4th 999, 1030, 141 Cal. Rptr. 3d 109(citingFearon v. Fodera169 Cal. 370, 148 P. 200 (1915)). The required elements of this tort are “(1) a publication, (2) without privilege or justification, (3) falsity, and (4) direct pecuniary loss.”Id.(citingTruck Ins. Exchange v. Bennett,53 Cal.App.4th 75, 84, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 497 (1997);Howard v. Schaniel,113 Cal.App.3d 256, 263-264, 169 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1980)).

The Barrionuevos’ amended complaint is sufficient to “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face'”with regard to this tort.Cousins,568 F.3d at 1067 (9th Cir. 2009).Plaintiffs allege, and Defendants do not appear to question, that they effected a publication regarding Plaintiffs title to the subject property (i.e.the Notice of Default and the three Notices of Trustee’s Sales).Whether that publication was done “without privilege or justification” is somewhat harder to discern.InGudger v. Manton,the California Supreme Court held that “a rival claimant of property is conditionally privileged to disparage or justified in disparaging another’s property in land by an honest and good-faith assertion of an inconsistent legally protected interest in himself.”21 Cal. 2d 537, 545, 134 P.2d 217 (1943).TheGudgerCourt went on to say that an “express finding of lack of goodfaith, or of actual malice…would destroy the privilege or justification here discussed.”Id.at 546.Plaintiffs allege quite clearly that Defendants published the February 2, 2012, Notice of Trustee’s sale with “malice and a reckless disregard for the truth.” Am. Compl. ¶ 24. Broadly construing their amended complaint, it would be fair to conclude that Plaintiffs view the remaining three Notices published by Chase and California Reconveyance in a similar light. Thus, on balance, Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to satisfy this element of the tort at the12(b)(6)stage. Likewise, Plaintiffs allege with some force the apparent falsity of Defendants’ four publications.Finally, the Barrionuevos claim that Defendants’ publications “directlyimpair[ed]the vendibility of Plaintiffs’ property on the open market,” and caused Plaintiffs to incur costs related to bringing “this action to cancel the instruments casting doubt on Plaintiffs’ title,” is sufficient to allege the “direct pecuniary loss” element to a slander of title action.Id.at ¶¶ 25-26.See alsoSumner Hill,205 Cal. App. 4th at 1030(“it is well-established that attorney fees and litigation costs are recoverable aspecuniary damages in slander of title causes of action.”).

Accordingly, to the extent Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss reaches Plaintiffs’ action for slander of title, Plaintiffs have met their burden to plead sufficient “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”Ashcroft v. Iqbal,129 S. Ct. at 1949.

E.California Civil Code § 2923.5

California Civil Code § 2923.5(a)(1)provides that “[a] mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, [976] or authorized agent may not file a notice of default pursuant toSection 2924until 30 daysafterinitial contact is made as required by paragraph (2) or 30 daysaftersatisfying the due diligence requirements as described in subdivision (g).”Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.5(a)(1)(emphasis added).Underparagraph (2), “[a] mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall contact the borrower in person or by telephone in order to assess the borrower’s financial situation and explore options for the borrower to avoid foreclosure.”Id.§ 2923.5(a)(2). Undersubdivision (g), “[a] notice of default may be filed . . . when a mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent hasnotcontacted a borroweras required by paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) provided that the failure to contact borrower occurred despite the due diligence of the mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent.”Id.§ 2923.5(g)(emphasis added). If a mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent fails to comply with§ 2923.5, “then there is no valid notice of default and, without a valid notice of default, a foreclosure sale cannot proceed.”Mabry v. Superior Court,185 Cal. App. 4th 208, 223, 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 201 (2010).The only remedy for a violation of this section is “to postpone the sale until there has been compliance withsection 2923.5.”Id.(citingCal. Civ. Code § 2924g, subdivision (c)(1)(A)).

In the instant case, the Barrionuevos assert that Chase and California Reconveyance violated§ 2923.5(a)(1)because they failed to contact them prior to filing the notice of default on April 7, 2009. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 28, 32. Despite the fact that the Defendants’ Notice of Default included a statement that “the beneficiary or its designated agent declares that it has contacted the borrower” or has “tried with due diligence to contact the borrower as required byCalifornia Civil Code 2923.5,” Plaintiffs assert that they were, in fact, “nevercontacted.” Am. Compl., Ex. B – Notice of Default; Am. Compl. ¶ 28. Defendants initially argue that the Barrionuevos fail to state a claim under this cause of action because they offer “no specified factual support” for their allegations. Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 9. However, their Reply Brief offers a very different assessment:

Plaintiffs could not be clearer; “Plaintiffs allege that the Declaration is false because Plaintiffs werein factnever contacted.” (Plaintiffs’ opposition,p. 6, ln 21-23). Plaintiffs therefore claim that Defendant never called, never left a voice message, and never knocked on their door to discuss their default on the loan before having the NOD [Notice of Default] recorded. Plaintiffs’ allegation also means that Defendant never offered them a trial loan modification payment plan or even offered to evaluate them for a loan modification before recording the NOD.

Defs.’ Reply Brief at 3 (emphasis in original). Defendants nonetheless contends that “[w]henthe foreclosing entity declares that it tried to contact the borrower, the statutory requirements are satisfied.Id..Defendants are mistaken.

A mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent has satisfied the “duediligence” requirement of§ 2923.5:

if it was not able to contact the borrower after (1) mailing a letter containing certain information; (2) then calling the borrower “by telephone at least three times at different hours and on different days”; (3) mailing a certified letter, with return receipt requested, if the borrower does not call back within two weeks; (4) providing a telephone number to a live representative during business hours; and (5) posting a link on the homepage of its Internet Web site with certain information.

Argueta v. J.P. Morgan Chase,787 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1107 (E.D. Cal. 2011)(citing [977] Cal. Civ. Code. § 2923.5(g)).Defendants have given no indication that they exercised “due diligence” as defined in the statute in trying to contact the Barrionuevos prior to recording the Notice of Default, other than their declaration in the Notice itself that they complied with the statute. When a plaintiff’s allegations dispute the validity of defendant’s declaration of compliance in a Notice of Default as here, the plaintiff has “plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'”Cousins,568 F.3d at 1067 (9th Cir. 2009).SeeArgueta,787 F. Supp. 2d at 1107;Caravantes v. California Reconveyance Co.,10CV1407, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109842, 2010 WL 4055560 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2010).Accordingly, Plaintiff’s allegations of non-compliance are sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.

F.Unfair Business Practices Act

California’s Unfair Business Practices Act, codified asCal. Bus. Prof. Code §§ 17200, prohibits unfair competition, which is defined as,inter alia,”any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.”Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Plaintiffs asserts claims under§ 17200for Chase and California Reconveyance’s violation ofCal Civ. Code § 2923.5, and openly acknowledge that their§ 17200claim “is a derivative cause of action.” Pls.’ Response Brief at 7. They also acknowledge that “plaintiffs’ ability to pursue this cause of action depends on the success or failure of their substantive causes of action.”Id.

Defendants challenge the§ 17200claim on the basis that “a violation [ofCal Civ. Code § 2923.5] does not impact plaintiffs with an actual loss of money or property to give standing underCal. B&P § 17200.” Defs.’ Reply Brief at 3. However, “[i]tis undisputed that foreclosure proceedings were initiated which put [the Barrionuevos] interestin the property in jeopardy; this fact is sufficient to establish standing as this Court has previously held.”Clemens v. J.P. Morgan Chase Nat’l Corporate Services, Inc.,No. C-09-3365 EMC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111646, 2009 WL 4507742, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2009)(citingSullivan v. Washington Mut. Bank, FA,No. C-09-2161 EMC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104074, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2009).See alsoSacchi,2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68007, 2011 WL 2533029 at *8-9(refusing to dismiss underFRCP 12(b)(6)plaintiff’ssection 17200claim, in part, because plaintiff alleged a violation ofCal Civ. Code § 2923.5).

Second, Defendants repeat their argument that Plaintiffs have “failed to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate that defendants violatedSection 2923.5” Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 9-10. “A plaintiff alleging unfair business practices under [17200] must state with reasonable particularity the facts supporting the statutory elements of the violation.”Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc.,14 Cal. App. 4th 612, 619, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 708 (1993). As a derivative claim based upon defendants’ alleged failure to comply withCal Civ. Code § 2923.5, the Barrionuevos’§ 17200claim rises and falls along with that underlying cause of action.Having already determined thatPlaintiffs’§ 2923.5claim was pled with enough specificity and factual support to withstand Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the Court finds Plaintiffs’§17200claim is likewise sufficiently pled underRule 12(b)(6).

IV.CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the CourtDENIESDefendants’ motion to dismiss.

This Order disposes of Docket No. 23.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 6, 2012

Attorney General Kamala D. Harris Announces $1 Million Grant to Benefit California Homeowners

From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Thursday, March 28, 2013 1:35 PM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: Attorney General Kamala D. Harris Announces $1 Million Grant to Benefit California Homeowners

State of California Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General Kamala D. Harris
News Release

March 28, 2013

For Immediate Release
(415) 703-5837

Social Networks
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Print Version

Attorney General Kamala D. Harris Announces $1 Million Grant to Benefit California Homeowners

SAN FRANCISCO — Attorney General Kamala D. Harris today announced a $1 million California Homeowner Bill of Rights implementation grant to The National Housing Law Project.

“Californians were hit hard by the mortgage crisis and many people are still struggling to stay in their homes,” Attorney General Harris said. “The California Homeowner Bill of Rights gives borrowers more opportunities to stay in their homes, and this grant will help make sure the law is applied across the state and that everyone gets the protection they are entitled to.”

The California Homeowner Bill of Rights (HBOR) is a set of landmark laws that extend key mortgage and foreclosure protections to California homeowners and borrowers. The laws, which took effect at the beginning of this year, restrict dual-track foreclosures, guarantee struggling homeowners a reliable point of contact at their lender, impose civil penalties on fraudulently signed mortgage documents and require loan servicers to document their right to foreclose.

This grant will maximize consumer benefits from the HBOR, while minimizing abuses of the law by providing training to California consumer and housing attorneys from both private and non-profit firms.

The National Housing Law Project will partner with Western Center on Law and Poverty, National Consumer Law Center and Tenants Together to implement this grant.

The National Housing Law Project and its partners will use the grant to:

  • Provide high-quality, on-site trainings and webinars to consumer and housing attorneys on how to maximize the HBOR’s protections.
  • Train more than 800 lawyers.
  • Provide support in cases that raise important legal issues or have potential for broad impact.
  • Create a library of litigation materials to help attorneys maximize the HBOR’s benefits.
  • Produce a report that analyzes the HBOR’s statewide impact and identifies compliance problems.

Funds provided through this grant were secured by Attorney General Harris through the $18 billion National Mortgage Settlement.

Established in 1968, The National Housing Law Project seeks to advance housing justice by advocating for affordable housing, litigating to uphold homeowners’ and tenants’ rights and offering technical assistance to legal aid attorneys who work with low-income families.

The State Bar has partnered with the Attorney General’s Office to administer the grant and monitor compliance. The National Housing Law Project will provide quarterly financial and program reports to the State Bar and the Attorney General’s Office.

# # #

You may view the full account of this posting, including possible attachments, in the News & Alerts section of our website at: http://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-kamala-d-harris-announces-1-million-grant-benefit-california

© 2013 Department of Justice

Using the Four-Letter Word “Note” in Court May Cost You

Show me the Note

From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Friday, March 29, 2013 8:29 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: Using the Four-Letter Word "Note" in Court May Cost You

Good article by Bill.

Charles
Charles Wayne Cox
Email: mailto:Charles
Websites: www.BayLiving.com; www.FdnPro.com and www.ForensicLoanAnalyst.com
1969 Camellia Ave.
Medford, OR 97504-5403
(541) 727-2240 direct
(541) 610-1931 eFax

Paralegal; Litigation Support and Expert Witness Services; Forensic Loan Analyst; CA Licensed Real Estate Broker.

beware-article-by-bill-butler.pdf

Results of some legal research for an appellate case I’m working on – California case law Headnotes

From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Friday, March 29, 2013 11:41 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: Results of some legal research for an appellate case I’m working on – California case law Headnotes

Those of you getting hit with the standard BS about CCP 2924 being a “comprehensive statutory scheme” might find this quote interesting and useful in your litigations:

“The mere existence of a comprehensive statutory scheme does not necessarily eliminate all further remedies without the consideration of the relevant policy concerns. Indeed, California courts have repeatedly allowed parties to pursue additional remedies for misconduct arising out of a nonjudicial foreclosure sale when not inconsistent with the policies behind the statutes.” Pfeifer v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 211 Cal. App. 4th 1250 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 2012)

And

“The rights and powers of trustees in nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings have long been regarded as strictly limited and defined by the contract of the parties and the statutes. The fact that a borrower is in arrears does not allow the trustee to circumvent the conditions precedent to foreclosure. Indeed, the conditions precedent in the deed of trust that govern the accrual of the trustee’s latent power to foreclose do not become relevant until the borrower has first breached the deed of trust in some way. Therefore, prohibiting the borrower who has breached from bringing an action to enforce the conditions precedent in a deed of trust would nullify such conditions. The mere fact of the borrower’s breach alone would become, de facto, the only condition precedent to foreclosure. Lenders require deeds of trust precisely because they contemplate the possibility of non-payment, and the deed of trust is a contract in which the parties have agreed that material breach of the note by nonpayment will not deprive borrowers of their rights to enforce conditions precedent.” Pfeifer, Id.

And

“A full tender must be made to set aside a foreclosure sale, based on equitable principles. Courts, however, have not required tender when the lender has not yet foreclosed and has allegedly violated laws related to avoiding the necessity for a foreclosure.” Pfeifer, Id.

“Courts have recognized various exceptions to the tender rule, including an exception based on an allegation that a foreclosure sale is void.” Pfeifer, Id.

Cal.App.4th – Partial Loss to BAC

From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Saturday, March 30, 2013 9:32 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: Cal.App.4th – Partial Loss to BAC

Judgment dismissing plaintiff’s complaint alleging defendants lacked authority to foreclose on her property is reversed as to the cause of action for wrongful foreclosure, where: 1) judicial notice could not be taken of defendants’ compliance with Civil Code section 2923.5; and 2) plaintiff’s allegations that defendants did not comply with the statute were sufficient to state a cause of action for wrongful foreclosure.

See case attached.

Charles
Charles Wayne Cox
Email: mailto:Charles
Websites: www.BayLiving.com; www.FdnPro.com and www.ForensicLoanAnalyst.com
1969 Camellia Ave.
Medford, OR 97504-5403
(541) 727-2240 direct
(541) 610-1931 eFax

Paralegal; Litigation Support and Expert Witness Services; Forensic Loan Analyst; CA Licensed Real Estate Broker.

Intenganv.BAC Home Loans Serving.docx

Strip 2nd Trust Deeds in a 7 ??

Bankruptcy Ruling Allows Homeowners to Keep their Home

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In a recent earth-shattering decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit, which includes Georgia and Florida, the Circuit Court ruled on May 11, 2012 that it is possible for a Chapter 7 Debtor to strip off a second mortgage on their home pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code. Prior to this decision, a Debtor was only allowed to strip off a second mortgage in a Chapter 13 filing.

To more fully explain the significance of this ruling, I must first give you some background on what it means to strip off a mortgage and the difference between a Chapter 7 and a Chapter 13 filing. Prior to this decision, a Debtor was only allowed to strip off a second mortgage in a Chapter 13 case. In order to strip off a second mortgage, the Debtor is required to show that the value of the house on her primary home is less than the value of the first mortgage. In the case where the first mortgage exceeds the value of the property, the second mortgage is thereby rendered totally unsecured. Traditionally, in a Chapter 13, if the Debtors desired to keep their home, they would be able to make payments of the first mortgage and stop making payments on the second as the second was totally unsecured and would be treated like other unsecured creditors such as a credit card. Upon completion of a Debtor’s Chapter 13 payments over a period from anywhere from 36 to 60 months, the Discharge would render the second mortgage removed as a lien of record, the Debtor would be relieved from that obligation, and the bank would be left to filing a Proof of Claim and receiving its pro rata share of distribution to unsecured creditors.

The reason Debtors were not allowed to strip down a second mortgage in a Chapter 7 case, was based upon the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S.Ct. 773 (1992), in which the Supreme Court ruled that a Chapter 7 Debtor could not “strip down” a partially secured lien under the Bankruptcy Code. However, in a decision prior to the Supreme Court’s decision, the 11th Circuit ruled in Felendore v. United States Small Business Administration, 862 F 2d. 1537 (11th Cir. 1989), that the claim was wholly unsecured, it was avoidable under the Bankruptcy Code. In a very narrow and precise interpretation of the Supreme Court’s decision in Dewsnup, the 11th Circuit Court in its recent decision of In re: Lorraine McNeal, concluded that since the Supreme Court’s decision in Dewsnup did not specifically address the issue where a second mortgage was wholly unsecured, its ruling was not controlling on it and that its decision in Felendore was still the binding law in the 11th Circuit.

The 11th Circuit Court stated “that the reasoning of an intervening high court decision is at odds with that of our prior decision is no basis for a panel to depart from our prior decision. As we have stated, obedience to a Supreme Court decision is one thing, extrapolating from its implications a holding on an issue that was not before that Court in order to have upend settled circuit law is another thing.”

This is a great decision for potential Chapter 7 Debtors in the future, since it will allow them the opportunity to strip off a second mortgage without having to go through the repayment process of anywhere from 36 to 60 months in a Chapter 13. Under a Chapter 7, a Debtor may receive a Discharge in as quickly as four to six months from the date of filing. This will certainly open up additional opportunities for individual to keep their homes and force second mortgage holders to be more creative in attempting to be paid prior to a bankruptcy filing. This may allow more underwater homeowners to save their homes.

Order Re Cross Motion for Summary Judgment – USDC WA

From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Tuesday, March 12, 2013 7:53 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: Order Re Cross Motion for Summary Judgment – USDC WA

Posted on March 12, 2013 by Neil Garfield

McDonald v OneWest

This case should be read more than once

When I started writing about legal defenses to foreclosures that appeared patently fraudulent to me, I thought it might only take a few months for things to catch on. About the timing I have been consistently wrong. About the substance I have been consistently right.

Here again, the party seeking foreclosure not only failed in its current effort to do so, but was ordered to pay $25,000 within 7 days for forcing the homeowner’s attorney to fight tooth and nail for items that were or should have been at their fingertips, they had no reason to withhold, and should have been anxious to supply if the foreclosure was real.

The only potential error I see in the homeowner’s case is that there appears to be an admission that Indy Mac was indeed the party who was the source of the loan — a fact which is nearly universally presumed and virtually always wrong in today’s foreclosures. Not knowing the actual facts of the case I can only speculate that this was an oversight, but it is possible that it wasn’t an oversight and that Indy Mac did in fact make the loan, booked it as a loan receivable, and then sold it into the secondary market for securitization.

There are several very important issues discussed rationally and without bias in this very well-written decision:

  1. Dates DO Matter: If the authorization to sign something is received after the signature is executed it isn’t any good. Lying about it and then fabricating documents to cover up the first lie are grounds for sanctions.
  2. Allegations of holder status are no substitute for facts and evidence. The supposed right to request it is not the same as holding, possessing or owning the note. Execution and recording of substitution of trustee, notice of default, notice of sale are all void if the party stated as the holder is not the holder.
  3. Ownership counts, which means that in order to submit a credit bid at a foreclosure action, the books and records of all the relevant parties must be open to inspection and review to determine what balance, if any, exists, on the records of the owner of the debt — i.e., the party who would actually lose money if the loan was not paid, and the amount of the principal and accrued interest due, if any, after deductions for all receipts.
  4. Agency either exists or it doesn’t. And the paramount element of agency is control by the principal of the agent. There is, however, contractual obligations that come into play here. So if the investment bank received payments to mitigate damages on loans it either did so as agent for the investor or because they were contractually bound to do so as a vendor thus reducing the balance due on the bond. Either way, the balance due is reduced as to that creditor. It might be shifted to the party who paid who in turn might have a right of contribution unless they waived that right (which the insurance companies and CDS counterparts did in fact waive), but either way the new debt is no secured unless there was a purchase of the loan.
  5. Rules of Civil Procedure do matter and are “not optional.” If discovery requests, qualified written requests, debt validation letters are sent, answers are expected and due. The fact that the QWR is long does not mean it is invalid.
  6. Damages are possible, but you need to plead and prove them and that pretty much goes to whether these parties ever had any right to collect any money or enforce any note or any debt or enforce any mortgage against the homeowner. If the answer is yes, that if they get their act together, they can foreclose, there will likely be no damages. If the answer is no, which more likely than not is the case in current foreclosures, then damages properly pleaded and proven are easily sustained.
  7. Discovery is not a toy. The answer or the production is due.
  8. Hearsay is inadmissible and the business records exception, as stated by dozens of courts before this one, where the witness or declarant testified for “defendants chose to offer up what can only be described as a “Rule 30(b)(6) declarant” who regurgitated information provided by other sources” then we are taking hearsay and turning it into evidence without any personal knowledge or testing of the truth of the matter asserted.
  9. Judges are not stupid. They know a lie when they hear it. But what happens after that depends upon the trial experience and knowledge of the lawyer. Don’t expect the Judge to go into orbit and give you everything just because he found that the other side lied. You still have a case to prove.

McDonald v Onewest Bank.pdf
McDonald ROA.pdf
McDonald v Onewest Bank MSJ.pdf
McDonald v Onewest Bank Cross-MSJ.pdf

The Latest from The UCL Practitioner by Kimberly A. Kralowec

From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Friday, March 22, 2013 6:13 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: The Latest from The UCL Practitioner by Kimberly A. Kralowec

New UCL "unfair" prong opinion: West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

Posted: 22 Mar 2013 05:00 AM PDT

In West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., ___ Cal.App.4th ___ (Mar. 18, 2013), the Court of Appeal (Fourth Appellate District, Division Three) summarized the three-way split in authority on "unfair" conduct in UCL consumer actions:

Several definitions of “unfair” under the UCL have been formulated. They are:

1. “An act or practice is unfair if the consumer injury is substantial, is not outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition, and is not an injury the consumers themselves could reasonably have avoided.” (Daugherty v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 824, 839.)

2. “‘[A]n “unfair” business practice occurs when that practice “offends an established public policy or when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Smith v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 700, 719.)

3. An unfair business practice means “‘the public policy which is a predicate to the action must be “tethered” to specific constitutional, statutory or regulatory provisions.’” (Scripps Clinic v. Superior Court (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 917, 940.)

Slip op. at 28. The Court held that the plaintiff’s complaint adequately alleged that the defendant "engaged in unfair business practices under any of the three definitions," and that the trial court had improperly sustained the defendant’s demurrer to the UCL cause of action. Id. at 29.

West v JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A..doc

Re Fraud Exception to Parol Evidence Rule

From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Monday, February 25, 2013 5:21 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: Re Fraud Exception to Parol Evidence Rule

Lenders beware

Reed Smith LLP
Peter S. Clark, II and Marsha A. Houston
February 18 2013

A new troubling case from California allows borrowers to present evidence of prior oral statements of a lender which contradict the terms of the written agreement between the parties with a standard integration clause. Marsha Houston of our Los Angeles office writes more about the case below.

On January 14 2013, the California Supreme Court overturned a rule that lenders and parties to contracts have long relied upon to prohibit the admission of parol evidence of terms outside the four corners of the agreement. In Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Production Credit Association, No. S190518, 2013 Cal. LEXIS 253 (Cal. Jan. 14, 2013), Riverisland Cold Storage (and related borrowers and guarantors) defaulted on a loan provided by Fresno-Madera PCA in 2007. On March 26 2007, the parties entered into a written forbearance agreement with a standard integration clause that provided that the lender would forbear from collection efforts until July 1 2007 in exchange for the borrowers’ pledge of eight parcels of additional real estate to secure the loan. Thereafter, the borrowers defaulted under the forbearance agreement and the lender began foreclosure proceedings. Although the borrowers repaid the loan in full and the foreclosure proceedings were dismissed, the borrowers and guarantors filed suit against the lender, seeking damages for fraud and negligent misrepresentation, and including causes of action for rescission and reformation of the forbearance agreement.

Plaintiffs alleged that they met with the lender’s senior vice-president, who represented to them that the lender would forbear from collection for two years and would require the pledge of only two parcels of real estate in connection with the forbearance agreement. Plaintiffs acknowledged that they signed the agreement (and presumably eight separate deeds of trust), and claimed that they did not read it, relying instead upon the representations of the lender’s representative.

The lender successfully moved for summary judgment, alleging that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the parol evidence rule from presenting evidence of prior oral agreements which contradicted the terms of the written agreement. Plaintiffs asserted that this was consistent with the 70-year-old decision of the California Supreme Court in Pendergrass, which held that a “fraud exception” to the parol evidence rule could not be asserted to prove a fraudulent oral promise that directly contradicted the written terms of the agreement. Plaintiffs won on appeal when the California Court of Appeals held that the fraud at issue was a misrepresentation of fact, not a fraudulent promise (a distinction recognized in Pendergrass and its progeny).

The California Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court and overturned its own decision in Pendergrass, finding that the decision was confusing, difficult to apply and did not account for the principle that fraud undermines the very validity of the parties’ agreement and that when fraud is proven, it cannot be held that the parties had a meeting of the minds.

For decades, lenders have relied upon Pendergrass and integration clauses in agreements to protect them against claims by borrowers of fraudulent misrepresentations by loan officers. Apparently, lenders and contracting parties will no longer be able to rely upon this defense in California. While one cannot prevent a party from asserting fraudulent misrepresentation, and it is not clear exactly what precautions might convince the courts to exclude parol evidence, we recommend: insisting that borrowers and guarantors have counsel review the documents; providing a separate document acknowledging that borrowers and guarantors were represented by counsel and that each of them and counsel have read and understood the terms of the loan documents which are named and providing at least the salient terms of any restructure in the separate document; insisting upon a pre-negotiation agreement; providing sufficient time for the borrowers and guarantors to review the documents; and, stating such in the documents.

Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Production Credit Assn..docx

The Honorable(?) Judge Carolyn Ellsworth has some EXPLAINING to do

From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Wednesday, February 27, 2013 4:51 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: The Honorable(?) Judge Carolyn Ellsworth has some EXPLAINING to do

The judicial corruption never ceases to amaze.

Judge tosses mortgage ‘robosigning’ case in Vegas

By KEN RITTER, Associated Press
Updated 3:28 pm, Tuesday, February 26, 2013

MERS wins again

From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Wednesday, February 27, 2013 4:51 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: MERS wins again

Sixth Circuit upholds dismissal of putative class action

Squire Sanders
Pierre H. Bergeron
February 20 2013

In Christian County Clerk v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., the Sixth Circuit upheld dismissal of an action brought by various Kentucky county clerks against the MERS system and a variety of banks that utilized it. The clerks essentially alleged that the defendant banks established MERS to enable its members to avoid recording mortgage assignments and paying the associated recording fees to the country clerks. The district court dismissed the case on 12(b)(6) grounds, and the country clerks appealed.

The first issue addressed by the Court concerned the standing of the county clerks. The defendants insisted that the clerks lacked constitutional standing because the clerks purportedly only have an official, but not a personal, stake in the litigation. The Sixth Circuit, however, found that because the clerks alleged that the defendant’s actions deprived them of fees and interfered with their duties as custodians of property records, they had alleged sufficient injury to pass constitutional muster.

Turning to the merits of the claim, the Court assessed whether the Kentucky statutes upon which the clerks sued afforded them a private right of action. The statutes relied upon by the clerks did not provide any express cause of action, and therefore the clerks invoked a Kentucky negligence per se statute, which can create a private right of action for a violation of certain state statutes. The Sixth Circuit, however, rejected this argument, concluding that the clerks were not within the class of persons the Kentucky legislature intended to protect under the recording statutes. While the recording statutes served multiple purposes, the Sixth Circuit found “no indication that the legislature intended to protect the officers who administer those laws and collect fees.” This case is a blow to county officers who have sought to recoup fees that they claim are lost through the use of the MERS system, and it certainly begs the question of whether states will pursue other statutory efforts to prevent the loss of those revenues.

Kentucky MERS.pdf

OCC News Release: Amendments to Consent Orders Memorialize $9.3 Billion Foreclosure Agreement

From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Thursday, February 28, 2013 8:09 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: OCC News Release: Amendments to Consent Orders Memorialize $9.3 Billion Foreclosure Agreement

Amendment to Consent Orders:

Comptroller of the Currency, Administrator of National Banks Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Ensuring a safe and sound national banking system for all America
NR 2013-35
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
February 28, 2013
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

Amendments to Consent Orders Memorialize $9.3 Billion Foreclosure Agreement

WASHINGTON — The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Federal Reserve Board today released amendments to their enforcement actions against 13 mortgage servicers for deficient practices in mortgage loan servicing and foreclosure processing. The amendments require the servicers to provide $9.3 billion in payments and other assistance to borrowers.

The amendments memorialize agreements in principle announced in January with Aurora, Bank of America, Citibank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JPMorgan Chase, MetLife Bank, Morgan Stanley, PNC, Sovereign, SunTrust, U.S. Bank, and Wells Fargo. The amount includes $3.6 billion in cash payments and $5.7 billion in other assistance to borrowers such as loan modifications and forgiveness of deficiency judgments.

Borrowers covered by the amendments include 4.2 million people whose homes were in any stage of the foreclosure process in 2009 or 2010 and whose mortgages were serviced by one of the companies listed above. These borrowers are expected to be contacted by the Paying Agent—Rust Consulting, Inc.—by the end of March 2013 with payment details. The Paying Agent will send payments and correspondence.

Borrowers covered by the amendments are expected to receive compensation ranging from hundreds of dollars up to $125,000. Borrowers are not required to take any additional steps to receive the payments. In addition, borrowers will not be required to execute a waiver of any legal claims they may have against their servicer as a condition for receiving payment.

Borrowers can call the Paying Agent at 1-888-952-9105 to update their contact information or to verify that they are covered by the amendments.

In providing the $5.7 billion in assistance, the 13 servicers are expected to undertake well-structured loss mitigation efforts focused on foreclosure prevention, with preference given to activities designed to keep borrowers in their homes through affordable, sustainable, and meaningful home preservation actions.

Borrowers seeking assistance should work directly with their servicer or a counselor approved by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Borrowers can reach HUD-approved counselors by calling 888-995-HOPE (4673).

OCC and Federal Reserve examiners continue to monitor the servicers’ implementation of corrective actions required by the original enforcement actions to address unsafe and unsound mortgage servicing and foreclosure practices.

For the 13 servicers, these amendments to the enforcement actions replace the requirements related to the Independent Foreclosure Review. For GMAC Mortgage, Everbank, and OneWest, which did not enter agreements in principle with federal regulators, the Independent Foreclosure Review process continues. Regulators expect the reviews for these servicers to be completed over the course of the coming year. These companies service 457,000 mortgages that were in some stage of foreclosure in 2009 or 2010.

Media Contacts

Federal Reserve Barbara Hagenbaugh 202-452-2955
OCC Bryan Hubbard 202-649-6870

Related Links

# # #

OCC shield The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) charters and oversees a nationwide system of national banks and federal savings associations and assures that these banking institutions are safe and sound, competitive, and capable of serving the banking needs of their customers in the best possible manner. OCC press releases and other information are available at http://www.occ.gov. To receive OCC press releases and issuances by e-mail,

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Homeowner Wins as Against Chase WaMu

JOLLEY v. CHASE HOME FINANCE, LLC

SCOTT CALL JOLLEY, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

CHASE HOME FINANCE, LLC et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. A134019.

Court of Appeals of California, First District, Division Two.

Filed February 11, 2013.

Law Offices of Vernon Bradley, Vernon Bradley, Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Law Offices of Sohnen & Kelly, Harvey SohnenPatricia M. Kelly, Attorneys for Defendants and Respondents.


 

 

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

RICHMAN, J.

Plaintiff Scott Call Jolley and Washington Mutual Bank (WaMu) entered into a construction loan agreement in 2006, which eventually encountered problems due to alleged failures by WaMu to properly disburse construction funds. As Jolley was continuing to attempt to salvage the transaction, WaMu went into receivership with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and in September 2008 JP Morgan Chase1 (Chase) bought WaMu’s assets through a purchase and assumption agreement (Agreement or P&A Agreement). Jolley soon stopped making payments on the loan, and in late 2009 Chase took steps to foreclose.

Two days before the scheduled foreclosure sale, Jolley sued Chase and California Reconveyance Company (CRC), the trustee, alleging eight causes of action, including misrepresentation, breach of contract, and negligence. Defendants jointly moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication, Chase’s position based in large part on the theory that under the P&A Agreement Chase had not assumed the liabilities of WaMu. The Agreement was put before the court only in a request for judicial notice, which Agreement, an expert witness for Jolley declared, was not complete. Without addressing the expert’s testimony, the trial court granted the request for judicial notice and, rejecting all of Jolley’s arguments, granted summary judgment for both defendants.

Jolley appeals, arguing that there are triable issues of material fact relating to the financing debacle, not just limited to the claimed inauthenticity of the Agreement but also as to misconduct by Chase itself. We agree, and we reverse the summary judgment for Chase, concluding that six causes of action must proceed against it, all but the causes of action for declaratory relief and accounting. We affirm the summary judgment for CRC.

BACKGROUND

The Underlying Facts

In January 2006 Jolley entered into a construction loan agreement with WaMu through which he borrowed $2,156,000 to renovate a house to be used as a rental property in Tiburon, a property he had earlier purchased with a loan from WaMu, having put down $330,000 on the $1,650,000 purchase price. After the construction loan agreement was signed, WaMu disbursed the money to pay off its own first mortgage, approximately $1.3 million. Jolley understood that approximately $1 million would be available to cover construction costs for the renovation.

Jolley claims WaMu lost the loan documents, which held up construction financing for approximately eight months. Construction went forward nonetheless, with Jolley incurring at least $100,000 in construction expense. Jolley testified that WaMu made false representations, including that amounts prepaid for construction ($328,308.79) would be reimbursed to him. He further claims there were significant irregularities in the loan disbursements, with the result that WaMu claimed it had disbursed more of the money than he had actually received, which errors caused delays in construction that resulted in financial losses.

Jolley retained an attorney to assist him, and by May 2006 the attorney had written to WaMu to try to straighten out these problems. In August 2006 Jolley retained Jeffrey Thorne, a former WaMu employee, to review implementation of the agreement and to facilitate its modification. Thorne went through the files and concluded that Jolley had not received approximately $350,000 due him under the loan agreement. Thorne wrote a detailed memorandum to WaMu explaining the problems, which memorandum recommended that the loan amount be increased to $2,485,000.

WaMu “eventually agreed to the modification . . .” and on October 5, 2006 WaMu and Jolley executed a loan modification based on an expansion of the original construction project from 2500 square feet to 5000. This was done at WaMu’s insistence, as Jolley was told that increasing the size and scope of the project would qualify him for a higher loan amount. Even at that time, Thorne warned that the loan amount needed to be increased by $400,000 to complete the enlarged project. The modification agreement itself does not specify a new maximum amount to be disbursed, but indicates the new principal amount would be “Variable: new principal amount.” And WaMu “promised that if [Jolley] increased the square footage and scope of the work that [WaMu] would supply the additional funds needed to complete the construction . . . .”

The modified agreement called for completion of construction by July 1, 2007, and required Jolley to make monthly interest and principal payments of $16,181.12 beginning August 1.2 Exactly what transpired from October 2006 to September 2008 is somewhat hazy from the record, but construction apparently continued, with Jolley continuing to make interest payments. If we read Chase’s documents correctly, the last disbursement was in June 2008.

On September 25, 2008, WaMu was closed by the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the FDIC was appointed receiver. (U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, Office of Thrift Supervision Order No. 2008-36 (Sep. 25, 2008); 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c).) On the same date, Chase acquired certain assets of WaMu, including all loans and loan commitments. According to Chase, the acquisition was pursuant to the P&A Agreement, which agreement was between the FDIC as receiver and Chase.

Section 2.1 of the Agreement specified the liabilities Chase was assuming: “Subject to Sections 2.5 and 4.8, the Assuming Bank expressly assumes at Book Value (subject to adjustment pursuant to Article VIII) and agrees to pay, perform, and discharge, all of the liabilities of the Failed Bank which are reflected on the Books and Records of the Failed Bank as of Bank Closing, including the Assumed Deposits and all liabilities associated with any and all employee benefit plans, except as listed on the attached Schedule 2.1, and as otherwise provided in this Agreement (such liabilities referred to as `Liabilities Assumed’). Notwithstanding Section 4.8, the Assuming Bank specifically assumes all mortgage servicing rights and obligations of the Failed Bank.” Jolley contends Chase assumed liability for WaMu’s failures in servicing Jolley’s loan as part of its “mortgage servicing . . . obligations.”

Section 2.5 of the Agreement expressly provided, however, that Chase would assume no liabilities associated with borrower claims arising out of WaMu’s lending activities: “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Agreement, any liability associated with borrower claims for payment of or liability associated with borrower claims for payments of or liability to any borrower for monetary relief, or that provide for any other form of relief to any borrower, whether or not such liability is reduced to judgment, liquidated or unliquidated, fixed or contingent, matured or unmatured, disputed or undisputed, legal or equitable, judicial or extra-judicial, secured or unsecured, whether asserted affirmatively or defensively, related in any way to any loan or commitment to lend made by the failed Bank prior to the failure, or to any loan made by a third party in connection with a loan which is or was held by the Failed Bank, or otherwise arising in connection with the Failed Bank’s lending and loan purchase activities are specifically not assumed by the assuming Bank.” As will be seen, this paragraph played a central role in the trial court’s decision granting summary judgment.

According to Jolley’s testimony, “Once Chase had taken over the operations of [WaMu], they continued in the construction loan department with the same people that I had been dealing with when [Wamu] still owned the loan. I had dealt with Mabette Del Rosario, Neil Lampert, and Jed Sonstrom in the legal department . . . . After the takeover by Chase, Mabette Del Rosario continued to run the construction disbursement department. I was led to believe that because Chase had taken over the loan from [Wamu], it was still going to honor the original agreement which said in the addendum Construction/Permanent Loan Part One: `When all conditions prior to rollover are met as described in the construction loan agreement, the loan will rollover to a fully amortized loan.'” Another Chase employee with whom Jolley would come to deal was Andrew North.

In November 2008, shortly after Chase had entered the picture, Jolley made his last monthly payment on the loan, claiming he was forced to default thereafter by WaMu’s breaches and negligence in the funding of the construction loan. The total amount owing on the loan by the time of Jolley’s default, according to Chase’s records, was $2,426,650.00. At the time of Jolley’s default, construction had not been completed, but was allegedly completed sometime between April 2009 and April 2010.

After Chase’s involvement Jolley tried to secure a loan modification, with Thorne continuing to advocate on Jolley’s behalf that he would need an additional $400,000 to complete construction. Thorne and Jolley both told Chase “in great detail” about the prior problems with the loan.

As indicated, the original construction loan contained a rollover provision. Chase claims it was not obligated to honor it because Jolley was in default and construction had not been completed when he went into default, and thus “all conditions prior to rollover” had not been met.

But, Jolley testified, he was encouraged on many occasions by North that, in light of the history of problems with WaMu, there was a “high probability” that Chase “would be able to modify the loan so as to avoid the foreclosure.” North said the “likelihood was good,” that it was “likely” when construction was complete he could roll the construction loan into a fully amortized conventional loan. Jolley further testified that as a result of these representations he was induced to complete construction at a cost of $100,000, borrowing from family and friends to do so. In addition to other damages, Jolley claims the construction delays and “inordinate delay” during the loan modification negotiations prevented him from selling the property before the housing market collapsed.

Ultimately, instead of agreeing to a loan modification, Chase demanded payment of the loan in full.3 On December 29, 2009, CRC, as trustee, recorded a notice of default, and on March 30, 2010, recorded and served a notice of sale.

On April 5, 2010 North sent Jolley an email saying he had requested the Chase foreclosure department to hold off on its planned foreclosure, “which means any future sale dates will be postpone [sic] to give us the opportunity to see if we can modify the collateral property.” Chase refused.

The Proceedings Below

The Complaint

On April 19, 2010, two days before the scheduled foreclosure sale, Jolley filed this lawsuit. It named Chase Home Finance LLC and CRC, and alleged eight causes of action: (1) fraud and deceit—intentional misrepresentation;4 (2) fraud and deceit—negligent misrepresentation; (3) breach of contract/promissory estoppel; (4) negligence; (5) violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 et. seq.; (6) declaratory relief; (7) accounting; and (8) reformation. Though CRC was named as a defendant, no specific wrongdoing was alleged with respect to it.

On April 20, 2010, Jolley obtained a temporary restraining order prohibiting Chase from going forward with the trustee’s sale. And on August 20, 2010, a preliminary injunction was issued, with Jolley putting up a $50,000 bond.

Meanwhile, an answer was filed on behalf of Chase and CRC jointly.

Jolley’s lawsuit rested in part on the theory that Chase was the successor in interest to WaMu and therefore had “stepp[ed] into the shoes” of WaMu and was liable for any misrepresentation, negligence, or breach of contract on its part under California law and under the construction contract he had signed with WaMu. Jolley relied on language in paragraph 13 of his agreement with WaMu that made “the covenants and agreements” binding on “the successors and assigns of [WaMu].” Jolley also relied on Civil Code section 1589, which requires one who takes the benefit of a transaction to also assume its liabilities.5

The Motion and the Request for Judicial Notice

On August 25, 2011, Chase6 filed a motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication, fundamentally claiming that it had no liability for borrower claims based on WaMu’s conduct prior to the FDIC receivership. It relied on federal law relating to the powers of the FDIC as receiver and on the terms of the P&A Agreement, specifically that it had acquired only the assets of WaMu in its purchase from the FDIC, not the liabilities. This contention was based on section 2.5 of the Agreement quoted above, which had also been asserted as an affirmative defense in Chase’s answer. The motion was set for hearing on November 15, 2011.

Simultaneously with filing its motion, Chase filed a request for judicial notice that requested “the Court to take judicial notice pursuant to California Evidence Code Sections 450-460” of five facts, the first of which was as follows:

“1. On September 25, 2008, Washington Mutual Bank, _.A. (“WaMu”) was closed by the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was named Receiver for WaMu pursuant to its authority under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d). Pursuant to the Purchase and Assumption Agreement between the FDIC as Receiver for WaMu, and Chase, dated September 25, 2008, Chase acquired certain of the assets of WaMu, including all loans and loan commitments of WaMu. A copy of that Purchase and Assumption Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit A and can be found on the FDIC’s website at http://www.fdic.gov/about/freedom/Washington_Mutual_P_and _ A.pdf.”7 The attached copy was 39 pages, including exhibits. No separate points and authorities accompanied Chase’s request for judicial notice.

Jolley’s Opposition

Jolley filed opposition to the motion. He also objected to the request for judicial notice as to the P&A Agreement, and filed points and authorities supporting his position, most fundamentally disputing that the 39-page Agreement was the complete document governing Chase’s purchase of WaMu. Thorne, who at one time worked at the FDIC as an independent contractor, filed a declaration stating he had seen and read a 118-page P&A Agreement for the Chase purchase of WaMu. Thorne claimed the longer document had never been made public and its provision governing assumption of liability was different.

In November 2011, Jolley began trying to secure a copy of the 118-page agreement referred to in Thorne’s declaration. His counsel requested a copy from the FDIC, and also apparently served a subpoena duces tecum seeking production of it. According to Jolley’s counsel, the FDIC refused to produce the document unless all parties to the litigation signed a confidentiality agreement. On November 9, 2011, six days before the motion was to be heard, Jolley requested that counsel for Chase sign a confidentiality agreement. She refused to do so.8 On or about November 14, 2011, Jolley filed an ex parte application seeking to continue the motion, to keep discovery open, and to continue the trial date so that further efforts could be made to obtain the longer agreement.9

Meanwhile, Chase had filed a reply to Jolley’s opposition, which included 62 objections to Jolley’s evidence, 40 of which objected to particular testimony in Thorne’s declaration or his deposition.

The Ruling on the Motion

Argument on the motion was heard on November 15, most of which focused on Thorne’s declaration, at the conclusion of which the matter was taken under submission. On December 1, the court entered its order granting summary judgment, which order reads in pertinent part as follows:

“The Court affirms its tentative ruling which stated as follows:

“The undisputed evidence establishes that Defendant Chase Home Finance, LLC (Chase) is not liable for the alleged intentional and negligent misrepresentations (causes of action nos. 1 & 2), made to Plaintiff by employees of the Washington Mutual Bank in relation to the Construction Loan issued to Plaintiff, pursuant to the Purchase and Assumption Agreement through which Chase acquired Washington Mutual from the FDIC on September 25, 2008.

“Under that Agreement, Chase expressly did not assume liability for borrower’s claims `related in any way to any loan or commitment to lend made by the Failed Bank prior to failure, . . .’ or `otherwise arising in connection with [WaMu’s] lending or loan purchase activities . . . .’ (Request to Take Judicial Notice, Ex. 1, P&A Agreement ¶ 2.5) [¶] . . . [¶]

“The third cause of action for Breach of Contract/Promissory Estoppel also fails, as the undisputed evidence shows that Defendants never promised to modify the Washington Mutual Construction, or to issue Plaintiff any additional funds to complete the Project. No enforceable promise or loan modification agreement was created by Chase’s conduct.

“Chase’s employee Mr. North’s representations to Plaintiff that approval of his loan modification application was “likely”, “highly probable”, and “looks good”, are all opinions of Mr. North, which do not create a binding commitment to modify a loan, nor do they represent the fact that the loan has been approved.

“These hopes or expectations expressed by North do not constitute either: a clear and unambiguous promise to approve the application; nor do they evidence any terms to create an enforceable contract. (See Laks v. Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 885, 891, 893 [agreement to make construction loan was expressly conditional, and lacked essential terms of the loan, and could not support a cause of action for promissory estoppel].)

“Also, there is no evidence to suggest that Mr. North had authority to approve a loan modification either by himself, or with the consent of others.

“A borrower’s `understanding or expectation that the Bank would extend a loan is not sufficient to establish an agreement to make a loan. [Citation.]’ (Conrad v. Bank of America (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 133, 156.) `To be enforceable, a promise must be definite enough that a court can determine the scope of the duty and the limits of performance must be sufficiently defined to provide a rational basis for the assessment of damages. [Citations.]’ (Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 770.) `When the evidence clearly shows that the only (and the complete) subject matter that is under consideration is left for further negotiation and agreement, there is no contract, not for vagueness or indefiniteness of terms but for lack of any terms. [Citation.]’ (Kruse v. Bank of America (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 38, 59.)

“The motion is granted on the fourth cause of action for Negligence.”

`Under California law, a lender does not owe a borrower or third party any duties beyond those expressed in the loan agreement, except those imposed due to special circumstance.’ (Sipe v. Countrywide Bank (E.D.Cal. 2010) 690 F.Supp.2d 1141, 1153, citing Nymark v. Heart Fed. Savings & Loan Assn., (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1089, 1096.) . . . .

“The undisputed evidence shows that Chase and Plaintiff engaged in the typical lender/borrower relationship. Plaintiff has not presented evidence of special circumstances on which to impose a general duty of due care. (See Sipe v. Countrywide Bank (E.D.Cal. 2010) 690 F.Supp.2d 1141, 1153.)

“Moreover, the complaint does not allege, and there is no evidence to establish, that Chase committed a negligent act after acquiring Plaintiff’s loan.”

Then, after disposing of the other four causes of action, the order concludes with this: “Defendants’ Request to Take Judicial Notice is granted. (Evid. Code § 452(c)(d)).”

No ruling was made on any of the evidentiary objections.

Judgment was thereafter entered accordingly, from which Jolley filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

1. Summary Judgment Law and the Standard of Review

We collected and confirmed the applicable law in Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009)178 Cal.App.4th 243, 253-254:

“Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c) provides that summary judgment is properly granted when there is no triable issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) As applicable here, moving defendants can meet their burden by demonstrating that `a cause of action has no merit,’ which they can do by showing that `[o]ne or more elements of the cause of action cannot be separately established.’ (§ 437c, subd. (o)(1); see also Romano v. Rockwell Internat., Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 479, 486-487.) Once defendants meet this burden, the burden shifts to plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (§ 437c, subd. (p)(2).)

“On appeal `[w]e review a grant of summary judgment de novo; we must decide independently whether the facts not subject to triable dispute warrant judgment for the moving party as a matter of law. [Citations.]’ (Intel Corp. v. Hamidi (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1342, 1348.) Put another way, we exercise our independent judgment, and decide whether undisputed facts have been established that negate plaintiff’s claims. (Romano v. Rockwell Internat., Inc., supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 487.) As we put it in Fisherman’s Wharf Bay Cruise Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 309, 320: `[W]e exercise an independent review to determine if the defendant moving for summary judgment met its burden of establishing a complete defense or of negating each of the plaintiff’s theories and establishing that the action was without merit.’ (Accord, Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London v. Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 945, 972.)

“But other principles guide us as well, including that `[w]e accept as true the facts . . . in the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them.’ (Morgan v. Regents of University of California (2000) 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 67.) And we must `”view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff[] as the losing part[y]” and “liberally construe plaintiff[‘s] evidentiary submissions and strictly scrutinize defendant[‘s] own evidence, in order to resolve any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in plaintiff[‘s] favor.”‘ (McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College Dist. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 88, 96-97.)”

2. The P&A Agreement: Judicial Notice, the Law, and Thorne’s Testimony

As noted, Chase requested judicial notice of the P&A Agreement attached to the declaration of its counsel who represented that it was a copy of the agreement found on the FDIC website. The declarant was not a custodian of records, was not a party to the Agreement, gave no indication she was involved in negotiating or drafting it, and provided no background as to how she acquired knowledge of the document. Indeed, she did not even aver it was a true and complete copy.

We also note that the request was for judicial notice of the fact that on September 25, 2008, “Chase acquired certain of the assets of WaMu, including all loans and loan commitments of WaMu.” The papers did not request judicial notice that Chase did notassume liabilities based on borrower claims. Unquestionably, the trial court below used the Agreement for a much broader purpose, namely to prove that Chase did not assume liability for WaMu’s alleged misdeeds with respect to Jolley’s loan.

We conclude this was error, and that the content and legal effect of the P & A Agreement could not properly be determined on judicial notice under California law. And certainly not here.

Judicial notice, of course, may be utilized on a motion for summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(1); Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1374.) But only to the extent authorized by our state statutes. (Evid. Code, § 450.)

As noted above, Chase’s request for judicial notice requested it, however unhelpfully, “pursuant to . . . Evidence Code sections 450-460.” As also noted, the order granting summary judgment ended with the ruling that Chase’s request for judicial notice was also granted, citing Evidence Code section 452, subdivisions (c) & (d).

The Evidence Code section cited by the trial court allow for permissive judicial notice respectively of “(c) Official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States” and “(d) Records of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States.” (Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (c) & (d).)

Certainly the P&A Agreement does not come within subdivision (d), as it is not a record of any court. And while it is true that subdivision (c) “enables courts in California to take notice of a wide variety of official acts. . . . [and] an expansive reading must be provided to certain of its phrases [and] included in `executive’ acts are those performed by administrative agencies. . . .” (Simons, California Evidence Manual (2012) Judicial Notice § 7:11, p. 544), we do not understand a contract with a private bank to come within that subdivision.

Apparently satisfied itself that the two subdivisions cited in the trial court’s order are unsupportive, Chase’s brief cites two different subdivisions, and asserts that “judicial notice may be taken of the following:

“(g) Facts and propositions that are of such common knowledge within the territorial jurisdiction of the court that they cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute.

“(h) Facts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.”

In claimed support, Chase first cites some cases clearly inapposite, such as cases dealing with State Bar records (In re White (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1453) and the “definition of `mass transportation.'” (Shaw v. People ex rel. Chiang (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 577). Chase then goes on: “[s]imilarly, under federal law the information on government agency websites has often been treated as a proper subject for judicial notice by numerous circuits (See, e.g., Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. McPherson, No. C 06-4670 SBA, 2008 WL 4183981, at p. *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2008) (and cases cited therein).) [¶] Here, the P&A Agreement is available on a public Web site maintained by the FDIC. It is not reasonably subject to dispute and is capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy. The taking of judicial notice of the terms of the P&A Agreement was not in error.”10 (Fn. omitted.) Chase then concludes as follows: “Chase and CRC sought the taking of judicial notice of a document which is not hearsay, but which itself contains admissible evidence.”

Maybe some federal cases might allow this. California law does not. (Searles Valley Minerals Operations, Inc. v. State Bd. Of Equalization (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 514, 519 [taxpayers who produced and sold electricity to California requested judicial notice of materials contained on website pages of American Coal Foundation and United States Department of Energy under Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (h). Held: request was properly denied, as though “it might be appropriate to take judicial notice of the existence of the Web sites, the same is not true of their factual content”].)

Chase makes much of the fact that the P&A Agreement is posted on the FDIC Web site, which it calls an “official governmental agency,” apparently believing this fact alone makes the legal significance of the Agreement subject to judicial notice. While there may be federal cases that adopt this approach, frequently without analysis (see fn. 10, ante), we know of no “official Web site” provision for judicial notice in California. (See L.B. Research & Education Foundation v. UCLA Foundation (2005) 30 Cal.App.4th 171, 180, fn. 2.) “Simply because information is on the Internet does not mean that it is not reasonably subject to dispute.” (Huitt v. Southern California Gas Co. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1586, 1605, fn. 10.)

In typically scholarly fashion, Witkin has an elaborate exposition of the law of judicial notice in 1 California Evidence (5th ed. 2012), Judicial Notice, ch. 2, beginning at page 109. Beginning at section 32, the author discusses “matters commonly known or readily determinable,” and goes on for several sections with descriptions of cases and “illustrations” of such facts. One looks in vain for any case remotely supporting Chase’s position here. In sum, we hold that judicial notice was not properly taken of the content of the P&A Agreement even if there was no dispute about its authenticity. A fortiori here, where the very authenticity of the Agreement was in dispute.

As described above, Jolley’s opposition included a declaration from Thorne, who had been a “senior construction loan consultant” with WaMu until July of 2006, having been in charge of construction lending in 38 states since May 2005. He was an “asset manager for the FDIC” at the time he signed the declaration (October 2011), and was “intimately familiar with the procedures for taking over a failed bank.” And he testified: “Pursuant to the public part of the agreement with the FDIC, of which were approximately 36 pages, the balance of the contract and the complete agreement with the FDIC and Chase bank is 118 pages long which has not been made public. I am familiar with this agreement, I read it.” Though somewhat ungrammatical, the declaration fairly clearly recites the existence of a nonpublic agreement (or portion of an agreement) that could affect the outcome of this case. In short, Thorne testified that the P&A Agreement submitted by Chase was not the full agreement entered between Chase and the FDIC, but rather a longer version exists, the terms of which are different from the version of which the court below took judicial notice.

Thorne also made certain representations about the content of the missing pages, claiming the FDIC guaranteed 80 percent of any failed WaMu loans, while Chase assumed only 20 percent of potential losses on the loans by receiving an 80 percent discount on WaMu’s assets. In his deposition Thorne not only referred to the P&A Agreement being 118 pages long, but also testified that it obligated Chase “to work directly with the customers to do as much as possible to modify any loans . . . so that no foreclosures are made and borrowers are kept in their homes.” The missing part of the document “spells out an agreement between the purchasing institution and the FDIC as to how they are to handle the customers upon the purchase of the bank; i.e., how the foreclosures are to be handled, work out agreements that they’re supposed to make. . . . They just can’t go in and just start foreclosing on everybody that’s not paying.”

Chase filed 62 objections to Jolley’s evidence, including 33 objections to particular aspects of Thorne’s declaration and seven objections to particular statements in his deposition. We are concerned primarily with Objections 5 and 60, objecting to Thorne’s statements that a 118-page purchase and assumption agreement exists, objections based on the best evidence rule, lack of foundation, and lack of competency.11

As noted, the trial court did not rule on these, or any other, evidentiary objections, and Jolley preliminarily contends that the objections cannot be maintained here. He is wrong, as specifically held in Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 534, a case involving objections made in a summary judgment proceeding. The Supreme Court held that if the objections were not ruled upon in the trial court, the objections are presumed overruled and are preserved for appeal. We thus turn to the merits of Chase’s objections, and find there is none.

Chase questions the competency of Thorne’s declaration because he is not a lawyer, was not employed at WaMu at the time of the P&A Agreement, and was never employed by Chase. This, the argument runs, fails to establish personal knowledge or expertise sufficient to opine about the contents of the purported nonpublic agreement. Chase also points out that while his declaration says Thorne was an independent contractor at the FDIC at the time he signed the declaration, it fails to show he worked there at the time of the WaMu receivership.

But that is no basis for rejecting Thorne’s testimony on the narrow point that a 118-page agreement exists, one that he had personally read. We view his testimony on this point as that of a percipient witness, not an expert.

We may agree with Chase for purposes of argument that Thorne’s statements about the contents of the longer agreement were not admissible. But we need not credit those statements in order to conclude that a factual issue has been raised. The judgment in this case rests squarely on the terms of a much shorter, disputed version of the P&A Agreement submitted by Chase. This was wrong. Since Jolley has presented evidence that a longer agreement exists, the court below resolved a disputed issue of fact by resting its decision on the terms of the shorter agreement. Put otherwise, the court did not view the evidence favorably to Jolley. (See Gould v. Maryland Sound Industries, Inc. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1145-1146 [existence of a written contract could not be judicially noticed where the opposing party claimed that an oral contract governed the relationship].)

It may be true that in some extreme circumstances “a trial court may weigh the credibility of a declaration submitted in opposition to a summary judgment motion and grant the motion `where the declaration is facially so incredible as a matter of law that the moving party otherwise would be entitled to summary judgment.'” (People v. Schlimbach (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1132, 1142, fn. 9, quoting Estate of Housley (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 342, 359-360.) This is not such a case.

Thorne’s declaration certainly raises significant issues vis a vis Chase and the FDIC, with testimony that is hardly run of the mill. But that testimony is not so incredible that it could be ignored or rejected as untruthful on summary judgment, especially given the FDIC’s response here, which not only did not deny the existence of the longer agreement, but suggested there were documents to be produced if there were a confidentiality agreement.

3. Summary Adjudication Was Improperly Granted On The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, And Eighth Causes Of Action

A. The First And Second Causes Of Action, For Misrepresentation

The conclusion that Chase was not liable for WaMu’s conduct presupposes acceptance of the P&A Agreement submitted by Chase as the full and complete contract governing its assumption of liabilities. Since, as discussed above, the Agreement was not properly utilized here, on that basis alone the summary adjudication of first and second causes of action was improper. In addition to the alleged misrepresentations by WaMu, Jolley alleges misstatements by Chase after the receivership, which would render summary adjudication improper for an additional reason if there are triable issues of material fact with respect to such misrepresentations. We find such issues here.

The elements of fraud, which give rise to the tort action for deceit, are (a) misrepresentation; (b) knowledge of falsity; (c) intent to defraud, i.e., induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) damage. (Lovejoy v. AT&T Corp. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 85, 93; see also, Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.) “The tort of negligent misrepresentation, a species of the tort of deceit [citation], does not require intent to defraud but only the assertion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who has no reasonable ground for believing it to be true.” (Conroy v. Regents of University of California (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1244, 1255.)

Jolley testified that Chase representative North told him in various ways—that it was “highly probable,” and “likely,” and “look[ed] good”—that a modification of the loan agreement would be approved and the construction loan rolled over into a conventional loan. The trial court concluded there was no evidence of a misstatement of fact, but at most an overoptimistic opinion upon which Jolley could not reasonably have relied. We disagree.

To begin with, it is well settled that an opinion may be actionable when it is made by a party who “possess[es] superior knowledge.” (Pacesetter Homes v. Brodken (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 206, 211.) As one Court of Appeal put it almost ninety years ago, “[W]hen one of the parties possesses, or assumes to possess, superior knowledge or special information regarding the subject matter of the representation, and the other party is so situated that he may reasonably rely upon such supposed superior knowledge or special information, a representation made by the party possessing or assuming to possess such knowledge or information, though it might be regarded as but the expression of an opinion if made by any other person, is not excused if it be false.” (Haserot v. Keller (1924) 67 Cal.App. 659, 670;Cohen v. S & S Construction Co. (1983) 151 Cal.App.3d 941, 946; see generally Rest.2d Torts § 542; CACI No. 1904.)

Equally well recognized is that there may be liability for an opinion where it is “expressed in a manner implying a factual basis which does not exist.” (Pacesetter Homes, Inc. v. Brodkin, supra, 5 Cal.App.3d at p. 211; see generally, Crandall v. Parks (1908) 152 Cal. 772, 776; Civ. Code, § 1572; Rest.2d Torts, § 525, com. f.) Witkin explains how this rule is often applied to statements about future events, describing it this way: “(3) Future Events.As pointed out above . . ., predictions or representations as to what will happen in the future are normally treated as opinion; but sometimes they may be interpreted as implying knowledge of facts that make the predictions probable. If the defendant does not know of these facts, the statement is an actionable misrepresentation. . . . The same is true where an agent states that his or her principal will advance money to harvest a crop, or where a corporation agent represents that the corporation will lease certain property or locate a plant in a certain city. (See Eade v. Reich (1932) 120 Cal.App. 32, 35 [discussing holdings to this effect].)” (5 Witkin, Summary of California Law (10th ed. 2005) Torts, § 776, p. 1126; also see Apollo Capital Fund LLC v. Roth Capital Partners, LLC (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 226, 241 [broker-dealer’s oral representations concerning offering of company’s bridge notes, that preferred stock offering was “done deal” and that early prepayment of notes was “guaranteed,” were actionable statements of facts, rather than opinion or prediction].)

Jolley testified that North told him he was “from the executive offices of Chase,” causing Jolley to think he “was dealing with the decision makers at the highest level of Chase Bank.” Beyond that, the very assessment of probabilities of a loan modification may have implied that North had discussed the matter with those who actually would make the decision or that he possessed facts from which he could reasonably assess the probabilities. In any event, the matter should have been left to the trier of fact, not determined on summary judgment: “[W]here there is a reasonable doubt as to whether a particular statement is an expression of opinion or the affirmation of a fact, the determination rests with the trier of the facts.” (Willson v. Municipal Bond Co. (1936) 7 Cal.2d 144, 151.)

Jolley presented evidence that he in fact relied upon these statements, expending additional sums to complete the construction, that the promising statements by North induced him to borrow from other sources to finish the renovation. These consequences were entirely foreseeable in light of the history of the construction loan, the unfinished status of the underlying project, and the encouraging statements by North that the loan would likely be rolled over into a conventional loan once construction was completed. Whether Jolley’s reliance was justified in the circumstances is a factual question for a jury, not one for summary judgment.

Price v. Wells Fargo Bank (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 465 (Price), overruled on other grounds in Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Production Credit Association(2013) 55 Cal.4th 1169, 1182, relied on by Chase, is not to the contrary. There, the ranch owner plaintiffs took out three loans totaling $370,000 from Wells Fargo to pay off preexisting loans to other banks. (Id. at p. 471.) The notes for two of the loans called for repayment within approximately eight months; the third loan documents were less clear but appeared to call for payment at the same time. Testimony by bank officers, however, tended to support plaintiffs’ argument that the parties intended the loans to be paid off over a five-year period. (Ibid.) After seeing the early due date in the notes, plaintiffs discussed the matter with the same bank representative who had helped them with the original loans, who promised to “redo” the loans to reflect the five-year repayment period. (Price, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at p. 472.) Plaintiffs let the eight-month maturity date pass without repaying any principal. When the bank began sending past due letters, plaintiffs did not insist that the loans be rewritten, but sought a restructuring of the repayments. For a period of time the bank negotiated with plaintiffs and established alternate repayment terms. However, when the repayment schedule was not kept, the bank initiated foreclosure proceedings. (Id. at pp. 472-473.)

Plaintiffs were able to pay off the loans before a foreclosure sale was conducted, and then sued the bank, claiming that in order to pay off the loans they were forced to sell other assets at distressed prices. (Id. at pp. 473-474.) They alleged several theories based fundamentally on the bank’s having taken a “hard line” during negotiations regarding repayment of the loans. (Id. at p. 479.) Summary judgment was granted for the bank, which was affirmed on appeal.

Chase points particularly to the statement in Price to the effect that the bank would “redo” the loans or “work with” the borrowers, and draws a parallel between those representations and the statements made by North here. We find the analogy unpersuasive. The Price plaintiffs admitted in discovery that they understood their obligations under the original notes and never disputed that the amounts claimed by the bank were in fact owed to it. (Price, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at pp. 472, 480-481.) And the alleged promise to “redo” the contract was never asserted during loan renegotiation as a basis for loan modification. (Id.at pp. 480-481.) In short, the plaintiffs’ own actions undermined any claim of reliance on the misstatement. This is not the situation here.

Chase also cites Conrad v. Bank of America (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 133, which held that a postbankruptcy fraud claim against a bank was precluded by failure of the borrowers to list that claim in the original bankruptcy filing. (Id. at pp. 145-155.) As a second ground for denying relief, the Court of Appeal held that no fraudulent statement had been shown. (Id. at pp. 155-156.) The borrower’s testimony showed only that he told the banker his company “might need some loans and that it intended to go forward utilizing liquid assets and that kind of thing before talking” further to the bank about loans. The banker reportedly said “No problem.” (Id. at p. 156.) The court observed “[t]hat exchange establishes nothing more than a willingness to consider future loan applications and does not establish a fraudulent promise to make a loan. [Citation.]” (Conrad, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 156.) The court went on that the borrower’s “understanding or expectation that the Bank would extend a loan is not sufficient to establish an agreement to make a loan. [Citation.] And his testimony is otherwise lacking in specificity.” (Conrad, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 156.)

Here we have more specificity as to a predicted outcome of the loan modification process and the likelihood of its occurrence, as Jolley continued discussions with North into the days immediately preceding the proposed trustee’s sale. Indeed, there is documentary evidence that North continued to represent that he would ask the “Foreclosure Department to hold [its] processes,” thus making the alleged promises more certain—and more central to the loan renegotiation efforts. And not only did Jolley not act inconsistently with a claim of reliance, he in fact relied, investing additional funds into completing the construction in anticipation that the loan would be rolled into a conventional loan.

While there may not be any direct showing of an intention to defraud, it is clear that Chase would benefit from Jolley’s further investment in the construction project. This is so because the bank could ultimately foreclose on a newly renovated property instead of a stalled construction project, making its ability to realize on the asset more fruitful. In addition, prolonging the loan modification process allowed Chase’s investment in the property to mount while Jolley’s equity, if any, was consumed in a declining real estate market. Drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, as we must (Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc., supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 254), we conclude that prolonged communication—perhaps more accurately, miscommunication—about a possible loan modification raises a triable issue of fact of intent by Chase to profit by misleading Jolley about his loan modification prospects, a showing sufficient to withstand summary adjudication.

B. The Third Cause of Action, for Breach Of Contract/Promissory Estoppel

On the third cause of action, styled breach of contract/promissory estoppel, Chase claims there was no evidence of a breach by it of WaMu’s loan agreement, again claims the P&A Agreement relieves it of any liability for any breach by WaMu, and claims its own conduct toward Jolley in the form of North’s promising forecast of a loan modification did not create a contract or amount to an estoppel. We, of course, disagree as to the P&A Agreement. We also find a triable issue of material fact regarding Chase’s own conduct.

Jolley obviously complains that WaMu failed to timely disburse funds in accordance with the loan agreement, but he also appears to claim the failure to fully fund the loan continued through the Chase period. Jolley stated as a disputed fact, “Even with the Modification Agreement, further delays in disbursements as a result of WaMu made it effectively impossible for Jolley to complete the project and commence payments as of August 1, 2007.” He also asserted in his declaration, “Chase continued in WaMu’s refusal to disburse portions of the construction loan due and to modify the loan to provide necessary funding.” And he said, “Chase . . . had an obligation to carry out the terms of the Washington Mutual loan which was to provide adequate funds to complete the modified construction plans after which, Chase . . . [was] responsible for rolling the loan into a permanent financing loan.”

Thorne testified that after he got involved on Jolley’s behalf, Jolley “received disbursements on the work that had been completed based on the inspection that had been made.” The trial court construed that statement as follows: “Plaintiff’s expert, Jeffrey Thorne, . . . testified that Plaintiff ultimately received the disbursements for the work Plaintiff had completed.” And the court concluded, “[t]he undisputed evidence shows Chase fulfilled all of its obligations under the Construction Loan Agreement.” We read the record differently.

To begin with, this was not specified as an undisputed fact in Chase’s moving papers, and Jolley did not admit any such fact as undisputed. It cannot be said that the undisputed facts show no controversy on this point.

Jolley contends “Chase . . . had a direct continuing responsibility to provide necessary funding to see that the project was finished . . . .” We understand this to mean that Jolley believes Chase was obligated to disburse, but failed to disburse, additional funds under his preexisting agreement with WaMu. The fact that Thorne may have believed the loan had been fully funded by WaMu prior to the receivership (if his statement is properly so construed) does not bind Jolley to that same conclusion.

Turning to the paperwork, Thorne’s memorandum to WaMu in approximately September 2006 recommended a modified loan amount of $2,485,000. As far as we can tell, the amount actually disbursed as of September 25, 2008, was $2,426,650. This also suggests that further disbursements may have been due under the modified agreement. We are also not able to say with confidence that the dispute about the $350,000 that Thorne found to be “in limbo” was ever resolved. In sum, there appear to be disputed facts concerning whether WaMu, succeeded by Chase, ever fully funded the loan, factual disputes relating to whether the lender’s obligations under the modified loan agreement ever were fulfilled.

Chase also argues it was under no obligation to disburse further funds or to roll over the construction loan because Jolley was in default on the loan payments beginning in December 2008. True, the loan contract conditioned the loan rollover provision on the borrower’s compliance with the terms of the loan agreement. But there was a two-month period postreceivership—and prior to Jolley’s default—during which it seems possible that funds were due to be disbursed, at least under Jolley’s interpretation of the loan agreement.

Jolley also argues that the frequent reassurances by North that a modification was forthcoming induced him to rely, and as a result he “borrowed from friends and family to finish the construction.” The effect of this is a triable issue of fact whether Chase has potential liability for its own conduct under a theory of promissory estoppel.

“`A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.'” (C&K Engineering Contractors v. Amber Steel Co. (1978) 23 Cal.3d 1, 6.) The elements of promissory estoppel are: “`”(1) a promise clear and unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance by the party to whom the promise is made; (3) [the] reliance must be both reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) the party asserting the estoppel must be injured by the party’s reliance.”‘” (Joffe v. City of Huntington Park (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 492, 513.)

The Fourth Cause Of Action, For Negligence

The trial court granted summary adjudication on the fourth cause of action, for negligence, essentially finding no duty. The order read as follows: “`Under California law, a lender does not owe a borrower or third party any duties beyond those expressed in the loan agreement, except those imposed due to special circumstance.’ (Sipe v. Countrywide Bank(E.D.Cal. 2010) 690 F.Supp.2d 1141, 1153, citing Nymark v. Heart Fed. Savings & Loan Assn., (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1089, 1096.) . . .” We conclude there was a triable issue of material fact as to a duty of care to Jolley, which potentially makes Chase liable for its own negligence.

We acknowledge that we deal with an ordinary duty of reasonable care, not a fiduciary duty. We further acknowledge the frequent observation that lenders and borrowers operate at arm’s length. (Oaks Management Corp. v. Superior Court (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 453, 466-467; Nymark v. Heart Fed. Savings & Loan Assn., supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 1093 (Nymark).) And we finally acknowledge that “as a general rule, a financial institution owes no duty of care to a borrower when the institution’s involvement in the loan transaction does not exceed the scope of its conventional role as a mere lender of money.” (Nymark, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 1096; see also Fox & Carskadon Financial Corp. v. San Francisco Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 484, 488, 489; Ragland v. U.S. Bank National Association (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 182, 206.)

Such “general rule” has often been repeated, including in federal cases involving the takeover by Chase of WaMu’s loans12 and cases decided in the context of loan modification applications.13 It was primarily on the basis of this general rule that the trial court below, without further analysis, granted summary adjudication of the negligence claim. And Chase relies upon such general rule here, contending it owed Jolley no duty of care. Such reliance is misplaced.

When considered in full context, the cases show the question is not subject to black-and-white analysis—and not easily decided on the “general rule.” We conclude here, where there was an ongoing dispute about WaMu’s performance of the construction loan contract, where that dispute appears to have bridged the FDIC’s receivership and Chase’s acquisition of the construction loan, and where specific representations were made by a Chase representative as to the likelihood of a loan modification, a cause of action for negligence has been stated that cannot be properly resolved based on lack of duty alone.

In Connor v. Great Western Sav. & Loan Assn. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 850, 856-858 (Connor), a lender was involved in developing tract housing which proved to be faulty because the builders poured slab foundations on adobe soil, and the foundations cracked in subsequent rainstorms. (Id. at pp. 856-857.) The lender provided the money for the purchase of the land and for construction loans, and ultimately offered homebuyers long-term loans on the homes. (Id. at p. 858.) The Supreme Court held the bank was not liable as a joint venturer (id. at pp. 862-863), but further held that its role as “an active participant in a home construction enterprise” imposed upon it a duty of ordinary care to the purchasers of the homes (id. at p. 864)—a holding reached by applying the six factors identified in Biakanja v. Irving (1958) 49 Cal.2d 647, 650 (the “Biakanja factors”).14 (Connor, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 865.)

Perhaps the Biakanja factors must be applied here too. (See Auto Equity Sales v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.) But even if not, they are certainly appropriate for consideration, which consideration compels a conclusion for Jolley.

The Biakanja factors are six nonexhaustive factors: (1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, (2) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, (4) the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, (5) the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, and (6) the policy of preventing future harm. (Biakanja v. Irving, supra, 49 Cal.2d at p. 650.)

We begin by identifying the specific conduct by Chase that Jolley claims was negligent so as to limit our analysis “to the specific action the plaintiff claims the particular [defendant] had a duty to undertake in the particular case.” (Vasquez v. Residential Investments, Inc.(2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 269, 280.) As we see it, Jolley claims Chase had an obligation to investigate the history of the loan and to make additional disbursements, to review his loan modification request in good faith, and to conform to standards of conduct in the industry to protect him against further losses associated with the loan. Chase allegedly acted unreasonably by failing to review Jolley’s request for a loan modification in good faith, having decided in advance it would extend no further monies in connection with WaMu’s loans.15Jolley also complains about specific misstatements, false assurances given by Chase personnel about the prospects for a loan modification, while different personnel at Chase—the actual decision makers—were bent on foreclosure.

The first factor, the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, hardly needs discussion. Jolley was the person in direct negotiation, and contractual privity, with the loan originator (WaMu), from which Chase took over. Jolley specifically brought to Chase’s attention his dissatisfaction with WaMu’s funding of the loan. To the extent Chase undertook a reassessment of the propriety of past disbursements, it obviously did so for Jolley’s benefit. And North’s representations were made directly to Jolley, and were certainly likely to, if not intended to, affect his decisionmaking.

Likewise, it was certainly foreseeable that harm to Jolley could ensue in the event of Chase’s negligence. Jolley began missing payments shortly after Chase bought WaMu’s assets. That his credit rating would be adversely affected if Chase failed to negotiate with him in good faith was foreseeable, making it more difficult for him to secure alternative financing to cure the default. Given North’s encouragement, it was also foreseeable that Jolley would sink more of his own money into the project, thereby suffering further injury.

There is also no doubt that Jolley was in fact injured. He invested $100,000 in finishing construction on the property shortly before foreclosure proceedings were initiated. As to the closeness of the connection between Chase’s acts and Jolley’s injury, the upbeat prediction of the availability of a loan modification and the rollover of the loan into a conventional mortgage was almost certainly a primary factor in causing this particular injury. Had Jolley known that Chase would ultimately foreclose on the property, he would have had no incentive to invest an additional $100,000 in its completion.

While it is not possible to tell at this point how blameworthy Chase’s conduct may prove to be, this is not a case such as Nymark, where the borrower was in a better position to protect his own interests. To the contrary, Jolley’s ability to protect his own interests in the loan modification process was practically nil. Chase held all the cards. The fact that Chase benefited from prolonging the loan renegotiation period and encouraging Jolley to complete construction certainly lends itself to a blameworthy interpretation. And a fair reading of the evidence here includes that Jolley was subjected to “dual tracking,” which as discussed below has now been made illegal, illegality that tends to reinforce the view that Chase’s conduct was blameworthy.

The policy of preventing future harm also favors imposing a duty of care on an entity in Chase’s position. When a bank acquires from the FDIC loans from a failed bank part of what it acquires is the history of the loan. Even if acquiring banks are not liable for breaches, fraud, or negligence of the failed bank under their purchase and assumption agreements—an issue we do not decide—simple good business practices dictate that they take into account the position in which the borrower has been placed prior to their acquisition of the loan. Where there is a long running dispute whether the failed bank properly disbursed monies due under the loan, the acquiring bank owes a duty of care to investigate the history of the loan and take that into account in negotiating with the borrower for a loan modification. Particularly so here.

We note that we deal with a construction loan, not a residential home loan where, save for possible loan servicing issues, the relationship ends when the loan is funded. By contrast, in a construction loan the relationship between lender and borrower is ongoing, in the sense that the parties are working together over a period of time, with disbursements made throughout the construction period, depending upon the state of progress towards completion.16 We see no reason why a negligent failure to fund a construction loan, or negligent delays in doing so, would not be subject to the same standard of care.

Even when the lender is acting as a conventional lender, the no-duty rule is only a general rule. (Osei v. Countrywide Home Loans (E.D.Cal. 2010) 692 F.Supp.2d 1240, 1249.) As a recent federal case put it: “Nymark does not support the sweeping conclusion that a lender never owes a duty of care to a borrower. Rather, the Nymark court explained that the question of whether a lender owes such a duty requires `the balancing of the “Biakanja factors.”‘” (Newson v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (N.D.Cal. Nov. 30, 2010 No. C 09-5288) 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 126383, at p. * 15.) Or, in the words of an even more recent case, in each case where the general rule was applied to shield a lender from liability, “the plaintiff sought to impose upon the lender liability for activities outside the scope of the lender’s conventional role in a loan transaction. It is against this attempt to expand lender liability (to that of, e.g., an investment advisor or construction manager) that the court inNymark found a financial institution owes no duty of care to a borrower when its involvement in the loan transaction `does not exceed the scope of its conventional role as a mere lender of money.’ Nymark, 231 Cal.App.3d at 1096. Nymark and the cases cited therein do not purport to state a legal principle that a lender can never be held liable for negligence in its handling of a loan transaction within its conventional role as a lender of money.” (Ottolini v. Bank of America (N.D.Cal. Aug. 19, 2011 No. C-11-0477) 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 92900, at p. *16.) We agree with these observations.

Chase relies upon the historical truism that a bank as lender is entitled to pursue its own economic interest in dealing with a borrower, citing Kruse v. Bank of America (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 38, 67. We live, however, in a world dramatically rocked in the past few years by lending practices perhaps too much colored by short-sighted self-interest. We have experienced not only an alarming surge in the number of bank failures, but the collapse of the housing market, an avalanche of foreclosures,17 and related costs borne by all of society.18 There is, to be sure, blame enough to go around. And banks are hardly to be excluded.

Due to the ongoing financial crisis, the federal government has adopted a voluntary incentive-based program designed to encourage lenders and borrowers to work together in the event of the borrower’s default, by establishing a home loan modification program. (See U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Supplemental Directive No. 09-01 (Apr. 5, 2009). Similarly, the California Legislature has expressed a strong preference for fostering more cooperative relations between lenders and borrowers who are at risk of foreclosure, so that homes will not be lost.19 (Civ. Code, §§ 2923.5 & 2923.6.) These provisions, enacted in 2008, require lenders to negotiate with borrowers in default to seek loss mitigation solutions. As discussed hereafter, existing law will soon be supplemented by amendments enacted as part of the “California Homeowner Bill of Rights.” (Assem. Bill No. 278; Sen. Bill No. 900 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.).)

Granted, these ameliorative efforts have been directed primarily at aiding resident homeowners at risk of losing their homes. (Civ. Code, §§ 2923.5, subd. (f); Assem. Bill No. 278, § 18, adding Civ. Code, § 2924.15.) We also understand there is no express duty on a lender’s part to grant a modification under state or federal loan modification statutes. And until the new legislation takes effect, no private right of action for damages is granted under the statutes. (See Hamilton v. Greenwich Investors XXVI, LLC (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1602, 1616; Mabry v. Superior Court (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 208, 214; Pantoja v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (N.D.Cal.2009) 640 F.Supp.2d 1177, 1188.) We do not cite any of these legislative measures in reliance upon their provisions, nor do we suggest their provisions were violated in the present case. Rather, we refer to the existence—and recent strengthening—of these legislative measures because they demonstrate a rising trend to require lenders to deal reasonably with borrowers in default to try to effectuate a workable loan modification. In short, these measures indicate that courts should not rely mechanically on the “general rule” that lenders owe no duty of care to their borrowers.

Existing state statutes relating to loan modifications will soon be supplemented by stiffer restrictions on the conduct of lenders and loan servicers during the loan modification process. Even as this case has been pending before us, on July 2, 2012, the California Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 278 and Senate Bill No. 900, which have since been signed into law by the Governor. These provisions address more pointedly the foreclosure crisis in our state through even greater encouragement to lenders and loan servicers to engage in good faith loan modification efforts.

One of the targets of the legislation is a practice that has come to be known as “dual tracking.” Dual tracking refers to a common bank tactic. When a borrower in default seeks a loan modification, the institution often continues to pursue foreclosure at the same time.” (Alejandro Lazo, Banks Are Foreclosing While Homeowners Pursue Loan Modifications,Los Angeles Times, (Apr. 14, 2011); see also Sen. Floor Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 278 at p. 3.) The result is that the borrower does not know where he or she stands, and by the time foreclosure becomes the lender’s clear choice, it is too late for the borrower to find options to avoid it. “Mortgage lenders call it `dual tracking,’ but for homeowners struggling to avoid foreclosure, it might go by another name: the double-cross.”20 (Lazo, Banks Are Foreclosing.) As we understand the pleadings and proof here, this is precisely one of Jolley’s claims.21

The recent California legislation attempts over time to eliminate the practice of dual tracking and to ameliorate its effects, by requiring lenders and loan servicers to designate a “single point of contact” for each borrower in default. (Assem. Bill No. 278, § 7, amending Civil Code § 2923.6, subd. (c) [prohibiting dual tracking by higher volume lenders and mortgage servicers], Assem. Bill No. 278, § 9, adding Civil Code, § 2923.7 [single point of contact], Assem. Bill No. 278, § 15, adding Civil Code, § 2924.11 [prohibiting dual tracking by all lenders and mortgage servicers effective January 1, 2018].) The single point of contact provision, like the dual-tracking provision, is intended to prevent borrowers from being given the run around, being told one thing by one bank employee while something entirely different is being pursued by another. Under the legislation, the single point of contact must be responsible for, among other things, “[h]aving access to current information and personnel sufficient to timely, accurately, and adequately inform the borrower of the current status of” his loan modification request and “[h]aving access to individuals with the ability and authority to stop foreclosure proceedings when necessary.” (Assem.Bill No. 278, § 9, adding Civ. Code, § 2923.7.)

The same legislation provides homeowners who are facing foreclosure or whose homes have actually been lost to foreclosure with a remedy if the lender or loan servicer materially violated the provisions of the Act intentionally, recklessly, or through “willful misconduct.” (Assem. Bill No. 278, §§ 16 & 17, adding Civil Code, § 2924.12): those facing foreclosure may seek an injunction, while those who have lost their homes may seek treble actual damages or statutory damages of $50,000, whichever is greater.

Of course, these provisions do not apply to our case. The question for our purposes is whether the new legislation sets forth policy considerations that should affect the assessment whether a duty of care was owed to Jolley at that time. We think it does.

We find support for our conclusion in recent federal district court cases that have found a duty of care in particular circumstances surrounding loan modification negotiations.Ansanelli v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2011 No. C 10-03892) 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 32350, p. *21, is illustrative. There, the court found a duty of care had properly been pleaded in a negligence action where the bank offered plaintiffs a trial loan modification plan, then reneged on a promise to modify the loan. The bank reported the loan as past due despite the fact that plaintiffs had made proper payments under the trial modification, thereby damaging their credit rating. (Id. at pp. *2-3.)

Similarly, Robinson v. Bank of America (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2012 No. 12-CV-00494-RMW) 2012 U.S. Dist. Lexis 74212, p. *21, decided on a motion to dismiss, held that a bank went beyond its role as a “silent” lender in its dealings with plaintiff during loan modification negotiations. There, the bank was “alleged to have executed and breached the modification agreement, then engaged in a series of contradictory and somewhat misleading communications with plaintiff—in person, in writing, and by phone—regarding the status of his loan. Under such circumstances, it was entirely foreseeable that [the bank’s] conduct could result in damage to plaintiff’s credit rating or a decrease in the value of his home.” (Ibid.; see also Crilley v. Bank of America, N.A. (D.Haw. Apr. 26, 2012 No. 12-00081) 2012 U.S. Dist. Lexis 58469 at pp. * 5-12, 26 [duty of care owed where plaintiff and bank engaged in substantial negotiations regarding loan modification, finding potential liability based in part on “delays in the loan modification process”]; Watkinson v. MortgageIT, Inc. (S.D.Cal. June 1, 2010 No. 10-CV-327) 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 53540, pp. * 23-24 [duty of care found where bank knowingly misstated borrower’s income and value of property on loan application, and where borrower sought but was denied a loan modification]; Garcia v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (N.D.Cal. May 6, 2010 No. C-10-0290) 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 45375 at pp. *7-11 [plaintiff’s allegations about loan modification application process sufficiently pled a duty under Biakanja factors]; but see, Ottolini v. Bank of America, supra, 2011 Dist. Lexis 92900 at pp. *18-19 [distinguishing Ansanelli, supra, 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 32350 where “the application for loan modification had not progressed to a concrete stage and . . . there is no indication of the likelihood that such an application would have been granted”].)

We conclude that the determination that Chase owed no duty to Jolley was error. Thus, the summary adjudication on the negligence cause of action must be reversed, as it was inLaabs v. Southern California Edison Co. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1269 where the Court of Appeal held as follows: “We note, however, that we do not hold that SCE owed Laabs a duty of care as a matter of law; rather, we hold that triable issues of fact exist as to the relevant considerations underlying duty in this case, and that SCE failed to establish that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. While we recognize that the issue of duty is a matter for the trial court, it is nonetheless a factually oriented inquiry. As stated in Burger v. Pond (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 597, 603, `”Foreseeability” and “policy considerations” are not determined in a vacuum, but rather depend . . . upon the particular circumstances in which the purported wrongful conduct occurred.'”

C. The Fifth Cause Of Action, Violation Of Business And Professions Code Section 17200

Jolley claims Chase violated the unfair competition law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200), but does not specify which acts violated that provision or the nature of the violation. Again, he bases his theory of liability on the premise that Chase “must stand squarely in the shoes of WaMu for all of its criminal, fraudulent, negligent and otherwise `unfair’ practices perpetrated against Appellant and the world economy . . . .” He further claims, without specificity, that Chase is equally liable for such wrongdoing on its own part.

The UCL is broad in scope, prohibiting any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising,” as well as any act specifically prohibited under Business and Professions Code section 17500 et seq. The statute is meant to forbid not only anti-competitive practices but also “`”`the right of thepublic to protections from fraud and deceit.'”‘” (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 209.) An “unlawful” activity is any business activity that is forbidden by law. (Saunders v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 832, 838-839.) A “fraudulent” activity includes any act or practice likely to deceive the public, even if no one is actually deceived. (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp., supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 211.)

There is a split of authority on what constitutes an “unfair” practice. (Bardin v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1260-1261.) Some cases hold an “unfair” practice is one that offends established public policy, that is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers, or that has an impact on the victim that outweighs defendant’s reasons, justifications, and motives for the practice. (Pastoria v. Nationwide Ins. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1498; Smith v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 700, 718-719; Podolsky v. First Healthcare Corp.(1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 632, 647.) Others, including at least one from our district (Gregory v. Albertson’s, Inc. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 845, 853-854), hold that the public policy which is a predicate to a claim under the “unfair” prong of the UCL must be tethered to specific constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provisions. (See also, Scripps Clinic v. Superior Court(2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 917, 938.) Either way, unfairness is independently sufficient to state a claim under the statute. (Allied Grape Growers v. Bronco Wine Co. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 432, 451; see Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co.(1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180 [indicating that conduct may be “unfair” without being “unlawful”].)

Granting summary adjudication on the fifth cause of action, the trial court concluded that “the undisputed evidence shows that Chase has not violated any law, or committed a deceptive or fraudulent act/misrepresentation to fall within § 17200.” There was no reference to “unfair” conduct.

With respect to Chase’s own conduct, we have already decided that North’s statements may be construed as misstatements of fact, with possible liability for such conduct left to the trier of fact. That raises a triable issue as to “fraudulent.” We have also concluded that dual tracking has been alleged and supported by Jolley’s declaration. And while dual tracking may not have been forbidden by statute at the time, the new legislation and its legislative history may still contribute to its being considered “unfair” for purposes of the UCL. Summary adjudication of Jolley’s fifth cause of action was improper.

E. The Eighth Cause Of Action, For Reformation

Civil Code section 3399 provides the authority upon which a contract may be reformed: “When, through fraud or a mutual mistake of the parties, or a mistake of one party, which the other at the time knew or suspected, a written contract does not truly express the intention of the parties, it may be revised, on the application of a party aggrieved, so as to express that intention, so far as it can be done without prejudice to rights acquired by third persons, in good faith and for value.” (See generally, 5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008 Pleading, § 806, pp. 221-222.)

The “intention of the parties,” as stated in Civil Code section 3399, refers to “a single intention which is entertained by both parties.” (Shupe v. Nelson (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 693, 700.) “The essential purpose of reformation is to reflect the intent of the parties.” (Jones v. First American Title Ins. Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 381, 389.) “`Although a court of equity may revise a written instrument to make it conform to the real agreement, it has no power to make a new contract for the parties . . . .'” (American Home Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co. (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 951, 963.)

The facts are undisputed that Chase and Jolley never signed a contract to modify the WaMu loan or reached agreement on any specific terms for a loan modification. However, Jolley pled, and testified, that the original loan agreement with WaMu was marred by either fraud or mutual mistake in that he was promised that prepaid construction costs would be reimbursed to him. Jolley’s basis for this claim is a written document entitled “Construction Items Prepaid at Closing” signed in December 2005, before the actual loan was finalized. Jolley evidently wishes to reform the written agreement to incorporate this reimbursement provision, and there is a triable issue of fact whether he can. Summary adjudication on this cause of action must be reversed. (See Jensen v. Quality Loan Services Corp (E.D.Cal. 2010) 702 F.Supp.2d 1183, 1197, fn. 5 [Chase may be subject to reformation of WaMu’s loan based on its acquisition of the loan].)

4. Summary Adjudication Was Properly Granted On The Sixth and Seventh Causes Of Action

A. The Sixth Cause Of Action, For Declaratory Relief

Code of Civil Procedure section 1060 authorizes actions for declaratory relief under a “written instrument” or “contract.” Declaratory relief generally operates prospectively to declare future rights, rather than to redress past wrongs. (Babb v. Superior Court (1971) 3 Cal.3d 841, 848; Gafcon, Inc. v. Ponsor & Associates (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1403 (Gafcon).) It serves to set controversies at rest before they lead to repudiation of obligations, invasion of rights or commission of wrongs. In short, the remedy is to be used in the interests of preventive justice, to declare rights rather than execute them. (Ibid.)

“To qualify for declaratory relief, [a party] would have to demonstrate its action presented two essential elements: `(1) a proper subject of declaratory relief, and (2) an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to [the party’s] rights or obligations.'” (Wilson & Wilson v. City Council of Redwood City (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1582.)

The trial court did not state any reason for granting summary adjudication on the declaratory relief cause of action, but simply recited in conclusory fashion that Jolley was not entitled to such relief, citing Gafcon, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at pages 1401-1402. Citation of that case suggests the ruling was premised on the notion that Jolley has, if anything, a fully matured cause of action against Chase, and not one appropriate for declaratory relief. With this we agree.

The undisputed facts show that loan modification negotiations did not result in a written instrument or contract under which the parties’ rights need to be declared. While there may be a controversy about past conduct, we see no reason why money damages would not be an adequate remedy. (See Gafcon, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1403-1404.) Moreover, this cause of action is redundant of Jolley’s other claims, and declaratory relief may be denied “where its declaration or determination is not necessary or proper at the time under all the circumstances.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1061.) Where, as here, Jolley has a fully matured cause of action for money, he must seek damages, and not pursue a declaratory relief claim. (Gafcon, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1403-1404; Jackson v. Teachers Ins. Co.(1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 341, 344.) Summary adjudication of the sixth cause of action was proper.

F. The Seventh Cause Of Action, For Accounting

An action for an accounting may be brought to compel the defendant to account to the plaintiff for money or property (1) where a fiduciary relationship exists between the parties, or (2) where, even though no fiduciary relationship exists, the accounts are so complicated that an ordinary legal action demanding a fixed sum is impracticable. (5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Pleadings, § 819, p. 236.) “A cause of action for an accounting requires a showing that a relationship exists between the plaintiff and defendant that requires an accounting, and that some balance is due the plaintiff that can only be ascertained by an accounting.” (Teselle v. McLoughlin (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 156, 179.)

Chase contends that Jolley’s cause of action for an accounting is subject to summary adjudication because Jolley makes no claim that money was due him under the contract with WaMu, and no independent contract was ever entered into with Chase. The trial court found “no evidence that Defendants owe [Jolley] any money under the Construction Loan Agreement that requires an accounting.” It further concluded, “[Jolley] makes no effort to identify where in the payment record he is owed any money” with the consequence that “no grounds for an accounting exist.” Jolley’s efforts aside, there are disputed facts with respect to whether the modified construction loan had been fully funded prior to Chase’s acquisition of the loan.

That said, we find an accounting remedy uncalled for in this case. There was no fiduciary relationship between the parties and we detect no proof of any other special relationship that would give rise to an accounting remedy, nor a specification of amounts due so complicated that it cannot be determined in a legal action for damages. Summary adjudication of the seventh cause of action was proper.

5. Summary Judgment for CRC Was Proper

CRC acted solely as trustee in the present case. None of Jolley’s allegations of wrongdoing pertains to CRC, and no factual support has been offered with respect to any claim against it. The summary judgment is therefore affirmed insofar as it is in favor of CRC. (See Moncrief v. Washington Mutual, supra, 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 64100, at p. *8.)

DISPOSITION

The summary judgment in favor of CRC is affirmed, as are the summary adjudications in favor of Chase of the sixth and seventh causes of action. The summary judgment for Chase is reversed. Both sides shall bear their respective costs on appeal.

Haerle, Acting P.J. and Lambden, J., concurs.


Request for Production No. 1:Footnotes


1. J.P. Morgan Chase is the successor corporation to both Chase Home Finance LLC and California Reconveyance Company (CRC). We refer to the Chase entities collectively as “Chase.”

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2. Payments on the construction loan were interest only during construction and varied in amount depending on the status of funding. Once construction had been completed, the balance of the loan was to be rolled over into a fully amortized mortgage on the home. A reserve was included to pay the interest payments during construction. Because the reserve was calculated based on the predicted length of construction, it proved to be insufficient to cover interest payments during the extended construction period.

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3. Documents submitted by Chase show the outstanding principal owing at default in December 2008 was $2,426,650, increased to $2,632,066.99 when the notice of default was recorded. By the time the motion was filed in August 2011, Chase calculated it was owed $3,019,693.29.

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4. Jolley’s complaint referred to both WaMu and Chase collectively as “the Bank,” making it difficult to ascertain which conduct was alleged with respect to which entity.

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5. That section reads: “A voluntary acceptance of the benefit of a transaction is equivalent to a consent to all the obligations arising from it, so far as the facts are known, or ought to be known, to the person accepting.” (Civ. Code, § 1589.)

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6. The motion was actually filed on behalf of both named defendants, Chase, and CRC. As noted, no charging allegations were made in Jolley’s complaint against CRC, and his opposition to the motion said essentially nothing about it. Thus, the focus of the proceedings below, and here, is on Chase, and for ease of discussion we refer to Chase as the moving party.

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7. The remaining “facts” were four paragraphs attaching what were claimed to be “certified” or “true and correct” copies of documents recorded in Marin County.

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8. We cast no aspersions on Chase’s counsel for her position, as the confidentiality agreement prepared by Jolley’s counsel did not specify the documents requested.

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9. We find no express ruling on Jolley’s ex parte application for a continuance, but it was effectively denied by the grant of summary judgment.

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10. The referenced footnote says that “Federal Courts have taken judicial notice of the P&A Agreement and similar agreements with the FDIC. (Allen v. United Fin. Mortgage Corp., 660 F.Supp.2d 1089, 1093 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (judicial notice taken of the P&A Agreement even though a few pages missing from that offered by defendant, because the Agreement is available online, from the FDIC’s web site; In re Sharp, Case No. 09-13980 A P. No. 10-1032 (N. D. Cal. Bk.); Jarvis v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2010 WL 2927276, at *1, (C.D. Cal. July 23, 2010); see also Yeomalakis v. F.D.I.C., 562 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2009.) (Resp. App. 86-89.)”

Some federal courts have taken judicial notice of the same or similar purchase and assumption agreements, frequently without discussion or analysis, either because they were deemed “public records” or because their contents could be “accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” (Fed. Rules Evid., rule 201(b)(2); Rosenfeld v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (N.D.Cal. 2010) 732 F.Supp.2d 952, 958-960 [dismissing claims against Chase despite claim that it engaged in loan modification negotiations with plaintiff]; McCann v. Quality Loan Service Corp. (W.D.Wash. 2010) 729 F.Supp.2d 1238, 1241-1242 [in context of claims relating to WaMu refinance transaction, collecting cases holding Chase not liable for WaMu’s conduct]; Cassese v. Washington Mutual et al. (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2008 No. 05 CV 2724) 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 111709, at pp. *6-7, 2009 [same, including claims of fraud and breach of contract]; Moncrief v. Washington Mutual(S.D.Cal. June 28, 2010 No. 10CV350) 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 64100 at pp.*6-7 [same for claims filed after Chase acquired WaMu’s assets].)

Some cases have found the language of section 2.1 of the P&A Agreement creates a degree of uncertainty about whether Chase assumed specific liabilities depending on whether it acted as lender, loan servicer, or both. (See Hayes-Boman v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank (D.Minn. 2010) 724 F.Supp.2d 1003, 1015; Punzalan v. FDIC (W.D.Tex. 2009) 633 F.Supp.2d 406, 414 & fn. 5; In re Pena (Bankr. S.D.Tex. 2009) 409 B.R. 847, 859-862.)

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11. Chase also argues on appeal that Jolley’s testimony is barred by the parol evidence rule and as hearsay. These objections were not made in the trial court, and are thus inappropriate here.

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12. Rosenfeld., supra, 732 F.Supp.2d at p. 969 [claim for breach of fiduciary duty]; Argueta v. J.P. Morgan Chase (E.D.Cal. June 30, 2011 No. CIV. 2:11-441) 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 70756, at p. *12; Sullivan v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA (E.D.Cal. 2010) 725 F.Supp.2d 1087, 1094 [“Plaintiffs’ allegations that Defendant misrepresented to them that a permanent loan modification would be put into place are insufficient to form the basis of a negligence claim”].)

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13. Becker v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Inc. (E.D.Cal. Mar. 22, 2011 No. 2:10-cv-02799) 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 29687, at pp.*67-71 [allegations about loan modification application process did not give rise to duty]; Dooms v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (E.D.Cal. Mar. 31, 2011 No. CV F 11-0352) 2011 Dist. Lexis 38550, at pp. *25-28; DeLeon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (N.D.Cal. Oct. 22, 2010 No. 10-CV-01390) 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 112941, at p. *12 [defendant did not have a duty “to complete the loan modification process”].)

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14. Connor held there was lender liability to the homeowners who bought into the housing tract. The Legislature subsequently enacted Civil Code section 3434 to restrict such liability, and to that extent Connorhas been superseded by statute. (Anthony v. Kelsey-Hayes Co. (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 442, 454, fn. 5.)

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15. We agree with Chase that no admissible evidence was submitted to support the assertion that Chase had decided in advance not to further fund any WaMu loans. The only evidence on this point was Thorne’s declaration, which lacked foundation. However, regardless whether the decision was made in advance, if it were made without due care to avoid further injury to Jolley, then Chase is potentially liable for its own negligence.

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16. Such a loan more readily gives rise to a cause of action for negligence in that contractual disbursements must be made with due care. “A lender that enters into a loan agreement to disburse the loan funds according to the terms of the loan documents, assumes a duty of care to act reasonably to abstain from injuring the borrower by its disbursal of funds. A lender may be liable to the borrower who is damaged as a result of the lender’s negligent disbursal of the loan funds.” (12 Miller & Starr, California Real Estate (3d ed. 2011) § 36:6, fns. omitted.)

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17. We quote the California Legislature: “California is still reeling from the economic impacts of a wave of residential property foreclosures that began in 2007. From 2007 to 2011 alone, there were over 900,000 completed foreclosure sales. In 2011, 38 of the top 100 hardest hit ZIP Codes in the nation were in California, and the current wave of foreclosures continues apace. All of this foreclosure activity has adversely affected property values and resulted in less money for schools, public safety, and other public services. In addition, according to the Urban Institute, every foreclosure imposes significant costs on local governments, including an estimated nineteen thousand two hundred twenty-nine dollars ($19,229) in local government costs. And the foreclosure crisis is not over; there remain more than two million `underwater’ mortgages in California.

“It is essential to the economic health of this state to mitigate the negative effects on the state and local economies and the housing market that are the result of continued foreclosures by modifying the foreclosure process to ensure that borrowers who may qualify for a foreclosure alternative are considered for, and have a meaningful opportunity to obtain, available loss mitigation options. These changes to the state’s foreclosure process are essential to ensure that the current crisis is not worsened by unnecessarily adding foreclosed properties to the market when an alternative to foreclosure may be available. Avoiding foreclosure, where possible, will help stabilize the state’s housing market and avoid the substantial, corresponding negative effects of foreclosures on families, communities, and the state and local economy.” (Assem. Bill No. 278 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.), § 1 (subdivisions designations omitted).)

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18. The legislative history of Assembly Bill No. 278 recognized extensive “`spillover’ costs” of “the foreclosure epidemic”: “By some estimates the foreclosure crisis will strip neighboring homeowners of $1.9 trillion in equity as foreclosures drain value from homes located near foreclosed properties by 2012. . . . Meanwhile, state and local governments continue to be hit hard by declining tax revenues coupled with increased demand for social services. In fact, the Urban Institute estimates that a single foreclosure costs $79,443 after aggregating the costs borne by financial institutions, investors, the homeowner, their neighbors, and local governments.” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. Of Sen. Floor Analyses, Conference Report on Assem. Bill No. 278 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.) June 27, 2012, pp. 14-15.)

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19. “When a borrower is in danger of defaulting, a commonsense approach under a traditional mortgage would be for the lender and borrower to mutually agree to modify the terms of the loan . . . . [¶] Despite the apparent mutual interest of loan holders and borrowers, many distressed homeowners report obstacles when trying to obtain a loan modification or short-sale approval. (See e.g. `Loan Modifications Elude Local Homeowners,’ Sacramento Bee (January 17, 2011).) . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] Some analysts and leading economists have cited a failure by banks to provide loan modifications as a single reason that the foreclosure crisis continues to drag on.” (Sen. Floor Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 278 at pp. 15-16.)

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20. According to the legislative history, “borrowers can find their loss-mitigation options curtailed because of dual-track processes that result in foreclosures even when a borrower has been approved for a loan modification.” (Sen. Floor Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 278, pp. 20-21.)

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21. Jolley alleged, inter alia, that he was told a “workable loan modification was in the works” and “[f]oreclosure proceedings would be suspended pending the outcome of the loan modification process.” He further alleged the true facts were that “a loan modification was not in the works” and “foreclosure proceedings were ongoing.” Beyond the mere allegations, Jolley testified that because of “inordinate delay” by Chase in responding to his initial contact regarding a loan modification, he “borrowed heavily from friends and family” to complete construction. And further, that had the loan modification been granted and the construction loan converted to a conventional loan, the permanent financing would have been at a “favorable rate,” making the “payments substantially less” and he “could have afforded to pay them.”

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The latest from Reiss and Borden – Dirt Lawyers, Dirty REMICS

From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Friday, February 01, 2013 2:12 PM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: The latest from Reiss and Borden – Dirt Lawyers, Dirty REMICS

Dirty REMICs…

Charles
Charles Wayne Cox
Email: mailto:Charles
Websites: www.BayLiving.com; www.FdnPro.com and www.ForensicLoanAnalyst.com
1969 Camellia Ave.
Medford, OR 97504-5403
(541) 727-2240 direct
(541) 610-1931 eFax

Paralegal; Litigation Support and Expert Witness Services; Forensic Loan Analyst; CA Licensed Real Estate Broker.

article dirt lawyers dirty remics david reiss borden.pdf

California Homeowners Bill of Rights White Paper

From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Monday, February 11, 2013 7:14 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: California Homeowners Bill of Rights White Paper

FYI

Charles
Charles Wayne Cox
Email: mailto:Charles
Websites: www.BayLiving.com; www.FdnPro.com and www.ForensicLoanAnalyst.com
1969 Camellia Ave.
Medford, OR 97504-5403
(541) 727-2240 direct
(541) 610-1931 eFax

Paralegal; Litigation Support and Expert Witness Services; Forensic Loan Analyst; CA Licensed Real Estate Broker.

Nationwide_Title_Clearing_White_Paper_Preparing_for_CA_Homeowner_Bill_of_Rights.pdf

2012 in review

The WordPress.com stats helper monkeys prepared a 2012 annual report for this blog.

Here’s an excerpt:

About 55,000 tourists visit Liechtenstein every year. This blog was viewed about 200,000 times in 2012. If it were Liechtenstein, it would take about 4 years for that many people to see it. Your blog had more visits than a small country in Europe!

Click here to see the complete report.

timothymccandless's avatarabc Assignment for benefit of creditors

Of late I have had three clients who have contracted with companies who claim they can settle the second trust deed on the clients home for pennies on the dollar. They clients must pay the agreed amount up front and to the scamming company. As an example this client paid 40,000.00 to settle a 112,000.00. Eagerly my client paid from a loan from relatives. Eight months later still no settlement and when he asks for a refund the company says they are going through an audit and right after the audit he will get a refund. Double talk if you ask me and the company will be using some other “clients’ money if they ever pay back. We sued the and took their default they promised a full refund by Dec. 15, 2011 no refund yet I believe this is a Ponzzi scheme cooked up by some Broker. Advise: when…

View original post 50 more words

timothymccandless's avatarlitigation and damages for lenders bad acts

In McCollough v. Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger, LLC., No. 09-35767 (9th Cir. Mar. 4, 2011), plaintiff opened a credit card account around 1990 with Chemical Bank, which later merged with Chase. Plaintiff’s account became delinquent and in 2000, Chase Manhattan charged off the $3,000 account balance and later sold the account to CACV of Colorado, Ltd. CACV filed a collection action in state court in 2005. Two weeks later, CACV dismissed the case after plaintiff pointed out that the statute of limitations had lapsed. In 2006 CACV ‘s parent company retained Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger (“JRL”), a debt collection law firm, to pursue collection of plaintiff’s debt.

JRL noticed a statute of limitations problem with plaintiff’s account and inquired to CACV, who responded that plaintiff had made a partial payment in 2004, which would extend the statute of limitations to 2009. This information was incorrect: the payment in 2004 was…

View original post 378 more words

timothymccandless's avatarlitigation and damages for lenders bad acts

Letter to collection agency for Cease and Desist

One way to stop harassing phone calls from a collection agency is to send them a Cease and Desist Letter, requesting that they stop contacting you. Below is a sample Cease and Desist Letter.

Your Name
Your Address
Your Phone #

Collector’s Name
Collector’s Address
Date

Dear Sir/Madam,
Re: Account Number

I am requesting that you cease and desist with your efforts to collect on the debt referenced above. I wish to deal with the original creditor and not a collection agency.

Therefore, I request that you cease collection efforts immediately or face legal action under State and Federal consumer protection laws. I hope you would consider giving this letter the attention it deserves.

Sincerely,
Your Signature
Your Name

View original post

timothymccandless's avatarlitigation and damages for lenders bad acts

How to request creditor for debt verification

Debt validation works only with collection agencies and not the original creditor. The only way you can make your original creditor verify your debt is by telling him that you’ll sue his company for defamation if he cannot prove that you are actually late on payments or even that you are on the debt account. This is when you need to use debt verification letters. A sample debt verification letter (verification of debt letter) is given below.

Company Name
Company Address

Collector’s Name
Department
Collector’s Address

Date

Dear Sir/Madam,
Re: Account Number

This letter is to dispute the account referenced above. I have already disputed this information with the credit bureaus .

I have contacted you previously regarding this account, and you have not responded to me. If you cannot verify this information pursuant to the FCRA, and it continues to appear on…

View original post 67 more words

timothymccandless's avatarlitigation and damages for lenders bad acts

Validation of debt: 7 debt validation steps to fight collection agency

Are collection agencies harassing you with repeated calls? Are you sure they’re legally entitled to collect the debt? Before you make a payment, try finding out if the agencies have the right to collect your debt. This is where debt validation can help you. Check out the topics given below if you want to know what debt validation is all about.

What is validation of debt?
Is there a time limit for validation of debt?
What details do you get with debt validation?
What are the steps in validation of debt?
Can you dispute the debt after the validation period?
Debt assigned to CA – how does it affect validation?
How do validation and debt verification differ?

What is validation of debt?

Debt validation is where you try to find out whether the collection agency (CA) has the legal…

View original post 1,091 more words

timothymccandless's avatarlitigation and damages for lenders bad acts

The whole purpose of a trial is to resolve disputes about the facts of your case. If neither party can dispute the facts, then a motion for summary judgement can be filed. A summary judgement means the judge looks at the facts, applies the law, and makes a ruling — saving you both a lot of time, money, and anguish. If there is any dispute about the facts, then the judge will deny the motion. In other words, there is no reason to bring a case to trial unless there is evidence that should be heard by a jury.

Other motions include:

Motion to dismiss – The Defendant can request the case be thrown out because it doesn’t state any kind of claim that warrants an award; or, as we mentioned earlier, if the court lacks the subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction for the case, isn’t of the proper…

View original post 985 more words

paragraph 22 Condition precedent

In standard FNMA deed of trust in paragraph 22 there exists a condition precedent of contact prior to Notice of Default that is routinely ignored by most lenders and or servicers and it is a defense to Foreclosure see attached ruling in Florida

Final Judgment Paragraph 22 Judge Tepper Brendan Riley.pdf

Suarez case – set for jury trial

From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Monday, January 28, 2013 5:27 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: Suarez case – set for jury trial

This is the first one I know of actually set for jury trial. Almost the same dirt bags as in our own case (they’ve got Bryan Cave, the S. California counter-part to our Severson & Werson group of scum bags.) Looks like Prosper is making some headway.

Good on them!

Charles
Charles Wayne Cox
Email: mailto:Charles
Websites: www.BayLiving.com; www.FdnPro.com and www.ForensicLoanAnalyst.com
1969 Camellia Ave.
Medford, OR 97504-5403
(541) 727-2240 direct
(541) 610-1931 eFax

Paralegal; Litigation Support and Expert Witness Services; Forensic Loan Analyst; CA Licensed Real Estate Broker.

PrintCase.pdf
121066708-Suarez-v-Bank-of-New-York-Mellon.pdf

Suarez Case – Complaint

From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Thursday, January 31, 2013 5:19 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: Suarez Case – Complaint

Initial complaint attached.

Charles
Charles Wayne Cox
Email: mailto:Charles
Websites: www.BayLiving.com; www.FdnPro.com and www.ForensicLoanAnalyst.com
1969 Camellia Ave.
Medford, OR 97504-5403
(541) 727-2240 direct
(541) 610-1931 eFax

Paralegal; Litigation Support and Expert Witness Services; Forensic Loan Analyst; CA Licensed Real Estate Broker.

SuarezCase Complaint.pdf

Follow up-Williamson County Texas – Clerk Report and findings

From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Thursday, January 31, 2013 6:21 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: Follow up-Williamson County Texas – Clerk Report and findings

Follow up to the Williamson County Clerk Audit Findings…link here to posting on my website due to file size: http://www.fdnpro.com/reference-material/documents/TexasRecorder-Audit.pdf (about 21mb…177 pages)

Remember Phil Ting and the similar report done in San Francisco? I think you’ll like this one even more.

Charles
Charles Wayne Cox
Email: mailto:Charles
Websites: www.BayLiving.com; www.FdnPro.com and www.ForensicLoanAnalyst.com
1969 Camellia Ave.
Medford, OR 97504-5403
(541) 727-2240 direct
(541) 610-1931 eFax

Paralegal; Litigation Support and Expert Witness Services; Forensic Loan Analyst; CA Licensed Real Estate Broker.

If her allegations are taken as true, she has satisfied the tender requirement

From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Thursday, January 24, 2013 5:22 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: If her allegations are taken as true, she has satisfied the tender requirement

From Deontos (I’ve attached the Order):

Martin v. LITTON LOAN SERVICING LP, Dist. Court, ED California 2013

RENEE’L. MARTIN, Plaintiff,
v.
LITTON LOAN SERVICING LP, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:12-cv-00970-MCE-EFB PS.

United States District Court, E.D. California.

January 16, 2013.

ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

EDMUND F. BRENNAN, Magistrate Judge.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendants have submitted a request for judicial notice which indicates that the deed of trust was assigned to defendant Deutsche Bank on March 19, 2004 and that Western Progressive is an agent for Deutsche Bank; the assignment was recorded on August 16, 2012. Defs.’ Req. for Jud. Notice, Dckt. No. 33, Exs. B, C. Although not specifically alleged in plaintiff’s first amended complaint, plaintiff contends that the assignment is fraudulent. Dckt. No. 42.

b. Failure to Respond to QWR

Here, plaintiff vaguely alleges that she sent Litton and Ocwen a QWR for an accounting and those defendants failed to respond, and defendants failed to disclose to plaintiff the true holders of the loan, after repeated attempts by plaintiff to ascertain that information. As an initial matter, those allegations lack specificity and are too speculative under Twombly andIqbal. Plaintiff does not allege, among other things, when the QWR or other requests were sent. Nonetheless, as discussed above, alleging a breach of RESPA duties alone does not state a claim under RESPA. Plaintiff must, at a minimum, also allege that the breach resulted in actual damages. See 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f)(1)(A) ("Whoever fails to comply with this section shall be liable to the borrower . . . [for] any actual damages to the borrower as a result of the failure."); Hutchinson v. Delaware Savings Bank FSB, 410 F. Supp. 2d 374, 383 (D.N.J. 2006)(citations omitted) (a claimant under 12 U.S.C. § 2605 must allege a pecuniary loss attributable to the alleged violation). Here, plaintiff does not specify any damages resulting from an alleged failure to respond to her QWR or requests regarding the true holder of the loan. Therefore, plaintiff’s RESPA claim against Litton and Ocwen based on a failure to respond to a QWR and/or requests for information about the true holders of the loan should be dismissed with leave to amend.

5. Quiet Title

Plaintiff seeks to quiet title as of March 8, 2004. Plaintiff seeks a judicial declaration that the title to the subject property is vested in plaintiff alone and that the defendants have no interest, right, or title to the property. First Am. Compl. ¶ 99. Defendants move to dismiss this claim, arguing that it fails because plaintiff has not alleged valid and/or viable tender of the indebtedness. Dckt. No. 32 at 17.

To establish a claim for quiet title, plaintiff must file a verified complaint that alleges: (a) a description of the property; (b) plaintiff’s title as to which a determination is sought; (c) the adverse claims to the title; (d) the date as to which the determination is sought; and (e) a prayer for the determination of title. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 761.020. Additionally, plaintiff must allege that she has tendered her indebtedness. See Kelley v. Mortg. Elec. Registration, 642 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1057 (N.D. Cal. 2009) ("Plaintiffs have not alleged . . . that they have satisfied their obligation under the Deed of Trust. As such, they have not stated a claim to quiet title.");see also Distor v. U.S. Bank, NA, 2009 WL 3429700, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2009) ("plaintiff has no basis to quiet title without first discharging her debt, and . . . she has not alleged that she has done so and is therefore the rightful owner of the property").

Here, defendants contend that plaintiff fails to allege tender or the ability to tender. However, plaintiff’s first amended complaint specifically alleges that she does not owe anything to any of the defendants. The fundamental essence of her claim is that she sent the regular payment of her mortgage every month but defendants wrongfully refused to process those payments because of the dispute over the amount and, because defendants did not have the authority to pay taxes on her behalf, they lacked authority to alter the amount due on her payments. Therefore, according to plaintiff, she has submitted her payments as due and there is nothing further to tender.

At the hearing, plaintiff specifically stated that she did not agree to paragraphs 4 or 9 of the deed of trust, which required her to pay taxes and which authorized the lender to pay the taxes on her behalf, nor did she agree to paragraph 10 of the loan modification agreement, which also reaffirmed plaintiff’s obligation to pay her taxes. If her allegations are taken as true, she has satisfied the tender requirement.[2] In light of plaintiff’s allegations that she has timely submitted her payments, and her allegations that she did not agree to all of the terms in the deed of trust, plaintiff’s quiet title claim is sufficient to withstand defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Martin v. Litton Loan Servicing.docx

Well well well…what do we have here?

From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Thursday, January 24, 2013 5:22 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: Well well well…what do we have here?

From PI Bill Paatalo in Portland.

Assignment of DOT – Manos.pdf

MERSCORP Shell Game Attacked by Kentucky Attorney General Jack Conway

From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Thursday, January 24, 2013 8:20 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: MERSCORP Shell Game Attacked by Kentucky Attorney General Jack Conway

One more try!

Posted by Neil Garfield:

EDITOR’S NOTES AND COMMENTS: My congratulations to Kentucky Attorney General Jack Conway and his staff. They nailed one of the key issues that cut revenues on transfers of interests in real property AND they nailed one of the key issues in perfecting the mortgage lien.

As we all know now MERSCORP has been playing a shell game with multiple corporate identities, the purpose of which, as explained in Conway’s complaint, was to add mud to the waters already polluted by predatory loan practices and outright fraud in the appraisal and identification of the lender. This of course is in addition to the very gnarly issue of using a nominee that explicitly disclaims any interest in the property or loan.

The use of MERS, just like the use of fabricated, forged, robo-signed documents doesn’t necessarily wipe out the debt. The debt is created when the borrower accepts the money, regardless of what the paperwork says — unless the state’s usury laws penalize the lender by eliminating the debt entirely and adding treble damages.

But the use of a nominee that has no interest in the loan or the property creates a problem in the perfection of the mortgage lien. The use of TWO nominees doubles the problem. It eliminates the most basic disclosure required by Federal and state lending laws — who is the creditor?

By intentionally naming the originator as the lender when it was merely a nominee and by using MERS, as nominee to have the rights under the security interest, the Banks created layers of bankruptcy remote protection as they intended, as well as the moral hazard of stealing or "borrowing" the loan to create fictitious transactions in which the bank kept part of the money intended for mortgage funding. Since the mortgage or deed of trust contains no stakeholders other than the homeowner and the note fails to name any actual creditor with a loan receivable account, the mortgage lien is fatally defective rendering the loan unsecured.

When you take into consideration that the funding of the loan came from a source unrelated (stranger tot he transaction) then the debt doesn’t exist either — as it relates to any of the parties named at the "closing" of the mortgage loan. So you end up with no debt, no note, and no mortgage. You also end up with a debt that is undocumented wherein the homeowner is the debtor and the source of funds is the creditor — in a transaction that neither of them knew took place and neither of them had agreed.

The lender/investors were expecting to participate in a REMIC trust which was routinely ignored as the money was diverted by the banks to their own pockets before they made increasingly toxic over-priced loans on over-valued property. The borrower ended up in limbo with no place to go to settle, modify or even litigate their loan, mortgage or foreclosure. This is not the statutory scheme in any state and Conway in Kentucky spotted it. Besides the usual "dark side" rhetoric, the plan as executed by the banks creates fatal uncertainty that cannot be cured as to who owns the loan or the lien or the debt, note or mortgage. The answer clearly does not lie in the documents presented to the borrower.

Now Conway has added the hidden issue of the MERS shell game. Confirming what we have been saying for years, the Banks, using the MERS model, have made it nearly impossible for ANY borrower to know the identity of the actual lender/creditor before during and even one day after the "closing" of the loan (which I have postulated may never have been completed because the money didn’t come from MERS nor the other nominee identified as the "lender").

The Banks are trying to run the clock on the statute of limitations with these settlements, like the the last one in which Bank of America would have owed tens of millions of dollars had the review process continued, and instead they cancelled the program with a minor settlement in which homeowners will get some pocket change while BofA walks off with the a mouthful of ill-gotten gains.

The plain truth is that in most cases BofA never paid a dime for the funding or purchase of the loan. That is called lack of consideration and in order for the rules of negotiable paper to apply, there must be transfer for value. There was no value, there was no cancelled check and there was no wire transfer receipt in which BofA was the lender or acquirer of the loan. Now add this ingredient: more than 50% of the REMIC trusts BofA says it "represents no longer exist, having been long since dissolved and settled.

The same holds true for US Bank, Mellon, Chase, Deutsch and others. Applying basic black letter law, the only possible conclusion here is that the mortgages cannot be foreclosed, the notes cannot be enforced, the debt can be collected ONLY upon proof of payment and proof of loss. This is how it always was, for obvious reasons, and this is what we should re turn to, providing a degree of certainty to the marketplace that does not and will never exist without the massive correction in title corruption and the wrongful foreclosures conducted by what the reviewers in the San Francisco audit called "strangers to the transaction."

See Louisville Morning Call here

See Bloomberg Article here

CALL TO ACTION CONTACT THE COUNSEL REPRESENTING INVESTORS!

From: rene powers [mailto:gpanda26@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, January 25, 2013 6:23 AM
To: CJ Holmes
Subject: CALL TO ACTION CONTACT THE COUNSEL REPRESENTING INVESTORS!

CJ! I am on fire to get to the attorneys and the judge so we homeowners can be heard. Apparently it looks like we could have been by the deadlines noted BUT I don’t know about the rest of those affected but I never got notice to participate! The verbiage in the notice "mentions" anyone affected could be heard..They had ALL the addresses in the 530 trusts but I did not get a notice in the mail??? Anyhow, I have sent an email to Kenneth Warner through his AVVO account, will be calling his office and want this CALL TO ACTION to go out! THIS IS WHAT IT TAKES!! I know BJ will be on today and you are doing updates, this is HUGE for all homeowners to start making noise! It was like they threw a party and never invited the guest of honor!! THANK YOU!!!

Please cut and paste the message below

CALL TO ACTION! Are you affected by ANY of the Countrywide Trust Pools? If you are CONTACT ME! Doc Wood sent me the link to the case going on with BONY and investors I am linking here. I sent an email to one of the attorneys asking WHY ARE HOMEOWNERS LEFT OUT OF THIS SETTLEMENT??? The investors think THEY were duped? WHAT ABOUT THE HOMEOWNERS?? We MUST have a voice and I want to direct those affected to READ THE LINKS IN THIS CASE AND START MAKING NOISE!!! WE MUST STAND TOGETHER AND BE HEARD AS WE HAVE BEEN SILENCED TOO LONG!! FIND EMAIL ADDRESSES FOR THESE ATTORNEYS AND LET’s CALL THEIR OFFICES TOO! PLEASE CONTACT ME FOR ORGANIZATION OF OUR EFFORTS AND WE WILL MAKE OUR VOICES HEARD!!address for addressing the court is included as well! GET LETTERS WRITTEN AND TELL YOUR STORY! WE were victims ALONG WITH the investors! WITH 530 affected trusts that is A LOT of homeowners affected! DO IT! FAX EMAIL CALL SEND MAIL. Thank you! Rene gpanda26!! Put "affected by one of the "TRUSTS" " in the subject line please!

http://www.cwrmbssettlement.com/index.php

Rene’ Powers

Real Estate & Mortgage Consultant/Agent

949.648-3655 Cell

gpanda26
"Integrity & Service Coming To You"

license# 01797666

Foreclosure Homeowners Bill of Rights

311743_461142693917204_1622590124_nOn January 1, 2013 a new California law, the Homeowner Bill of Rights, will go into effect. The new law reforms some aspects of the California foreclosure process in order to better protect homeowners in foreclosure.

Between 2008 and 2011, more than one million homes in California were foreclosed. In many cases, lenders did not provide homeowners with a significant opportunity to obtain loss mitigation options to avoid foreclosure and also engaged in extensive mortgage servicing misconduct. To address this issue, Governor Jerry Brown signed the California Homeowner Bill of Rights into law on July 11, 2012.

The Homeowner Bill of Rights makes the nonjudicial foreclosure process in California more fair and transparent. Read on to learn about the new protections for homeowners and how the Homeowner Bill of Rights can help you if you are facing foreclosure in California.

(See our article Summary of California Foreclosure Laws for more information on the California foreclosure process).

What Is the California Homeowner Bill of Rights?

The purpose of the Homeowner Bill of Rights is to provide protections for homeowners facing foreclosure and to reform some aspects of the foreclosure process. It aims to ensure that homeowners are considered for, and have a meaningful opportunity to obtain, available loss mitigation options, such as loan modifications or other alternatives to foreclosure. (Learn more in our Alternatives to Foreclosure area.)

The Homeowner Bill of Rights is part of California Attorney General Kamala D. Harris’ response to the state’s foreclosure crisis and largely came about as a result of the recent national mortgage settlement between 49 states and certain lenders. (Learn more about the the national mortgage settlement.)

However, whereas the national mortgage settlement is only applicable to the five settling banks and their customers, the Homeowner Bill of Rights extends the reforms addressed in the national mortgage settlement to almost all mortgage lenders and servicers.

Key Reforms in the California Homeowner Bill of Rights

The Homeowner Bill of Rights contains four key reforms:

No Dual-Tracking

Under current law, a lender may foreclose on a homeowner even if a loan modification application is pending, which is a process called “dual-tracking.” The Homeowner Bill of Rights bans the dual-tracking of foreclosures. This means loan servicers must make a decision to grant or deny a first lien loan modification application before starting or continuing the foreclosure process.

What does this mean for homeowners? Once the homeowner submits a complete loan modification application, the foreclosure is stalled while the loan servicer reviews the application and makes a decision. Even if the lender denies the loan modification, it still cannot foreclose until any applicable appeals period has expired (this is generally 30 days from the date of the written denial).

Lenders Must Provide Homeowners With a Single Point of Contact

gt_loan_mod_fair_470x340_111212In the past, homeowners who called their lender to get help with mortgage problems have had to explain their circumstances repeatedly, often to several different representatives. Under the Homeowner Bill of Rights, mortgage servicers must designate a single point of contact for homeowners who are potentially eligible for loan modifications or other foreclosure prevention alternatives. The homeowner must be given one or more direct means of communication with the single point of contact.

The point of contact may be an individual person or a team of personnel each of whom has:

  • knowledge of the homeowner’s status
  • information regarding foreclosure prevention alternatives
  • access to decision-makers, and
  • the responsibility to coordinate the flow of documents between the homeowner and mortgage servicer.

The single point of contact will remain assigned to the account until all loss mitigation options are exhausted or until the account is brought current.

Penalties for Robo-Signing

“Robo-signing” occurs when a representative of the lender or servicer signs foreclosure documents without reading them or having any personal knowledge about the accuracy of the information contained in them. The Homeowner Bill of Rights imposes a civil penalty up to $7,500 per loan on lenders or servicers that record or file multiple, unverified documents. (Learn more about robo-signing in the mortgage industry.)

Homeowners Have the Right to Sue for Violations

23458820Homeowners may sue the lender or servicer for violations of the California Homeowner Bill of Rights. Potential relief includes:

  • injunctive relief, such as a halt to the foreclosure sale (if the foreclosure sale hasn’t happened yet), or
  • actual economic damages if the foreclosure sale has already occurred.

In addition, if the court finds that the violation was intentional, reckless, or resulted from willful misconduct by a loan servicer or lender, the court may award the borrower the greater of treble actual damages or statutory damages of $50,000.

Effective Date of the New Law

The Homeowner Bill of Rights goes into effect on January 1, 2013. It is scheduled to sunset on January 1, 2018.

Applicability of the California Homeowner Bill of Rights

The protections afforded to homeowners by the Homeowner Bill of Rights generally apply to first lien mortgage loans for properties that are:

  • owner-occupied
  • residential, and
  • no more than four units.

Smaller servicers (entities that conduct fewer than 175 foreclosure sales per year or annual reporting period) are exempt from some of the procedural requirements.

To Learn More About the California Homeowner Bill of Rights

For more information, go to the State of California Department of Justice’s webpage at www.oag.ca.gov and click on the link to “CA Homeowner Bill of Rights”.

by: Amy Loftsgordon

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6th USCCA Appeal Rules Foreclosures are Debt Collection under FDCPA and Attorneys Must Comply

From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Saturday, January 19, 2013 7:43 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: 6th USCCA Appeal Rules Foreclosures are Debt Collection under FDCPA and Attorneys Must Comply

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Monday handed down an opinion that defined mortgage foreclosure actions as “debt collection” under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), reversing a lower court decision.

In Glazer v. Chase Home Finance, LLC, et. al., the appellate panel said that third parties initiating foreclosure actions must comply with the provisions of the FDCPA.

The case was brought by plaintiff Glazer after he inherited a home that still had an outstanding and active mortgage serviced by Chase. After six missed payments, Chase engaged with law firm Reimer, Arnovitz, Chernek & Jeffrey Co., LPA (RACJ) to begin foreclosure proceedings.

In a complicated twist indicative of the time, Chase did not own the mortgage in question. In fact, the bank had not even originated it. The loan was owned by Fannie Mae and Chase had been assigned as the servicer from the originator. When RACJ moved to foreclose, it represented as owner of the loan Chase.

When Glazer asked for verification that Chase was the owner, he claims RACJ did not comply, prompting a lawsuit seeking FDCPA damages. A district judge in Ohio sided with Chase and RACJ and dismissed the case, which Glazer appealed.

The Sixth Circuit panel said Monday that Chase was not a “debt collector” under the FDCPA:

…we hold that mortgage foreclosure is debt collection under the, Act. Lawyers who meet the general definition of a “debt collector” must comply with, the FDCPA when engaged in mortgage foreclosure. And a lawyer can satisfy that definition if his principal business purpose is mortgage foreclosure or if he “regularly” performs this function. In this case, the district court held that RACJ was not engaged in debt collection when it sought to foreclose on the property. That decision was erroneous, and the judgment must be reversed.

The case will now go back to the lower court for further consideration.

Glazer v. Chase.pdf

California – Oral promises can be used in fraud case – Parol Evidence Rule Issues

From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Sunday, January 20, 2013 5:58 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: California – Oral promises can be used in fraud case – Parol Evidence Rule Issues

Oral promises can be used in fraud case

STATE SUPREME COURT Ruling favors couple facing foreclosure who maintain terms of loan differed from what they had been told

Bob Egelko

Published 9:18 pm, Monday, January 14, 2013

Borrowers facing default on a loan can try to prove that the lender orally promised them an extension that didn’t appear in the written contract, the state Supreme Court ruled Monday while overturning a 1935 decision that restricted evidence of fraud in contract disputes.

A lawyer for the borrowers, a Fresno County couple, called the unanimous ruling a victory for consumers. The lender’s lawyer said the court had eliminated important protections for written contracts.

The couple, Lance and Pamela Workman, fell behind on repaying a $776,000 loan from the Fresno-Madera Production Credit Association and signed an agreement in March 2007 pledging eight properties as security in return for a three-month extension.

The lender sought foreclosure after the Workmans failed to meet the three-month deadline. But the couple said the credit association’s vice president had told them two weeks before the agreement was signed, and repeated at the time of signing, that they would actually have two years to make the payments and would have to put up only two ranches as security.

The Workmans later repaid the loan – selling the eight properties at a loss, according to their lawyer, Steven Paganetti – and then sued the lender for fraud for allegedly misleading them about the terms of the loan.

The credit association argued that the vice president’s alleged promise to the couple was inadmissible because, under the law, a written contract overrides any previous oral statements between the signing parties.

The California Bankers Association and other lending organizations took the same position when the case reached the state’s high court. Arguing that contracts should be enforced as written, they asked the court to reaffirm the 1935 ruling that allowed oral evidence in such cases only to prove that a contract was procured by fraud and not to contradict any of its stated terms.

But the court, in an opinion by Justice Carol Corrigan, said the 1935 ruling was poorly reasoned, had been rejected by other states and "may actually provide a shield for fraudulent conduct."

Monday’s decision allows the Workmans to offer the lending officer’s promise as evidence that the credit association had deceived them into signing the agreement or misled them about its contents.

The ruling will "protect consumers from the old bait-and-switch" and should allow the Workmans to take their case to a jury, said Paganetti, their lawyer.

Scott Ivy, the credit association’s lawyer, said the ruling allows California courts to refuse to enforce written contracts "based upon alleged oral statements that directly conflict with the written terms." He said the lender will now try to get the suit dismissed on the grounds that the Workmans acted unreasonably by failing to review the contract before signing it.

Source: http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Oral-promises-can-be-used-in-fraud-case-4194025.php

Workman.pdf

An act to amend and add Sections 2923.5 and 2923.6 of, to amend and repeal Section 2924 of, to add Sections 2920.5, 2923.4, 2923.7, 2924.17, and 2924.20 to, to add and rRepeal Sections 2923.55, 2924.9, 2924.10, 2924.18, and 2924.19 of, and to add, repeal, and add Sections 2924.11, 2924.12, and 2924.15 of, the Civil Code, relating to mortgages

 

CALIFORNIA HOMEOWNER BILL OF RIGHTS

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General of California

The 2012 California Homeowner Bill of Rights is a legislative package designed to bring fairness, accountability and transparency to the state’s mortgage and foreclosure process.

More than one million California homes were lost to foreclosure between 2008 and 2011—with an additional 500,000 currently in the foreclosure pipeline. Seven of the nation’s 10 hardest-hit cities by foreclosure rate in 2011 were in California.

The California Homeowner Bill of Rights marks the third step in Attorney General Harris’ response to the state’s foreclosure and mortgage crisis. The first step was to create the Mortgage Fraud Strike Force, which has been investigating and prosecuting misconduct at all stages of the mortgage process. The second step was to extract a commitment from the nation’s five largest banks of an estimated $18 billion for California borrowers. The settlement contained thoughtful reforms but are only applicable for three years, and only to loans serviced by the settling banks.

Two key bills contain significant mortgage and foreclosure reforms. AB 278 (Eng/Feuer/Mitchell/Pérez) and SB 900 (Leno/Evans/Corbett/DeSaulnier/Pavley/Steinberg) have been thoroughly considered by a legislative conference committee. The major provisions of the bills include:

Dual track foreclosure ban – The legislation would require a mortgage servicer to render a decision on a loan modification application before advancing the foreclosure process by filing a notice of default or notice of sale, or by conducting a trustee’s sale. The foreclosure process is essentially paused upon the completion of a loan modification application for the duration of the lender’s review of that application.

 

Single point of contact – The legislation would require a mortgage servicer to designate a “single point of contact” for borrowers who are potentially eligible for a federal or proprietary loan modification application. The single point of contact is an individual or team which must have knowledge of the borrower’s status and foreclosure prevention alternatives, access to decision makers, and the responsibility to coordinate the flow of documentation between borrower and mortgage servicer.

 

Enforceability – Includes authority for borrowers to seek redress of “material” violations of the legislation. Injunctive relief would be available prior to a foreclosure sale and recovery of damages would be available following a sale.

 

Verification of documents – The legislation would subject the recording and filing of multiple unverified documents to a civil penalty of up to $7,500 per loan in an action brought by a civil prosecutor. It would also allow enforcement under a violator’s licensing statute by the Department of Corporations, Department of Real Estate or Department of Financial Institutions.

v v v v

The other bills in the California Homeowner Bill of Rights are:

BLIGHT PREVENTION LEGISLATION: AB 2314 (Carter) & SB 1472 (Pavley and DeSaulnier) to help combat the blight and crime associated with foreclosed properties.

v AB 2314: Passed out of Assembly (71-0). It was passed out of Senate Judiciary on June 26 (4-0). It will be heard next on the Senate floor.

v SB 1472: Passed out of Senate (36-0). It passed out of Assembly Housing and Community Development (7-0) on June 27, and will be heard next in Assembly Judiciary Committee on July 3.

 

TENANT PROTECTION LEGISLATION: AB 2610 (Skinner) and SB 1473 (Hancock) to help protect tenants in foreclosed properties.

v AB 2610: Passed out of Assembly (56-14). It will be heard next in Senate Judiciary on July 3.

v SB 1473: Passed out of Senate (25-13). It passed out the Assembly Housing and Community Development on June 27 (6-1) and will be heard next in Assembly Judiciary on July 3.

 

ENHANCEMENT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL ENFORCEMENT ACT: AB 1950 (Davis) to strengthen the law enforcement response to mortgage and foreclosure fraud.

v AB 1950: Passed out of Assembly (56-22). It passed out of Senate Banking (5-0) on June 27 and will be heard next in the Senate Judiciary, July 3, 2012.

 

ATTORNEY GENERAL SPECIAL GRAND JURY ACT: AB 1763 (Davis) and SB 1474 (Hancock) to strengthen prosecutions of complex, multi-jurisdictional fraud and crimes.

v SB 1474: Passed out of Senate (38-0). Passed out of Assembly Public Safety (4-0) and will be heard next in Assembly Appropriations.

v AB 1763: Passed out of Assembly (78-0). Passed out of Senate Public Safety on June 26 (7-0). It will be heard next in Senate Appropriations.

 

 

 

 

Assembly Bill No. 278

CHAPTER 86

An act to amend and add Sections 2923.5 and 2923.6 of, to amend and

repeal Section 2924 of, to add Sections 2920.5, 2923.4, 2923.7, 2924.17,

and 2924.20 to, to add and repeal Sections 2923.55, 2924.9, 2924.10,

2924.18, and 2924.19 of, and to add, repeal, and add Sections 2924.11,

2924.12, and 2924.15 of, the Civil Code, relating to mortgages.

[Approved by Governor July 11, 2012. Filed with

Secretary of State July 11, 2012.]

legislative counsel’s digest

AB 278, Eng. Mortgages and deeds of trust: foreclosure.

(1) Existing law, until January 1, 2013, requires a mortgagee, trustee,

beneficiary, or authorized agent to contact the borrower prior to filing a

notice of default to explore options for the borrower to avoid foreclosure,

as specified. Existing law requires a notice of default or, in certain

circumstances, a notice of sale, to include a declaration stating that the

mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent has contacted the

borrower, or has tried with due diligence to contact the borrower, or that no

contact was required for a specified reason.

This bill would add mortgage servicers, as defined, to these provisions

and would extend the operation of these provisions indefinitely, except that

it would delete the requirement with respect to a notice of sale. The bill

would, until January 1, 2018, additionally require the borrower, as defined,

to be provided with specified information in writing prior to recordation of

a notice of default and, in certain circumstances, within 5 business days

after recordation. The bill would prohibit a mortgage servicer, mortgagee,

trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent from recording a notice of default

or, until January 1, 2018, recording a notice of sale or conducting a trustee’s

sale while a complete first lien loan modification application is pending,

under specified conditions. The bill would, until January 1, 2018, establish

additional procedures to be followed regarding a first lien loan modification

application, the denial of an application, and a borrower’s right to appeal a

denial.

(2) Existing law imposes various requirements that must be satisfied

prior to exercising a power of sale under a mortgage or deed of trust,

including, among other things, recording a notice of default and a notice of

sale.

The bill would, until January 1, 2018, require a written notice to the

borrower after the postponement of a foreclosure sale in order to advise the

borrower of any new sale date and time, as specified. The bill would provide

that an entity shall not record a notice of default or otherwise initiate the

94

foreclosure process unless it is the holder of the beneficial interest under

the deed of trust, the original or substituted trustee, or the designated agent

of the holder of the beneficial interest, as specified.

The bill would prohibit recordation of a notice of default or a notice of

sale or the conduct of a trustee’s sale if a foreclosure prevention alternative

has been approved and certain conditions exist and would, until January 1,

2018, require recordation of a rescission of those notices upon execution of

a permanent foreclosure prevention alternative. The bill would, until January

1, 2018, prohibit the collection of application fees and the collection of late

fees while a foreclosure prevention alternative is being considered, if certain

criteria are met, and would require a subsequent mortgage servicer to honor

any previously approved foreclosure prevention alternative.

The bill would authorize a borrower to seek an injunction and damages

for violations of certain of the provisions described above, except as

specified. The bill would authorize the greater of treble actual damages or

$50,000 in statutory damages if a violation of certain provisions is found

to be intentional or reckless or resulted from willful misconduct, as specified.

The bill would authorize the awarding of attorneys’ fees for prevailing

borrowers, as specified. Violations of these provisions by licensees of the

Department of Corporations, the Department of Financial Institutions, and

the Department of Real Estate would also be violations of those respective

licensing laws. Because a violation of certain of those licensing laws is a

crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.

The bill would provide that the requirements imposed on mortgage

servicers, and mortgagees, trustees, beneficiaries, and authorized agents,

described above are applicable only to mortgages or deeds of trust secured

by residential real property not exceeding 4 dwelling units that is

owner-occupied, as defined, and, until January 1, 2018, only to those entities

who conduct more than 175 foreclosure sales per year or annual reporting

period, except as specified.

The bill would require, upon request from a borrower who requests a

foreclosure prevention alternative, a mortgage servicer who conducts more

than 175 foreclosure sales per year or annual reporting period to establish

a single point of contact and provide the borrower with one or more direct

means of communication with the single point of contact. The bill would

specify various responsibilities of the single point of contact. The bill would

define single point of contact for these purposes.

(3) Existing law prescribes documents that may be recorded or filed in

court.

This bill would require that a specified declaration, notice of default,

notice of sale, deed of trust, assignment of a deed of trust, substitution of

trustee, or declaration or affidavit filed in any court relative to a foreclosure

proceeding or recorded by or on behalf of a mortgage servicer shall be

accurate and complete and supported by competent and reliable evidence.

The bill would require that before recording or filing any of those documents,

a mortgage servicer shall ensure that it has reviewed competent and reliable

evidence to substantiate the borrower’s default and the right to foreclose,

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Ch. 86 2

including the borrower’s loan status and loan information. The bill would,

until January 1, 2018, provide that any mortgage servicer that engages in

multiple and repeated violations of these requirements shall be liable for a

civil penalty of up to $7,500 per mortgage or deed of trust, in an action

brought by specified state and local government entities, and would also

authorize administrative enforcement against licensees of the Department

of Corporations, the Department of Financial Institutions, and the Department

of Real Estate.

The bill would authorize the Department of Corporations, the Department

of Financial Institutions, and the Department of Real Estate to adopt

regulations applicable to persons and entities under their respective

jurisdictions for purposes of the provisions described above. The bill would

provide that a violation of those regulations would be enforceable only by

the regulating agency.

(4) The bill would state findings and declarations of the Legislature in

relation to foreclosures in the state generally, and would state the purposes

of the bill.

(5) The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local

agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory

provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.

This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for

a specified reason.

The people of the State of California do enact as follows:

SECTION 1. The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:

(a) California is still reeling from the economic impacts of a wave of

residential property foreclosures that began in 2007. From 2007 to 2011

alone, there were over 900,000 completed foreclosure sales. In 2011, 38 of

the top 100 hardest hit ZIP Codes in the nation were in California, and the

current wave of foreclosures continues apace. All of this foreclosure activity

has adversely affected property values and resulted in less money for schools,

public safety, and other public services. In addition, according to the Urban

Institute, every foreclosure imposes significant costs on local governments,

including an estimated nineteen thousand two hundred twenty-nine dollars

($19,229) in local government costs. And the foreclosure crisis is not over;

there remain more than two million “underwater” mortgages in California.

(b) It is essential to the economic health of this state to mitigate the

negative effects on the state and local economies and the housing market

that are the result of continued foreclosures by modifying the foreclosure

process to ensure that borrowers who may qualify for a foreclosure

alternative are considered for, and have a meaningful opportunity to obtain,

available loss mitigation options. These changes to the state’s foreclosure

process are essential to ensure that the current crisis is not worsened by

unnecessarily adding foreclosed properties to the market when an alternative

to foreclosure may be available. Avoiding foreclosure, where possible, will

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3 Ch. 86

help stabilize the state’s housing market and avoid the substantial,

corresponding negative effects of foreclosures on families, communities,

and the state and local economy.

(c) This act is necessary to provide stability to California’s statewide and

regional economies and housing market by facilitating opportunities for

borrowers to pursue loss mitigation options.

SEC. 2. Section 2920.5 is added to the Civil Code, to read:

2920.5. For purposes of this article, the following definitions apply:

(a) “Mortgage servicer” means a person or entity who directly services

a loan, or who is responsible for interacting with the borrower, managing

the loan account on a daily basis including collecting and crediting periodic

loan payments, managing any escrow account, or enforcing the note and

security instrument, either as the current owner of the promissory note or

as the current owner’s authorized agent. “Mortgage servicer” also means a

subservicing agent to a master servicer by contract. “Mortgage servicer”

shall not include a trustee, or a trustee’s authorized agent, acting under a

power of sale pursuant to a deed of trust.

(b) “Foreclosure prevention alternative” means a first lien loan

modification or another available loss mitigation option.

(c) (1) Unless otherwise provided and for purposes of Sections 2923.4,

2923.5, 2923.55, 2923.6, 2923.7, 2924.9, 2924.10, 2924.11, 2924.18, and

2924.19, “borrower” means any natural person who is a mortgagor or trustor

and who is potentially eligible for any federal, state, or proprietary

foreclosure prevention alternative program offered by, or through, his or

her mortgage servicer.

(2) For purposes of the sections listed in paragraph (1), “borrower” shall

not include any of the following:

(A) An individual who has surrendered the secured property as evidenced

by either a letter confirming the surrender or delivery of the keys to the

property to the mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent.

(B) An individual who has contracted with an organization, person, or

entity whose primary business is advising people who have decided to leave

their homes on how to extend the foreclosure process and avoid their

contractual obligations to mortgagees or beneficiaries.

(C) An individual who has filed a case under Chapter 7, 11, 12, or 13 of

Title 11 of the United States Code and the bankruptcy court has not entered

an order closing or dismissing the bankruptcy case, or granting relief from

a stay of foreclosure.

(d) “First lien” means the most senior mortgage or deed of trust on the

property that is the subject of the notice of default or notice of sale.

SEC. 3. Section 2923.4 is added to the Civil Code, to read:

2923.4. (a) The purpose of the act that added this section is to ensure

that, as part of the nonjudicial foreclosure process, borrowers are considered

for, and have a meaningful opportunity to obtain, available loss mitigation

options, if any, offered by or through the borrower’s mortgage servicer,

such as loan modifications or other alternatives to foreclosure. Nothing in

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Ch. 86 4

the act that added this section, however, shall be interpreted to require a

particular result of that process.

(b) Nothing in this article obviates or supersedes the obligations of the

signatories to the consent judgment entered in the case entitled United States

of America et al. v. Bank of America Corporation et al., filed in the United

States District Court for the District of Columbia, case number

1:12-cv-00361 RMC.

SEC. 4. Section 2923.5 of the Civil Code is amended to read:

2923.5. (a) (1) A mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary,

or authorized agent may not record a notice of default pursuant to Section

2924 until both of the following:

(A) Either 30 days after initial contact is made as required by paragraph

(2) or 30 days after satisfying the due diligence requirements as described

in subdivision (e).

(B) The mortgage servicer complies with paragraph (1) of subdivision

(a) of Section 2924.18, if the borrower has provided a complete application

as defined in subdivision (d) of Section 2924.18.

(2) A mortgage servicer shall contact the borrower in person or by

telephone in order to assess the borrower’s financial situation and explore

options for the borrower to avoid foreclosure. During the initial contact, the

mortgage servicer shall advise the borrower that he or she has the right to

request a subsequent meeting and, if requested, the mortgage servicer shall

schedule the meeting to occur within 14 days. The assessment of the

borrower’s financial situation and discussion of options may occur during

the first contact, or at the subsequent meeting scheduled for that purpose.

In either case, the borrower shall be provided the toll-free telephone number

made available by the United States Department of Housing and Urban

Development (HUD) to find a HUD-certified housing counseling agency.

Any meeting may occur telephonically.

(b) A notice of default recorded pursuant to Section 2924 shall include

a declaration that the mortgage servicer has contacted the borrower, has

tried with due diligence to contact the borrower as required by this section,

or that no contact was required because the individual did not meet the

definition of “borrower” pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 2920.5.

(c) A mortgage servicer’s loss mitigation personnel may participate by

telephone during any contact required by this section.

(d) A borrower may designate, with consent given in writing, a

HUD-certified housing counseling agency, attorney, or other adviser to

discuss with the mortgage servicer, on the borrower’s behalf, the borrower’s

financial situation and options for the borrower to avoid foreclosure. That

contact made at the direction of the borrower shall satisfy the contact

requirements of paragraph (2) of subdivision (a). Any loan modification or

workout plan offered at the meeting by the mortgage servicer is subject to

approval by the borrower.

(e) A notice of default may be recorded pursuant to Section 2924 when

a mortgage servicer has not contacted a borrower as required by paragraph

(2) of subdivision (a) provided that the failure to contact the borrower

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5 Ch. 86

occurred despite the due diligence of the mortgage servicer. For purposes

of this section, “due diligence” shall require and mean all of the following:

(1) A mortgage servicer shall first attempt to contact a borrower by

sending a first-class letter that includes the toll-free telephone number made

available by HUD to find a HUD-certified housing counseling agency.

(2) (A) After the letter has been sent, the mortgage servicer shall attempt

to contact the borrower by telephone at least three times at different hours

and on different days. Telephone calls shall be made to the primary telephone

number on file.

(B) A mortgage servicer may attempt to contact a borrower using an

automated system to dial borrowers, provided that, if the telephone call is

answered, the call is connected to a live representative of the mortgage

servicer.

(C) A mortgage servicer satisfies the telephone contact requirements of

this paragraph if it determines, after attempting contact pursuant to this

paragraph, that the borrower’s primary telephone number and secondary

telephone number or numbers on file, if any, have been disconnected.

(3) If the borrower does not respond within two weeks after the telephone

call requirements of paragraph (2) have been satisfied, the mortgage servicer

shall then send a certified letter, with return receipt requested.

(4) The mortgage servicer shall provide a means for the borrower to

contact it in a timely manner, including a toll-free telephone number that

will provide access to a live representative during business hours.

(5) The mortgage servicer has posted a prominent link on the homepage

of its Internet Web site, if any, to the following information:

(A) Options that may be available to borrowers who are unable to afford

their mortgage payments and who wish to avoid foreclosure, and instructions

to borrowers advising them on steps to take to explore those options.

(B) A list of financial documents borrowers should collect and be

prepared to present to the mortgage servicer when discussing options for

avoiding foreclosure.

(C) A toll-free telephone number for borrowers who wish to discuss

options for avoiding foreclosure with their mortgage servicer.

(D) The toll-free telephone number made available by HUD to find a

HUD-certified housing counseling agency.

(f) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust described

in Section 2924.15.

(g) This section shall apply only to entities described in subdivision (b)

of Section 2924.18.

(h) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2018, and as

of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted statute, that is enacted before

January 1, 2018, deletes or extends that date.

SEC. 5. Section 2923.5 is added to the Civil Code, to read:

2923.5. (a) (1) A mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary,

or authorized agent may not record a notice of default pursuant to Section

2924 until both of the following:

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Ch. 86 6

(A) Either 30 days after initial contact is made as required by paragraph

(2) or 30 days after satisfying the due diligence requirements as described

in subdivision (e).

(B) The mortgage servicer complies with subdivision (a) of Section

2924.11, if the borrower has provided a complete application as defined in

subdivision (f) of Section 2924.11.

(2) A mortgage servicer shall contact the borrower in person or by

telephone in order to assess the borrower’s financial situation and explore

options for the borrower to avoid foreclosure. During the initial contact, the

mortgage servicer shall advise the borrower that he or she has the right to

request a subsequent meeting and, if requested, the mortgage servicer shall

schedule the meeting to occur within 14 days. The assessment of the

borrower’s financial situation and discussion of options may occur during

the first contact, or at the subsequent meeting scheduled for that purpose.

In either case, the borrower shall be provided the toll-free telephone number

made available by the United States Department of Housing and Urban

Development (HUD) to find a HUD-certified housing counseling agency.

Any meeting may occur telephonically.

(b) A notice of default recorded pursuant to Section 2924 shall include

a declaration that the mortgage servicer has contacted the borrower, has

tried with due diligence to contact the borrower as required by this section,

or that no contact was required because the individual did not meet the

definition of “borrower” pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 2920.5.

(c) A mortgage servicer’s loss mitigation personnel may participate by

telephone during any contact required by this section.

(d) A borrower may designate, with consent given in writing, a

HUD-certified housing counseling agency, attorney, or other adviser to

discuss with the mortgage servicer, on the borrower’s behalf, the borrower’s

financial situation and options for the borrower to avoid foreclosure. That

contact made at the direction of the borrower shall satisfy the contact

requirements of paragraph (2) of subdivision (a). Any loan modification or

workout plan offered at the meeting by the mortgage servicer is subject to

approval by the borrower.

(e) A notice of default may be recorded pursuant to Section 2924 when

a mortgage servicer has not contacted a borrower as required by paragraph

(2) of subdivision (a) provided that the failure to contact the borrower

occurred despite the due diligence of the mortgage servicer. For purposes

of this section, “due diligence” shall require and mean all of the following:

(1) A mortgage servicer shall first attempt to contact a borrower by

sending a first-class letter that includes the toll-free telephone number made

available by HUD to find a HUD-certified housing counseling agency.

(2) (A) After the letter has been sent, the mortgage servicer shall attempt

to contact the borrower by telephone at least three times at different hours

and on different days. Telephone calls shall be made to the primary telephone

number on file.

(B) A mortgage servicer may attempt to contact a borrower using an

automated system to dial borrowers, provided that, if the telephone call is

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answered, the call is connected to a live representative of the mortgage

servicer.

(C) A mortgage servicer satisfies the telephone contact requirements of

this paragraph if it determines, after attempting contact pursuant to this

paragraph, that the borrower’s primary telephone number and secondary

telephone number or numbers on file, if any, have been disconnected.

(3) If the borrower does not respond within two weeks after the telephone

call requirements of paragraph (2) have been satisfied, the mortgage servicer

shall then send a certified letter, with return receipt requested.

(4) The mortgage servicer shall provide a means for the borrower to

contact it in a timely manner, including a toll-free telephone number that

will provide access to a live representative during business hours.

(5) The mortgage servicer has posted a prominent link on the homepage

of its Internet Web site, if any, to the following information:

(A) Options that may be available to borrowers who are unable to afford

their mortgage payments and who wish to avoid foreclosure, and instructions

to borrowers advising them on steps to take to explore those options.

(B) A list of financial documents borrowers should collect and be

prepared to present to the mortgage servicer when discussing options for

avoiding foreclosure.

(C) A toll-free telephone number for borrowers who wish to discuss

options for avoiding foreclosure with their mortgage servicer.

(D) The toll-free telephone number made available by HUD to find a

HUD-certified housing counseling agency.

(f) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust described

in Section 2924.15.

(g) This section shall become operative on January 1, 2018.

SEC. 6. Section 2923.55 is added to the Civil Code, to read:

2923.55. (a) A mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or

authorized agent may not record a notice of default pursuant to Section 2924

until all of the following:

(1) The mortgage servicer has satisfied the requirements of paragraph

(1) of subdivision (b).

(2) Either 30 days after initial contact is made as required by paragraph

(2) of subdivision (b) or 30 days after satisfying the due diligence

requirements as described in subdivision (f).

(3) The mortgage servicer complies with subdivision (c) of Section

2923.6, if the borrower has provided a complete application as defined in

subdivision (h) of Section 2923.6.

(b) (1) As specified in subdivision (a), a mortgage servicer shall send

the following information in writing to the borrower:

(A) A statement that if the borrower is a servicemember or a dependent

of a servicemember, he or she may be entitled to certain protections under

the federal Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (50 U.S.C. Sec. 501 et seq.)

regarding the servicemember’s interest rate and the risk of foreclosure, and

counseling for covered servicemembers that is available at agencies such

as Military OneSource and Armed Forces Legal Assistance.

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Ch. 86 8

(B) A statement that the borrower may request the following:

(i) A copy of the borrower’s promissory note or other evidence of

indebtedness.

(ii) A copy of the borrower’s deed of trust or mortgage.

(iii) A copy of any assignment, if applicable, of the borrower’s mortgage

or deed of trust required to demonstrate the right of the mortgage servicer

to foreclose.

(iv) A copy of the borrower’s payment history since the borrower was

last less than 60 days past due.

(2) A mortgage servicer shall contact the borrower in person or by

telephone in order to assess the borrower’s financial situation and explore

options for the borrower to avoid foreclosure. During the initial contact, the

mortgage servicer shall advise the borrower that he or she has the right to

request a subsequent meeting and, if requested, the mortgage servicer shall

schedule the meeting to occur within 14 days. The assessment of the

borrower’s financial situation and discussion of options may occur during

the first contact, or at the subsequent meeting scheduled for that purpose.

In either case, the borrower shall be provided the toll-free telephone number

made available by the United States Department of Housing and Urban

Development (HUD) to find a HUD-certified housing counseling agency.

Any meeting may occur telephonically.

(c) A notice of default recorded pursuant to Section 2924 shall include

a declaration that the mortgage servicer has contacted the borrower, has

tried with due diligence to contact the borrower as required by this section,

or that no contact was required because the individual did not meet the

definition of “borrower” pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 2920.5.

(d) A mortgage servicer’s loss mitigation personnel may participate by

telephone during any contact required by this section.

(e) A borrower may designate, with consent given in writing, a

HUD-certified housing counseling agency, attorney, or other adviser to

discuss with the mortgage servicer, on the borrower’s behalf, the borrower’s

financial situation and options for the borrower to avoid foreclosure. That

contact made at the direction of the borrower shall satisfy the contact

requirements of paragraph (2) of subdivision (b). Any foreclosure prevention

alternative offered at the meeting by the mortgage servicer is subject to

approval by the borrower.

(f) A notice of default may be recorded pursuant to Section 2924 when

a mortgage servicer has not contacted a borrower as required by paragraph

(2) of subdivision (b), provided that the failure to contact the borrower

occurred despite the due diligence of the mortgage servicer. For purposes

of this section, “due diligence” shall require and mean all of the following:

(1) A mortgage servicer shall first attempt to contact a borrower by

sending a first-class letter that includes the toll-free telephone number made

available by HUD to find a HUD-certified housing counseling agency.

(2) (A) After the letter has been sent, the mortgage servicer shall attempt

to contact the borrower by telephone at least three times at different hours

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and on different days. Telephone calls shall be made to the primary telephone

number on file.

(B) A mortgage servicer may attempt to contact a borrower using an

automated system to dial borrowers, provided that, if the telephone call is

answered, the call is connected to a live representative of the mortgage

servicer.

(C) A mortgage servicer satisfies the telephone contact requirements of

this paragraph if it determines, after attempting contact pursuant to this

paragraph, that the borrower’s primary telephone number and secondary

telephone number or numbers on file, if any, have been disconnected.

(3) If the borrower does not respond within two weeks after the telephone

call requirements of paragraph (2) have been satisfied, the mortgage servicer

shall then send a certified letter, with return receipt requested, that includes

the toll-free telephone number made available by HUD to find a

HUD-certified housing counseling agency.

(4) The mortgage servicer shall provide a means for the borrower to

contact it in a timely manner, including a toll-free telephone number that

will provide access to a live representative during business hours.

(5) The mortgage servicer has posted a prominent link on the homepage

of its Internet Web site, if any, to the following information:

(A) Options that may be available to borrowers who are unable to afford

their mortgage payments and who wish to avoid foreclosure, and instructions

to borrowers advising them on steps to take to explore those options.

(B) A list of financial documents borrowers should collect and be

prepared to present to the mortgage servicer when discussing options for

avoiding foreclosure.

(C) A toll-free telephone number for borrowers who wish to discuss

options for avoiding foreclosure with their mortgage servicer.

(D) The toll-free telephone number made available by HUD to find a

HUD-certified housing counseling agency.

(g) This section shall not apply to entities described in subdivision (b)

of Section 2924.18.

(h) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust described

in Section 2924.15.

(i) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2018, and as

of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted statute, that is enacted before

January 1, 2018, deletes or extends that date.

SEC. 7. Section 2923.6 of the Civil Code is amended to read:

2923.6. (a) The Legislature finds and declares that any duty that

mortgage servicers may have to maximize net present value under their

pooling and servicing agreements is owed to all parties in a loan pool, or to

all investors under a pooling and servicing agreement, not to any particular

party in the loan pool or investor under a pooling and servicing agreement,

and that a mortgage servicer acts in the best interests of all parties to the

loan pool or investors in the pooling and servicing agreement if it agrees to

or implements a loan modification or workout plan for which both of the

following apply:

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Ch. 86 10

(1) The loan is in payment default, or payment default is reasonably

foreseeable.

(2) Anticipated recovery under the loan modification or workout plan

exceeds the anticipated recovery through foreclosure on a net present value

basis.

(b) It is the intent of the Legislature that the mortgage servicer offer the

borrower a loan modification or workout plan if such a modification or plan

is consistent with its contractual or other authority.

(c) If a borrower submits a complete application for a first lien loan

modification offered by, or through, the borrower’s mortgage servicer, a

mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall

not record a notice of default or notice of sale, or conduct a trustee’s sale,

while the complete first lien loan modification application is pending. A

mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall

not record a notice of default or notice of sale or conduct a trustee’s sale

until any of the following occurs:

(1) The mortgage servicer makes a written determination that the borrower

is not eligible for a first lien loan modification, and any appeal period

pursuant to subdivision (d) has expired.

(2) The borrower does not accept an offered first lien loan modification

within 14 days of the offer.

(3) The borrower accepts a written first lien loan modification, but

defaults on, or otherwise breaches the borrower’s obligations under, the

first lien loan modification.

(d) If the borrower’s application for a first lien loan modification is

denied, the borrower shall have at least 30 days from the date of the written

denial to appeal the denial and to provide evidence that the mortgage

servicer’s determination was in error.

(e) If the borrower’s application for a first lien loan modification is

denied, the mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized

agent shall not record a notice of default or, if a notice of default has already

been recorded, record a notice of sale or conduct a trustee’s sale until the

later of:

(1) Thirty-one days after the borrower is notified in writing of the denial.

(2) If the borrower appeals the denial pursuant to subdivision (d), the

later of 15 days after the denial of the appeal or 14 days after a first lien

loan modification is offered after appeal but declined by the borrower, or,

if a first lien loan modification is offered and accepted after appeal, the date

on which the borrower fails to timely submit the first payment or otherwise

breaches the terms of the offer.

(f) Following the denial of a first lien loan modification application, the

mortgage servicer shall send a written notice to the borrower identifying

the reasons for denial, including the following:

(1) The amount of time from the date of the denial letter in which the

borrower may request an appeal of the denial of the first lien loan

modification and instructions regarding how to appeal the denial.

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(2) If the denial was based on investor disallowance, the specific reasons

for the investor disallowance.

(3) If the denial is the result of a net present value calculation, the monthly

gross income and property value used to calculate the net present value and

a statement that the borrower may obtain all of the inputs used in the net

present value calculation upon written request to the mortgage servicer.

(4) If applicable, a finding that the borrower was previously offered a

first lien loan modification and failed to successfully make payments under

the terms of the modified loan.

(5) If applicable, a description of other foreclosure prevention alternatives

for which the borrower may be eligible, and a list of the steps the borrower

must take in order to be considered for those options. If the mortgage servicer

has already approved the borrower for another foreclosure prevention

alternative, information necessary to complete the foreclosure prevention

alternative.

(g) In order to minimize the risk of borrowers submitting multiple

applications for first lien loan modifications for the purpose of delay, the

mortgage servicer shall not be obligated to evaluate applications from

borrowers who have already been evaluated or afforded a fair opportunity

to be evaluated for a first lien loan modification prior to January 1, 2013,

or who have been evaluated or afforded a fair opportunity to be evaluated

consistent with the requirements of this section, unless there has been a

material change in the borrower’s financial circumstances since the date of

the borrower’s previous application and that change is documented by the

borrower and submitted to the mortgage servicer.

(h) For purposes of this section, an application shall be deemed

“complete” when a borrower has supplied the mortgage servicer with all

documents required by the mortgage servicer within the reasonable

timeframes specified by the mortgage servicer.

(i) Subdivisions (c) to (h), inclusive, shall not apply to entities described

in subdivision (b) of Section 2924.18.

(j) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust described

in Section 2924.15.

(k) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2018, and

as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted statute, that is enacted

before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends that date.

SEC. 8. Section 2923.6 is added to the Civil Code, to read:

2923.6. (a) The Legislature finds and declares that any duty mortgage

servicers may have to maximize net present value under their pooling and

servicing agreements is owed to all parties in a loan pool, or to all investors

under a pooling and servicing agreement, not to any particular party in the

loan pool or investor under a pooling and servicing agreement, and that a

mortgage servicer acts in the best interests of all parties to the loan pool or

investors in the pooling and servicing agreement if it agrees to or implements

a loan modification or workout plan for which both of the following apply:

(1) The loan is in payment default, or payment default is reasonably

foreseeable.

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Ch. 86 12

(2) Anticipated recovery under the loan modification or workout plan

exceeds the anticipated recovery through foreclosure on a net present value

basis.

(b) It is the intent of the Legislature that the mortgage servicer offer the

borrower a loan modification or workout plan if such a modification or plan

is consistent with its contractual or other authority.

(c) This section shall become operative on January 1, 2018.

SEC. 9. Section 2923.7 is added to the Civil Code, to read:

2923.7. (a) Upon request from a borrower who requests a foreclosure

prevention alternative, the mortgage servicer shall promptly establish a

single point of contact and provide to the borrower one or more direct means

of communication with the single point of contact.

(b) The single point of contact shall be responsible for doing all of the

following:

(1) Communicating the process by which a borrower may apply for an

available foreclosure prevention alternative and the deadline for any required

submissions to be considered for these options.

(2) Coordinating receipt of all documents associated with available

foreclosure prevention alternatives and notifying the borrower of any missing

documents necessary to complete the application.

(3) Having access to current information and personnel sufficient to

timely, accurately, and adequately inform the borrower of the current status

of the foreclosure prevention alternative.

(4) Ensuring that a borrower is considered for all foreclosure prevention

alternatives offered by, or through, the mortgage servicer, if any.

(5) Having access to individuals with the ability and authority to stop

foreclosure proceedings when necessary.

(c) The single point of contact shall remain assigned to the borrower’s

account until the mortgage servicer determines that all loss mitigation options

offered by, or through, the mortgage servicer have been exhausted or the

borrower’s account becomes current.

(d) The mortgage servicer shall ensure that a single point of contact refers

and transfers a borrower to an appropriate supervisor upon request of the

borrower, if the single point of contact has a supervisor.

(e) For purposes of this section, “single point of contact” means an

individual or team of personnel each of whom has the ability and authority

to perform the responsibilities described in subdivisions (b) to (d), inclusive.

The mortgage servicer shall ensure that each member of the team is

knowledgeable about the borrower’s situation and current status in the

alternatives to foreclosure process.

(f) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust described

in Section 2924.15.

(g) (1) This section shall not apply to a depository institution chartered

under state or federal law, a person licensed pursuant to Division 9

(commencing with Section 22000) or Division 20 (commencing with Section

50000) of the Financial Code, or a person licensed pursuant to Part 1

(commencing with Section 10000) of Division 4 of the Business and

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Professions Code, that, during its immediately preceding annual reporting

period, as established with its primary regulator, foreclosed on 175 or fewer

residential real properties, containing no more than four dwelling units, that

are located in California.

(2) Within three months after the close of any calendar year or annual

reporting period as established with its primary regulator during which an

entity or person described in paragraph (1) exceeds the threshold of 175

specified in paragraph (1), that entity shall notify its primary regulator, in

a manner acceptable to its primary regulator, and any mortgagor or trustor

who is delinquent on a residential mortgage loan serviced by that entity of

the date on which that entity will be subject to this section, which date shall

be the first day of the first month that is six months after the close of the

calendar year or annual reporting period during which that entity exceeded

the threshold.

SEC. 10. Section 2924 of the Civil Code, as amended by Section 1 of

Chapter 180 of the Statutes of 2010, is amended to read:

2924. (a) Every transfer of an interest in property, other than in trust,

made only as a security for the performance of another act, is to be deemed

a mortgage, except when in the case of personal property it is accompanied

by actual change of possession, in which case it is to be deemed a pledge.

Where, by a mortgage created after July 27, 1917, of any estate in real

property, other than an estate at will or for years, less than two, or in any

transfer in trust made after July 27, 1917, of a like estate to secure the

performance of an obligation, a power of sale is conferred upon the

mortgagee, trustee, or any other person, to be exercised after a breach of

the obligation for which that mortgage or transfer is a security, the power

shall not be exercised except where the mortgage or transfer is made pursuant

to an order, judgment, or decree of a court of record, or to secure the payment

of bonds or other evidences of indebtedness authorized or permitted to be

issued by the Commissioner of Corporations, or is made by a public utility

subject to the provisions of the Public Utilities Act, until all of the following

apply:

(1) The trustee, mortgagee, or beneficiary, or any of their authorized

agents shall first file for record, in the office of the recorder of each county

wherein the mortgaged or trust property or some part or parcel thereof is

situated, a notice of default. That notice of default shall include all of the

following:

(A) A statement identifying the mortgage or deed of trust by stating the

name or names of the trustor or trustors and giving the book and page, or

instrument number, if applicable, where the mortgage or deed of trust is

recorded or a description of the mortgaged or trust property.

(B) A statement that a breach of the obligation for which the mortgage

or transfer in trust is security has occurred.

(C) A statement setting forth the nature of each breach actually known

to the beneficiary and of his or her election to sell or cause to be sold the

property to satisfy that obligation and any other obligation secured by the

deed of trust or mortgage that is in default.

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Ch. 86 14

(D) If the default is curable pursuant to Section 2924c, the statement

specified in paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of Section 2924c.

(2) Not less than three months shall elapse from the filing of the notice

of default.

(3) Except as provided in paragraph (4), after the lapse of the three months

described in paragraph (2), the mortgagee, trustee, or other person authorized

to take the sale shall give notice of sale, stating the time and place thereof,

in the manner and for a time not less than that set forth in Section 2924f.

(4) Notwithstanding paragraph (3), the mortgagee, trustee, or other person

authorized to take sale may record a notice of sale pursuant to Section 2924f

up to five days before the lapse of the three-month period described in

paragraph (2), provided that the date of sale is no earlier than three months

and 20 days after the recording of the notice of default.

(5) Until January 1, 2018, whenever a sale is postponed for a period of

at least 10 business days pursuant to Section 2924g, a mortgagee, beneficiary,

or authorized agent shall provide written notice to a borrower regarding the

new sale date and time, within five business days following the

postponement. Information provided pursuant to this paragraph shall not

constitute the public declaration required by subdivision (d) of Section

2924g. Failure to comply with this paragraph shall not invalidate any sale

that would otherwise be valid under Section 2924f. This paragraph shall be

inoperative on January 1, 2018.

(6) No entity shall record or cause a notice of default to be recorded or

otherwise initiate the foreclosure process unless it is the holder of the

beneficial interest under the mortgage or deed of trust, the original trustee

or the substituted trustee under the deed of trust, or the designated agent of

the holder of the beneficial interest. No agent of the holder of the beneficial

interest under the mortgage or deed of trust, original trustee or substituted

trustee under the deed of trust may record a notice of default or otherwise

commence the foreclosure process except when acting within the scope of

authority designated by the holder of the beneficial interest.

(b) In performing acts required by this article, the trustee shall incur no

liability for any good faith error resulting from reliance on information

provided in good faith by the beneficiary regarding the nature and the amount

of the default under the secured obligation, deed of trust, or mortgage. In

performing the acts required by this article, a trustee shall not be subject to

Title 1.6c (commencing with Section 1788) of Part 4.

(c) A recital in the deed executed pursuant to the power of sale of

compliance with all requirements of law regarding the mailing of copies of

notices or the publication of a copy of the notice of default or the personal

delivery of the copy of the notice of default or the posting of copies of the

notice of sale or the publication of a copy thereof shall constitute prima

facie evidence of compliance with these requirements and conclusive

evidence thereof in favor of bona fide purchasers and encumbrancers for

value and without notice.

(d) All of the following shall constitute privileged communications

pursuant to Section 47:

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(1) The mailing, publication, and delivery of notices as required by this

section.

(2) Performance of the procedures set forth in this article.

(3) Performance of the functions and procedures set forth in this article

if those functions and procedures are necessary to carry out the duties

described in Sections 729.040, 729.050, and 729.080 of the Code of Civil

Procedure.

(e) There is a rebuttable presumption that the beneficiary actually knew

of all unpaid loan payments on the obligation owed to the beneficiary and

secured by the deed of trust or mortgage subject to the notice of default.

However, the failure to include an actually known default shall not invalidate

the notice of sale and the beneficiary shall not be precluded from asserting

a claim to this omitted default or defaults in a separate notice of default.

SEC. 11. Section 2924 of the Civil Code, as amended by Section 2 of

Chapter 180 of the Statutes of 2010, is repealed.

SEC. 12. Section 2924.9 is added to the Civil Code, to read:

2924.9. (a) Unless a borrower has previously exhausted the first lien

loan modification process offered by, or through, his or her mortgage servicer

described in Section 2923.6, within five business days after recording a

notice of default pursuant to Section 2924, a mortgage servicer that offers

one or more foreclosure prevention alternatives shall send a written

communication to the borrower that includes all of the following information:

(1) That the borrower may be evaluated for a foreclosure prevention

alternative or, if applicable, foreclosure prevention alternatives.

(2) Whether an application is required to be submitted by the borrower

in order to be considered for a foreclosure prevention alternative.

(3) The means and process by which a borrower may obtain an application

for a foreclosure prevention alternative.

(b) This section shall not apply to entities described in subdivision (b)

of Section 2924.18.

(c) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust described

in Section 2924.15.

(d) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2018, and

as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted statute, that is enacted

before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends that date.

SEC. 13. Section 2924.10 is added to the Civil Code, to read:

2924.10. (a) When a borrower submits a complete first lien modification

application or any document in connection with a first lien modification

application, the mortgage servicer shall provide written acknowledgment

of the receipt of the documentation within five business days of receipt. In

its initial acknowledgment of receipt of the loan modification application,

the mortgage servicer shall include the following information:

(1) A description of the loan modification process, including an estimate

of when a decision on the loan modification will be made after a complete

application has been submitted by the borrower and the length of time the

borrower will have to consider an offer of a loan modification or other

foreclosure prevention alternative.

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Ch. 86 16

(2) Any deadlines, including deadlines to submit missing documentation,

that would affect the processing of a first lien loan modification application.

(3) Any expiration dates for submitted documents.

(4) Any deficiency in the borrower’s first lien loan modification

application.

(b) For purposes of this section, a borrower’s first lien loan modification

application shall be deemed to be “complete” when a borrower has supplied

the mortgage servicer with all documents required by the mortgage servicer

within the reasonable timeframes specified by the mortgage servicer.

(c) This section shall not apply to entities described in subdivision (b)

of Section 2924.18.

(d) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust described

in Section 2924.15.

(e) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2018, and

as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted statute, that is enacted

before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends that date.

SEC. 14. Section 2924.11 is added to the Civil Code, to read:

2924.11. (a) If a foreclosure prevention alternative is approved in writing

prior to the recordation of a notice of default, a mortgage servicer, mortgagee,

trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record a notice of default

under either of the following circumstances:

(1) The borrower is in compliance with the terms of a written trial or

permanent loan modification, forbearance, or repayment plan.

(2) A foreclosure prevention alternative has been approved in writing by

all parties, including, for example, the first lien investor, junior lienholder,

and mortgage insurer, as applicable, and proof of funds or financing has

been provided to the servicer.

(b) If a foreclosure prevention alternative is approved in writing after

the recordation of a notice of default, a mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee,

beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record a notice of sale or conduct

a trustee’s sale under either of the following circumstances:

(1) The borrower is in compliance with the terms of a written trial or

permanent loan modification, forbearance, or repayment plan.

(2) A foreclosure prevention alternative has been approved in writing by

all parties, including, for example, the first lien investor, junior lienholder,

and mortgage insurer, as applicable, and proof of funds or financing has

been provided to the servicer.

(c) When a borrower accepts an offered first lien loan modification or

other foreclosure prevention alternative, the mortgage servicer shall provide

the borrower with a copy of the fully executed loan modification agreement

or agreement evidencing the foreclosure prevention alternative following

receipt of the executed copy from the borrower.

(d) A mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall record a rescission

of a notice of default or cancel a pending trustee’s sale, if applicable, upon

the borrower executing a permanent foreclosure prevention alternative. In

the case of a short sale, the rescission or cancellation of the pending trustee’s

sale shall occur when the short sale has been approved by all parties and

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proof of funds or financing has been provided to the mortgagee, beneficiary,

or authorized agent.

(e) The mortgage servicer shall not charge any application, processing,

or other fee for a first lien loan modification or other foreclosure prevention

alternative.

(f) The mortgage servicer shall not collect any late fees for periods during

which a complete first lien loan modification application is under

consideration or a denial is being appealed, the borrower is making timely

modification payments, or a foreclosure prevention alternative is being

evaluated or exercised.

(g) If a borrower has been approved in writing for a first lien loan

modification or other foreclosure prevention alternative, and the servicing

of that borrower’s loan is transferred or sold to another mortgage servicer,

the subsequent mortgage servicer shall continue to honor any previously

approved first lien loan modification or other foreclosure prevention

alternative, in accordance with the provisions of the act that added this

section.

(h) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust described

in Section 2924.15.

(i) This section shall not apply to entities described in subdivision (b) of

Section 2924.18.

(j) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2018, and as

of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted statute, that is enacted before

January 1, 2018, deletes or extends that date.

SEC. 15. Section 2924.11 is added to the Civil Code, to read:

2924.11. (a) If a borrower submits a complete application for a

foreclosure prevention alternative offered by, or through, the borrower’s

mortgage servicer, a mortgage servicer, trustee, mortgagee, beneficiary, or

authorized agent shall not record a notice of sale or conduct a trustee’s sale

while the complete foreclosure prevention alternative application is pending,

and until the borrower has been provided with a written determination by

the mortgage servicer regarding that borrower’s eligibility for the requested

foreclosure prevention alternative.

(b) Following the denial of a first lien loan modification application, the

mortgage servicer shall send a written notice to the borrower identifying

with specificity the reasons for the denial and shall include a statement that

the borrower may obtain additional documentation supporting the denial

decision upon written request to the mortgage servicer.

(c) If a foreclosure prevention alternative is approved in writing prior to

the recordation of a notice of default, a mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee,

beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record a notice of default under

either of the following circumstances:

(1) The borrower is in compliance with the terms of a written trial or

permanent loan modification, forbearance, or repayment plan.

(2) A foreclosure prevention alternative has been approved in writing by

all parties, including, for example, the first lien investor, junior lienholder,

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Ch. 86 18

and mortgage insurer, as applicable, and proof of funds or financing has

been provided to the servicer.

(d) If a foreclosure prevention alternative is approved in writing after

the recordation of a notice of default, a mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee,

beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record a notice of sale or conduct

a trustee’s sale under either of the following circumstances:

(1) The borrower is in compliance with the terms of a written trial or

permanent loan modification, forbearance, or repayment plan.

(2) A foreclosure prevention alternative has been approved in writing by

all parties, including, for example, the first lien investor, junior lienholder,

and mortgage insurer, as applicable, and proof of funds or financing has

been provided to the servicer.

(e) This section applies only to mortgages or deeds of trust as described

in Section 2924.15.

(f) For purposes of this section, an application shall be deemed “complete”

when a borrower has supplied the mortgage servicer with all documents

required by the mortgage servicer within the reasonable timeframes specified

by the mortgage servicer.

(g) This section shall become operative on January 1, 2018.

SEC. 16. Section 2924.12 is added to the Civil Code, to read:

2924.12. (a) (1) If a trustee’s deed upon sale has not been recorded, a

borrower may bring an action for injunctive relief to enjoin a material

violation of Section 2923.55, 2923.6, 2923.7, 2924.9, 2924.10, 2924.11, or

2924.17.

(2) Any injunction shall remain in place and any trustee’s sale shall be

enjoined until the court determines that the mortgage servicer, mortgagee,

trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent has corrected and remedied the

violation or violations giving rise to the action for injunctive relief. An

enjoined entity may move to dissolve an injunction based on a showing that

the material violation has been corrected and remedied.

(b) After a trustee’s deed upon sale has been recorded, a mortgage

servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall be liable

to a borrower for actual economic damages pursuant to Section 3281,

resulting from a material violation of Section 2923.55, 2923.6, 2923.7,

2924.9, 2924.10, 2924.11, or 2924.17 by that mortgage servicer, mortgagee,

trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent where the violation was not corrected

and remedied prior to the recordation of the trustee’s deed upon sale. If the

court finds that the material violation was intentional or reckless, or resulted

from willful misconduct by a mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee,

beneficiary, or authorized agent, the court may award the borrower the

greater of treble actual damages or statutory damages of fifty thousand

dollars ($50,000).

(c) A mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized

agent shall not be liable for any violation that it has corrected and remedied

prior to the recordation of a trustee’s deed upon sale, or that has been

corrected and remedied by third parties working on its behalf prior to the

recordation of a trustee’s deed upon sale.

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19 Ch. 86

(d) A violation of Section 2923.55, 2923.6, 2923.7, 2924.9, 2924.10,

2924.11, or 2924.17 by a person licensed by the Department of Corporations,

Department of Financial Institutions, or Department of Real Estate shall be

deemed to be a violation of that person’s licensing law.

(e) No violation of this article shall affect the validity of a sale in favor

of a bona fide purchaser and any of its encumbrancers for value without

notice.

(f) A third-party encumbrancer shall not be relieved of liability resulting

from violations of Section 2923.55, 2923.6, 2923.7, 2924.9, 2924.10,

2924.11, or 2924.17 committed by that third-party encumbrancer, that

occurred prior to the sale of the subject property to the bona fide purchaser.

(g) A signatory to a consent judgment entered in the case entitled United

States of America et al. v. Bank of America Corporation et al., filed in the

United States District Court for the District of Columbia, case number

1:12-cv-00361 RMC, that is in compliance with the relevant terms of the

Settlement Term Sheet of that consent judgment with respect to the borrower

who brought an action pursuant to this section while the consent judgment

is in effect shall have no liability for a violation of Section 2923.55, 2923.6,

2923.7, 2924.9, 2924.10, 2924.11, or 2924.17.

(h) The rights, remedies, and procedures provided by this section are in

addition to and independent of any other rights, remedies, or procedures

under any other law. Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter, limit,

or negate any other rights, remedies, or procedures provided by law.

(i) A court may award a prevailing borrower reasonable attorney’s fees

and costs in an action brought pursuant to this section. A borrower shall be

deemed to have prevailed for purposes of this subdivision if the borrower

obtained injunctive relief or was awarded damages pursuant to this section.

(j) This section shall not apply to entities described in subdivision (b) of

Section 2924.18.

(k) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2018, and

as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted statute, that is enacted

before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends that date.

SEC. 17. Section 2924.12 is added to the Civil Code, to read:

2924.12. (a) (1) If a trustee’s deed upon sale has not been recorded, a

borrower may bring an action for injunctive relief to enjoin a material

violation of Section 2923.5, 2923.7, 2924.11, or 2924.17.

(2) Any injunction shall remain in place and any trustee’s sale shall be

enjoined until the court determines that the mortgage servicer, mortgagee,

trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent has corrected and remedied the

violation or violations giving rise to the action for injunctive relief. An

enjoined entity may move to dissolve an injunction based on a showing that

the material violation has been corrected and remedied.

(b) After a trustee’s deed upon sale has been recorded, a mortgage

servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall be liable

to a borrower for actual economic damages pursuant to Section 3281,

resulting from a material violation of Section 2923.5, 2923.7, 2924.11, or

2924.17 by that mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or

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Ch. 86 20

authorized agent where the violation was not corrected and remedied prior

to the recordation of the trustee’s deed upon sale. If the court finds that the

material violation was intentional or reckless, or resulted from willful

misconduct by a mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or

authorized agent, the court may award the borrower the greater of treble

actual damages or statutory damages of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000).

(c) A mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized

agent shall not be liable for any violation that it has corrected and remedied

prior to the recordation of the trustee’s deed upon sale, or that has been

corrected and remedied by third parties working on its behalf prior to the

recordation of the trustee’s deed upon sale.

(d) A violation of Section 2923.5, 2923.7, 2924.11, or 2924.17 by a

person licensed by the Department of Corporations, Department of Financial

Institutions, or Department of Real Estate shall be deemed to be a violation

of that person’s licensing law.

(e) No violation of this article shall affect the validity of a sale in favor

of a bona fide purchaser and any of its encumbrancers for value without

notice.

(f) A third-party encumbrancer shall not be relieved of liability resulting

from violations of Section 2923.5, 2923.7, 2924.11, or 2924.17 committed

by that third-party encumbrancer, that occurred prior to the sale of the subject

property to the bona fide purchaser.

(g) The rights, remedies, and procedures provided by this section are in

addition to and independent of any other rights, remedies, or procedures

under any other law. Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter, limit,

or negate any other rights, remedies, or procedures provided by law.

(h) A court may award a prevailing borrower reasonable attorney’s fees

and costs in an action brought pursuant to this section. A borrower shall be

deemed to have prevailed for purposes of this subdivision if the borrower

obtained injunctive relief or was awarded damages pursuant to this section.

(i) This section shall become operative on January 1, 2018.

SEC. 18. Section 2924.15 is added to the Civil Code, to read:

2924.15. (a) Unless otherwise provided, paragraph (5) of subdivision

(a) of Section 2924, and Sections 2923.5, 2923.55, 2923.6, 2923.7, 2924.9,

2924.10, 2924.11, and 2924.18 shall apply only to first lien mortgages or

deeds of trust that are secured by owner-occupied residential real property

containing no more than four dwelling units. For these purposes,

“owner-occupied” means that the property is the principal residence of the

borrower and is security for a loan made for personal, family, or household

purposes.

(b) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2018, and

as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted statute, that is enacted

before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends that date.

SEC. 19. Section 2924.15 is added to the Civil Code, to read:

2924.15. (a) Unless otherwise provided, Sections 2923.5, 2923.7, and

2924.11 shall apply only to first lien mortgages or deeds of trust that are

secured by owner-occupied residential real property containing no more

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21 Ch. 86

than four dwelling units. For these purposes, “owner-occupied” means that

the property is the principal residence of the borrower and is security for a

loan made for personal, family, or household purposes.

(b) This section shall become operative on January 1, 2018.

SEC. 20. Section 2924.17 is added to the Civil Code, to read:

2924.17. (a) A declaration recorded pursuant to Section 2923.5 or, until

January 1, 2018, pursuant to Section 2923.55, a notice of default, notice of

sale, assignment of a deed of trust, or substitution of trustee recorded by or

on behalf of a mortgage servicer in connection with a foreclosure subject

to the requirements of Section 2924, or a declaration or affidavit filed in

any court relative to a foreclosure proceeding shall be accurate and complete

and supported by competent and reliable evidence.

(b) Before recording or filing any of the documents described in

subdivision (a), a mortgage servicer shall ensure that it has reviewed

competent and reliable evidence to substantiate the borrower’s default and

the right to foreclose, including the borrower’s loan status and loan

information.

(c) Until January 1, 2018, any mortgage servicer that engages in multiple

and repeated uncorrected violations of subdivision (b) in recording

documents or filing documents in any court relative to a foreclosure

proceeding shall be liable for a civil penalty of up to seven thousand five

hundred dollars ($7,500) per mortgage or deed of trust in an action brought

by a government entity identified in Section 17204 of the Business and

Professions Code, or in an administrative proceeding brought by the

Department of Corporations, the Department of Real Estate, or the

Department of Financial Institutions against a respective licensee, in addition

to any other remedies available to these entities. This subdivision shall be

inoperative on January 1, 2018.

SEC. 21. Section 2924.18 is added to the Civil Code, to read:

2924.18. (a) (1) If a borrower submits a complete application for a first

lien loan modification offered by, or through, the borrower’s mortgage

servicer, a mortgage servicer, trustee, mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized

agent shall not record a notice of default, notice of sale, or conduct a trustee’s

sale while the complete first lien loan modification application is pending,

and until the borrower has been provided with a written determination by

the mortgage servicer regarding that borrower’s eligibility for the requested

loan modification.

(2) If a foreclosure prevention alternative has been approved in writing

prior to the recordation of a notice of default, a mortgage servicer, mortgagee,

trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record a notice of default

under either of the following circumstances:

(A) The borrower is in compliance with the terms of a written trial or

permanent loan modification, forbearance, or repayment plan.

(B) A foreclosure prevention alternative has been approved in writing

by all parties, including, for example, the first lien investor, junior lienholder,

and mortgage insurer, as applicable, and proof of funds or financing has

been provided to the servicer.

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Ch. 86 22

(3) If a foreclosure prevention alternative is approved in writing after

the recordation of a notice of default, a mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee,

beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record a notice of sale or conduct

a trustee’s sale under either of the following circumstances:

(A) The borrower is in compliance with the terms of a written trial or

permanent loan modification, forbearance, or repayment plan.

(B) A foreclosure prevention alternative has been approved in writing

by all parties, including, for example, the first lien investor, junior lienholder,

and mortgage insurer, as applicable, and proof of funds or financing has

been provided to the servicer.

(b) This section shall apply only to a depository institution chartered

under state or federal law, a person licensed pursuant to Division 9

(commencing with Section 22000) or Division 20 (commencing with Section

50000) of the Financial Code, or a person licensed pursuant to Part 1

(commencing with Section 10000) of Division 4 of the Business and

Professions Code, that, during its immediately preceding annual reporting

period, as established with its primary regulator, foreclosed on 175 or fewer

residential real properties, containing no more than four dwelling units, that

are located in California.

(c) Within three months after the close of any calendar year or annual

reporting period as established with its primary regulator during which an

entity or person described in subdivision (b) exceeds the threshold of 175

specified in subdivision (b), that entity shall notify its primary regulator, in

a manner acceptable to its primary regulator, and any mortgagor or trustor

who is delinquent on a residential mortgage loan serviced by that entity of

the date on which that entity will be subject to Sections 2923.55, 2923.6,

2923.7, 2924.9, 2924.10, 2924.11, and 2924.12, which date shall be the first

day of the first month that is six months after the close of the calendar year

or annual reporting period during which that entity exceeded the threshold.

(d) For purposes of this section, an application shall be deemed

“complete” when a borrower has supplied the mortgage servicer with all

documents required by the mortgage servicer within the reasonable

timeframes specified by the mortgage servicer.

(e) If a borrower has been approved in writing for a first lien loan

modification or other foreclosure prevention alternative, and the servicing

of the borrower’s loan is transferred or sold to another mortgage servicer,

the subsequent mortgage servicer shall continue to honor any previously

approved first lien loan modification or other foreclosure prevention

alternative, in accordance with the provisions of the act that added this

section.

(f) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust described

in Section 2924.15.

(g) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2018, and

as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted statute, that is enacted

before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends that date.

SEC. 22. Section 2924.19 is added to the Civil Code, to read:

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23 Ch. 86

2924.19. (a) (1) If a trustee’s deed upon sale has not been recorded, a

borrower may bring an action for injunctive relief to enjoin a material

violation of Section 2923.5, 2924.17, or 2924.18.

(2) Any injunction shall remain in place and any trustee’s sale shall be

enjoined until the court determines that the mortgage servicer, mortgagee,

beneficiary, or authorized agent has corrected and remedied the violation

or violations giving rise to the action for injunctive relief. An enjoined entity

may move to dissolve an injunction based on a showing that the material

violation has been corrected and remedied.

(b) After a trustee’s deed upon sale has been recorded, a mortgage

servicer, mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall be liable to a

borrower for actual economic damages pursuant to Section 3281, resulting

from a material violation of Section 2923.5, 2924.17, or 2924.18 by that

mortgage servicer, mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent where the

violation was not corrected and remedied prior to the recordation of the

trustee’s deed upon sale. If the court finds that the material violation was

intentional or reckless, or resulted from willful misconduct by a mortgage

servicer, mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent, the court may award

the borrower the greater of treble actual damages or statutory damages of

fifty thousand dollars ($50,000).

(c) A mortgage servicer, mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent

shall not be liable for any violation that it has corrected and remedied prior

to the recordation of the trustee’s deed upon sale, or that has been corrected

and remedied by third parties working on its behalf prior to the recordation

of the trustee’s deed upon sale.

(d) A violation of Section 2923.5, 2924.17, or 2917.18 by a person

licensed by the Department of Corporations, the Department of Financial

Institutions, or the Department of Real Estate shall be deemed to be a

violation of that person’s licensing law.

(e) No violation of this article shall affect the validity of a sale in favor

of a bona fide purchaser and any of its encumbrancers for value without

notice.

(f) A third-party encumbrancer shall not be relieved of liability resulting

from violations of Section 2923.5, 2924.17 or 2924.18, committed by that

third-party encumbrancer, that occurred prior to the sale of the subject

property to the bona fide purchaser.

(g) The rights, remedies, and procedures provided by this section are in

addition to and independent of any other rights, remedies, or procedures

under any other law. Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter, limit,

or negate any other rights, remedies, or procedures provided by law.

(h) A court may award a prevailing borrower reasonable attorney’s fees

and costs in an action brought pursuant to this section. A borrower shall be

deemed to have prevailed for purposes of this subdivision if the borrower

obtained injunctive relief or damages pursuant to this section.

(i) This section shall apply only to entities described in subdivision (b)

of Section 2924.18.

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Ch. 86 24

(j) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2018, and as

of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted statute, that is enacted before

January 1, 2018, deletes or extends that date.

SEC. 23. Section 2924.20 is added to the Civil Code, to read:

2924.20. Consistent with their general regulatory authority, and

notwithstanding subdivisions (b) and (c) of Section 2924.18, the Department

of Corporations, the Department of Financial Institutions, and the Department

of Real Estate may adopt regulations applicable to any entity or person

under their respective jurisdictions that are necessary to carry out the

purposes of the act that added this section. A violation of the regulations

adopted pursuant to this section shall only be enforceable by the regulatory

agency.

SEC. 24. The provisions of this act are severable. If any provision of

this act or its application is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other

provisions or applications that can be given effect without the invalid

provision or application.

SEC. 25. No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section

6 of Article XIII B of the California Constitution because the only costs that

may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because

this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction,

or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of

Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime

within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIII B of the California

Constitution.

Senate Bill No. 900

CHAPTER 87

An act to amend and add Sections 2923.5 and 2923.6 of, to amend and

repeal Section 2924 of, to add Sections 2920.5, 2923.4, 2923.7, 2924.17,

and 2924.20 to, to add and repeal Sections 2923.55, 2924.9, 2924.10,

2924.18, and 2924.19 of, and to add, repeal, and add Sections 2924.11,

2924.12, and 2924.15 of, the Civil Code, relating to mortgages.

[Approved by Governor July 11, 2012. Filed with

Secretary of State July 11, 2012.]

legislative counsel’s digest

SB 900, Leno. Mortgages and deeds of trust: foreclosure.

(1) Existing law, until January 1, 2013, requires a mortgagee, trustee,

beneficiary, or authorized agent to contact the borrower prior to filing a

notice of default to explore options for the borrower to avoid foreclosure,

as specified. Existing law requires a notice of default or, in certain

circumstances, a notice of sale, to include a declaration stating that the

mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent has contacted the

borrower, has tried with due diligence to contact the borrower, or that no

contact was required for a specified reason.

This bill would add mortgage servicers, as defined, to these provisions

and would extend the operation of these provisions indefinitely, except that

it would delete the requirement with respect to a notice of sale. The bill

would, until January 1, 2018, additionally require the borrower, as defined,

to be provided with specified information in writing prior to recordation of

a notice of default and, in certain circumstances, within 5 business days

after recordation. The bill would prohibit a mortgage servicer, mortgagee,

trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent from recording a notice of default

or, until January 1, 2018, recording a notice of sale or conducting a trustee’s

sale while a complete first lien loan modification application is pending,

under specified conditions. The bill would, until January 1, 2018, establish

additional procedures to be followed regarding a first lien loan modification

application, the denial of an application, and a borrower’s right to appeal a

denial.

(2) Existing law imposes various requirements that must be satisfied

prior to exercising a power of sale under a mortgage or deed of trust,

including, among other things, recording a notice of default and a notice of

sale.

The bill would, until January 1, 2018, require a written notice to the

borrower after the postponement of a foreclosure sale in order to advise the

borrower of any new sale date and time, as specified. The bill would provide

that an entity shall not record a notice of default or otherwise initiate the

93

foreclosure process unless it is the holder of the beneficial interest under

the deed of trust, the original or substituted trustee, or the designated agent

of the holder of the beneficial interest, as specified.

The bill would prohibit recordation of a notice of default or a notice of

sale or the conduct of a trustee’s sale if a foreclosure prevention alternative

has been approved and certain conditions exist and would, until January 1,

2018, require recordation of a rescission of those notices upon execution of

a permanent foreclosure prevention alternative. The bill would until January

1, 2018, prohibit the collection of application fees and the collection of late

fees while a foreclosure prevention alternative is being considered, if certain

criteria are met, and would require a subsequent mortgage servicer to honor

any previously approved foreclosure prevention alternative.

The bill would authorize a borrower to seek an injunction and damages

for violations of certain of the provisions described above, except as

specified. The bill would authorize the greater of treble actual damages or

$50,000 in statutory damages if a violation of certain provisions is found

to be intentional or reckless or resulted from willful misconduct, as specified.

The bill would authorize the awarding of attorneys’ fees for prevailing

borrowers, as specified. Violations of these provisions by licensees of the

Department of Corporations, the Department of Financial Institutions, and

the Department of Real Estate would also be violations of those respective

licensing laws. Because a violation of certain of those licensing laws is a

crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated local program.

The bill would provide that the requirements imposed on mortgage

servicers, and mortgagees, trustees, beneficiaries, and authorized agents,

described above are applicable only to mortgages or deeds of trust secured

by residential real property not exceeding 4 dwelling units that is

owner-occupied, as defined, and, until January 1, 2018, only to those entities

who conduct more than 175 foreclosure sales per year or annual reporting

period, except as specified.

The bill would require, upon request from a borrower who requests a

foreclosure prevention alternative, a mortgage servicer who conducts more

than 175 foreclosure sales per year or annual reporting period to establish

a single point of contact and provide the borrower with one or more direct

means of communication with the single point of contact. The bill would

specify various responsibilities of the single point of contact. The bill would

define single point of contact for these purposes.

(3) Existing law prescribes documents that may be recorded or filed in

court.

This bill would require that a specified declaration, notice of default,

notice of sale, deed of trust, assignment of a deed of trust, substitution of

trustee, or declaration or affidavit filed in any court relative to a foreclosure

proceeding or recorded by or on behalf of a mortgage servicer shall be

accurate and complete and supported by competent and reliable evidence.

The bill would require that, before recording or filing any of those

documents, a mortgage servicer shall ensure that it has reviewed competent

and reliable evidence to substantiate the borrower’s default and the right to

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Ch. 87 2

foreclose, including the borrower’s loan status and loan information. The

bill would, until January 1, 2018, provide that any mortgage servicer that

engages in multiple and repeated violations of these requirements shall be

liable for a civil penalty of up to $7,500 per mortgage or deed of trust, in

an action brought by specified state and local government entities, and would

also authorize administrative enforcement against licensees of the

Department of Corporations, the Department of Financial Institutions, and

the Department of Real Estate.

The bill would authorize the Department of Corporations, the Department

of Financial Institutions, and the Department of Real Estate to adopt

regulations applicable to persons and entities under their respective

jurisdictions for purposes of the provisions described above. The bill would

provide that a violation of those regulations would be enforceable only by

the regulating agency.

(4) The bill would state findings and declarations of the Legislature in

relation to foreclosures in the state generally, and would state the purposes

of the bill.

(5) The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse local

agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the state. Statutory

provisions establish procedures for making that reimbursement.

This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this act for

a specified reason.

The people of the State of California do enact as follows:

SECTION 1. The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:

(a) California is still reeling from the economic impacts of a wave of

residential property foreclosures that began in 2007. From 2007 to 2011

alone, there were over 900,000 completed foreclosure sales. In 2011, 38 of

the top 100 hardest hit ZIP Codes in the nation were in California, and the

current wave of foreclosures continues apace. All of this foreclosure activity

has adversely affected property values and resulted in less money for schools,

public safety, and other public services. In addition, according to the Urban

Institute, every foreclosure imposes significant costs on local governments,

including an estimated nineteen thousand two hundred twenty-nine dollars

($19,229) in local government costs. And the foreclosure crisis is not over;

there remain more than two million “underwater” mortgages in California.

(b) It is essential to the economic health of this state to mitigate the

negative effects on the state and local economies and the housing market

that are the result of continued foreclosures by modifying the foreclosure

process to ensure that borrowers who may qualify for a foreclosure

alternative are considered for, and have a meaningful opportunity to obtain,

available loss mitigation options. These changes to the state’s foreclosure

process are essential to ensure that the current crisis is not worsened by

unnecessarily adding foreclosed properties to the market when an alternative

to foreclosure may be available. Avoiding foreclosure, where possible, will

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3 Ch. 87

help stabilize the state’s housing market and avoid the substantial,

corresponding negative effects of foreclosures on families, communities,

and the state and local economy.

(c) This act is necessary to provide stability to California’s statewide and

regional economies and housing market by facilitating opportunities for

borrowers to pursue loss mitigation options.

SEC. 2. Section 2920.5 is added to the Civil Code, to read:

2920.5. For purposes of this article, the following definitions apply:

(a) “Mortgage servicer” means a person or entity who directly services

a loan, or who is responsible for interacting with the borrower, managing

the loan account on a daily basis including collecting and crediting periodic

loan payments, managing any escrow account, or enforcing the note and

security instrument, either as the current owner of the promissory note or

as the current owner’s authorized agent. “Mortgage servicer” also means a

subservicing agent to a master servicer by contract. “Mortgage servicer”

shall not include a trustee, or a trustee’s authorized agent, acting under a

power of sale pursuant to a deed of trust.

(b) “Foreclosure prevention alternative” means a first lien loan

modification or another available loss mitigation option.

(c) (1) Unless otherwise provided and for purposes of Sections 2923.4,

2923.5, 2923.55, 2923.6, 2923.7, 2924.9, 2924.10, 2924.11, 2924.18, and

2924.19, “borrower” means any natural person who is a mortgagor or trustor

and who is potentially eligible for any federal, state, or proprietary

foreclosure prevention alternative program offered by, or through, his or

her mortgage servicer.

(2) For purposes of the sections listed in paragraph (1), “borrower” shall

not include any of the following:

(A) An individual who has surrendered the secured property as evidenced

by either a letter confirming the surrender or delivery of the keys to the

property to the mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent.

(B) An individual who has contracted with an organization, person, or

entity whose primary business is advising people who have decided to leave

their homes on how to extend the foreclosure process and avoid their

contractual obligations to mortgagees or beneficiaries.

(C) An individual who has filed a case under Chapter 7, 11, 12, or 13 of

Title 11 of the United States Code and the bankruptcy court has not entered

an order closing or dismissing the bankruptcy case, or granting relief from

a stay of foreclosure.

(d) “First lien” means the most senior mortgage or deed of trust on the

property that is the subject of the notice of default or notice of sale.

SEC. 3. Section 2923.4 is added to the Civil Code, to read:

2923.4. (a) The purpose of the act that added this section is to ensure

that, as part of the nonjudicial foreclosure process, borrowers are considered

for, and have a meaningful opportunity to obtain, available loss mitigation

options, if any, offered by or through the borrower’s mortgage servicer,

such as loan modifications or other alternatives to foreclosure. Nothing in

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Ch. 87 4

the act that added this section, however, shall be interpreted to require a

particular result of that process.

(b) Nothing in this article obviates or supersedes the obligations of the

signatories to the consent judgment entered in the case entitled United States

of America et al. v. Bank of America Corporation et al., filed in the United

States District Court for the District of Columbia, case number

1:12-cv-00361 RMC.

SEC. 4. Section 2923.5 of the Civil Code is amended to read:

2923.5. (a) (1) A mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary,

or authorized agent may not record a notice of default pursuant to Section

2924 until both of the following:

(A) Either 30 days after initial contact is made as required by paragraph

(2) or 30 days after satisfying the due diligence requirements as described

in subdivision (e).

(B) The mortgage servicer complies with paragraph (1) of subdivision

(a) of Section 2924.18, if the borrower has provided a complete application

as defined in subdivision (d) of Section 2924.18.

(2) A mortgage servicer shall contact the borrower in person or by

telephone in order to assess the borrower’s financial situation and explore

options for the borrower to avoid foreclosure. During the initial contact, the

mortgage servicer shall advise the borrower that he or she has the right to

request a subsequent meeting and, if requested, the mortgage servicer shall

schedule the meeting to occur within 14 days. The assessment of the

borrower’s financial situation and discussion of options may occur during

the first contact, or at the subsequent meeting scheduled for that purpose.

In either case, the borrower shall be provided the toll-free telephone number

made available by the United States Department of Housing and Urban

Development (HUD) to find a HUD-certified housing counseling agency.

Any meeting may occur telephonically.

(b) A notice of default recorded pursuant to Section 2924 shall include

a declaration that the mortgage servicer has contacted the borrower, has

tried with due diligence to contact the borrower as required by this section,

or that no contact was required because the individual did not meet the

definition of “borrower” pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 2920.5.

(c) A mortgage servicer’s loss mitigation personnel may participate by

telephone during any contact required by this section.

(d) A borrower may designate, with consent given in writing, a

HUD-certified housing counseling agency, attorney, or other advisor to

discuss with the mortgage servicer, on the borrower’s behalf, the borrower’s

financial situation and options for the borrower to avoid foreclosure. That

contact made at the direction of the borrower shall satisfy the contact

requirements of paragraph (2) of subdivision (a). Any loan modification or

workout plan offered at the meeting by the mortgage servicer is subject to

approval by the borrower.

(e) A notice of default may be recorded pursuant to Section 2924 when

a mortgage servicer has not contacted a borrower as required by paragraph

(2) of subdivision (a) provided that the failure to contact the borrower

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occurred despite the due diligence of the mortgage servicer. For purposes

of this section, “due diligence” shall require and mean all of the following:

(1) A mortgage servicer shall first attempt to contact a borrower by

sending a first-class letter that includes the toll-free telephone number made

available by HUD to find a HUD-certified housing counseling agency.

(2) (A) After the letter has been sent, the mortgage servicer shall attempt

to contact the borrower by telephone at least three times at different hours

and on different days. Telephone calls shall be made to the primary telephone

number on file.

(B) A mortgage servicer may attempt to contact a borrower using an

automated system to dial borrowers, provided that, if the telephone call is

answered, the call is connected to a live representative of the mortgage

servicer.

(C) A mortgage servicer satisfies the telephone contact requirements of

this paragraph if it determines, after attempting contact pursuant to this

paragraph, that the borrower’s primary telephone number and secondary

telephone number or numbers on file, if any, have been disconnected.

(3) If the borrower does not respond within two weeks after the telephone

call requirements of paragraph (2) have been satisfied, the mortgage servicer

shall then send a certified letter, with return receipt requested.

(4) The mortgage servicer shall provide a means for the borrower to

contact it in a timely manner, including a toll-free telephone number that

will provide access to a live representative during business hours.

(5) The mortgage servicer has posted a prominent link on the homepage

of its Internet Web site, if any, to the following information:

(A) Options that may be available to borrowers who are unable to afford

their mortgage payments and who wish to avoid foreclosure, and instructions

to borrowers advising them on steps to take to explore those options.

(B) A list of financial documents borrowers should collect and be

prepared to present to the mortgage servicer when discussing options for

avoiding foreclosure.

(C) A toll-free telephone number for borrowers who wish to discuss

options for avoiding foreclosure with their mortgage servicer.

(D) The toll-free telephone number made available by HUD to find a

HUD-certified housing counseling agency.

(f) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust described

in Section 2924.15.

(g) This section shall apply only to entities described in subdivision (b)

of Section 2924.18.

(h) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2018, and as

of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted statute, that is enacted before

January 1, 2018, deletes or extends that date.

SEC. 5. Section 2923.5 is added to the Civil Code, to read:

2923.5. (a) (1) A mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary,

or authorized agent may not record a notice of default pursuant to Section

2924 until both of the following:

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Ch. 87 6

(A) Either 30 days after initial contact is made as required by paragraph

(2) or 30 days after satisfying the due diligence requirements as described

in subdivision (e).

(B) The mortgage servicer complies with subdivision (a) of Section

2924.11, if the borrower has provided a complete application as defined in

subdivision (f) of Section 2924.11.

(2) A mortgage servicer shall contact the borrower in person or by

telephone in order to assess the borrower’s financial situation and explore

options for the borrower to avoid foreclosure. During the initial contact, the

mortgage servicer shall advise the borrower that he or she has the right to

request a subsequent meeting and, if requested, the mortgage servicer shall

schedule the meeting to occur within 14 days. The assessment of the

borrower’s financial situation and discussion of options may occur during

the first contact, or at the subsequent meeting scheduled for that purpose.

In either case, the borrower shall be provided the toll-free telephone number

made available by the United States Department of Housing and Urban

Development (HUD) to find a HUD-certified housing counseling agency.

Any meeting may occur telephonically.

(b) A notice of default recorded pursuant to Section 2924 shall include

a declaration that the mortgage servicer has contacted the borrower, has

tried with due diligence to contact the borrower as required by this section,

or that no contact was required because the individual did not meet the

definition of “borrower” pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 2920.5.

(c) A mortgage servicer’s loss mitigation personnel may participate by

telephone during any contact required by this section.

(d) A borrower may designate, with consent given in writing, a

HUD-certified housing counseling agency, attorney, or other advisor to

discuss with the mortgage servicer, on the borrower’s behalf, the borrower’s

financial situation and options for the borrower to avoid foreclosure. That

contact made at the direction of the borrower shall satisfy the contact

requirements of paragraph (2) of subdivision (a). Any loan modification or

workout plan offered at the meeting by the mortgage servicer is subject to

approval by the borrower.

(e) A notice of default may be recorded pursuant to Section 2924 when

a mortgage servicer has not contacted a borrower as required by paragraph

(2) of subdivision (a) provided that the failure to contact the borrower

occurred despite the due diligence of the mortgage servicer. For purposes

of this section, “due diligence” shall require and mean all of the following:

(1) A mortgage servicer shall first attempt to contact a borrower by

sending a first-class letter that includes the toll-free telephone number made

available by HUD to find a HUD-certified housing counseling agency.

(2) (A) After the letter has been sent, the mortgage servicer shall attempt

to contact the borrower by telephone at least three times at different hours

and on different days. Telephone calls shall be made to the primary telephone

number on file.

(B) A mortgage servicer may attempt to contact a borrower using an

automated system to dial borrowers, provided that, if the telephone call is

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answered, the call is connected to a live representative of the mortgage

servicer.

(C) A mortgage servicer satisfies the telephone contact requirements of

this paragraph if it determines, after attempting contact pursuant to this

paragraph, that the borrower’s primary telephone number and secondary

telephone number or numbers on file, if any, have been disconnected.

(3) If the borrower does not respond within two weeks after the telephone

call requirements of paragraph (2) have been satisfied, the mortgage servicer

shall then send a certified letter, with return receipt requested.

(4) The mortgage servicer shall provide a means for the borrower to

contact it in a timely manner, including a toll-free telephone number that

will provide access to a live representative during business hours.

(5) The mortgage servicer has posted a prominent link on the homepage

of its Internet Web site, if any, to the following information:

(A) Options that may be available to borrowers who are unable to afford

their mortgage payments and who wish to avoid foreclosure, and instructions

to borrowers advising them on steps to take to explore those options.

(B) A list of financial documents borrowers should collect and be

prepared to present to the mortgage servicer when discussing options for

avoiding foreclosure.

(C) A toll-free telephone number for borrowers who wish to discuss

options for avoiding foreclosure with their mortgage servicer.

(D) The toll-free telephone number made available by HUD to find a

HUD-certified housing counseling agency.

(f) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust described

in Section 2924.15.

(g) This section shall become operative on January 1, 2018.

SEC. 6. Section 2923.55 is added to the Civil Code, to read:

2923.55. (a) A mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or

authorized agent may not record a notice of default pursuant to Section 2924

until all of the following:

(1) The mortgage servicer has satisfied the requirements of paragraph

(1) of subdivision (b).

(2) Either 30 days after initial contact is made as required by paragraph

(2) of subdivision (b) or 30 days after satisfying the due diligence

requirements as described in subdivision (f).

(3) The mortgage servicer complies with subdivision (c) of Section

2923.6, if the borrower has provided a complete application as defined in

subdivision (h) of Section 2923.6.

(b) (1) As specified in subdivision (a), a mortgage servicer shall send

the following information in writing to the borrower:

(A) A statement that if the borrower is a servicemember or a dependent

of a servicemember, he or she may be entitled to certain protections under

the federal Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (50 U.S.C. Sec. 501 et seq.)

regarding the servicemember’s interest rate and the risk of foreclosure, and

counseling for covered servicemembers that is available at agencies such

as Military OneSource and Armed Forces Legal Assistance.

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Ch. 87 8

(B) A statement that the borrower may request the following:

(i) A copy of the borrower’s promissory note or other evidence of

indebtedness.

(ii) A copy of the borrower’s deed of trust or mortgage.

(iii) A copy of any assignment, if applicable, of the borrower’s mortgage

or deed of trust required to demonstrate the right of the mortgage servicer

to foreclose.

(iv) A copy of the borrower’s payment history since the borrower was

last less than 60 days past due.

(2) A mortgage servicer shall contact the borrower in person or by

telephone in order to assess the borrower’s financial situation and explore

options for the borrower to avoid foreclosure. During the initial contact, the

mortgage servicer shall advise the borrower that he or she has the right to

request a subsequent meeting and, if requested, the mortgage servicer shall

schedule the meeting to occur within 14 days. The assessment of the

borrower’s financial situation and discussion of options may occur during

the first contact, or at the subsequent meeting scheduled for that purpose.

In either case, the borrower shall be provided the toll-free telephone number

made available by the United States Department of Housing and Urban

Development (HUD) to find a HUD-certified housing counseling agency.

Any meeting may occur telephonically.

(c) A notice of default recorded pursuant to Section 2924 shall include

a declaration that the mortgage servicer has contacted the borrower, has

tried with due diligence to contact the borrower as required by this section,

or that no contact was required because the individual did not meet the

definition of “borrower” pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 2920.5.

(d) A mortgage servicer’s loss mitigation personnel may participate by

telephone during any contact required by this section.

(e) A borrower may designate, with consent given in writing, a

HUD-certified housing counseling agency, attorney, or other advisor to

discuss with the mortgage servicer, on the borrower’s behalf, the borrower’s

financial situation and options for the borrower to avoid foreclosure. That

contact made at the direction of the borrower shall satisfy the contact

requirements of paragraph (2) of subdivision (b). Any foreclosure prevention

alternative offered at the meeting by the mortgage servicer is subject to

approval by the borrower.

(f) A notice of default may be recorded pursuant to Section 2924 when

a mortgage servicer has not contacted a borrower as required by paragraph

(2) of subdivision (b), provided that the failure to contact the borrower

occurred despite the due diligence of the mortgage servicer. For purposes

of this section, “due diligence” shall require and mean all of the following:

(1) A mortgage servicer shall first attempt to contact a borrower by

sending a first-class letter that includes the toll-free telephone number made

available by HUD to find a HUD-certified housing counseling agency.

(2) (A) After the letter has been sent, the mortgage servicer shall attempt

to contact the borrower by telephone at least three times at different hours

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and on different days. Telephone calls shall be made to the primary telephone

number on file.

(B) A mortgage servicer may attempt to contact a borrower using an

automated system to dial borrowers, provided that, if the telephone call is

answered, the call is connected to a live representative of the mortgage

servicer.

(C) A mortgage servicer satisfies the telephone contact requirements of

this paragraph if it determines, after attempting contact pursuant to this

paragraph, that the borrower’s primary telephone number and secondary

telephone number or numbers on file, if any, have been disconnected.

(3) If the borrower does not respond within two weeks after the telephone

call requirements of paragraph (2) have been satisfied, the mortgage servicer

shall then send a certified letter, with return receipt requested, that includes

the toll-free telephone number made available by HUD to find a

HUD-certified housing counseling agency.

(4) The mortgage servicer shall provide a means for the borrower to

contact it in a timely manner, including a toll-free telephone number that

will provide access to a live representative during business hours.

(5) The mortgage servicer has posted a prominent link on the homepage

of its Internet Web site, if any, to the following information:

(A) Options that may be available to borrowers who are unable to afford

their mortgage payments and who wish to avoid foreclosure, and instructions

to borrowers advising them on steps to take to explore those options.

(B) A list of financial documents borrowers should collect and be

prepared to present to the mortgage servicer when discussing options for

avoiding foreclosure.

(C) A toll-free telephone number for borrowers who wish to discuss

options for avoiding foreclosure with their mortgage servicer.

(D) The toll-free telephone number made available by HUD to find a

HUD-certified housing counseling agency.

(g) This section shall not apply to entities described in subdivision (b)

of Section 2924.18.

(h) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust described

in Section 2924.15.

(i) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2018, and as

of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted statute, that is enacted before

January 1, 2018, deletes or extends that date.

SEC. 7. Section 2923.6 of the Civil Code is amended to read:

2923.6. (a) The Legislature finds and declares that any duty that

mortgage servicers may have to maximize net present value under their

pooling and servicing agreements is owed to all parties in a loan pool, or to

all investors under a pooling and servicing agreement, not to any particular

party in the loan pool or investor under a pooling and servicing agreement,

and that a mortgage servicer acts in the best interests of all parties to the

loan pool or investors in the pooling and servicing agreement if it agrees to

or implements a loan modification or workout plan for which both of the

following apply:

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Ch. 87 10

(1) The loan is in payment default, or payment default is reasonably

foreseeable.

(2) Anticipated recovery under the loan modification or workout plan

exceeds the anticipated recovery through foreclosure on a net present value

basis.

(b) It is the intent of the Legislature that the mortgage servicer offer the

borrower a loan modification or workout plan if such a modification or plan

is consistent with its contractual or other authority.

(c) If a borrower submits a complete application for a first lien loan

modification offered by, or through, the borrower’s mortgage servicer, a

mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall

not record a notice of default or notice of sale, or conduct a trustee’s sale,

while the complete first lien loan modification application is pending. A

mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall

not record a notice of default or notice of sale or conduct a trustee’s sale

until any of the following occurs:

(1) The mortgage servicer makes a written determination that the borrower

is not eligible for a first lien loan modification, and any appeal period

pursuant to subdivision (d) has expired.

(2) The borrower does not accept an offered first lien loan modification

within 14 days of the offer.

(3) The borrower accepts a written first lien loan modification, but

defaults on, or otherwise breaches the borrower’s obligations under, the

first lien loan modification.

(d) If the borrower’s application for a first lien loan modification is

denied, the borrower shall have at least 30 days from the date of the written

denial to appeal the denial and to provide evidence that the mortgage

servicer’s determination was in error.

(e) If the borrower’s application for a first lien loan modification is

denied, the mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized

agent shall not record a notice of default or, if a notice of default has already

been recorded, record a notice of sale or conduct a trustee’s sale until the

later of:

(1) Thirty-one days after the borrower is notified in writing of the denial.

(2) If the borrower appeals the denial pursuant to subdivision (d), the

later of 15 days after the denial of the appeal or 14 days after a first lien

loan modification is offered after appeal but declined by the borrower, or,

if a first lien loan modification is offered and accepted after appeal, the date

on which the borrower fails to timely submit the first payment or otherwise

breaches the terms of the offer.

(f) Following the denial of a first lien loan modification application, the

mortgage servicer shall send a written notice to the borrower identifying

the reasons for denial, including the following:

(1) The amount of time from the date of the denial letter in which the

borrower may request an appeal of the denial of the first lien loan

modification and instructions regarding how to appeal the denial.

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(2) If the denial was based on investor disallowance, the specific reasons

for the investor disallowance.

(3) If the denial is the result of a net present value calculation, the monthly

gross income and property value used to calculate the net present value and

a statement that the borrower may obtain all of the inputs used in the net

present value calculation upon written request to the mortgage servicer.

(4) If applicable, a finding that the borrower was previously offered a

first lien loan modification and failed to successfully make payments under

the terms of the modified loan.

(5) If applicable, a description of other foreclosure prevention alternatives

for which the borrower may be eligible, and a list of the steps the borrower

must take in order to be considered for those options. If the mortgage servicer

has already approved the borrower for another foreclosure prevention

alternative, information necessary to complete the foreclosure prevention

alternative.

(g) In order to minimize the risk of borrowers submitting multiple

applications for first lien loan modifications for the purpose of delay, the

mortgage servicer shall not be obligated to evaluate applications from

borrowers who have already been evaluated or afforded a fair opportunity

to be evaluated for a first lien loan modification prior to January 1, 2013,

or who have been evaluated or afforded a fair opportunity to be evaluated

consistent with the requirements of this section, unless there has been a

material change in the borrower’s financial circumstances since the date of

the borrower’s previous application and that change is documented by the

borrower and submitted to the mortgage servicer.

(h) For purposes of this section, an application shall be deemed

“complete” when a borrower has supplied the mortgage servicer with all

documents required by the mortgage servicer within the reasonable

timeframes specified by the mortgage servicer.

(i) Subdivisions (c) to (h), inclusive, shall not apply to entities described

in subdivision (b) of Section 2924.18.

(j) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust described

in Section 2924.15.

(k) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2018, and

as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted statute, that is enacted

before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends that date.

SEC. 8. Section 2923.6 is added to the Civil Code, to read:

2923.6. (a) The Legislature finds and declares that any duty mortgage

servicers may have to maximize net present value under their pooling and

servicing agreements is owed to all parties in a loan pool, or to all investors

under a pooling and servicing agreement, not to any particular party in the

loan pool or investor under a pooling and servicing agreement, and that a

mortgage servicer acts in the best interests of all parties to the loan pool or

investors in the pooling and servicing agreement if it agrees to or implements

a loan modification or workout plan for which both of the following apply:

(1) The loan is in payment default, or payment default is reasonably

foreseeable.

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Ch. 87 12

(2) Anticipated recovery under the loan modification or workout plan

exceeds the anticipated recovery through foreclosure on a net present value

basis.

(b) It is the intent of the Legislature that the mortgage servicer offer the

borrower a loan modification or workout plan if such a modification or plan

is consistent with its contractual or other authority.

(c) This section shall become operative on January 1, 2018.

SEC. 9. Section 2923.7 is added to the Civil Code, to read:

2923.7. (a) Upon request from a borrower who requests a foreclosure

prevention alternative, the mortgage servicer shall promptly establish a

single point of contact and provide to the borrower one or more direct means

of communication with the single point of contact.

(b) The single point of contact shall be responsible for doing all of the

following:

(1) Communicating the process by which a borrower may apply for an

available foreclosure prevention alternative and the deadline for any required

submissions to be considered for these options.

(2) Coordinating receipt of all documents associated with available

foreclosure prevention alternatives and notifying the borrower of any missing

documents necessary to complete the application.

(3) Having access to current information and personnel sufficient to

timely, accurately, and adequately inform the borrower of the current status

of the foreclosure prevention alternative.

(4) Ensuring that a borrower is considered for all foreclosure prevention

alternatives offered by, or through, the mortgage servicer, if any.

(5) Having access to individuals with the ability and authority to stop

foreclosure proceedings when necessary.

(c) The single point of contact shall remain assigned to the borrower’s

account until the mortgage servicer determines that all loss mitigation options

offered by, or through, the mortgage servicer have been exhausted or the

borrower’s account becomes current.

(d) The mortgage servicer shall ensure that a single point of contact refers

and transfers a borrower to an appropriate supervisor upon request of the

borrower, if the single point of contact has a supervisor.

(e) For purposes of this section, “single point of contact” means an

individual or team of personnel each of whom has the ability and authority

to perform the responsibilities described in subdivisions (b) to (d), inclusive.

The mortgage servicer shall ensure that each member of the team is

knowledgeable about the borrower’s situation and current status in the

alternatives to foreclosure process.

(f) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust described

in Section 2924.15.

(g) (1) This section shall not apply to a depository institution chartered

under state or federal law, a person licensed pursuant to Division 9

(commencing with Section 22000) or Division 20 (commencing with Section

50000) of the Financial Code, or a person licensed pursuant to Part 1

(commencing with Section 10000) of Division 4 of the Business and

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Professions Code, that, during its immediately preceding annual reporting

period, as established with its primary regulator, foreclosed on 175 or fewer

residential real properties, containing no more than four dwelling units, that

are located in California.

(2) Within three months after the close of any calendar year or annual

reporting period as established with its primary regulator during which an

entity or person described in paragraph (1) exceeds the threshold of 175

specified in paragraph (1), that entity shall notify its primary regulator, in

a manner acceptable to its primary regulator, and any mortgagor or trustor

who is delinquent on a residential mortgage loan serviced by that entity of

the date on which that entity will be subject to this section, which date shall

be the first day of the first month that is six months after the close of the

calendar year or annual reporting period during which that entity exceeded

the threshold.

SEC. 10. Section 2924 of the Civil Code, as amended by Section 1 of

Chapter 180 of the Statutes of 2010, is amended to read:

2924. (a) Every transfer of an interest in property, other than in trust,

made only as a security for the performance of another act, is to be deemed

a mortgage, except when in the case of personal property it is accompanied

by actual change of possession, in which case it is to be deemed a pledge.

Where, by a mortgage created after July 27, 1917, of any estate in real

property, other than an estate at will or for years, less than two, or in any

transfer in trust made after July 27, 1917, of a like estate to secure the

performance of an obligation, a power of sale is conferred upon the

mortgagee, trustee, or any other person, to be exercised after a breach of

the obligation for which that mortgage or transfer is a security, the power

shall not be exercised except where the mortgage or transfer is made pursuant

to an order, judgment, or decree of a court of record, or to secure the payment

of bonds or other evidences of indebtedness authorized or permitted to be

issued by the Commissioner of Corporations, or is made by a public utility

subject to the provisions of the Public Utilities Act, until all of the following

apply:

(1) The trustee, mortgagee, or beneficiary, or any of their authorized

agents shall first file for record, in the office of the recorder of each county

wherein the mortgaged or trust property or some part or parcel thereof is

situated, a notice of default. That notice of default shall include all of the

following:

(A) A statement identifying the mortgage or deed of trust by stating the

name or names of the trustor or trustors and giving the book and page, or

instrument number, if applicable, where the mortgage or deed of trust is

recorded or a description of the mortgaged or trust property.

(B) A statement that a breach of the obligation for which the mortgage

or transfer in trust is security has occurred.

(C) A statement setting forth the nature of each breach actually known

to the beneficiary and of his or her election to sell or cause to be sold the

property to satisfy that obligation and any other obligation secured by the

deed of trust or mortgage that is in default.

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Ch. 87 14

(D) If the default is curable pursuant to Section 2924c, the statement

specified in paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of Section 2924c.

(2) Not less than three months shall elapse from the filing of the notice

of default.

(3) Except as provided in paragraph (4), after the lapse of the three months

described in paragraph (2), the mortgagee, trustee, or other person authorized

to take the sale shall give notice of sale, stating the time and place thereof,

in the manner and for a time not less than that set forth in Section 2924f.

(4) Notwithstanding paragraph (3), the mortgagee, trustee, or other person

authorized to take sale may record a notice of sale pursuant to Section 2924f

up to five days before the lapse of the three-month period described in

paragraph (2), provided that the date of sale is no earlier than three months

and 20 days after the recording of the notice of default.

(5) Until January 1, 2018, whenever a sale is postponed for a period of

at least 10 business days pursuant to Section 2924g, a mortgagee, beneficiary,

or authorized agent shall provide written notice to a borrower regarding the

new sale date and time, within five business days following the

postponement. Information provided pursuant to this paragraph shall not

constitute the public declaration required by subdivision (d) of Section

2924g. Failure to comply with this paragraph shall not invalidate any sale

that would otherwise be valid under Section 2924f. This paragraph shall be

inoperative on January 1, 2018.

(6) No entity shall record or cause a notice of default to be recorded or

otherwise initiate the foreclosure process unless it is the holder of the

beneficial interest under the mortgage or deed of trust, the original trustee

or the substituted trustee under the deed of trust, or the designated agent of

the holder of the beneficial interest. No agent of the holder of the beneficial

interest under the mortgage or deed of trust, original trustee or substituted

trustee under the deed of trust may record a notice of default or otherwise

commence the foreclosure process except when acting within the scope of

authority designated by the holder of the beneficial interest.

(b) In performing acts required by this article, the trustee shall incur no

liability for any good faith error resulting from reliance on information

provided in good faith by the beneficiary regarding the nature and the amount

of the default under the secured obligation, deed of trust, or mortgage. In

performing the acts required by this article, a trustee shall not be subject to

Title 1.6c (commencing with Section 1788) of Part 4.

(c) A recital in the deed executed pursuant to the power of sale of

compliance with all requirements of law regarding the mailing of copies of

notices or the publication of a copy of the notice of default or the personal

delivery of the copy of the notice of default or the posting of copies of the

notice of sale or the publication of a copy thereof shall constitute prima

facie evidence of compliance with these requirements and conclusive

evidence thereof in favor of bona fide purchasers and encumbrancers for

value and without notice.

(d) All of the following shall constitute privileged communications

pursuant to Section 47:

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(1) The mailing, publication, and delivery of notices as required by this

section.

(2) Performance of the procedures set forth in this article.

(3) Performance of the functions and procedures set forth in this article

if those functions and procedures are necessary to carry out the duties

described in Sections 729.040, 729.050, and 729.080 of the Code of Civil

Procedure.

(e) There is a rebuttable presumption that the beneficiary actually knew

of all unpaid loan payments on the obligation owed to the beneficiary and

secured by the deed of trust or mortgage subject to the notice of default.

However, the failure to include an actually known default shall not invalidate

the notice of sale and the beneficiary shall not be precluded from asserting

a claim to this omitted default or defaults in a separate notice of default.

SEC. 11. Section 2924 of the Civil Code, as amended by Section 2 of

Chapter 180 of the Statutes of 2010, is repealed.

SEC. 12. Section 2924.9 is added to the Civil Code, to read:

2924.9. (a) Unless a borrower has previously exhausted the first lien

loan modification process offered by, or through, his or her mortgage servicer

described in Section 2923.6, within five business days after recording a

notice of default pursuant to Section 2924, a mortgage servicer that offers

one or more foreclosure prevention alternatives shall send a written

communication to the borrower that includes all of the following information:

(1) That the borrower may be evaluated for a foreclosure prevention

alternative or, if applicable, foreclosure prevention alternatives.

(2) Whether an application is required to be submitted by the borrower

in order to be considered for a foreclosure prevention alternative.

(3) The means and process by which a borrower may obtain an application

for a foreclosure prevention alternative.

(b) This section shall not apply to entities described in subdivision (b)

of Section 2924.18.

(c) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust described

in Section 2924.15.

(d) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2018, and

as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted statute, that is enacted

before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends that date.

SEC. 13. Section 2924.10 is added to the Civil Code, to read:

2924.10. (a) When a borrower submits a complete first lien modification

application or any document in connection with a first lien modification

application, the mortgage servicer shall provide written acknowledgment

of the receipt of the documentation within five business days of receipt. In

its initial acknowledgment of receipt of the loan modification application,

the mortgage servicer shall include the following information:

(1) A description of the loan modification process, including an estimate

of when a decision on the loan modification will be made after a complete

application has been submitted by the borrower and the length of time the

borrower will have to consider an offer of a loan modification or other

foreclosure prevention alternative.

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Ch. 87 16

(2) Any deadlines, including deadlines to submit missing documentation,

that would affect the processing of a first lien loan modification application.

(3) Any expiration dates for submitted documents.

(4) Any deficiency in the borrower’s first lien loan modification

application.

(b) For purposes of this section, a borrower’s first lien loan modification

application shall be deemed to be “complete” when a borrower has supplied

the mortgage servicer with all documents required by the mortgage servicer

within the reasonable timeframes specified by the mortgage servicer.

(c) This section shall not apply to entities described in subdivision (b)

of Section 2924.18.

(d) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust described

in Section 2924.15.

(e) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2018, and

as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted statute, that is enacted

before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends that date.

SEC. 14. Section 2924.11 is added to the Civil Code, to read:

2924.11. (a) If a foreclosure prevention alternative is approved in writing

prior to the recordation of a notice of default, a mortgage servicer, mortgagee,

trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record a notice of default

under either of the following circumstances:

(1) The borrower is in compliance with the terms of a written trial or

permanent loan modification, forbearance, or repayment plan.

(2) A foreclosure prevention alternative has been approved in writing by

all parties, including, for example, the first lien investor, junior lienholder,

and mortgage insurer, as applicable, and proof of funds or financing has

been provided to the servicer.

(b) If a foreclosure prevention alternative is approved in writing after

the recordation of a notice of default, a mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee,

beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record a notice of sale or conduct

a trustee’s sale under either of the following circumstances:

(1) The borrower is in compliance with the terms of a written trial or

permanent loan modification, forbearance, or repayment plan.

(2) A foreclosure prevention alternative has been approved in writing by

all parties, including, for example, the first lien investor, junior lienholder,

and mortgage insurer, as applicable, and proof of funds or financing has

been provided to the servicer.

(c) When a borrower accepts an offered first lien loan modification or

other foreclosure prevention alternative, the mortgage servicer shall provide

the borrower with a copy of the fully executed loan modification agreement

or agreement evidencing the foreclosure prevention alternative following

receipt of the executed copy from the borrower.

(d) A mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall record a rescission

of a notice of default or cancel a pending trustee’s sale, if applicable, upon

the borrower executing a permanent foreclosure prevention alternative. In

the case of a short sale, the rescission or cancellation of the pending trustee’s

sale shall occur when the short sale has been approved by all parties and

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17 Ch. 87

proof of funds or financing has been provided to the mortgagee, beneficiary,

or authorized agent.

(e) The mortgage servicer shall not charge any application, processing,

or other fee for a first lien loan modification or other foreclosure prevention

alternative.

(f) The mortgage servicer shall not collect any late fees for periods during

which a complete first lien loan modification application is under

consideration or a denial is being appealed, the borrower is making timely

modification payments, or a foreclosure prevention alternative is being

evaluated or exercised.

(g) If a borrower has been approved in writing for a first lien loan

modification or other foreclosure prevention alternative, and the servicing

of that borrower’s loan is transferred or sold to another mortgage servicer,

the subsequent mortgage servicer shall continue to honor any previously

approved first lien loan modification or other foreclosure prevention

alternative, in accordance with the provisions of the act that added this

section.

(h) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust described

in Section 2924.15.

(i) This section shall not apply to entities described in subdivision (b) of

Section 2924.18.

(j) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2018, and as

of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted statute, that is enacted before

January 1, 2018, deletes or extends that date.

SEC. 15. Section 2924.11 is added to the Civil Code, to read:

2924.11. (a) If a borrower submits a complete application for a

foreclosure prevention alternative offered by, or through, the borrower’s

mortgage servicer, a mortgage servicer, trustee, mortgagee, beneficiary, or

authorized agent shall not record a notice of sale or conduct a trustee’s sale

while the complete foreclosure prevention alternative application is pending,

and until the borrower has been provided with a written determination by

the mortgage servicer regarding that borrower’s eligibility for the requested

foreclosure prevention alternative.

(b) Following the denial of a first lien loan modification application, the

mortgage servicer shall send a written notice to the borrower identifying

with specificity the reasons for the denial and shall include a statement that

the borrower may obtain additional documentation supporting the denial

decision upon written request to the mortgage servicer.

(c) If a foreclosure prevention alternative is approved in writing prior to

the recordation of a notice of default, a mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee,

beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record a notice of default under

either of the following circumstances:

(1) The borrower is in compliance with the terms of a written trial or

permanent loan modification, forbearance, or repayment plan.

(2) A foreclosure prevention alternative has been approved in writing by

all parties, including, for example, the first lien investor, junior lienholder,

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Ch. 87 18

and mortgage insurer, as applicable, and proof of funds or financing has

been provided to the servicer.

(d) If a foreclosure prevention alternative is approved in writing after

the recordation of a notice of default, a mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee,

beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record a notice of sale or conduct

a trustee’s sale under either of the following circumstances:

(1) The borrower is in compliance with the terms of a written trial or

permanent loan modification, forbearance, or repayment plan.

(2) A foreclosure prevention alternative has been approved in writing by

all parties, including, for example, the first lien investor, junior lienholder,

and mortgage insurer, as applicable, and proof of funds or financing has

been provided to the servicer.

(e) This section applies only to mortgages or deeds of trust as described

in Section 2924.15.

(f) For purposes of this section, an application shall be deemed “complete”

when a borrower has supplied the mortgage servicer with all documents

required by the mortgage servicer within the reasonable timeframes specified

by the mortgage servicer.

(g) This section shall become operative on January 1, 2018.

SEC. 16. Section 2924.12 is added to the Civil Code, to read:

2924.12. (a) (1) If a trustee’s deed upon sale has not been recorded, a

borrower may bring an action for injunctive relief to enjoin a material

violation of Section 2923.55, 2923.6, 2923.7, 2924.9, 2924.10, 2924.11, or

2924.17.

(2) Any injunction shall remain in place and any trustee’s sale shall be

enjoined until the court determines that the mortgage servicer, mortgagee,

trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent has corrected and remedied the

violation or violations giving rise to the action for injunctive relief. An

enjoined entity may move to dissolve an injunction based on a showing that

the material violation has been corrected and remedied.

(b) After a trustee’s deed upon sale has been recorded, a mortgage

servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall be liable

to a borrower for actual economic damages pursuant to Section 3281,

resulting from a material violation of Section 2923.55, 2923.6, 2923.7,

2924.9, 2924.10, 2924.11, or 2924.17 by that mortgage servicer, mortgagee,

trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent where the violation was not corrected

and remedied prior to the recordation of the trustee’s deed upon sale. If the

court finds that the material violation was intentional or reckless, or resulted

from willful misconduct by a mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee,

beneficiary, or authorized agent, the court may award the borrower the

greater of treble actual damages or statutory damages of fifty thousand

dollars ($50,000).

(c) A mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized

agent shall not be liable for any violation that it has corrected and remedied

prior to the recordation of a trustee’s deed upon sale, or that has been

corrected and remedied by third parties working on its behalf prior to the

recordation of a trustee’s deed upon sale.

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19 Ch. 87

(d) A violation of Section 2923.55, 2923.6, 2923.7, 2924.9, 2924.10,

2924.11, or 2924.17 by a person licensed by the Department of Corporations,

Department of Financial Institutions, or Department of Real Estate shall be

deemed to be a violation of that person’s licensing law.

(e) No violation of this article shall affect the validity of a sale in favor

of a bona fide purchaser and any of its encumbrancers for value without

notice.

(f) A third-party encumbrancer shall not be relieved of liability resulting

from violations of Section 2923.55, 2923.6, 2923.7, 2924.9, 2924.10,

2924.11, or 2924.17 committed by that third-party encumbrancer, that

occurred prior to the sale of the subject property to the bona fide purchaser.

(g) A signatory to a consent judgment entered in the case entitled United

States of America et al. v. Bank of America Corporation et al., filed in the

United States District Court for the District of Columbia, case number

1:12-cv-00361 RMC, that is in compliance with the relevant terms of the

Settlement Term Sheet of that consent judgment with respect to the borrower

who brought an action pursuant to this section while the consent judgment

is in effect shall have no liability for a violation of Section 2923.55, 2923.6,

2923.7, 2924.9, 2924.10, 2924.11, or 2924.17.

(h) The rights, remedies, and procedures provided by this section are in

addition to and independent of any other rights, remedies, or procedures

under any other law. Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter, limit,

or negate any other rights, remedies, or procedures provided by law.

(i) A court may award a prevailing borrower reasonable attorney’s fees

and costs in an action brought pursuant to this section. A borrower shall be

deemed to have prevailed for purposes of this subdivision if the borrower

obtained injunctive relief or was awarded damages pursuant to this section.

(j) This section shall not apply to entities described in subdivision (b) of

Section 2924.18.

(k) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2018, and

as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted statute, that is enacted

before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends that date.

SEC. 17. Section 2924.12 is added to the Civil Code, to read:

2924.12. (a) (1) If a trustee’s deed upon sale has not been recorded, a

borrower may bring an action for injunctive relief to enjoin a material

violation of Section 2923.5, 2923.7, 2924.11, or 2924.17.

(2) Any injunction shall remain in place and any trustee’s sale shall be

enjoined until the court determines that the mortgage servicer, mortgagee,

trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent has corrected and remedied the

violation or violations giving rise to the action for injunctive relief. An

enjoined entity may move to dissolve an injunction based on a showing that

the material violation has been corrected and remedied.

(b) After a trustee’s deed upon sale has been recorded, a mortgage

servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall be liable

to a borrower for actual economic damages pursuant to Section 3281,

resulting from a material violation of Section 2923.5, 2923.7, 2924.11, or

2924.17 by that mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or

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Ch. 87 20

authorized agent where the violation was not corrected and remedied prior

to the recordation of the trustee’s deed upon sale. If the court finds that the

material violation was intentional or reckless, or resulted from willful

misconduct by a mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or

authorized agent, the court may award the borrower the greater of treble

actual damages or statutory damages of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000).

(c) A mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized

agent shall not be liable for any violation that it has corrected and remedied

prior to the recordation of the trustee’s deed upon sale, or that has been

corrected and remedied by third parties working on its behalf prior to the

recordation of the trustee’s deed upon sale.

(d) A violation of Section 2923.5, 2923.7, 2924.11, or 2924.17 by a

person licensed by the Department of Corporations, Department of Financial

Institutions, or Department of Real Estate shall be deemed to be a violation

of that person’s licensing law.

(e) No violation of this article shall affect the validity of a sale in favor

of a bona fide purchaser and any of its encumbrancers for value without

notice.

(f) A third-party encumbrancer shall not be relieved of liability resulting

from violations of Section 2923.5, 2923.7, 2924.11, or 2924.17 committed

by that third-party encumbrancer, that occurred prior to the sale of the subject

property to the bona fide purchaser.

(g) The rights, remedies, and procedures provided by this section are in

addition to and independent of any other rights, remedies, or procedures

under any other law. Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter, limit,

or negate any other rights, remedies, or procedures provided by law.

(h) A court may award a prevailing borrower reasonable attorney’s fees

and costs in an action brought pursuant to this section. A borrower shall be

deemed to have prevailed for purposes of this subdivision if the borrower

obtained injunctive relief or was awarded damages pursuant to this section.

(i) This section shall become operative on January 1, 2018.

SEC. 18. Section 2924.15 is added to the Civil Code, to read:

2924.15. (a) Unless otherwise provided, paragraph (5) of subdivision

(a) of Section 2924, and Sections 2923.5, 2923.55, 2923.6, 2923.7, 2924.9,

2924.10, 2924.11, and 2924.18 shall apply only to first lien mortgages or

deeds of trust that are secured by owner-occupied residential real property

containing no more than four dwelling units. For these purposes,

“owner-occupied” means that the property is the principal residence of the

borrower and is security for a loan made for personal, family, or household

purposes.

(b) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2018, and

as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted statute, that is enacted

before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends that date.

SEC. 19. Section 2924.15 is added to the Civil Code, to read:

2924.15. (a) Unless otherwise provided, Sections 2923.5, 2923.7, and

2924.11 shall apply only to first lien mortgages or deeds of trust that are

secured by owner-occupied residential real property containing no more

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21 Ch. 87

than four dwelling units. For these purposes, “owner-occupied” means that

the property is the principal residence of the borrower and is security for a

loan made for personal, family, or household purposes.

(b) This section shall become operative on January 1, 2018.

SEC. 20. Section 2924.17 is added to the Civil Code, to read:

2924.17. (a) A declaration recorded pursuant to Section 2923.5 or, until

January 1, 2018, pursuant to Section 2923.55, a notice of default, notice of

sale, assignment of a deed of trust, or substitution of trustee recorded by or

on behalf of a mortgage servicer in connection with a foreclosure subject

to the requirements of Section 2924, or a declaration or affidavit filed in

any court relative to a foreclosure proceeding shall be accurate and complete

and supported by competent and reliable evidence.

(b) Before recording or filing any of the documents described in

subdivision (a), a mortgage servicer shall ensure that it has reviewed

competent and reliable evidence to substantiate the borrower’s default and

the right to foreclose, including the borrower’s loan status and loan

information.

(c) Until January 1, 2018, any mortgage servicer that engages in multiple

and repeated uncorrected violations of subdivision (b) in recording

documents or filing documents in any court relative to a foreclosure

proceeding shall be liable for a civil penalty of up to seven thousand five

hundred dollars ($7,500) per mortgage or deed of trust in an action brought

by a government entity identified in Section 17204 of the Business and

Professions Code, or in an administrative proceeding brought by the

Department of Corporations, the Department of Real Estate, or the

Department of Financial Institutions against a respective licensee, in addition

to any other remedies available to these entities. This subdivision shall be

inoperative on January 1, 2018.

SEC. 21. Section 2924.18 is added to the Civil Code, to read:

2924.18. (a) (1) If a borrower submits a complete application for a first

lien loan modification offered by, or through, the borrower’s mortgage

servicer, a mortgage servicer, trustee, mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized

agent shall not record a notice of default, notice of sale, or conduct a trustee’s

sale while the complete first lien loan modification application is pending,

and until the borrower has been provided with a written determination by

the mortgage servicer regarding that borrower’s eligibility for the requested

loan modification.

(2) If a foreclosure prevention alternative has been approved in writing

prior to the recordation of a notice of default, a mortgage servicer, mortgagee,

trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record a notice of default

under either of the following circumstances:

(A) The borrower is in compliance with the terms of a written trial or

permanent loan modification, forbearance, or repayment plan.

(B) A foreclosure prevention alternative has been approved in writing

by all parties, including, for example, the first lien investor, junior lienholder,

and mortgage insurer, as applicable, and proof of funds or financing has

been provided to the servicer.

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Ch. 87 22

(3) If a foreclosure prevention alternative is approved in writing after

the recordation of a notice of default, a mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee,

beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record a notice of sale or conduct

a trustee’s sale under either of the following circumstances:

(A) The borrower is in compliance with the terms of a written trial or

permanent loan modification, forbearance, or repayment plan.

(B) A foreclosure prevention alternative has been approved in writing

by all parties, including, for example, the first lien investor, junior lienholder,

and mortgage insurer, as applicable, and proof of funds or financing has

been provided to the servicer.

(b) This section shall apply only to a depository institution chartered

under state or federal law, a person licensed pursuant to Division 9

(commencing with Section 22000) or Division 20 (commencing with Section

50000) of the Financial Code, or a person licensed pursuant to Part 1

(commencing with Section 10000) of Division 4 of the Business and

Professions Code, that, during its immediately preceding annual reporting

period, as established with its primary regulator, foreclosed on 175 or fewer

residential real properties, containing no more than four dwelling units, that

are located in California.

(c) Within three months after the close of any calendar year or annual

reporting period as established with its primary regulator during which an

entity or person described in subdivision (b) exceeds the threshold of 175

specified in subdivision (b), that entity shall notify its primary regulator, in

a manner acceptable to its primary regulator, and any mortgagor or trustor

who is delinquent on a residential mortgage loan serviced by that entity of

the date on which that entity will be subject to Sections 2923.55, 2923.6,

2923.7, 2924.9, 2924.10, 2924.11, and 2924.12, which date shall be the first

day of the first month that is six months after the close of the calendar year

or annual reporting period during which that entity exceeded the threshold.

(d) For purposes of this section, an application shall be deemed

“complete” when a borrower has supplied the mortgage servicer with all

documents required by the mortgage servicer within the reasonable

timeframes specified by the mortgage servicer.

(e) If a borrower has been approved in writing for a first lien loan

modification or other foreclosure prevention alternative, and the servicing

of the borrower’s loan is transferred or sold to another mortgage servicer,

the subsequent mortgage servicer shall continue to honor any previously

approved first lien loan modification or other foreclosure prevention

alternative, in accordance with the provisions of the act that added this

section.

(f) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust described

in Section 2924.15.

(g) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2018, and

as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted statute, that is enacted

before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends that date.

SEC. 22. Section 2924.19 is added to the Civil Code, to read:

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23 Ch. 87

2924.19. (a) (1) If a trustee’s deed upon sale has not been recorded, a

borrower may bring an action for injunctive relief to enjoin a material

violation of Section 2923.5, 2924.17, or 2924.18.

(2) Any injunction shall remain in place and any trustee’s sale shall be

enjoined until the court determines that the mortgage servicer, mortgagee,

beneficiary, or authorized agent has corrected and remedied the violation

or violations giving rise to the action for injunctive relief. An enjoined entity

may move to dissolve an injunction based on a showing that the material

violation has been corrected and remedied.

(b) After a trustee’s deed upon sale has been recorded, a mortgage

servicer, mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall be liable to a

borrower for actual economic damages pursuant to Section 3281, resulting

from a material violation of Section 2923.5, 2924.17, or 2924.18 by that

mortgage servicer, mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent where the

violation was not corrected and remedied prior to the recordation of the

trustee’s deed upon sale. If the court finds that the material violation was

intentional or reckless, or resulted from willful misconduct by a mortgage

servicer, mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent, the court may award

the borrower the greater of treble actual damages or statutory damages of

fifty thousand dollars ($50,000).

(c) A mortgage servicer, mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent

shall not be liable for any violation that it has corrected and remedied prior

to the recordation of the trustee’s deed upon sale, or that has been corrected

and remedied by third parties working on its behalf prior to the recordation

of the trustee’s deed upon sale.

(d) A violation of Section 2923.5, 2924.17, or 2917.18 by a person

licensed by the Department of Corporations, the Department of Financial

Institutions, or the Department of Real Estate shall be deemed to be a

violation of that person’s licensing law.

(e) No violation of this article shall affect the validity of a sale in favor

of a bona fide purchaser and any of its encumbrancers for value without

notice.

(f) A third-party encumbrancer shall not be relieved of liability resulting

from violations of Section 2923.5, 2924.17 or 2924.18, committed by that

third-party encumbrancer, that occurred prior to the sale of the subject

property to the bona fide purchaser.

(g) The rights, remedies, and procedures provided by this section are in

addition to and independent of any other rights, remedies, or procedures

under any other law. Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter, limit,

or negate any other rights, remedies, or procedures provided by law.

(h) A court may award a prevailing borrower reasonable attorney’s fees

and costs in an action brought pursuant to this section. A borrower shall be

deemed to have prevailed for purposes of this subdivision if the borrower

obtained injunctive relief or damages pursuant to this section.

(i) This section shall apply only to entities described in subdivision (b)

of Section 2924.18.

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Ch. 87 24

(j) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2018, and as

of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted statute, that is enacted before

January 1, 2018, deletes or extends that date.

SEC. 23. Section 2924.20 is added to the Civil Code, to read:

2924.20. Consistent with their general regulatory authority, and

notwithstanding subdivisions (b) and (c) of Section 2924.18, the Department

of Corporations, the Department of Financial Institutions, and the Department

of Real Estate may adopt regulations applicable to any entity or person

under their respective jurisdictions that are necessary to carry out the

purposes of the act that added this section. A violation of the regulations

adopted pursuant to this section shall only be enforceable by the regulatory

agency.

SEC. 24. The provisions of this act are severable. If any provision of

this act or its application is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other

provisions or applications that can be given effect without the invalid

provision or application.

SEC. 25. No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to Section

6 of Article XIII B of the California Constitution because the only costs that

may be incurred by a local agency or school district will be incurred because

this act creates a new crime or infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction,

or changes the penalty for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of

Section 17556 of the Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime

within the meaning of Section 6 of Article XIII B of the California

Constitution.

O

93

Watchdog Report: Foreclosure Review Scrapped On Eve Of Critical, Congressman Says

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Posted: 12/31/2012 3:53 pm EST  |  Updated: 12/31/2012 4:08 pm EST

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The surprising decision by regulators to scrap a massive and expensive foreclosure review program in favor of a $10 billion settlement with 14 banks — reported by The New York Times Sunday night — came after a year of mounting concerns about the independence and effectiveness of the controversial program.

The program, known as the Independent Foreclosure Review, was supposed to give homeowners who believe that their bank made a mistake in handling their foreclosure an opportunity for a neutral third party to review the claim. It’s not clear what factors led banking regulators to abandon the program in favor of a settlement, but the final straw may have been a pending report by the Government Accountability Office, a nonpartisan investigative arm of Congress, which was investigating the review program.

Rep. Brad Miller, a North Carolina Democrat, told The Huffington Post that the report, which has not been released, was “critical” and that the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, which administers the review, was aware of its findings. Miller said that that one problem the GAO was likely to highlight was an “unacceptably high” error rate of 11 percent in a sampling of bank loan files.

The sample files were chosen at random by the banks from their broader pool of foreclosed homeowners, who had not necessarily applied for relief. The data suggests that of the 4 million families who lost their homes to foreclosure since the housing crash, more than 400,000 had some bank-caused problem in their loan file. It also suggests that many thousands of those who could have applied for relief didn’t — because they weren’t aware of the review, or weren’t aware that their bank had made a mistake. Some of these mistakes pushed homeowners into foreclosure who otherwise could have afforded to keep their homes.

Miller said the news that a settlement to replace the review was in the works caught him by surprise, and stressed that he had no way of knowing whether the impending GAO report had triggered the decision.

It’s not clear what will happen to the 250,000 homeowners who have already applied to the Independent Foreclosure Review for relief. The Times, citing people familiar with the negotiations, said that a deal between the banks and banking regulators, led by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, could be reached by the end of the week. It wasn’t clear how that money would be distributed or how many current and former homeowners who lost their homes to foreclosure — or who were hit with an unnecessary fee — might qualify.

Bryan Hubbard, a spokesman for the OCC, which administers the program, declined to comment on the Times’ story. Hubbard told HuffPost, “The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency is committed to ensuring the Independent Foreclosure Review proceeds efficiently and to ensuring harmed borrowers are compensated as quickly as possible.”

Since the housing market crashed in 2007, thousands of foreclosed homeowners have complained that their mortgage company made a mistake in the management of their home loan, such as foreclosing on someone making payments on a loan modification plan. The Independent Foreclosure Review emerged from a legal agreement in April 2011 between 14 mortgage companies and bank regulators over these abusive “servicing” practices. It was supposed to give homeowners an opportunity to have an unbiased third party review their foreclosure and determine whether they might qualify for a cash payout of up to $125,000.

The initial response was tepid, at best. Homeowners and advocates complained that the application forms were confusing and that information about what type of compensation they might get was missing. Some told HuffPost that they were so disillusioned by the federal government’s anemic response to widely reported bank errors that they weren’t going to bother to apply.

In one instance, Daniel Casper, an Illinois wedding videographer, applied to the program in January after years of combat with Bank of America over his home loan. As The Huffington Post reported in October, he was initially rejected, because, according to the bank, his mortgage was not in the foreclosure process during the eligible review period. Promontory Financial Group, which Bank of America hired to review his loan, apparently did not double check Bank of America’s analysis against the extensive documentation that Chase submitted. That documentation clearly showed that his loan was eligible for review.

In recent months ProPublica, an investigative nonprofit, has issued a series of damning articles about the Independent Foreclosure Review. The most recent found that supposedly independent third-party reviewers looking over Bank of America loan files were given the “correct” answers in advance by the bank. These reviewers could override the answers, but they weren’t starting from a blank slate.

Banks, if they did not find a “compensable error,” did not have to pay anything, giving them a strong incentive to find no flaws with their own work.

“It was flawed from the start,” Miller said of the review program. “There was an inherent conflict of interest by just about everyone involved.”

Also on HuffPost:

Related News On Huffington Post:

Bank Of America Supplied Answers For ‘Independent’ Foreclosure Reviewers

ProPublica: The Independent Foreclosure Review is the government’s main effort to compensate homeowners for harm they suffered at the hands of banks — and, as…

Central Valley Foreclosures: Few Homeowners Taking Advantage Of Reviews

MODESTO — Nearly 50,000 Northern San Joaquin Valley homeowners potentially may be owed compensation for financial losses they incurred because of errors made during foreclosure…

Foreclosure-Prevention Roadshow Still Drawing Crowds Indicating Not All Is Well In The Housing Market

* NACA has hosted more than 100 events to assist homeowners * Group plays middleman between borrowers and banks * Foreclosures down from last year,…

Rebecca Mairone, BofA Exec Who Allegedly Enabled Fraud, Now Head Of JPMorgan Chase Foreclosure Review

by Paul Kiel ProPublica, Nov. 9, 2012, 1:18 p.m. An executive who the Justice Department says facilitated a scheme to defraud Fannie Mae and…

“Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007” has been extended!

From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Tuesday, January 01, 2013 1:47 PM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: "Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007" has been extended!

“American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012’’

Extends

"Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007"

H. R. 8 passed at 2:07am Eastern time on January 1, 2013. Since this wasn’t passed before midnight it retroactively extends the "Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007." The extension is through midnight December 31, 2013. The vote was 89 – 8.

I have attached a copy of H.R. 8 for you.

Here is the pertinent language from H.R. 8:

"TITLE II—INDIVIDUAL TAX EXTENDERS

SEC. 202. EXTENSION OF EXCLUSION FROM GROSS INCOME OF DISCHARGE OF QUALIFIED PRINCIPAL RESIDENCE INDEBTEDNESS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Subparagraph (E) of section 108(a)(1) is amended by striking ‘‘January 1, 2013’’ and inserting ‘‘January 1, 2014’’.

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by this section shall apply to indebtedness discharged after December 31, 2012."

2013-01-01, American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012.pdf

Weekly legal newsletter has arrived

From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@ldapro.com]
Sent: Wednesday, January 02, 2013 5:44 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: Weekly legal newsletter has arrived

The topic of the newsletter this week is a brief discussion of some of the issues involved for a party filing a motion to dismiss an adversary complaint for fraud filed against them in United States Bankruptcy Court on the grounds that the adversary complaint fails to state a claim.

This type of motion is often called a 12(b)(6) motion as it is based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure § 12(b)(6) (FRCP), or Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure § 7012(b)(6) (FRBP. A party may also request in the alternative, that the party be required to provide a more definite statement under FRCP § 12(e) or FRBP § 7012(e).

FRCP and FRBP §§12 (e) states in pertinent part that, “A party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response. The motion must be made before filing a responsive pleading and must point out the defects complained of and the details desired”.

The motion for a more definite statement may be joined with the motion to dismiss pursuant to FRCP and FRBP §§ 12(g).

Many adversary complaints filed in bankruptcy courts are made under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) on the grounds of fraudulent representations. Note that FRCP 9(b) states in pertinent part that, “In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake”. This is a federally imposed requirement. although the Court will examine state law to determine if the elements of fraud have been sufficiently alleged.

“It is established law, in this circuit and elsewhere, that Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement applies to state-law causes of action. "While a federal court will examine state law to determine whether the elements of fraud have been pled sufficiently to state a cause of action, the Rule 9(b) requirement that the circumstances of the fraud must be stated with particularity is a federally imposed rule." Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. 317 F. 3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted).

The reason for the particularity requirement is due to the fact that fraud is a serious charge against another party.

As the author works on cases from Southern California, the great majority of the cases he works on are in the Central District of California and any fraud claims would most likely be a California cause of action.

California law requires that four (4) elements be specifically pleaded in any cause of action for fraud.

“A complaint for fraud must allege the following elements: (1) a knowingly false representation by the defendant; (2) an intent to deceive or induce reliance; (3) justifiable reliance by the plaintiff; and (4) resulting damages. Every element must be specifically pleaded.” Service by Medallion, Inc. v. Clorox Co. 44 Cal.App.4th 1807, 1816 (1996).

Whatever form it takes, injury or damage from fraud must not only be distinctly alleged but its causal connection with reliance on representations must be shown…. In order to recover for fraud, as in any other tort, the plaintiff must plead and prove the detriment proximately caused by the defendant’s tortious conduct. Deception without resulting loss is not actionable fraud. Whatever form it takes, the injury or damage must not only be distinctly alleged but its causal connection with the reliance on the representations must be shown. Service by Medallion, Inc.,

44 Cal.App.4th 1807, supra at 1818.

And in California, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 338(d) there is a three-year statute of limitations for an action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake. The cause of action is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.

An action based on fraud may be brought more than three years after the fraud occurred if the plaintiff shows not only that he did not discover the facts but he could not with reasonable diligence have discovered them within that time. The complaint must set forth specifically (1) the facts of the time and manner of discovery; and (2) the circumstances which excuse the failure to have made an earlier discovery. Olson v. County of Sacramento 274 Cal.App 2d 316, 327 (1969) (internal citations omitted).

While leave to amend is usually granted if a motion to dismiss is successful, the Ninth Circuit has ruled that leave to amend does not need to be granted where amending the complaint would be futile, and that any discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where plaintiff has previously amended their complaint.

“Leave need not be granted where the amendment of the complaint . . . constitutes an exercise in futility," and "the district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where plaintiff has previously amended the complaint." Ascon Properties v. Mobil Oil Co. 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989).

A motion to dismiss and/or a motion for a more definite statement are very useful when used in the right situation as many adversary complaints for fraud are filed but fail to allege the fraud with particularity, or they are so vague and ambiguous that the defendant cannot reasonably prepare a proper response.

In the author’s experience filing a motion to dismiss can be particularly useful when it is obvious that plaintiff has a weak case. This will force plaintiff to seek leave to amend. Once plaintiff has previously amended their adversary complaint some judges will deny leave to amend where the moving party can show that amendment would be futile as plaintiff cannot state a cause of action for fraud.

Copyright 2012 Stan Burman. All rights reserved.

DISCLAIMER:

Please note that the author of this newsletter, Stan Burman is NOT an attorney and as such is unable to provide any specific legal advice. The author is NOT engaged in providing any legal, financial, or other professional services, and any information contained in this newsletter is NOT intended to constitute legal advice.

These materials and information contained in this newsletter have been prepared by Stan Burman for informational purposes only and are not legal advice. Transmission of the information contained in this newsletter is not intended to create, and receipt does not constitute, any business relationship between the sender and receiver. Subscribers and any other readers should not act upon this information without seeking professional counsel.

MERS Assignments-AWL/BofA et al.

From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Saturday, January 05, 2013 5:55 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: MERS Assignments-AWL/BofA et al.

Do you know of authority (particularly if from MERS themselves) showing MERS cannot assign a Note or DOT for a non-MERS member? I’ve looked for something many times but never finish my research being interrupted by something else so I never remember where I was and what I found (or didn’t…maybe that’s the problem.)

America’s Wholesale Lender was never a MERS member. Countrywide Bank , FSB is/was as a purported “investor” (address in Alexandria, VA) but I see no listing of Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. nor Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. dba America’s Wholesale Lender as a member either. Neither is Bank of America Corporation by the way, the supposed assigned owner of the Service Mark America’s Wholesale Lender (assigned in 2008, Recorded January 2009). I also find it interesting that MERS has so many designations for Bank of America (when BofA mixes and matches names and typestyles to suit their needs and confuse courts all over the Country) (By the way, how is Bank of America, National Association different than Bank of America, N.A. and with different addresses I might add…only so far, distinguished differently on MERS site.):

Please Select A Company Below:

Bank of America Warehouse Lender
Bank of America, N.A.
Bank of America, National Association
Bank of America, National Association as Trustee
Bank of America.
Bank of American Fork
Back To Member Search

USPTO Assignments on the Web AWL Transfer from CWHL to BofA.pdf

Fraudulent “Independent” Foreclosure Reviews – It Didn’t Pass the Smell Test From The Start

From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Saturday, January 05, 2013 6:32 AM
Cc: ‘AAli Mohammad’; ‘Alison Marlow’; ‘Andrew Cameron Bailey’; ‘Anita Carr’; ‘Ann Castro’; ‘Antonia Woghiren’; ‘Art Fleming’; ‘Barbara Gilbert’; ‘Barbara Griswold’; ‘Barbara Hart’; ‘Barbara Webb’; ‘Beth Findsen’; ‘Bill Paatalo’; ‘Bob Lund’; ‘Brent Hunsberger’; ‘Brian Davies’; ‘Brian Longley’; ‘Bruce Kamperman’; ‘Carl Cox’; ‘Carol Molloy’; ‘Carson Pay’; ‘Catherine King’; ‘CFOmkin’; ‘Charles Koppa’; ‘Chris Ebling’; ‘Chris Gardas’; ‘Chris McLaughlin’; ‘Christian Kluge’; ‘Christie Baca’; ‘Christopher Thompson’; ‘Claude bennett’; ‘Clayton’; ‘Clint Allen’; ‘Colin Davis’; ‘Colin Doyle’; ‘Constance Anne Dudley’; ‘Dan Hanecak’; Dan McCauley; ‘Daniel Edstrom’; ‘Darrell Blomberg’; ‘Dave Mowett’; ‘David Fahrny’; ‘David Silber’; ‘David Slayter’; ‘Deby Morrow’; ‘Denny Armstrong’; ‘Derrick Barnett’; ‘Don Klug’; ‘Don Loeb’; ‘Doug Gillies’; ‘Ed Peckham’; ‘Ellen Brown’; ‘Felix Trejo’; ‘Frank DeCarlo’; ‘Gail Williamson’; ‘Gary Silverman’; ‘George Bye’; ‘George Christian’; ‘George Daniel’; ‘Gerald Gandrup’; ‘Grace Adams’; ‘Harry Paez’; ‘Iris Lansdown’; ‘Jake Naumer’; ‘James Chappell’; ‘James Stout’; ‘Jean’; Jeffrey Cancilla; ‘Jeffrey Olson’; ‘Jim Curtis’; ‘Joanne Kopp’; ‘Joe Caracciolo’; ‘John Dunn’; ‘John St. Claire’; ‘Jon Lindeman’; ‘Joseph La Costa’; ‘Josiah Morgan’; ‘Judy Hoffman’; ‘Judy Moore’; ‘Kartika Ingram’; ‘Kathie Lustig’; Kaye DeVito; ‘Ken Johnson’; ‘Kerry Hurd’; ‘Kimberly Cromwell’; ‘Lee Ann Hildhal’; ‘Leon Miles’; ‘Linda Hamilton’; ‘Linda Howarth’; ‘Lizette Espinosa’; ‘Luis Reyes’; ‘Lynette Rhodes’; ‘Marc Findsen’; ‘Marilyn Yee’; ‘Mario Marsden’; ‘Mark Didak’; ‘Marla Buchwald’; ‘Marshall Foxworthy’; ‘Matt Cee’; ‘Matt Crehan’; mdgattorney@gmail.com; ‘Michael Moore’; Michelle Constantini; ‘Neil Garfield’; ‘Norm Redhead’; ‘Oktay Senvar’; ‘Patrick Hutchinson’; ‘Patti Lyles’; ‘Peter Coleman’; ‘Phil Johnson’; ‘Phyllis Harb’; ‘Precy Haw’; ‘Rami Nabi’; ‘Ramirez’; ‘Ramon Fuentes’; ‘Reinhold Sommerstedt’; ‘Rich Billin’; ‘Richard Hall’; ‘Richard Hubbard’; ‘Robert Bows’; ‘Robert Kincaid’; ‘Rod Ciferri’; ‘Ron Freshman’; ‘Ronda Edgar’; ‘Satish Shetty’; ‘Scottie Johnson’; ‘Shai Benmoshe’; ‘Sheri Deterling’; ‘Simona’; ‘Stan Thompson’; ‘Stephen Agar’; ‘Steve Campbell’; ‘Steve Foos’; ‘Steve Skidmore’; ‘Susan Lange’; ‘Suzanne Clements’; ‘Tim Fong’; ‘Tim McCandless’; ‘Valerie Lopez’; ‘Vermont Trotter’; ‘Vince Nguyen-NLG’; ‘Vinluan Manny’; ‘Will Doherty’; ‘William Ball’
Subject: Fraudulent "Independent" Foreclosure Reviews – It Didn’t Pass the Smell Test From The Start

From Naked Capitalism:

OCC Foreclosure Reviewer: “Independent” Reviews Were Controlled by Banks, Which Suppressed Any Findings of Harm to Foreclosed Homeowners

You simply must read this post if you care at all about the rule of law or can stand to see the gory mechanisms by which “regulation” has now become a fig leaf for criminal corporate conduct.

Reader Luxtexente submitted this comment yesterday, describing his experience as a Claim Reviewer for one of the 14 servicers, in theory working under the direction of Promontory Group and the OCC. He makes clear, contrary to other banks, which hired very junior people who had little understanding of real estate law and foreclosure procedures (see Adam Levitin and Abigail Field for examples) or foreclosure review firms who held themselves out as experts but have yawning gaps in their knowledge, that he and many of the other reviewers he worked with were very well qualified to screen servicer records. He describes how these reviews were systematically gutted.

Remember, the review firms were supposed to be independent, selected according to criteria set by the OCC and paid for by the banks, but supposedly not accountable to them. We had dismissed that idea early on as ridiculous. From a May 2011 post:

Let’s see…who chose these reviewers? The banks. Who is paying their bills? The banks. Who is a potential future client if all goes smoothly? The banks. And Walsh seriously expects us to believe the reviewers are independent, even before we get to the rampant conflicts?

But as Luxtexente tells us, it was much worse than that. It wasn’t simply that the consulting firms airbrushed out unflattering findings so as not to ruffle their current and hoped-for future meal tickets. The banks were actively involved in overseeing the project and the results were shameless rejection of any and every possible basis for borrowers getting recompense. He provides numerous examples of unquestionably abusive conduct, such as foreclosing on homeowners in non-judicial states without advertising the notice of sale as required by law, or failing to send a notice of acceleration. Enough of the reviewers understood state law requirements that they would find many, often over a dozen, violations on a single file. So how did the bank and the OCC conspire to solve this problem? They redefined the review process so as to omit matters of law. I am not making this up.

This is what corruption looks like at the operational level. I suggest you read this piece closely; it’s chock full of damning tidbits. For instance, Luxtexente gives us one reason why the cost of this process got to be so high: he and his colleagues were being paid early on to do nothing.

From Luxtexente:

It is a first time one of a kind project. In theory those of us who joined were actually going to make a major financial debacle right again. We were going to examine 1.8 million mortgage foreclosures for technical error, misrepresentations, fraud, and failure to comply with Federal and state foreclosure laws or procedures.

Many of us are older and have been in the mortgage business in one way or another for 20 plus years. We came from every walk of the industry including Foreclosure Law Firms. So we should all have been skeptical, but the way we were selected for the job set aside our skepticism, we were hopeful that we might fix, at least for some people, this horrendous mortgage debacle all of us saw unfold for almost a decade.

I often refused to sign off on loans because of the complete lack of sense they made. I constantly warned superiors of the tremendous risk we ran by accepting Appraisals on properties that accelerated at 25, 30, and 50% annually or even semi-annually.

My wife ran a small mortgage business and she refused to sell the option payment arms, and the interest only 1.25% teaser rates that produced negative amortization. She would not and did not sell the ever increasing products that lacked any of the traditional restraints on credit risk, ability to pay and property review. She only sold the standard fixed rate and term products and warned hundreds of clients and potential clients of the dangers of what they were trying to do. Most would not listen. Some did. We slept at night when the debacle came crashing down.

However, this 25 billion dollar settlement with the banks seemed like a way to help fix the mess the Government, Banks, Realtors, and Appraisers got us into. Yes, some of it was just plain ignorance and greed on the part of consumers, but it was also sold as the American Dream, the chance of a life time to get ahead, to make a better life for our children, to achieve financial freedom, educate our children at schools we couldn’t even consider before this. It was a sold as a chance to move up to better, bigger, safer neighborhoods. It was sold as the chance of a lifetime. Many of us in the industry knew better, we tried to warn clients, bosses, banks, lenders, but who listens to the peons in the chairs drawing a paycheck.

This 25 billion dollar settlement seemed like the chance to help make it right. The head hunters called us by the hundreds and thousands. It was going to be a program where people with our skills in underwriting, processing, title work, insurance, bankruptcy, foreclosure law, and credit counseling could help right this sinking Titanic. We were told we can make a difference and help make things right for millions of people, and it paid well.

I was with the second wave of “recruits”. I was impressed. In a training class of 70 people at the bank I was to work with most of us were underwriters and processors with a smattering of actual Bar registered lawyers. The amount of mortgage and foreclosure knowledge was tremendous. From what I could see and hear, it seemed we could fix this debacle pretty quick. Across the country and with the 14 major banks and lenders involved there would be thousands of us, all with years of experience and a determination to make this right. Our instructors were from the banks and lenders.

I didn’t like that idea. I had originally thought that I would be instructed on procedures and goals by a third party entity called Promontory and or the government agency OCC. That did not happen. However, the training was interesting, and seemed straight forward, review the file, find the problems, and report them so they could be fixed. The goal, make wronged borrowers whole again as nearly as possible or so we thought.

After the training we arrived on the “floor” to begin a more in-depth training. We learned at that point that there was nothing ready for us to work on, but this nothing paid well, we could wait. Things did progress though, and our review procedures began to develop. We began in January, by April there were 500 of us at the location I was in and it was projected to reach 750 by June. Forty of us were actually reviewing files.

This is where we began to see the sham of the project. By the time I began reviewing files there were on 57000 files to review. The trigger for a review was that a borrower had to file a written complaint with the OCC. The problem with getting people to write a complaint was that all the advertising was direct mail to their homes and only to people that had been foreclosed on between January 2009 and December 2010. At a meeting involving the entire staff across the country (by phone) the question was asked “why just direct mail”, the answer, “TV, Radio and Print Media would attract too many of the wrong people and the banks and lenders didn’t want that.” When it was mentioned that it was two to three years after the borrower had been evicted we were told that “they should have put in a forwarding address with us”. I was dumbfounded, how could they expect people who lost everything to the bank to keep updating their addresses with the bank? It made no sense. But we kept plugging away at our task knowing now the battle was going to be tougher than we thought.

There was another issue. We were supposedly independent contractors, but we worked directly under bank and lenders authority and supervision. Any findings we made were quality controlled by the bank. Any findings we made came directly under the scrutiny of the bank. Any arguments over our findings, and whether they should be changed or not could and often did result in termination from the program without cause or warning and we had no recourse because we were contractors.

Other issues began to come up. Many of the tests and procedures we used to test a particular loan for harm to the borrower were State Specific in regard to the foreclosure laws of that State. As we began to delve into the files we found sometimes a dozen or more violations of the foreclosure laws with a specific file. The situation was becoming heated as Claim Reviewers (as we were called) began finding more and more issues of law, not to mention, incompetence, and immorality and poor judgment. Often times it was just a lack of communications between departments within the bank that caused the problem. None the less, there were tensions building between Claim Reviewers and bank managers as the list of harm on borrowers grew. However, the bank and the OCC did find a solution. Take the questions out of the tests we were doing that asked about issues of law. So one test that had 2200 investigative questions (there are about a dozen tests for a file review) now became about 550 questions. Issues of law were removed. At another of our group meetings we were told that if a borrower did not specifically cite the law or statute that was violated in their complaint that we were not to address a violation of law found in the file as it was now irrelevant to the issues at hand. When the questions was asked “how is a borrower going to know if a specific law or statute was violated since they are not trained in the law” the answer was that we only address what the borrower specifically complained about. The problem was that usually a borrower only had a feeling they got shafted somehow, but did not specifically know how. The complaint form also didn’t mention to the borrower that they had to be specific about issues of law. The form only asked generic questions about what happened. Now it was very evident that we were there as window dressing and not the compassionate heroes we thought we were.

Those were only the general issues that were causing friction. The sham was becoming more and more evident in the details. Some of the details involve foreclosure timelines, missing documents, misapplied funds, multiple modifications and similar programs at one time, it was amazing.

For example, in one case I reviewed the borrower paid approximately 25K to reinstate his mortgage. Then he began to make his mortgage payments as agreed. Each time he made a payment the payment was sent back stating he had to be current for the bank to accept a payment. He made three payments and each time the response was the same. Each time he wrote and called stating he had sent in the $25K to reinstate the loan and had the canceled check to prove it. After several months the bank realized that they had put the 25K in the wrong account. At that time that notified him that they were crediting his account, but because of the delay in receiving the reinstatement funds into the proper account he owed them more interest on the monies, late fees for the payments that had been returned and not credited and he was again in default for failing to continue making his payment. The bank foreclosed when he refused to pay additional interest and late fees for the banks error. I was told that I shouldn’t show that as harm because he did quit making his payments. I refused to do that.

There was another instance when there was no evidence that the bank had properly published the notice of sale in the newspaper as required by law. The argument the bank made when it was listed as harm to the borrower was “here is the foreclosure sale deed, obviously we followed proper procedure, and you should change your answer as to harm.”

Often there is no evidence of a borrower being sent a proper notice of intent to accelerate the mortgage. When these issues are noted in a file we are told to ignore them and transfer those files to a “special team” set up to handle that kind of situation. You choose whatever meaning you like for that scenario.

As far as modifications and forbearance go, I saw multiple cases in which a borrower would be given a forbearance agreement. It would be signed and properly executed and before the borrower could make the first payment the borrower would be offered a trial modification. Before that payment was due the borrower would be offered a permanent modification, but because there was already a forbearance and a trial modification offered and in place the borrower would be told that he/she must cancel the other offers in writing. Once that was done the modification offered would be denied for lack of performance on the other programs offered and then further assistance would be denied because of the borrower turning down assistance on the other programs. Then the argument was that we shouldn’t say the borrower was harmed financially because he turned down the help offered.

Time after time scenarios would go something like this. The borrower would call in and ask for help with a modification. Usually they called or were referred to the collections department. The bank employee would tell the borrower that in order to receive help they must bring the mortgage current. The borrower would send the money in, usually to the bank collection agent who gave the information and then the modification department would deny the borrower assistance because the mortgage was current and they had to be behind to receive assistance. Of course the bank argued that there was no harm because the borrower obviously could make the payment.

More often than not a borrower would be foreclosed on even though the bank had said they could apply for a modification if they would send in the financial paperwork required. The borrower would do this, 2, 3,4,5,6 or more times and the bank would “loose” the paperwork time and time again, until the house was finally foreclosed on. The borrowers would call, write, and call immediately after faxing the paperwork, be told it was received only to be denied later because they failed to send in any paperwork. The banks argument was that there was no harm to the borrower because they didn’t send in the paperwork, even though more often than not with a little searching the paperwork would be found in the system somewhere.

Often the paperwork would be sent in and not reviewed for four, five or six months and then the borrower would be sent a letter requesting they send it again because everything the bank had was too old to use. Many times this was done even after the home was already sold at foreclosure. The argument by the bank was no harm was done because they did not send the paperwork again.

The bottom line, agree or be fired. When the independent contractors who are there to independently judge the situation are ruled and judged by the very people that are responsible for the debacle in the first place is ludicrous. So many times I was told to not argue because I could be let go without notice or cause, it was difficult to hold my tongue. Most people would change the results and simply make notes in the system about being ordered by management to make the changes. But the banks and lenders control the notes. Others left the position. I actually thought there was hope when the OCC took the decision about financial harm to the borrower away from the banks and lenders and gave it to Promontory. It was called the H test. But that was short lived when we were told the banks and lenders were being allowed to form review teams to determine if Promontory made the right decision about financial harm. That was decided by the OCC. The joke is on the American people. Actually, the American people are being made the punch line.

Source: http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2013/01/occ-foreclosure-file-reviewer-independent-reviews-were-controlled-by-banks-which-suppressed-any-findings-of-harm-to-foreclosed-homeowner.html

Ruling Against Bank In Mortgage Modification Suit

Judge Rules Against Bank In Mortgage Modification Suit

Shah Gilani Shah Gilani, Contributor
Half million dollar house in Salinas, Californ...Image via Wikipedia

A recent ruling by a California appeals court clears the way for fraud charges against a lender that promised a loan modification but then foreclosed on the borrower.

The ruling throws into question the legality of hundreds of thousands of foreclosures.

Not only was the ruling a frontal assault on the empty promises made by servicers and banks, the case highlighted some despicable tactics often employed to force foreclosures.

Claudia Aceves, who originally sued U.S. Bank, NA in the Los Angeles County Superior Court, had taken out an $845,000 mortgage with Option One Mortgage Corporation. Option One later assigned the loan over to U.S. Bank.

The interest on Aceves’ adjustable rate note ratcheted up two years after it was entered into. By January 2008 she was falling behind on her payments. Shortly after March 26, 2008 when the loan’s servicer recorded a “Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under Deed of Trust,” Aceves filed for bankruptcy protection under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.

The bankruptcy filing imposed an automatic stay on the foreclosure proceedings.

After being offered financial help from her husband, Aceves converted her bankruptcy case from a chapter 7 to a chapter 13 case. Chapter 7, entitled “Liquidation,” would allow Aceves to discharge her debt on the home but not allow her to keep it. Chapter 13, entitled “Adjustment of Debts of an Individual with Regular Income,” has protections for homeowners that allows them to reinstate loan payments, pay arrearages, avoid foreclosure and keep their home.

U.S. Bank, upon learning of the original bankruptcy filing, filed a motion to lift the stay in order to execute a nonjudicial foreclosure and take the house back.

What happens next is indicative of the underhandedness of many servicers and banks.

Aceves’ bankruptcy attorney gets a letter from counsel to the loan’s servicer (American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc.) that asks for permission to talk directly to Aceves to “explore Loss Mitigation possibilities.”  Aceves calls the servicer’s attorney because she wants a loan modification, which they are promising. But they tell her they can’t do anything or talk to her until their motion to lift the bankruptcy stay is granted.

So, Aceves doesn’t oppose the motion to lift the stay and further decides not to file the chapter 13 bankruptcy. All in the hopes that a modification would be negotiated.

On December 4, 2008 the stay is lifted. And, unbeknownst to Aceves, on December 9, 2008 U.S. Bank schedules the home for public auction one month later on January 9, 2009.

On December 10, 2008 Aceves sends in documents to American Home aiming to modify and reinstate the loan. Then on December 23, 2008 the servicer tells Aceves a “negotiator” will contact her on or before January 13, 2009.

Too bad for Aceves January 13, 2009 is going to be four days after her home is sold at auction. Which it is, with none other than U.S. Bank as the buyer.

But just to cover its promise to modify the loan, one day before the home is to be sold at auction the negotiator for American Home presents a unilateral offer to raise the loan balance from the original $845,000 to $965,926.22 and make the new monthly payments $7,200 as opposed to the original monthly payment amount of $4,857.09.

Aceves told them where to go.

She lost her home and sued. She lost when the Superior Court found that the defendants had met their obligations. The three-judge panel Appeals Court disagreed in its January 27, 2010 ruling.

The crux of the ruling, which in part relied on a decision in a previous case (Garcia v. World Savings, FSB) determined that “To be enforceable, a promise need only be ”’definite enough that a court can determine the scope of the duty.”’

Further illuminating its stance the Court said the point is, “simply whether U.S. Bank made and kept a promise to negotiate with Aceves, not whether the bank promised to make a loan, or more precisely, to modify a loan” is what matters.

As far as the servicer’s offer of a modification, the Appeals Court found that the promise to negotiate is “not based on a promise to make a unilateral offer but on a promise to negotiate in an attempt to reach a mutually agreeable loan modification.”

With all the unkept promises by banks and servicers to negotiate loan modifications that were never entertained, new litigation on top of all the foreclosure cases already being pursued is bound to cloud the future of real estate for the foreseeable future.

Tax Break for Mortgage Forgiveness Set to Expire on December 31, 2012

From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Monday, December 10, 2012 6:02 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: Tax Break for Mortgage Forgiveness Set to Expire on December 31, 2012

Tax Break for Mortgage Forgiveness Set to Expire on December 31, 2012

by Jonathan Ginsberg, Atlanta Bankruptcy Attorney

Unless Congress acts, the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 will expire on December 31, 2012.

What is this law, you may ask. Stated simply the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act waives any tax due on debt forgiveness if you are able to negotiate a mortgage modification. Without this waiver, any amount of forgiven debt will be treated as ordinary income and taxed accordingly.

Here’s an example: let’s say that you owe $100,000 on your mortgage. Your property value has gone down and you are able to convince the bank to reduce your principal balance to $80,000, The $20,000 of debt forgiveness would be considered income by the IRS and you would be taxed on this. Currently, this tax is eliminated by the Mortgage Forgiveness law, but this waiver comes to an end on December 31, 2012.

Mortgage modification is already a time consuming, difficult process. Homeowners typically apply for modifications because they are struggling financially. If these homeowners discover that they will be facing a tax bill for debt forgiveness, many will conclude that there is no point in pursuing a modification and will decide to either walk away or file bankruptcy to deal with their upside down mortgages.

In November, 2012, forty-one state attorney’s general sent Congress a letter urging lawmakers to extend the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Act. In this letter the attorney’s general note that the elimination of the Mortgage Forgiveness break will greatly undercut the $20 billion mortgage settlement negotiated earlier this year with the nation’s largest mortgage lenders.

Senate bill 3521 has been introduced by Senator Max Baucus of Montana but it currently has no co-sponsors. If you are contemplating a modification with your bank, I urge you to contact your Senator or Representative to urge him/her to support S.3521.

by Jonathan Ginsberg, Atlanta bankruptcy

California court holds that omission of trustee does not preclude nonjudicial foreclosure

From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Monday, December 10, 2012 6:02 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: California court holds that omission of trustee does not preclude nonjudicial foreclosure

Yet one more lousy ruling putting more nails in the coffin of home ownership and perpetuating the bankster controlled judiciary. And of course they easily publish this case.

A case of first impression? Seems to me I sent out citations from California related to this issue some time back.

Note:

· No objection to RJN on at least two occasions (and finally making the objection on the same RJN after the SAC demurrer, which of course failed)

· An assumed “Beneficial Interest” in the Deed of Trust by MERS

· Post foreclosure action…no Tender or offer of Same and no arguing Tender Rule Exceptions

· No pleading additional material facts in the SAC

· No attempt to distinguish out of state citations

· No attempt to argue “commencing a non-judicial foreclosure sale” v. sustaining a foreclosure sale are very different!

· Failure to argue prejudice when no indorsed note was provided timely…apparently failing to claim forgery

· The court claiming Plaintiffs were :”in default;” “owned more than 90k in back payments;” “continue to occupy the Property “rent free,””

· Since when is forging a note indorsement; failure to name a trustee; substituting a trustee when there was none (what about the term “substitute” do you not understand!) merely “seek shelter in MINOR ministerial omissions” (emphasis added)…well, I guess certainly in California!

Sound familiar?

Also interesting is the court cites probate cases re failure of a trust does not occur for lack of a trustee but it appears, there was never addressed the fact that similar statutory authority exists that an unfunded trust DOES NOT EXIST. (while on the other hand stating the trustee serves as a common agent in the typical argument on these issues) The pick and choose your law out of context (from any jurisdiction they want, even if non-controlling) to argue your point still seems to succeed only for the banksters…

Yet more bad law made on what appears to be another poorly litigated case.

The theft of real property continues with the blessing of the judiciary.

Shuster v. BAC.docx

Shuster v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP

From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Monday, December 10, 2012 7:50 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: Re: Shuster v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP

Thread posted by April Charney:

Oce a Failed REMIC, Never a REMIC

From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Tuesday, December 11, 2012 9:51 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: Oce a Failed REMIC, Never a REMIC

See Paper attached.

Thanks Deontos!

Charles
Charles Wayne Cox
Email: mailto:Charles
Websites: www.BayLiving.com; www.FdnPro.com and www.ForensicLoanAnalyst.com
1969 Camellia Ave.
Medford, OR 97504-5403
(541) 727-2240 direct
(541) 610-1931 eFax

Paralegal; Litigation Support and Expert Witness Services; Forensic Loan Analyst; CA Licensed Real Estate Broker.

REMIC not a REMIC Brooklyn Law School Paper.pdf

Predatory Lending and Predatory Servicing together at last Jan 1, 2013 Civil Code §2924.12(b)

Predatory Lending are abusive practices used in the mortgage industry that strip borrowers of home equity and threaten families with bankruptcy and foreclosure.

Predatory Lending can be broken down into three categories: Mortgage Origination, Mortgage Servicing; and Mortgage Collection and Foreclosure.

Mortgage Origination is the process by which you obtain your home loan from a mortgage broker or a bank.

Predatory lending practices in Mortgage Origination include:
# Excessive points;
# Charging fees not allowed or for services not delivered;
# Charging more than once for the same fee
# Providing a low teaser rate that adjusts to a rate you cannot afford;
# Successively refinancing your loan of “flipping;”
# “Steering” you into a loan that is more profitable to the Mortgage Originator;
# Changing the loan terms at closing or “bait & switch;”
# Closing in a location where you cannot adequately review the documents;
# Serving alcohol prior to closing;
# Coaching you to put minimum income or assets on you loan so that you will qualify for a certain amount;
# Securing an inflated appraisal;
# Receiving a kickback in money or favors from a particular escrow, title, appraiser or other service provider;
# Promising they will refinance your mortgage before your payment resets to a higher amount;
# Having you sign blank documents;
# Forging documents and signatures;
# Changing documents after you have signed them; and
# Loans with prepayment penalties or balloon payments.

Mortgage Servicing is the process of collecting loan payments and credit your loan.

Predatory lending practices in Mortgage Servicing include:
# Not applying payments on time;
# Applying payments to “Suspense;”
# “Jamming” illegal or improper fees;
# Creating an escrow or impounds account not allowed by the documents;
# Force placing insurance when you have adequate coverage;
# Improperly reporting negative credit history;
# Failing to provide you a detailed loan history; and
# Refusing to return your calls or letters.
#

Mortgage Collection & Foreclosure is the process Lenders use when you pay off your loan or when you house is repossessed for non-payment

Predatory lending practices in Mortgage Collection & Foreclosure include:
# Producing a payoff statement that includes improper charges & fees;
# Foreclosing in the name of an entity that is not the true owner of the mortgage;
# Failing to provide Default Loan Servicing required by all Fannie Mae mortgages;
# Failing to follow due process in foreclosure;
# Fraud on the court;
# Failing to provide copies of all documents and assignments; and
# Refusing to adequately communicate with you.

Abuses by Mortgage Service Companies

Although predatory lending has received far more attention than abusive servicing, a significant percentage of consumer complaints over loans involve servicing, not origination. For example, the director of the Nevada Fair Housing Center testified that of the hundreds of complaints of predatory lending issues her office received in 2002, about 42 percent involved servicing once the loan was transferred

Abusive Mortgage Servicing Defined:

Abusive servicing occurs when a servicer, either through action or inaction, obtains or attempts to obtain unwarranted fees or other costs from borrowers, engages in unfair collection practices, or through its own improper behavior or inaction causes borrowers to be more likely to go into default or have their homes foreclosed. Abusive practices should be distinguished from appropriate actions that may harm borrowers, such as a servicer merely collecting appropriate late fees or foreclosing on borrowers who do not make their payments despite proper loss mitigation efforts. Servicing can be abusive either intentionally, when there is intent to obtain unwarranted fees, or negligently, when, for example, a servicer’s records are so disorganized that borrowers are regularly charged late fees even when mortgage payments were made on time.

Abusive servicing often happens to debtors who have filed a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Plan and are in the process of making payments under the Plan. If you suspect that your mortgage servicer is abusing your relationship by charging unnecessary fees while you are paying off your Chapter 13 Plan, call us. We can help.

There is significant evidence that some Mortgage servicers have engaged in abusive behavior and that borrowers have frequently been the victims. Some servicers have engaged in practices that are not only detrimental to borrowers but also illegal Such abuse has been documented in court opinions and decisions, in the decisions and findings of ratings agencies, in litigation and settlements obtained by government agencies against prominent servicers, in congressional testimony, and in newspaper accounts of borrowers who claim to have been mistreated by servicers. The abusive servicing practices documented in these sources include improper foreclosure or attempted foreclosure, improper fees, improper forced-placed insurance, and improper use or oversight of escrow funds .

Civil Code §2924.12(b) Right to Sue Mortgage Servicers for Injunctive Relief, Damages, Treble Damages, and Right to Attorney’s Fees. : )

5 Dec

prohabition-images

H. Right to Sue Mortgage Servicers for Injunctive Relief, Damages, Treble Damages, and Right to Attorney’s Fees

2013 is going to be a good year

One of the most important provisions of the Act from a lender’s perspective is that it provides borrowers with the right to sue mortgage servicers for injunctive relief before the trustee’s deed upon sale has recorded, or if it has already recorded, to sue for actual economic damages, if the mortgage servicer has not corrected any “material” violation of certain enumerated portions of the Act before the trustee’s deed upon sale recorded. (Civil Code §2924.12(a).) In an area that will certainly open up a Pandora’s Box of litigation, the Act does not define what constitutes a “material” violation of the Act. If a court finds that the violation was intentional, reckless or willful, the court can award the borrower the greater of treble (triple) damages or $50,000. (Civil Code §2924.12(b).) Furthermore, a violation of the enumerated provisions of the Act is also deemed to be a violation of the licensing laws if committed by a person licensed as a consumer or commercial finance lender or broker, a residential mortgage lender or servicer, or a licensed real estate broker or salesman. (Civil Code §2924.12(d).) Lastly, in a one-sided attorney’s fee provision that only benefits borrowers, the court may award a borrower who obtains an injunction or receives an award of economic damages as a result of the violation of the Act their reasonable attorney’s fees and costs as the prevailing party. (Civil Code §2924.12(i).) This provides all the more reason for lenders and mortgage servicers to comply with the terms of the Act. This provision for the recovery by only the borrower of their reasonable attorney’s fees makes it more likely that borrowers will file litigation against mortgage lenders or servicers than they otherwise would. Compliance is the lender’s or mortgage servicer’s best defense to litigation under the Act.

Significantly for lenders, as long as the mortgage servicer remedies the material violation of the Act before the trustee’s deed upon sale has recorded, the Act specifically provides that the mortgage servicer shall not be liable under the Act for any violation or damages. (Civil Code §2924.12(b) & (c).) The Act also clarifies that signatories to the National Mortgage Settlement who are in compliance with the terms of that settlement, as they relate to the terms of the Act, will not face liability under the Act. (Civil Code §2924.12(g).

Improper foreclosure or attempted foreclosure

Because servicers can exact fees associated with foreclosures, such as attorneys’ fees, some servicers have attempted to foreclose on property even when borrowers are current on their payments or without giving borrowers enough time to repay or otherwise working with them on a repayment plan Furthermore, a speedy foreclosure may save servicers the cost of attempting other techniques that might have prevented the foreclosure.

Some servicers have been so brazen that they have regularly claimed to the courts that borrowers were in default so as to justify foreclosure, even though the borrowers were current on their payments. Other courts have also decried the frequent use of false statements to obtain relief from stay in order to foreclose on borrowers’ homes. For example, in Hart v. GMAC Mortgage Corporation, et al., 246 B.R. 709 (2000), even though the borrower had made the payments required of him by a forbearance agreement he had entered into with the servicer (GMAC Mortgage Corporation), it created a “negative suspense account” for moneys it had paid out, improperly charged the borrower an additional monthly sum to repay the negative suspense account, charged him late fees for failing to make the entire payment demanded, and began foreclosure proceedings.

Improper fees

Claiming that borrowers are in default when they are actually current allows servicers to charge unwarranted fees, either late fees or fees related to default and foreclosure. Servicers receive as a conventional fee a percentage of the total value of the loans they service, typically 25 basis points for prime loans and 50 basis points for subprime loans In addition, contracts typically provide that the servicer, not the trustee or investors, has the right to keep any and all late fees or fees associated with defaults. Servicers charge late fees not only because they act as a prod to coax borrowers into making payments on time, but also because borrowers who fail to make payments impose additional costs on servicers, which must then engage in loss mitigation to induce payment.

Such fees are a crucial part of servicers’ income. For example, one servicer’s CEO reportedly stated that extra fees, such as late fees, appeared to be paying for all of the operating costs of the company’s entire servicing department, leaving the conventional servicing fee almost completely profit The pressure to collect such fees appears to be higher on subprime servicers than on prime servicers:

Because borrowers typically cannot prove the exact date a payment was received, servicers can charge late fees even when they receive the payment on time Improper late fees may also be based on the loss of borrowers’ payments by servicers, their inability to track those payments accurately, or their failure to post payments in a timely fashion. In Ronemus v. FTB Mortgage Services, 201 B.R. 458 (1996), under a Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan, the borrowers had made all of their payments on time except for two; they received permission to pay these two late and paid late fees for the privilege. However, the servicer, FTB Mortgage Services, misapplied their payments, then began placing their payments into a suspense account and collecting unauthorized late fees. The servicer ignored several letters from the borrowers’ attorney attempting to clear up the matter, sent regular demands for late fees, and began harassing the borrowers with collection efforts. When the borrowers sued, the servicer submitted to the court an artificially inflated accounting of how much the borrowers owed.

Some servicers have sent out late notices even when they have received timely payments and even before the end of a borrower’s grace period Worse yet, a servicer might pocket the payment, such as an extra payment of principal, and never credit it to the borrower Late fees on timely payments are a common problem when borrowers are making mortgage payments through a bankruptcy plan

Moreover, some servicers have also added false fees and charges not authorized by law or contract to their monthly payment demands, relying on borrowers’ ignorance of the exact amount owed. They can collect such fees or other unwarranted claims by submitting inaccurate payoff demands when a borrower refinances or sells the house). Or they can place the borrowers’ monthly payments in a suspense account and then charge late fees even though they received the payment Worse yet, some servicers pyramid their late fees, applying a portion of the current payment to a previous late fee and then charging an additional late fee even though the borrower has made a timely and full payment for the new month Pyramiding late fees allows servicers to charge late fees month after month even though the borrower made only one late payment

Servicers can turn their fees into a profit center by sending inaccurate monthly payment demands, demanding unearned fees or charges not owed, or imposing fees higher than the expenses for a panoply of actions For example, some servicers take advantage of borrowers’ ignorance by charging fees, such as prepayment penalties, where the note does not provide for them Servicers have sometimes imposed a uniform set of fees over an entire pool of loans, disregarding the fact that some of the loan documents did not provide for those particular fees. Or they charge more for attorneys’, property inspection, or appraisal fees than were actually incurred. Some servicers may add a fee by conducting unnecessary property inspections, having an agent drive by even when the borrower is not in default, or conducting multiple inspections during a single period of default to charge the resulting multiple fees

The complexity of the terms of many loans makes it difficult for borrowers to discover whether they are being overcharged Moreover, servicers can frustrate any attempts to sort out which fees are genuine.

Improperly forced-placed insurance

Mortgage holders are entitled under the terms of the loan to require borrowers to carry homeowners’ insurance naming the holder as the payee in case of loss and to force-place insurance by buying policies for borrowers who fail to do so and charging them for the premiums However, some servicers have force-placed insurance even in cases where the borrower already had it and even provided evidence of it to the servicer Worse yet, servicers have charged for force-placed insurance without even purchasing it. Premiums for force-placed insurance are often inflated in that they provide protection in excess of what the loan.

Escrow Account Mismanagement

One of the benefits of servicing mortgages is controlling escrow accounts to pay for insurance, taxes, and the like and, in most states, keeping any interest earned on these accounts Borrowers have complained that servicers have failed to make tax or insurance payments when they were due or at all. The treasurer of the country’s second largest county estimated that this failure to make timely payments cost borrowers late fees of at least $2 million in that county over a two-year span, causing some to lose their homes. If servicers fail to make insurance payments and a policy lapses, borrowers may face much higher insurance costs even if they purchase their own, non-force-placed policy. Worse yet, borrowers may find themselves unable to buy insurance at all if they cannot find a new insurer willing to write them a policy

You can make a claim for mortgage service abuse, and often the court will award actual and punitive damages. If you think you have been a victim of mortgage service abuse, contact us. We can help you make a claim.

Many a client call me when its toooooo late however sometimes something can be done it would envolve an appeal and this application for a stay. Most likely you will have to pay the reasonable rental value till the case is decided. And … Yes we have had this motion granted. ex-parte-application-for-stay-of-judgment-or-unlawful-detainer3
When title to the property is still in dispute ie. the foreclosure was bad. They (the lender)did not comply with California civil code 2923.5 or 2923.6 or 2924. Or the didn’t possess the documents to foreclose ie. the original note. Or they did not possess a proper assignment 2932.5. at trial you will be ignored by the learned judge but if you file a Motion for Summary Judgmentevans sum ud
template notice of Motion for SJ
TEMPLATE Points and A for SJ Motion
templateDeclaration for SJ
TEMPLATEProposed Order on Motion for SJ
TEMPLATEStatement of Undisputed Facts
you can force the issue and if there is a case filed in the Unlimited jurisdiction Court the judge may be forced to consider title and or consolidate the case with the Unlimited Jurisdiction Case

BILL NUMBER: AB 278	CHAPTERED
	BILL TEXT

	CHAPTER  86
	FILED WITH SECRETARY OF STATE  JULY 11, 2012
	APPROVED BY GOVERNOR  JULY 11, 2012
	PASSED THE SENATE  JULY 2, 2012
	PASSED THE ASSEMBLY  JULY 2, 2012
	AMENDED IN SENATE  SEPTEMBER 1, 2011
	AMENDED IN SENATE  JUNE 23, 2011

INTRODUCED BY   Assembly Members Eng, Feuer, Mitchell, and John A.
Pérez
   (Principal coauthors: Assembly Members Davis, Carter, and Skinner)

   (Principal coauthors: Senators Leno, Evans, Calderon, Corbett,
DeSaulnier, Hancock, Pavley, and Steinberg)

                        FEBRUARY 8, 2011

   An act to amend and add Sections 2923.5 and 2923.6 of, to amend
and repeal Section 2924 of, to add Sections 2920.5, 2923.4, 2923.7,
2924.17, and 2924.20 to, to add and repeal Sections 2923.55, 2924.9,
2924.10, 2924.18, and 2924.19 of, and to add, repeal, and add
Sections 2924.11, 2924.12, and 2924.15 of, the Civil Code, relating
to mortgages.

	LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

   AB 278, Eng. Mortgages and deeds of trust: foreclosure.
   (1) Existing law, until January 1, 2013, requires a mortgagee,
trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent to contact the borrower
prior to filing a notice of default to explore options for the
borrower to avoid foreclosure, as specified. Existing law requires a
notice of default or, in certain circumstances, a notice of sale, to
include a declaration stating that the mortgagee, trustee,
beneficiary, or authorized agent has contacted the borrower, or has
tried with due diligence to contact the borrower, or that no contact
was required for a specified reason.
   This bill would add mortgage servicers, as defined, to these
provisions and would extend the operation of these provisions
indefinitely, except that it would delete the requirement with
respect to a notice of sale. The bill would, until January 1, 2018,
additionally require the borrower, as defined, to be provided with
specified information in writing prior to recordation of a notice of
default and, in certain circumstances, within 5 business days after
recordation. The bill would prohibit a mortgage servicer, mortgagee,
trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent from recording a notice of
default or, until January 1, 2018, recording a notice of sale or
conducting a trustee's sale while a complete first lien loan
modification application is pending, under specified conditions. The
bill would, until January 1, 2018, establish additional procedures to
be followed regarding a first lien loan modification application,
the denial of an application, and a borrower's right to appeal a
denial.
   (2) Existing law imposes various requirements that must be
satisfied prior to exercising a power of sale under a mortgage or
deed of trust, including, among other things, recording a notice of
default and a notice of sale.
   The bill would, until January 1, 2018, require a written notice to
the borrower after the postponement of a foreclosure sale in order
to advise the borrower of any new sale date and time, as specified.
The bill would provide that an entity shall not record a notice of
default or otherwise initiate the foreclosure process unless it is
the holder of the beneficial interest under the deed of trust, the
original or substituted trustee, or the designated agent of the
holder of the beneficial interest, as specified.
   The bill would prohibit recordation of a notice of default or a
notice of sale or the conduct of a trustee's sale if a foreclosure
prevention alternative has been approved and certain conditions exist
and would, until January 1, 2018, require recordation of a
rescission of those notices upon execution of a permanent foreclosure
prevention alternative. The bill would, until January 1, 2018,
prohibit the collection of application fees and the collection of
late fees while a foreclosure prevention alternative is being
considered, if certain criteria are met, and would require a
subsequent mortgage servicer to honor any previously approved
foreclosure prevention alternative.
   The bill would authorize a borrower to seek an injunction and
damages for violations of certain of the provisions described above,
except as specified. The bill would authorize the greater of treble
actual damages or $50,000 in statutory damages if a violation of
certain provisions is found to be intentional or reckless or resulted
from willful misconduct, as specified. The bill would authorize the
awarding of attorneys' fees for prevailing borrowers, as specified.
Violations of these provisions by licensees of the Department of
Corporations, the Department of Financial Institutions, and the
Department of Real Estate would also be violations of those
respective licensing laws. Because a violation of certain of those
licensing laws is a crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated
local program.
   The bill would provide that the requirements imposed on mortgage
servicers, and mortgagees, trustees, beneficiaries, and authorized
agents, described above are applicable only to mortgages or deeds of
trust secured by residential real property not exceeding 4 dwelling
units that is owner-occupied, as defined, and, until January 1, 2018,
only to those entities who conduct more than 175 foreclosure sales
per year or annual reporting period, except as specified.
   The bill would require, upon request from a borrower who requests
a foreclosure prevention alternative, a mortgage servicer who
conducts more than 175 foreclosure sales per year or annual reporting
period to establish a single point of contact and provide the
borrower with one or more direct means of communication with the
single point of contact. The bill would specify various
responsibilities of the single point of contact. The bill would
define single point of contact for these purposes.
   (3) Existing law prescribes documents that may be recorded or
filed in court.
   This bill would require that a specified declaration, notice of
default, notice of sale, deed of trust, assignment of a deed of
trust, substitution of trustee, or declaration or affidavit filed in
any court relative to a foreclosure proceeding or recorded by or on
behalf of a mortgage servicer shall be accurate and complete and
supported by competent and reliable evidence. The bill would require
that before recording or filing any of those documents, a mortgage
servicer shall ensure that it has reviewed competent and reliable
evidence to substantiate the borrower's default and the right to
foreclose, including the borrower's loan status and loan information.
The bill would, until January 1, 2018, provide that any mortgage
servicer that engages in multiple and repeated violations of these
requirements shall be liable for a civil penalty of up to $7,500 per
mortgage or deed of trust, in an action brought by specified state
and local government entities, and would also authorize
administrative enforcement against licensees of the Department of
Corporations, the Department of Financial Institutions, and the
Department of Real Estate.
   The bill would authorize the Department of Corporations, the
Department of Financial Institutions, and the Department of Real
Estate to adopt regulations applicable to persons and entities under
their respective jurisdictions for purposes of the provisions
described above. The bill would provide that a violation of those
regulations would be enforceable only by the regulating agency.
   (4) The bill would state findings and declarations of the
Legislature in relation to foreclosures in the state generally, and
would state the purposes of the bill.
   (5) The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse
local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the
state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that
reimbursement.
   This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this
act for a specified reason.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:

  SECTION 1.  The Legislature finds and declares all of the
following:
   (a) California is still reeling from the economic impacts of a
wave of residential property foreclosures that began in 2007. From
2007 to 2011 alone, there were over 900,000 completed foreclosure
sales. In 2011, 38 of the top 100 hardest hit ZIP Codes in the nation
were in California, and the current wave of foreclosures continues
apace. All of this foreclosure activity has adversely affected
property values and resulted in less money for schools, public
safety, and other public services. In addition, according to the
Urban Institute, every foreclosure imposes significant costs on local
governments, including an estimated nineteen thousand two hundred
twenty-nine dollars ($19,229) in local government costs. And the
foreclosure crisis is not over; there remain more than two million
"underwater" mortgages in California.
   (b) It is essential to the economic health of this state to
mitigate the negative effects on the state and local economies and
the housing market that are the result of continued foreclosures by
modifying the foreclosure process to ensure that borrowers who may
qualify for a foreclosure alternative are considered for, and have a
meaningful opportunity to obtain, available loss mitigation options.
These changes to the state's foreclosure process are essential to
ensure that the current crisis is not worsened by unnecessarily
adding foreclosed properties to the market when an alternative to
foreclosure may be available. Avoiding foreclosure, where possible,
will help stabilize the state's housing market and avoid the
substantial, corresponding negative effects of foreclosures on
families, communities, and the state and local economy.
   (c) This act is necessary to provide stability to California's
statewide and regional economies and housing market by facilitating
opportunities for borrowers to pursue loss mitigation options.
  SEC. 2.  Section 2920.5 is added to the Civil Code, to read:
   2920.5.  For purposes of this article, the following definitions
apply:
   (a) "Mortgage servicer" means a person or entity who directly
services a loan, or who is responsible for interacting with the
borrower, managing the loan account on a daily basis including
collecting and crediting periodic loan payments, managing any escrow
account, or enforcing the note and security instrument, either as the
current owner of the promissory note or as the current owner's
authorized agent. "Mortgage servicer" also means a subservicing agent
to a master servicer by contract. "Mortgage servicer" shall not
include a trustee, or a trustee's authorized agent, acting under a
power of sale pursuant to a deed of trust.
   (b) "Foreclosure prevention alternative" means a first lien loan
modification or another available loss mitigation option.
   (c) (1) Unless otherwise provided and for purposes of Sections
2923.4, 2923.5, 2923.55, 2923.6, 2923.7, 2924.9, 2924.10, 2924.11,
2924.18, and 2924.19, "borrower" means any natural person who is a
mortgagor or trustor and who is potentially eligible for any federal,
state, or proprietary foreclosure prevention alternative program
offered by, or through, his or her mortgage servicer.
   (2) For purposes of the sections listed in paragraph (1),
"borrower" shall not include any of the following:
   (A) An individual who has surrendered the secured property as
evidenced by either a letter confirming the surrender or delivery of
the keys to the property to the mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or
authorized agent.
   (B) An individual who has contracted with an organization, person,
or entity whose primary business is advising people who have decided
to leave their homes on how to extend the foreclosure process and
avoid their contractual obligations to mortgagees or beneficiaries.
   (C) An individual who has filed a case under Chapter 7, 11, 12, or
13 of Title 11 of the United States Code and the bankruptcy court
has not entered an order closing or dismissing the bankruptcy case,
or granting relief from a stay of foreclosure.
   (d) "First lien" means the most senior mortgage or deed of trust
on the property that is the subject of the notice of default or
notice of sale.
  SEC. 3.  Section 2923.4 is added to the Civil Code, to read:
   2923.4.  (a) The purpose of the act that added this section is to
ensure that, as part of the nonjudicial foreclosure process,
borrowers are considered for, and have a meaningful opportunity to
obtain, available loss mitigation options, if any, offered by or
through the borrower's mortgage servicer, such as loan modifications
or other alternatives to foreclosure. Nothing in the act that added
this section, however, shall be interpreted to require a particular
result of that process.
   (b) Nothing in this article obviates or supersedes the obligations
of the signatories to the consent judgment entered in the case
entitled United States of America et al. v. Bank of America
Corporation et al., filed in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, case number 1:12-cv-00361 RMC.
  SEC. 4.  Section 2923.5 of the Civil Code is amended to read:
   2923.5.  (a) (1) A mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee,
beneficiary, or authorized agent may not record a notice of default
pursuant to Section 2924 until both of the following:
   (A) Either 30 days after initial contact is made as required by
paragraph (2) or 30 days after satisfying the due diligence
requirements as described in subdivision (e).
   (B) The mortgage servicer complies with paragraph (1) of
subdivision (a) of Section 2924.18, if the borrower has provided a
complete application as defined in subdivision (d) of Section
2924.18.
   (2) A mortgage servicer shall contact the borrower in person or by
telephone in order to assess the borrower's financial situation and
explore options for the borrower to avoid foreclosure. During the
initial contact, the mortgage servicer shall advise the borrower that
he or she has the right to request a subsequent meeting and, if
requested, the mortgage servicer shall schedule the meeting to occur
within 14 days. The assessment of the borrower's financial situation
and discussion of options may occur during the first contact, or at
the subsequent meeting scheduled for that purpose. In either case,
the borrower shall be provided the toll-free telephone number made
available by the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) to find a HUD-certified housing counseling agency.
Any meeting may occur telephonically.
   (b) A notice of default recorded pursuant to Section 2924 shall
include a declaration that the mortgage servicer has contacted the
borrower, has tried with due diligence to contact the borrower as
required by this section, or that no contact was required because the
individual did not meet the definition of "borrower" pursuant to
subdivision (c) of Section 2920.5.
   (c) A mortgage servicer's loss mitigation personnel may
participate by telephone during any contact required by this section.

    (d) A borrower may designate, with consent given in writing, a
HUD-certified housing counseling agency, attorney, or other adviser
to discuss with the mortgage servicer, on the borrower's behalf, the
borrower's financial situation and options for the borrower to avoid
foreclosure. That contact made at the direction of the borrower shall
satisfy the contact requirements of paragraph (2) of subdivision
(a). Any loan modification or workout plan offered at the meeting by
the mortgage servicer is subject to approval by the borrower.
    (e) A notice of default may be recorded pursuant to Section 2924
when a mortgage servicer has not contacted a borrower as required by
paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) provided that the failure to contact
the borrower occurred despite the due diligence of the mortgage
servicer. For purposes of this section, "due diligence" shall require
and mean all of the following:
   (1) A mortgage servicer shall first attempt to contact a borrower
by sending a first-class letter that includes the toll-free telephone
number made available by HUD to find a HUD-certified housing
counseling agency.
   (2) (A) After the letter has been sent, the mortgage servicer
shall attempt to contact the borrower by telephone at least three
times at different hours and on different days. Telephone calls shall
be made to the primary telephone number on file.
   (B) A mortgage servicer may attempt to contact a borrower using an
automated system to dial borrowers, provided that, if the telephone
call is answered, the call is connected to a live representative of
the mortgage servicer.
   (C) A mortgage servicer satisfies the telephone contact
requirements of this paragraph if it determines, after attempting
contact pursuant to this paragraph, that the borrower's primary
telephone number and secondary telephone number or numbers on file,
if any, have been disconnected.
   (3) If the borrower does not respond within two weeks after the
telephone call requirements of paragraph (2) have been satisfied, the
mortgage servicer shall then send a certified letter, with return
receipt requested.
   (4) The mortgage servicer shall provide a means for the borrower
to contact it in a timely manner, including a toll-free telephone
number that will provide access to a live representative during
business hours.
   (5) The mortgage servicer has posted a prominent link on the
homepage of its Internet Web site, if any, to the following
information:
   (A) Options that may be available to borrowers who are unable to
afford their mortgage payments and who wish to avoid foreclosure, and
instructions to borrowers advising them on steps to take to explore
those options.
   (B) A list of financial documents borrowers should collect and be
prepared to present to the mortgage servicer when discussing options
for avoiding foreclosure.
   (C) A toll-free telephone number for borrowers who wish to discuss
options for avoiding foreclosure with their mortgage servicer.
   (D) The toll-free telephone number made available by HUD to find a
HUD-certified housing counseling agency.
    (f) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust
described in Section 2924.15.
   (g) This section shall apply only to entities described in
subdivision (b) of Section 2924.18.
    (h) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1,
2018, and as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted
statute, that is enacted before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends
that date.
  SEC. 5.  Section 2923.5 is added to the Civil Code, to read:
   2923.5.  (a) (1) A mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee,
beneficiary, or authorized agent may not record a notice of default
pursuant to Section 2924 until both of the following:
   (A) Either 30 days after initial contact is made as required by
paragraph (2) or 30 days after satisfying the due diligence
requirements as described in subdivision (e).
   (B) The mortgage servicer complies with subdivision (a) of Section
2924.11, if the borrower has provided a complete application as
defined in subdivision (f) of Section 2924.11.
   (2) A mortgage servicer shall contact the borrower in person or by
telephone in order to assess the borrower's financial situation and
explore options for the borrower to avoid foreclosure. During the
initial contact, the mortgage servicer shall advise the borrower that
he or she has the right to request a subsequent meeting and, if
requested, the mortgage servicer shall schedule the meeting to occur
within 14 days. The assessment of the borrower's financial situation
and discussion of options may occur during the first contact, or at
the subsequent meeting scheduled for that purpose. In either case,
the borrower shall be provided the toll-free telephone number made
available by the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) to find a HUD-certified housing counseling agency.
Any meeting may occur telephonically.
   (b) A notice of default recorded pursuant to Section 2924 shall
include a declaration that the mortgage servicer has contacted the
borrower, has tried with due diligence to contact the borrower as
required by this section, or that no contact was required because the
individual did not meet the definition of "borrower" pursuant to
subdivision (c) of Section 2920.5.
   (c) A mortgage servicer's loss mitigation personnel may
participate by telephone during any contact required by this section.

   (d) A borrower may designate, with consent given in writing, a
HUD-certified housing counseling agency, attorney, or other adviser
to discuss with the mortgage servicer, on the borrower's behalf, the
borrower's financial situation and options for the borrower to avoid
foreclosure. That contact made at the direction of the borrower shall
satisfy the contact requirements of paragraph (2) of subdivision
(a). Any loan modification or workout plan offered at the meeting by
the mortgage servicer is subject to approval by the borrower.
   (e) A notice of default may be recorded pursuant to Section 2924
when a mortgage servicer has not contacted a borrower as required by
paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) provided that the failure to contact
the borrower occurred despite the due diligence of the mortgage
servicer. For purposes of this section, "due diligence" shall require
and mean all of the following:
   (1) A mortgage servicer shall first attempt to contact a borrower
by sending a first-class letter that includes the toll-free telephone
number made available by HUD to find a HUD-certified housing
counseling agency.
   (2) (A) After the letter has been sent, the mortgage servicer
shall attempt to contact the borrower by telephone at least three
times at different hours and on different days. Telephone calls shall
be made to the primary telephone number on file.
   (B) A mortgage servicer may attempt to contact a borrower using an
automated system to dial borrowers, provided that, if the telephone
call is answered, the call is connected to a live representative of
the mortgage servicer.
   (C) A mortgage servicer satisfies the telephone contact
requirements of this paragraph if it determines, after attempting
contact pursuant to this paragraph, that the borrower's primary
telephone number and secondary telephone number or numbers on file,
if any, have been disconnected.
   (3) If the borrower does not respond within two weeks after the
telephone call requirements of paragraph (2) have been satisfied, the
mortgage servicer shall then send a certified letter, with return
receipt requested.
   (4) The mortgage servicer shall provide a means for the borrower
to contact it in a timely manner, including a toll-free telephone
number that will provide access to a live representative during
business hours.
   (5) The mortgage servicer has posted a prominent link on the
homepage of its Internet Web site, if any, to the following
information:
   (A) Options that may be available to borrowers who are unable to
afford their mortgage payments and who wish to avoid foreclosure, and
instructions to borrowers advising them on steps to take to explore
those options.
   (B) A list of financial documents borrowers should collect and be
prepared to present to the mortgage servicer when discussing options
for avoiding foreclosure.
   (C) A toll-free telephone number for borrowers who wish to discuss
options for avoiding foreclosure with their mortgage servicer.
   (D) The toll-free telephone number made available by HUD to find a
HUD-certified housing counseling agency.
   (f) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust
described in Section 2924.15.
   (g) This section shall become operative on January 1, 2018.
  SEC. 6.  Section 2923.55 is added to the Civil Code, to read:
   2923.55.  (a) A mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee,
beneficiary, or authorized agent may not record a notice of default
pursuant to Section 2924 until all of the following:
    (1) The mortgage servicer has satisfied the requirements of
paragraph (1) of subdivision (b).
   (2) Either 30 days after initial contact is made as required by
paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) or 30 days after satisfying the due
diligence requirements as described in subdivision (f).
   (3) The mortgage servicer complies with subdivision (c) of Section
2923.6, if the borrower has provided a complete application as
defined in subdivision (h) of Section 2923.6.
   (b) (1) As specified in subdivision (a), a mortgage servicer shall
send the following information in writing to the borrower:
   (A) A statement that if the borrower is a servicemember or a
dependent of a servicemember, he or she may be entitled to certain
protections under the federal Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (50
U.S.C. Sec. 501 et seq.) regarding the servicemember's interest rate
and the risk of foreclosure, and counseling for covered
servicemembers that is available at agencies such as Military
OneSource and Armed Forces Legal Assistance.
   (B) A statement that the borrower may request the following:
   (i) A copy of the borrower's promissory note or other evidence of
indebtedness.
   (ii) A copy of the borrower's deed of trust or mortgage.
   (iii) A copy of any assignment, if applicable, of the borrower's
mortgage or deed of trust required to demonstrate the right of the
mortgage servicer to foreclose.
   (iv) A copy of the borrower's payment history since the borrower
was last less than 60 days past due.
   (2) A mortgage servicer shall contact the borrower in person or by
telephone in order to assess the borrower's financial situation and
explore options for the borrower to avoid foreclosure. During the
initial contact, the mortgage servicer shall advise the borrower that
he or she has the right to request a subsequent meeting and, if
requested, the mortgage servicer shall schedule the meeting to occur
within 14 days. The assessment of the borrower's financial situation
and discussion of options may occur during the first contact, or at
the subsequent meeting scheduled for that purpose. In either case,
the borrower shall be provided the toll-free telephone number made
available by the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) to find a HUD-certified housing counseling agency.
Any meeting may occur telephonically.
   (c) A notice of default recorded pursuant to Section 2924 shall
include a declaration that the mortgage servicer has contacted the
borrower, has tried with due diligence to contact the borrower as
required by this section, or that no contact was required because the
individual did not meet the definition of "borrower" pursuant to
subdivision (c) of Section 2920.5.
   (d) A mortgage servicer's loss mitigation personnel may
participate by telephone during any contact required by this section.

   (e) A borrower may designate, with consent given in writing, a
HUD-certified housing counseling agency, attorney, or other adviser
to discuss with the mortgage servicer, on the borrower's behalf, the
borrower's financial situation and options for the borrower to avoid
foreclosure. That contact made at the direction of the borrower shall
satisfy the contact requirements of paragraph (2) of subdivision
(b). Any foreclosure prevention alternative offered at the meeting by
the mortgage servicer is subject to approval by the borrower.
   (f) A notice of default may be recorded pursuant to Section 2924
when a mortgage servicer has not contacted a borrower as required by
paragraph (2) of subdivision (b), provided that the failure to
contact the borrower occurred despite the due diligence of the
mortgage servicer. For purposes of this section, "due diligence"
shall require and mean all of the following:
   (1) A mortgage servicer shall first attempt to contact a borrower
by sending a first-class letter that includes the toll-free telephone
number made available by HUD to find a HUD-certified housing
counseling agency.
   (2) (A) After the letter has been sent, the mortgage servicer
shall attempt to contact the borrower by telephone at least three
times at different hours and on different days. Telephone calls shall
be made to the primary telephone number on file.
   (B) A mortgage servicer may attempt to contact a borrower using an
automated system to dial borrowers, provided that, if the telephone
call is answered, the call is connected to a live representative of
the mortgage servicer.
   (C) A mortgage servicer satisfies the telephone contact
requirements of this paragraph if it determines, after attempting
contact pursuant to this paragraph, that the borrower's primary
telephone number and secondary telephone number or numbers on file,
if any, have been disconnected.
   (3) If the borrower does not respond within two weeks after the
telephone call requirements of paragraph (2) have been satisfied, the
mortgage servicer shall then send a certified letter, with return
receipt requested, that includes the toll-free telephone number made
available by HUD to find a HUD-certified housing counseling agency.
   (4) The mortgage servicer shall provide a means for the borrower
to contact it in a timely manner, including a toll-free telephone
number that will provide access to a live representative during
business hours.
   (5) The mortgage servicer has posted a prominent link on the
homepage of its Internet Web site, if any, to the following
information:
   (A) Options that may be available to borrowers who are unable to
afford their mortgage payments and who wish to avoid foreclosure, and
instructions to borrowers advising them on steps to take to explore
those options.
   (B) A list of financial documents borrowers should collect and be
prepared to present to the mortgage servicer when discussing options
for avoiding foreclosure.
   (C) A toll-free telephone number for borrowers who wish to discuss
options for avoiding foreclosure with their mortgage servicer.
   (D) The toll-free telephone number made available by HUD to find a
HUD-certified housing counseling agency.
   (g) This section shall not apply to entities described in
subdivision (b) of Section 2924.18.
   (h) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust
described in Section 2924.15.
   (i)  This section shall remain in effect only until January 1,
2018, and as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted
statute, that is enacted before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends
that date.
  SEC. 7.  Section 2923.6 of the Civil Code is amended to read:
   2923.6.  (a) The Legislature finds and declares that any duty that
mortgage servicers may have to maximize net present value under
their pooling and servicing agreements is owed to all parties in a
loan pool, or to all investors under a pooling and servicing
agreement, not to any particular party in the loan pool or investor
under a pooling and servicing agreement, and that a mortgage servicer
acts in the best interests of all parties to the loan pool or
investors in the pooling and servicing agreement if it agrees to or
implements a loan modification or workout plan for which both of the
following apply:
   (1) The loan is in payment default, or payment default is
reasonably foreseeable.
   (2) Anticipated recovery under the loan modification or workout
plan exceeds the anticipated recovery through foreclosure on a net
present value basis.
   (b) It is the intent of the Legislature that the mortgage servicer
offer the borrower a loan modification or workout plan if such a
modification or plan is consistent with its contractual or other
authority.
   (c) If a borrower submits a complete application for a first lien
loan modification offered by, or through, the borrower's mortgage
servicer, a mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or
authorized agent shall not record a notice of default or notice of
sale, or conduct a trustee's sale, while the complete first lien loan
modification application is pending. A mortgage servicer, mortgagee,
trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record a notice
of default or notice of sale or conduct a trustee's sale until any of
the following occurs:
   (1) The mortgage servicer makes a written determination that the
borrower is not eligible for a first lien loan modification, and any
appeal period pursuant to subdivision (d) has expired.
   (2) The borrower does not accept an offered first lien loan
modification within 14 days of the offer.
   (3) The borrower accepts a written first lien loan modification,
but defaults on, or otherwise breaches the borrower's obligations
under, the first lien loan modification.
   (d) If the borrower's application for a first lien loan
modification is denied, the borrower shall have at least 30 days from
the date of the written denial to appeal the denial and to provide
evidence that the mortgage servicer's determination was in error.
   (e) If the borrower's application for a first lien loan
modification is denied, the mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee,
beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record a notice of default
or, if a notice of default has already been recorded, record a
notice of sale or conduct a trustee's sale until the later of:
   (1) Thirty-one days after the borrower is notified in writing of
the denial.
   (2) If the borrower appeals the denial pursuant to subdivision
(d), the later of 15 days after the denial of the appeal or 14 days
after a first lien loan modification is offered after appeal but
declined by the borrower, or, if a first lien loan modification is
offered and accepted after appeal, the date on which the borrower
fails to timely submit the first payment or otherwise breaches the
terms of the offer.
   (f) Following the denial of a first lien loan modification
application, the mortgage servicer shall send a written notice to the
borrower identifying the reasons for denial, including the
following:
   (1) The amount of time from the date of the denial letter in which
the borrower may request an appeal of the denial of the first lien
loan modification and instructions regarding how to appeal the
denial.
   (2) If the denial was based on investor disallowance, the specific
reasons for the investor disallowance.
   (3) If the denial is the result of a net present value
calculation, the monthly gross income and property value used to
calculate the net present value and a statement that the borrower may
obtain all of the inputs used in the net present value calculation
upon written request to the mortgage servicer.
   (4) If applicable, a finding that the borrower was previously
offered a first lien loan modification and failed to successfully
make payments under the terms of the modified loan.

         (5) If applicable, a description of other foreclosure
prevention alternatives for which the borrower may be eligible, and a
list of the steps the borrower must take in order to be considered
for those options. If the mortgage servicer has already approved the
borrower for another foreclosure prevention alternative, information
necessary to complete the foreclosure prevention alternative.
   (g) In order to minimize the risk of borrowers submitting multiple
applications for first lien loan modifications for the purpose of
delay, the mortgage servicer shall not be obligated to evaluate
applications from borrowers who have already been evaluated or
afforded a fair opportunity to be evaluated for a first lien loan
modification prior to January 1, 2013, or who have been evaluated or
afforded a fair opportunity to be evaluated consistent with the
requirements of this section, unless there has been a material change
in the borrower's financial circumstances since the date of the
borrower's previous application and that change is documented by the
borrower and submitted to the mortgage servicer.
   (h) For purposes of this section, an application shall be deemed
"complete" when a borrower has supplied the mortgage servicer with
all documents required by the mortgage servicer within the reasonable
timeframes specified by the mortgage servicer.
   (i) Subdivisions (c) to (h), inclusive, shall not apply to
entities described in subdivision (b) of Section 2924.18.
   (j) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust
described in Section 2924.15.
    (k)  This section shall remain in effect only until January 1,
2018, and as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted
statute, that is enacted before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends
that date.
  SEC. 8.  Section 2923.6 is added to the Civil Code, to read:
   2923.6.  (a) The Legislature finds and declares that any duty
mortgage servicers may have to maximize net present value under their
pooling and servicing agreements is owed to all parties in a loan
pool, or to all investors under a pooling and servicing agreement,
not to any particular party in the loan pool or investor under a
pooling and servicing agreement, and that a mortgage servicer acts in
the best interests of all parties to the loan pool or investors in
the pooling and servicing agreement if it agrees to or implements a
loan modification or workout plan for which both of the following
apply:
   (1) The loan is in payment default, or payment default is
reasonably foreseeable.
   (2) Anticipated recovery under the loan modification or workout
plan exceeds the anticipated recovery through foreclosure on a net
present value basis.
   (b) It is the intent of the Legislature that the mortgage servicer
offer the borrower a loan modification or workout plan if such a
modification or plan is consistent with its contractual or other
authority.
   (c) This section shall become operative on January 1, 2018.
  SEC. 9.  Section 2923.7 is added to the Civil Code, to read:
   2923.7.  (a) Upon request from a borrower who requests a
foreclosure prevention alternative, the mortgage servicer shall
promptly establish a single point of contact and provide to the
borrower one or more direct means of communication with the single
point of contact.
   (b) The single point of contact shall be responsible for doing all
of the following:
   (1) Communicating the process by which a borrower may apply for an
available foreclosure prevention alternative and the deadline for
any required submissions to be considered for these options.
   (2) Coordinating receipt of all documents associated with
available foreclosure prevention alternatives and notifying the
borrower of any missing documents necessary to complete the
application.
   (3) Having access to current information and personnel sufficient
to timely, accurately, and adequately inform the borrower of the
current status of the foreclosure prevention alternative.
   (4) Ensuring that a borrower is considered for all foreclosure
prevention alternatives offered by, or through, the mortgage
servicer, if any.
   (5) Having access to individuals with the ability and authority to
stop foreclosure proceedings when necessary.
   (c) The single point of contact shall remain assigned to the
borrower's account until the mortgage servicer determines that all
loss mitigation options offered by, or through, the mortgage servicer
have been exhausted or the borrower's account becomes current.
   (d) The mortgage servicer shall ensure that a single point of
contact refers and transfers a borrower to an appropriate supervisor
upon request of the borrower, if the single point of contact has a
supervisor.
   (e) For purposes of this section, "single point of contact" means
an individual or team of personnel each of whom has the ability and
authority to perform the responsibilities described in subdivisions
(b) to (d), inclusive. The mortgage servicer shall ensure that each
member of the team is knowledgeable about the borrower's situation
and current status in the alternatives to foreclosure process.
   (f) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust
described in Section 2924.15.
   (g) (1) This section shall not apply to a depository institution
chartered under state or federal law, a person licensed pursuant to
Division 9 (commencing with Section 22000) or Division 20 (commencing
with Section 50000) of the Financial Code, or a person licensed
pursuant to Part 1 (commencing with Section 10000) of Division 4 of
the Business and Professions Code, that, during its immediately
preceding annual reporting period, as established with its primary
regulator, foreclosed on 175 or fewer residential real properties,
containing no more than four dwelling units, that are located in
California.
   (2) Within three months after the close of any calendar year or
annual reporting period as established with its primary regulator
during which an entity or person described in paragraph (1) exceeds
the threshold of 175 specified in paragraph (1), that entity shall
notify its primary regulator, in a manner acceptable to its primary
regulator, and any mortgagor or trustor who is delinquent on a
residential mortgage loan serviced by that entity of the date on
which that entity will be subject to this section, which date shall
be the first day of the first month that is six months after the
close of the calendar year or annual reporting period during which
that entity exceeded the threshold.
  SEC. 10.  Section 2924 of the Civil Code, as amended by Section 1
of Chapter 180 of the Statutes of 2010, is amended to read:
   2924.  (a) Every transfer of an interest in property, other than
in trust, made only as a security for the performance of another act,
is to be deemed a mortgage, except when in the case of personal
property it is accompanied by actual change of possession, in which
case it is to be deemed a pledge. Where, by a mortgage created after
July 27, 1917, of any estate in real property, other than an estate
at will or for years, less than two, or in any transfer in trust made
after July 27, 1917, of a like estate to secure the performance of
an obligation, a power of sale is conferred upon the mortgagee,
trustee, or any other person, to be exercised after a breach of the
obligation for which that mortgage or transfer is a security, the
power shall not be exercised except where the mortgage or transfer is
made pursuant to an order, judgment, or decree of a court of record,
or to secure the payment of bonds or other evidences of indebtedness
authorized or permitted to be issued by the Commissioner of
Corporations, or is made by a public utility subject to the
provisions of the Public Utilities Act, until all of the following
apply:
   (1) The trustee, mortgagee, or beneficiary, or any of their
authorized agents shall first file for record, in the office of the
recorder of each county wherein the mortgaged or trust property or
some part or parcel thereof is situated, a notice of default. That
notice of default shall include all of the following:
   (A) A statement identifying the mortgage or deed of trust by
stating the name or names of the trustor or trustors and giving the
book and page, or instrument number, if applicable, where the
mortgage or deed of trust is recorded or a description of the
mortgaged or trust property.
   (B) A statement that a breach of the obligation for which the
mortgage or transfer in trust is security has occurred.
   (C) A statement setting forth the nature of each breach actually
known to the beneficiary and of his or her election to sell or cause
to be sold the property to satisfy that obligation and any other
obligation secured by the deed of trust or mortgage that is in
default.
   (D) If the default is curable pursuant to Section 2924c, the
statement specified in paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of Section
2924c.
   (2) Not less than three months shall elapse from the filing of the
notice of default.
   (3) Except as provided in paragraph (4), after the lapse of the
three months described in paragraph (2), the mortgagee, trustee, or
other person authorized to take the sale shall give notice of sale,
stating the time and place thereof, in the manner and for a time not
less than that set forth in Section 2924f.
   (4) Notwithstanding paragraph (3), the mortgagee, trustee, or
other person authorized to take sale may record a notice of sale
pursuant to Section 2924f up to five days before the lapse of the
three-month period described in paragraph (2), provided that the date
of sale is no earlier than three months and 20 days after the
recording of the notice of default.
   (5) Until January 1, 2018, whenever a sale is postponed for a
period of at least 10 business days pursuant to Section 2924g, a
mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall provide written
notice to a borrower regarding the new sale date and time, within
five business days following the postponement. Information provided
pursuant to this paragraph shall not constitute the public
declaration required by subdivision (d) of Section 2924g. Failure to
comply with this paragraph shall not invalidate any sale that would
otherwise be valid under Section 2924f. This paragraph shall be
inoperative on January 1, 2018.
   (6) No entity shall record or cause a notice of default to be
recorded or otherwise initiate the foreclosure process unless it is
the holder of the beneficial interest under the mortgage or deed of
trust, the original trustee or the substituted trustee under the deed
of trust, or the designated agent of the holder of the beneficial
interest. No agent of the holder of the beneficial interest under the
mortgage or deed of trust, original trustee or substituted trustee
under the deed of trust may record a notice of default or otherwise
commence the foreclosure process except when acting within the scope
of authority designated by the holder of the beneficial interest.
   (b) In performing acts required by this article, the trustee shall
incur no liability for any good faith error resulting from reliance
on information provided in good faith by the beneficiary regarding
the nature and the amount of the default under the secured
obligation, deed of trust, or mortgage. In performing the acts
required by this article, a trustee shall not be subject to Title
1.6c (commencing with Section 1788) of Part 4.
   (c) A recital in the deed executed pursuant to the power of sale
of compliance with all requirements of law regarding the mailing of
copies of notices or the publication of a copy of the notice of
default or the personal delivery of the copy of the notice of default
or the posting of copies of the notice of sale or the publication of
a copy thereof shall constitute prima facie evidence of compliance
with these requirements and conclusive evidence thereof in favor of
bona fide purchasers and encumbrancers for value and without notice.
   (d) All of the following shall constitute privileged
communications pursuant to Section 47:
   (1) The mailing, publication, and delivery of notices as required
by this section.
   (2) Performance of the procedures set forth in this article.
   (3) Performance of the functions and procedures set forth in this
article if those functions and procedures are necessary to carry out
the duties described in Sections 729.040, 729.050, and 729.080 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
   (e) There is a rebuttable presumption that the beneficiary
actually knew of all unpaid loan payments on the obligation owed to
the beneficiary and secured by the deed of trust or mortgage subject
to the notice of default. However, the failure to include an actually
known default shall not invalidate the notice of sale and the
beneficiary shall not be precluded from asserting a claim to this
omitted default or defaults in a separate notice of default.
  SEC. 11.  Section 2924 of the Civil Code, as amended by Section 2
of Chapter 180 of the Statutes of 2010, is repealed.
  SEC. 12.  Section 2924.9 is added to the Civil Code, to read:
   2924.9.  (a) Unless a borrower has previously exhausted the first
lien loan modification process offered by, or through, his or her
mortgage servicer described in Section 2923.6, within five business
days after recording a notice of default pursuant to Section 2924, a
mortgage servicer that offers one or more foreclosure prevention
alternatives shall send a written communication to the borrower that
includes all of the following information:
   (1) That the borrower may be evaluated for a foreclosure
prevention alternative or, if applicable, foreclosure prevention
alternatives.
   (2) Whether an application is required to be submitted by the
borrower in order to be considered for a foreclosure prevention
alternative.
   (3) The means and process by which a borrower may obtain an
application for a foreclosure prevention alternative.
   (b) This section shall not apply to entities described in
subdivision (b) of Section 2924.18.
   (c) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust
described in Section 2924.15.
   (d)  This section shall remain in effect only until January 1,
2018, and as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted
statute, that is enacted before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends
that date.
  SEC. 13.  Section 2924.10 is added to the Civil Code, to read:
   2924.10.  (a) When a borrower submits a complete first lien
modification application or any document in connection with a first
lien modification application, the mortgage servicer shall provide
written acknowledgment of the receipt of the documentation within
five business days of receipt. In its initial acknowledgment of
receipt of the loan modification application, the mortgage servicer
shall include the following information:
   (1) A description of the loan modification process, including an
estimate of when a decision on the loan modification will be made
after a complete application has been submitted by the borrower and
the length of time the borrower will have to consider an offer of a
loan modification or other foreclosure prevention alternative.
   (2) Any deadlines, including deadlines to submit missing
documentation, that would affect the processing of a first lien loan
modification application.
   (3) Any expiration dates for submitted documents.
   (4) Any deficiency in the borrower's first lien loan modification
application.
   (b) For purposes of this section, a borrower's first lien loan
modification application shall be deemed to be "complete" when a
borrower has supplied the mortgage servicer with all documents
required by the mortgage servicer within the reasonable timeframes
specified by the mortgage servicer.
   (c) This section shall not apply to entities described in
subdivision (b) of Section 2924.18.
   (d) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust
described in Section 2924.15.
   (e)  This section shall remain in effect only until January 1,
2018, and as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted
statute, that is enacted before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends
that date.
  SEC. 14.  Section 2924.11 is added to the Civil Code, to read:
   2924.11.  (a) If a foreclosure prevention alternative is approved
in writing prior to the recordation of a notice of default, a
mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized
agent shall not record a notice of default under either of the
following circumstances:
   (1) The borrower is in compliance with the terms of a written
trial or permanent loan modification, forbearance, or repayment plan.

   (2) A foreclosure prevention alternative has been approved in
writing by all parties, including, for example, the first lien
investor, junior lienholder, and mortgage insurer, as applicable, and
proof of funds or financing has been provided to the servicer.
   (b) If a foreclosure prevention alternative is approved in writing
after the recordation of a notice of default, a mortgage servicer,
mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record
a notice of sale or conduct a trustee's sale under either of the
following circumstances:
   (1) The borrower is in compliance with the terms of a written
trial or permanent loan modification, forbearance, or repayment plan.

   (2) A foreclosure prevention alternative has been approved in
writing by all parties, including, for example, the first lien
investor, junior lienholder, and mortgage insurer, as applicable, and
proof of funds or financing has been provided to the servicer.
   (c) When a borrower accepts an offered first lien loan
modification or other foreclosure prevention alternative, the
mortgage servicer shall provide the borrower with a copy of the fully
executed loan modification agreement or agreement evidencing the
foreclosure prevention alternative following receipt of the executed
copy from the borrower.
   (d) A mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall record a
rescission of a notice of default or cancel a pending trustee's sale,
if applicable, upon the borrower executing a permanent foreclosure
prevention alternative. In the case of a short sale, the rescission
or cancellation of the pending trustee's sale shall occur when the
short sale has been approved by all parties and proof of funds or
financing has been provided to the mortgagee, beneficiary, or
authorized agent.
   (e) The mortgage servicer shall not charge any application,
processing, or other fee for a first lien loan modification or other
foreclosure prevention alternative.
   (f) The mortgage servicer shall not collect any late fees for
periods during which a complete first lien loan modification
application is under consideration or a denial is being appealed, the
borrower is making timely modification payments, or a foreclosure
prevention alternative is being evaluated or exercised.
   (g) If a borrower has been approved in writing for a first lien
loan modification or other foreclosure prevention alternative, and
the servicing of that borrower's loan is transferred or sold to
another mortgage servicer, the subsequent mortgage servicer shall
continue to honor any previously approved first lien loan
modification or other foreclosure prevention alternative, in
accordance with the provisions of the act that added this section.
   (h) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust
described in Section 2924.15.
   (i) This section shall not apply to entities described in
subdivision (b) of Section 2924.18.
   (j)  This section shall remain in effect only until January 1,
2018, and as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted
statute, that is enacted before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends
that date.
  SEC. 15.  Section 2924.11 is added to the Civil Code, to read:
   2924.11.  (a) If a borrower submits a complete application for a
foreclosure prevention alternative offered by, or through, the
borrower's mortgage servicer, a mortgage servicer, trustee,
mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record a notice
of sale or conduct a trustee's sale while the complete foreclosure
prevention alternative application is pending, and until the borrower
has been provided with a written determination by the mortgage
servicer regarding that borrower's eligibility for the requested
foreclosure prevention alternative.
   (b) Following the denial of a first lien loan modification
application, the mortgage servicer shall send a written notice to the
borrower identifying with specificity the reasons for the denial and
shall include a statement that the borrower may obtain additional
documentation supporting the denial decision upon written request to
the mortgage servicer.
   (c) If a foreclosure prevention alternative is approved in writing
prior to the recordation of a notice of default, a mortgage
servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall
not record a notice of default under either of the following
circumstances:
   (1) The borrower is in compliance with the terms of a written
trial or permanent loan modification, forbearance, or repayment plan.

   (2) A foreclosure prevention alternative has been approved in
writing by all parties, including, for example, the first lien
investor, junior lienholder, and mortgage insurer, as applicable, and
proof of funds or financing has been provided to the servicer.
   (d) If a foreclosure prevention alternative is approved in writing
after the recordation of a notice of default, a mortgage servicer,
mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record
a notice of sale or conduct a trustee's sale under either of the
following circumstances:
   (1) The borrower is in compliance with the terms of a written
trial or permanent loan modification, forbearance, or repayment plan.

   (2) A foreclosure prevention alternative has been approved in
writing by all parties, including, for example, the first lien
investor, junior lienholder, and mortgage insurer, as applicable, and
proof of funds or financing has been provided to the servicer.
   (e) This section applies only to mortgages or deeds of trust as
described in Section 2924.15.
   (f) For purposes of this section, an application shall be deemed
"complete" when a borrower has supplied the mortgage servicer with
all documents required by the mortgage servicer within the reasonable
timeframes specified by the mortgage servicer.
   (g) This section shall become operative on January 1, 2018.
  SEC. 16.  Section 2924.12 is added to the Civil Code, to read:
   2924.12.  (a) (1) If a trustee's deed upon sale has not been
recorded, a borrower may bring an action for injunctive relief to
enjoin a material violation of Section 2923.55, 2923.6, 2923.7,
2924.9, 2924.10, 2924.11, or 2924.17.
   (2) Any injunction shall remain in place and any trustee's sale
shall be enjoined until the court determines that the mortgage
servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent has
corrected and remedied the violation or violations giving rise to the
action for injunctive relief. An enjoined entity may move to
dissolve an injunction based on a showing that the material violation
has been corrected and remedied.
   (b) After a trustee's deed upon sale has been recorded, a mortgage
servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall
be liable to a borrower for actual economic damages pursuant to
Section 3281, resulting from a material violation of Section 2923.55,
2923.6, 2923.7, 2924.9, 2924.10, 2924.11, or 2924.17 by that
mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized
agent where the violation was not corrected and remedied prior to the
recordation of the trustee's deed upon sale. If the court finds that
the material violation was intentional or reckless, or resulted from
willful misconduct by a mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee,
beneficiary, or authorized agent, the court may award the borrower
the greater of treble actual damages or statutory damages of fifty
thousand dollars ($50,000).
   (c) A mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or
authorized agent shall not be liable for any violation that it has
corrected and remedied prior to the recordation of a trustee's deed
upon sale, or that has been corrected and remedied by third parties
working on its behalf prior to the recordation of a trustee's deed
upon sale.
   (d) A violation of Section 2923.55, 2923.6, 2923.7, 2924.9,
2924.10, 2924.11, or 2924.17 by a person licensed by the Department
of Corporations, Department of Financial Institutions, or Department
of Real Estate shall be deemed to be a violation of that person's
licensing law.
   (e) No violation of this article shall affect the validity of a
sale in favor of a bona fide purchaser and any of its encumbrancers
for value without notice.
   (f) A third-party encumbrancer shall not be relieved of liability
resulting from violations of Section 2923.55, 2923.6, 2923.7, 2924.9,
2924.10, 2924.11, or 2924.17 committed by that third-party
encumbrancer, that occurred prior to the sale of the subject property
to the bona fide purchaser.
   (g) A signatory to a consent judgment entered in the case entitled
United States of America et al. v. Bank of America Corporation et
al., filed in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, case number 1:12-cv-00361 RMC, that is in compliance with
the relevant terms of the Settlement Term Sheet of that consent
judgment with respect to the borrower who brought an action pursuant
to this section while the consent judgment is in effect shall have no
liability for a violation of Section 2923.55, 2923.6, 2923.7,
2924.9, 2924.10, 2924.11, or 2924.17.
   (h) The rights, remedies, and procedures provided by this section
are in addition to and independent of any other rights, remedies, or
procedures under any other law. Nothing in this section shall be
construed to alter, limit, or negate any other rights, remedies, or
procedures provided by law.
   (i) A court may award a prevailing borrower reasonable attorney's
fees and costs in an action brought pursuant to this section. A
borrower shall be deemed to have prevailed for purposes of this
subdivision if the borrower obtained injunctive relief or was awarded
damages pursuant to this section.
   (j) This section shall not apply to entities described in
subdivision (b) of Section 2924.18.
   (k)  This section shall remain in effect only until January 1,
2018, and as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted
statute, that is enacted before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends
that date.
  SEC. 17.  Section 2924.12 is added to the Civil Code, to read:
   2924.12.  (a) (1) If a trustee's deed upon sale has not been
recorded, a borrower may bring an action for injunctive relief to
enjoin a                                                 material
violation of Section 2923.5, 2923.7, 2924.11, or 2924.17.
   (2) Any injunction shall remain in place and any trustee's sale
shall be enjoined until the court determines that the mortgage
servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent has
corrected and remedied the violation or violations giving rise to the
action for injunctive relief. An enjoined entity may move to
dissolve an injunction based on a showing that the material violation
has been corrected and remedied.
   (b) After a trustee's deed upon sale has been recorded, a mortgage
servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall
be liable to a borrower for actual economic damages pursuant to
Section 3281, resulting from a material violation of Section 2923.5,
2923.7, 2924.11, or 2924.17 by that mortgage servicer, mortgagee,
trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent where the violation was not
corrected and remedied prior to the recordation of the trustee's
deed upon sale. If the court finds that the material violation was
intentional or reckless, or resulted from willful misconduct by a
mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized
agent, the court may award the borrower the greater of treble actual
damages or statutory damages of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000).
   (c) A mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or
authorized agent shall not be liable for any violation that it has
corrected and remedied prior to the recordation of the trustee's deed
upon sale, or that has been corrected and remedied by third parties
working on its behalf prior to the recordation of the trustee's deed
upon sale.
   (d) A violation of Section 2923.5, 2923.7, 2924.11, or 2924.17 by
a person licensed by the Department of Corporations, Department of
Financial Institutions, or Department of Real Estate shall be deemed
to be a violation of that person's licensing law.
   (e) No violation of this article shall affect the validity of a
sale in favor of a bona fide purchaser and any of its encumbrancers
for value without notice.
   (f) A third-party encumbrancer shall not be relieved of liability
resulting from violations of Section 2923.5, 2923.7, 2924.11, or
2924.17 committed by that third-party encumbrancer, that occurred
prior to the sale of the subject property to the bona fide purchaser.

   (g) The rights, remedies, and procedures provided by this section
are in addition to and independent of any other rights, remedies, or
procedures under any other law. Nothing in this section shall be
construed to alter, limit, or negate any other rights, remedies, or
procedures provided by law.
   (h) A court may award a prevailing borrower reasonable attorney's
fees and costs in an action brought pursuant to this section. A
borrower shall be deemed to have prevailed for purposes of this
subdivision if the borrower obtained injunctive relief or was awarded
damages pursuant to this section.
   (i) This section shall become operative on January 1, 2018.
  SEC. 18.  Section 2924.15 is added to the Civil Code, to read:
   2924.15.  (a) Unless otherwise provided, paragraph (5) of
subdivision (a) of Section 2924, and Sections 2923.5, 2923.55,
2923.6, 2923.7, 2924.9, 2924.10, 2924.11, and 2924.18 shall apply
only to first lien mortgages or deeds of trust that are secured by
owner-occupied residential real property containing no more than four
dwelling units. For these purposes, "owner-occupied" means that the
property is the principal residence of the borrower and is security
for a loan made for personal, family, or household purposes.
   (b)  This section shall remain in effect only until January 1,
2018, and as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted
statute, that is enacted before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends
that date.
  SEC. 19.  Section 2924.15 is added to the Civil Code, to read:
   2924.15.  (a) Unless otherwise provided, Sections 2923.5, 2923.7,
and 2924.11 shall apply only to first lien mortgages or deeds of
trust that are secured by owner-occupied residential real property
containing no more than four dwelling units. For these purposes,
"owner-occupied" means that the property is the principal residence
of the borrower and is security for a loan made for personal, family,
or household purposes.
   (b) This section shall become operative on January 1, 2018.
  SEC. 20.  Section 2924.17 is added to the Civil Code, to read:
   2924.17.  (a) A declaration recorded pursuant to Section 2923.5
or, until January 1, 2018, pursuant to Section 2923.55, a notice of
default, notice of sale, assignment of a deed of trust, or
substitution of trustee recorded by or on behalf of a mortgage
servicer in connection with a foreclosure subject to the requirements
of Section 2924, or a declaration or affidavit filed in any court
relative to a foreclosure proceeding shall be accurate and complete
and supported by competent and reliable evidence.
   (b) Before recording or filing any of the documents described in
subdivision (a), a mortgage servicer shall ensure that it has
reviewed competent and reliable evidence to substantiate the borrower'
s default and the right to foreclose, including the borrower's loan
status and loan information.
   (c) Until January 1, 2018, any mortgage servicer that engages in
multiple and repeated uncorrected violations of subdivision (b) in
recording documents or filing documents in any court relative to a
foreclosure proceeding shall be liable for a civil penalty of up to
seven thousand five hundred dollars ($7,500) per mortgage or deed of
trust in an action brought by a government entity identified in
Section 17204 of the Business and Professions Code, or in an
administrative proceeding brought by the Department of Corporations,
the Department of Real Estate, or the Department of Financial
Institutions against a respective licensee, in addition to any other
remedies available to these entities. This subdivision shall be
inoperative on January 1, 2018.
  SEC. 21.  Section 2924.18 is added to the Civil Code, to read:
   2924.18.  (a) (1) If a borrower submits a complete application for
a first lien loan modification offered by, or through, the borrower'
s mortgage servicer, a mortgage servicer, trustee, mortgagee,
beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record a notice of
default, notice of sale, or conduct a trustee's sale while the
complete first lien loan modification application is pending, and
until the borrower has been provided with a written determination by
the mortgage servicer regarding that borrower's eligibility for the
requested loan modification.
   (2) If a foreclosure prevention alternative has been approved in
writing prior to the recordation of a notice of default, a mortgage
servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall
not record a notice of default under either of the following
circumstances:
   (A) The borrower is in compliance with the terms of a written
trial or permanent loan modification, forbearance, or repayment plan.

   (B) A foreclosure prevention alternative has been approved in
writing by all parties, including, for example, the first lien
investor, junior lienholder, and mortgage insurer, as applicable, and
proof of funds or financing has been provided to the servicer.
   (3) If a foreclosure prevention alternative is approved in writing
after the recordation of a notice of default, a mortgage servicer,
mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record
a notice of sale or conduct a trustee's sale under either of the
following circumstances:
   (A) The borrower is in compliance with the terms of a written
trial or permanent loan modification, forbearance, or repayment plan.

   (B) A foreclosure prevention alternative has been approved in
writing by all parties, including, for example, the first lien
investor, junior lienholder, and mortgage insurer, as applicable, and
proof of funds or financing has been provided to the servicer.
   (b) This section shall apply only to a depository institution
chartered under state or federal law, a person licensed pursuant to
Division 9 (commencing with Section 22000) or Division 20 (commencing
with Section 50000) of the Financial Code, or a person licensed
pursuant to Part 1 (commencing with Section 10000) of Division 4 of
the Business and Professions Code, that, during its immediately
preceding annual reporting period, as established with its primary
regulator, foreclosed on 175 or fewer residential real properties,
containing no more than four dwelling units, that are located in
California.
   (c) Within three months after the close of any calendar year or
annual reporting period as established with its primary regulator
during which an entity or person described in subdivision (b) exceeds
the threshold of 175 specified in subdivision (b), that entity shall
notify its primary regulator, in a manner acceptable to its primary
regulator, and any mortgagor or trustor who is delinquent on a
residential mortgage loan serviced by that entity of the date on
which that entity will be subject to Sections 2923.55, 2923.6,
2923.7, 2924.9, 2924.10, 2924.11, and 2924.12, which date shall be
the first day of the first month that is six months after the close
of the calendar year or annual reporting period during which that
entity exceeded the threshold.
   (d) For purposes of this section, an application shall be deemed
"complete" when a borrower has supplied the mortgage servicer with
all documents required by the mortgage servicer within the reasonable
timeframes specified by the mortgage servicer.
   (e) If a borrower has been approved in writing for a first lien
loan modification or other foreclosure prevention alternative, and
the servicing of the borrower's loan is transferred or sold to
another mortgage servicer, the subsequent mortgage servicer shall
continue to honor any previously approved first lien loan
modification or other foreclosure prevention alternative, in
accordance with the provisions of the act that added this section.
   (f) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust
described in Section 2924.15.
   (g)  This section shall remain in effect only until January 1,
2018, and as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted
statute, that is enacted before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends
that date.
  SEC. 22.  Section 2924.19 is added to the Civil Code, to read:
   2924.19.  (a) (1) If a trustee's deed upon sale has not been
recorded, a borrower may bring an action for injunctive relief to
enjoin a material violation of Section 2923.5, 2924.17, or 2924.18.
   (2) Any injunction shall remain in place and any trustee's sale
shall be enjoined until the court determines that the mortgage
servicer, mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent has corrected
and remedied the violation or violations giving rise to the action
for injunctive relief. An enjoined entity may move to dissolve an
injunction based on a showing that the material violation has been
corrected and remedied.
   (b) After a trustee's deed upon sale has been recorded, a mortgage
servicer, mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall be
liable to a borrower for actual economic damages pursuant to Section
3281, resulting from a material violation of Section 2923.5, 2924.17,
or 2924.18 by that mortgage servicer, mortgagee, beneficiary, or
authorized agent where the violation was not corrected and remedied
prior to the recordation of the trustee's deed upon sale. If the
court finds that the material violation was intentional or reckless,
or resulted from willful misconduct by a mortgage servicer,
mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent, the court may award the
borrower the greater of treble actual damages or statutory damages of
fifty thousand dollars ($50,000).
   (c) A mortgage servicer, mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized
agent shall not be liable for any violation that it has corrected and
remedied prior to the recordation of the trustee's deed upon sale,
or that has been corrected and remedied by third parties working on
its behalf prior to the recordation of the trustee's deed upon sale.
   (d) A violation of Section 2923.5, 2924.17, or 2917.18 by a person
licensed by the Department of Corporations, the Department of
Financial Institutions, or the Department of Real Estate shall be
deemed to be a violation of that person's licensing law.
   (e) No violation of this article shall affect the validity of a
sale in favor of a bona fide purchaser and any of its encumbrancers
for value without notice.
   (f) A third-party encumbrancer shall not be relieved of liability
resulting from violations of Section 2923.5, 2924.17 or 2924.18,
committed by that third-party encumbrancer, that occurred prior to
the sale of the subject property to the bona fide purchaser.
   (g) The rights, remedies, and procedures provided by this section
are in addition to and independent of any other rights, remedies, or
procedures under any other law. Nothing in this section shall be
construed to alter, limit, or negate any other rights, remedies, or
procedures provided by law.
   (h) A court may award a prevailing borrower reasonable attorney's
fees and costs in an action brought pursuant to this section. A
borrower shall be deemed to have prevailed for purposes of this
subdivision if the borrower obtained injunctive relief or damages
pursuant to this section.
   (i) This section shall apply only to entities described in
subdivision (b) of Section 2924.18.
   (j)  This section shall remain in effect only until January 1,
2018, and as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted
statute, that is enacted before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends
that date.
  SEC. 23.  Section 2924.20 is added to the Civil Code, to read:
   2924.20.  Consistent with their general regulatory authority, and
notwithstanding subdivisions (b) and (c) of Section 2924.18, the
Department of Corporations, the Department of Financial Institutions,
and the Department of Real Estate may adopt regulations applicable
to any entity or person under their respective jurisdictions that are
necessary to carry out the purposes of the act that added this
section. A violation of the regulations adopted pursuant to this
section shall only be enforceable by the regulatory agency.
  SEC. 24.  The provisions of this act are severable. If any
provision of this act or its application is held invalid, that
invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications that can
be given effect without the invalid provision or application.
  SEC. 25.   No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to
Section 6 of Article XIII B of the California Constitution because
the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school
district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or
infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty
for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the
Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the
meaning of Section 6 of Article XIII B of the California
Constitution.

The NEW Sevicing abuse cases california Jan1, 2013

Abuses by Mortgage Service Companies

Although predatory lending has received far more attention than abusive servicing, a significant percentage of consumer complaints over loans involve servicing, not origination. For example, the director of the Nevada Fair Housing Center testified that of the hundreds of complaints of predatory lending issues her office received in 2002, about 42 percent involved servicing once the loan was transferred

Abusive Mortgage Servicing Defined:

Abusive servicing occurs when a servicer, either through action or inaction, obtains or attempts to obtain unwarranted fees or other costs from borrowers, engages in unfair collection practices, or through its own improper behavior or inaction causes borrowers to be more likely to go into default or have their homes foreclosed. Abusive practices should be distinguished from appropriate actions that may harm borrowers, such as a servicer merely collecting appropriate late fees or foreclosing on borrowers who do not make their payments despite proper loss mitigation efforts. Servicing can be abusive either intentionally, when there is intent to obtain unwarranted fees, or negligently, when, for example, a servicer’s records are so disorganized that borrowers are regularly charged late fees even when mortgage payments were made on time.

Abusive servicing often happens to debtors who have filed a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Plan and are in the process of making payments under the Plan. If you suspect that your mortgage servicer is abusing your relationship by charging unnecessary fees while you are paying off your Chapter 13 Plan, call us. We can help.

There is significant evidence that some Mortgage servicers have engaged in abusive behavior and that borrowers have frequently been the victims. Some servicers have engaged in practices that are not only detrimental to borrowers but also illegal Such abuse has been documented in court opinions and decisions, in the decisions and findings of ratings agencies, in litigation and settlements obtained by government agencies against prominent servicers, in congressional testimony, and in newspaper accounts of borrowers who claim to have been mistreated by servicers. The abusive servicing practices documented in these sources include improper foreclosure or attempted foreclosure, improper fees, improper forced-placed insurance, and improper use or oversight of escrow funds .

Improper foreclosure or attempted foreclosure

Because servicers can exact fees associated with foreclosures, such as attorneys’ fees, some servicers have attempted to foreclose on property even when borrowers are current on their payments or without giving borrowers enough time to repay or otherwise working with them on a repayment plan Furthermore, a speedy foreclosure may save servicers the cost of attempting other techniques that might have prevented the foreclosure.

Some servicers have been so brazen that they have regularly claimed to the courts that borrowers were in default so as to justify foreclosure, even though the borrowers were current on their payments. Other courts have also decried the frequent use of false statements to obtain relief from stay in order to foreclose on borrowers’ homes. For example, in Hart v. GMAC Mortgage Corporation, et al., 246 B.R. 709 (2000), even though the borrower had made the payments required of him by a forbearance agreement he had entered into with the servicer (GMAC Mortgage Corporation), it created a “negative suspense account” for moneys it had paid out, improperly charged the borrower an additional monthly sum to repay the negative suspense account, charged him late fees for failing to make the entire payment demanded, and began foreclosure proceedings.

Improper fees

Claiming that borrowers are in default when they are actually current allows servicers to charge unwarranted fees, either late fees or fees related to default and foreclosure. Servicers receive as a conventional fee a percentage of the total value of the loans they service, typically 25 basis points for prime loans and 50 basis points for subprime loans In addition, contracts typically provide that the servicer, not the trustee or investors, has the right to keep any and all late fees or fees associated with defaults. Servicers charge late fees not only because they act as a prod to coax borrowers into making payments on time, but also because borrowers who fail to make payments impose additional costs on servicers, which must then engage in loss mitigation to induce payment.

Such fees are a crucial part of servicers’ income. For example, one servicer’s CEO reportedly stated that extra fees, such as late fees, appeared to be paying for all of the operating costs of the company’s entire servicing department, leaving the conventional servicing fee almost completely profit The pressure to collect such fees appears to be higher on subprime servicers than on prime servicers:

Because borrowers typically cannot prove the exact date a payment was received, servicers can charge late fees even when they receive the payment on time Improper late fees may also be based on the loss of borrowers’ payments by servicers, their inability to track those payments accurately, or their failure to post payments in a timely fashion. In Ronemus v. FTB Mortgage Services, 201 B.R. 458 (1996), under a Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan, the borrowers had made all of their payments on time except for two; they received permission to pay these two late and paid late fees for the privilege. However, the servicer, FTB Mortgage Services, misapplied their payments, then began placing their payments into a suspense account and collecting unauthorized late fees. The servicer ignored several letters from the borrowers’ attorney attempting to clear up the matter, sent regular demands for late fees, and began harassing the borrowers with collection efforts. When the borrowers sued, the servicer submitted to the court an artificially inflated accounting of how much the borrowers owed.

Some servicers have sent out late notices even when they have received timely payments and even before the end of a borrower’s grace period Worse yet, a servicer might pocket the payment, such as an extra payment of principal, and never credit it to the borrower Late fees on timely payments are a common problem when borrowers are making mortgage payments through a bankruptcy plan

Moreover, some servicers have also added false fees and charges not authorized by law or contract to their monthly payment demands, relying on borrowers’ ignorance of the exact amount owed. They can collect such fees or other unwarranted claims by submitting inaccurate payoff demands when a borrower refinances or sells the house). Or they can place the borrowers’ monthly payments in a suspense account and then charge late fees even though they received the payment Worse yet, some servicers pyramid their late fees, applying a portion of the current payment to a previous late fee and then charging an additional late fee even though the borrower has made a timely and full payment for the new month Pyramiding late fees allows servicers to charge late fees month after month even though the borrower made only one late payment

Servicers can turn their fees into a profit center by sending inaccurate monthly payment demands, demanding unearned fees or charges not owed, or imposing fees higher than the expenses for a panoply of actions For example, some servicers take advantage of borrowers’ ignorance by charging fees, such as prepayment penalties, where the note does not provide for them Servicers have sometimes imposed a uniform set of fees over an entire pool of loans, disregarding the fact that some of the loan documents did not provide for those particular fees. Or they charge more for attorneys’, property inspection, or appraisal fees than were actually incurred. Some servicers may add a fee by conducting unnecessary property inspections, having an agent drive by even when the borrower is not in default, or conducting multiple inspections during a single period of default to charge the resulting multiple fees

The complexity of the terms of many loans makes it difficult for borrowers to discover whether they are being overcharged Moreover, servicers can frustrate any attempts to sort out which fees are genuine.

Improperly forced-placed insurance

Mortgage holders are entitled under the terms of the loan to require borrowers to carry homeowners’ insurance naming the holder as the payee in case of loss and to force-place insurance by buying policies for borrowers who fail to do so and charging them for the premiums However, some servicers have force-placed insurance even in cases where the borrower already had it and even provided evidence of it to the servicer Worse yet, servicers have charged for force-placed insurance without even purchasing it. Premiums for force-placed insurance are often inflated in that they provide protection in excess of what the loan.

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Escrow Account Mismanagement

One of the benefits of servicing mortgages is controlling escrow accounts to pay for insurance, taxes, and the like and, in most states, keeping any interest earned on these accounts Borrowers have complained that servicers have failed to make tax or insurance payments when they were due or at all. The treasurer of the country’s second largest county estimated that this failure to make timely payments cost borrowers late fees of at least $2 million in that county over a two-year span, causing some to lose their homes. If servicers fail to make insurance payments and a policy lapses, borrowers may face much higher insurance costs even if they purchase their own, non-force-placed policy. Worse yet, borrowers may find themselves unable to buy insurance at all if they cannot find a new insurer willing to write them a policy

You can make a claim for mortgage service abuse, and often the court will award actual and punitive damages. If you think you have been a victim of mortgage service abuse, contact us. We can help you make a claim.

Civil Code §2924.12(b) Right to Sue Mortgage Servicers for Injunctive Relief, Damages, Treble Damages, and Right to Attorney’s Fees. : )

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H. Right to Sue Mortgage Servicers for Injunctive Relief, Damages, Treble Damages, and Right to Attorney’s Fees

2013 is going to be a good year

One of the most important provisions of the Act from a lender’s perspective is that it provides borrowers with the right to sue mortgage servicers for injunctive relief before the trustee’s deed upon sale has recorded, or if it has already recorded, to sue for actual economic damages, if the mortgage servicer has not corrected any “material” violation of certain enumerated portions of the Act before the trustee’s deed upon sale recorded. (Civil Code §2924.12(a).) In an area that will certainly open up a Pandora’s Box of litigation, the Act does not define what constitutes a “material” violation of the Act. If a court finds that the violation was intentional, reckless or willful, the court can award the borrower the greater of treble (triple) damages or $50,000. (Civil Code §2924.12(b).) Furthermore, a violation of the enumerated provisions of the Act is also deemed to be a violation of the licensing laws if committed by a person licensed as a consumer or commercial finance lender or broker, a residential mortgage lender or servicer, or a licensed real estate broker or salesman. (Civil Code §2924.12(d).) Lastly, in a one-sided attorney’s fee provision that only benefits borrowers, the court may award a borrower who obtains an injunction or receives an award of economic damages as a result of the violation of the Act their reasonable attorney’s fees and costs as the prevailing party. (Civil Code §2924.12(i).) This provides all the more reason for lenders and mortgage servicers to comply with the terms of the Act. This provision for the recovery by only the borrower of their reasonable attorney’s fees makes it more likely that borrowers will file litigation against mortgage lenders or servicers than they otherwise would. Compliance is the lender’s or mortgage servicer’s best defense to litigation under the Act.

Significantly for lenders, as long as the mortgage servicer remedies the material violation of the Act before the trustee’s deed upon sale has recorded, the Act specifically provides that the mortgage servicer shall not be liable under the Act for any violation or damages. (Civil Code §2924.12(b) & (c).) The Act also clarifies that signatories to the National Mortgage Settlement who are in compliance with the terms of that settlement, as they relate to the terms of the Act, will not face liability under the Act. (Civil Code §2924.12(g).

 

Foreclosure Defense Argument that Promissory Notes are not “negotiable instruments”

From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Tuesday, December 04, 2012 7:20 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: Foreclosure Defense Argument that Promissory Notes are not "negotiable instruments"

Here is Matt Weidner’s video of his oral argument on this issue.

And attached is the brief

He states we need one trial judge to be honest with the facts.

Initial Brief.docx