From: Timothymccandless’s Weblog [mailto:donotreply@wordpress.com]
Sent: Tuesday, March 13, 2012 7:18 PM
To: tim@prodefenders.com
Subject: [New post] We Now have PROOF that Mortgage Loans Were Pledged to Multiple Trusts
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California Sets Precedent: No More Hiding Behind Bogus PEOs – Workers Rights Compliance, Precedent Set: Employers Can’t Outsource Accountability – Workers Rights Compliance, DLSE Draws the Line: Fraudulent PEO Coverage Doesn’t Cut It – Workers Rights Compliance, New Legal Benchmark: PEO Schemes Won’t Shield Employers – Workers Rights Compliance, Garcias Pallets Case Becomes First-Ever DLSE Precedent – Workers Rights Compliance, Historic First: California Labor Commissioner Issues Precedent Ruling on PEO Fraud – Workers Rights Compliance, DLSE Makes It Official—No Valid Workers’ Comp, No Excuses – Workers Rights Compliance, Real Coverage for Real Workers: Fraud Won’t Fly in California – Workers Rights Compliance, Workers Deserve Real Protection—Bogus Insurance Doesn’t Count – Workers Rights Compliance, Precedent Protects Workers from Fake Insurance Scams – Workers Rights Compliance, 50+ Workers, No Coverage—California Says Never Again – Workers Rights Compliance, Labor Law Victory: Worker Safety Over Corporate Shell Games – Workers Rights Compliance, $1.3M Lesson: Ignorance of the Law Is No Defense – Workers Rights Compliance, Certificates Can Lie—Employers Are Still on the Hook – Workers Rights Compliance, Fraudulent Coverage = Real Fines – Workers Rights Compliance, The Bill Comes Due: $1.3M in Fines for Workers' Comp Evasion – Workers Rights Compliance, Subcontracting Liability Doesn’t Mean Subcontracting Responsibility – Workers Rights Compliance, A Win for Honest PEOs, a Loss for Cheaters – Workers Rights Compliance, Leveling the Field: Fraudulent Operators Face Real Consequences – Workers Rights Compliance, PEO Accountability Is Here—Honest Brokers Applaud – Workers Rights Compliance, No More Free Ride for Fraudulent PEOs – Workers Rights Compliance, Justice for Legitimate Employers—Fraudsters Pay the Price – Workers Rights Compliance, From CompOne to CompassPilot—The Shell Game Ends Here – Workers Rights Compliance, How a Bogus Insurance Scheme Cost One Company $1.3 Million – Workers Rights Compliance, Unmasking the PEO Scam: California Cracks Down – Workers Rights Compliance, One Employer, Three PEOs, Zero Coverage—The Precedent Tells All – Workers Rights Compliance, DLSE Precedent Highlights Deep Industry Scams – Workers Rights Compliance, Fake Insurance Certificates Are Not a Defense—They’re a Liability – Workers Rights Compliance, Employers: Verify Your Workers’ Comp Coverage—Before the State Does – Workers Rights Compliance, Don’t Get Burned—Understand Joint Employer Liability Today – Workers Rights Compliance, Legit PEO? Or Just a New Name for the Same Old Scam? – Workers Rights Compliance, Your PEO’s Certificate Might Be Fake—Know the Signs – Workers Rights Compliance, Before You Contract Labor, Read This Precedent Decision – Workers Rights Compliance.
From: Timothymccandless’s Weblog [mailto:donotreply@wordpress.com]
Sent: Tuesday, March 13, 2012 7:18 PM
To: tim@prodefenders.com
Subject: [New post] We Now have PROOF that Mortgage Loans Were Pledged to Multiple Trusts
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From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Thursday, March 01, 2012 10:29 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: David Ambrose on James v. Recontrust
Attached is the opinion which came down today of US District Court Judge Michael H. Simon. This is a significant opinion, and one which will likely have a substantial impact on not only pending nonjudicial foreclosures in Oregon, but those which have already occurred, involving MERS as the nominee for the lender on the trust deed. Of most import, the ruling holds:
1. Only the note holder may be a beneficiary under a trust deed under Oregon law;
2. Therefore, whether the parties have agreed to designate MERS as the beneficiary or not, is irrelevant, as Oregon law is controlling and paramount, and because MERS is not the note holder, MERS is not the beneficiary. While this opinion is of course specific to Oregon’s laws, it does persuasively dispel the argument that because the parties designated MERS as the beneficiary, that should be controlling (and as an aside, like any home owner signing a trust deed with MERS as the designated nominee had any idea what that really meant?);
3. In non-legalese, the law and custom argument made by MERS (who at MERS law firm actually dreamed up this language?) is simply bogus. The opinion includes a fascinating, and somewhat humorous, discussion of this provision in a MERS trust deed and the circularity of the MERS argument on this point.
4. Under Oregon law, when the ownership of the note is transferred, there is a corresponding transfer of the beneficiary’s interest under the trust deed, and under Oregon law, all such transfers must be recorded in order for the remedy of nonjudicial foreclosure to be available. Absent such recorded assignments, there can be a judicial foreclosure, but not a nonjudicial foreclosure. And once you get into court, all of a sudden the "who owns the note" argument is no longer an irrelevant inquiry (standing, real party in interest, etc.).
Why the potential impact on completed nonjudicial foreclosures? Because if the trustee had no authority to conduct the sale, the sale is arguably void (not just voidable) (and there are already Oregon Circuit Court cases holding to this effect), and taking a cue from rulings in Massachusetts, and other states, this means that a buyer at a foreclosure sale, or a later buyer of the property from the foreclosing lender who acquired title at the foreclosure sale, may be set aside, and the bona fide purchaser doctrine will be unavailable. I imagine our title insurers are going to be having heart palpitations about this one.
Regards,
David Ambrose
drambrose
From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Thursday, March 01, 2012 8:33 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: Federal Reserve Board released action plans for supervised correction of deficiencies in loan servicing and foreclosure.
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/enforcement/20120227a.htm
Release Date: February 27, 2012
For immediate release
The Federal Reserve Board on Monday released action plans for supervised financial institutions to correct deficiencies in residential mortgage loan servicing and foreclosure processing. It also released engagement letters between supervised financial institutions and independent consultants retained by the firms to review foreclosures that were in process in 2009 and 2010.
The action plans are required by formal enforcement actions issued by the Federal Reserve last year. The enforcement actions direct mortgage loan servicers regulated by the Federal Reserve to submit acceptable plans that describe, among other things, how the institutions will strengthen communications with borrowers by providing each borrower the name of a primary point of contact at the servicer; establish limits on foreclosures where loan modifications have been approved; establish robust, third-party vendor controls; and strengthen compliance programs.
The Federal Reserve enforcement actions also require the parent holding companies of mortgage servicers to submit acceptable plans that describe, among other things, how the companies will improve oversight of servicing and foreclosure processing conducted by bank and nonbank subsidiaries.
The enforcement actions further require the mortgage servicing subsidiaries to provide appropriate remediation to borrowers who suffered financial injury as a result of errors by the servicers. The engagement letters describe the procedures that will be followed by the independent consultants in reviewing servicers’ foreclosure files to determine whether borrowers suffered financial injury as a result of servicer error.
Release of the action plans and engagement letters follows reviews conducted from November 2010 to January 2011, in which examiners found unsafe and unsound processes and practices in residential mortgage loan servicing and foreclosure processing at a number of supervised institutions.
The Federal Reserve will closely follow the implementation of action plans to ensure that the financial institutions correct deficiencies and evaluate any harm that was done to homeowners in the foreclosure process in 2009 and 2010. The Federal Reserve anticipates that more engagement letters and action plans will be posted soon.
Action plans and engagement letters: http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/enforcement/20120227aletters.htm
From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Sunday, March 04, 2012 6:03 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: When Are Countrywide Notes Endorsed? A Filing in A Federal Case Shows the Problems With Negotiability.
When Are Countrywide Notes Endorsed? A Filing in A Federal Case Shows the Problems With Negotiability.
March 3rd, 2012 | Author: Matthew D. Weidner, Esq.
When exactly are promissory notes endorsed? When did the Plaintiff come to perfect his cause of action to foreclose? These were key questions in yesterday’s transcript of a court proceeding. When the judge referred to “673″, he was referring to the Uniform Commercial Code which is found in Chapter 673, Florida Statutes. He has picked up on that fact that “673″ and the rules of negotiability are critical components in this whole fraudclosure hurricane. Importantly, so has Florida’s Second District Court of Appeals…..it’s widely known that the Second is a very, very astute, academic and profoundly perceptive court. They’ve weighed in on a whole host of fraudclosure opinions and the opinions are tight and profound….
The sole basis upon which hundreds of millions of dollars in real wealth and millions of acres of property are being transferred from one party to another in this country are squiggly lines and stamps which purport to endorse the promissory notes an issue in millions of foreclosure cases pending all across this country.
In most cases, the notes were not intended by the loan servicers, depositors or mortgage backed security trustee to be transferred via endorsement alone. How do I know this? It says so right in the terms of the applicable Pooling and Servicing Agreement. The individual PSAs are the Constitution that governs the rights, responsibilities and relationships among the myriad parties in a typical mortgage loan. These documents were supposed to be followed by all the parties, but in the vast majority of cases they are just ignored by all parties and now by the courts. But they should not be ignored. The PSAs are the real source of guidance and direction in a world gone mad. The fact that we are all allowing them to be ignored with the constant mantra that, “you’re not a party to the agreement” and “the mortgage follows the note” is a failing on the part of the defense bar for not making it an issue in every case.
I recently stumbled upon a filing in a federal court case that’s pending in Southern Mississippi. I’ve got deep roots in Southern Mississippi, and frankly some great legal scholarship in consumer rights comes out of that area. I was following up on the bombshell federal litigation where Mississippi workers realized the money they had placed with big shot Yankee investors is um…well, a little squirrely, when I came across this fascinating case. But first, we would all do well to understand the Public Employee Retirement System of Mississippi lawsuit. It is alleged that Goldman Sachs misrepresented the quality of hundreds of millions of dollars in loans that were sold to these retirees. Goldman said they were solid gold, it turns out they were garbage. Mississippi said they were defrauded, Goldman says you shouldn’t expect our marketing, sales and investment material to be truthful, too bad your retirees lost their pension checks, screw you, we’re Goldman.
Now, what’s important to keep in mind is this is just one institutional investor who was smart enough to catch this. The allegations contained in this litigation could and should be being made in lawsuits all across this country….NEWSFLASH: ALL YOU RETIREES AND PEOPLE THAT THINK YOUR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PENSIONS ARE SAFE…..REMEMBER THE OLD STORY, “THE EMPEROR HAS NO CLOTHES”
Anywhoo, back to the story the question about how billions of dollars in notes gets transferred should be on everyone’s mind. Our nation has been hijacked by the reckless and out of control banking system with their sloppiness, lies, smoke and mirrors and misrepresentations. And now they have thoroughly polluted our court systems. But some judges are fighting back. They are pulling back the curtain, not willing to be blown off or glossed over by slick lawyers who want to dust them off, distract them and suggest they should ignore fundamental legal principles.
The fate of this nation rests in the ability of good judges and a strong legal system to defend and protect this nation from the looming regime, the banking cabal, that has hijacked the whole of the United States government.
Read these deposition transcripts carefully, can you spot the critical legal issues that are spawned here? Can you figger out who the who in whoville is?
Consider the impact of this in all Countrywide cases…
From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Monday, March 12, 2012 10:05 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: Lynn Szymoniak Securitization Teach-In/Introduction to Mortgage Securitization
From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Monday, March 12, 2012 10:24 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: $25 Billion Mortgage Servicing Agreement Filed in Federal Court
Consent judgments…”the settlement”
Complaint: http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/complaint.pdf
Ally Financial Consent Judgment: http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/residential-consent-judgement.pdf
Bank of America Consent Judgment: http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/bank-of-america-consent-judgement.pdf
Citigroup Consent Judgment: http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/citi-consent-judgement.pdf
JPMorgan Chase Consent Judgment: http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/chase-consent-judgement.pdf
Wells Fargo Consent Judgment: http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/wellsfargo-consent-judgement.pdf
Link to DOJ and related materials: http://www.justice.gov/opa/opa_mortgage-service.htm
Disgusting, all of it!
Charles
Charles Wayne Cox – Oregon State Director for the National Homeowners Cooperative
Email: mailto:Charles
Websites: http://www.NHCwest.com; www.BayLiving.com; and www.ForensicLoanAnalyst.com
1969 Camellia Ave.
Medford, OR 97504-5403
(541) 727-2240 direct
(541) 610-1931 eFax

Defending or Litigating Foreclosure?
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From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Tuesday, March 13, 2012 7:15 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: The Legal Lie at the Heart of the $8.5 Billion Bank of America and Federal/State Mortgage Settlements
Monday, March 12, 2012 – Naked Capitalism Yves Smith
The Legal Lie at the Heart of the $8.5 Billion Bank of America and Federal/State Mortgage Settlements
Once in a while, you can discern a linchpin lie on which other important lies hinge. We can point to quite a few in America: the notion of a permanent war on terror, which somehow justifies vitiating not just the Constitution, but even the Magna Carta, or the idea of an imperial executive branch.
Now the apparently-to-be-filed-in-court-today Federal/state attorneys general mortgage settlement is less consequential than matters of life and limb. But it still show the lengths to which the officialdom is willing to go to vitiate the law in order to get its way.
HUD Secretary Donovan, the propagandist in chief for the Federal/state mortgage pact, has claimed he has investor approval to do the mortgage modifications that are a significant portion of the value of the settlement. We’ll eventually see what is actually in the settlement, but the early PR was that “no less than $10 billion” of the $25 billion headline total was to come from principal reductions. Modifications of mortgages not owned by banks, meaning in securitized trusts, are counted only 50% and before Donovan realized he was committing a faux pas, he said he expected 85% of the mods to be from securitizations, so that means $17 billion.
Bear in mind that investors, analysts, and commentators have objected to the very premise of this arrangement. A settlement involves a release of liability, and in anything other than the through-the-looking-glass world of rule by banks, the party that did the bad stuff is the one that pays for the settlement. This deal is like stealing your neighbor’s gold watch and using it to resolve charges of embezzlement.
But what about this investor approval that Donovan says he has? He has told both journalists and mortgage investors directly that the bulk of the mods will come from Countrywide deals and he has consent via the $8.5 billion Bank of America/Bank of New York settlement. Huh? First, it seems more that a bit cheeky to rely on a major piece of a program via a deal that has not yet gone through (the Bank of America settlement was removed to Federal court and has now been sent back to state court, and there will be discovery in the state court process, so approval is not imminent).
But second and more important, investors approved nothing. Bank of New York is trying to act well outside its authority as trustee for the 530 Countrywide trusts in the settlement. It’s tantamount to having a friend that you gave a medical power of attorney claim that it gave him the authority to sell your car and write checks on your account.
The terms of Countrywide PSAs vary, but all appear to restrict mods. The prohibitions varied by credit quality of the deal. Alt-A and early vintage (2004 and earlier) deals often barred mods completely; subprime and later vintage deals generally allowed for a higher limit on mods, with 5% the top amount across these deals. The idea was that some mods were expected in the dreckier mortgage pools. Nevertheless, all of them, as well as the few that had no caps, also required Bank of America to buy the modified loans back at par. That is something the battered Charlotte bank would be very keen to avoid doing.
Now remember, as we have discussed, that these Countrywide deals also typically elected New York law as governing law for the trust. New York trust law is both well settled and unforgiving. Trusts are permitted to act only as stipulated; any deviation is a “void act” and has no legal force. And a trustee can ONLY exercise the authority the trust has; as an agent, it cannot exceed the legal rights its principal has.
On top of that, Countrywide pooling and servicing agreements (the contracts that govern the securitizations, and in particular, set forth the duties of the servicer and the trustee), again like all PSAs, require an amendment to the PSA to change their terms. That in turn requires approval of the certificateholders, meaning the investors. Our Tom Adams has looked at a few Countrywide PSA, and what he has found so far is that it take the approval of either 51% or 2/3 of the certificateholders in each class, meaning in each tranche of the deal. To wit:
This Agreement may also be amended from time to time by the Depositor, each Seller, the Master Servicer and the Trustee with the consent of the Holders of a Majority in Interest of each Class of Certificates affected thereby for the purpose of adding any provisions to or changing in any manner or eliminating any of the provisions of this Agreement or of modifying in any manner the rights of the Holders of Certificates; provided,
however, that no such amendment shall (i) reduce in any manner the amount of, or delay the timing of, payments required to be distributed on any Certificate without the consent of the Holder of such Certificate, (ii) adversely affect in any material respect the interests of the Holders of any Class of Certificates in a manner other than as described in (i), without the consent of the Holders of Certificates of such Class evidencing, as to such Class,
Percentage Interests aggregating 66-2/3% or (iii) reduce the aforesaid percentages of Certificates the Holders of which are required to consent to any such amendment, without the consent of the Holders of all such Certificates then outstanding.
Now how does the Bank of America/Bank of New York settlement agreement deal with this wee problem? It pretends it does not exist (emphasis ours):
(e) Loss Mitigation Considerations. In considering modifications and/or other loss mitigation strategies, including, without limitation, short sales and deeds in lieu of foreclosure, the Master Servicer and all Subservicers shall consider the following factors: (a) the net present value of the Mortgage Loan at the time the modification and/or other loss mitigation strategy is considered and whether the contemplated modification and/or other loss mitigation strategy would have a positive effect on the net present value of the Mortgage Loan as compared to foreclosure; (b) where loan performance is the goal, whether the modification and/or other loss mitigation strategy is reasonably likely to return the Mortgage Loan to permanently performing status; (c) whether the borrower has the ability to pay, but has defaulted strategically or is otherwise acting strategically; (d) reasonably available avenues of recovery of the full principal balance of the Mortgage Loan other than foreclosure or liquidation of the loan; (e) the requirements of the applicable Governing Agreement; (f) such other factors as would be deemed prudent in its judgment; and (g) all requirements imposed by applicable Law. When the Master Servicer and/or Subservicer, in implementing a modification and/or other loss mitigation strategy (which may, pursuant to the Governing Agreements, include principal reductions), considers the factors set forth above, and/or acts in accordance with the policies or practices that the Master Servicer is then applying to its or any of its affiliates’ “held for investment” portfolios, the Master Servicer shall be deemed to be in compliance with its obligation to service the Mortgage Loans prudently in keeping with the relevant servicing provisions of the relevant Governing Agreement and the requirements of this Subparagraph 5(e), the modification and/or other loss mitigation strategy so implemented shall be deemed to be permissible under the terms of the applicable Governing Agreement, and the judgments in applying such factors to a particular loan shall not be subject to challenge under the applicable Governing Agreement, this Settlement Agreement, or otherwise.Notwithstanding anything else in this Subparagraph 5(e), no principal modification by the Master Servicer or any Subservicer shall reduce the principal amount due on any Mortgage Loan below the current market value of the property, as determined by a third-party broker price opinion, using a fair market value method, applying normal marketing time criteria and excluding REO or short sale comparative sales in the valuation calculation.
Now this might not strike you as amiss until you realize this deal is between the trustee, Bank of New York, and Bank of America. The investors are NOT party to it and their consent has not been obtained, either properly, via amendments to the PSA, or by any other means.
You might say, “Weren’t there 22 big investors who originally signed a letter that led to this deal?” Yes, and that happens to be irrelevant. Those 22 investors didn’t have even as much as 25% in most of the 530 trusts (the necessary percentage to take action against a trustee); there are many trusts in this settlement where these 22 investors have NO interest at all. So Bank of New York can’t pretend it has enough in the way of investors via the investor letter to give it the authority to ignore the PSA.
Keep this in mind: Bank of New York’s petition to the court to approve the deal in an Article 77 hearing makes NO mention of the fact that they will effectively be amending the PSA to permit modifications to stay in the trust and to exceed 5% of the pool balance.
Since the purpose of the hearing is to obtain a judicial determination whether Bank of New York acted properly in settling with Bank of America, one would assume the parties to the action are bound by the normal requirements of making accurate submissions to the court, just as they are at trial (Judge William Pauley, who approved the removal of the case to federal court, argued that this hearing fits “comfortably” within the definition of a trial). Thus BoNY should mention that the modification provision excerpted above requires an amendment which requires consent of 51% or more of the certificateholders in each class in each trust. Instead, they instead discuss the broad powers of the trustee! And yet they later argued the reverse to Judge Pauley. He noted in his ruling: “If, as BYNM [Bank of New York Mellon] argues, the only relevant legal standards for evaluating its conduct as trustee are found in the PSAs…” If they have only the authority given them by the PSA, they have no authority to authorized mods beyond those contemplated in the PSA for each deal.
And as we observed above even if BoNY could be argued to have additional authority under common law, that extra common law authority in New York is nada.
It is hard to conclude anything other than that Gibbs & Bruns, the firm representing Bank of New York, lied to the court about what the settlement constitutes and what the PSAs permit. The PSAs have very clear terms on modifications and changing them should require an amendment.
But lying to the court seems to be standard operating procedure for Kathy Patrick, the partner leading the settlement deal. Alison Frankel of Reuters described how Gibbs & Bruns lied about why they were leading this action:
The most dramatic moment at the Sept. 21 hearing on Bank of America’s proposed $8.5 billion settlement with Countrywide mortgage-backed securities investors came near the end, when Gibbs & Bruns partner Robert Madden stood up to address Manhattan federal judge William Pauley’s concerns about how the settlement came to be. Tall and clear-spoken, Madden captured the judge’s attention as he explained that his clients, a group of 22 large institutional investors, hadn’t entered a sweetheart deal with BofA, but had banded together to force the bank to pony up billions to investors for claims BofA thought it would never have to deal with.
“The problem was that these repurchase claims were lying fallow,” Madden said, according to the transcript of the hearing. “No one was doing anything. None of (the investors now objecting to the deal) were doing anything. And, I’m sorry to say, the trustee wasn’t doing anything. Limitations were running on those claims, and nothing was happening.”
Or was it?
I’ve learned that in the summer of 2010, as Gibbs & Bruns began to push Countrywide MBS trustee Bank of New York Mellon to act on its assertions that mortgages underlying the Countrywide securities were deficient, another group of Countrywide MBS investors was finalizing its own notice of default to serve on BNY Mellon.
You need to read the Alison Frankel article in full to have some appreciation as to what happened. The pre-existing, and likely larger group of investors (I am told it included Fannie, which is one of the biggest investors in MBS) had concluded an investigation and found breaches in every single Countrywide securitization (Bill Frey had developed proof of Countrywide modifying loans where Bank of America owned a second lien behind that first and had not wiped it out first, as would be required). But when Fannie confirmed the Frey information and said it was in, Blackrock suddenly withdrew and went with Patrick, as shortly did another existing Gibbs & Bruns client, Pimco.
Now why, might you ask, would investors drop out of a group that had hard evidence of breaches and could prove real economic harm, and switch to one that could only handwave? I’m no fan of rep and warranty cases, and even so, I’ve estimated this deal is a screaming bargain for those liabilities alone; the servicing breaches that the earlier (Grais & Ellis) group found would add to the total value of the deal, as does its waiver on chain of title claims. It’s not hard to guesstimate that this settlement is worth easily ten times the $8.5 billion Bank of America plans to pony up. And Mr. Market agrees. BofA’s stock was trading below $6 when both settlements were in doubt; it’s now up more than 33%, closing last Friday at $8.05.
So why would Pimco and Blackrock abandon a strategy that would seem likely to bear more fruit? Recall that Blackrock signed on to the Gibbs & Bruns negotiated settlement while it was still 49% owned by Merrill, um, Bank of America. So its motives seem straightforward, even if they also happen to be a breach of its fiduciary duty to its investors.
Pimco is awfully active in Washington; it is almost certainly one of the fund managers that the Fed chooses to talk to about its interest rate thinking, which effectively means Pimco has permitted inside information (one of my readers refused to invest in Pimco funds because the returns were sufficiently out of line with benchmarks that the funds either had to be taking on more risk than they pretended to or were reliant on privileged information). So Pimco has plenty of reason to curry favor rather than make life miserable for Bank of America, and by extension, the Administration, which has thrown its lot in fully with the big banks.
Now let’s go back to the Donovan lie, which depends on the Gibbs & Bruns lie not being challenged by the court, or the $8.5 billion settlement not coming unglued for some other reason. Donovan is relying on the authority supposedly conferred by the $8.5 billion settlement…which has not been approved by court, meaning it is not yet valid and may not come to fruition. Yet (per leaks) the banks are to get credit for mods starting March 31 even though the Federal/state AG deal won’t be approved by that date either. And remember also that four other large servicers are signing up to the Federal/state settlement. Even though the authorities anticipate that the other major servicers will enter into private settlements along the BofA/BoNY lines once it is approved, that is some ways away even if everything breaks in the banks’s favor.
Recall how sanctimonious Timothy Geithner has been about not breaking contracts, such as the AIG credit default swaps agreements and employment contracts with AIG staffers. Similarly, Obama pay czar Kenneth Feinberg excoriated bankers for the bonuses they took out of firms they blew up but refused to try to claw back pay, because it might lead to lawsuits. So? The Administration didn’t necessarily need to win that litigation to prevail. If it did discovery on what executives were paid, what they did, and how derelict they were in their duty, they could have created such a huge and cry so to keep bankers cowed for at least five years. And as we have pointed out repeatedly, Team Obama has also refused to use the best weapon in its arsenal: Sarbanes Oxley, which would allow it to file civil and from that if successful, criminal charges for false certifications about the adequacy of internal controls, in particular, risk controls.
Now the railroading of investors may not seem all that important to many of you. But you are in fact all exposed. The failure of Fannie to pursue valid claims, for instance, is a direct subsidy from taxpayers to Bank of America and other banks. And more important, if investors are for the most part, too afraid, too compromised, or too plain lazy to take action against banks, and will sit passively as their contracts are violated, what hope is there for ordinary, less well connected citizens?
This settlement farce reveals yet again that contracts in America have become decidedly one sided affairs: banks will take advantage of every trap and snare, and engage in further abuses if they can get away with them, but woe betide anyone on the other side. You have perilous little hope that you will get a fair hearing from regulators (witness the farce of the OCC foreclosure reviews) or courts, since banks both outgun and outlie most opponents.
The banks and the authorities seem remarkably unaware of what they are doing in undermining the rule of law, which is critical to resolving disputes peacefully in a complex and combative society. They are likely to find that undermining the protective role of the judiciary will leave them more exposed than they could possibly imagine.
From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Tuesday, March 13, 2012 10:38 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: We Now have PROOF that Mortgage Loans Were Pledged to Multiple Trusts
From 4closurefraud:
Exclusive Smoking Gun | The Sophisticated and The Scammed IV – It Appears We Now have PROOF that Mortgage Loans Were Pledged to Multiple Trusts
So last night we got word from Virginia Parsons, our friend over at www.deadlyclear.com. She discovered a WAMU loan in a WAMU trust that was ALSO in TWO other WAMU trusts.
Yes, this appears to be a TRIPLE PLEDGED loan.
Well, as we know from experience in the fraudclosure underworld, that if you find an anomaly it usually is not an anomaly.
So what did Lisa decide to do? Well, look for more silly.
Guess what…
Here is what she found after she dumped the tr…
From Lisa
I looked at the SEC filed loan level data for all three trusts and ran a comparison for all the loan numbers that were listed in the 2006 SEC files.
I found a total of 44 loans (including Ginny’s triple pledged loan) and here are the results.
Each of these loans is in two (one is in three) of the following trusts:
WAMU Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-AR11
WAMU Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-AR13
WAMU Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-AR15
| Loan Number | WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-AR | |||||
| 3010064859 | 11 | 15 | ||||
| 3010002701 | 11 | 15 | ||||
| 714934858 | 11 | 13 | 15 | |||
| 3010073819 | 11 | 13 | ||||
| 3010112153 | 11 | 13 | ||||
| 3010166548 | 15 | 13 | ||||
| 3010238461 | 11 | 13 | ||||
| 3010272585 | 15 | 13 | ||||
| 3010294712 | 15 | 13 | ||||
| 3010466831 | 11 | 13 | ||||
| 3010555286 | 15 | 13 | ||||
| 3010566010 | 15 | 13 | ||||
| 3010584575 | 15 | 13 | ||||
| 3010589509 | 15 | 13 | ||||
| 3010631244 | 11 | 13 | ||||
| 3010943060 | 15 | 13 | ||||
| 3010944548 | 15 | 13 | ||||
| 3011042730 | 15 | 13 | ||||
| 3062099423 | 15 | 13 | ||||
| 3062174630 | 11 | 13 | ||||
| 3062175199 | 11 | 13 | ||||
| 3062215581 | 11 | 13 | ||||
| 3062251925 | 11 | 13 | ||||
| 3062342641 | 11 | 13 | ||||
| 3062427889 | 11 | 13 | ||||
| 3062431626 | 15 | 13 | ||||
| 3062544402 | 11 | 13 | ||||
| 3062638584 | 11 | 13 | ||||
| 3062660091 | 11 | 13 | ||||
| 3062663459 | 11 | 13 | ||||
| 3062663459 | 15 | 13 | ||||
| 3062717586 | 11 | 13 | ||||
| 3062721349 | 15 | 13 | ||||
| 3062758135 | 15 | 13 | ||||
| 3062759299 | 15 | 13 | ||||
| 3062810019 | 11 | 15 | ||||
| 3062917996 | 11 | 13 | ||||
| 3062954270 | 11 | 15 | ||||
| 3063020881 | 11 | 13 | ||||
| 3063123990 | 11 | 13 | ||||
| 3063140127 | 15 | 13 | ||||
| 3063180966 | 15 | 13 | ||||
| 3063191302 | 15 | 13 | ||||
| 3063197093 | 11 | 13 | ||||
She ONLY compared these three trusts, for all we know these loans could be in other trusts also.
Is this the final smoking gun we need? How many loans were multiple pledged into numerous trusts?
Can they allow the foreclosure to continue on loans that have been sold multiple times?
So many questions.
More to come as we dig into it.
Reuters is already all over it for us.
From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Tuesday, March 13, 2012 8:26 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: Matt Weidner video on AG settlement
Matt Weidner video on AG settlement papers I sent out yesterday or so…
Charles
Charles Wayne Cox – Oregon State Director for the National Homeowners Cooperative
Email: mailto:Charles
Websites: http://www.NHCwest.com; www.BayLiving.com; and www.ForensicLoanAnalyst.com
1969 Camellia Ave.
Medford, OR 97504-5403
(541) 727-2240 direct
(541) 610-1931 eFax

Defending or Litigating Foreclosure?
Click Here For More Information
Paralegal; CA Licensed Real Estate Broker; Certified Forensic Loan Analyst. Litigation Support; Mortgage and Real Estate Expert Witness Services.
From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Wednesday, March 07, 2012 3:22 PM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: Phil Querin on the James Case in Oregon – two part commentary on the case included here…ruling attached. REQUIRED READING!
Importance: High
By Phil Querin.
“In Roman mythology, the god Janus, for whom each year’s first month is named, was the deity of beginnings and endings. According to legend, the titan Saturn gave the two-faced god the power to see both the future and the past. Romans carved both of Janus’ two faces on gates and doorways to solemnize momentous transitions. Most notably, in the Roman Forum, the Senate erected the ritual gates called the Janus Geminus, which the Romans opened in times of conflict. At war’s outset, priests made sacrifices here to curry favor from the gods and forecast the prospects of success. No deity better symbolizes what financiers hoped to create when they founded the Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS). MERS sits as a dichotomous, enigmatic gatekeeper on the vestibule of our nation’s complex and turbulent mortgage finance industry. Financiers invoked MERS’s name at the beginning of millions of subprime and exotic mortgage loan transactions and again invoke its name as they attempt to terminate so many of these loans through foreclosure. Like Janus, MERS is two-faced: impenetrably claiming to both own mortgages and act as an agent for others who also claim ownership.” Professor Christopher Peterson, “Two Faces: Demystifying The Mortgage Electronic Registration System’s Land Title Theory”
In a stunning rejection of the earlier Beyer and James cases [severely criticized by yours truly here, here, here, here, here and [satirically] here – PCQ] holding that MERS and Big Banks may ignore the plain language of the mandatory recording law found at ORS 86.735(1), recently appointed U.S. Federal District Judge Michael H. Simon, issued a 41-page Opinion and Order (attached) that should be required reading for all lawyers and laypersons interested in the current MERS issues bouncing around in Oregon’s state and federal courts. Quoting Lake Oswego attorney Kelly Harpster’s statement to the Oregonian, Judge Simon’s ruling is “the most thorough and thoughtful analysis of the MERS issue that has yet been published ….”
The court’s written opinion, in clear, cogent and concise language, systematically dismantled the Big Banks’ arguments set out in the cookie cutter pro-MERS briefs that they uniformly file across the country whenever MERS is attacked as a sham. And MERS was not without its big guns in the recent James case. It was represented by the 900-lawyer Fullbright and Jawarski international law firm, in tandem with its local counsel, 200-lawyer Lane Powell, PC.
On the side of the angels was The Law Office of Terry Scannell, ably assisted by a host of unnamed, but heroic, consumer and foreclosure defense attorneys who freely donated their time, effort, support, and collective intelligence to this huge win. They know who they are. Congratulations all!
Procedural Background. If you’re reading this article, you are likely familiar with the ongoing debate as to whether ORS 86.735(1) requires that all assignments of a trust deed must be publically recorded in the county records before commencing a non-judicial foreclosure in Oregon. For a brief summary, go to this link.
Up until now, the score was tied at 2 and 2. The McCoy decision by Federal Bankruptcy Chief Judge Frank R. Alley III, held that if banks want to foreclose Oregonians out of their homes, they must follow the plain language of ORS 86.735(1) and record all assignments of the trust deed – from first to last. Then along came the Hooker decision by Federal District Court Judge Owen Panner, which followed much of the reasoning of Judge Alley.
On the other side of the scoreboard were the two, more recent, Federal Court decisions referenced above, Beyer and James, holding that the plain language of ORS 86.735(1) – which has remained substantially unchanged and unchallenged since its inception in 1959 – did not really mean what it said. ORS 86.735(1) provides:
“The trustee may foreclose a trust deed by advertisement and sale in the manner provided in ORS 86.740 to 86.755 if: (1) The trust deed, any assignments of the trust deed by the trustee or the beneficiary and any appointment of a successor trustee are recorded in the mortgage records in the counties in which the property described in the deed is situated***”
The Beyer opinion was written by Federal Judge Michael Mosman; the James decision was issued by a Federal Magistrate, Janice Stewart. This meant that if Mr. and Mrs. James timely objected to her ruling [known as “Findings and Recommendations” or “F&Rs” – PCQ], the assigned federal district court judge – in this case, Judge Simon – must review those F&Rs objected to, “de novo” – i.e. all over again. Judge Simon complied in spades, and revisited each major argument made by the MERS attorneys, and each major point made by Judge Mossman and Magistrate Stewart in their respective opinions.[1]
The Main Issue. Judge Simon succinctly identified it as follows:
“The primary question presented in this case is whether an entity such as MERS may be a ‘beneficiary’ under the OTDA [the Oregon Trust Deed Act – PCQ] if it is neither a lender nor a successor to a lender. If MERS can be a “beneficiary” under the OTDA in such circumstances, then any assignments of the trust deed that were not publicly recorded and made only among the members of MERS (and privately recorded only within the MERS internal database) would not preclude the availability of a non-judicial foreclosure. If, however, MERS is not a beneficiary under the OTDA, then the existence of any assignments by a trustee or beneficiary that were not publicly recorded in appropriate county files would preclude a non-judicial foreclosure.”
The reason that the definition of “beneficiary” is pivotal is because MERS has consistently argued that it has been contractually appointed as the “nominee” of the lender to act as the “beneficiary.” If true, then that designation would give MERS the ability to do things that the OTDA only permits beneficiaries to do; i.e. assign the trust deed and appoint a successor trustee. Furthermore, if permitted to act as the de jure beneficiary of record, then all of the de facto off-record assignments are irrelevant, and MERS’ “single assignment” to the foreclosing bank legally complies with ORS 86.735(1). But if MERS is wrong, it places into question the ability of any MERS member bank that has relied upon the off-record registration model, to legally conduct a non-judicial foreclosure.
From this starting point, Judge Simon methodically addressed each side’s arguments. However, in doing so, he has also written a very good primer on MERS, Oregon real estate finance law, and Oregon foreclosure law – both judicial and non-judicial. Since I could not presume to do a better job, let me just suggest to readers seeking a more complete understanding of the MERS landscape in Oregon, that they focus on pages 3 through 11 of Judge Simon’s well-written opinion, here.
There were several “take-aways” in Judge Simon’s written ruling. Discussed below are those findings I believe are particularly significant:
Finding: MERS is Not a Beneficiary Under Oregon’s Trust Deed Act. Following standard methodology in determining the Oregon Legislature’s intent, Judge Simon concluded that the definition of a “beneficiary” found in ORS 86.705(2)[2] can really only refer to the holder of the promissory note [sometimes referred in his opinion as the “noteholder” – PCQ] which the trust deed secures.[3] He based his conclusion upon a plain reading of several other provisions in the OTDA. Judge Simon went to great lengths examining these other statutes to support his reasoning that the noteholder could have been the only logical person or entity intended to be the “beneficiary.”
With regards to the earlier Beyer decision that concluded otherwise, Judge Simon simply said: “I respectfully decline to adopt the reasoning in Beyer.” Judge Mosman in the Beyer decision was so intent on concluding that MERS receive a “benefit” he gratuitously found that MERS had the right to receive borrowers’ payments under the promissory note – something that MERS itself denies. Judge Simon knew better, noting that such a result “invites a variety of incongruous applications….” [such as borrowers making their mortgage payments to MERS, etc. – PCQ][4]
Effect of Finding that MERS is not the Beneficiary. For the last few years now, MERS has argued that the Oregon Legislature’s definition of a trust deed beneficiary was never intended to require that the beneficiary and the note holder be one and the same. Judge Simon’s conclusion drives a stake through the heart of that argument. [I will put a different point on it – admittedly with less finesse than Judge Simon – MERS’ arguments that it may serve not only as the lender’s nominee, but also the lender, are not only specious, but they are an affront to anyone conversant with 5th grade-level English. [Imagine going to any standard dictionary and finding the definition of “beneficiary” to include persons having no right to receive a benefit – yet that is what MERS contends for in its legal arguments. Judge Simon rightly concluded that since MERS is – by its own admission – a mere “nominee” or “agent” of the lender – it is not “the lender.” Therefore, as a mere agent, MERS can receive no benefit under the trust deed. End of discussion….]
Not being a beneficiary means that MERS may not “act” like a beneficiary; ergo, it may not assign trust deeds and it may not appoint successor trustees to foreclose Oregon homeowners.
Finding: The Big Banks’ Single Assignment Theory is Rejected. Once MERS convinced Judge Mosman and Magistrate Stewart that it could legally act as a Beneficiary, it then argued that its member banks’ foreclosures were legally compliant with ORS 86.735(1) by the “single assignment” from MERS to the foreclosing lender.[5]
Obviously, Mr. and Mrs. James took the opposite position – i.e. that MERS was a sham designed to avoid the recording law, and that all of the successive assignments of the trust deed, from start to finish, had to be recorded before the foreclosing bank was compliant with ORS 86.735(1). Until that happened, the foreclosure was invalid.
Judge Simon sided with the James, holding that “…the noteholder, not MERS, is the beneficiary of the trust deed.” Moreover, he concluded that since the trust deed follows the note[6], “…the transfer of the note necessarily causes an assignment of the security instrument [i.e. the trust deed], even if the security instrument is not formally assigned.” [Underscore mine. – PCQ]
Judge Simon rejected Magistrate Stewart’s conclusion that these automatic assignments of the trust deed that occur by operation of law when the promissory note is transferred were “not the same act as an assignment of the trust deed by the trustee or the beneficiary contemplated by ORS 86.735(1).” Over nearly three pages of his opinion, Judge Simon meticulously dissected the case of Jackson v Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W 248 (Minn. 2009), upon which Magistrate Stewart relied. In doing so, he concluded that the Jackson case was distinguishable from the Oregon law for one basic reason – Minnesota real estate law uses mortgages[7] while Oregon law uses trust deeds[8], to securitize the promissory note:
“Under the OTDA, therefore, the trustee holds legal title to the trust deed and the beneficiary holds equitable title to the trust deed. Because MERS is neither the trustee nor the beneficiary, it holds no title at all.”
****
“ORS §86.735(1), therefore, requires the recording of assignments of both legal and equitable title, which is different from the law in Minnesota according to Jackson. Further, because the noteholder, not MERS, is the beneficiary, ORS § 86.735(1) requires the recording of an assignment of the beneficial interest for each transfer of the note.”
Effect of Rejecting the Single Assignment Argument. Simply stated, Judge Simon concluded that from the lender who actually funds the loan, to the lender who conducts the foreclosure, every time the trust deed is transferred by operation of law [i.e. because of the transfer of the promissory note – PCQ], and every time the trust deed is transferred by a formal assignment document, ORS 86.735(1) requires that each event must be recorded.[9] How the banks intend to comply is impossible to fathom. I suspect some banks, fearful of further judicial backlash, will simply start conducting judicial foreclosures, since ORS 86.735(1) does not apply to that process.
Finding: The Big Banks and MERS May not “Contract Around” the OTDA. The lending industry has used a standard form trust deed that contains express [and very self-serving – PCQ] language to the effect that the borrower voluntarily agrees that MERS may serve in its capacity as the “beneficiary,” and this should be binding. Accordingly, MERS argued that regardless of the statutory definition of a “beneficiary” in ORS 86.705(2), the parties may “contract around” that law. Judge Simon found otherwise, saying that the OTDA serves a “broad and important public purpose” and therefore it was not something that can be waived. He also noted that the entire statutory scheme in ORS Chapter 90, the Oregon Residential Landlord Tenant Act (“ORLTA”), sets de minimus standards for landlord compliance, but makes them subject to the proviso: “unless the parties agree otherwise….” [10] No such latitude is found in the OTDA, and therefore, concluded Judge Simon, it is reasonable to believe that the OTDA was not intended to be a set of laws that could be contractually waived or avoided.
Effect of Finding that MERS may not “Contract Around” ORS 86.705(2). This further places into question the entire MERS business model. It’s one thing for Judge Simon to find that MERS does not fall within the legal definition of a “beneficiary” but his ruling that the lender and borrower cannot agree otherwise, seems to seal MERS’ fate; metaphorically, MERS is no longer invited to come in through the front door, and now it can’t sneak in through the back.
[Continued below….]
[1] Sidebar Comment: Nothing is more gratifying to an amateur blogger like myself, than to have an “I told you so!” moment. I had more than one such moments while reading Judge Simon’s opinion. At various places in the opinion Judge Simon effectively dispatched several MERS’ arguments made in the earlier Beyer and James cases – arguments that I found specious at the outset. The reason for my frustration was that the MERS lawyers were able to unabashedly rely upon pure sophistry, since they did not have to contend with real lawyers on the other side – both cases were brought by pro se’ plaintiffs. I view the recent James redux as a victory for Plain English and Basic Logic. – PCQ
[2] Note: Judge Simon referred to subsection (2) of the statute found in the 2011 Oregon laws. The link I have provided cites to the 2009 edition of the same law, and the relevant language is found at subsection (1). For some reason, the publishers of Oregon Revised Statutes are able to get the printed version out faster than the online version. So much for technology….
[3] Judge Simon noted that the term “beneficiary” does not expressly refer to the one holding the “note” in order to “encompass all possible security arrangements.” Lest anyone wonder what those “arrangements” might include, the answer is that the trust deed not only secures “payment” but also “performance.” For that reason, trust deeds are used to secure a personal guaranty of the promissory note that might be given by a third party to the bank. A guarantor whose obligation is secured by the trust deed is not a “noteholder.”
[4] As pointed out in my earlier post on the Beyer decision, here, this conclusion [that MERS has the right to receive borrowers’ payments – PCQ) is simply a finding that resulted because the judge was not familiar with MERS’ business model. Remember, the Beyers were pro se’ litigants – meaning that they had no attorney. You can be sure that the MERS attorneys had no desire to correct Judge Mosman’s erroneous conclusion. They were happy with the win, even though it was based upon a misunderstanding of what MERS purports to do.
[5] If the original loan did not name MERS as the Beneficiary, then presumably that assignment, i.e. the one to MERS in the first place, would also have to be recorded prior to commencement of the foreclosure as well. Thus there would have to be two assignments, one to MERS and the last from MERS – PCQ
[6] This well established Oregon law has been memorialized in a famous poem by an unknown author. It can be found here.
[7] A 2-party instrument, mortgagor (borrower) and mortgagee (lender). Upon default of the promissory note, the mortgagee-lender has the power of foreclose.
[8] A 3-party instrument, grantor (borrower), beneficiary (lender) and a trustee who retains the power to sell the property upon default of the note.
[9] Query: How does one “record” on the public record an event that only occurred by operation of law? Recording assumes that a tangible document has been prepared and signed by one or both parties before a notary public.
[10] While Judge Simon’s observation is a good one, the ORLTA is much more restrictive than this language suggests. That is, notwithstanding the clause, “unless the parties agree otherwise,” ORLTA contains some very stringent language at the commencement of Chapter 90, to wit: ORS 90.130 imposes an obligation of good faith as a “condition precedent to the exercise of a right or remedy under this chapter.” ORS 90.150 permits a court to unilaterally refuse to enforce any provision of the rental agreement that it concludes was “unconscionable when made.” The initial reason for the disparity in statutory protection between ORLTA and the OTDA may have been a fundamental one: Consumer advocates initially believed that tenants needed more protection from landlords than borrowers from banks. Today, I submit that is not the case. Most landlords understand, respect, and actually strive to follow the law. The same cannot be said of Big Banks.
From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Thursday, March 08, 2012 11:50 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: bac v awl ex parte Read this one.
Countrywide v. America’s Wholesale Lender, Inc.
Infringement lawsuit. Note, Steve Vondran is representing AWL, Inc.
This could get “interesting”…
Charles
Charles Wayne Cox – Oregon State Director for the National Homeowners Cooperative
Email: mailto:Charles
Websites: http://www.NHCwest.com; www.BayLiving.com; and www.ForensicLoanAnalyst.com
1969 Camellia Ave.
Medford, OR 97504-5403
(541) 727-2240 direct
(541) 610-1931 eFax

Defending or Litigating Foreclosure?
Click Here For More Information
Paralegal; CA Licensed Real Estate Broker; Certified Forensic Loan Analyst. Litigation Support; Mortgage and Real Estate Expert Witness Services.
gov.uscourts.cacd.524165.11.0.pdf
gov.uscourts.cacd.524165.10.0.pdf
gov.uscourts.ctd.94549.32.0.pdf
From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Thursday, March 08, 2012 11:50 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: Wells Fargo LOSES at Seventh Circuit Appellate …. Excoriating opinion regarding a HAMP Class Action. AND a Judicial Request for a Federal Amicus Curiae
<excerpts>
HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. We are asked in this appeal
to determine whether Lori Wigod has stated claims
under Illinois law against her home mortgage servicer
for refusing to modify her loan pursuant to the federal
Home Affordable Mortgage Program (HAMP).
—
She brought this putative class action alleging violations
of Illinois law under common-law contract and tort
theories and under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices Act (ICFA). The district
court dismissed the complaint in its entirety under
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
—
This appeal followed, and it presents two sets of issues.
The first set of issues concerns whether Wigod
has stated viable claims under Illinois common law and
the ICFA. We conclude that she has on four counts …
—
These allegations support garden-variety
claims for breach of contract or promissory estoppel.
She has also plausibly alleged that Wells Fargo com-
mitted fraud under Illinois common law and engaged in
unfair or deceptive business practices in violation of the
ICFA.
—
The second set of issues concerns whether these
state-law claims are preempted or otherwise barred by
federal law. We hold that they are not.
—
We accordingly reverse the judgment of
the district court on the contract, promissory estoppel,
fraudulent misrepresentation, and ICFA claims …
—
IV. Conclusion
The judgment of the district court is therefore
REVERSED as to Counts I, II, and VII, and the
fraudulent misrepresentation claim of Count V …
—
RIPPLE, Circuit Judge, concurring. I am very pleased
to join the excellent opinion of the court written by
Judge Hamilton. I write separately only to note that, in
my view, our task of adjudicating this matter would
have been assisted significantly if the United States had
entered this case as an amicus curiae.
—
In this case, this last consideration justifies the
decision to proceed without further delay. Prompt resolution
of this matter is necessary not only for the good
of the litigants but for the good of the Country.
From: Marc Tow [mailto:marctow2000@yahoo.com]
Sent: Friday, March 09, 2012 7:38 AM
To: Tim McCandless; tim mccandless
Subject: election news
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/bank-america-announces-agreements-principle-204700717.html
Marc R. Tow
Email: marctow2000
Skype: Marc.Tow
9393 W. 110th Street, Suite 500
Overland Park, Kansas 66210
From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Friday, March 09, 2012 6:30 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: REMIC tax concerns surrounding foreclosures
REMIC tax concerns surrounding foreclosures
· Alston & Bird LLP
· John Baron and Robert J. Sullivan
· USA
·
· March 6 2012
A Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit (REMIC) is an entity employed to securitize loans secured by real property and that has been granted tax-favored status. In the current economic environment, due to the fact that they hold primarily commercial or residential mortgages, REMICs are commonly faced with workouts of troubled loans. The tax rules1 that apply to REMICs place restrictions on the activities of a REMIC and the assets a REMIC can hold without risking its tax-favored status. These rules apply to performing and nonperforming loans alike, and therefore restrict when, how and what a REMIC can hold when it forecloses on a loan. The tax rules relating to foreclosure property held by a REMIC are intended to prevent a REMIC from engaging in activities that are the equivalent of operating a business.
What Property Can a REMIC Hold upon Foreclosure?
In order to maintain its preferred tax status, a trust formed as a REMIC is permitted to hold only “qualified mortgages” and “permitted investments.” The tax rules define the term “permitted investments” to include “foreclosure property” as that concept is set forth in the rules applicable to Real Estate Investment Trusts. Generally speaking, foreclosure property is any real property (including interests in real property), as well as personal property incident to such real property, that is acquired by the REMIC via a foreclosure as a result of a default on the loan that such property secured. The REMIC can acquire the property through foreclosure or a similar process, such as the acceptance of a deed in lieu of foreclosure. Foreclosure property would include real property and personal property incident to such real property, but would not include equity interests in an entity that owns such real or personal property. A REMIC cannot, therefore, foreclose on a pledge of equity in an entity.
If a REMIC holds more than a de minimis amount of nonpermitted assets (such as property that does not qualify as foreclosure property), its tax-favored status as a REMIC is terminated. If the REMIC holds only a de minimis amount of nonpermitted assets (less than 1 percent of the aggregate tax basis of all of the REMIC’s assets), the REMIC will not lose its status as a REMIC, but will still be subject to a 100 percent tax on any net income attributable to such nonpermitted assets. If, when the loan was transferred to the REMIC, the REMIC or its agents knew the loan was troubled and would likely result in a foreclosure, it cannot foreclose on the collateral and hold the property without paying the 100 percent tax.
How Long Can a REMIC Hold Foreclosure Property?
Importantly, foreclosure property can only be held by the REMIC until the end of the third taxable year following the taxable year in which the trust acquired the property, unless an extension is granted by the IRS. An extension will only be available if the REMIC can prove to the IRS that it is necessary for the orderly liquidation of the REMIC’s interest in the foreclosure property.
What Limitations Are Placed on a REMIC in Owning Foreclosure Property?
A REMIC will be subject to a 100 percent tax if it engages in certain prohibited activities with respect to foreclosure property. These prohibited activities include:
In order to avoid violating the prohibition against operating the property in a trade or business, the REMIC must employ the services of an independent contractor to manage the property after the initial 90-day grace period. Such manager must be truly independent and cannot exceed certain ownership levels in the REMIC.
If a REMIC engages in one of the prohibited activities with regard to the foreclosure property, it will be subject to a 100 percent tax on the income it receives from the foreclosure property, as well as any gain on the disposition of the property.
What Income from Foreclosure Property Is Taxable?
While the benefit of REMIC status is that it is not generally taxed on its income, there is an exception for “net income from foreclosure property.” To the extent a REMIC receives net income from foreclosure property, it will be taxed on such income at the highest corporate tax rates. Generally, the type of income on which a REMIC would be taxed is income from foreclosure property that does not qualify as “rents from real property.”
So long as income from foreclosure property qualifies as rents from real property, such income will not be taxed. Rental income does not qualify as rents from real property, and therefore will be subject to the tax on net income from foreclosure property, if (i) the amount of the rent is tied to the amount of income generated by such property, (ii) the rent is received from a party related to the REMIC, or (iii) the REMIC provides services to the lessee of the property that are not customary for the rental of real property. Services provided to tenants are considered customarily rendered in connection with the rental of real property based on comparisons to buildings of a similar class in the same geographic market. For example, providing utilities, general maintenance, parking facilities, swimming pool maintenance and security services will be considered customarily rendered if those services are provided to tenants of buildings of a similar class in the same geographic market. Further, such services must be provided by an independent contractor.
Assets such as shopping centers and office buildings typically generate income that qualifies as rents from real property because the services provided to tenants of such properties, such as utilities, general maintenance and janitorial services, are customarily provided in connection with the rental of real property. Such services, however, must be provided by an independent contractor.
Certain types of assets, such as a hotel or nursing home, typically produce income that is taxable. These types of assets commonly generate income that cannot be characterized as charges for services customarily rendered in connection with the rental of real property, such as a dry cleaning service offered by a hotel or a hair salon operated in a nursing home. Gross income from such assets is first reduced by any deductions or expenses directly connected to such gross income before the amount of tax is determined. The REMIC can, therefore, deduct from its gross taxable income items such as interest, depreciation and management fees associated with the property.
If an asset will generate taxable income, the REMIC may choose to enter into a master lease of the property. If a master lease structure is employed, the master tenant will operate the property and receive all income, and pay only a set amount of rent to the REMIC that is the landlord under the master lease, thereby preventing the REMIC from receiving any taxable income. In this situation, while the REMIC may escape the burden of paying tax on net income from foreclosure property, the master tenant will not likely be willing to pay as much rent as a tenant under a standard lease due to the increased responsibility and risk involved in operating the property itself.
Considerations for Servicers
The time periods in which property can be held, the type of collateral for a loan (real property vs. equity in an entity owning the real property) and the limited activities relating to the property in which the REMIC can engage while it holds the property are relevant factors to consider in its long-term approach to the workout of a troubled asset. A key decision for a servicer that has decided to foreclose is whether to operate the property through an independent contractor or to enter into a master lease of the property. If an independent contractor is engaged to operate the property and the property generates income other than rents from real property, such income will be taxable (less certain deductions as discussed above). While a master lease structure prevents the REMIC from receiving such taxable income, the REMIC will also receive less rent from a master tenant than it would a tenant under a standard lease.
From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Friday, March 09, 2012 6:30 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: Nevada Supreme Court continues the trend of upholding the legitimacy of MERS
· Dykema Gossett PLLC
· Alexandra J. Wolfe , Thomas M. Schehr and Jeffrey E. Jamison
· USA
·
· March 2 2012
·
In two separate cases the Nevada Supreme Court has upheld the validity of a mortgage assignment from MERS and rejected borrowers arguments that use of MERS somehow invalidates a foreclosure. In both Davis v. US Bank, Nat. Ass’n, No. 56306, and Volkes v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, No. 57304, the Court rejected the contention that a MERS-generated assignment is insufficient to establish the ownership of a loan. The appellants argued that the assignment was invalid solely because it was generated by MERS and that MERS is a sham or fraud entity. The Court specifically rejected this argument, citing numerous opinions from courts in Nevada and across that nation that have recognized MERS as having a legitimate business purpose.
From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Friday, March 09, 2012 6:30 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: Circuit holds TILA bars rescission suits filed more than 3 years after consummation
Circuit holds TILA bars rescission suits filed more than 3 years after consummation
· Bryan Cave LLP
· James Goldberg and Leena Rege
· USA
·
· March 6 2012
·
In McOmie-Gray v. Bank of America (9th Cir. Feb. 8, 2012), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that under the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. Section 1601 et seq., “rescission suits must be brought within three years from consummation of the loan, regardless whether notice of rescission is delivered within that three-year period”. It ruled that the three year period for rescission in Section 1635(f) is an absolute limitation on rescission actions and that the one year period for bringing claims under Section 1640(e) applies only to damages actions and does not extend the time to file a claim for rescission even where the borrower has sent the Bank a written notice of rescission within three years of loan signing or “consummation”. It also held that an agreement to toll the time to file a rescission action is ineffective, because Section 1635(f) is a statute of repose.
In McOmie-Gray, the borrower obtained a loan in April 2006. She sent a notice of rescission to the bank in January 2008, well within the three-year period provided in § 1635(f), claiming that the copies of the statutory Notice of Right to Cancel which she had received did not identify the exact date that her right to cancel would expire. The Bank denied her request because it had a completed copy of a Notice of Right to Cancel in its files, but at some point in time agreed to toll her time to file a lawsuit. The borrower filed suit in August 2009, outside the three-year period provided by § 1635(f). The district court granted the Bank’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that every TILA rescission claim is subject to the three-year period in 15 U.S.C. Section 1635(f) and that the period constitutes a statute of repose which cannot be tolled. The borrower opposed the motion on the grounds that sending a notice of intent to rescind the loan within the three years following loan signing satisfied § 1635(f) and automatically effectuated rescission, that the Bank then had twenty days to accept and comply with the demand under § 1635(b), and that under § 1640(e) the borrower had one year thereafter to file an action for rescission.
Prior decisions in the Ninth Circuit had left open the question of whether a rescission claim was barred if the borrower had given notice of rescission, but not filed suit, within the three-year period.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision affirms the district court’s dismissal. It relies in part on the Supreme Court’s decision in Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410 (1998). Beach addressed whether mortgagors, who never sent a notice of rescission to the lender, could nonetheless raise the right of rescission as “an affirmative defense in a collection action brought more than three years after the consummation of the transaction.” Id. at 411-12. Beach held that TILA “permits no federal right to rescind, defensively or otherwise, after the 3-year period of §1635(f) has run”. Id at 419.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision may be persuasive precedent in other Federal Circuits because of its reliance on Beach. It is authored by Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation, who had previously issued two opinions suggesting that if the borrower had mailed a rescission notice within three years, a rescission suit filed after three years would be timely.
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by Cora Currier ProPublica, Feb. 24, 2012, 4:39 p.m.
A class-action lawsuit in Florida that moved forward this week highlights a little-appreciated aspect of the housing market 2014 the cozy relationship between banks and insurance companies that often results in overpriced home insurance for already struggling borrowers.
As American Banker reported, a federal judge in Miami on Tuesday opened the door to a class action against Wells Fargo. More than 20,000 Florida homeowners can now sue Wells Fargo and an insurance company, QBE, for allegedly overcharging for insurance. More than $50 million in insurance premiums are at issue, according to American Banker.
The suit itself, filed last year, is sealed, but the judge, Robert Scola, laid out the allegations against Wells Fargo. The judge didn’t rule on the case but allowed it to go forward as a class action. In his decision, the judge cited the plaintiffs’ claims that Wells Fargo and QBE “colluded in a scheme to artificially inflate the premiums charged to homeowners.”
The judge also said Wells Fargo has actually threatened to retaliate against homeowners who join the suit.
A spokesman for Wells Fargo said in an emailed statement that “the judge’s recent ruling only addresses the certification of the class in this case and not any of the underlying claims. We disagree with a number of the representations made by the plaintiffs’ attorneys.”
The bank also disputed the judge’s claim that it threatened retaliation for the suit, saying “we made our argument in a purely procedural context in connection with the class certification motion. Wells Fargo has no intention of taking the actions referenced with regard to our customers.”
QBE did not respond to our requests for comment.
The case sheds light on the world of force-placed insurance, an industry that has grown in the years since the housing crisis. Among all the suits and scandals related to the crisis, troubles with force-placed insurance have flown largely under the radar. Here’s some background on the lawsuit and why there might be more of suits to come.
What force-placed insurance is and why it’s controversial
Force-placed insurance is just what it sounds like 2014 insurance you are forced to buy.
This insurance is meant to protect mortgage lenders against damage to homes. If the homeowner doesn’t have insurance on a house, or has let it lapse, most mortgage contracts allow the lender to buy the insurance and pass on the cost to the borrower.
Some homeowners, though, have complained of sudden and excessive penalties, as well as policies that seem to be added unnecessarily 2014 and sometimes retroactively 2014 to their bills. What’s more, the cost of force-placed insurance can be 10 times that of a regular policy, adding to the homeowner’s burden and increasing the chance of default, which is bad for both homeowners and investors in the mortgage market.
Lenders, of course, need to make sure that the asset behind a loan is safe. Force-placed insurance is expensive, the industry argues, because it is high-risk 2014 if you’re the kind of homeowner who doesn’t have any insurance on your property, you’re probably also likelier to default. And because force-placed insurance often replaces lapsed insurance, insurers take on more risk because it has to happen quickly.
But as American Banker started reporting in 2010, problems can arise when banks also make big money off these insurance policies. Bank of America, until recently, owned the company that provided its force-placed insurance. Other banks, including Wells Fargo, contract with insurance companies and get a commission from the policies placed on homes underlying their mortgages.
In some cases, American Banker reported, an insurance company appears to be paying a bank to do nothing except pass along customers. The bank, in turn, has an incentive to force insurance onto its borrowers.
The charges against Wells Fargo
The suit alleges that Wells Fargo and insurer QBE inflated the costs of force-placed insurance policies and that QBE paid commissions to Wells Fargo 2014 commissions the plaintiffs say amounted to kickbacks.
In his approval of the class-action suit, the judge summarized the plaintiffs’ allegations:
American Banker reported that internal Wells Fargo email messages seem to show that some bank employees were uncomfortable with QBE’s high premiums. In court proceedings, Wells Fargo said the pricey policies were justified because of Florida’s vulnerability to hurricanes.
Wells Fargo also argued that borrowers could have avoided the need for force-placed insurance and thus shouldn’t be able to complain about the expensive premiums.
To that, U.S. District Court Judge Scola responded: “That’s like a defense for usury 2026 you are going to have a defense that they live a bad lifestyle which leads them to be more in a position to be taken advantage of …? That makes no sense.”
The case materials were originally public before Wells Fargo got them sealed, citing business confidentiality concerns. American Banker’s review of the case is based on materials that it reviewed before the case was sealed, while the rest is gleaned from Scola’s opinion on the class-action designation.
Fighting a class-action suit
Wells Fargo and QBE didn’t want a class-action designation because they said individual borrowers’ claims would vary too much, an argument that didn’t win over the court.
The judge also wrote that Wells Fargo actually threatened to escalate foreclosure proceedings against homeowners who joined the class-action suit. The bank’s arguments against the class action, he said, “unabashedly set out its threats to retaliate against any homeowner seeking to avoid the alleged excessive and inflated force-placed insurance premiums through this litigation.”
The judge based his conclusion on certain types of borrowers that Wells wanted excluded from a class action, including those who were in default. Scola claimed that for people in default on their mortgages:
Wells Fargo, as we mentioned above, denies that it planned to take these actions.
Not the only ones
It’s not just Wells Fargo that could face litigation. The plaintiffs’ attorneys have said they plan to file similar suits beyond Florida. The New York State Department of Financial Services subpoenaed 31 banks in October, including Wells Fargo, to look into what a spokesman called the “sometimes problematic overlap between banking and insurance.”
Last summer, a class-action suit in Minneapolis won more than $9 million from Chase Home Finance for 40,000 homeowners who claimed Chase forced them to buy unnecessary flood insurance.
There may be new regulations in the works clamping down on force-placed insurance, but so far nothing has been implemented.
In an op-ed published earlier this month, Richard Cordray, director of the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, promised “new consumer protections” that would require banks to allow borrowers to purchase their own insurance. This month’s big mortgage settlement, to which Wells Fargo is a party, also promises restrictions and regulations to reduce premiums and force banks to communicate more clearly with homeowners. But it is unclear exactly how the deal’s rules will be enforced or how they fit into the CFPB’s promised regulations. The CFPB did not immediately respond to our requests for comment.
From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Thursday, March 01, 2012 1:30 PM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: Mortgage Settlement or Mortgage Shakedown?
WSJ article by David Skeel attached. Comments of note:
“The biggest loser is the rule of law.”
Government plaintiffs allege the “banks” “robo-signed” by executives who never checked document details; also “added unnecessary fees such as overpriced insurance.”
Realize, this is NOT related to litigation but rather amounts to LEGISLATION essentially ruling out the “chief objectives of the judicial process [which] are in fact finding and redress.”
As indicated in the article and I agree, the AGs have NOT done any meaningful investigations into these issues. Phil Ting in San Francisco; Jeff Thigpen in North Carolina and John O’Brien as “merely” registrars of deeds found out more on their own than 49 State Attorneys General did in 18 months of supposed investigation and still don’t seem to not know the difference between a servicer and real party in interest.
This whole settlement appears to be yet another entitlement and “stimulus” without having to go to Congress with little money going to homeowners and large sums potentially going to the States themselves. A question seldom asked…where is the money coming from?
I still contend it is a buy-your-way-out-of-jail-free card.
Charles
Charles Wayne Cox – Oregon State Director for the National Homeowners Cooperative
Email: mailto:Charles
Websites: http://www.NHCwest.com; www.BayLiving.com; and www.ForensicLoanAnalyst.com
1969 Camellia Ave.
Medford, OR 97504-5403
(541) 727-2240 direct
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From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Friday, March 02, 2012 4:35 PM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: Bank of America is a "raging hurricane of theft and fraud" – And The Countrywide Double Stamp Shows the Problem with Robo Endorsements
http://fthebanks.org/matt-taibbi-on-bank-of-america/ Bank of America is a “raging hurricane of theft and fraud” (yeah, so what else is new!)
Countrywide Double Stamp – Matt Weidner
BOMBSHELL, THE COUNTRYWIDE DOUBLE STAMP SHOWS THE PROBLEM WITH ROBO ENDORSEMENTS!
March 1st, 2012 |
Author: Matthew D. Weidner, Esq.
Another in the continuing series on how a Thief Can Steal Your Home.
All across this country, the garbage Countrywide loans are being foreclosed on and Americans thrown into the street, many times based on nothing more than a simple endorsement. To be valid an endorsement must actually be authorized and valid. But far too often, the signatures and purported endorsements are not even challenged…
AND IMPORTANTLY, THE BANKS ARE ARGUING THAT THEY NO PARTY HAS A RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE VALIDITY OF ENDORSEMENTS!
The argument presented by the banks is that the endorsements do not matter, and that no one can challenge these signatures. By extension, this argument suggests that not even judges could question signatures when presented with obvious forgeries.
The alleged endorsements were highlighted to me by my friend David at Case Clarity
Look closely, it looks like two endorsements, two signatures, correct? Well, no, they’re not actually signatures at all….the “signatures” are just ink stamps. But that’s not what’s most interesting.
At first blush it looks like two separate stamps, but when you compare this stamp to many of the other stamps, they “both” line up perfectly and exactly. Which suggests that the figure above is really made by one singular stamp made to look like two stamps. Now did Meder stamp this? Did Sjolander stamp this? And if neither stamped it, did either stamp it?
Oh, but right, we’re not even allowed to make such inquiry correct?
From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Wednesday, February 29, 2012 2:43 PM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: FW: Attorney General Kamala D. Harris Joins Legislative Leaders to Unveil California Homeowner Bill of Rights
Isn’t there ANYONE that can educate these people before they draft this junk! They have no idea what a “CREDITOR” is and continue to cater to the whims of servicers! Speaking of “servicers”…a $25 fee to record a notice of default? Now THAT’S punitive!!!! [NOT!!!] AND since when was the statute of limitations for Fraud reduced from 4 to 1 years requiring an extension; let me see…new legislation giving 90 days’ notice before commencing eviction proceedings (whatever the hell that’s supposed to mean) when there’s already Federal legislation doing what they’re purporting to legislate; $10k CIVIL penalty for robosiging…I guess forgery and recording fraud (both felonies) aren’t worthy of prosecuting (and the fines involved) so they’ll make it a simple civil penalty now?…on and on…ignorance…massive, abject ignorance!!! Never ceases to amaze…
C
A recent study of San Francisco home foreclosures found widespread irregularities in almost all the home seizures scrutinized. The report, commissioned by San Francisco Assessor-Recorder Phil Ting, was prepared by Aequitas Compliance Solutions Inc. of Newport Beach.
Company partner Lou Pizante conducted the study. He explained its findings …
Us: What did your report show?
Lou: We reviewed about 16% of all foreclosure sales that occurred in San Francisco from 2009 through 2011. The audit shows that 99% of the sampled foreclosures contain at least one irregularity and 84% appear to contain one or more clear violations of law.
Us: What were the key problems identified in your report?
Lou: We looked at six general subject areas, including assignments (which relate to chain of title), notices of default and trustee sale and suspicious activity (like robo-signing). The report, which you can download from the Aequitas website, explains these things in laymen terms. Within each subject area, we looked at a variety of issues.
Two-thirds of the loans had four or more exceptions and more three-quarters of the loans had violations across three or more of the six subject areas. In other words, this was not a case of most of the loans having one irregularity. Most of the loans had many irregularities across different stages of the foreclosure process.
We also compared the MERS database to public records. MERS was created by the mortgage industry as, essentially, an alternative to the public land records system. It is an electronic registry for tracking ownership interests and servicing of mortgage loans. We found that in 58% of the cases the beneficial owner of loan as entered on the trustee’s deed upon sale conflicted with the owner of the loan according to the MERS database.
Us: Weren’t most of these homeowners likely to lose their homes to foreclosure anyway? Why does this matter?
Lou: That’s a very good point. Many of these homeowners simply overextended themselves and the resulting foreclosure sales were inevitable. So, what’s there to really care about?
What’s at issue here is compliance with California’s laws relating to non-judicial foreclosure. These are statutory requirements that, in many respects, are rather technical. Why, then, should inadvertent violations provide windfall remedies to reckless borrowers?
First, its important to understand foreclosure in California. Lenders in California rely almost exclusively on the non-judicial foreclosure process, also called statutory foreclosure. This is an expedited process where homes are sold without court approval. Therefore, there is frequently little, if any oversight. Because of this, courts have generally required strict compliance with statutory requirements affording borrower’s due process.
Now, there is plenty of public evidence showing that not all distressed borrowers are reckless deadbeats. We know that some borrowers did not receive fair and accurate disclosures, as required by federal law, explaining the payment and other material terms of their mortgage. Furthermore, the report reveals that a lot of lender’s foreclosing on homeowners don’t appear to own the underlying loans. The fact that homeowners borrowed something, on some terms, from someone should not be enough to rob them of their due process right.
To say most of these borrowers are deadbeats and can be denied their due process rights seems pretty lousy to me. It’s like saying that there might be a falsely accused guy on death row, but—hey—he probably killed someone.
But look, the purpose of this report is not to indict the mortgage industry or bailout borrowers. What’s at stake here is more than merely fairness and homeowner’s due process. Foreclosures impact not only homeowners but also entire communities, housing markets and mortgage-backed securities holders like pension plans. The integrity of California’s record title system is also at stake because the validity of title for subsequent purchasers is dependent on those that precede it.
So addressing this problem is critical to the recovery of the housing market and national economy, and that’s something that everyone has an interest in no matter their political leanings.
Us: Are these problems confined to San Francisco, or do you think the same problems are occurred throughout California?
Lou: The study focused exclusively on San Francisco. However, we are now working with other counties in California requesting similar studies.
My understanding is that lender and servicers practices are essentially the same in San Francisco as elsewhere in the state. And, of course, the same laws apply. So, we’d except to see similar irregularities in other counties, including those hit harder by foreclosures.
Us: How widespread do you think the foreclosure irregularities are in Orange County?
Lou: I cannot speculate as to whether the problems are the same or different. The foreclosing parties are generally the same cast of players and the laws the same, so you’d expect a strong correlation.
Us: What led to such a high rate of irregularities and illegalities in foreclosures?
Lou: It goes back to the origination boom, which was fueled by low interest rates and lubricated by an insatiable securitization market. Lenders’ operational infrastructure couldn’t keep pace with record fundings, and so you had lots of missing and incomplete documentation.
These loans were sold and resold and ultimately packaged into securities. Along the way, the necessary paperwork documenting these loan sales fell through the cracks and, once the market turned, a lot of the sellers of these loans disappeared.
Servicing is a business of razor-thin margins, and these folks had a tough time dealing with record volumes of new and exotic products that didn’t play nice with their systems.
When the party got broken up, the servicers were left to clean up a big mess. Ultimately, all this stuff above made it infeasible to carry out large-scale foreclosures.
That’s why you hear all this stuff about forged or back-dated documents and robo-signing. There are gaps in title that need to be filled. This is also why this is such a big mess to fix. You might have bought a loan but you never got a receipt and now the seller is dead and buried. Its difficult to imagine how the industry can cost-effectively solve these problems ex post facto.
Us: What’s the key lesson? Are the foreclosure laws antiquated?
Lou: Yeah, that’s it. If there is one lesson to take away from this report it is that, with so many homes being foreclosed and with so little oversight, California’s foreclosure process appears utterly broken.
Remember, these laws are more than 100 years old. The non-judicial foreclosure process was created long before things such as the secondary market and mortgage brokers existed. Back then, you rode your horse to meet with the banker, who you knew on a first name basis… sort of like It’s a Wonderful Life.
Surely the mortgage industry has much work to do in order to correct the weaknesses and deficiencies in its foreclosure practices. But to prevent this from happening again, change needs to come from the legislature. The mortgage industry has since seen remarkable innovation over the past few decades. Considering the extent and consequence of the issues, perhaps it is time for the legislature to be similarly innovative.
Us: How do you think the laws should be changed to catch up with the complex world of mortgage securitization?
Lou: As is often the case, it’s much easier to identify the problem than the solution. I have a lot of thought on this but, quite frankly, they require much explaining and go into some pretty arcane and mundane stuff.
Basically, ensuring clear chains of title and the integrity of California’s record title system are essential to the recovery and stabilization of the state’s housing market. So we need laws and systems in place that achieve these objectives without increasing overall costs to mortgage lenders and society generally.
Smart people will disagree on the best approach. But we should all agree that the status quo is unacceptable.
Learn more about Aequitas HERE!
Read more …
in RE: Macklin: Deutsche Must Answer Wrongful Foreclosure and Quiet Title
By Daniel Edstrom
DTC Systems, Inc.
Excerpts on Wrongful Foreclosure (changed by the Judge Sargis to Breach of Contract)
… a record has been created that someone not of record title purported to take action on a Deed of Trust prior to compliance with Civil Code 2932.5.
The court will not sanction conduct by this Defendant which puts into question the validity of the nonjudicial foreclosure process and California real property records. Though this issue could have been simply addressed by the recording of a new notice of default months ago, the ninety days under the new notice of default allowed to run and this creditor be on the door step of conducting a nonjudicial foreclosure sale consistent with the California statutes, it has elected to continue with the existing notice of default, subsequent substitution of trustee, and sale.
The contract between the parties is the Note and Deed of Trust.
Excerpt on Quiet Title
Though not artfully done, Macklin sufficiently explains that he asserts superior title to the Property over the Trustee’s Deed through which DBNTC asserts its interest in the Property. Given that Macklin has asserted that DBNTC cannot show that it complied with the minimal requirements for properly conducting a nonjudicial foreclosure sale, the motion to dismiss the Tenth Cause of Action is denied.
Download order here: http://dtc-systems.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Macklin-222-Order.pdf
Download memorandum opinion and decision (part 1) here: http://dtc-systems.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Macklin-221-Memorandum_Opinion_and_Decision_Part1.pdf
Download memorandum opinion and decision (part 2) here: http://dtc-systems.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Macklin-221-Memorandum_Opinion_and_Decision_Part2.pdf
Tagged with: breach of contract • California real property records • Civil Code 2932.5 • Daniel Edstrom • DBNTC • Deed of Trust • Deutsche • DTC-Systems • in RE: Macklin • Judge Sargis • nonjudicial foreclosure process • note • Trustee’s Deed • Wrongul Foreclosure
From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Saturday, February 18, 2012 6:55 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: The Banking Crisis Represents Systematic Destruction of "Our" Legal System
The Banking Crisis Represents The Destruction of “Our” Legal System
February 18th, 2012 | Author: Matthew D. Weidner, Esq.
From New Deal 2.0, an essay by Bruce Johnson (see below):
Banks are demonstrating that if you have enough money and influence, you’re not expected to follow the same laws as everyone else.
For several years, I have been writing that extreme economic inequality is among the most destructive forces in a society. As inequality grows, it undermines the effective functioning of the economy, the basic tenets of capitalism, and the foundations of democracy.
Unfortunately, the housing crisis and now the housing settlement increasingly look like an example of how these mechanisms work.
One of the central characteristics of highly unequal societies is that two sets of laws develop: One set for the rich and powerful and one set for everyone else. The more unequal societies become, the more easily they accept the unacceptable, and with each unrebuked violation, the powerful actors at the top of the society gain an ever greater sense of entitlement and an ever greater sense that the laws that govern everyone else don’t apply to them. As a result, their behavior becomes increasingly egregious.
I would suggest that the robo-mortgage scandal is a strong indicator that this type of unequal justice is now becoming ever more commonplace in America. Past bank abuses are typically discussed without a sense of outrage. They have, in effect, become a recognized practice of deception with no consequences. Here are three prominent examples from the past few years:
First, the robo-mortgage scandal was discovered. As powerful members of society, the banks effectively decided what laws they wanted to follow and disregarded others. The banks claimed that their violations were technical and harmed no one. Nonetheless, the activities of the banks constituted massive fraud, perjury, and conspiracy. Bank officials have testified in court that they filed as many as 10,000 false affidavits a month. These are effectively undeniable admissions of law-breaking on a massive scale.
It’s a federal crime, punishable by up of five years of imprisonment, to knowingly file a false affidavit with the court. From the perspective of the law, you are guilty of the same perjury when you falsely testify in court or when you submit a false affidavit. In most states, filing false affidavits with the court similarly constitutes a felony offense of perjury.
An audit by San Francisco county officials of about 400 recent foreclosures there determined that almost all involved either legal violations or suspicious documentation, according to a report released Wednesday.

Phil Ting, the San Francisco assessor-recorder, found widespread violations or irregularities in files of properties subject to foreclosure sales.
Readers shared their thoughts on this article.
Anecdotal evidence indicating foreclosure abuse has been plentiful since the mortgage boom turned to bust in 2008. But the detailed and comprehensive nature of the San Francisco findings suggest how pervasive foreclosure irregularities may be across the nation.
The improprieties range from the basic — a failure to warn borrowers that they were in default on their loans as required by law — to the arcane. For example, transfers of many loans in the foreclosure files were made by entities that had no right to assign them and institutions took back properties in auctions even though they had not proved ownership.
Commissioned by Phil Ting, the San Francisco assessor-recorder, the report examined files of properties subject to foreclosure sales in the county from January 2009 to November 2011. About 84 percent of the files contained what appear to be clear violations of law, it said, and fully two-thirds had at least four violations or irregularities.
Kathleen Engel, a professor at Suffolk University Law School in Boston said: “If there were any lingering doubts about whether the problems with loan documents in foreclosures were isolated, this study puts the question to rest.”
The report comes just days after the $26 billion settlement over foreclosure improprieties between five major banks and 49 state attorneys general, including California’s. Among other things, that settlement requires participating banks to reduce mortgage amounts outstanding on a wide array of loans and provide $1.5 billion in reparations for borrowers who were improperly removed from their homes.
But the precise terms of the states’ deal have not yet been disclosed. As the San Francisco analysis points out, “the settlement does not resolve most of the issues this report identifies nor immunizes lenders and servicers from a host of potential liabilities.” For example, it is a felony to knowingly file false documents with any public office in California.
In an interview late Tuesday, Mr. Ting said he would forward his findings and foreclosure files to the attorney general’s office and to local law enforcement officials. Kamala D. Harris, the California attorney general, announced a joint investigation into foreclosure abuses last December with the Nevada attorney general, Catherine Cortez Masto. The joint investigation spans both civil and criminal matters.
The depth of the problem raises questions about whether at least some foreclosures should be considered void, Mr. Ting said. “We’re not saying that every consumer should not have been foreclosed on or every lender is a bad actor, but there are significant and troubling issues,” he said.
California has been among the states hurt the most by the mortgage crisis. Because its laws, like those of 29 other states, do not require a judge to oversee foreclosures, the conduct of banks in the process is rarely scrutinized. Mr. Ting said his report was the first rigorous analysis of foreclosure improprieties in California and that it cast doubt on the validity of almost every foreclosure it examined.
“Clearly, we need to set up a process where lenders are following every part of the law,” Mr. Ting said in the interview. “It is very apparent that the system is broken from many different vantage points.”
The report, which was compiled by Aequitas Compliance Solutions, a mortgage regulatory compliance firm, did not identify specific banks involved in the irregularities. But among the legal violations uncovered in the analysis were cases where the loan servicer did not provide borrowers with a notice of default before beginning the eviction process; 8 percent of the audited foreclosures had that basic defect.
In a significant number of cases — 85 percent — documents recording the transfer of a defaulted property to a new trustee were not filed properly or on time, the report found. And in 45 percent of the foreclosures, properties were sold at auction to entities improperly claiming to be the beneficiary of the deeds of trust. In other words, the report said, “a ‘stranger’ to the deed of trust,” gained ownership of the property; as a result, the sale may be invalid, it said.
In 6 percent of cases, the same deed of trust to a property was assigned to two or more different entities, raising questions about which of them actually had the right to foreclose. Many of the foreclosures that were scrutinized showed gaps in the chain of title, the report said, indicating that written transfers from the original owner to the entity currently claiming to own the deed of trust have disappeared.
Banks involved in buying and selling foreclosed properties appear to be aware of potential problems if gaps in the chain of title cloud a subsequent buyer’s ownership of the home. Lou Pizante, a partner at Aequitas who worked on the audit, pointed to documents that banks now require buyers to sign holding the institution harmless if questions arise about the validity of the foreclosure sale.
The audit also raises serious questions about the accuracy of information recorded in the Mortgage Electronic Registry System, or MERS, which was set up in 1995 by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and major lenders. The report found that 58 percent of loans listed in the MERS database showed different owners than were reflected in other public documents like those filed with the county recorder’s office.
The report contradicted the contentions of many banks that foreclosure improprieties did little harm because the borrowers were behind on their mortgages and should have been evicted anyway. “We can deduce from the public evidence,” the report noted, “that there are indeed legitimate victims in the mortgage crisis. Whether these homeowners are systematically being deprived of legal safeguards and due process rights is an important question.”
From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Thursday, February 16, 2012 5:59 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: Audit Uncovers Extensive Flaws in Foreclosures (copy attached)
Audit Uncovers Extensive Flaws in Foreclosures
Published: February 15, 2012
An audit by San Francisco county officials of about 400 recent foreclosures there determined that almost all involved either legal violations or suspicious documentation, according to a report released Wednesday.
Phil Ting, the San Francisco assessor-recorder, found widespread violations or irregularities in files of properties subject to foreclosure sales.
Anecdotal evidence indicating foreclosure abuse has been plentiful since the mortgage boom turned to bust in 2008. But the detailed and comprehensive nature of the San Francisco findings suggest how pervasive foreclosure irregularities may be across the nation.
The improprieties range from the basic — a failure to warn borrowers that they were in default on their loans as required by law — to the arcane. For example, transfers of many loans in the foreclosure files were made by entities that had no right to assign them and institutions took back properties in auctions even though they had not proved ownership.
Commissioned by Phil Ting, the San Francisco assessor-recorder, the report examined files of properties subject to foreclosure sales in the county from January 2009 to November 2011. About 84 percent of the files contained what appear to be clear violations of law, it said, and fully two-thirds had at least four violations or irregularities.
Kathleen Engel, a professor at Suffolk University Law School in Boston said: “If there were any lingering doubts about whether the problems with loan documents in foreclosures were isolated, this study puts the question to rest.”
The report comes just days after the $26 billion settlement over foreclosure improprieties between five major banks and 49 state attorneys general, including California’s. Among other things, that settlement requires participating banks to reduce mortgage amounts outstanding on a wide array of loans and provide $1.5 billion in reparations for borrowers who were improperly removed from their homes.
But the precise terms of the states’ deal have not yet been disclosed. As the San Francisco analysis points out, “the settlement does not resolve most of the issues this report identifies nor immunizes lenders and servicers from a host of potential liabilities.” For example, it is a felony to knowingly file false documents with any public office in California.
In an interview late Tuesday, Mr. Ting said he would forward his findings and foreclosure files to the attorney general’s office and to local law enforcement officials. Kamala D. Harris, the California attorney general, announced a joint investigation into foreclosure abuses last December with the Nevada attorney general, Catherine Cortez Masto. The joint investigation spans both civil and criminal matters.
The depth of the problem raises questions about whether at least some foreclosures should be considered void, Mr. Ting said. “We’re not saying that every consumer should not have been foreclosed on or every lender is a bad actor, but there are significant and troubling issues,” he said.
California has been among the states hurt the most by the mortgage crisis. Because its laws, like those of 29 other states, do not require a judge to oversee foreclosures, the conduct of banks in the process is rarely scrutinized. Mr. Ting said his report was the first rigorous analysis of foreclosure improprieties in California and that it cast doubt on the validity of almost every foreclosure it examined.
“Clearly, we need to set up a process where lenders are following every part of the law,” Mr. Ting said in the interview. “It is very apparent that the system is broken from many different vantage points.”
The report, which was compiled by Aequitas Compliance Solutions, a mortgage regulatory compliance firm, did not identify specific banks involved in the irregularities. But among the legal violations uncovered in the analysis were cases where the loan servicer did not provide borrowers with a notice of default before beginning the eviction process; 8 percent of the audited foreclosures had that basic defect.
In a significant number of cases — 85 percent — documents recording the transfer of a defaulted property to a new trustee were not filed properly or on time, the report found. And in 45 percent of the foreclosures, properties were sold at auction to entities improperly claiming to be the beneficiary of the deeds of trust. In other words, the report said, “a ‘stranger’ to the deed of trust,” gained ownership of the property; as a result, the sale may be invalid, it said.
In 6 percent of cases, the same deed of trust to a property was assigned to two or more different entities, raising questions about which of them actually had the right to foreclose. Many of the foreclosures that were scrutinized showed gaps in the chain of title, the report said, indicating that written transfers from the original owner to the entity currently claiming to own the deed of trust have disappeared.
Banks involved in buying and selling foreclosed properties appear to be aware of potential problems if gaps in the chain of title cloud a subsequent buyer’s ownership of the home. Lou Pizante, a partner at Aequitas who worked on the audit, pointed to documents that banks now require buyers to sign holding the institution harmless if questions arise about the validity of the foreclosure sale.
The audit also raises serious questions about the accuracy of information recorded in the Mortgage Electronic Registry System, or MERS, which was set up in 1995 by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and major lenders. The report found that 58 percent of loans listed in the MERS database showed different owners than were reflected in other public documents like those filed with the county recorder’s office.
The report contradicted the contentions of many banks that foreclosure improprieties did little harm because the borrowers were behind on their mortgages and should have been evicted anyway. “We can deduce from the public evidence,” the report noted, “that there are indeed legitimate victims in the mortgage crisis. Whether these homeowners are systematically being deprived of legal safeguards and due process rights is an important question.”
From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Thursday, February 16, 2012 5:59 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: Foreclosure Fraud by Robo-Signing Lawyers – Our Leaders Wish You’d Just Forget About It
Foreclosure Fraud by Robo-Signing Lawyers – Our Leaders Wish You’d Just Forget About It
by Chip Parker, Jacksonville Bankruptcy Attorney
Obama Cares This Much About Homeowners
Much has been written over the last week about what President Obama calls a “landmark” foreclosure fraud settlement between 49 Attorneys General and the five largest banks. With the lone exception of the National Association of Consumer Advocates, champions for Middle Class consumers have roundly criticized the agreement as a sweetheart deal for the banks. In response, supporters of the settlement are quick to point out that it settles the “narrow” issue of “robo-signing.”
What is robo-signing? After all, it doesn’t sound as bad as “fraud and corruption.”
Robo-signing and it’s sibling, “surrogate signing,” is the systematic, intentional misrepresentation or fabrication of evidence in every court of every county in every state of the United States. It is the filing of forged documents critical to a bank’s case in nearly every foreclosure in our country. It’s bad enough that the banks are perpetrating fraud, but what’s worse is that their lawyers are knowing accomplices to the fraud.
Lawyers are commonly referred to as “Officers of the Court.” That’s because lawyers take an oath upon admission to the profession to uphold the law and the integrity of the judicial process. We are the gatekeepers of justice. When we lie to judges, the integrity of our judicial system suffers irreparable harm.
Here is but one example of the criminal conduct that is being forgiven by the AG settlement:
In Florida, only the owner of the mortgage note and mortgage can file a foreclosure against a homeowner. Usually, the plaintiff in a foreclosure case is someone other than the originator of the loan because the original note holder usually sells the loan. The document evidencing that transfer of ownership is known as the Assignment of Mortgage, which is recorded in the official records of the county where the home is located. The Assignment of Mortgage is a critical piece of evidence in a foreclosure because it establishes the plaintiff’s “standing” to foreclose.
Example of a robo-signing lawyer
Here is a screenshot of four signatures of one “Assistant Secretary” of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems as “nominee” for various mortgage originators. Clearly, all four signatures do not look alike, even though this is allegedly the signature of the same person. But this person isn’t just a person – she’s a lawyer. And she’s not just any lawyer. She’s the litigation managing attorney at The Law Offices of Marshall C. Watson, P.A., one of the largest foreclosure law firms in the State of Florida, and I spoke with her just two days ago!
The fraud being perpetrated goes like this: The plaintiff needs the Assignment of Mortgage from the originator of the loan to the plaintiff to create “standing.” So, the plaintiff’s own lawyer creates the assignment, allegedly transferring an interest in land, and signs it herself. The lawyer then actually records this fabricated document in the county official records and also files it in the actual foreclosure case.
As the litigation managing attorney for Marshall Watson, this lawyer appears regularly before judges throughout the state, and these judges rely upon her honesty in all her dealings with the court. When a lawyer lies in court, it is worse than when a non-lawyer lies because we are not just sworn to tell the truth but to uphold the integrity of the court.
But what about a chief judge who is in cahoots with this foreclosure firm? Well, one of Marshall Watson’s newer lawyers is the former Chief Judge of Broward County, Victor Tobin, who, just before joining the firm, designed Broward’s notorious “Rocket Docket” foreclosure court that radically tilts the judicial process in Marshall Watson’s favor.
Someone really should tell Florida Attorney General Pam Bondi about this lawyer. Oh wait. She already knows. Florida’s Attorney General has had an ongoing investigation of Marshall Watson for years. The investigation was started by Bondi’s predecessor, Bill McCollum, but the moment she took office, she was more focused on shutting down such investigations, starting with her firing of the bulldog attorneys assigned to foreclosure fraud. In Marshall Watson’s case, they settled for $2M, but nobody was prosecuted for any crimes.
Well, even if Attorney General Pam Bondi ignores fraud on the court, surely The Florida Bar is investigating this lawyer because The Florida Bar HAS TO take robo-signing by lawyers seriously. But the Florida Bar doesn’t investigate robo-signers. To the contrary, The Florida Bar HIRES THEM to oversee attorney ethics investigations (The Florida Bar has in the past and will probably again investigate ME for speaking the truth). I AM NOT MAKING THIS UP!
Well, at least Floridians have our elected state representatives to protect homeowner rights in the wake of this massive fraud. Don’t look now, but a new Florida House of Representatives Bill HB213 is an “expedited foreclosure” bill that actually MAKES FRAUD EASIER for the banks by accelerating the foreclosure process. This bill has already made it out of committee with a 12 – 4 passing vote. Stay tuned for more on this selling out by our elected legislators.
If you are a homeowner, who is on your side? The President of the United States? The United States Congress? Your Attorney General? Your State Legislator? Your local Bar?
It’s getting harder to tell, but the signs aren’t good.
From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Monday, February 13, 2012 10:20 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: What Goes to the Banks Stays With the Banks
| Borrowers Don’t Count — But False Claims of Losses Count Multiple Times |
What Goes to the Banks Stays With the Banks
Even if the Payment was on the Debt owned by Another
There have been dozens of deals with law enforcement and regulatory agencies. There have been thousands of settlements with individual homeowners sealed under confidentiality. Why do they not work for everyone?
The answer is obvious — borrowers don’t count. And the reason they don’t count is the uninformed view that borrowers took the loans and should repay them — even if the loans are NOT in default, are paid off in full to creditors, and the claimants who keep getting money from all sides and from all directions without any demand for accounting.
It is the policy of this country that the full brunt of the cost of the mortgage crisis should be borne by borrowers. We are imposing an ideology over the facts, ignoring the absurdity of the consequences, and compounding both past evil and greasing the tracks for the banks to serve as the collection point for payments covering losses that never occurred (to the banks).
These payments include taxpayer direct bailouts (Bush’s TARP), indirect bailouts (Bush-Obama public-private Maiden Lane deals), direct private payments from servicers (while declaring non-payment from the borrower), direct private payments from insurers who were bailed out using taxpayer dollars, direct private payments from credit default swap counter parties who were funded by Taxpayer bailouts from the U.S. treasury and foreign treasuries, and indirect credits from other exotic credit enhancements.
THAT MAKES 6 distinct sources of payment received by the banks IN ADDITION TO THE DIRECT PAYMENTS FROM BORROWERS AND INDIRECT PAYMENTS FROM BORROWERS WHO GAVE UP TITLE AND POSSESSION TO HOMES ON WHICH THE CREDITOR WAS PAID IN FULL AND THERE WAS NO DEFAULT.
Even Borrowers can’t get their brains around the possibility that they accepted a loan that was paid off using their tax dollars and financial relationships enabled by the ignorance of both the creditor investor who actually loaned the money and the ignorance of the Buyer.
In all cases the investors are sitting with the alleged loss due to so-called defaulted mortgages. In no case have the banks loaned money in any securitized loan. In no case have the banks paid any money to buy the loans. In all cases the risk of loss was left with the creditor investor. In all cases, the Banks collected the payments, the bailouts, the insurance proceeds, the CDS proceeds etc. In no case have the banks even admitted the receipt of more than $17 trillion on defaults that at most were valued under $3 trillion. In no case have the banks been required to provide a full and fair accounting.
Instead, the banks and servicers have completely controlled the narrative portraying borrowers as deadbeats wanting to get out of a valid debt when what these brewers want is a modification based upon realistic numbers in a fair Market on a fair playing field — one which recognizes that the inflated appraisals of yesteryear were the responsibility of the banks that ordered those appraisals with express instructions as to what value must be attached to the property if the apprised ever wanted to work again as an appraiser.
What goes to the banks, stays with the banks.
There are rarely payments of more than a pittance paid to the creditors from their agent bankers.
The banks withhold money received because (a) they mean to keep it and (b) they mean to declare a non-existent default in order to create the appearance on an economic reality in which foreclosure is proper.
Add to that the "credit bid" the banks submit in lieu of cash payment at the bogus foreclosure sales, and you end up with the banks taking all of the money from investors and homeowners and all of the property from the homeowners whose debt has long since been paid.
This validation of economic crimes worthy of life sentences on Wall Street. Instead, we continue the attack on the middle class and poor thus defiling our own reputation and undermining the nation’s ability to recover from what could have been a temporary debasement of our currency and prospects.
It is axiomatically true that no nation has survived severe income inequality — because for wealth inequality to get that extreme the freedoms in the marketplace must be replaced by bullies. The nation of laws that keep a society intact is replaced by the law of men. Thus is born both the new Aristocracy and the new seeds of social revolution.

You wonder about the attitude in California in particular, with regard to the problems we’re facing…this should give you an idea.
To: Charles Cox
Subject: Judicial council meeting.
>> Mr. Stewart: Thank you. Good morning, lady chairperson and California Judicial Council members. It’s an honor to address you. And I thank you for allowing me to speak. As you may know, in 2009, there were over 500,000 foreclosures in California. My talk coincides with a power point slide presentation that I submitted for this talk, that all of you I understand have a copy of.
It’s regarding Judicial Council Ud-100 form, intent versus use. And for all these talks, usually you give an outline of what you’re going to say, then you say it and then you give a conclusion and recap what you said. So, I would open with a joke but the one that I had is kind of corny, so I’ll proceed to the outline.
The — I’m going to contrast the unlimited jurisdiction complaint versus the unlawful detainer complaint, then go to the legislative report concerning the code passed by the legislature regarding unlawful detainer actions, the Judicial Council intent as inferred by the comments on the Jd-100 form. The current use by attorneys for banks of the Ud-100 form. And then overview how judges implement the U D complaint versus the intent of the complaint and the civil rights and due process issues for homeowners who are confronted with UD complaint.
First of all the ordinary unlawful or unlimited jurisdiction complaint is to be used only after administrative remedies have been exhausted. For a party whose rights have been violated. The unlimited jurisdiction complaints have three realms of discovery prior to trial setting another full round of discovery after trial setting, but before trial. The unlimited jurisdiction complaint allows for cross complaint that must be heard prior to the hearing of the complaint and cannot be dismissed unlike the complaint. pursuant to maxums of law. The unlawful detainer does not allow for cross complaint. It does not allow for full discovery, it operates under the presumption that the plaintiff, who is filing the unlawful detainer, has standing to file the unlawful detainer, does not allow a challenge to the ownership claim of the plaintiff or the standing of the plaintiff to file and make the claim for unlawful detainer.
The legislative report for the unlawful detainer legislation makes it clear that it is intended for non-payment of rent. That indicates that it’s to be applied to renters, not homeowners, who have been foreclosed upon. The Judicial Council on the UD-100 Judicial Council form states clearly on page 1, note, do not use this form for evictions after sale, and then it cites code of civil procedure section 1161-A.
Now the current use of the unlawful detainer complaint by the banks involves their deliberate misrepresentation of the owner who of this foreclosed upon as renters. And of course there is no opportunity in the unlawful detainer complaint to challenge this. 99% of foreclosures are currently done in California in fraud. So we’ve got a situation where you’ve got a fraudulent complaint filed, home owners are confronted with this on a fast track, and generally they are confused and baffled and when they ask to change the jurisdiction from the limbed jurisdiction unlawful detainer to an unlimited complaint with cross complaint as is provided generally by local rules, the judges generally refuse and further the judges do not do a SuA Sponte dismissal of the unlawful detainer for lack of standing –
>> Mr. Stewart you’re up to your five minutes.
>> I can conclude.
>> Within 30 seconds, please, sir.
>> Mr. Stewart: The banks have no standing to foreclose because all the notes for the mortgages are securitized, sealed in a 30 years real estate management conduit that the banks do not open because then they will have to pay the taxes and penalties on 3.6 billion dollars of Remic notes, not just the note they are trying to get. They never become an assign on the note, they never are recorded in the public record as an assign on the note, they’ve separated the note from the deed of trust, so they have violated UCC 3-305-B and made the note unenforceable but the standing is never allowed to be challenged and further more the trustee fraudulently certifies under penalty of perjury that civil code 2934 and all its requirements have been satisfied when in fact the California civil code 2932.5 has been violated because the banks never have the note.
>>Mr. Stewart, I’ll stop you here because I want you to know we have an idea of the substance of your complaint about the use of this form. And we appreciate you are bringing this to the attention of the judicial counsel. Thank you, Mr. Stewart.
>> Thank you commissioner, chairperson.
From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Friday, February 10, 2012 1:39 PM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: American Banker | Other sources who spoke with American Banker raised doubts that everything is yet in place. A person familiar with the mortgage servicing pact says that a settlement term sheet does not yet exist.
By Jeff Horwitz and Kate Davidson
FEB 10, 2012 1:07pm ET
More than a day after the announcement of a mammoth national mortgage servicing settlement, the actual terms of the deal still aren’t public. The website created for the national settlement lists the document as "coming soon."
That’s because a fully authorized, legally binding deal has not been inked yet.
The implication of this is hard to say. Spokespersons for both the Iowa attorney general’s office and the Department of Justice both told American Banker that the actual settlement will not be made public until it is submitted to a court. A representative for the North Carolina attorney general downplayed the significance of the document’s non-final status, saying that the terms were already fixed.
"Once the documents are finalized, they’ll be posted to nationalmortgagesettlement.com," the representative said in an email to American Banker.
Other sources who spoke with American Banker raised doubts that everything is yet in place. A person familiar with the mortgage servicing pact says that a settlement term sheet does not yet exist. Instead, there are a series of nearly-complete documents that will be attached to a consent judgment eventually filed with the court. That truly final version will include things such as servicing standards, consumer relief options, legal releases, and enforcement terms. There will likely be separate state and a federal versions of the release.
Some who talked to American Banker said that the political pressure to announce the settlement drove the timing, in effect putting the press release cart in front of the settlement horse.
Whatever the reason for the document’s continued non-appearance, the lack of a public final settlement is already the cause for disgruntlement among those who closely follow the banking industry. Quite simply, the actual terms of a settlement matter.
"The devil’s in the details," says Ron Glancz, chairman of law firm Venable LLP’s Financial Services Group. "Until you see the document you’re never quite sure what your rights are."
"It’s frustrating," agrees Stern Agee analyst John Nadel. "But it’s not unlike anything else that’s been going on in financial reform generally, is it?"
Should the settlement still have loose strings, yesterday’s frenzy over the completion of the settlement may have been premature. The announced deal launched a countless press releases and wall to wall news coverage. But few news outlets asked for the document, and those that did (including American Banker) have been unsuccessful.
"It is hard for me to believe that they would have gone public in the way that they did if they didn’t have it all worked out. But it is unusual that we don’t have a copy of the settlement yet," says Diane Thompson, an attorney for the National Consumer Law Center.
American Banker asked The Department of Justice, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the offices of Attorneys General in Iowa, North Carolina and Colorado for a copy of the settlement last night. Only Iowa, North Carolina and the Department of Justice have responded, saying that the document would not be available until it is filed with the court on a yet-undetermined date.
And there is plenty more still to be worked out under all circumstances.
"Even once we get to the final terms, the servicers we’re told are going to be allowed to develop their own plans," says NCLC’s Thompson. "They’re going to have three months to develop those from when the settlement is approved by the court. We are a long way in lots of ways from being able to kick the tires."

© 2012 American Banker and SourceMedia, Inc. All Rights Reserved. SourceMedia is an Investcorp company. Use, duplication, or sale of this service, or data contained herein, except as described in the Subscription Agreement, is strictly prohibited.
Mrs Harris our Attorney General says we foreclosure victims will get real relief but if you divide 26 Billion into the 2 million victims that’s 13,000 how is that going to help anybody but the Banks. Short sale relief is no relief at all. California is an Anti- deficiency state. The victim only gets to move.
From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Thursday, February 09, 2012 6:44 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: Attorney General Kamala D. Harris Secures $18 Billion California Commitment for Struggling Homeowners – Another sell out!
Sold out again!!! I knew it. She’s right in there with Governor Moonbeam and his $8.4 billion settlement with Countrywide that helped him get elected that no one collected on…disgusting but typical and not unexpected. She’s obviously been to the “talk out of both sides of your mouth” school of politics.
As readers may know by now, 49 of 50 states have agreed to join the so-called mortgage settlement, with Oklahoma the lone refusenik. Although the fine points are still being hammered out, various news outlets (New York Times, Financial Times, Wall Street Journal) have details, with Dave Dayen’s overview at Firedoglake the best thus far.
The Wall Street Journal is also reporting that the SEC is about to launch some securities litigation against major banks. Since the statue of limitations has already run out on securities filings more than five years old, this means they’ll clip the banks for some of the very last (and dreckiest) deals they shoved out the door before the subprime market gave up the ghost.
The various news services are touting this pact at the biggest multi-state settlement since the tobacco deal in 1998. While narrowly accurate, this deal is bush league by comparison even though the underlying abuses in both cases have had devastating consequences.
The tobacco agreement was pegged as being worth nearly $250 billion over the first 25 years. Adjust that for inflation, and the disparity is even bigger. That shows you the difference in outcomes between a case where the prosecutors have solid evidence backing their charges, versus one where everyone know a lot of bad stuff happened, but no one has come close to marshaling the evidence.
The mortgage settlement terms have not been released, but more of the details have been leaked:
1. The total for the top five servicers is now touted as $26 billion (annoyingly, the FT is calling it “nearly $40 billion”), but of that, roughly $17 billion is credits for principal modifications, which as we pointed out earlier, can and almost assuredly will come largely from mortgages owned by investors. $3 billion is for refis, and only $5 billion will be in the form of hard cash payments, including $1500 to $2000 per borrower foreclosed on between September 2008 and December 2011.
Banks will be required to modify second liens that sit behind firsts “at least” pari passu, which in practice will mean at most pari passu. So this guarantees banks will also focus on borrowers where they do not have second lien exposure, and this also makes the settlement less helpful to struggling homeowners, since borrowers with both second and first liens default at much higher rates than those without second mortgages. Per the Journal:
“It’s not new money. It’s all soft dollars to the banks,” said Paul Miller, a bank analyst at FBR Capital Markets.
The Times is also subdued:
Despite the billions earmarked in the accord, the aid will help a relatively small portion of the millions of borrowers who are delinquent and facing foreclosure. The success could depend in part on how effectively the program is carried out because earlier efforts by Washington aimed at troubled borrowers helped far fewer than had been expected.
2. Schneiderman’s MERS suit survives, and he can add more banks as defendants. It isn’t clear what became of the Biden and Coakley MERS suits, but Biden sounded pretty adamant in past media presentations on preserving that.
3. Nevada’s and Arizona’s suits against Countrywide for violating its past consent decree on mortgage servicing has, in a new Orwellianism, been “folded into” the settlement.
4. The five big players in the settlement have already set aside reserves sufficient for this deal.
Here are the top twelve reasons why this deal stinks:
1. We’ve now set a price for forgeries and fabricating documents. It’s $2000 per loan. This is a rounding error compared to the chain of title problem these systematic practices were designed to circumvent. The cost is also trivial in comparison to the average loan, which is roughly $180k, so the settlement represents about 1% of loan balances. It is less than the price of the title insurance that banks failed to get when they transferred the loans to the trust. It is a fraction of the cost of the legal expenses when foreclosures are challenged. It’s a great deal for the banks because no one is at any of the servicers going to jail for forgery and the banks have set the upper bound of the cost of riding roughshod over 300 years of real estate law.
2. That $26 billion is actually $5 billion of bank money and the rest is your money. The mortgage principal writedowns are guaranteed to come almost entirely from securitized loans, which means from investors, which in turn means taxpayers via Fannie and Freddie, pension funds, insurers, and 401 (k)s. Refis of performing loans also reduce income to those very same investors.
3. That $5 billion divided among the big banks wouldn’t even represent a significant quarterly hit. Freddie and Fannie putbacks to the major banks have been running at that level each quarter.
4. That $20 billion actually makes bank second liens sounder, so this deal is a stealth bailout that strengthens bank balance sheets at the expense of the broader public.
5. The enforcement is a joke. The first layer of supervision is the banks reporting on themselves. The framework is similar to that of the OCC consent decrees implemented last year, which Adam Levitin and yours truly, among others, decried as regulatory theater.
6. The past history of servicer consent decrees shows the servicers all fail to comply. Why? Servicer records and systems are terrible in the best of times, and their systems and fee structures aren’t set up to handle much in the way of delinquencies. As Tom Adams has pointed out in earlier posts, servicer behavior is predictable when their portfolios are hit with a high level of delinquencies and defaults: they cheat in all sorts of ways to reduce their losses.
7. The cave-in Nevada and Arizona on the Countrywide settlement suit is a special gift for Bank of America, who is by far the worst offender in the chain of title disaster (since, according to sworn testimony of its own employee in Kemp v. Countrywide, Countrywide failed to comply with trust delivery requirements). This move proves that failing to comply with a consent degree has no consequences but will merely be rolled into a new consent degree which will also fail to be enforced. These cases also alleged HAMP violations as consumer fraud violations and could have gotten costly and emboldened other states to file similar suits not just against Countrywide but other servicers, so it was useful to the other banks as well.
8. If the new Federal task force were intended to be serious, this deal would have not have been settled. You never settle before investigating. It’s a bad idea to settle obvious, widespread wrongdoing on the cheap. You use the stuff that is easy to prove to gather information and secure cooperation on the stuff that is harder to prove. In Missouri and Nevada, the robosigning investigation led to criminal charges against agents of the servicers. But even though these companies were acting at the express direction and approval of the services, no individuals or entities higher up the food chain will face any sort of meaningful charges.
9. There is plenty of evidence of widespread abuses that appear not to be on the attorney generals’ or media’s radar, such as servicer driven foreclosures and looting of investors’ funds via impermissible and inflated charges. While no serious probe was undertaken, even the limited or peripheral investigations show massive failures (60% of documents had errors in AGs/Fed’s pathetically small sample). Similarly, the US Trustee’s office found widespread evidence of significant servicer errors in bankruptcy-related filings, such as inflated and bogus fees, and even substantial, completely made up charges. Yet the services and banks will suffer no real consequences for these abuses.
10. A deal on robosiginging serves to cover up the much deeper chain of title problem. And don’t get too excited about the New York, Massachusetts, and Delaware MERS suits. They put pressure on banks to clean up this monstrous mess only if the AGs go through to trial and get tough penalties. The banks will want to settle their way out of that too. And even if these cases do go to trial and produce significant victories for the AGs, they still do not address the problem of failures to transfer notes correctly.
11. Don’t bet on a deus ex machina in terms of the new Federal foreclosure task force to improve this picture much. If you think Schneiderman, as a co-chairman who already has a full time day job in New York, is going to outfox a bunch of DC insiders who are part of the problem, I have a bridge I’d like to sell to you.
12. We’ll now have to listen to banks and their sycophant defenders declaring victory despite being wrong on the law and the facts. They will proceed to marginalize and write off criticisms of the servicing practices that hurt homeowners and investors and are devastating communities. But the problems will fester and the housing market will continue to suffer. Investors in mortgage-backed securities, who know that services have been screwing them for years, will be hung out to dry and will likely never return to a private MBS market, since the problems won’t ever be fixed. This settlement has not only revealed the residential mortgage market to be too big to fail, but puts it on long term, perhaps permanent, government life support.
As we’ve said before, this settlement is yet another raw demonstration of who wields power in America, and it isn’t you and me. It’s bad enough to see these negotiations come to their predictable, sorry outcome. It adds insult to injury to see some try to depict it as a win for long suffering, still abused homeowners.
From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Thursday, February 09, 2012 6:48 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: The 50 State AG Sellout- The American People Sold Out To The Banks – I agree with Matt!
The 50 State AG Sellout- The American People Sold Out To The Banks
February 9th, 2012 | Author: Matthew D. Weidner, Esq.
Is Canada accepting applications? How Bout Mexico? China? This place is toast. A white collar criminal corprotacracy that makes us all slaves to a corporate machine that will not be slowed down and certainly will not stop.
I find the news that attorneys general from 49 states will sign a settlement with the banks most offensive. I’m sorry, I thought this was a government Of The People. I thought we had a say in things….I’m certain I read that somewhere. But that’s an old dream. Today, the criminals negotiate directly with the prosecutors…such as they are and we just sit back and wait for their pronouncement, like some oracles on high.
It’s a sick and despicable state of affairs, our national descent into hell is only hastened. Not much you can do now…the fix is in. They all own us. There are no leaders, only minions of the evil machine….
Keep in mind, it’s not just everyday Americans that are hosed by this deal, it’s investors who are being hosed to pay for this garbage. It sets up a good old fashioned taking of private property….scary huh?
Well, hopefully the big, well-funded investors will stand up and fight this insanity…because the little guy has no seat at the table and won’t stand a chance of fighting back…..
Top 12 reasons to hate this deal: http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2012/02/the-top-twelve-reasons-why-you-should-hate-the-mortgage-settlement.html
From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Thursday, February 09, 2012 9:11 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: Robo-Deal: The Price of Crime – Neil Garfield Weighs in…
Robo-Deal: The Price of Crime
Posted on February 9, 2012 by Neil Garfield
” The biggest mistake being made in the settlement is that investors are being insulted. They won’t return to the same marketplace and invest in similar offerings in the future. This puts a permanent damper on credit markets and liquidity. Investors have no reason to trust a society that ratifies criminal fraud. Investors have a high tolerance for risk, but zero tolerance for corruption. The net effect will be investments going anywhere but the credit markets based on Wall Street, which means that fund managers are going to perceive that their only safe move is to go to a more stable environment in which crime is punished and fraud isn’t tolerated.” — Neil F Garfield, livinglies.me
EDITOR’S COMMENT AND ANALYSIS: If you steal a little money you go to jail. If you steal a lot you get to keep it. That seems to be the net impact of the multi-state settlement. Yves Smith (see below) and Adam Levitin are among many who decry this settlement and I agree with their reasons, but I don’t agree that this is the end of this “theater.”
It is probable that world class criminals will escape prosecution and it is certainly a bad precedent to put a price — $2,000 — on committing forgery, where the loss is in the hundreds of thousands of dollars. The driving theme behind the settlement is to get this episode behind us and so, like the tobacco settlement, this new deal is intended to start us on the path of clearing out the foreclosure problem — but unlike the tobacco settlement in which people were successfully encouraged to stop smoking, this settlement is based solidly on continuing false and fraudulent foreclosures on debts that have been paid if you apply the third party payments.
Those foreclosures cannot continue without continuing the fraud. This isn’t a paperwork problem — it is an economic one in which the real parties in interest have been left out.
Yet the theater is far from over because the title issues and the individual causes of action — for those homeowners who want to pursue them — still exist, and criminal prosecutions — for those prosecutors who won’t be stopped will also continue. There is no avoiding the realization that the very banks who are parties to this settlement are not and never were parties to the loans. They never owned them and they never bought them.
Thus any document signed by these strangers to the transaction is no more than a wild deed that cannot support a chain of title. If this issue is not addressed head-on, who is going to buy anything or lend anything in a market where a growing number of supposedly ex-homeowners successfully overturn foreclosures and regain title and possession of their properties? It isn’t the number of people who succeed in this endeavor that matters — it is that the risk exists that it could happen on any property.
WHY ROBO? Take a step back and look at this picture. The Banks are settling claims for wrongful foreclosure but the wrongful foreclosure is being left intact. The obvious title problems are left intact like a disease on a rotting corpse. The question of why false declarations in false documents were used is being glossed over as though it doesn’t really matter why they did it. Isn’t anyone curious why banks would resort to widespread use of forged documents with false declarations contained in them?
This issue won’t go away. If there was a cover-up, what were they attempting to cover up? For me the answer is clear — (a) the loans contain numerous fatal defects that eviscerate the debt mortgage securing the debt and (b) that there was no right or reason to foreclose except that the banks and servicers saw an opportunity to make even more money by taking the homes after they had already taken the investors and the homeowners to the cleaners.
The bottom line is (a) that there were fatal defects in both the documentation for the origination of the loan and the documentation for the origination of the sale of mortgage bonds to investors. This was intentional, so that the banks could do exactly what they are now doing, pretending on a grand scale to be the creditors when in fact the real creditors are being left out in the cold. And (b) there remain fatal defects in both the so-called mortgages and the foreclosure process as it has progressed thus far. The only settlement that counts, therefore, is one that stops the false foreclosures by strangers to the deal on loans that are not in default and that are not secured by a perfected mortgage lien.
In the end run, how much more the banks will be required to fork over will depend upon you and others who read this blog. If you call it quits, then the most you will see if in fact anyone sees it, is $2,000 for losing a home you should not have lost and being tricked into a loan that should have been far different in both amount and terms. Those who have not yet been foreclosed are not directly affected by the settlement. So assuming that the banks and servicers persist in pursuing foreclosures in which they have no interest other than greed, nothing we have so far will change anything.
Those who press on will see a benefit from their efforts although I concede that the turmoil of litigation is daunting at the very least. The prospect of overturning foreclosures and evictions that were based upon false declarations in false documents by banks and servicers who had no privity with the homeowner remains a viable and even an enhanced option. How Judges will react to the news of indictment for criminal activity and settlement with law enforcement officials is anyone’s guess. The added factor that has not been addressed is that most of the foreclosed loans were not in actual default.
In the final analysis, the crisis in title chains is not being addressed at all and there is a lot of work to do to clear it up one way or another. But one thing is certain: continued false foreclosures is not the path of recovery.
From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Thursday, February 09, 2012 2:09 PM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: Attacking Standing in Federal / Bankruptcy Court – Max Gardner Newsletter Posting
Attacking Standing in Federal / Bankruptcy Court
By Tiffany Sanders on February 9, 2012
It is apodictic there can be no cause of action to foreclose a mortgage unless we know where the paper is and that it actually represents something. There is much “sand in the gears” of our property transfer system in these times. However, we cannot bend the rules. A person seeking to enforce an instrument conveying an interest in real property must demonstrate he has directly or indirectly acquired ownership of the instrument. – Max Gardner
Robin Miller has compiled an extensive bibliography on standing issues for us, and we’ll be sharing the case citations she has aggregated in a series of articles over the next several newsletters. Today, we’ll start with the basics: standing in federal court generally and bankruptcy court specifically. Later in the series, we’ll look at state court standing decisions, cases relating to MERS, right to enforce the note and more.
Standing in Federal Court – the Basics
Standing is a threshold issue in every federal case and cannot be waived; if the litigant does not have standing, the court has no power to hear the case, even if no objection has been raised. Unfortunately, not all courts exercise that affirmative duty, so it’s up to us as attorneys for the debtor/defendant to ensure that claimants without standing don’t slip through. The cases below establish those basic principles.
Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC Services, Inc., 554 U.S. 269 (2008): Assignee to claim must hold legal title at the time that it is asserted in action.
Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004): Federal court can only exercise jurisdiction when litigant meets both constitutional and prudential standing requirements.
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975): Standing is a threshold question in every federal case determining the power of the court to entertain the suit.
St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 884 F. 2d 688 (2nd Cir. 1989): Court has independent duty to examine standing.
Barhold v. Rodriguez, 863 F.2d 233 (2nd Cir. 1988): Parties cannot consent to waive standing.
Constitutional and Prudential Standing in Bankruptcy Courts
Numerous U.S. Bankruptcy Court rulings have reaffirmed the general rule that federal court jurisdiction requires that the litigant have both Constitutional and prudential standing. That requirement and what exactly is required to satisfy the standard is elaborated upon in:
In re Jackson, 451 B.R. 24 (Bankr. E.D. Cal., June 6, 2011): For a federal court to have jurisdiction, the proponent of a matter must have both constitutional standing, which requires an injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief, and prudential standing.
In re Veal, 450 B.R. 897 (9th Cir. B.A.P., June 10, 2011): A federal court may exercise jurisdiction over a litigant only when that litigant meets constitutional and prudential standing requirements; constitutional standing requires an injury in fact, which is caused by or fairly traceable to some conduct or some statutory prohibition, and which the requested relief will likely redress; prudential standing embodies judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction; here, Wells Fargo did not establish standing to seek relief from stay, as it did not show that it or its agent had actual possession of the note, so that it could not establish that it was a “person entitled to enforce” the note under UCC § 3-301.
In re Burnett, 450 B.R. 589 (Bankr. W.D. Va., April 28, 2011): In order to establish a colorable claim, a movant for relief from stay must satisfy the constitutional limitations on federal court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise.
In re Hill, 2009 WL 1956174 (Bankr. D.Ariz., July 6, 2009): In addition to the procedural “real party in interest” requirements of Rule 17, a litigant must also have standing to bring a motion; a litigant must have both constitutional standing and prudential standing for a federal court to have jurisdiction to hear the case.
Party in Interest Issues in Bankruptcy Courts
In re Wilhelm, 407 B.R. 392 (Bankr. D. Idaho, July 7, 2009): To obtain stay relief, a movant must have standing and be the real party in interest under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17.
Standing of a Servicer
In re Alcide, 450 B.R. 526 (Bankr. E.D. Pa., May 27, 2011): To establish its status as a party in interest entitled to seek relief from the automatic stay, a mortgage servicer must demonstrate that (1) the initiation of a stay relief motion is within the scope of authority delegated to the servicer by its principal and; and (2) the principal itself is a party in interest (i.e., the principal is a party with the right to enforce the mortgage).
In re Gulley, 436 B.R. 878 (Bankr. N.D.Tex., August 23, 2010): A mortgage loan servicer is considered a creditor with standing to file a proof of claim by virtue of its pecuniary interest in collecting payments under the terms of the note.
In re Jacobson, 402 B.R. 359 (Bankr. W.D. Wash., March 6, 2009): Even if a servicer or agent has authority to bring a motion for relief from stay on behalf of the holder, it is the holder, rather than the servicer, that must be the moving party, and so identified in the papers and in the electronic docketing done by the moving party’s counsel.
Possession of the Note
In re Escobar, 457 B.R. 229 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y., August 22, 2011): Where the stay relief movant claims rights as a secured creditor by virtue of an assignment of rights to a promissory note secured by a lien against real property, it must provide satisfactory proof of its status as the owner or holder of the note; here, the movants had met this burden of proof through their uncontroverted affidavit testimony that they were holders of the notes by virtue of possession of the original notes executed with endorsements in blank.
In re Veal, 450 B.R. 897 (9th Cir. B.A.P., June 10, 2011): (See Constitutional and Prudential Standing in Bankruptcy Courts)
In re Banks, 457 B.R. 9 (8th Cir. B.A.P., Oct. 11, 2011): The bankruptcy court erred in holding that a creditor possessed the right to enforce a note endorsed in blank where the creditor did not establish that it was in possession of the note.
Date of Possession
In re Ruest, Case No. 08-10512, Adv. Proc. No. 09-1035 (Bankr. D. Vt., August 23, 2011): Even though it was undisputed that loan servicer was in possession of the note and the note was endorsed in blank, the date that the bank came into possession of the note was a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to deny motion for summary judgment.
In re Parker, 445 B.R. 301 (Bankr. D.Vt., March 18, 2011): The creditor needed to show that it was the holder of the note on the date of the debtor’s bankruptcy petition, and, since the endorsement was not dated, the court would hold a hearing to receive evidence on the issue.

Freddie Mac, the taxpayer-owned mortgage giant, has placed multibillion-dollar bets that pay off if homeowners stay trapped in expensive mortgages with interest rates well above current rates.
Freddie began increasing these bets dramatically in late 2010, the same time that the company was making it harder for homeowners to get out of such high-interest mortgages.
No evidence has emerged that these decisions were coordinated. The company is a key gatekeeper for home loans but says its traders are “walled off” from the officials who have restricted homeowners from taking advantage of historically low interest rates by imposing higher fees and new rules.
Freddie’s charter calls for the company to make home loans more accessible. Its chief executive, Charles Haldeman Jr., recently told Congress that his company is “helping financially strapped families reduce their mortgage costs through refinancing their mortgages.”
But the trades, uncovered for the first time in an investigation by ProPublica and NPR, give Freddie a powerful incentive to do the opposite, highlighting a conflict of interest at the heart of the company. In addition to being an instrument of government policy dedicated to making home loans more accessible, Freddie also has giant investment portfolios and could lose substantial amounts of money if too many borrowers refinance.
“We were actually shocked they did this,” says Scott Simon, who as the head of the giant bond fund PIMCO’s mortgage-backed securities team is one of the world’s biggest mortgage bond traders. “It seemed so out of line with their mission.”
The trades “put them squarely against the homeowner,” he says.
Those homeowners have a lot at stake, too. Many of them could cut their interest payments by thousands of dollars a year.
Freddie Mac, along with its cousin Fannie Mae, was bailed out in 2008 and is now owned by taxpayers. The companies play a pivotal role in the mortgage business because they insure most home loans in the United States, making banks likelier to lend. The companies’ rules determine whether homeowners can get loans and on what terms.
The Federal Housing Finance Agency effectively serves as Freddie’s board of directors and is ultimately responsible for Freddie’s decisions. It is run by acting director Edward DeMarco, who cannot be fired by the president except in extraordinary circumstances.
Freddie and the FHFA repeatedly declined to comment on the specific transactions.
Freddie’s moves to limit refinancing affect not only individual homeowners but the entire economy. An expansive refinancing program could help millions of homeowners, some economists say. Such an effort would “help the economy and put tens of billions of dollars back in consumers’ pockets, the equivalent of a very long-term tax cut,” says real-estate economist Christopher Mayer of the Columbia Business School. “It also is likely to reduce foreclosures and benefit the U.S. government” because Freddie and Fannie, which guarantee most mortgages in the country, would have lower losses over the long run.
Freddie Mac’s trades, while perfectly legal, came during a period when the company was supposed to be reducing its investment portfolio, according to the terms of its government takeover agreement. But these trades escalate the risk of its portfolio, because the securities Freddie has purchased are volatile and hard to sell, mortgage securities experts say.
The financial crisis in 2008 was made worse when Wall Street traders made bets against their customers and the American public. Now, some see similar behavior, only this time by traders at a government-owned company who are using leverage, which increases the potential profits but also the risk of big losses, and other Wall Street stratagems. “More than three years into the government takeover, we have Freddie Mac pursuing highly levered, complicated transactions seemingly with the purpose of trading against homeowners,” says Mayer. “These are the kinds of things that got us into trouble in the first place.”
Freddie Mac is betting against, among others, Jay and Bonnie Silverstein. The Silversteins live in an unfinished development of cul-de-sacs and yellow stucco houses about 20 miles north of Philadelphia, in a house decorated with Bonnie’s orchids and their Rose Bowl parade pin collection. The developer went bankrupt, leaving orange plastic construction fencing around some empty lots. The community clubhouse isn’t complete.
“We’re in financial Jail”
The Silversteins have a 30-year fixed mortgage with an interest rate of 6.875 percent, much higher than the going rate of less than 4 percent. They have borrowed from family members and are living paycheck to paycheck. If they could refinance, they would save about $500 a month. He says the extra money would help them pay back some of their family members and visit their grandchildren more often.
But brokers have told the Silversteins that they cannot refinance, thanks to a Freddie Mac rule.
The Silversteins used to live in a larger house 15 minutes from their current place, in a more upscale development. They had always planned to downsize as they approached retirement. In 2005, they made the mistake of buying their new house before selling the larger one. As the housing market plummeted, they couldn’t sell their old house, so they carried two mortgages for 2½ years, wiping out their savings and 401(k). “It just drained us,” Jay Silverstein says.
Finally, they were advised to try a short sale, in which the house is sold for less than the value of the underlying mortgage. They stopped making payments on the big house for it to go through. The sale was finally completed in 2009.
Such debacles hurt a borrower’s credit rating. But Bonnie has a solid job at a doctor’s office, and Jay has a pension from working for more than two decades for Johnson & Johnson. They say they haven’t missed a payment on their current mortgage.
But the Silversteins haven’t been able to get their refi. Freddie Mac won’t insure a new loan for people who had a short sale in the last two to four years, depending on their financial condition. While the company’s previous rules prohibited some short sales, in October 2010 the company changed its criteria to include all short sales. It is unclear whether the Silverstein mortgage would have been barred from a short sale under the previous Freddie rules.
Short-term, Freddie’s trades benefit from the high-interest mortgage in which the Silversteins are trapped. But in the long run, Freddie could benefit if the Silversteins refinanced to a more affordable loan. Freddie guarantees the Silversteins’ mortgage, so if the couple defaults, Freddie — and the taxpayers who own the company — are on the hook. Getting the Silversteins into a more affordable mortgage would make a default less likely.
If millions of homeowners like the Silversteins default, the economy would be harmed. But if they switch to loans with lower interest rates, they would have more money to spend, which could boost the economy.
“We’re in financial jail,” says Jay, “and we’ve never been there before.”
How Freddie’s investments work
Here’s how Freddie Mac’s trades profit from the Silversteins staying in “financial jail.” The couple’s mortgage is sitting in a big pile of other mortgages, most of which are also guaranteed by Freddie and have high interest rates. Those mortgages underpin securities that get divided into two basic categories.
Anatomy of a Deal
How Freddie Mac structured a deal in which it profited if homeowners stayed trapped in high-interest mortgages.
One portion is backed mainly by principal, pays a low return, and was sold to investors who wanted a safe place to park their money. The other part, the inverse floater, is backed mainly by the interest payments on the mortgages, such as the high rate that the Silversteins pay. So this portion of the security can pay a much higher return, and this is what Freddie retained.
In 2010 and ’11, Freddie purchased $3.4 billion worth of inverse floater portions — their value based mostly on interest payments on $19.5 billion in mortgage-backed securities, according to prospectuses for the deals. They covered tens of thousands of homeowners. Most of the mortgages backing these transactions have high rates of about 6.5 percent to 7 percent, according to the deal documents.
Between late 2010 and early 2011, Freddie Mac’s purchases of inverse floater securities rose dramatically. Freddie purchased inverse floater portions of 29 deals in 2010 and 2011, with 26 bought between October 2010 and April 2011. That compares with seven for all of 2009 and five in 2008.
In these transactions, Freddie has sold off most of the principal, but it hasn’t reduced its risk.
First, if borrowers default, Freddie pays the entire value of the mortgages underpinning the securities, because it insures the loans.
It’s also a big problem if people like the Silversteins refinance their mortgages. That’s because a refi is a new loan; the borrower pays off the first loan early, stopping the interest payments. Since the security Freddie owns is backed mainly by those interest payments, Freddie loses.
And these inverse floaters burden Freddie with entirely new risks. With these deals, Freddie has taken mortgage-backed securities that are easy to sell and traded them for ones that are harder and possibly more expensive to offload, according to mortgage market experts.
The inverse floaters carry another risk. Freddie gets paid the difference between the high mortgages rates, such as the Silversteins are paying, and a key global interest rate that right now is very low. If that rate rises, Freddie’s profits will fall.
It is unclear what kinds of hedging, if any, Freddie has done to offset its risks.
At the end of 2011, Freddie’s portfolio of mortgages was just over $663 billion, down more than 6 percent from the previous year. But that $43 billion drop in the portfolio overstates the risk reduction, because the company retained risk through the inverse floaters. The company is well below the cap of $729 billion required by its government takeover agreement.
How Freddie tightened credit
Restricting credit for people who have done short sales isn’t the only way that Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae have tightened their lending criteria in the wake of the financial crisis, making it harder for borrowers to get housing loans.
Some tightening is justified because, in the years leading up to the financial crisis, Freddie and Fannie were too willing to insure mortgages taken out by people who couldn’t afford them.
In a statement, Freddie contends it is “actively supporting efforts for borrowers to realize the benefits of refinancing their mortgages to lower rates.”
The company said in a statement: “During the first three quarters of 2011, we refinanced more than $170 billion in mortgages, helping nearly 835,000 borrowers save an average of $2,500 in interest payments during the next year.” As part of that effort, the company is participating in an Obama administration plan, called the Home Affordable Refinance Program, or HARP. But critics say HARP could be reaching millions more people if Fannie and Freddie implemented the program more effectively.
Indeed, just as it was escalating its inverse floater deals, it was also introducing new fees on borrowers, including those wanting to refinance. During Thanksgiving week in 2010, Freddie quietly announced that it was raising charges, called post-settlement delivery fees.
In a recent white paper on remedies for the stalled housing market, the Federal Reserve criticized Fannie and Freddie for the fees they have charged for refinancing. Such fees are “another possible reason for low rates of refinancing” and are “difficult to justify,” the Fed wrote.
A former Freddie employee, who spoke on condition he not be named, was even blunter: “Generally, it makes no sense whatsoever” for Freddie “to restrict refinancing” from expensive loans to ones borrowers can more easily pay, since the company remains on the hook if homeowners default.
In November, the FHFA announced that Fannie and Freddie were eliminating or reducing some fees. The Fed, however, said that “more might be done.”
The regulator as owner
The trades raise questions about the FHFA’s oversight of Fannie and Freddie. But the FHFA is not just a regulator. With the two companies in government conservatorship, the FHFA now plays the role of their board of directors and shareholders, responsible for the companies’ major decisions.
Under acting director DeMarco, the FHFA has emphasized that its main goal is to limit taxpayer losses by managing the two companies’ giant investment portfolios to make profits. To cover their previous losses and ongoing operations, Fannie and Freddie already had received $169 billion from taxpayers through the third quarter of last year.
The FHFA has frustrated the administration because the agency has made preserving the value of the companies’ investment portfolios a priority over helping homeowners in expensive mortgages. In 2010, President Barack Obama nominated a permanent replacement for acting director DeMarco, but Republicans in Congress blocked him. Obama has not nominated anyone else to replace DeMarco.
Even though Freddie is a ward of the state, top executives are highly compensated. Peter Federico, who’s in charge of the company’s investment portfolio, made $2.5 million in 2010, and he had target compensation of $2.6 million for last year, when most of these leveraged investments were made.
One of Federico’s responsibilities — tied to his bonuses — is to “support and provide liquidity and stability in the mortgage market,” according to Freddie’s annual filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Mortgage experts contend that the inverse floater trades don’t further that goal.
ProPublica and NPR made numerous attempts to reach Federico. A woman who answered his home phone said he declined to comment.
The FHFA knew about the trades before ProPublica and NPR approached the regulatory agency about them, according to an FHFA official. The FHFA has the power to approve and disapprove trades, though it doesn’t involve itself in day-to-day decisions. The official declined to comment on whether the FHFA knew about them as Freddie was conducting them or whether the FHFA had explicitly approved them.
Liz Day of ProPublica contributed to this story.
From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Tuesday, February 07, 2012 8:56 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: Your AG Needs Your Opinion on the No-Investigation-Slap-on-the-Wrist “Settlement” – Posted by Beth Findsen
Your AG Needs Your Opinion on the No-Investigation-Slap-on-the-Wrist “Settlement”
February 6, 2012
So the persistent buzz is that the AGs are close to a deal, despite the resistance of various AGs of the braver ilk, California and Nevada come to mind. I vote that we all write to Arizona AG Tom Horne and urge him to show the courage of Nevada and hold out until investigations are complete (or even begun) and to insist that there be no waivers of criminal liability or other blatant pandering.
For Abigail Field on the “settlement,” read No, the Latest Bailed-Out-Bank Giveaway Won’t Help Housing
On another note, there was this article in the Awl, critiquing a recent New York magazine article:
Oh dear, here we go again: “Wall Street is a meritocracy, for the most part,” an irate but of course unnamed onetime Citigroup executive confides to junior father confessor Gabriel Sherman in this week’s hallucinatory New York magazine cover story, “The Emasculation of Wall Street.” “If someone has a bonus, it’s because they’ve created value for their institution.”
In the jumpy, suggestible universe of Gabe Sherman, Wall Street sleuth, things really are that simple: The beleaguered financial overclass creates value, in a rationally ordered system of maximally awarded talent. And the clueless public sector, intoxicated on post-meltdown regulatory prerogative, meddles with the primal forces of nature, skews executive compensation downward, panders to the blurry “populist” agenda of the Occupy Wall Street Crowd, generally foments market uncertainty and other forms of intolerable chaos so that presto, before you know it, we have “The End of Wall Street As They Knew It.”
In other words: To your crying towels, bankers! Correspondent Sherman is on the scene, and no howling distortion of recent financial history you care to offer is too outlandish for him to faithfully record! After duly huddling with a couple of dozen financial titans, our reporter has arrived at a chilling verdict: “what emerged is a picture of an industry afflicted by a crisis it would not be flip to call existential.”
Perhaps not—but what is exceedingly flip is brother Sherman’s account of the origins of the crisis.
Sure, there was that awkward business that sent the global finance sector to the brink of ruin, plus a devastating tsunami in Japan and whatnot—but the true culprit sending Wall Street titans back into their bedrooms to listen to Interpol on auto-repeat and cut themselves is of course the specter of government regulation. The Dodd-Frank financial reform act, a largely toothless measure lousy with loopholes and lobbying dosh, becomes in the alternate universe of Adam Moss’s New York magazine a rash bid to expropriate the expropriators. Even though the full provisions of the already anemic bill don’t go into effect until 2016, the very thought of a somewhat straitened financial playing field so terrifies Wall Street’s stout corridor of wealth creators that, well, they’re bidding farewell to the most valuable commodity of all—their big swinging dicks. “The government has strangled the financial system,” Dick Bove, an especially excitable and frequently mistaken bank analyst, tells Sherman. “We’ve basically castrated these companies. They can’t borrow as much as they used to borrow.”
You see, by force of the Volcker rule—a watered-down version of the central Glass-Steagall protections separating out commercial and investment banking that were disastrously repealed in 1999—Wall Street is re-thinking everything, from the scale of its year-end bonuses to its “core value to the economy.” And Bove, for one, preaches that all this doom-and-gloom thinking can’t help but be self-fulfilling: “These are sweeping secular changes taking place that won’t just impact the guys who won’t get their bonuses this year. We’ve made a decision as a nation to shrink the growth of the financial system under the theory that it won’t impact the growth of the nation’s economy.” Another unnamed informant tells Sherman that the financial industry is gearing up for a state of near permanent pay-austerity at the mere thought of the Volcker rule, which doesn’t kick in officially until July: “If you landed on Earth from Mars and looked at the banks, you’d see that these are institutions that need to build up capital and they’re becoming lower-margin businesses. So that means it will be hard, nearly impossible, to sustain their size and compensation structure.”
Never mind that this diagnosis is diametrically opposed to the Bove-ian school of market alarmism, which holds that banks are being starved of desperately needed leverage and credit; this unnamed fearmonger sees them in a frenzy to raise capital, and one thing the Volcker rule undeniably seeks to achieve is minimal capital requirements to prevent speculative lending from veering once more into toxic chaos.
No, for Sherman, all that’s needed to stoke the proper mood of Misean panic is to rouse the specter of frightened bankers, and a few quick-and-dirty quarterly profit reports.
From the moment Dodd-Frank passed, the banks’ financial results have tended to slide downward, in significant part because of measures taken in anticipation of its future effect. Since July 2010, Bank of America nosed down 42 percent, Morgan Stanley fell 25 percent, Goldman fell 21 percent, and Citigroup fell 16—in a period when the Dow rose 25 percent.
Other economic journalists might conclude that this downturn was a set of long-overdue market corrections, and given the broader turn around in the actual manufacturing economy, by no means an indication of worsening conditions—for investors and workers alike. Some radical others might even suggest that the shredded headcounts at the financial firms played a part in their own downturn in revenue. But while from his evidently privileged vantage in the driver’s seat of the Doc’s Time Machine, Sherman can divine all sorts of mischief arising from the yet-to-be-implemented provisions of Dodd-Frank, it does bear reminding that since 2010, BofA has been forced to eat a sizable portion of the toxic mortgage debt it acquired amid its spectacularly ill-advised purchase of Countrywide; Morgan has suffered tremendous losses in its Japanese operations and has, like most banks, been spooked by its exposure to the Euro-debt crisis (funnily enough, the firm’s US-based investment-banking operations—ie, the shop most directly affected by the dread Volcker rule, has booked profits amid all the tumult abroad); much the same general picture holds at Goldman, which as you may recall, has had more than its share of legal contretemps thrown into the bargain . As for Citigroup—the company whose very grotesque merged existence was the deregulatory excuse for repealing Glass Steagall—it’s been a basket case for so very long that a 16 percent loss in profits over the past two years seems cause for celebration, Volcker Rule or no Volcker Rule.
From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Tuesday, February 07, 2012 10:43 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: Price of Signature of Homeowners Rises to Avoid "Title Crash"
Price of Signature of Homeowners Rises to Avoid “Title Crash”
Posted on February 7, 2012 by Neil Garfield
EDITOR’S ANALYSIS: The race is on. Homeowners are sitting on an asset — their signature — that has gone up in value 35X thus far from $1,000 to $35,000. The REAL STORY is that the Banks and servicers need to find a way to get the signatures of homeowners through any means possible, including payment. The amount of the payment is rising and will continue to rise like the last holdout of a property owner on a parcel where some big developer wants to build a giant stadium. People are starting to realize that the longer you hold out the higher will be the payment.
The reason is simple. With the current Missouri indictment clarifying that this was no accidental paperwork problem, the realization is dawning on almost everyone that plain old property law is going to be the basis of the solution to the title crisis enveloping this nation. Without solving it, title insurers, banks, servicers, and other parties could be liable or indicted for stealing millions of homes.
The logic is both simple and compelling. The Banks and services employed “outside servicers” to fabricate documents containing false declarations about the chain of title, their authority to execute documents. Those documents “established” that the forecloser “pretender” was the creditor and that the original loan documents were perfectly fine — and now transferred to a stranger to the transaction — something we call a break in the chain of title if it shows up in the title records.
If the documents consisted of false declarations (and forged too), and that point is accepted as a fact proven in court, there remains no discretion for the Judge but to invalidate the title chain from the time that the break occurred forward. This means title reverts back to the way title appeared in the title chain before the fabrication of documents. That means the homeowner is still the record title owner, entitled to both the title and possession of the property.
The fact is that all the foreclosed homeowners who were the victims of wrongful foreclosures are most probably still the legal owner of the property that was “foreclosed” and “sold” to “creditors” at a false “auction” claiming false credentials. There is only one way to be sure that the title chain can be fixed — get the signature of the homeowner(s) who were involved in the title chain. But the banks and Servicers know that if they simply come right out and ask for the signature they will be met with a negative answer and a barrage of lawsuits which now bear substantial likelihood of success.
So they are concocting various excuses for why homeowners should sign documents that contain releases and ratifications of title. THAT is why they are getting more lenient on modifications short-sales, and now bonuses that raise the standard amount of “cash for keys” from what was $1,000 to over $35,000 so far. See an attorney who is knowledgeable in real estate transactions before you agree to sign anything and bargain hard for your rights and compensation.
They made a fortune deceiving you into signing onto loans that were unworkable based upon prices that were just plain false. You might as well get your piece of the pie — or up the ante and file a quiet title lawsuit. Lawyers should be careful when advising their clients or prospective clients. Many lawyers are still saying the old “you owe the money, you have no rights” mantra. This could be the basis for a malpractice suit later when the client realizes that he did have rights and he lost them as a result of the attorney’s bad advice.
BLOOMBERG
by Prashant Gopal, banks-paying-homeowners-a-bonus-to-avoid-foreclosures-mortgages.html
Banks, accelerating efforts to move troubled mortgages off their books, are offering as much as $35,000 or more in cash to delinquent homeowners to sell their properties for less than they owe.
Lenders have routinely delayed or blocked such transactions, known as short sales, in which they accept less from a buyer than the seller’s outstanding loan. Now banks have decided the deals are faster and less costly than foreclosures, which have slowed in response to regulatory probes of abusive practices. Banks are nudging potential sellers by pre-approving deals, streamlining the closing process, forgoing their right to pursue unpaid debt and in some cases providing large cash incentives, said Bill Fricke, senior credit officer for Moody’s Investors Service in New York.
Losses for lenders are about 15 percent lower on the sales than on foreclosures, which can take years to complete while taxes and legal, maintenance and other costs accumulate, according to Moody’s. The deals accounted for 33 percent of financially distressed transactions in November, up from 24 percent a year earlier, said CoreLogic Inc., a Santa Ana, California-based real estate information company.
Karen Farley hadn’t made a mortgage payment in a year when she got what looked like a form letter from her lender.
“You could sell your home, owe nothing more on your mortgage and get $30,000,” JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) said in the Aug. 17 letter obtained by Bloomberg News.
$200,000 Short
Farley, whose home construction lending business dried up after the housing crash, said the New York-based bank agreed to let her sell her San Marcos, California, home for $592,000 — about $200,000 less than what she owes. The $30,000 will cover moving costs and the rental deposit for her next home. Farley, who is also approved for an additional $3,000 through a federal incentive program, is scheduled to close the deal Feb. 10.
“I wondered, why would they offer me something, and why wouldn’t they just give me the boot?” Farley, 65, said in a telephone interview. “Instead, I’m getting money.”
Tom Kelly, a JPMorgan spokesman, declined to comment on the company’s incentives.
“When a modification is not possible, a short sale produces a better and faster result for the homeowner, the investor and the community than a foreclosure,” he said in an e-mail.
A mountain of pending repossessions is holding back a recovery in the housing market, where prices have fallen for six straight years, and damping economic growth. Owners of more than 14 million homes are in foreclosure, behind on their mortgages or owe more than their properties are worth, said RealtyTrac Inc., a property-data company in Irvine, California.
Foreclosure Holdouts
Short sales represented 9 percent of all U.S. residential transactions in November, the most recent month for which data is available, up from 2 percent in January 2008, according to Corelogic. Bank-owned foreclosures and short sales sold at a discount of 34 percent to non-distressed properties in the third quarter, according to RealtyTrac.
As lenders shift their focus to sales, they are finding that some borrowers would rather risk repossession while they wait for a loan modification, according to Guy Cecala, publisher of Inside Mortgage Finance, a trade journal. In a loan modification, the monthly payment, and sometimes principal, is reduced to help prevent seizure. Homeowners facing foreclosure may live rent-free for years before they are forced out.
“That’s why the banks have got to pay the big bucks,” Cecala said. “The real question is why is the bribe so big? Is that what it takes to get somebody out of their home?”
Multiple Banks
Banks also pay a few thousand dollars to the owners of second liens, whose loans can be wiped out by a short sale, to encourage them not to block the deals.
While JPMorgan is giving the largest incentive payments, other banks and mortgage investors are also offering them, according to interviews with 12 real estate agents in Arizona, California, Florida, New York and Washington. Lenders also provide incentives on loans they service and don’t own when the mortgage investor, such as a hedge fund, requests it.
JPMorgan, the biggest U.S. bank, approves about 5,000 short sales a month. It generally offers $10,000 to $35,000 in cash payments at settlement, real estate agents said. Not all of the sales include incentives.
Borrowers also can receive payments from the federal government’s Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives program, which in 2010 began offering as much as $1,500 to servicers, $2,000 to investors and $3,000 to homeowners who complete short sales.
Quicker Resolution
For banks, approving a sale for less than is owed on the home can cut a year or more off the time it takes to unload a property. From listing to sale, the transactions took about 123 days on average at the end of last year, according to the Campbell/Inside Mortgage Finance HousingPulse Tracking Survey.
Lenders spend an average of 348 days to foreclose in the U.S. and an additional 175 days to sell the property, according to RealtyTrac. In New York, a state that requires court approval for repossessions, it takes about four years to foreclose on a home and then resell it, the company said.
Lenders can often afford to forgive debt, offer the incentive and still make a profit because they purchased the loan from another bank at a discount, said Trent Chapman, a Realtor who trains brokers and attorneys to negotiate with banks for short sales.
Chapman, who also writes a blog on TheShortSaleGenius.com, said he’s heard about 50 homeowners who have received incentives from lenders including JPMorgan, Wells Fargo & Co., Citigroup Inc. and Ally Financial Inc.
Wells Fargo
“My guess is they want to get rid of bad loans,” Chapman said. “If they short sale these types of loans, they have less of a headache and have some goodwill with the homeowner.”
Wells Fargo, based in San Francisco, offers relocation assistance of as much as $20,000 for borrowers who complete short sales or agree to transfer title through a deed in lieu of foreclosure “in certain states with extended foreclosure timelines, including Florida,” Veronica Clemons, a spokeswoman, said in an e-mail.
Bank of America Corp. sent letters to 20,000 Florida homeowners as part of a pilot program, offering incentives of as much as $20,000, or 5 percent of the unpaid loan balance, Jumana Bauwens, a spokeswoman, said in an e-mail. The program expired in December and the Charlotte, North Carolina-based bank hasn’t decided whether to introduce it in other states, she said. About 15 percent of the homeowners agreed to participate in the program, she said.
Citigroup Offers
“The bank is pleased with the response,” Bauwens wrote. “The state is experiencing higher foreclosure rates than other parts of the country and is therefore seen as a viable market to gauge incremental short-sale response and completion rates when presenting homeowners with relocation assistance at closing.”
Citigroup offers $3,000 to most borrowers who qualify for its program, but the “amount may increase based on the circumstances of each individual case,” Mark Rodgers, a spokesman for the New York-based bank, said in an e-mail. “Investor programs have different guidelines for relocation incentives, which we honor.”
Susan Fitzpatrick, a spokeswoman for Detroit-based Ally, didn’t comment specifically on incentives when asked about them.
Borrowers typically can’t negotiate the incentives, which arrive by mail, Chapman, the Realtor, said.
Tap on Shoulder
“It’s not really easy to identify the guidelines because Chase doesn’t tell you, they kind of tap you on the shoulder,” he said. “When I first saw it in January 2011, I thought it was a joke or a typo. I was convinced it must say $3,000, not $30,000.”
Offering enough for the homeowner to put down a deposit on a rental apartment is reasonable, said Sean O’Toole, chief executive officer of ForeclosureRadar.com, which tracks sales of foreclosed properties. Giving tens of thousands of dollars to delinquent homeowners sends the wrong message, particularly if they got into trouble by running up home-equity loans during the housing boom, he said.
“It may make sense for people to walk away, it doesn’t make sense for them to get rewarded for doing it,” O’Toole said. “It’s not the homeowner’s fault that house prices dropped so dramatically, but they have already received months of free rent, if not cash out.”
Cecala of Inside Mortgage Finance said he wonders whether lenders are making big payments on properties with underlying title problems. Evan Berlin, managing partner of Berlin Patten, a real estate law firm in Sarasota, Florida, said representatives of a large bank told him the incentives are primarily given to borrowers when it doesn’t have the proper paperwork needed to win its foreclosure case. He declined to name the bank for publication.
Incentive Disconnect
State attorneys general across the U.S. began investigating foreclosure practices in October 2010 following allegations that the nation’s top mortgage servicers were using faulty documents to repossess homes.
Berlin said his office negotiated about 400 short sales in the past year and about a quarter included an incentive, ranging from $3,000 to $48,000. In some cases, the payments aren’t incentives at all because they’re offered after the borrower has almost completed the short sale, he said.
“The idea is that this is relocation assistance,” Berlin said. “But when you’re offering $48,000, obviously it doesn’t cost $48,000 to relocate.”
Cooperation Sought
The size of the payment may have little to do with sales price. JPMorgan gave one Phoenix homeowner $20,000 after she sold her property in June for $32,000, according to Royce Hauger, the real estate agent who represented the seller and shared a copy of the settlement sheet with Bloomberg News. The bank also agreed to forgive more than $70,000 in debt, she said.
Kelly, the JPMorgan spokesman, declined to comment on the payment.
The homeowners are getting the money in exchange for their cooperation, said Kris Pilles, a Riverhead, New York-based real estate broker who represents banks, servicers and hedge funds that own distressed housing debt.
Pilles is frequently dispatched to the homes of delinquent borrowers to explain the benefits of avoiding foreclosure, he said. His clients have paid as much as $92,500. In return, the lenders expect the seller to clean the house before showings, and trim the grass.
“Money talks,” Pilles said. “From the bank side, it’s anything to initiate a conversation with someone who may not be listening to them.”
To contact the reporter on this story: Prashant Gopal in New York at pgopal2
To contact the editors responsible for this story: Daniel Taub at dtaub; Rob Urban at robprag.

California not among states that OK bank settlement
——————–
More than 40 states signed onto a proposed $25-billion deal with major mortgage servicers over faulty foreclosure practices. New York, Nevada and Delaware joined California in holding out for better terms.
By Alejandro Lazo and Jim Puzzanghera, Los Angeles Times
February 7 2012
Reporting from Los Angeles and Washington — More than 40 states signed onto a proposed $25-billion settlement with major mortgage servicers over faulty foreclosure procedures, but California, New York and other key states were still not among them.
The complete article can be viewed at:
http://www.latimes.com/business/realestate/la-fi-foreclosure-settlement-20120207,0,5999524.story

We have uncovered a number of the Newspapers that “publish” for 21 days the notice of Trustee sale are not legally qualified to do so.
A “newspaper of general circulation” is a newspaper published for the dissemination of local or telegraphic news and intelligence of a general character, which has a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers, and has been established, printed and published at regular intervals in the State, county, or city where publication, notice by publication, or official advertising is to be given or made for at least one year preceding the date of the publication, notice or advertisement.
The Paso Robles Press in Paso Robles California are not Judicially adjudicated and they are printed outside the county, We are currently litigating cases and having the Trustee Sales set aside. This paper is printed hundreds of miles ouside the San Luis Obispo county in Watsonville, California and they have published hundreds of Legal notices.
Generally speaking, the statutory, nonjudicial foreclosure procedure begins with the recording of a notice of default by the trustee. (§ 2924, subd. (a)(1).) 8 After the expiration of not less than three months, the trustee must publish, post, and mail a notice of sale at least 20 days before the sale, and must also record the notice of sale at least 14 days before the sale (§§ 2924, subds. (a)(1), (a)(2) & (a)(3), 2924f, subd. (b)(1); see Moeller v. Lien (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 822, 830, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 777 (Moeller ); see also 4 Miller & Starr, supra, § 10:199, p. 623.) The sale and any postponement are governed by section 2924g. (Moeller, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 830, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 777; Miller & Starr, supra, § 10:201, p. 637.)
From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Friday, January 20, 2012 8:25 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: My Dear Fellow Attorneys from Matt Weidner
My Dear Fellow Attorneys:
January 20th, 2012 | Author: Matthew D. Weidner, Esq.
I have spent this week, the week we celebrate Martin Luther King Jr and his accomplishments during the civil rights movement, thinking about the very real parallels between that tumultuous time and where we are today in this country. Especially today, when I am in a jail of sorts, I have been considering how King and his followers were constantly attacked. The attacks King and his followers suffered are not unlike the attacks that are visited upon those few who are standing up to defend consumers, fight for basic rights and the Rule of Law. It is rumored that the banks will announce a deal soon with the attorney generals from all across the country that have been investigating them. If any deal is indeed inked it will be a most dark day in this nation’s history. A deal between the banks and the attorney generals will indeed be the last nail in the coffin of the fiction that we are still a nation ruled by laws. So as you think about that, close your eyes for a moment and picture Martin Luther King sitting in a Birmingham jail and responding to a letter of complaint that he had recently received:
My Dear Fellow Attorneys:
While confined here in a foreclosure courtroom, I came across your recent statement calling my present activities “unwise and untimely.” Seldom do I pause to answer criticism of myself and the other foreclosure and consumer defense attorneys by those who do not understand that the work of defending the helpless is the highest calling of the legal profession. If I sought to answer all the criticisms that cross my desk, my secretaries would have little time for anything other than such correspondence in the course of the day, and I would have no time for constructive work. But since I feel that you are men of genuine good will and that your criticisms are sincerely set forth, I want to try to answer your statement in what I hope will be patient and reasonable terms.
I think I should indicate why I am here in foreclosure courtrooms, since you have been influenced by the view which argues against defending consumers in court, fearful that all these defendants want is a “Free House”. I have the honor of serving and defending families and good people who find themselves down on their luck and facing foreclosure. Despite some of the unfair, unfortunate and misinformed characterizations of my clients perpetuated by some small segment of the population, my clients are not in foreclosure because they want to be in foreclosure. They are not unemployed because they do not want to work. They are not down on their luck because they sought out a tortured existence in this world. They are in foreclosure because they have no money. They have no money because there are no jobs. There are no jobs because their government has failed them. The industries and institutions that should be providing jobs and providing the money that would permit them to pay their bills and fulfill their obligations have closed down here at home and sent all the jobs offshore. For many of my clients, foreclosure courtroom is their last stop before they disappear into oblivion. They stand in courtrooms gripping onto their homes with white, bleeding knuckles, hoping against all hope that what they have heard about justice and fairness and equity and our nation’s court system really is true.
But more basically, I defend homeowners in court because injustice is here. Just as the prophets of the eighth century B.C. left their villages and carried their “thus saith the Lord” far beyond the boundaries of their home towns, and just as the Apostle Paul left his village of Tarsus and carried the gospel of Jesus Christ to the far corners of the Greco Roman world, so am I compelled to carry the fight for the Rule of Law beyond my own cases and clients. Like Paul, I must constantly respond to the Macedonian call for aid. Moreover, I am cognizant of the interrelatedness of all communities and states. I cannot sit idly by in Saint Petersburg and not be concerned about what happens in Birmingham. Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly. Never again can we afford to live with the narrow, provincial “outside agitator” idea. Anyone who lives inside the United States can never be considered an outsider anywhere within its bounds.
You deplore the defense of foreclosure cases and the Occupy protests that are taking place all across this country. But your statements, I am sorry to say, fail to express a similar concern for the conditions that brought about the demonstrations and the defense. I am sure that none of you would want to rest content with the superficial kind of social and legal analysis that deals merely with effects and does not grapple with underlying causes. It is unfortunate that demonstrations are taking place all across this country, but it is even more unfortunate that this nation’s power structure left the 99% with no alternative. It is terribly unfortunate that attorneys general from states all across this nation are meeting in secret with the banks and their henchmen and that they appear to close to finalizing some sort of deal. If the attorneys general that are supposed to be representing the interests of The People do indeed finalize a deal, it will truly be a deal with the devil. Such a deal will hasten our nation’s descent into a dark pit of white collar criminal lawlessness from which we will never recover.
In any nonviolent campaign there are four basic steps: collection of the facts to determine whether injustices exist; negotiation; self purification; and direct action. We have gone through all these steps in foreclosure courtrooms. There can be no gainsaying the fact that injustice engulfs our entire nation. Foreclosure courtrooms are probably the most clear expression of this injustice in the United States. The ugly record of injustice in foreclosure is widely known. Defendants in foreclosure have experienced grossly unjust treatment in the courts. There have been more violations of the fundamental principles of justice and equity in foreclosures than in any other aspect of our national existence. These are the hard, brutal facts of the case. On the basis of these conditions, homeowners and activists have sought to negotiate with the banks and institutions.
But the latter consistently refused to engage in good faith negotiation. Then, last September, came the opportunity to talk with leaders of banking community. In the course of the negotiations, certain promises were made by them–for example, they would review homeowners for loan modifications. On the basis of these promises, homeowners, attorneys and courts agreed to suspend most pending foreclosure cases. As the weeks and months went by however, we realized that we were the victims of a broken promise. A few temporary modifications were offered then just as quickly removed. As in so many past experiences, our hopes had been blasted, and the shadow of deep disappointment settled upon us. We had no alternative except to prepare for direct action like foreclosure trials, whereby we would continue the defense of homeowners and speaking out against the banks and the corporate elite as a means of laying our case before the conscience of the local and the national community.
You may well ask: “Why direct action? Why motions and discovery, foreclosure trials and so forth? Isn’t mediation a better path? You are quite right in calling for mediation. Indeed, this is the very purpose of direct action. Nonviolent direct action seeks to create such a crisis and foster such a tension that an industry which has constantly refused to negotiate is forced to confront the issues. It seeks so to dramatize the issue that it can no longer be ignored. My citing the creation of tension as part of the work of the nonviolent resister may sound rather shocking. But I must confess that I am not afraid of the word “tension.” I have earnestly opposed violent tension, but there is a type of constructive, nonviolent tension which is necessary for growth. Just as Socrates felt that it was necessary to create a tension in the mind so that individuals could rise from the bondage of myths and half truths to the unfettered realm of creative analysis and objective appraisal, so must we see the need for nonviolent gadflies to create the kind of tension in society that will help men rise from the dark depths of prejudice and racism to the majestic heights of understanding and brotherhood.
The purpose of our direct action program is to create a situation so crisis packed that it will inevitably open the door to successful mediations. I therefore concur with you in your call for mediations. Too long has our beloved court system been bogged down in a tragic effort to live in monologue rather than dialogue. One of the basic points in your statement is that the action that I and my associates have taken in foreclosure courtrooms is untimely. Some have asked: “Why didn’t you give the new mediation programs time to act?” The only answer that I can give to this query is that the programs and the plaintiffs must be prodded about as much as before. We are all sadly mistaken if we feel that these new mediation programs will bring any real changes without pressure on the banks to deal fairly and in good faith. While the new banks and servicers may be different, they are both corporate creatures, dedicated to maintenance of the status quo. I have hope that the banks will be reasonable enough to see the futility of massive resistance to mortgage modifications and solutions. But they will not see this without pressure from devotees of consumer rights.
My friends, I must say to you that we have not made a single gain in consumer rights without determined legal and nonviolent pressure. Lamentably, it is an historical fact that privileged groups seldom give up their privileges voluntarily. Individuals may see the moral light and voluntarily give up their unjust posture; but, as Reinhold Niebuhr has reminded us, groups tend to be more immoral than individuals. We know through painful experience that fair dealings are never voluntarily given by the banks; it must be demanded by the consumers that bailed them out. Some say, “Be patient, pushing these issues is not well-timed.”
Frankly, I have yet to engage in a direct action campaign that was “well timed” in the view of those who have suffered unduly from the tortures of this obscene and unfair economy and its parasitic legal and political system. For years now I have heard the words, “Wait, a solution is coming!” It rings in the ear of every American citizen with piercing familiarity. This “Wait” has almost always meant “Never.” We must come to see, with one of our distinguished jurists, that “justice too long delayed is justice denied.” We have waited for since 2008 for the banks and Wall Street to start treating Americans fairly. The banks and Wall Street are moving with jetlike speed toward gaining extraordinary profitablity, but we still creep at horse and buggy pace toward gaining principle reductions or short sale approvals.
Perhaps it is easy for those who have never felt the stinging darts foreclosure to say, “Wait.” But when you have seen good families thrown into the street, when you have seen the banks kick down doors and change the locks with no court order, when you have seen law enforcement standing idly by and saying, “it is a civil matter”, when you have seen court rulings that are repugnant to fundamental laws, when you have seen the bank and corporate executives reap unconscionable profits, when you have seen clients become sick and die due to the stress and pain of foreclosure and their economic situation, when you have seen single women who live in mortal fear that her front door may be kicked down for the third time, when you see children who have only known their parents suffering–then you will understand why we find it difficult to wait.There comes a time when the cup of endurance runs over, and men are no longer willing to be plunged into the abyss of despair. I hope, sirs, you can understand our legitimate and unavoidable impatience.
You express a great deal of anxiety over our willingness to aggressively pursue foreclosure cases, to stand up for basic laws and argue that certain foreclosure case law should not be followed. You express concern that we some of the recent case law should not be followed. This is certainly a legitimate concern. Since we so diligently urge people to obey the laws. One may well ask: “How can you advocate breaking some laws and obeying others?” The answer lies in the fact that there are two types of laws: just and unjust. I would be the first to advocate obeying just laws. One has not only a legal but a moral responsibility to obey just laws. Conversely, one has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws. I would agree with St. Augustine that “an unjust law is no law at all.” Now, what is the difference between the two? How does one determine whether a law is just or unjust? A just law is a man made code that squares with the moral law or the law of God. An unjust law or appellate case is a code that is out of harmony with the moral law and economic reality. A just law and a just outcome in foreclosure recognizes that the homeowners that the banks are using the court process to throw into the street have already paid the banks and institutions through trillions of dollars in tax benefits and direct profits. To put it in the terms of St. Thomas Aquinas: An unjust law is a human law that is not rooted in eternal law and natural law. Any law that uplifts human personality is just. Any law that degrades human personality is unjust.
All homestead foreclosures, when the case is defended because the homeowner has already paid the bank his fair share through bailouts, handouts and direct political corruption. Let us consider a more concrete example of just and unjust laws. An unjust law is a code that a numerical or power majority group compels a minority group to obey but does not make binding on itself. This is difference made legal. By the same token, a just law is a code that a majority compels a minority to follow and that it is willing to follow itself. This is sameness made legal. Let me give another explanation. A law is unjust if it is inflicted on a minority that, as a result of being denied the right to vote, had no part in enacting or devising the law. Who can say that the banks, which have obscenely unequal bargaining power have passed laws that benefit themselves while forcing trauma and the expenses of their ill-conceived laws on the unrepresented taxpayer and consumer who is victimized by their laws?
Throughout this nation all sorts of devious methods are used to prevent the voice of The People from being heard and to silencing advocates and critics. Can any law enacted under such circumstances be considered democratically structured? Sometimes a law is just on its face and unjust in its application. For instance, I have been charged with abusing my First Amendment rights. Now, there is nothing wrong in having an ordinance which restricts speech. But such an ordinance becomes unjust when it is used to punish well-intentioned criticism of our court system and to deny citizens the First-Amendment privilege of peaceful assembly and protest. I hope you are able to see the distinction I am trying to point out. In no sense do I advocate “free homes” as some do. That would lead to anarchy. One who seeks to defend a homeowner must be willing to counsel that homeowner to begin making what payments he can. I submit that an individual who correctly and aggressively defends the correct foreclosure case is in reality expressing the highest respect for law. Of course, there is nothing new about this kind of civil disobedience.
It was evidenced sublimely in the refusal of Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego to obey the laws of Nebuchadnezzar, on the ground that a higher moral law was at stake. It was practiced superbly by the early Christians, who were willing to face hungry lions and the excruciating pain of chopping blocks rather than submit to certain unjust laws of the Roman Empire. To a degree, academic freedom is a reality today because Socrates practiced civil disobedience. In our own nation, the Boston Tea Party represented a massive act of civil disobedience.
We should never forget that everything Adolf Hitler did in Germany was “legal” and everything the Hungarian freedom fighters did in Hungary was “illegal.” It was “illegal” to aid and comfort a Jew in Hitler’s Germany. Even so, I am sure that, had I lived in Germany at the time, I would have aided and comforted my Jewish brothers. If today I lived in a Communist country where certain principles dear to the Christian faith are suppressed, I would openly advocate disobeying that country’s antireligious laws. I must make two honest confessions to you, my fellow attorneys.
First, I must confess that over the past few years I have been gravely disappointed with other attorneys. I have almost reached the regrettable conclusion that the consumer’s great stumbling block in his stride toward fairness is not the banks or the servicers, but the attorneys who are more devoted to “order” than to justice; who prefer a negative peace which is the absence of tension to a positive peace which is the presence of justice; who constantly says: “I agree with you in the goal you seek, but I cannot agree with your methods of direct action”; who paternalistically believes he can set the timetable for demanding economic justice and the return to the Rule of Law in courtrooms; who live by a mythical concept of time and who constantly advises those who are suffering to wait for a “more convenient season.”
Shallow understanding from people of good will is more frustrating than absolute misunderstanding from people of ill will. Lukewarm acceptance is much more bewildering than outright rejection. I had hoped that the other attorneys would understand that law and order exist for the purpose of establishing justice and that when they fail in this purpose they become the dangerously structured dams that block the flow of social and economic progress. I had hoped that the other attorneys would understand that the present tension in the our courts is a necessary phase of the transition from an obnoxious negative peace, in which the consumer accepted his unjust plight, to a substantive and positive peace, in which all consumers wake up and start fighting back.
Actually, we who engage in the defense of consumers are not the creators of tension. We merely bring to the surface the hidden tension that is already alive. We bring it out in the open, where it can be seen and dealt with. Like a boil that can never be cured so long as it is covered up but must be opened with all its ugliness to the natural medicines of air and light, injustice must be exposed, with all the tension its exposure creates, to the light of human conscience and the air of national opinion before it can be cured. In your attacks on consumer attorneys and activists you assert that our actions, even though professionally and ethically appropriate, must be condemned because they slow down the court process.
I have even heard many good judges cry aloud, “The Supreme Court and Legislature demand we conclude foreclosure trials in 18 months!” But is this a logical assertion? What if the legislature demanded that all criminal cases be concluded in some arbitrary period, but the prosecutors did not want to proceed with false evidence? What if family courts were underfunded yet the legislature demanded swift closure…and yet the couple that stands before you did not yet want their divorce….would you still demand they conclude their divorce…or else? You speak of foreclosure defense as extreme. At first I was rather disappointed that fellow attorneys would see my efforts as those of an extremist.
I began thinking about the fact that I stand in the middle of two opposing forces in the economically depressed community. One is a force of complacency, made up in part of those who, as a result of long years of oppression, are so drained of self respect and a sense of “somebodiness” that they have adjusted to their condition; and in part of a few middle-class Americans who, because of a degree of academic and economic security and because in some ways they profit by segregation, have become insensitive to the problems of the masses. The other force is one of bitterness and hatred, and it comes perilously close to advocating violence.
It is expressed in the various Occupy groups that are springing up across the nation, the largest and best known being Occupy Wall Street. Nourished by the frustration over the continued existence of economic and social discrimination, this movement is made up of people who have lost faith in America, who have absolutely repudiated our corrupt form of government, and who have concluded that corporations are an incorrigible “devil.” Oppressed people cannot remain oppressed forever. The yearning for freedom and fairness eventually manifests itself, and that is what has happened to the American people. Something within has reminded him of his birthright of freedom and economic equality and something without has reminded him that it can be gained. I had hoped that the banks and institutions would see this need. Perhaps I was too optimistic; perhaps I expected too much. I suppose I should have realized that few members of the oppressor class can understand the deep groans and passionate yearnings of the oppressed people, and still fewer have the vision to see that injustice must be rooted out by strong, persistent and determined action.
But despite notable exceptions, I must honestly reiterate that I have been disappointed with the church. I do not say this as one of those negative critics who can always find something wrong with the church. I say this as a minister of the gospel, who loves the church; who was nurtured in its bosom; who has been sustained by its spiritual blessings and who will remain true to it as long as the cord of life shall lengthen. When myself and others started defending homeowners in foreclosure a few years ago, I felt we would be supported by other attorneys. Instead, some have been outright opponents, refusing to understand the foreclosure defense movement and misrepresenting its leaders; all too many others have been more cautious than courageous and have remained silent behind the anesthetizing security of their own offices.
In spite of my shattered dreams, I come to court everyday with the hope that other attorneys would see the justice of our cause and, with deep moral concern, would serve as the channel through which our just grievances could reach the power structure. I had hoped that each of you would understand. But again I have been disappointed. Yes, these questions are still in my mind. In deep disappointment I have wept over the laxity of the attorney class. But be assured that my tears have been tears of love. There can be no deep disappointment where there is not deep love. Yes, I love the attorney class. How could I do otherwise? There was a time when the attorney class was very powerful. In those days the attorney class was not merely a thermometer that recorded the ideas and principles of popular opinion; it was a thermostat that transformed the mores of society.
Whenever the good attorneys entered a town, the people in power became disturbed and immediately sought to convict them for being “disturbers of the peace” and “outside agitators.”‘ But the attorneys pressed on, in the conviction that they were “a colony of heaven,” called to obey the Rule of Law rather than man. Small in number, they were big in commitment. Things are different now. So often the attorney class is a weak, ineffectual voice with an uncertain sound. So often it is an archdefender of the status quo. Far from being disturbed by the presence of attorneys, the power structure of the average community is consoled by the attorney class’s silent–and often even vocal–sanction of things as they are.
But the judgment of The People is upon our court system as never before. If today’s court system does not recapture the spirit and integrity of the early courts, it will lose its authenticity, forfeit the loyalty of millions, and be dismissed as an institution with no meaning for the twentieth century. Every day I meet young people whose disappointment with the church has turned into outright disgust. Perhaps I have once again been too optimistic. Are attorneys too inextricably bound to the status quo to save our nation and the world? Perhaps I must turn my faith to the highest called among the ranks, the attorneys above the other attorneys, as the true ekklesia and the hope of the world. But again I am thankful to God that some noble souls from the ranks of attorneys have broken loose from the paralyzing chains of conformity and joined us as active partners in the struggle for foreclosure justice and basic rights.
It is true that the courts have exercised a degree of discipline in handling the foreclosure crisis. In this sense they have conducted themselves rather mechanically. But for what purpose? To preserve the system of foreclosure. Over the past few years I have consistently asserted that the vast magnitude of problems in the pending foreclosure files currently filed demands that most be dismissed in order not to soil the entire court system’s integrity. Never before have I written so long a letter. I’m afraid it is much too long to take your precious time. I can assure you that it would have been much shorter if I had been writing from a comfortable desk, but what else can one do when he is sitting here in a foreclosure courtroom, other than write long letters, think long thoughts and pray long prayers?
If I have said anything in this letter that overstates the truth and indicates an unreasonable impatience, I beg you to forgive me. If I have said anything that understates the truth and indicates my having a patience that allows me to settle for anything less than brotherhood, I beg God to forgive me. I hope this letter finds you strong in the faith. I also hope that circumstances will soon make it possible for me to meet each of you, not as an antagonist on one side of this profound economic and social rights battle but as a fellow attorney all on the side of justice and the Rule of Law.
Let us all hope that the dark clouds of injustice will soon pass away and the deep fog of misunderstanding will be lifted from our fear drenched communities, and in some not too distant tomorrow the radiant stars of love and brotherhood will shine over our great nation with all their scintillating beauty.
Yours for the cause of Peace and Brotherhood, Matthew Weidner
And I especially encourage you to read Luther’s Letter From A Birmingham Jail
By Scot J. Paltrow
Fri Jan 20, 2012 9:31am EST
(Reuters) – U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder and Lanny Breuer, head of the Justice Department’s criminal division, were partners for years at a Washington law firm that represented a Who’s Who of big banks and other companies at the center of alleged foreclosure fraud, a Reuters inquiry shows.
The firm, Covington & Burling, is one of Washington’s biggest white shoe law firms. Law professors and other federal ethics experts said that federal conflict of interest rules required Holder and Breuer to recuse themselves from any Justice Department decisions relating to law firm clients they personally had done work for.

Both the Justice Department and Covington declined to say if either official had personally worked on matters for the big mortgage industry clients. Justice Department spokeswoman Tracy Schmaler said Holder and Breuer had complied fully with conflict of interest regulations, but she declined to say if they had recused themselves from any matters related to the former clients.
Reuters reported in December that under Holder and Breuer, the Justice Department hasn’t brought any criminal cases against big banks or other companies involved in mortgage servicing, even though copious evidence has surfaced of apparent criminal violations in foreclosure cases.
The evidence, including records from federal and state courts and local clerks’ offices around the country, shows widespread forgery, perjury, obstruction of justice, and illegal foreclosures on the homes of thousands of active-duty military personnel.
In recent weeks the Justice Department has come under renewed pressure from members of Congress, state and local officials and homeowners’ lawyers to open a wide-ranging criminal investigation of mortgage servicers, the biggest of which have been Covington clients. So far Justice officials haven’t responded publicly to any of the requests.
While Holder and Breuer were partners at Covington, the firm’s clients included the four largest U.S. banks – Bank of America, Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase and Wells Fargo & Co – as well as at least one other bank that is among the 10 largest mortgage servicers.
DEFENDER OF FREDDIE
Servicers perform routine mortgage maintenance tasks, including filing foreclosures, on behalf of mortgage owners, usually groups of investors who bought mortgage-backed securities.
Covington represented Freddie Mac, one of the nation’s biggest issuers of mortgage backed securities, in enforcement investigations by federal financial regulators.
A particular concern by those pressing for an investigation is Covington’s involvement with Virginia-based MERS Corp, which runs a vast computerized registry of mortgages. Little known before the mortgage crisis hit, MERS, which stands for Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, has been at the center of complaints about false or erroneous mortgage documents.
Court records show that Covington, in the late 1990s, provided legal opinion letters needed to create MERS on behalf of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase and several other large banks. It was meant to speed up registration and transfers of mortgages. By 2010, MERS claimed to own about half of all mortgages in the U.S. — roughly 60 million loans.
But evidence in numerous state and federal court cases around the country has shown that MERS authorized thousands of bank employees to sign their names as MERS officials. The banks allegedly drew up fake mortgage assignments, making it appear falsely that they had standing to file foreclosures, and then had their own employees sign the documents as MERS “vice presidents” or “assistant secretaries.”
Covington in 2004 also wrote a crucial opinion letter commissioned by MERS, providing legal justification for its electronic registry. MERS spokeswoman Karmela Lejarde declined to comment on Covington legal work done for MERS.
It isn’t known to what extent if any Covington has continued to represent the banks and other mortgage firms since Holder and Breuer left. Covington declined to respond to questions from Reuters. A Covington spokeswoman said the firm had no comment.
Several lawyers for homeowners have said that even if Holder and Breuer haven’t violated any ethics rules, their ties to Covington create an impression of bias toward the firms’ clients, especially in the absence of any prosecutions by the Justice Department.
O. Max Gardner III, a lawyer who trains other attorneys to represent homeowners in bankruptcy court foreclosure actions, said he attributes the Justice Department’s reluctance to prosecute the banks or their executives to the Obama White House’s view that it might harm the economy.
But he said that the background of Holder and Breuer at Covington — and their failure to act on foreclosure fraud or publicly recuse themselves — “doesn’t pass the smell test.”
Federal ethics regulations generally require new government officials to recuse themselves for one year from involvement in matters involving clients they personally had represented at their former law firms.
President Obama imposed additional restrictions on appointees that essentially extended the ban to two years. For Holder, that ban would have expired in February 2011, and in April for Breuer. Rules also require officials to avoid creating the appearance of a conflict.
Schmaler, the Justice Department spokeswoman, said in an e-mail that “The Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General Breuer have conformed with all financial, legal and ethical obligations under law as well as additional ethical standards set by the Obama Administration.”
She said they “routinely consult” the department’s ethics officials for guidance. Without offering specifics, Schmaler said they “have recused themselves from matters as required by the law.”
Senior government officials often move to big Washington law firms, and lawyers from those firms often move into government posts. But records show that in recent years the traffic between the Justice Department and Covington & Burling has been particularly heavy. In 2010, Holder’s deputy chief of staff, John Garland, returned to Covington, as did Steven Fagell, who was Breuer’s deputy chief of staff in the criminal division.
The firm has on its web site a page listing its attorneys who are former federal government officials. Covington lists 22 from the Justice Department, and 12 from U.S. Attorneys offices, the Justice Department’s local federal prosecutors’ offices around the country.
As Reuters reported in 2011, public records show large numbers of mortgage promissory notes with apparently forged endorsements that were submitted as evidence to courts.
There also is evidence of almost routine manufacturing of false mortgage assignments, documents that transfer ownership of mortgages between banks or to groups of investors. In foreclosure actions in courts mortgage assignments are required to show that a bank has the legal right to foreclose.
In an interview in late 2011, Raymond Brescia, a visiting professor at Yale Law School who has written about foreclosure practices said, “I think it’s difficult to find a fraud of this size on the U.S. court system in U.S. history.”
Holder has resisted calls for a criminal investigation since October 2010, when evidence of widespread “robo-signing” first surfaced. That involved mortgage servicer employees falsely signing and swearing to massive numbers of affidavits and other foreclosure documents that they had never read or checked for accuracy.
Recent calls for a wide-ranging criminal investigation of the mortgage servicing industry have come from members of Congress, including Senator Maria Cantwell, D-Wash., state officials, and county clerks. In recent months clerks from around the country have examined mortgage and foreclosure records filed with them and reported finding high percentages of apparently fraudulent documents.
On Wednesday, John O’Brien Jr., register of deeds in Salem, Mass., announced that he had sent 31,897 allegedly fraudulent foreclosure-related documents to Holder. O’Brien said he asked for a criminal investigation of servicers and their law firms that had filed the documents because they “show a pattern of fraud,” forgery and false notarizations.
(Reporting By Scot J. Paltrow, editing by Blake Morrison)
They take our payments they take the investors money they take AIG credit default Swap money they take the Private Mortgage Insurance they take the TARP they take our homes in Foreclosure THEN THEY ASK FOR AMNESTY.

by Yves Smith SEE FULL ARTICLE ON NAKEDCAPITALISM.COM
There is a slow moving but nevertheless troubling effort underway to change foreclosure
laws across the US. The Uniform Law Commission, the same body that created the Uniform Commercial Code, a model set of laws that sought to harmonize commercial laws in all 50 states, has had two full day public but not well publicized meeting of a “study group” on mortgage foreclosure. Note that it took over a decade to draft the first version of the UCC and a protracted period for it to be implemented by states (most states have adopted the updated version of the UCC, although certain articles of the new version have not been implemented in any states).
Given its august history, one would think the ULC would be above political influences. That would appear to be a naive assumption these days. The study committee’s public meetings meetings to solicit opinion from “stakeholders” on “problems” with foreclosures. Curiously enough, these “stakeholder” meetings had no representation of investors (Tom Deutsch of the American Securitization Forum would claim he played that role, but everyone in mortgage land knows the ASF is a sell side organization) and effectively no input from homeowners or consumer advocates (none at the first meeting, and only, at the second, in Washington last week).
I got reports from three people who attended the latest session, in Washington, last week, na all were disheartening. Tom Cox, the Maine attorney who broke the robosigning scandal, provided a memorandum that argues that the commission has effectively assumed that the “problems” require a legislative solution:
Before there can be a determination made as to whether there is a need for a new uniform act dealing with foreclosure issues, there must be an clear accounting of (1) what the problems are that cause legislation to be considered, (2) what has caused those problems to occur, and (3) only then, whether the problems lend themselves to a legislative solution that would be offered by a new uniform act. Unfortunately, it appears that the JEBURPA letter of May 30, 2011 and all of the subsequent steps leading to this stakeholders’ meeting have failed to conduct the step 2 analysis. Further, it appears that the assumption has been made that new legislation is the solution to the perceived problems without there having been analysis of whether other non-‐legislative solutions might be more appropriate.
I suggest you read Cox’s memo in full:
Thomas A. Cox Memo for ULC Study Committee
From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Monday, January 23, 2012 10:56 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: Pulling Back the Curtain Report
See the attached.The-Curtain-Report.pdf
Charles
Charles Wayne Cox – Oregon State Director for the National Homeowners Cooperative
Email: mailto:Charles
Websites: http://www.NHCwest.com; www.BayLiving.com; and www.ForensicLoanAnalyst.com
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Medford, OR 97504-5403
(541) 727-2240 direct
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It’s time for me to have an adult conversation with the experienced practicing attorneys in this country. Other grown-ups are welcome to sit in as well, but it’s time for children to be in bed or occupied elsewhere, okay?
Well, today we have a mammoth size foreclosure problem in this country, and it’s being talked about like it’s damn near an unsolvable problem… as if solving it would require determining the chemical origins of life, or figuring out whether black holes really do exist in space.
The foreclosure crisis, thank goodness, is not a black hole-type problem as many would have us believe. It is a problem that, political constraints notwithstanding, exists at the juncture of economics and the rule of law. In other words… it’s an oil spill… perhaps the worst oil spill of which the world has ever conceived… the Exxon Valdez meets Deepwater Horizon x 100, if you will… but it’s still just an oil spill.
It’s also important to note that as an economics problem alone, the foreclosure crisis is not a particularly challenging one to solve. Some would rush to remind me that any proposed solution would be rife with “moral hazard,” and while that may be true, it doesn’t make the problem insoluble, by any means.
A couple of years ago, many would have said that my use of the word “fraud” before “closure,” is just hyperbole. Today, however, anyone voicing that sort of opinion is selling something. Even a cursory review of last year’s scathing “consent orders,” that federal regulators issued after months spent investigating mortgage servicers… or a quick perusal of the complaints filed against the servicers by attorneys general in Massachusetts, Nevada, Maryland, or Arizona… or by reading any number of published court decisions favoring homeowners… and one can only conclude that use of the word “fraud” is, if anything, understatement.
Additionally, this past year has been a turning point for the general public as far as FRAUDclosures are concerned. Television’s most venerable news magazine, “60 Minutes,” along with newspaper-of-record, “The New York Times,” joined a long list of others documenting the many ways that banks and mortgage servicers are routinely breaking numerous laws in order to take advantage of homeowners in foreclosure. It’s now widely understood to be something that’s occurring all over the country, and even though the banking industry continues to try to dismiss publicized instances as insignificant dalliances or “isolated incidents,” their sheer number has made such attempts laughable. And the levels of wholesale anger and dissatisfaction with government felt among the populace are both palpable and rising fast.
Today, even forecasts from the likes of Goldman Sachs and Amherst Securities peg the number of foreclosures between 10.4 and 14 million by year-end 2014, and those numbers could easily go higher should home prices continue to fall… which they invariably will. Add those numbers to the millions of foreclosures already water under the bridge, and were talking about a crisis that results in ONE IN FOUR Americans with mortgages losing their homes to foreclosure in the next handful of years.
What I’m describing will unquestionably devastate any hope for recovery in our broader economy for any number of reasons. For one thing, as banks are forced to recognize their losses incurred on the mortgage-backed securities and CDOs that capitalize their balance sheets, they will become insolvent… and this time many will be forced to fail. For another, home prices will continue falling pushing more and more homeowners underwater and consumer spending will continue to decline and that will lead to rising unemployment, which will in turn fuel further foreclosures. And those hopelessly underwater will begin walking away en masse, which will further exacerbate the decline in prices and become impossible to combat.
All of these factors and more will combine to reduce future demand for residential real estate dramatically… perhaps by half, but in addition, with no secondary mortgage market… no ability to securitize debt… even those wanting to buy homes going forward will find credit to be tight and tighter, destroying any potential for recovery in the housing market.
And I’m no longer in a small group of people writing about this deteriorating situation as was the case three plus years ago. Every day others are waking up to the fact that what we’ve been told about foreclosures to-date by our government and the financial services and related industries, has proven itself to be at best mistaken… at worst misdirection… or, not to put too fine a point on it, outright folderol.
As conservative columnist, Peggy Noonan, has pointed out recently, it’s simply impossible to imagine this sort of future without also seeing social unrest on a scale not seen in this country since at least the 1930s. Writing recently about the Occupy Wall Street (“OWS”) movement, Noonan echoes my sentiments on the situation to a tee…
“OWS is an expression of American discontent, and others will follow. Protests and social unrest are particularly likely if people feel they are unfairly losing their homes to support irresponsible, law-breaking institutions that have successfully disregarded the fundamental rules of capitalism and good citizenship.”
Make no mistake about it… if we are to mitigate any of the damage being caused, uphold the rule of law, and protect the rights of millions of homeowners… it should be obvious to anyone that WE NEED TENS OF THOUSANDS OF LAWYERS trained in foreclosure defense, loss mitigation and bankruptcy. And yet, more than four years into the FRAUDclosure crisis, we don’t have anywhere near the number of trained, ethical attorneys required to meet the demand.
We’re all adults here, so let’s not kid ourselves about why that’s the case.
We all know why we don’t have the lawyers we need to marshall a more effective defense of homeowners engulfed by the FRAUDclosure crisis… it’s because THERE’S NO MONEY IN IT. Or, at least that’s what lawyers have been told they are supposed to believe. Not only that, but the message has been that there shouldn’t be any money in representing homeowners at risk of FRAUDclosure. It’s as if attorneys profiting from representing homeowners at risk of FRAUDclosure is somehow a bad thing.
AND THAT’S JUST 100% BANKER-INSPIRED B.S.
Don’t you see what’s happened here? We’ve allowed the banks, and the government that’s been bailing them out, to essentially criminalize the profit potential in representing homeowners at risk of foreclosure… and wonder of wonders, miracles of miracles… here we sit with what appears to be an unsolvable problem.
Consider this… bankers say that they’ve been overwhelmed by the millions of homeowners unexpectedly seeking loan modifications and that’s why applying for a loan modification has been such a nightmare. But, what about the number of foreclosures occurring in the same time frame? Haven’t there been an unprecedented and unexpected number of foreclosures too? So,why is it that the banks have no problems accommodating the millions of unexpected foreclosures, but the millions of unexpected loan modifications represent an unsolvable problem?
It’s simple… because on the foreclosure side of the equation, banks allow lawyers to be profitably compensated for handling foreclosures, and sure enough those law firms have figured out how to handle any number of foreclosures that come down the pike… in fact, the more the merrier, as they say. On the loan modification side of the house, however, profits are a dirty word… and wouldn’t you know it, the problem is unsolvable. Why am I not surprised?
Over the TWO YEARS following the Deepwater Horizon disaster, BP spent $21 billion to clean up the Gulf of Mexico. In the FOUR YEARS since the tsunami of foreclosures began, we’ve spent roughly ten percent of what BP spent cleaning up the Gulf… $2.4 billion… and the vast majority of that amount paid to mortgage servicers… and we’re wondering why the problem can’t be solved?
The fact is… there is a HUGE OPPORTUNITY today to build a very profitable legal practice based on the ethical and effective representation of homeowners caught in the FRAUDclosure crisis.
From the very beginning of the mortgage meltdown, banks have tried to make sure that homeowners were not represented by attorneys when trying to save their homes from FRAUDclosure. The reason is now apparent: Banks knew it was a FRAUDclosure crisis before the rest of us did because they’re the ones who put the FRAUD into FRAUDclosure. From the earliest days of the crisis, the banks and the Obama Administration have been reinforcing TWO LIES:
In California, the efforts to stop lawyers from representing homeowners have been more extreme than in any other state. Here the campaign to malign the legal profession has been driven by legislative committees and supported by the California State Bar Association. In October 2009, California’s SB 94 created a law that has effectively prevented lawyers from offering to represent homeowners who are seeking to avoid foreclosure through modification of their loans. Under the guise of “charging up front makes you a scammer,” SB 94 has made it illegal for a lawyer to charge a homeowner an upfront retainer for legal fees.
Quite predictably, the law has made it difficult or even impossible for California homeowners to find quality legal representation related to seeking loan modifications, forcing those at risk of foreclosure who want to be represented by an attorney into either litigation or bankruptcy. Writing for The New York Times in December 2010, David Streitfeld’s article titled, “Homes at Risk, and No Help from Lawyers,” described the situation in California related to SB 94.
In California, where foreclosures are more abundant than in any other state, homeowners trying to win a loan modification have always had a tough time.
Now they face yet another obstacle: hiring a lawyer.
Sharon Bell, a retiree who lives in Laguna Niguel, southeast of Los Angeles, needs a modification to keep her home. She says she is scared of her bank and its plentiful resources, so much so that she cannot even open its certified letters inquiring where her mortgage payments may be. Yet the half-dozen lawyers she has called have refused to represent her.
“They said they couldn’t help,” said Ms. Bell, 63. “But I’ve got to find help, because I’m dying every day.”
Lawyers throughout California say they have no choice but to reject clients like Ms. Bell because of a new state law that sharply restricts how they can be paid. Under the measure, passed overwhelmingly by the State Legislature and backed by the state bar association, lawyers who work on loan modifications cannot receive any money until the work is complete. The bar association says that under the law, clients cannot put retainers in trust accounts.
To make matters worse, SB 94 has recently become controversial. In late September 2011, Suzan Anderson, who is the supervising trial council of the state bar’s special team on loan modifications, made an unscheduled appearance at the bar’s annual conference, presenting what she purported to be the bar’s new interpretation of SB 94. Literally hundreds of attorneys and legal scholars disagree, however, and litigation has recently been filed against the bar seeking declaratory relief, so we’ll soon see the courts decide the issue.
The core issue is about when a lawyer who represents a homeowner trying to get their loan modified can be compensated. The bar claims the law requires an attorney to wait until the very end of the case, however, the actual language contained in SB 94 doesn’t say that… it says lawyers cannot be paid until completing “any and all services (the lawyer) has contracted to perform…” Up until Ms. Anderson’s presentation at the annual meeting, lawyers were dividing services into separate contractual arrangements and accepting payments from homeowners as discreet sets of services were completed.
Regardless of which side of the debate you’re on, the issue highlights how far the banking lobby will push a state legislature and state bar association in an attempt to prevent homeowners from being represented by legal council when trying to to avoid foreclosure, and it should come as absolutely no surprise that SB 94 was born in the state’s Senate Banking Committee, sponsored by Sen. Ron Calderon, who chairs that committee.
Advocates of SB 94 claim that it was needed to stop “scammers” who were preying on homeowners in distress from accepting up-front fees. As quoted from Streitfeld’s article in The New York Times…
A spokesman for the Mortgage Bankers Association said it simply wanted to protect homeowners from fraud. “Be very careful about anyone who wants you to pay them to help you get a loan modification,” said the spokesman, John Mechem.
The evidence of any sort of army of lawyers-turned-scammers ripping off homeowners has always been thin, and by “thin” I mean nonexistant. In the two years since the bill became law, the bar has taken some type of disciplinary action related to the representation of homeowners in foreclosure against two dozen lawyers, give or take a few. In a state with more than 200,000 lawyers and 2 million homeowners in foreclosure, two dozen lawyers disciplined would hardly seem justification for a law that effectively prevents lawyers from helping homeowners get their loans modified.
Last December, Suzan Anderson, who heads up the bar’s task force on loan modifications, told The New York Times…
“I wish the law had worked,” Ms. Anderson said.
It’s also telling that no other state in the country has a law anything like SB 94, in fact, the rest of the states follow the FTC’s Mortgage Assistance Relief Services rule, MARS, which was adopted on January 30, 2011, and it does allow attorneys representing homeowners seeking loan modifications to accept funds in advance into their trust accounts.
The New York Times article also offered the perspective of several California homeowners seeking legal assistance in a post SB 94 world…
Mark Stone, a 56-year-old general contractor in Sierra Madre, feels differently. A few years ago, he got sick with hepatitis C. Unable to work full time, he began to miss mortgage payments. The drugs he was taking left him “a little confused,” he said.
Mr. Stone knew that his condition put him at a disadvantage in negotiations with his bank. So he hired Gregory Royston, a real estate lawyer in Redondo Beach. It took Mr. Royston nearly a year, but he restructured the loan.
Without the lawyer, Mr. Stone said, “I’d be living under a bridge.”The legal bill, paid in advance, was $3,500. “Worth every penny,” said Mr. Stone, who is now back at work.“This law,” Mr. Royston said, “took the wrong people out of the game.”
California’s approach to discouraging lawyers from representing homeowners at risk of foreclosure has not served the state or its residents well at all. California is the “hardest hit” of all 50 states, accounting for one of every five foreclosures in the U.S. Almost half of California’s homeowners are either underwater or effectively underwater today. Since 2008, there have been 1.2 million foreclosures statewide, and that number is expected to exceed 2 million by the end of 2012. And, according to the report published by the California Reinvestment Coalition…
The 2 million foreclosures expected by the end of this year are forecasted to cost the state and its residents $650 billion statewide.
Today, in California alone there are roughly TWO MILLION homeowners in foreclosure. I don’t know exactly how many we have nationwide, estimates vary, but are in the 5 million range. I do know that if two million people needed just 10 hours of legal assistance, it would take 20 million man hours. Assuming a six hour work day and a 260 day work year… that’s just under 13,000 years assuming only one lawyer were involved. To help two million people, assuming 10 hours each, at best would require more than 10,000 lawyers trained and working efficiently.
How many attorneys do we have trained and ready to help loans get modified, represent homeowners in foreclosure defense matters and/or in bankruptcy. Nowhere near 13,000 that’s for sure… in fact, we might not find 1300 either… and many would say the number could be closer to 130, and with the proliferating fraudulent documents… the abuses by servicers… the number of people who are foreclosed on illegally… its become easy to see the disease, and trained ethical lawyers would seem the only cure.
Mandelman out.
We need a literal army of experienced litigators, and Max Gardner’s Bankruptcy Boot Camp has trained close to 900 attorneys to protect the rights of homeowners in foreclosure. I’ve attended Max’s Boot Camp… I could never recommend it strongly enough… and often do. But, there’s more than legal training that’s required here… and if we’re going to attract the number of lawyers we need to fight this war…
Ohio’s former Attorney General Marc Dann is a highly experienced foreclosure defense attorney and a graduate of Max Gardner’s Boot Camp. He’s proven in his own successful practice that lawyers have the opportunity to DO GOOD… and DO WELL at the same time by learning the ins and outs of this, unfortunately, very fast growing and specialized field. And he’s developed a comprehensive training and ongoing support program that allows experienced foreclosure defense attorneys to immediately access new clients and the right clients, improve operations within their firms, and yes… increase their profitability dramatically.
Marc understands our need for an experienced army of foreclosure defense lawyers, but he also understands the reality that lawyers have to make money in order to operate effectively. In a phrase, a lawyer that can provide effective representation for homeowners at risk of foreclosure today, should not be worried about losing his or her own home to foreclosure because that benefits no one.
So, Marc has developed and employed best practices in building his own successful foreclosure defense practice, and now he’s teaching other attorneys how to make money in foreclosure defense so that ultimately he will have provided countless thousands of homeowners all over the country with access to highly capable, ethical and experienced attorneys.
Marc Dann’s LAW PROFITS program will take experienced and effective attorneys committed to foreclosure defense and protecting the rights of homeowners, and help transform them into vibrant, profitable firms or individual legal practices. Some of the innovative solutions Marc will be delivering include:
Making little or no money in foreclosure defense isn’t doing your clients any favors because you cannot be your best without it. Marc Dann’s LAW PROFITS is not a pot of gold, or a winning lottery ticket, but it is a proven process and suite of best practices that makes a law practice profitable… essentially immediately. It’s work, no question about it, but it’s important and gratifying work.
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For purposes of this division: (a) "Annual percentage rate" means the annual percentage rate for the loan calculated according to the provisions of the federal Truth in Lending Act and the regulations adopted thereunder by the Federal Reserve Board. (b) "Covered loan" means a consumer loan in which the original principal balance of the loan does not exceed the most current conforming loan limit for a single-family first mortgage loan established by the Federal National Mortgage Association in the case of a mortgage or deed of trust, and where one of the following conditions are met: (1) For a mortgage or deed of trust, the annual percentage rate at consummation of the transaction will exceed by more than eight percentage points the yield on Treasury securities having comparable periods of maturity on the 15th day of the month immediately preceding the month in which the application for the extension of credit is received by the creditor. (2) The total points and fees payable by the consumer at or before closing for a mortgage or deed of trust will exceed 6 percent of the total loan amount. (c) "Points and fees" shall include the following: (1) All items required to be disclosed as finance charges under Sections 226.4(a) and 226.4(b) of Title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations, including the Official Staff Commentary, as amended from time to time, except interest. (2) All compensation and fees paid to mortgage brokers in connection with the loan transaction. (3) All items listed in Section 226.4(c)(7) of Title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations, only if the person originating the covered loan receives direct compensation in connection with the charge. (d) "Consumer loan" means a consumer credit transaction that is secured by real property located in this state used, or intended to be used or occupied, as the principal dwelling of the consumer that is improved by a one-to-four residential unit. "Consumer loan" does not include a reverse mortgage, an open line of credit as defined in Part 226 of Title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations (Regulation Z), or a consumer credit transaction that is secured by rental property or second homes. "Consumer loan" does not include a bridge loan. For purposes of this division, a bridge loan is any temporary loan, having a maturity of one year or less, for the purpose of acquisition or construction of a dwelling intended to become the consumer's principal dwelling. (e) "Original principal balance" means the total initial amount the consumer is obligated to repay on the loan. (f) "Licensing agency" shall mean the Department of Real Estate for licensed real estate brokers, the Department of Corporations for licensed residential mortgage lenders and licensed finance lenders and brokers, and the Department of Financial Institutions for commercial and industrial banks and savings associations and credit unions organized in this state. (g) "Licensed person" means a real estate broker licensed under the Real Estate Law (Part 1 (commencing with Section 10000) of Division 4 of the Business and Professions Code), a finance lender or broker licensed under the California Finance Lenders Law (Division 9 (commencing with Section 22000)), a residential mortgage lender licensed under the California Residential Mortgage Lending Act (Division 20 (commencing with Section 50000)), a commercial or industrial bank organized under the Banking Law (Division 1 (commencing with Section 99)), a savings association organized under the Savings Association Law (Division 2 (commencing with Section 5000)), and a credit union organized under the California Credit Union Law (Division 5 (commencing with Section 14000)). Nothing in this division shall be construed to prevent any enforcement by a governmental entity against any person who originates a loan and who is exempt or excluded from licensure by all of the licensing agencies, based on a violation of any provision of this division. Nothing in this division shall be construed to prevent the Department of Real Estate from enforcing this division against a licensed salesperson employed by a licensed real estate broker as if that salesperson were a licensed person under this division. A licensed person includes any person engaged in the practice of consumer lending, as defined in this division, for which a license is required under any other provision of law, but whose license is invalid, suspended or revoked, or where no license has been obtained. (h) "Originate" means to arrange, negotiate, or make a consumer loan. (i) "Servicer" has the same meaning provided in Section 6 (i)(2) of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974.
In addition to discussing remedial measures for predatory lending, it is important to also discuss ways in which individuals can avoid receiving a predatory loan.
The first way to avoid predatory lending is to comparison shop different lenders to find the best deal. As predatory lenders would have them believe, borrowers with credit problems think that only by paying exorbitant interest rates can they qualify for a loan. However, the truth is that up to 50% of those people who receive predatory loans would actually qualify for a prime loan. The most practical way to remedy this problem is for a borrower to obtain a credit history report and have it analyzed by a disinterested third party. By doing this, the borrower will know when a predatory lender is being untruthful about the type of loan for which he or she will qualify due to credit problems.
Second, when applying for a loan, keep an eye out for common misrepresentations that are indicative of predatory loans. For example, the lender states that the loan has the flexibility of an open line of credit, or the lender requires credit insurance, claiming it is the only way the borrower will qualify for the loan. Next, the consumer should ask to see the lender’s published rates on fees and points.
Finally, the consumer should look for terms and conditions that will trap him or her into the loan. As discussed above, prepayment clauses are indicative of a predatory loan. The reasoning behind prepayment clauses is to keep borrowers from refinancing into a prime loan once they learn the financial reality of their current loan. Furthermore, when a borrower is offered a loan that is “asset based”(10), he or she should demand to be told what affect such a loan could have on the asset’s equity.
CONCLUSION
It is important for attorneys to utilize all available tools at their discretion to curb harm resulting from predatory lending. California Finance Code § 4970 is a powerful new tool for litigators. Equipped with this new tool and California Business & Professions Code 17200, California attorneys should be eager to assist the victims of predatory lending.
In addition, it is important for the consumer to learn ways to spot predatory lending terms and conditions. By seeking the advice of counsel when applying for a loan, one may be able to avoid financial pitfalls down the road.
California Financial Code § 4970 et seq. became effective on July 1, 2002. This law recognizes the need for more stringent regulations on consumer loans secured by specified real property, defined as “covered loans.” The effect of the bill was best summed up by the Legislative Counsel’s digest, which states:
The law prohibits various acts in making covered loans, including the following:
- Failing to consider the financial ability of a borrower to repay the loan
- Financing specified types of credit insurance into a consumer loan transaction
- Recommending or encouraging a consumer to default on an existing consumer loan in order to solicit or make a covered loan that refinances the consumer loan
- Making a covered loan without providing the consumer specified disclosure
Moreover, this law expressly defines the relationship between the broker and the borrower as a fiduciary relationship, thereby placing a legal duty on the broker to act in the borrower’s best interest.Furthermore, the newly enacted provisions clearly lay out strong incentives for attorneys to vigorously prosecute predatory lending. Under California Financial Code § 4978, these incentives include mandatory attorney fees, the award of punitive damages, and the greater of either actual damages or statutorily prescribed damages when the violation is “willful and knowing.”
(a) A person who fails to comply with the provisions of this division is civilly liable to the consumer in an amount equal to actual damages suffered by the consumer, plus attorney’s fees and costs. For a willful and knowing violation of this division, the person shall be liable to the consumer in the amount of $15,000.00 or the consumer’s actual damages, whichever is greater, plus attorneys’ fees and costs…..
(b)(2). A court may, in addition to any other remedy, award punitive damages to the consumer upon a finding that such damages are warranted pursuant to Section 3294 of the Civil Code.
Accordingly, if either an express violation of this section or abuse of the fiduciary relationship between broker and borrower is established, private attorneys and their clients are now equipped with statutory power to obtain redress.
Although California Financial Code § 4970 paints with a broad stroke, with its specificity, predatory lenders will undoubtedly find loopholes in the regulations. Fortunately for California consumers, actions for predatory lending can also be brought under the very expansive state consumer protection statutes, such as Business and Professions Code §17200.

The California Reinvestment Committee (CRC) is currently conducting a study weighing the effect predatory lending has had on Californians. The preliminary findings suggest predatory lending is a very common practice in California:
Although the study is still in its infancy, the preliminary numbers leave no room for doubt that predatory lending has become a tremendous problem in California and is robbing Californians of millions of dollars. The discrepancies in prime loan interest rates and those offered by the subprime lenders has steadily increased.
Subprime lenders state that they serve a very important function, mainly providing credit to borrowers with imperfect credit histories. However, it is this exact premise, the supposed benevolence of subprime lending, on which predatory lenders rely to justify their practices, thereby blending financially feasible subprime lending into predatory lending. Financial Code § 4970 is California’s remedy to this problem.