SAY NO TO LENDERS FRAUD!

Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com

Dear Homeowner,

It’s been widely reported around the country, via internet, blogs and newspapers, how the lenders used the foreclosure mills and other legal ways, to fabricate fraudulent documents to record in the county recorder offices and pretend they have legal standing to initiate the foreclosure procedure.

Neil Garfield in his blog http://www.livinglies.com, The Huffington Post, The New York Times, Steve Vondran in his website http://www.foreclosuredefenseresourcecenter.com, Tim McCandless in his blog https://timothymccandless.wordpress.com and many others have been advocating for the homeowners trying to raise awareness in the courts so that justice can be served.Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com

A few years ago, when the Mortgage Debacle started, these lenders went after the Mortgage Brokers after they found themselves in trouble for the many defaulted loans. They filed civil and criminal lawsuits convicting these brokers for fabricating documents and forging signatures to fund the loans. The legal system, judges and General Attorneys were prompt to convict “these so called criminals”.Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com

Today the tables have turned 180 degrees and we have discovered how these entities have been widely practicing what they accused others of. Today the lenders are fabricating documents, forging signatures and filing fraudulent documents with the government agencies to weasel their way into owning the homeowners’ properties.Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com

The fact that judges preceding the Unlawful Detainer hearings are not educated enough about the matter and don’t want to take the time to hear the attorneys defending the homeowners, does not help to make this wrong right. Securitization is a very complicated subject that cannot be taught in an Unlawful Detainer hearing or even in a Wrongful Foreclosure hearing. The way judges have been manipulating the information provided by the homeowners in their lawsuits to rule in favor of the lenders is despicable!Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com

That’s why it’s so important to have all your property recorded documents used to foreclose on your home, been researched and analyzed by an expert that can identify all the issues that can be used in a Court of Law to fight for your home.

When you go in front of a Judge with enough evidence to prove that fraud was committed by the lender when the lender fabricated documents used to foreclose, you have a good chance to get the Judge’s attention. Fraud is a subject they know, it’s a crime and they can rule in your favor. It would be very difficult for a Judge to justify this fraudulent behavior on the part of the lender.

Later on, once you have successfully received an injunction, you can bring the securitization argument in your complaint and make the lender prove their innocence.Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com

The documents used to initiate the foreclosure of your home have been fraudulently fabricated by either the Trustee or the Lender.

Some attorneys who have explored this cause of action in their civil lawsuits, have been able to get relief for the homeowners by getting the in Temporary Restraining Order and the Injunction granted.

Below please find proof of a very common practice within these entities when they fabricate documents. They use the name of one person who becomes an officer of many entities and the signature is very different in different documents. This has happened in your case too.

This is a portion of our report after thoroughly performing research and discovery for one of our clients: (testimonial letters can be provided upon request after signing a confidentiality agreement).

SIGNED BY: LINDA GREEN AS VICE PRESIDENT FOR AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE SERVICING, INC. AS SUCCESOR IN INTEREST TO OPTION ONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION

TOO MANY JOBS

For this report, over 500 mortgage assignments were examined.

Each Assignment was filed by Docx, a mortgage servicing company in Alpharetta, GA; each was notarized in Fulton County, GA.

Many of these Assignments have been used in foreclosure actions to prove that the lender has the legal right to file the foreclosure actions.

The name of Linda Green, frequently appears on Docx documents. The following list summarizes some of the many job titles used by Green.Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com

JOB TITLES HELD BY LINDA GREEN

11-11-2004 & 06-22-2006

Vice President, Loan Documentation, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., successor by merger to Wells Fargo

Home Mortgage, Inc.

08-11-2008 & 08-14-2008

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc

08-27-2008

Vice President, American Home Mortgage Servicing as successor-in-interest to Option One Mortgage Corporation

09-19-2008

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Brokers Conduit

09-30-2008

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc

09-30-2008

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Brokers Conduit

10-08-2009

Vice President & Asst. Secretary, American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc., as servicer for Ameriquest Mortgage Corporation

10-16-2008

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc

10-17-2008, 11-20-2008

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Brokers Conduit

11-20-2008

Vice President, Option One Mortgage Corporation

12-08-2008

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Brokers Conduit

12-15-2008

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for HLB Mortgage

12-24-2008

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc

12-26-2008

Vice President, American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc

01-13-2009

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for Family Lending Services, Inc

01-15-2009

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., acting solely as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc

02-03-2009

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Broker Conduit

02-24-2009

Vice President, American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc. as successor-in-interest to Option One Mortgage Corporation

02-25-2009

Vice President, Bank of America, N A

02-27-2009

Vice President, American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc., as successor-in-interest to Option One Mortgage Corporation

03-02-2009

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., acting solely as nominee for American Home Mortgage

03-04-2009

Vice President, Argent Mortgage Company, LLC by Citi Residential Lending Inc., attorney-in-fact

03-06-2009 & 03-20-2009

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc

04-15-2009, 04-17-2009, 04-20-2009

Vice President, Bank of America, N.A.

05-11-2009, 07-06-2009

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc

07-14-2009

Vice President, Bank of America, N.A.

07-30-2009

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc

08-12-2009

Vice President, Sand Canyon Corporation f/k/a Option One Mortgage Corporation

08-28-2009

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc.

09-03-2009

Asst. Vice President, Sand Canyon Corporation formerly known as Option One Mortgage Corporation

09-03-2009

Asst. Secretary, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., acting solely as nominee for American Home Mortgage

09-04-2009

Asst. Secretary, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., acting solely as nominee for American Home Mortgage

09-08-2009

Vice President, Bank of America, N.A.

09-21-2009 & 09-22-2009

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc

ATTACHED TO THIS DOCUMENT OTHER DOCUMENTS SIGNED BY LINDA GREEN THAT SHOW THE VARIATIONS OF HER SIGNATURE

IT APPEARS AS IF THE SIGNATURE OF MS. GREEN COULD BE A FORGERY.Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com

A forgery is a writing which falsely purports to be writing for another and is executed with the intent to defraud. Ordinarily a forged instrument cannot carry title.

THE SIGNATURE BELOW IS THE SIGNATURE IN THIS ASSIGNMENT OF DEED OF TRUST:Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com

THE FOLLOWING SIGNATURES ARE FROM DIFFERENT DOCUMENTS RECORDEDIN DIFFERENT COUNTIES:

THIS WHOLE SYSTEM IS A FARCE. A BROKEN DOWN, FRAUDULENT, SHAKY, DISHONEST AND TERRIFYINGLY CORRUPT SYSTEM.

The press and the general public is starting to pick up on these major systemic issues that judges, attorneys and other insiders have known about for some time…when the whole system collapses we’ve all got a real mess on our hands.

As we all struggle to unravel this monstrous mess, breaking down capacity will be a key focus in the problem. We’re all going to be searching around to determine who to sue and where to sue them, but because the courts failed to enforce the most basic pleading requirement….i.e. specifically identify who the parties to the lawsuit are, this is going to be most difficult.

One of the persistent and most pervasive problems in the whole foreclosure crisis is the inability of any party to get reliable or credible information about what is owed on a mortgage, who that phantom amount is owed to and what negotiated amount a lender, servicer or other party involved in the transaction might accept to modify or short sale the underlying loan.

A very concerning issue is the publication on the MERS website of information that identifies who the servicer on a loan is and who the investor in that loan is. But, neither the servicer or investor matches up to the information in many cases.

When you combine all this information with the depositions of Robo signers that are posted on many website, you’ll understand that in a large number of cases, the only connection between the plaintiff foreclosing and the mortgage being foreclosed is a sloppy and hastily executed Assignment signed by an officer that has no corporate authority and has no personal knowledge of the information contained on those documents.

It’s simply not okay to use the “robosigning” practice in the non judicial foreclosure states because these foreclosure cases don’t have to go to court.

The following are some of the most clear legal reasons why the Robo-Signer Controversy should entitle hundreds of thousands of homeowners wrongfully foreclosed and evicted to sue in non judicial foreclosure states. Robo Signers are illegal because fraud cannot be the basis of clear title, trustee’s deeds following Robo Signed sales should be void as a matter of law, notarization is a recording requirement for many of the documents, which was often botched, and most importantly because robo signed falsifications are meant for use in court, including unlawful detainers and bankruptcy matters.Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com

CALIFORNIA

1. Clear Title May Not Derive from a Fraud (including a bona fide purchaser for value).

In the case of a fraudulent transaction California law is settled. The Court in Trout v. Trout, (1934), 220 Cal. 652 at 656 stated:

“Numerous authorities have established the rule that an instrument wholly void, such as an undelivered deed, a forged instrument, or a deed in blank, cannot be made the foundation of a good title, even under the equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase. Consequently, the fact that defendant Archer acted in good faith in dealing with persons who apparently held legal title, is not in itself sufficient basis for relief.” (Emphasis added, internal citations omitted).

This sentiment was clearly echoed in 6 Angels, Inc. v. Stuart-Wright Mortgage, Inc. (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1279 at 1286 where the Court stated:

“It is the general rule that courts have power to vacate a foreclosure sale where there has been fraud in the procurement of the foreclosure decree or where the sale has been improperly, unfairly or unlawfully conducted, or is tainted by fraud, or where there has been such a mistake that to allow it to stand would be inequitable to purchaser and parties.” (Emphasis added).

If forged signatures are used to obtain the foreclosure it makes a difference!

2. Any apparent sale based on Robosigned documents or forged signatures should be void and without any legal effect.

In Bank of America v. LaJolla Group II, the California Court of Appeals held that if a trustee is not contractually empowered under the Deed of Trust to hold a sale, it is totally void. Voidness, as opposed to voidability, means that it is without legal effect. Title does not transfer. No right to evict arises. The property is not sold.

In turn, California Civil Code 2934a requires that the beneficiary execute, notarize and record a substitution for a valid Substitution of Trustee to take effect. Thus, if the Assignment of Deed of Trust, the Substitution of Trustee or the Notice of Default are Robo-Signed, the sale should be void.Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com

3. These documents are not recordable without good notarization.

In California, the reason these documents are notarized in the first place is because otherwise they will not be accepted by the County recorder. Moreover, a notary who helps commit real estate fraud is liable for $25,000 per offense.

Once the document is recorded, however, it is entitled to a “presumption of validity”, which is what spurned the falsification trend in the first place. California Civil Code Section 2924. Therefore, the notarization of a false signature not only constitutes fraud, but is every bit intended as part of a larger conspiracy to commit fraud on the court.

4. The documents are intended for court eviction proceedings.

A necessary purpose for these documents, after the non judicial foreclosure, is the eviction of the rightful owners afterward. Even in California, eviction is a judicial process, albeit summary and often sloppily conducted by judges who don’t really believe they can say no to the pirates taking your house. However, as demonstrated below, once these documents make it into court, the bank officers and lawyers become guilty of felonies:

California Penal Code section 118 provides (a) Every person who, having taken an oath that he or she will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly before any competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any of the cases in which the oath may by law of the State of California be administered, willfully and contrary to the oath, states as true any material matter which he or she knows to be false, and every person who testifies, declares, deposes, or certifies under penalty of perjury in any of the cases in which the testimony, declarations, depositions, or certification is permitted by law of the State of California under penalty of perjury and willfully states as true any material matter which he or she knows to be false, is guilty of perjury.Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com

This subdivision is applicable whether the statement, or the testimony, declaration, deposition, or certification is made or subscribed within or without the State of California.

Penal Code section 132 provides: Every person who upon any trial, proceeding, inquiry, or investigation whatever, authorized or permitted by law, offers in evidence, as genuine or true, any book, paper, document, record, or other instrument in writing, knowing the same to have been forged or fraudulently altered or ante-dated, is guilty of felony.

The Doctrine of Unclean Hands provides: plaintiff’s misconduct in the matter before the court makes his hands “unclean” and he may not hold with them the pristine remedy of injunctive relief. California Satellite Sys. v Nichols (1985) 170 CA3d 56, 216 CR 180. California’s unclean hands rule requires that the Plaintiff don’t cheat, and behave fairly. The plaintiff must come into court with clean hands, and keep them clean, or he or she will be denied relief, regardless of the merits of the claim. Kendall-Jackson Winery Ltd. v Superior Court (1999) 76 CA4th 970, 978, 90 CR2d 743. Whether the doctrine applies is a question of fact. CrossTalk Prods., Inc. v Jacobson (1998) 65 CA4th 631, 639, 76 CR2d 615.

5. Robo Signed Documents Are Intended for Use in California Bankruptcy Court Matters. One majorly overlooked facet of California is our extremely active bankrtupcy court proceedings, where, just as in judicial foreclosure states, the banks must prove “standing” to proceed with a foreclosure. If they are not signed by persons with the requisite knowledge, affidavits submitted in bankruptcy court proceedings such as objections to a plan and Relief from Stays are perjured.

The documents in support are often falsified evidence.

CONCLUSION

Verified eviction complaints, perjured motions for summary judgment, and all other eviction paperwork after robo signed non judicial foreclosures in California and other states are illegal and void. The paperwork itself is void. The sale is void. But the only way to clean up the hundreds of thousands of effected titles is through litigation, because even now the banks will simply not do the right thing. And that’s why robo signers count in non-judicial foreclosure states. Victims of robosigners in California may seek declaratory relief, damages under the Rosenthal Act; an injunction and attorneys fees for Unfair Business practices, as well as claims for slander of title; abuse of process, civil theft, and conversion.Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com

The Free House Myth

posted by Katie Porter
As challenges to whether a “bank” (usually actually a securitized
trust) has the right to foreclose because it owns the note and mortgage become more common, rumors swirl about the ability to use such tactics to get a “free house.” There are a few instances of consumer getting a free house, see here and here, for examples, but these are extreme situations not premised on ownership, but on a more fundamental flaw with the mortgage. In general, the idea that even a successful ownership challenge will create a free house to the borrower is an urban myth. I’ll explain why below, but there is a policy point here. The myth of the free house drives policymakers to complain about the moral hazard risks of holding mortgage companies to the law and tries to set up homeowners who are paying their mortgages against those who are not. It serves the banks’ political agenda to be able to point to the “free house” as an obviously unacceptable alternative of consumers winning legal challenges. It’s key then to understand that the “free house” is largely a creature of consumers’
and banks’ over-active imaginations.

In sorting out why even a successful ownership challenge does not give homeowners a free house, it is helpful to parse some key concepts. The first one is standing, which is the right of a party to ask a court for the relief it seeks. This comes in different flavors, including constitutional standing, but in the foreclosure context, usually boils down to whether the moving party is the “real party in interest.” In re Veal, the recent decision from the 9th Circuit BAP authored by Judge Bruce Markell, mentioned previously on Credit Slips , contains a discussion of standing in the foreclosure context. At least in part, the concern of the real party in interest doctrine is to make sure that the plaintiff is the right person to get legal relief in order to protect the defendant from a later action by the person truly entitled to relief. Note that standing is a concept that only applies in court; here that means in judicial foreclosures. In states that allow non-judicial foreclosure, the issue is slightly different. Does the party initiating the non-judicial foreclosure have the authority to do so under the state statute authorizing the sale? For example, cases such as In re Salazar discuss whether a recorded assignment of the mortgage is needed, as opposed to an unrecorded assignment, to initiate a foreclosure. Under either standing or statutory authority, a “win” by the homeowner leads to the same result. The foreclosure cannot proceed.

But this win is not the same as a free house. Just because a party lacked standing or statutory authority does not mean that there is not some party out there that does have the authority to foreclosure. Nor does a win on standing mean that there cannot be action taken to give the initial foreclosing party the authority that they need, which might occur by transferring possession of the note or by executing a series of assignments, to foreclose at a later date. Unless other problems exist, there is still a valid note that obligates the homeowner to pay money due and there is still a mortgage encumbering the house. The homeowner does not get a free house. Rather, the homeowner just doesn’t lose her house today to foreclosure. These are pretty different outcomes!

This doesn’t mean that I think the standing/ownership issue is inconsequential. For homeowners, a successful challenge that results in the dismissal of a foreclosure can lead to a loan modification or the delay itself can give the homeowner the time to find another solution. For investors in mortgage-backed securities, the problems with paperwork likely increase their loss severities in foreclosure, both because of increased litigation costs and because of delay in correcting problems. (And there may be even more serious problems for investors relating to whether the transfers even succeeded in putting the homes in the trust.) But we shouldn’t confuse these issues with the idea that what is at stake in sorting out this mess is giving a “free house” to some Americans, despite the lamentations of this LaSalle Bank lawyer after a judge ruled that LaSalle as trustee lacked standing to foreclose. A fruitful discussion of these issues needs to begin with a clear understanding of the consequences of the problem, as well as empirical evidence on how widespread these problems are.
The free house is political handwringing, not legal reality.

July 18, 2011 at 4:22 AM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity Comments It’s certainly not a “free” house. I think it’ll be a nightmare for homeowners who prevail in one of these actions to try and sell their homes. Just because party X can’t foreclose doesn’t mean that there isn’t a valid mortgage still on the property. No buyer is going to want to buy (and no title insurer will want to insure) unless that mortgage is paid off. And that means determining who is the mortgagee.
Adverse possession and/or quiet title actions might help solve some of this, but they are not self-executing solutions. Homeowners will have to go to court and litigate. That’s expensive and it takes time. So, at best, these homeowners are getting not “free” houses but houses with a severely depressed value.

Posted by: Adam Levitin | July 18, 2011 at 06:46 AM

The author skims the surface of the latte and finds after skimming the surface there is no more cream. Duh.
The Banks are often appearing as trustees on behalf of NY Trusts most of which died on or about 2008. If the trusts are dead than who has the right to appear in court? Nemo est hires viventis. No one is the heir of a living person and I would suggest, no one is the a trustee able to act on behalf of a dead trust. If the paper was successfully transferred to the trust, then perhaps the thousands of suckers who bought a RMBS are the owners. But if the paper was never successfully transferred, then the trusts and the trustees are certainly not the owners with standing. The original lenders might be but after phony documents have been created assigning the note and the mortgage to dead trusts, how could they possibly have the right of ownership?
The “myth” of the free houses was created not by consumers “oy!!” but by the very Banks who are picking up “free” houses every day by pretending to be trustees acting on behalf of dead trusts or trusts that never properly held the mortgages and notes. It is very much like Ronald Reagan calling a nuclear submarine the Corpus Christie or calling armed combatants “peacekeepers.” The “free house” was the Orwellian double speak created by Bankers for Bankers and their judicial minions and hand maidens have adopted their language very well.


Jake Naumer
Resolution Advisors
3187 Morgan Ford
St Louis Missouri 63116
314 961 7600
Fax Voice Mail 314 754 9086

MERS in California

From LivingLies:
I think that everyone is missing the #1 problem MERS has in CA.
MERS is a Non-Authorized Agent and cannot legally assign the Promissory Note, making any foreclosure by other than the original lender wrongful, for the following reasons.
1) Under established and binding Ca law, a Nominee can’t assign the Note. Born V. Koop 1962 200 C. A. 2d 519[200 CalApp2d Page 527, 528
2) On most Notes, the term Nominee is not included and MERS never takes ownership, making it unenforceable and unassignable by MERS.
Ott v. Home Savings & Loan Association, 265 F. 2d 643 [647,648
3) Ca Civil Code §2924, et seq. is exhaustive and a Nominee is never included as an acceptable form of “authorized agent” in a judicial or non-judicial foreclosure.
Finally, GOMES V. COUNTRYYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC., 192 Cal.App.4th 1149, IS FLAWED!
a) The Gomes case simply failed to address and apply the established and binding definition of a nominee.
b) The first thing the Deed of Trust does is (i) take away MERS right to payments and (ii) take away the right to enforce the Note.
c) REGARDLESS WHAT A BORROWER AGREES TO, a borrower cannot legally grant MERS the right to assign the note or any of the rights of the note owner.
________________________________________
MERS Fatal Flaws
MERS cannot legally assign a Promissory Note because, MERS is a Non-Authorized Agent under Established and Binding California Real Property Law and the borrower can’t provide that power to MERS.
First, a Nominee is someone who is nominated potentially for a future position. Much like being nominated for President, yet a Presidential Nominee doesn’t receive any powers until the person actually becomes President.
Second, in the Deed of Trust MERS is identified “Solely as a Nominee” and as the Beneficiary. Which is logically and legally impossible, because a party can only be either the nominated Beneficiary or the Beneficiary. You can’t “not be” and “be” the beneficiary at the same time.
Third, Ca Civil Code §2924, et seq. is exhaustive and a Nominee is never included as an acceptable form of “authorized agent” in a judicial or non-judicial foreclosure.
Fourth, MERS acts “Solely as a Nominee” for lenders, and under Established California Law a “Nominee” is a “Non-Authorized” form of agent, which fails to comply with California Civil Code §§ 2924 through 2924k, as a nominee inherently lacks the right to enforce or assign, the Note or real property ownership rights, per the following case.
“In Cisco v. Van Lew, 60 Cal.App.2d 575, 583-584, 141 P.2d 433, 438., Cisco could not enforce the land sale contract because he was not a party to it, the court, at pages 583-584, said: “The word ‘nominee’ in its commonly accepted meaning connotes the delegation of authority to the nominee in a representative or nominal capacity only, and does not connote the transfer or assignment to the nominee of any property in or ownership of the rights of the person nominating him.”
Born V. Koop 1962 200 C. A. 2d 519[200 CalApp2d Page 527, 528], see file below
Fifth, in addition to MERS’ inherit lack of authority, MERS is not a party to the Note and the Note fails to use the words, for example “ Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB or Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB Nominee”.
“The purpose of the document in question here was to offer an obligation to Harold L. Shaw alone and not to his nominee or any other person whomsoever.”
Ott v. Home Savings & Loan Association, 265 F. 2d 643 [647,648], see file below
Finally, GOMES V. COUNTRYYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC., 192 Cal.App.4th 1149, IS FLAWED!
a) The Gomes case simply failed to address and apply the established and binding definition of a nominee.
b) The first thing the Deed of Trust does is (i) take away MERS right to payments and (ii) take away the right to enforce the Note.
c) REGARDLESS WHAT A BORROWER AGREES TO, a “Borrower” cannot legally grant MERS the right to assign the note or any of the rights of the note owner.
“It is no defense to deceit that false statement was made pursuant to some statutory scheme such as statutory procedures for trustee’s sale (§ 2924 et seq.).” Block v. Tobin (App. 1 Dist. 1975) 119 Cal.Rptr. 288, 45 Cal.App.3d 214.

“It is true, as Defendants repeatedly assert, that California Civil Code § 2924, et seq. authorizes non-judicial foreclosure in this state. It is not the case, however, that the availability of a non-judicial foreclosure process somehow exempts lenders, trustees, beneficiaries, servicers, and the numerous other (sometimes ephemeral) entities involved in dealing with Plaintiffs from following the law.” Sacchi vs. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. US Central District Court of California CV 11-1658 AHM (CWx), June 24, 2011
Therefore, without an endorsement on the Note and an assignment directly from the original lender, assignments by MERS; the substitution of the Trustee; and trustee sale are unlawful and void.

“The assignment of the lien without a transfer of the debt was a nullity in law.” (Polhemus v. Trainer, 30 Cal. 685; Peters v. Jamestown Box Co., 5 Cal. 334; Hyde v. Mangan, 88 Cal. 319;
Jones on Pledges, secs. 418, 419; Van Ewan v. Stanchfield, 13 Minn. 75.)
“A lien is not assignable unless by the express language of the statute.”
(Jones on Liens, sec. 982; Wingard v. Banning, 39 Cal. 343; Ruggles v. Walker, 34 Vt. 468; Wing v. Griffin, 1 Smith, E.D. 162; Holly v. Hungerford, 8 Pick. 73; Daubigny v. Duval, 5 Tenn. 604.)
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT, DAVIS, BELAU & CO. V. NATIONAL SUR. CO., 139 CAL 223, 224 (1903)

“The note and mortgage are inseparable; the former as essential, the latter as an incident. An assignment of the note carries the mortgage with it, while an assignment of the latter alone is a nullity.”
CARPENTER V. LONGAN, 83 U. S. 271 (1872), U.S. Supreme Court
“California courts have repeatedly allowed parties to pursue additional remedies for misconduct arising out of a nonjudicial foreclosure sale when not inconsistent with the policies behind the statutes”
California Golf, L.L.C. v. Cooper (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1053,1070
“(2) Whenever a court becomes aware that a contract is illegal, it has a duty to refrain from entertaining an action to enforce the contract. (3) Furthermore the court will not permit the parties to maintain an action to settle or compromise a claim based on an illegal contract”
Bovard v. American Horse Enterprises, Inc., 201 Cal.App.3d 832 (1988)

On April 11th, 2011,
The Honorable Judge Margaret M. Mann made very clear the following,
based upon California Supreme Court and U.S. Supreme court cases:
• Assignments must be recorded before the foreclosure sale
• Recorded assignments are necessary despite MERS’ role
• MERS’s system is not an alternative to statutory foreclosure law
Bankruptcy No: 10-17456-MM13 re: Eleazar Salazar,

see attached below Mann_order_salazar.pdf

2) Nothing under California Civil Code §§ 2924 through 2924k applies, unless there is a legal chain of title for the Deed of Trust with the Note from the original lender to MERS, and then to the foreclosing party.

The First Fatal Flaw – MERS never takes ownership of the underlying Note, Voiding the “Original” Deed of Trust.
Under California Law, the named Beneficiary on the Deed of Trust must have ownership of the underlying Note. MERS consistently claims to be only “Holding the Note” as a Nominee for the original lender, never “Owning the Note”.

Why MERS doesn’t have ownership of the Note:
1. There is no assignment or indorsement of the Note from the original lender to MERS.
2. The Deed of Trust is not a substitute for an Assignment or legal transfer of the Note from the Original lender to MERS.
“It is well established law in the Ninth Circuit that the assignment of a trust deed does not assign the underlying promissory note and right to be paid, and that the security interest is incident of the debt.” Rickie Walker case, see attached
3. MERS is a mortgage exchange not unlike a stock exchange. It allows banks to buy and sell home mortgages much like stock. Stock exchanges don’t own the stock on their exchange, only the investors do.
4. A Nominee in California cannot own the Note,
“The word “nominee” in its commonly accepted meaning, connotes the delegation of authority to the nominee in a representative or nominal capacity only, and does not connote the transfer or assignment to the nominee of any property in or ownership of the rights of the person nominating him.”
Cisco v. Van Lew, 60 Cal.App.2d 575, 583-584, 141 P.2d 433, 438.
5. In California, a Note payable to the original lender is not a bearer instrument, the original lender must indorse or assign the Note to MERS.
See Cal Com. Code §§3109,3201,3203,3204. and Rickie Walker case Order, and P&A pg6 attached below
6. MERS requires that the owner of the Note never claim MERS as a “Note-Owner”
MERS Membership Rule 8 Foreclosure, Section 2(a)(i), page 25, 26, see attached below
7. MERS consistently argues in court that it does not own the promissory notes,
MERS v. NEBRASKA DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE No. S-04-786, see attached below
8. Finally, Moeller v. Lien and CCC § 2924 DOES NOT “EXPRESSLY” EXCLUDE
OR SUPERCEDE CA Comercial Code § 3301, OR ANY OTHER CA LAWS!
In the case of California Golf, L.L.C. v. Cooper, 163 Cal. App. 4th 1053, 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 153, 2008 Cal. App. LEXIS 850 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2008), the Appellate Court held that the remedies of 2924h were not exclusive.
9. U.S. Supreme Court decision, Carpenter v. Longan (Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. 271, 21 L.Ed. 313 [1873])):
“The note and mortgage are inseparable; the former as essential, the latter as an incident. An assignment of the note carries the mortgage with it, while an assignment of the latter alone is a nullity. Case law in virtually every state follows Carpenter.”

Deed of Trust is also void, without a recorded assignment of the Deed of Trust for each transfer of the Note:
1. MERS Involvement in the loan effectively stripped the deed of trust lien from the land and a foreclosure is not legally possible, Bellistri v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 284 S.W.3d 619 (Mo.App. E.D.,2009), attached below
2. Any assignment of the Deed of Trust & Note from MERS to a successor is void and fraudulent.
RICKIE WALKER CASE, see attached below
Therefore, MERS definition of “Holding the Note” is not the legal equivalent of “Owning the Note”;
California Civil Code section 2924 for foreclosure only applies if MERS owned the note.

The Second Fatal Flaw – MERS tracking system is not a legal chain of title and the debt may be uncollectible.
When a Note is sold, it has to be indorsed the same way you basically sign a check for deposit or cashing.

Under California Law the Note is not a bearer instrument, but an instrument payable only to a specifically identified person, per California Commercial Code §3109; any transfer of the Note requires a legal Negotiation, Endorsement and a physical delivery of the note to the transferee to perfect the transfer, per California Commercial Codes §§3201, 3203, 3204.
see attached Rickie Walker Order.

“MERS Basics “Registration vs. Recording. (PPT Slide)
o MERS is not a system of legal record nor a replacement for the public land records.
o Mortgages must be recorded in the county land records.
o MERS is a tracking system. No interests are transferred on the MERS® System, only tracked.”,
MERS Southeast Legal Seminar – MERS Basics slide 7,
see attached below. or http://www.mersinc.org/files/filedownload.aspx?id=63&table=DownloadFile

“A mortgage note holder can sell a mortgage note to another in what has become a gigantic secondary market. . . . For these servicing companies to perform their duties satisfactorily, the note and mortgage were bifurcated.”
MERSCORP President and CEO, R.K. Arnold, Yes, There is Life on MERS, Prob.& Prop., Aug. 1997, at p.16, see attached below

Clear Title May Not Derive From A Fraud (including a bona fide purchaser for value).
In the case of a fraudulent transaction California law is settled. The Court in Trout v. Taylor, (1934), 220 Cal. 652 at 656 made as much plain:
“Numerous authorities have established the rule that an instrument wholly void, such as an undelivered deed, a forged instrument, or a deed in blank, cannot be made the foundation of a good title, even under the equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase. Consequently, the fact that defendant Archer acted in good faith in dealing with persons who apparently held legal title, is not in itself sufficient basis for relief.” (Emphasis added, internal citations omitted).

This sentiment was clearly echoed in 6 Angels, Inc. v. Stuart-Wright Mortgage, Inc. (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1279 at 1286 where the Court stated:
“It is the general rule that courts have power to vacate a foreclosure sale where there has been fraud in the procurement of the foreclosure decree or where the sale has been improperly, unfairly or unlawfully conducted, or is tainted by fraud, or where there has been such a mistake that to allow it to stand would be inequitable to purchaser and parties.” (Emphasis added).

In Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal. 4th 1226, 1231 [44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 352, 900 P.2d 601], the California Supreme Court concluded that:
“ ‘the antideficiency laws were not intended to immunize wrongdoers from the consequences of their fraudulent acts’ ” and that, if the court applies a proper measure of damages, “ ‘fraud suits do not frustrate the antideficiency policies because there should be no double recovery for the beneficiary.’ ” (Id. at p. 1238.)
Great Article source: http://www.exclusiveforeclosures.net/real-estate-foreclosures/doan-on-%E2%80%9Cproduce-the-note%E2%80%9D/

Therefore, any attempt to collect by other than the original lender may be impossible without a legal chain of title, because MERS tracking system is not a legal chain of title.

Source: https://sites.google.com/site/mersfatalflawsincalifornia/

________________________________________
MERS Defense Flaw
Legal Disclaimer: All information contained on this website is alleged and general in nature, and should not be construed as legal advice or a substitute for legal advice. It was not written by an attorney and should only be reviewed by an attorney.

MERS alleged status as of November 18th, 2010

PROTECTION FROM VOIDABILITY IS ONLY PROVIDED FOR THE YEARS TAXES ARE PAID.

On July 21, 2010 MERS registered with the California Secretary of State.
MERS registration was necessary, and not retroactive for the following reasons:
1. MERS needed to register with the State of California, because MERS is Not a Foreign Lending Institution nor claims to be, therefore California Corporate Code § 191(d) does not exempt MERS from California Corporate Code §2105.
“the court cannot conclude that MERS falls within any of the five enumerated examples of “foreign lending institutions,” and the court declines to address sua sponte whether MERS otherwise satisfies subsection (d).”. . . “the enforcement of any loans by trustee’s sale, judicial process or deed in lieu of foreclosure or otherwise. . .” “Accordingly, section 191(c)(7) does not exempt MERS’s activity.”
CHAMPLAIE v. BAC, No. 2:09-cv-01316-LKK-DAD (E.D.Cal. 10-22-2009) pg23,24, attached below
As a result of MERS intentional failure from obtaining a certificate of qualification from the California Secretary of State as a “Beneficiary”, including filing returns and paying taxes, MERS is not allowed the right to defend a lawsuit when named as or defending its actions in a “Beneficiary” capacity, pursuant to California Revenue & Taxation Code Section §§ 23301, 23301.6, 23304.1.
“A suspended corporation is not allowed to exercise the powers and privileges of a corporation in good standing, including the right to sue or defend a lawsuit while its taxes remain unpaid”
PERFORMANCE PLASTERING v. RICHMOND AM. HOMES, 153 Cal.App.4th 659 (2007) 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 537
2. MERS must first produce a Certificate of Relief from Voidability for the time prior to July 21, 2010, California Revenue & Tax Code 23305.1 and file with this Superior Court Clerk receipt of payment to the California Secretary of State for taxes and penalties, California Corporations Code §2203(c).
“UMML qualified to transact intrastate business, but failed to pay the necessary fees, penalties and taxes.
The trial court correctly dismissed the complaint without prejudice.”
United Medical Management Ltd. v. Gatto, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1732 – Cal: Court of Appeals, 2nd Appellate
“we will dismiss a nonqualified foreign corporation’s appeal if we determine the nonqualified foreign corporation transacted
intrastate business in California.9 (Corp. Code, §§ 2105, 2203.) We believe this approach advances the policies of preventing tax evasion through the even-handed administration of the tax laws, while encouraging qualification of foreign corporations by prohibiting a delinquent corporation from enjoying the privileges of a going concern.”

“9 Pursuant to Corporations Code § 2203, subdivision (c), and as recognized in United Medical, supra, and Mediterranean Exports, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, a nonqualified foreign corporation is prohibited from maintaining an action in state court only until it complies with Corporations Code section 2105, pays to the Secretary of State a penalty of $250 and the fees for filing the required statement, and files with the court clerk receipts substantiating payment of such fees and franchise taxes and any other business taxes. Since the tax liability will be the issue presented to us, we will allow a nonqualified foreign corporation to maintain an action before us if it presents evidence substantiating it has qualified with the Secretary of State and paid the $250 penalty pursuant to Corporations Code section 2203, subdivision (c).”
In the Matter of the Appeal of Reitman Atlantic Corporation, 2001-SBE-002-A, See attached below

3. MERS will very likely cite one of these two cases:
United Medical Management Ltd. v. Gatto 49 Cal.App.4th 1732 (1996),
or Perlas v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Systems, Inc., 2010 WL 3079262 * 7, an unpublished case as of 10/18/2010
Both of which are based upon this case:
“A nonqualified corporation subject to a misdemeanor prosecution and on conviction to a heavy fine for doing business without complying with the law, is permitted to qualify, be restored to full legal competency and have its prior transactions given full effect.” (Tucker v. Cave Springs Min. Corp. (1934) 139 Cal. App. 213, 217 [33 P.2d 871].
So demand MERS filing of receipts and that Certificate of Relief from Voidability!
191 CHAMPLAIE_v_BAC_HOME_LOANS_SERVICING_LP_E_D_Cal_10-22-2009
atto, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1732 – Cal_ Court of Appeals, 2nd Appellate Dist., 5th Div. 1996 – Google Scholar
bellistri-v-ocwen

Joseph Born v. Koop
mann-order_salazar
MERS RULES(June2009)
MERS Southeast Legal Seminar (11.10.04) final

MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC v. NEBRASKA DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE – NE Supreme Court

Ott v. Home Savings & Loan Association
Perlas v. MERS
R.K. Arnold, MERS Admits Bifurcation
Reitman Atlantic Corporation BOE
Reitman Atlantic Corporation BOE
Rickie_Walker_P_and_A
RickieWalkerOrder

David and Goliath as court overturns case dissmissal

A Bakersfield homeowner is taking on a bank, in a battle that could have sweeping implications for people facing foreclosure.

Mark Demucha wants Wells Fargo to prove it owns his home loan. And, if his lawsuit is successful, it could set a legal precedent that slows or even stops foreclosures across the state.

“Filled out the same paperwork over and over again.”

Mark Demucha says all he wanted was to keep his house. “Sent it to them over and over again. I couldn’t give you the exact time frame, but it’s ridiculous,” he said.

But, after a year of trying to get a loan modification from Wells Fargo… “I had to do something to protect my family. to protect my home.”

He felt all washed up. “Not yes, not no, not anything. They didn’t respond.”

Demucha turned to family friend Michael Finley who happens to be a lawyer.

“A company that does not have a legal right to collect mortgage payments should not have the right to foreclose,” said Finley.

Now, in a case that could have far-reaching implications, Demucha and Finley say they have one simple request. “If they are going to take my house, I should be able to see they have a legal right to take it from me,” said Demucha. “They come to me and want me to have every single piece of paper I was ever supposed to have. But, when I say ‘hey where is my promissory note?’ they look at me like I’m a thief.”

That’s because Wells Fargo didn’t loan Demucha the money to buy his house. Another company called CTX Mortgage, did.

Banks, at the time, seemed like they were almost using the housing market as a roulette wheel or a craps table. They were shoving debt around like it was a card game.

Like so many millions of homeowners, Demucha’s loan was sold to another lender, a common practice because it’s profitable to the banks.

In the old days, any time ownership of a property and its loan changed hands, it would be recorded at the Hall of Records at a cost of $18. For the mortgage industry, that took too long and on a large scale cost too much money. So they privatized it by creating the mortgage electronic registration system, a company headquartered in Reston, Virginia.

The sole purpose of MERS was to cut out the county clerk, allowing one mortgage company to quickly and electronically transfer a loan to another mortgage company.

On Tuesday, a spokeswoman told 17 News, MERS holds title to about 60% of the country’s home mortgages or about 32 million loans. MERS is basically an electronic handshake between banks, saying we have a deal.

But, MERS has turned into a headache for some lenders as homeowners across the country have successfully challenged the company’s legal standing in court. Others like Demucha are demanding their lender produce loan documents which may have been lost or even destroyed in the MERS shuffle.

“Why should the bank not still be required to possess a single piece of paper that they are the right place to home the consumer should make the payments?”

Earlier this month, a state appellate court agreed, overturning a Kern County judge’s ruling that Wells Fargo could foreclose on the home.

The case is headed back to our county where the same judge will have to decide if Wells Fargo can prove it legitimately holds title to the Demucha’s home.

“I wish I were David and they were Goliath. This would have been an easier fight. They are like an army of Goliaths and I’m like David with his hands tied behind his back,” said Demucha.

Wells Fargo spokesman Tom Goyda couldn’t comment on the specifics of this case but acknowledged the appellate court had sent the case back to the Kern County trial court to rule on several issues. Goyda noted the appeals court did not actually rule on the case and that Wells Fargo would continue to try the case in court.

A spokeswoman for MERS said her company said she couldn’t comment because they are not part of this lawsuit. Demucha and his attorney are basically asking for Wells Fargo to go away and to restore the couple’s credit.

“Wells Fargo essentially ignored them until the fifth district appellate court said Wells Fargo you can’t ignore Mark and Sherry Demucha any more,” said Finley.

The appellate court ruling has arrived back here in Kern County but a hearing has not yet been scheduled.

Cloud on title forever post foreclosure {but wait the Banks own the title companies}

Recently Discovered Flaw in Recording System Clouds Titles on Previously

Foreclosed Properties

 

The modern system of mortgage refinancing and assignments created during the housing boom has left behind a wave of title defects on properties that have ever had a foreclosure in their history, due to a loophole in the property records recording system. This has been detected on a number of properties currently in foreclosure, and found to have been uncorrected on properties previously foreclosed.

 

(PRWEB) February 10, 2010 — A previously undetected title flaw has been discovered on many previously foreclosed properties. As the number of real estate foreclosures skyrockets, the odds are higher that a home you live in today, or at some point in the future may have had a foreclosure in its history. Even if the foreclosure has long since passed, a loophole in the way mortgages are recorded can create a serious title defect for future owners. Title analysis performed this month by AFX Title has detected this error to be common in random samples of properties it reviewed. “This could affect the property ownership of millions of homes nationwide” said David Pelligrinelli, of AFX Title. “The mortgage recording method which created this title flaw did not exist until

recently. As title abstractors are just seeing this problem emerge now but a wave of title claims is coming over the next year or so.”

 

The problem is created through a break in the chain of mortgage ownership. Until the 1980’s, most mortgages were loans between the homeowner and a bank, who lent the money directly. More recently, the mortgage financing system transformed into an international system of securitization, with mortgage lenders packaging their loans into securities, bought and sold by investors like stocks. These transactions even split individual mortgages into sections, where each loan could have parts owned by different investment banks.

 

The transfer of ownership in these mortgage backed securities (MBS) was done with contracts on the balance sheets of Wall Street investment banks, such as Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs. The company who originally appeared to make the loan was normally a retail lending company such as Countrywide or Lending Tree, who typically acted as a sales company, and sometimes remained contracted to service the loan. In the event that the loan goes into foreclosure at a later date, the then-current owner of the loan files the foreclosure and sells the property to a new owner, often at auction. The land records would show a deed of transfer from the investment bank to the new owner. This creates a break in the chain of ownership of the mortgage rights. In many cases, the transfer of ownership of the mortgage loan has gone from the original lender, through several owners, and then to the foreclosing bank, none of which is recorded on the property title history.

 

Technically, the foreclosing bank has no recorded title rights to foreclose in the first place. Owners of the loan normally do not publicly record each of the transfers out of expediency, and cost. Filing a document of transfer (called an assignment) in the land records incurs a substantial fee paid to the county clerk.

 

Some delinquent homeowners have used this error to delay the foreclosure, forcing lenders to “produce the note.” In these cases, the bank has to go through the process of getting assignments to the foreclosing bank after the fact. However, the title repair process is not required however in the majority of cases when the homeowner does not

contest the foreclosure.

 

PRWeb eBooks – Another online visibility tool from PRWeb

 

This leaves the break in chain of title dormant in the property records, vulnerable to be contested in the future. A few largely overlooked cases have already been decided by courts on this issue. In Lowell MA, a judge invalidated the foreclosure of homes based on missing and out-of-order assignments (US Bank v Ibanez).

 

Unraveling the chain of title and clarifying ownership of loans will create challenges for the courts and legislative bodies in all states. In the meantime, homeowners and buyers should be aware of how this could affect their property title. There are reports that some title insurers are indicating that they will not insure for this title defect.

 

As a national provider of property title searches, AFX Title is seeing an increasing number of files where the chain of title has obvious gaps in the recorded mortgage assignments. According to Pelligrinelli, the issue is serious. “When running searches for clients, we are noticing that a significant number of previously foreclosed properties have unconnected chain of assignments in the mortgage history. This could represent a title defect which could technically affect ownership rights for future owner.”

 

Pelligrinelli adds that some lenders and government institutions are rushing to repair the titles on lender-owned properties as they discover them in their portfolio. This does not help individual owners who own properties previously foreclosed.


 

What’s an Allonge anyway ??? thanks Jake

Do We Have a Fraud Problem? The Case of the Mysteriously Appearing Allonge posted by Adam Levitin I have generally been willing to give mortgage servicers, servicer support shops (like LPS), and foreclosure attorneys the benefit of the doubt when it comes to documentation irregularities (to put it mildly) in foreclosures. My working assumption up to this point has been that the documentation problems have been a function of corner cutting with securitization based on the assumptions that (1) the loans would perform better than they did and (2) those that defaulted would result in default judgments in foreclosure, so no one would ever notice the problems. I’ve also assumed that lack of capacity has played a critical role in problems in the default management chain–the system is held together by Scotch tape at this point. In other words, the problems in the system weren’t caused by malice.

I got some grief about this from people down in the trenches when I posted a comment about this a couple of weeks ago. And I was tempted to write it off as a function of litigants being too close to their cases. But a document I read today is making me rethink these assumptions. Here is an order from a Florida court that makes me start to wonder if we might have a serious fraud problem going on with blank endorsements and allonges.

To be sure, one data point isn’t an epidemic, but servicing is an industry where things tend to happen en masse. As Obi-Wan Kenobi

explains:

Obi-Wan: “A fighter that size couldn’t get this deep into space on its own.”

Luke: “Yeah, he must have gotten lost, been part of a convoy or something.”

Han: “Well, he ain’t going to be around long enough to tell anyone about us.”

Luke: “Look at him. He’s headed for that small moon.”

Han: “I think I can get him before he gets there. He’s almost in range.”

Obi-Wan: “That’s no moon. It’s a space station.”

Han: “It’s too big to be a space station.”

Luke: “I have a very bad feeling about this.”

Obi-Wan: “Turn the ship around.”

Han: “Yeah, I think your right. Full reverse! Chewie, lock in the auxiliary power.”

To start with, let me explain endorsements and allonges. And endorsement (or indorsement) is a signature on an instrument for the purpose of transferring rights in the instrument. (See UCC 3-204 for more details.) They work the same with notes as with checks and are governed by the same law. There are three types of endorsements. There are endorsements in blank–just your signature, nothing more (e.g., Adam J. Levitin), and special endorsements (Adam J. Levitin to Katherine Porter), and restrictive endorsements (Adam J. Levitin, for deposit only in Safe’n’Sound Bank).

A blank endorsement (by the instrument’s payee, of course) turns the instrument into bearer paper. That means it’s like cash. Whoever physically possesses the note, including a theif, can enforce it against the maker. And as a recent 9th Circuit BAP opinion, In re Veal (about which I hope to blog more) noted (fn 25), bearer paper has long had lots of nefarious associations (I would add Godfather III to the bearer bonds movie list in that note). In contrast, a special endorsement limits who can enforce the note; only the specially noted endorsee has rights in that note and can enforce it (they could transfer it to someone else, but that’s another matter).

Now allonges.  An allonge isn’t a delicious throat-soothing lozenge from Switzerland. It’s a piece of paper that goes a-long with the note. The allonge is basically an overflow sheet for extra endorsements. Frankly, no one should ever be using an allonge if there is room for an endorsement on the original note. Yes, it’s easier to print on the allonge, but allonges create evidentiary problems, namely that it can be difficult to tell when the endorsement on the allonge was done or if the allonge is even meant to go with that particular note. And I’m not sure what the evidentiary weight of an affidavit or testimony on this point could possibly be. Unless the affiant or witness has some basis for knowing that this particular allonge goes with this particular note (“I distinctly remember the peculiar coffee stain on both pieces of paper–it looked like Karl Malden’s nose”), then there’s little probative value from the affidavit or testimony.

The law on allonges is not particularly well-developed. The 1951 version of the UCC, in force in NY and South Carolina (I think), covers them in section 3-202, but the current version does not. The old version of the UCC required that allonges be “firmly attached.”

That requirement seems to have been fulfilled via pasting or gluing and maybe stapling. Query whether paper clip or rubber band or simply in the same folder will suffice. I’m not sure why any of them would.

None of these methods answers the question of when the allonge was created. I can paste or rubberband the day of trial. There’s a smidgen of state law on this, but it hasn’t been a major issue previously.

Which brings us to BONY v. Faulk. In this case, the foreclosure filing included a 3 page note. The note lacked endorsements connecting the originator to BONY as trustee for the foreclosing securitziation trust. This set up a motion to dismiss on the grounds that BONY didn’t have any right to do anything–it had no connection with the note.

But wait!  Suddenly BONY’s attorney tells the court that she is in possession of the fourth page of the note, which includes a blank endorsement. Puhlease…  What a ridiculous deus ex machina ending.

Are we do believe that this attorney filed 3 pages of the note, but not the 4th? If so, I sure hope she’s not billing for that screw up.

But here’s what perplexes me. Suppose that an allonge is produced. How are we going to know when that allonge was created or that it even relates to the note in question? (Just so everyone’s clear–if the endorsement were created later, then BONY as trustee for CWABS 2006-13 trust had no standing at the time the action was filed because the trust didn’t own the note at that time.) How do we know that this attorney isn’t engaged in fraud on the court (and a host of other violations of state and federal law)?

And this isn’t even getting into the question of whether the PSA at issue requires specific endorsements, not endorsements in blank. As it turns out that’s a problem in this particular case. Here’s the PSA for CWABS 2006-13 trust.  Section 2.01(g)(1) provides that the Depositor deliver to the trustee:

the original Mortgage Note, endorsed by manual of facsimile signature in blank in the following form: “Pay to the order of _______ without recourse”, with all intervening endorsements that show a complete chain of endorsement from the originator to the Person endorsing the Mortgage Note…

As an aside, let me point out that “endorsement…in blank” does not mean endorsed in blank in the UCC sense. In the UCC sense, endorsed in blank simply means the endorser’s signature, just as you might put on the back of a check before depositing it. Here, it means endorsed with a blank for the endorsee’s name.  Critically, this PSA requires a complete chain of endorsement with all intervening endorsements. A single endorsement in blank ain’t gonna do it if this PSA means anything. And there were a lot of MBS investors who assumed that it was going to be followed.

I think this PSA just puts the attorney in an even worse place. The only way there should be a separate blank endorsement page is if there was non-compliance with the PSA. Are we really to believe that happened? (Well, yes, but the attorney can’t really argue that BONY generally doesn’t comply with its duties as trustee, now can she?)

We’ve already seen pretty shocking evidence of documentation fraud in foreclosures.  Remember that the robosigning scandal was the by-product of depositions that aimed to show backdating of assignments to trusts. The shame of the robosigning press coverage was that it focused on some shmucks signing 10,000 assignments in a month–which didn’t necessarily produce any harm itself, just carpal tunnel syndrome–and overlooked the really quite serious criminal problem of the backdating of assignments. The depositions showed pretty clearly that there was backdating–the notarizations were by notaries who didn’t have their commissions until a couple of years subsequent or were done on Christmas Day, etc.

Document fraud in the mortgage industry is nothing new. It’s appeared in all flavors and sizes for centuries. The laws of negotiability are first and foremost evidentiary laws meant to protect against fraud.

Negotiable instruments are reified obligations–the instrument itself is the right to payment (UCC 3-203, cmt. 1).  That means that one can sue on either the instrument or on the underlying contract (but Statute of Frauds might require some writing for enforceability). I hope that courts will recognize that real serious potential for fraud that exists when one combines endorsements in blank with allonges and start demanding (1) that the complete note be filed with the original filing and (2) that anyone using an allonge prove that the allonge goes with the note in question. I think we’ve passed the point were there can be any assumptions of good faith and fair dealing.

I’d be curious to hear if any foreclosure defense attorneys have been pushing on the evidentiary status of allonges–namely what proof beyond a staple or the like is there that an allonge goes with a particular mortgage and wasn’t just photocopied from another one.

And yes, this sort of evidentiary scrutiny adds huge costs to the system. But it would be pretty easily avoided if PSAs had been followed in the first place–there was a reason that they required complete, unbroken chains of endorsement.

June 16, 2011 at 8:43 PM in Mortgage Debt & Home Equity

Adam J. Levitin

Associate Professor of Law

A.B. Harvard; A.M., M.Phil. Columbia; J.D. Harvard

Address:

600 New Jersey Avenue N.W.

Washington, DC 20001-2075

Office Location:  Hotung 6022

Office Phone:  202.662.9234

Office Fax:  202.662.4030

e-mail (preferred contact method): adam.levitin<at>law.georgetown.edu

(replace the <at> with the @ sign in the e-mail)

Assistant:  Terican Gross

Phone:  202.662.9485

Blog:  http://www.creditslips.org

*Please note that I do not provide personal legal advice, including on credit card and mortgage foreclosure issues.*

Biography

Professor Levitin specializes in bankruptcy, commercial law, and financial regulation.  His research focuses on consumer and housing finance, payments, and debt restructuring.

Before joining the Georgetown faculty, Professor Levitin practiced in the Business Finance & Restructuring Department of Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP in New York and served as law clerk to the Honorable Jane Richards Roth on the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.  While at Georgetown, he has served as Special Counsel to the Congressional Oversight Panel and as the Robert Zinman Scholar in Residence at the American Bankruptcy Institute.

Professor Levitin holds a J.D. from Harvard Law School, an M.Phil and an A.M. from Columbia University, and an A.B. from Harvard College, all with honors.

Jake Naumer

Resolution Advisors

3187 Morgan Ford

St Louis Missouri 63116

314 961 7600

Fax Voice Mail 314 754 9086

2924 unconstitutional ???

2924 unconstitutional  Check out this pro per complaint they raise some interesting issues.

PJATSI+Supplemental+Complaint+March+25+2011

current rulings on wrongful foreclosure

20.  TIME:  9:00   CASE#: MSC11-00162

 CASE NAME: CHRISTINA PENNES  vs.  PNC MORTGAGE

 HEARING ON DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT of PENNES

 FILED BY PNC BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION

* TENTATIVE RULING: *

 

 

Defendant PNC Bank, N.A.’s Demurrer to each cause of action within the Complaint is sustained with leave to amend in part and without leave to amend in part. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc., section 430.10, subd. (e).)

 

1st cause of action for Cancellation of Instruments (Assignment of Deed of Trust), 2nd cause of action for Cancellation of Instruments (Notice of Default), and  3rd cause of action for Cancellation of Instruments (Notice of Default), sustained with leave to amend. Actions to remove a cloud on title, under Civil Code section 3412, are equitable in nature, and differ from actions to quiet title in that they are aimed at a particular instrument or piece of evidence. Reiner v. Danial (1989) 211 Cal. App. 3d 682, 689.  To state a cause of action to remove a cloud, instead of pleading in general terms that the defendant claims an adverse interest, the plaintiff must allege, inter alia, facts showing actual invalidity of the apparently valid instrument or piece of evidence. (5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Pleading, sections 671-674, pp. 97-99.) Plaintiffs have not met this burden. See Complaint par 20, Ex D. See also, Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2011) 192 Cal. App. 4th 1149 1154-55 [under Civ C  section 2924(a)(1), a trustee, mortgagee, or beneficiary, or any of their authorized agents, may initiate the foreclosure process. Nowhere, however, does the statute provide for a judicial action to determine whether the person initiating the foreclosure process is indeed authorized, and the court saw no ground for implying such an action, which would have been inconsistent with the policy behind nonjudicial foreclosure of providing a quick, inexpensive and efficient remedy.]

 

4th cause of action for wrongful foreclosure, sustained with leave to amend. The elements of a common-law cause of action for damages for wrongful foreclosure are:  (1) Trustee or mortgagee caused an illegal, fraudulent or willfully oppressive sale of real property; (2) pursuant to a power of sale contained in a mortgage or deed of trust; and (3) the Trustor or mortgagor sustained damages. (Munger v. Moore (1970) 11 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7; see 4 Witkin, Sum. Of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Secured Transactions in Real Property, §168.)

The Plaintiffs  do not allege that the foreclosure sale has taken place. Thus, Plaintiffs fail to plead a necessary element of this cause of action.

 

5th cause of action for violation of UCL,  and 8th caused of action for violation of Rosenthal Debt Collection Practices Act [Civ C section 1788], sustained without leave to amend. California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) prohibits any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practice. (B&P Code section 17200.)  The broad scope of the statute encompasses both anti-competitive business practices and practices injurious to consumers. (Cel‑Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180.)

This cause of action is based in part upon the 8th cause of action for violation of the Rosenthal Debt Collection Practices Act [Civ C § 1788.]

The Rosenthal Debt Collection Practices Act [RDCPA] prohibits debt collectors from engaging in abusive, deceptive and unfair practices in the collection of consumer debts.  (Civ. Code  section 1788, et. Seq.)  Consumer debt is statutorily defined as money, property or the equivalent owed by reason of a consumer credit transaction, which in turn is defined as a transaction in which property, etc. is acquired on credit for personal, family or household purposes. Cal. Civ. Code  section 1788.2(b), (e)-(f), (h).  There are no California State Court opinions to date applying this statute to the enforcement of deeds of trust or to foreclosure proceedings.

 

6th cause of action for quiet title, sustained with leave to amend:

To state a claim for quiet title,  the complaint shall be verified. CCP section 761.020.  The Complaint is not verified.  Additionally, in order to quiet title, plaintiff  must tender the entire outstanding principal.  See, e.g., Aguilar v. Bocci (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 475, 477 [Plaintiff cannot quiet title without discharging his debt; the cloud upon his title persists until the debt is paid.]

 

7th cause of action for rescission, sustained without leave to amend. To state a claim for contract rescission, plaintiff must allege some grounds for rescission-fraud, mistake, coercion, etc. (Civ. Code, § 1689, subd. (b).) plaintiffs do not meet hits pleading burden.

Plaintiffs Opposition does not address this cause of action, therefore, they concede that it has no merit.

 

9th cause of action for  violation of Civ C § 2923.5, sustained with leave to amend:

Actual contact is not required. See, Civil Code section 2923.59(g). Additionally, the only remedy for a Section 2923.5 violation is a postponement of the foreclosure sale to enable the defendants to comply with the requirements of the statute — not a claim for damages. (Mabry v. Superior Court (2010) 185 Cal. App. 4th 208, 235.)

The Plaintiffs do not allege that a foreclosure sale date has been noticed.

Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice is granted. (Evid. Code, section 452(c)[public records].

 

In light of the ruling on the general demurrer, the special demurrer is moot. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc., section 430.10, subd. (f).)

 
 21.  TIME:  9:00   CASE#: MSC11-00162

 CASE NAME: CHRISTINA PENNES  vs.  PNC MORTGAGE

 HEARING ON MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT

 FILED BY PNC BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION

* TENTATIVE RULING: *

 

In llight of the ruling on the general demurrer, the Motion to Strike is moot.

 

Wrongful foreclosure and California Judge Firmat

Orange County (Cali) Superior Court Judge Firmat posted these notes on
the law and motion calendar to assist attorneys pleading various
theories in wrongful foreclosure cases etc.  Some interesting
points….

FOOTNOTES TO DEPT. C-15 LAW AND MOTION CALENDARS

Note 1 – Cause of Action Under CCC § 2923.5, Post Trustee’s Sale –
There is no private right of action under Section 2923.5 once the
trustee’s sale has occurred.  The “only remedy available under the
Section is a postponement of the sale before it happens.”  Mabry v.
Superior  Court, 185 Cal. App. 4th 208, 235 (2010).

Note 2 – Cause of Action Under CCC § 2923.6 – There is no private
right of action under Section 2923.6, and it does not operate
substantively.  Mabry v. Superior Court, 185 Cal. App. 4th 208,
222-223 (2010).  “Section 2923.6 merely expresses the hope that
lenders will offer loan modifications on certain terms.”  Id. at 222.

Note 3 – Cause of Action for Violation of CCC §§ 2923.52 and / or
2923.53 – There is no private right of action.  Vuki v. Superior
Court, 189 Cal. App. 4th 791, 795 (2010).

Note 4 –  Cause of Action for Fraud, Requirement of Specificity – “To
establish a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, the plaintiff must
prove: (1) the defendant represented to the plaintiff that an
important fact was true; (2) that representation was false; (3) the
defendant knew that the representation was false when the defendant
made it, or the defendant made the representation recklessly and
without regard for its truth; (4) the defendant intended that the
plaintiff rely on the representation; (5) the plaintiff reasonably
relied on the representation; (6) the plaintiff was harmed; and, (7)
the plaintiff’s reliance on the defendant’s representation was a
substantial factor in causing that harm to the plaintiff. Each element
in a cause of action for fraud must be factually and specifically
alleged. In a fraud claim against a corporation, a plaintiff must
allege the names of the persons who made the misrepresentations, their
authority to speak for the corporation, to whom they spoke, what they
said or wrote, and when it was said or written.”  Perlas v. GMAC
Mortg., LLC, 187 Cal. App. 4th 429, 434 (2010) (citations and
quotations omitted).

Note 5 –Fraud – Statute of Limitations- The statute of limitations for
fraud is three years.  CCP § 338(d).  To the extent Plaintiff wishes
to rely on the delayed discovery rule, Plaintiff must plead the
specific facts showing (1) the time and manner of discovery and (2)
the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable
diligence.”  Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 35 Cal. 4th 797, 808
(2005).

Note 6 – Cause of Action for Negligent Misrepresentation – “The
elements of negligent misrepresentation are (1) the misrepresentation
of a past or existing material fact, (2) without reasonable ground for
believing it to be true, (3) with intent to induce another’s reliance
on the fact misrepresented, (4) justifiable reliance on the
misrepresentation, and (5) resulting damage.  While there is some
conflict in the case law discussing the precise degree of
particularity required in the pleading of a claim for negligent
misrepresentation, there is a consensus that the causal elements,
particularly the allegations of reliance, must be specifically
pleaded.”  National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Cambridge
Integrated Services Group, Inc., 171 Cal. App. 4th 35, 50 (2009)
(citations and quotations omitted).

Note 7 – Cause of Action for Breach of Fiduciary Duty by Lender –
“Absent special circumstances a loan transaction is at arm’s length
and there is no fiduciary relationship between the borrower and
lender. A commercial lender pursues its own economic interests in
lending money. A lender owes no duty of care to the borrowers in
approving their loan. A lender is under no duty to determine the
borrower’s ability to repay the loan. The lender’s efforts to
determine the creditworthiness and ability to repay by a borrower are
for the lender’s protection, not the borrower’s.”  Perlas v. GMAC
Mortg., LLC, 187 Cal. App. 4th 429, 436 (2010) (citations and
quotations omitted).

Note 8 – Cause of Action for Constructive Fraud – “A relationship need
not be a fiduciary one in order to give rise to constructive fraud.
Constructive fraud also applies to nonfiduciary “confidential
relationships.” Such a confidential relationship may exist whenever a
person with justification places trust and confidence in the integrity
and fidelity of another. A confidential relation exists between two
persons when one has gained the confidence of the other and purports
to act or advise with the other’s interest in mind. A confidential
relation may exist although there is no fiduciary relation ….”
Tyler v. Children’s  Home Society, 29 Cal. App. 4th 511, 549 (1994)
(citations and quotations omitted).

Note 9 – Cause of Action for an Accounting – Generally, there is no
fiduciary duty between a lender and borrower.  Perlas v. GMAC Mortg.,
LLC, 187 Cal. App. 4th 429, 436 (2010).  Further, Plaintiff (borrower)
has not alleged any facts showing that a balance would be due from the
Defendant lender to Plaintiff.  St. James Church of Christ Holiness v.
Superior Court, 135 Cal. App. 2d 352, 359 (1955).  Any other duty to
provide an accounting only arises when a written request for one is
made prior to the NTS being recorded.  CCC § 2943(c).

Note 10 – Cause of Action for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing – “[W]ith the exception of bad faith insurance
cases, a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing permits
a recovery solely in contract.  Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood
Apartments, 171 Cal. App. 4th 1004, 1054 (2009).  In order to state a
cause of action for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and
Fair Dealing, a valid contract between the parties must be alleged.
The implied covenant cannot be extended to create obligations not
contemplated by the contract.  Racine & Laramie v. Department of Parks
and Recreation, 11 Cal. App. 4th 1026, 1031-32 (1992).

Note 11 – Cause of Action for Breach of Contract – “A cause of action
for damages for breach of contract is comprised of the following
elements: (1) the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for
nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damages
to plaintiff. It is elementary that one party to a contract cannot
compel another to perform while he himself is in default. While the
performance of an allegation can be satisfied by allegations in
general terms, excuses must be pleaded specifically.”  Durell v. Sharp
Healthcare, 183 Cal. App. 4th 1350, 1367 (2010) (citations and
quotations omitted).

Note 12 – Cause of Action for Injunctive Relief – Injunctive relief is
a remedy and not a cause of action.  Guessous v. Chrome Hearts, LLC,
179 Cal. App. 4th 1177, 1187 (2009).

Note 13 – Cause of Action for Negligence – “Under the common law,
banks ordinarily have limited duties to borrowers. Absent special
circumstances, a loan does not establish a fiduciary relationship
between a commercial bank and its debtor. Moreover, for purposes of a
negligence claim, as a general rule, a financial institution owes no
duty of care to a borrower when the institution’s involvement in the
loan transaction does not exceed the scope of its conventional role as
a mere lender of money. As explained in Sierra-Bay Fed. Land Bank
Assn. v. Superior Court (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 318, 334, 277 Cal.Rptr.
753, “[a] commercial lender is not to be regarded as the guarantor of
a borrower’s success and is not liable for the hardships which may
befall a borrower. It is simply not tortious for a commercial lender
to lend money, take collateral, or to foreclose on collateral when a
debt is not paid. And in this state a commercial lender is privileged
to pursue its own economic interests and may properly assert its
contractual rights.”  Das v. Bank of America, N.A., 186 Cal. App. 4th
727, 740-741 (2010) (citations and quotations omitted).

Note 14 – Cause of Action to Quiet Title – To assert a cause of action
to quiet title, the complaint must be verified and meet the other
pleading requirements set forth in CCP § 761.020.

Note 15 – Causes of Action for Slander of Title – The recordation of
the Notice of Default and Notice of Trustee’s Sale are privileged
under CCC § 47, pursuant to CCC § 2924(d)(1), and the recordation of
them cannot support a cause of action for slander of title against the
trustee.  Moreover, “[i]n performing acts required by [the article
governing non-judicial foreclosures], the trustee shall incur no
liability for any good faith error resulting from reliance on
information provided in good faith by the beneficiary regarding the
nature and the amount of the default under the secured obligation,
deed of trust, or mortgage. In performing the acts required by [the
article governing nonjudicial foreclosures], a trustee shall not be
subject to [the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act].”  CCC §
2924(b).

Note 16 – Cause of Action for Violation of Civil Code § 1632 – Section
1632, by its terms, does not apply to loans secured by real property.
CCC § 1632(b).

Note 17 – Possession of the original promissory note – “Under Civil
Code section 2924, no party needs to physically possess the promissory
note.” Sicairos v. NDEX West, LLC, 2009 WL 385855 (S.D. Cal. 2009)
(citing CCC § 2924(a)(1); see also Lomboy v. SCME Mortgage Bankers,
2009 WL 1457738 * 12-13 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (“Under California law, a
trustee need not possess a note in order to initiate foreclosure under
a deed of trust.”).

Note 18 – Statute of Frauds, Modification of Loan Documents – An
agreement to modify a note secured by a deed of trust must be in
writing signed by the party to be charged, or it is barred by the
statute of frauds.  Secrest v. Security Nat. Mortg. Loan Trust 2002-2,
167 Cal. App. 4th 544, 552-553 (2008).

Note 19 – Statute of Frauds, Forebearance Agreement – An agreement to
forebear from foreclosing on real property under a deed of trust must
be in writing and signed by the party to be charged or it is barred by
the statute of frauds.  Secrest v. Security Nat. Mortg. Loan Trust
2002-2, 167 Cal. App. 4th 544, 552-553 (2008).

Note 20 – Tender – A borrower attacking a voidable sale must do equity
by tendering the amount owing under the loan.  The tender rule applies
to all causes of action implicitly integrated with the sale.  Arnolds
Management Corp. v. Eischen, 158 Cal. App. 3d 575, 579 (1984).

Note 21 – Cause of Action for Violation of Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 –
“The UCL does not proscribe specific activities, but broadly prohibits
any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and
unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising. The UCL governs
anti-competitive business practices as well as injuries to consumers,
and has as a major purpose the preservation of fair business
competition. By proscribing “any unlawful business practice,” section
17200 “borrows” violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful
practices that the unfair competition law makes independently
actionable.  Because section 17200 is written in the disjunctive, it
establishes three varieties of unfair competition-acts or practices
which are unlawful, or unfair, or fraudulent. In other words, a
practice is prohibited as “unfair” or “deceptive” even if not
“unlawful” and vice versa.”  Puentes v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc.,
160 Cal. App. 4th 638, 643-644 (2008) (citations and quotations
omitted).

“Unfair” Prong

[A]ny finding of unfairness to competitors under section 17200 [must]
be tethered to some legislatively declared policy or proof of some
actual or threatened impact on competition. We thus adopt the
following test: When a plaintiff who claims to have suffered injury
from a direct competitor’s “unfair” act or practice invokes section
17200, the word “unfair” in that section means conduct that threatens
an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or
spirit of one of those laws because its effects are comparable to or
the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise significantly
threatens or harms competition.

Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co.,
20 Cal. 4th 163, 186-187 (1999).

“Fraudulent” Prong

The term “fraudulent” as used in section 17200 does not refer to the
common law tort of fraud but only requires a showing members of the
public are likely to be deceived. Unless the challenged conduct
targets a particular disadvantaged or vulnerable group, it is judged
by the effect it would have on a reasonable consumer.

Puentes, 160 Cal. App. 4th at 645 (citations and quotations
omitted).

“Unlawful” Prong

By proscribing “any unlawful” business practice, Business and
Professions Code section 17200 “borrows” violations of other laws and
treats them as unlawful practices that the UCL makes independently
actionable. An unlawful business practice under Business and
Professions Code section 17200 is an act or practice, committed
pursuant to business activity, that is at the same time forbidden by
law. Virtually any law -federal, state or local – can serve as a
predicate for an action under Business and Professions Code section
17200.

Hale v. Sharp Healthcare, 183 Cal. App. 4th 1373, 1382-1383 (2010)
(citations and quotations omitted).

“A plaintiff alleging unfair business practices under these statutes
must state with reasonable particularity the facts supporting the
statutory elements of the violation.”  Khoury v. Maly’s of California,
Inc., 14 Cal. App. 4th 612, 619 (1993) (citations and quotations
omitted).

Note 22 – Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress –  Collection of amounts due under a loan or restructuring a
loan in a way that remains difficult for the borrower to repay is not
“outrageous” conduct.  Price v. Wells Fargo Bank, 213 Cal. App. 3d
465, 486 (1989).

Note 23 – Cause of Action for Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress – Emotional distress damages are not recoverable where the
emotional distress arises solely from property damage or economic
injury to the plaintiff.  Butler-Rupp v. Lourdeaux, 134 Cal. App. 4th
1220, 1229 (2005).

Note 24 – Cause of Action for Conspiracy – There is no stand-alone
claim for conspiracy.  Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia
Ltd., 7 Cal. 4th 503, 510-511 (1994).

Note 25 – Cause of Action for Declaratory Relief – A claim for
declaratory relief is not “proper” since the dispute has crystallized
into COA under other theories asserted in other causes of actions in
the complaint.  Cardellini v. Casey, 181 Cal. App. 3d 389, 397-398
(1986).

Note 26 – Cause of Action for Violation of the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Acts – Foreclosure activities are not considered “debt
collection” activities.  Gamboa v. Trustee Corps, 2009 WL 656285, at
*4 (N.D. Cal. March 12, 2009).

Note 27 – Duties of the Foreclosure Trustee – The foreclosure
trustee’s rights, powers and duties regarding the notice of default
and sale are strictly defined and limited by the deed of trust and
governing statutes.  The duties cannot be expanded by the Courts and
no other common law duties exist.  Diediker v. Peelle Financial Corp.,
60 Cal. App. 4th 288, 295 (1997).

Note 28 – Unopposed Demurrer – The Demurrer is sustained [w/ or w/o]
leave to amend [and the RJN granted].  Service was timely and good and
no opposition was filed.
Failure to oppose the Demurrer may be construed as having abandoned
the claims.  See, Herzberg v. County of Plumas, 133 Cal. App. 4th 1,
20 (2005) (“Plaintiffs did not oppose the County’s demurrer to this
portion of their seventh cause of action and have submitted no
argument on the issue in their briefs on appeal.  Accordingly, we deem
plaintiffs to have abandoned the issue.”).

Note 29 – Responding on the Merits Waives Any Service Defect – “It is
well settled that the appearance of a party at the hearing of a motion
and his or her opposition to the motion on its merits is a waiver of
any defects or irregularities in the notice of the motion.”  Tate v.
Superior Court, 45 Cal. App. 3d 925, 930 (1975) (citations omitted).

Note 30 – Unargued Points – “Contentions are waived when a party fails
to support them with reasoned argument and citations to authority.”
Moulton Niguel Water Dist. v. Colombo, 111 Cal. App. 4th 1210, 1215
(2003).

Note 31 – Promissory Estoppel – “The doctrine of promissory estoppel
makes a promise binding under certain circumstances, without
consideration in the usual sense of something bargained for and given
in exchange. Under this doctrine a promisor is bound when he should
reasonably expect a substantial change of position, either by act or
forbearance, in reliance on his promise, if injustice can be avoided
only by its enforcement. The vital principle is that he who by his
language or conduct leads another to do what he would not otherwise
have done shall not subject such person to loss or injury by
disappointing the expectations upon which he acted. In such a case,
although no consideration or benefit accrues to the person making the
promise, he is the author or promoter of the very condition of affairs
which stands in his way; and when this plainly appears, it is most
equitable that the court should say that they shall so stand.”  Garcia
v. World Sav., FSB, 183 Cal. App. 4th 1031, 1039-1041 (2010)
(citations quotations and footnotes omitted).

Note 32 – Res Judicata Effect of Prior UD Action – Issues of title are
very rarely tried in an unlawful detainer action and moving party has
failed to meet the burden of demonstrating that the title issue was
fully and fairly adjudicated in the underlying unlawful detainer.
Vella v. Hudgins, 20 Cal. 3d 251, 257 (1977).  The burden of proving
the elements of res judicata is on the party asserting it.  Id. The
Malkoskie case is distinguishable because, there, the unlimited
jurisdiction judge was convinced that the title issue was somehow
fully resolved by the stipulated judgment entered in the unlawful
detainer court.  Malkoskie v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 188 Cal. App.
4th 968, 972 (2010).

Note 33 – Applicability of US Bank v. Ibanez – The Ibanez case, 458
Mass. 637 (January 7, 2011), does not appear to assist Plaintiff in
this action.  First, the Court notes that this case was decided by the
Massachusetts Supreme Court, such that it is persuasive authority, and
not binding authority.  Second, the procedural posture in this case is
different than that found in a case challenging a non-judicial
foreclosure in California.  In Ibanez, the lender brought suit in the
trial court to quiet title to the property after the foreclosure sale,
with the intent of having its title recognized (essentially validating
the trustee’s sale).  As the plaintiff, the lender was required to
show it had the power and authority to foreclose, which is
established, in part, by showing that it was the holder of the
promissory note.  In this action, where the homeowner is in the role
of the plaintiff challenging the non-judicial foreclosure, the lender
need not establish that it holds the note.

Note 34 – Statutes of Limitations for TILA and RESPA Claims – For TILA
claims, the statute of limitations for actions for damages runs one
year after the loan origination.  15 U.S.C. § 1640(e).  For actions
seeking rescission, the statute of limitations is three years from
loan origination.  15 U.S.C. § 1635(f).  For RESPA, actions brought
for lack of notice of change of loan servicer have a statute of
limitation of three years from the date of the occurrence, and actions
brought for payment of kickbacks for real estate settlement services,
or the conditioning of the sale on selection of certain title services
have a statute of limitations of one year from the date of the
occurrence.  12 U.S.C. § 2614.

CA Class Action gets a TRO; Credit Default Swaps addressed; HAMP’s bogus nature addressed

CA Class Action gets a TRO; Credit Default Swaps addressed; HAMP’s bogus nature addressed

This complaint from California is remarkable in its treatment of HAMP as well as Credit Default Swaps (CDS) and the rest of the securitization scam.  For research buffs, the complaint can be found here.The federal government is either utterly stupid or in cahoots with the rip-offs on Wall Street.  I tend to believe it is the latter.  Too many “mistakes” lately, especially those related to the “bail-outs.”  The complaint sets forth a clear demonstration of how all the players in the chain (primarily the Servicer and the Securitization Trustee) are incentivized NOT to modify loans, but to foreclose.  To add insult to injury, these rip-offs collect homeowners’ last money, collect the money from the government for MERELY making an ILLUSORY promise of a modification, and collect their own “insurance” (CDSs) on the loans designed to fail (“Subprime”/”Alt-A”).

As the complaint rightly points out, CDSs are line fire insurance on a neighbor’s house: the incentive for arson is too great.

Most of the claim are CA-specific because, apparently, in that state foreclosers need not re-notice a sale once it’s been postponed for pretend-loan-mod efforts, and can sell the property without further notice, notwithstanding apparent loan mod “review.”

This again goes to show: don’t rely on any loan mod promises; instead — modify, but also nullify.

Foreclosure Trustee duties and obligations

Because of the significant increase in defaults and foreclosures, mortgage servicers need to understand the duties and liabilities the law imposes upon foreclosure trustees.

Litigation based upon trustee error can slow, stop or invalidate foreclosures and impair the servicer’s ability to dispose of properties following foreclosure. When borrowers refinance or pay off during foreclosure, trustees are often responsible for the payoffs and reconveyances. After foreclosure, the trustee is responsible for distribution of surplus funds – the funds in excess of the debt due under the foreclosed deed of trust. All these responsibilities are sources of claims against trustees.

Foreclosure litigation plaintiffs often name and seek to hold lenders and servicers responsible for trustee errors on the theory that the trustee is the agent of the lender and servicer. According to Miller & Starr’s “California Real Estate,” this claim is particularly easy to make when the lender or servicer uses an in-house trustee and especially when the trustee acquires the property by credit bid for the lender or servicer at its own foreclosure sale. This article examines a trustee’s liability for damages under California law for conduct of the foreclosure sale, payoffs, reconveyances and distribution of surplus funds. The scope of a trustee’s duties differs for each of these services, and a breach of one of these duties can subject the trustee, lender and servicer to substantial compensatory damages, punitive damages and even criminal sanctions. Foreclosure sales In the I.E. Associates v. Safeco case, the California Supreme Court limited the scope of the trustee’s duties in conducting foreclosure sales. The issue in that case was whether a trustee breached its duty to a trustor by failing to ascertain the current address of the trustor where the current address was different from the address of record. The trustee did not have actual knowledge of the current address, but through reasonable diligence could have discovered it. The Supreme Court held that the trustee did not have a duty to find the current address. The court found that a foreclosure trustee is not a true trustee, such as a trustee of a person or a trustee under a trust agreement. Instead, a foreclosure trustee is merely “a middleman” between the beneficiary and the trustor who only carries out the specific duties that the deed of trust and foreclosure law specifically impose upon it.

The deed of trust and the statute are the exclusive source of the rights, duties and liabilities governing notice of nonjudicial foreclosure sales. Because neither the deed of trust nor the statute required the trustee to search for an address it did not have, the court held that the trustee had no duty to do so. The Stephens v. Hollis case reiterated the rule that a foreclosure trustee is not a true trustee: “Just as a panda is not an ordinary bear, a trustee of a deed of trust is not an ordinary trustee. ‘A trustee under a deed of trust has neither the powers nor the obligations of a strict trustee. He serves as a kind of common agent for the parties.’”

It is critical to recognize, however, that these rules of limited duty only apply to the trustee’s duty to provide proper notice of the sale. The trustee also has a broad common law duty to conduct a sale that is fair in all respects. In Hatch v. Collins, the court noted that “A trustee has a general duty to conduct the sale ‘fairly, openly, reasonably and with due diligence,’ exercising sound discretion to protect the rights of the mortgagor and others…A breach of the trustee’s duty to conduct an open, fair and honest sale may give rise to a cause of action for professional negligence, breach of an obligation created by statute, or fraud.” Examples of such a breach could be conspiring to “chill the bidding” by overstating the debt, thereby dissuading others from appearing and bidding at the sale. California Civil Code Section 2924h(g) states that it is “unlawful for any person, acting alone or in concert with others, (1) to offer to accept or accept from another any consideration of any type not to bid, or (2) to fix or restrain bidding in any manner at a sale of property conducted pursuant to a power of sale in a deed of trust or mortgage.” The code continues: “In addition to any other remedies, any person committing any act declared unlawful by this subdivision or any act which would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any beneficiary, trustor or junior [lien holder] shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned in the county jail for not more than one year, or be punished by both that fine and imprisonment.” In addition to imposing criminal penalties, this section also imposes civil liability upon the trustee.

The courts will review foreclosure sale proceedings to make sure they have been fair in all respects. A trustee who violates its contractual duties under the deed of trust or its statutory or common law duties is liable to the trustor or to an affected junior lien holder for such person’s lost equity in the property. This is measured by the difference between the fair market value of the property and the liens senior to the affected person’s interest at the time of the sale. In addition, pursuant to Civil Code Section 3333, the trustee has liability for all other damages proximately caused by its wrongful conduct, whether those damages were foreseeable or not. A willful violation of these duties can subject the trustee to punitive damages under Civil Code Section 3294. Payoffs and reconveyances Civil Code Section 2943(c) requires a beneficiary or its representative, which is frequently the trustee, to provide a payoff statement to an “entitled person” within 21 days after a written request for a payoff demand. An “entitled person” means the trustor, a junior lien holder, their successors or assigns, or an escrow. Failure to provide a timely payoff demand makes the beneficiary or its representative liable to the entitled person for all actual damages such a person may sustain due to a failure to provide a timely payoff demand, plus $300 in statutory damages. Failure to provide an accurate payoff demand can have dire consequences. If the entitled person closes a sale or refinance in reliance upon a payoff demand that understates the payoff, the beneficiary must reconvey its lien. The beneficiary is then left with only an unsecured claim against the entitled person. A trustee who is responsible for such an error could have substantial liability to its beneficiary. After the note and deed of trust are paid off, Civil Code Section 2941 requires the beneficiary to deliver the original note, the deed of trust and a request for reconveyance to the trustee. Within 21 days thereafter, the trustee must record the reconveyance and deliver the original note to the trustor. If the reconveyance has not been recorded within 60 days after the payoff, upon the trustee’s written request, the beneficiary must substitute himself as trustee and record the reconveyance. If the reconveyance is not recorded within 75 days after payoff, any title company may prepare and record a release of the obligation. A person who violates any of these provisions is liable for $500 in statutory damages and all actual damages caused by the violation. These can include damages for emotional distress. A willful violation of these requirements is a misdemeanor which can subject the violator to a $400 fine, plus six months’ imprisonment in the county jail. Surplus funds Civil Code Sections 2924j and 2924k impose upon the trustee a duty to distribute surplus funds that the trustee receives at a sale to lien holders and trustors whose interests are junior to the foreclosed deed of trust. Surplus funds are defined as funds in excess of the debt due to the holder of the foreclosed lien and the costs of the foreclosure sale. As previously referenced in the I. E. Associates and Stephens cases, those courts held that with respect to the conduct of the foreclosure sale, a foreclosure trustee is not a true trustee – only a middleman. Further, in Hatch v. Collins, the court held that a breach of the trustee’s duties in the conduct of the sale does not constitute a breach of a fiduciary duty. While no case holds that a trustee is a fiduciary with respect to surplus funds, a trustee’s surplus funds duties closely resemble those of a fiduciary – a fiduciary is one who holds and manages property for the benefit of another. Fiduciaries are held to a higher standard of care than others in discharging their duties. If a trustee has a fiduciary duty in handling surplus funds, a trustee may have a duty to do more than simply follow the statute with respect to giving notice of and distributing the surplus funds. For instance, a trustee may have a duty to take reasonable steps to find an interested party whose address is unknown to the trustee if the trustee has reason to believe such an address can be found. This is particularly so because the trustee can pay for the expense of the investigation from the surplus funds. Also, a trustee as a fiduciary may face greater exposure to punitive damages, which can be awarded for breach of fiduciary duty when coupled with fraud, malice or oppression. Servicers Using In-House Foreclosure Trustees Must Beware in Mortgage Servicing > Foreclosure by John Clark Brown Jr. on Tuesday 19 June 2007 email the content item print the content item comments: 0 Servicing Management, June 2007. Because of the significant increase in defaults and foreclosures, mortgage servicers need to understand the duties and liabilities the law imposes upon foreclosure trustees. Litigation based upon trustee error can slow, stop or invalidate foreclosures and impair the servicer’s ability to dispose of properties following foreclosure. When borrowers refinance or pay off during foreclosure, trustees are often responsible for the payoffs and reconveyances. After foreclosure, the trustee is responsible for distribution of surplus funds – the funds in excess of the debt due under the foreclosed deed of trust. All these responsibilities are sources of claims against trustees. Foreclosure litigation plaintiffs often name and seek to hold lenders and servicers responsible for trustee errors on the theory that the trustee is the agent of the lender and servicer. According to Miller & Starr’s “California Real Estate,” this claim is particularly easy to make when the lender or servicer uses an in-house trustee and especially when the trustee acquires the property by credit bid for the lender or servicer at its own foreclosure sale. This article examines a trustee’s liability for damages under California law for conduct of the foreclosure sale, payoffs, reconveyances and distribution of surplus funds. The scope of a trustee’s duties differs for each of these services, and a breach of one of these duties can subject the trustee, lender and servicer to substantial compensatory damages, punitive damages and even criminal sanctions. Foreclosure sales In the I.E. Associates v. Safeco case, the California Supreme Court limited the scope of the trustee’s duties in conducting foreclosure sales. The issue in that case was whether a trustee breached its duty to a trustor by failing to ascertain the current address of the trustor where the current address was different from the address of record. The trustee did not have actual knowledge of the current address, but through reasonable diligence could have discovered it. The Supreme Court held that the trustee did not have a duty to find the current address. The court found that a foreclosure trustee is not a true trustee, such as a trustee of a person or a trustee under a trust agreement. Instead, a foreclosure trustee is merely “a middleman” between the beneficiary and the trustor who only carries out the specific duties that the deed of trust and foreclosure law specifically impose upon it. The deed of trust and the statute are the exclusive source of the rights, duties and liabilities governing notice of nonjudicial foreclosure sales. Because neither the deed of trust nor the statute required the trustee to search for an address it did not have, the court held that the trustee had no duty to do so. The Stephens v. Hollis case reiterated the rule that a foreclosure trustee is not a true trustee: “Just as a panda is not an ordinary bear, a trustee of a deed of trust is not an ordinary trustee. ‘A trustee under a deed of trust has neither the powers nor the obligations of a strict trustee. He serves as a kind of common agent for the parties.’” It is critical to recognize, however, that these rules of limited duty only apply to the trustee’s duty to provide proper notice of the sale. The trustee also has a broad common law duty to conduct a sale that is fair in all respects. In Hatch v. Collins, the court noted that “A trustee has a general duty to conduct the sale ‘fairly, openly, reasonably and with due diligence,’ exercising sound discretion to protect the rights of the mortgagor and others…A breach of the trustee’s duty to conduct an open, fair and honest sale may give rise to a cause of action for professional negligence, breach of an obligation created by statute, or fraud.” Examples of such a breach could be conspiring to “chill the bidding” by overstating the debt, thereby dissuading others from appearing and bidding at the sale. California Civil Code Section 2924h(g) states that it is “unlawful for any person, acting alone or in concert with others, (1) to offer to accept or accept from another any consideration of any type not to bid, or (2) to fix or restrain bidding in any manner at a sale of property conducted pursuant to a power of sale in a deed of trust or mortgage.” The code continues: “In addition to any other remedies, any person committing any act declared unlawful by this subdivision or any act which would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any beneficiary, trustor or junior [lien holder] shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned in the county jail for not more than one year, or be punished by both that fine and imprisonment.” In addition to imposing criminal penalties, this section also imposes civil liability upon the trustee. The courts will review foreclosure sale proceedings to make sure they have been fair in all respects. A trustee who violates its contractual duties under the deed of trust or its statutory or common law duties is liable to the trustor or to an affected junior lien holder for such person’s lost equity in the property. This is measured by the difference between the fair market value of the property and the liens senior to the affected person’s interest at the time of the sale. In addition, pursuant to Civil Code Section 3333, the trustee has liability for all other damages proximately caused by its wrongful conduct, whether those damages were foreseeable or not. A willful violation of these duties can subject the trustee to punitive damages under Civil Code Section 3294. Payoffs and reconveyances Civil Code Section 2943(c) requires a beneficiary or its representative, which is frequently the trustee, to provide a payoff statement to an “entitled person” within 21 days after a written request for a payoff demand. An “entitled person” means the trustor, a junior lien holder, their successors or assigns, or an escrow. Failure to provide a timely payoff demand makes the beneficiary or its representative liable to the entitled person for all actual damages such a person may sustain due to a failure to provide a timely payoff demand, plus $300 in statutory damages. Failure to provide an accurate payoff demand can have dire consequences. If the entitled person closes a sale or refinance in reliance upon a payoff demand that understates the payoff, the beneficiary must reconvey its lien. The beneficiary is then left with only an unsecured claim against the entitled person. A trustee who is responsible for such an error could have substantial liability to its beneficiary. After the note and deed of trust are paid off, Civil Code Section 2941 requires the beneficiary to deliver the original note, the deed of trust and a request for reconveyance to the trustee. Within 21 days thereafter, the trustee must record the reconveyance and deliver the original note to the trustor. If the reconveyance has not been recorded within 60 days after the payoff, upon the trustee’s written request, the beneficiary must substitute himself as trustee and record the reconveyance. If the reconveyance is not recorded within 75 days after payoff, any title company may prepare and record a release of the obligation. A person who violates any of these provisions is liable for $500 in statutory damages and all actual damages caused by the violation. These can include damages for emotional distress. A willful violation of these requirements is a misdemeanor which can subject the violator to a $400 fine, plus six months’ imprisonment in the county jail. Surplus funds Civil Code Sections 2924j and 2924k impose upon the trustee a duty to distribute surplus funds that the trustee receives at a sale to lien holders and trustors whose interests are junior to the foreclosed deed of trust. Surplus funds are defined as funds in excess of the debt due to the holder of the foreclosed lien and the costs of the foreclosure sale. As previously referenced in the I. E. Associates and Stephens cases, those courts held that with respect to the conduct of the foreclosure sale, a foreclosure trustee is not a true trustee – only a middleman. Further, in Hatch v. Collins, the court held that a breach of the trustee’s duties in the conduct of the sale does not constitute a breach of a fiduciary duty. While no case holds that a trustee is a fiduciary with respect to surplus funds, a trustee’s surplus funds duties closely resemble those of a fiduciary – a fiduciary is one who holds and manages property for the benefit of another. Fiduciaries are held to a higher standard of care than others in discharging their duties. If a trustee has a fiduciary duty in handling surplus funds, a trustee may have a duty to do more than simply follow the statute with respect to giving notice of and distributing the surplus funds. For instance, a trustee may have a duty to take reasonable steps to find an interested party whose address is unknown to the trustee if the trustee has reason to believe such an address can be found. This is particularly so because the trustee can pay for the expense of the investigation from the surplus funds. Also, a trustee as a fiduciary may face greater exposure to punitive damages, which can be awarded for breach of fiduciary duty when coupled with fraud, malice or oppression.

Pooling and servicing agreements PSA how it works in Judicial foreclosure states like Florida

THE ROOT OF FORECLOSURE DEFENSE The Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA) is the document that actually creates a residential mortgage backed securitized trust and establishes the obligations and authority of the Master Servicer and the Primary Servicer. The PSA is the heart and root of all securitized based foreclosure action defenses. The PSA establishes that mandatory rules and procedures for the sales and transfers of the mortgages and mortgage notes from the originators to the Trust. It is this unbroken chain of assignments and negotiations that creates what is called “The Alphabet Problem.” In order to understand the “Alphabet Problem,” you must keep in mind that the primary purpose of securitization is to make sure the assets (e.g., mortgage notes) are both FDIC and Bankruptcy “remote” from the originator. As a result, the common structures seek to create at least two “true sales” between the originator and the Trust. One of the defenses used by the famous Foreclosure Defender, April Charney is the following: PLAINTIFF FAILED TO COMPLY WITH APPLICABLE POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT LOAN SERVICING REQUIREMENTS: Plaintiff failed to provide separate Defendants with legitimate and non predatory access to the debt management and relief that must be made available to borrowers, including this Defendant pursuant to and in accordance with the Pooling and Servicing Agreement filed by the plaintiff with the Securities and Exchange Commission that controls and applies to the subject mortgage loan. Plaintiff’s non-compliance with the conditions precedent to foreclosure imposed on the plaintiff pursuant to the applicable pooling and servicing agreement is an actionable event that makes the filing of this foreclosure premature based on a failure of a contractual and/or equitable condition precedent to foreclosure which denies Plaintiff’s ability to carry out this foreclosure. You therefore have in the most basic securitized structure the originator, the sponsor, the depositor and the Trust. I refer to these parties as the A (originator), B (sponsor), C (depositor) and D (Trust) alphabet players. The other primary but non-designated player in my alphabet game is the Master Document Custodian for the Trust. The MDC is entrusted with the physical custody of all of the “original” notes and mortgages and the assignment, sales and purchase agreements. The MDC must also execute representations and attestations that all of the transfers really and truly occurred “on time” and in the required “order” and that “true sales” occurred at each link in the chain. Section 2.01 of most PSAs includes the mandatory conveyancing rules for the Trust and the representations and warranties. The basic terms of this Section of the standard PSA is set-forth below: 2.01 Conveyance of Mortgage Loans. (a) The Depositor, concurrently with the execution and delivery hereof, hereby sells, transfers, assigns, sets over and otherwise conveys to the Trustee for the benefit of the Certificateholders, without recourse, all the right, title and interest of the Depositor in and to the Trust Fund, and the Trustee, on behalf of the Trust, hereby accepts the Trust Fund. (b) In connection with the transfer and assignment of each Mortgage Loan, the Depositor has delivered or caused to be delivered to the Trustee for the benefit of the Certificateholders the following documents or instruments with respect to each Mortgage Loan so assigned: (i) the original Mortgage Note (except for no more than up to 0.02% of the mortgage Notes for which there is a lost note affidavit and the copy of the Mortgage Note) bearing all intervening endorsements showing a complete chain of endorsement from the originator to the last endorsee, endorsed “Pay to the order of _____________, without recourse” and signed in the name of the last endorsee. To the extent that there is no room on the face of any Mortgage Note for an endorsement, the endorsement may be contained on an allonge, unless state law does not so allow and the Trustee is advised by the Responsible Party that state law does not so allow. If the Mortgage Loan was acquired by the Responsible Party in a merger, the endorsement must be by “[last endorsee], successor by merger to [name of predecessor]“. If the Mortgage Loan was acquired or originated by the last endorsee while doing business under another name, the endorsement must be by “[last endorsee], formerly known as [previous name]“; A review of all of the recent “standing” and “real party in interest” cases decided by the bankruptcy courts and the state courts in judicial foreclosure states all arise out of the inability of the mortgage servicer or the Trust to “prove up” an unbroken chain of “assignments and transfers” of the mortgage notes and the mortgages from the originators to the sponsors to the depositors to the trust and to the master document custodian for the trust. As stated in the referenced PSA, the parties have represented and warranted that there is “a complete chain of endorsements from the originator to the last endorsee” for the note. And, the Master Document Custodian must file verified reports that it in fact holds such documents with all “intervening” documents that confirm true sales at each link in the chain. The complete inability of the mortgage servicers and the Trusts to produce such unbroken chains of proof along with the original documents is the genesis for all of the recent court rulings. One would think that a simple request to the Master Document Custodian would solve these problems. However, a review of the cases reveals a massive volume of transfers and assignments executed long after the “closing date” for the Trust from the “originator” directly to the “trust.” I refer to these documents as “A to D” transfers and assignments. There are some serious problems with the A to D documents. First, at the time these documents are executed the A party has nothing to sell or transfer since the PSA provides such a sale and transfer occurred years ago. Second, the documents completely circumvent the primary objective of securitization by ignoring the “true sales” to the Sponsor (the B party) and the Depositor (the C party). In a true securitization, you would never have any direct transfers (A to D) from the originator to the trust. Third, these A to D transfers are totally inconsistent with the representations and warranties made in the PSA to the Securities and Exchange Commission and to the holders of the bonds (the “Certificateholders”) issued by the Trust. Fourth, in many cases the A to D documents are executed by parties who are not employed by the originator but who claim to have “signing authority” or some type of “agency authority” from the originator. Finally, in many of these A to D document cases the originator is legally defunct at the time the document is in fact signed or the document is signed with a current date but then states that it has an “effective date” that was one or two years earlier. Hence, we have what I call the Alphabet Problem.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES AND COUNTRCLAIMS RELATED TO POOLING & SERVICING AGREEMENTS 1. Plaintiff failed to comply with the foreclosure prevention loan servicing requirement imposed on Plaintiff pursuant to the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. 1701x(c)(5) which requires all private lenders servicing non-federally insured home loans, including the Plaintiff, to advise borrowers, including this separate Defendant, of any home ownership counseling Plaintiff offers together with information about counseling offered by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. 2. Plaintiff cannot legally pursue foreclosure unless and until Plaintiff demonstrates compliance with 12 U.S.C. 1701x(c)(5). 3. Plaintiff failed to provide separate Defendants with legitimate and non predatory access to the debt management and relief that must be made available to borrowers, including this Defendant pursuant to and in accordance with the Pooling and Servicing Agreement filed by the plaintiff with the Securities and Exchange Commission that controls and applies to the subject mortgage loan. 4. Plaintiff’s non-compliance with the conditions precedent to foreclosure imposed on the plaintiff pursuant to the applicable pooling and servicing agreement is an actionable event that makes the filing of this foreclosure premature based on a failure of a contractual and/or equitable condition precedent to foreclosure which denies Plaintiff’s ability to carry out this foreclosure. 5. The special default loan servicing requirements contained in the subject pooling and servicing agreement are incorporated into the terms of the mortgage contract between the parties as if written therein word for word and the defendants are entitled to rely upon the servicing terms set out in that agreement. 6. Defendants are third party beneficiaries of the Plaintiff’s pooling and servicing agreement and entitled to enforce the special default servicing obligations of the plaintiff specified therein. 7. Plaintiff cannot legally pursue foreclosure unless and until Plaintiff demonstrates compliance with the foreclosure prevention servicing imposed by the subject pooling and servicing agreement under which the plaintiff owns the subject mortgage loan. 8. The section of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA) is a public document on file and online at http://www.secinfo.com and the entire pooling and servicing agreement is incorporated herein. 9. The Plaintiff failed, refused or neglected to comply, prior to the commencement of this action, with the servicing obligations specifically imposed on the plaintiff by the PSA in many particulars, including, but not limited to: a. Plaintiff failed to service and administer the subject mortgage loan in compliance with all applicable federal state and local laws. b. Plaintiff failed to service and administer the subject loan in accordance with the customary an usual standards of practice of mortgage lenders and servicers. c. Plaintiff failed to extend to defendants the opportunity and failed to permit a modification, waiver, forbearance or amendment of the terms of the subject loan or to in any way exercise the requisite judgment as is reasonably required pursuant to the PSA. 10. The Plaintiff has no right to pursue this foreclosure because the Plaintiff has failed to provide servicing of this residential mortgage loan in accordance with the controlling servicing requirements prior to filing this foreclosure action. 11. Defendants have a right to receive foreclosure prevention loan servicing from the Plaintiff before the commencement or initiation of this foreclosure action. 12. Defendants are in doubt regarding their rights and status as borrowers under the National Housing Act and also under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement filed by the plaintiff with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Defendants are now subject to this foreclosure action by reason of the above described illegal acts and omissions of the Plaintiff. 13. Defendants are being denied and deprived by Plaintiff of their right to access the required troubled mortgage loan servicing imposed on the plaintiff and applicable to the subject mortgage loan by the National Housing Act and also under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement filed by the plaintiff with the Securities and Exchange Commission. 14. Defendants are being illegally subjected by the Plaintiff to this foreclosure action, being forced to defend the same and they are being charged illegal predatory court costs and related fees, and attorney fees. Defendants are having their credit slandered and negatively affected, all of which constitutes irreparable harm to Defendants for the purpose of injunctive relief. 15. As a proximate result of the Plaintiff’s unlawful actions set forth herein, Defendants continue to suffer the irreparable harm described above for which monetary compensation is inadequate. 18. Defendants have a right to access the foreclosure prevention servicing prescribed by the National Housing Act and under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement filed by the plaintiff with the Securities and Exchange Commission which right is being denied to them by the Plaintiff. 16. These acts were wrongful and predatory acts by the plaintiff, through its predecessor in interest, and were intentional and deceptive. 17. There is a substantial likelihood that Defendants will prevail on the merits of the case.

Foreclosure and too big to Fail – Bank Of America vs Wikileaks

TBR News February 20, 2011
Feb 20 2011
The Voice of the White House
Washinigton, D.C., February 20, 2011: “The most hated person today in Washington is Julian Assange, head of the WikiLeaks

An overall view of the Bank of America material now held by WikiLeaks reveals that starting in 2008, the Bank of America acquired Countrywide Mortgage, a very aggressive mortgage company that specialized in creating fraudulent loans to individuals that were unable to make continuing payments on their mortgages. Countrywide then sold these fraudulent mortgages to larger banking houses like Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, Goldman Sachs and others. The results of this takeover of Countrywide? The Bank of America now has over 1.3 mortgage holders in foreclosure.

Bank of America was subsequently sued by California, Illinois and eight other states over its predatory lending policies. The bank was forced to produce a settlement of over $8.4 billion in loan relief plans for those victims holding Countrywide mortgages.

In June of 2010, Bank of America had to pay out $108 million because of a suit by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) for “having extracted excessive fees” from their borrowers facing foreclosure. In August of 2010, Bank of America was forced to pay out $600 million to settle shareholder lawsuits which claimed that Bank of America’s Countrywide Mortgage had “concealed the riskiness” of its lending standards. In June of 2010, the State of Illinois once more had to sue the Bank of America for “racial discrimination” in its lending practices. The WikiLeaks documentation shows thousands of in-house emails circulating among top Bank of American personnel showing with shocking clarity that the bank was not only fully cognizant of the illegality of their actions but were, in fact, continuing these actions because of the assurance of protection by “senior American legislators and officials.”

Additional material in the WikiLeaks fundus concerns the brokerage house of Merrill Lynch which Bank of America acquired for $50 billion in January of 2009. The aforesaid “senior American legislators and officials: quicklyi loaned the Bank of America $20 billion in loans to facilitate this purchase. Subsequently, it was revealed that Merrill Lynch had lost over $16 billion at the end of 2008 but had paid out over $4 billion in bonuses to all the top Merrill Lynch personnel. In sum, the Merrill Lynch people, secure in the knowledge of a connived Federal bailout, took the funds for personal gain. The WikiLeaks documents clearly show all of this in detail, complete with boasting emails on the part of the recipients of the monies.

As another aspect of this enormous financial scandal furthered purely for gain, corporate and personal, the Bank of America has been the instigator of the so-called “robo-signing” scandal As a single example of this illegal conduct, in February of 2010, a Bank of American employee testified on deposition that they had personally signed over 8,000 official foreclosure documents without ever reading any of them. This is a clearcut violation of the law but there are so many such examples of this, not limited to the Bank of America alone, that there is not sufficient space to list them all. The WikiLeaks documents clearly show that these illegal actions were fully known to senior Bank of America officials and that extensive cover-ups were ordered from the very top levels of that bank.

WikiLeaks documentation shows clearly that the “senior American legislators and officials.” Who connived with the Bank of America include the leadership of the Federal Reserve, top Congressional leaders (mostly Republican) and even senior members of the White House staff, both in the Bush and Obama administrations.
With this pending dam collapse release to the public, it is no wonder that the government itself, the officials of the Bank of America and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the most powerful, arch-conservative business cabal would all join forces in an attempt to discredit or permanently silence Assange and his organization.

The front organization, HBGary Federal, a specialist in computer manipulations, was hired by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Bank of America to attempt to plant false information with WikiLeaks, double-heading frantic government attempts to get Assange physically into their hands. When WiliLeaks struck back and, in turn, infiltrated the government and private sector’s attempts to infiltrate them, it was discovered that HBGary Federal was involved with Stuxtnet, a very sophisticated computer virus developed by Israeli and American experts and designed to infiltrate and destroy computer systems deemed “unacceptable” to Washington.

Bank of American officials have been warning Washington that if they crash, the damage to the American ecnomoy wouild be catastrophic because of their size and pervasiveness and this message has resonated very clearly in official circles, prompting frantic but clumsy attacks on Assange and his organization.”

Find Your Home’s Pooling And Servicing Agreement

Critical Information: How to Find Your Home’s Pooling And Servicing Agreement

February 28th, 2011 • Foreclosure

The pooling and servicing agreement (PSA) is a contract that should govern the terms under which trillions of dollars-worth of equity in the land of the United States of America was flung around the world. These contracts should govern how disputes over ownership and interest in the land that was the United States of America should be resolved. Pretty simple stuff, right? I mean if I’m a millionaire big shot New York Lawyer working for big shot billionaire Wall Street Investors and banks, then I’d do my job as a lawyer to make sure the contract was right and that all the i’s were dotted and the t’s were crossed right?

But that’s not at all what’s happened. In our scraggly street level offices, far below the big fancy marble encased towers of American law and finance, simple dirt lawyers defending homeowners started actually reading these contracts. We ask lots of questions about just what all those fancy words in their big shot contracts mean. Invariably, the big shot lawyers and the foreclosure mills tell us, “Don’t you worry about all them words you scraggly, simple dirt lawyer. Those words aren’t important to you.”

But increasingly judges recognize that the words really do mean something. Take note of the following statements from the recent Ibanez Ruling:

I concur fully in the opinion of the court, and write separately only to underscore that what is surprising about these cases is not the statement of principles articulated by the court regarding title law and the law of foreclosure in Massachusetts, but rather the utter carelessness with which the plaintiff banks documented the titles to their assets.

The type of sophisticated transactions leading up to the accumulation of the notes and mortgages in question in these cases and their securitization, and, ultimately the sale of mortgaged-backed securities, are not barred nor even burdened by the requirements of Massachusetts law. The plaintiff banks, who brought these cases to clear the titles that they acquired at their own foreclosure sales, have simply failed to prove that the under-lying assignments of the mortgages that they allege (and would have) entitled them to foreclose ever existed in any legally cognizable form before they exercised the power of sale that accompanies those assignments.

The Ibanez decision underscores the fact that it is important for all of us to know and understand how the pooling and servicing agreements directly impact what is occurring in the courtroom. And for assistance with understanding the PSA and how to find it, more commentary from Michael Olenick at Legalprise:

Overview of PSA’s

Securitized loans are built into securities, which happen to look and function virtually identically to bonds but are categorized and called securities because of some legal restrictions on bonds that nobody seems to know about.

The securities start with one or more investment banks, called the Underwriter (should be called the Undertaker), that seems to disappear right after cashing in lots of fees. They create a prospectus that has different parts of the security that they are proposing. Each of these parts is called a tranche. There are anywhere from a half-dozen to a couple dozen tranches. Each one is considered riskier.

Each tranche is actually a separate sub-security, that can and is traded differently, but governed by the same PSA, listed in the Prospectus. Similar tranches from multiple loans were often bundled together into something called a Collateralized Debt Obligation, or CDO. So besides the MBS there might also be one or more CDO’s made up of, say, one middle tranche of each MBS. Each tranche is considered riskier, usually based a combination of the credit-scores of the people in the tranche and the type of loans (ex: full/partial/no doc, traditional/interest-only/neg am, first or secondary lien, etc…).

CDO’s were eligible for a type of “insurance” in case their price went down called a Credit Default Swap, or CDS (also known as “synthetic CDO’s”). There was actually no need to own the CDO to buy the
insurance and many companies purchased the insurance, that paid out handsomely. [That’s what the AIG bailout was for, because they didn’t keep adequate reserves to pay out the insurance policies.]

Later, investors could also purchase securities made up of multiple CDO’s, much the same way that CDO’s were made up of tranches of multiple MBS’s. These were called “CDO’s squared.” Not surprisingly,
there were also a few “CDO’s cubed,” CDO’s of CDO’s squared. CDO’s were virtually all written offshore so little is known about who owns them, except that they were premised on the idea that since there was
collateralized mortgage debt at their base they could not collapse. Their purpose was to spread the various of risks of mortgages which, back then, meant prepayment of high interest debt and default.

Investors were actually way more obsessed with prepayment because they thought the whole country could not default; to make sure of that MBS’s and all their gobbly gook were spread around the country; you
can see where in the prospectus. They were almost more concerned with geographic dispersion than credit dispersion.

After that it’s the servicers/trustee/document custodian scheme we’re all familiar with. OK .. with that too-strange-to-make-up explanation means let’s dive into how to find one’s loan:

1. Find the security name: it will be a year (usually the year of origination), a dash, two letters, then a number. It will be somewhere in one of your filings. For this we’ll use a random First Franklin loan, 2005-FF1. [Note; they would just sequentially number them, so the first security First Franklin floated in 2005 would be FF1, then FF2, etc…]
2. Go to the SEC’s new search engine: http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html
3. Click the first link, Company or fund name…
4. Choose the radio button marked “contains” and type in the ticker; that is 2005-FF1
5. There will be multiple filings but one of them will be marked 424B5. Click that, it’s the prospectus.

If you really want to have fun, and want to know what happened after 2008 when these all disappeared, type the ticker (again, 2005-FF1) into the full text link from the first search page. There you’ll see lots and lots of filings as pieces and parts of the security are blasted everywhere. To track yours you have to find which tranche you ended up in. Sometimes it’s in the filing but, if not, you can usually figure it out from the prospectus if you know basic origination info (credit-score, type of loan, where the house is, etc…); some even list loan amounts.

One warning on those secondary filings, servicers and trusts both break them out as assets. How one loan can be reported as an asset in two places is a mystery, but considering this doesn’t even cover the CDO’s and CDS’s dual reporting doesn’t seem to strange. You’ll see your loan keep wandering through the financial system, with one exception (next paragraph), right up to the present day. You can even see how much the investment banks thinks that its worth over time since they report out both original amount and fair market value.

The exception — when your loan really does disappear — is when it was eaten up by the Federal Reserve’s Toxic Loan Asset Facility, TALF. But you can look that up to and see how the government purchased your
loan for full-price, when investors on the open market were only willing to pay a few cents on the dollar. If your loan went to TALF you can find it in the spreadsheet here: http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_talf.htm Your loan will be in the top spreadsheet and the genuine lender in the bottom.

Now they have to admit it they violated the law and will be liable for Billions

BofA, Wells, Citi see foreclosure probe fines

By Joe Rauch and Clare Baldwin
CHARLOTTE, N.C./NEW YORK | Fri Feb 25, 2011 9:20pm EST
CHARLOTTE, N.C./NEW YORK (Reuters) – Bank of America, Citigroup and Wells Fargo — three of the biggest banks in the United States — said they could face fines from a regulatory probe into the industry’s foreclosure practices.
The statements, made in regulatory filings on Friday, are the most direct admission yet from major banks that they could have to pay significant amounts of money to settle probes and lawsuits alleging that they improperly foreclosed on homes.
Bank of America Corp (BAC.N), the largest U.S. bank by assets, said the probe could lead to “material fines” and “significant” legal expenses in 2011.
Wells Fargo & Co (WFC.N), the largest U.S. mortgage lender, said it is likely to face fines or sanctions, such as a foreclosure moratorium or suspension, imposed by federal or state regulators. It said some government agency enforcement action was likely and could include civil money penalties.
Citigroup Inc (C.N) said it could pay fines or set up principal reduction programs.
The biggest U.S. mortgage lenders are being investigated by 50 state attorneys general and U.S. regulators for foreclosing on homes without having proper paperwork in place or without having properly reviewed paperwork before signing it.
The bad documentation threatens to slow down the foreclosure process and invalidate some repossessions.
Sources familiar with discussions among federal authorities have said they could seek as much as $20 billion in total from lenders to settle the foreclosure probe, which began last fall.
Analysts said the acknowledgment of potential foreclosure liabilities highlights the continuing struggles of the largest U.S. banks after the world financial crisis.
“Are they trying? Sure, but this is not an easy fix and these kinds of problems are going to hang around the banks for years,” said Matt McCormick, a portfolio manager with Cincinnati-based Bahl & Gaynor Investment Counsel.
McCormick said he has sold nearly all of his U.S. bank holdings because of concerns over foreclosures and other losses.
Beyond direct fines due to regulators, banks may also end up paying government-controlled mortgage giants Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae for the foreclosure delays.
Bank of America said it recorded $230 million in compensatory fees in the fourth quarter that it expects to owe the government mortgage companies.
The bank said its projected costs for settlements for all legal matters it is facing, including mortgage issues, could be $145 million to $1.5 billion beyond what it has already reserved.
Wells Fargo said that in the worst-case scenario, as of the end of 2010, it could have to pay $1.2 billion more than it has set aside to cover legal matters.
Citigroup said it could face up to about $4 billion more in losses from all sorts of lawsuits, including but not limited to those relating to mortgages and foreclosures.
Wells Fargo said in October that it plans to amend 55,000 foreclosure filings nationwide, amid signs that documentation for some foreclosures was incomplete or incorrect. Other banks made similar moves.
Other banks echoed the concern over foreclosures in a wave of annual report filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission on Friday.
Atlanta-based SunTrust said it expects regulators may issue a consent order, which will require the largest mortgage lenders to fix problems with their foreclosure processes, and potentially levy fines.
Wells Fargo shares closed 3.1 percent higher at $32.40 on the New York Stock Exchange. Bank of America shares closed 1.6 percent higher at $14.20 and Citi shares closed 0.2 percent higher at $4.70, also on the New York Stock Exchange.
(Reporting by Joe Rauch, Clare Baldwin and Maria Aspan; Editing by Gary Hill)

Commercial Bailout property values down 3 Trillion

The financial disaster of continuing to bailout commercial real estate through the shadows of Federal Reserve jargon. Why you haven’t heard of this trillion dollar bailout.

The financial disaster of continuing to bailout commercial real estate through the shadows of Federal Reserve jargon. Why you haven’t heard of this trillion dollar bailout.

The media has done a fantastic job painting over the enormous sinkhole of a problem that is commercial real estate (CRE). U.S. banks hold over $3 trillion in commercial real estate loans on properties that were once valued at over $6 trillion. Today those values are down to roughly $3 to $3.5 trillion depending on what metric you believe. How is it possible for a market that has lost $2.5 to $3 trillion to become largely hidden in the dark from the mainstream media? We constantly hear about $3 billion deficits or other issues but is the trillion dollar figure just so enormous that they don’t even bother investigating? It is probably more likely that the Federal Reserve has concealed massive failures in CRE by allowing banks to play a game of extend and pretend that continues today. The shadowy problems of empty shopping centers, vacant car dealership lots, and misplaced strip malls is largely a taxpayer problem now. Banks made these irresponsible loans but had the Fed hand over taxpayer loot in exchange for worthless real estate.

empty strip mall

“Another empty strip mall”

CRE bringing down FDIC banks

commercial real estate mit

Source: MIT

CRE values are still hovering near their trough and are likely to move lower. The only reason these prices haven’t moved lower is because banks are more generous with the borrowers of CRE debt since these holders are grappling with multi-million dollar cuts in each deal. Banks would rather pretend a mall is valued at $100 million instead of marking it to a real value of $40 million or less. The fact that the Federal Reserve allows this to happen is financial chicanery. Can you pretend to the government that you really don’t make $100,000 a year so instead you will act as if you make $30,000 a year and act accordingly? This is what is happening here. Banks are essentially allowing these toxic loans to be laundered through the system in exchange for taxpayer dollars. The Fed is betting that the public doesn’t wake up to this scam.

CRE is a giant and pernicious problem. With residential real estate it hits directly home and many American families are considered home owners. This bubble has garnered most media attention as it should. Yet CRE debt is enormous, larger than every state budget deficit combined by many times! In fact, the losses on CRE loans is larger than the state budget issues. Of course the Fed wants the public to look away from the real culprit behind the decline of the American middle class. The scheme was to build junk and pawn off the loans to average Americans whether they wanted to accept the debt or not.

The cost of CRE problems

commercial loans

Banks have no faith in this recovery. Look at the above regarding commercial loans. Banks continue to claim that the reason for the taxpayer bailouts was to help the American public weather the economic storm and for banks to continue lending to average Americans. Instead, as you can see above, commercial loan lending has collapsed and banks have hoarded money and speculated on the stock market casino on the taxpayer dime. This money was used to shore up bad balance sheet problems and for gambling on the stock market to boost profits. In short it was one giant swindle perpetrated on the public.

And think about the supposed recovery we are experiencing. If we were truly growing and expanding don’t you think there would be healthy demand for loans as businesses expand their workforce? Wouldn’t it be logical to conclude that commercial loans would reflect the supposed increased demand from a booming American economy? Of course the only boom occurring is for the top 1 percent who are siphoning off the wealth from average Americans to spin their continuing speculation in the stock market. Many are starting to wake up from this collective sleepwalk where taxpayers were robbed in open daylight.

The problems are coming up

Source: ZeroHedge

What is even more problematic is many of the CRE loans are going bad in the next few years. Just like residential real estate is now experiencing a second collapse, CRE will have another move lower. Banks can only carry fantasy paper for so long. So far we have been paying for it through QE1, QE2, TARP, and other convoluted programs to launder money and devalue the U.S. dollar and decrease the quality of life of average Americans. The public did not sign up for this. The banks talk about shared responsibility and many are paying for it by losing their homes and going bankrupt. Millions are facing this economic “responsibility” on a daily basis. What penalty for the banks? Instead, they get bailouts and continue to pretend the junk loans they made on concrete disasters are worth inflated values only to shovel them off to taxpayers. How is it that there are no buyers for these supposedly highly priced items?

CRE debt exposes the worst aspect of the bubble. Pure profit motive by supposed sophisticated investors on both sides of the coin with no financial responsibility or ownership. This isn’t some poor family in a low-income neighborhood taking out a subprime loan. This is actually a supposed responsible bank and a supposed financially savvy investor. There is no justification for one penny of a bailout here. Yet the Federal Reserve continues with their hidden bailout where they support malls in Oklahoma to Chick-fil-A. Don’t expect to hear about this on your nightly news

Agard MERS a nominee is not an agent

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
—————————————————————–x
In re:
Case No. 810-77338-reg
FERREL L. AGARD,
Chapter 7
Debtor.
—————————————————————–x
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Before the Court is a motion (the “Motion”) seeking relief from the automatic stay
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) and (2), to foreclose on a secured interest in the Debtor’s real
property located in Westbury, New York (the “Property”). The movant is Select Portfolio
Servicing, Inc. (“Select Portfolio” or “Movant”), as servicer for U.S. Bank National Association,
as Trustee for First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF12, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-FF12 (“U.S. Bank”). The Debtor filed limited opposition to the Motion
contesting the Movant’s standing to seek relief from stay. The Debtor argues that the only
interest U.S. Bank holds in the underlying mortgage was received by way of an assignment from
the Mortgage Electronic Registration System a/k/a MERS, as a “nominee” for the original
lender. The Debtor’s argument raises a fundamental question as to whether MERS had the legal
authority to assign a valid and enforceable interest in the subject mortgage. Because U.S. Bank’s
rights can be no greater than the rights as transferred by its assignor – MERS – the Debtor argues
that the Movant, acting on behalf of U.S. Bank, has failed to establish that it holds an
enforceable
Case 8-10-77338-reg Doc 41 Filed 02/10/11 Entered 02/10/11 14:13:10
right against the Property.1 The Movant’s initial response to the Debtor’s opposition was that
MERS’s authority to assign the mortgage to U.S. Bank is derived from the mortgage itself which
allegedly grants to MERS its status as both “nominee” of the mortgagee and “mortgagee of
record.” The Movant later supplemented its papers taking the position that U.S. Bank is a
creditor with standing to seek relief from stay by virtue of a judgment of foreclosure and sale
entered in its favor by the state court prior to the filing of the bankruptcy. The Movant argues
that the judgment of foreclosure is a final adjudication as to U.S. Bank’s status as a secured
creditor and therefore the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits this Court from looking behind the
judgment and questioning whether U.S. Bank has proper standing before this Court by virtue of a
valid assignment of the mortgage from MERS.
The Court received extensive briefing and oral argument from MERS, as an intervenor in
these proceedings which go beyond the arguments presented by the Movant. In addition to the
rights created by the mortgage documents themselves, MERS argues that the terms of its
membership agreement with the original lender and its successors in interest, as well as New
York state agency laws, give MERS the authority to assign the mortgage. MERS argues that it
holds legal title to mortgages for its member/lenders as both “nominee” and “mortgagee of
1 The Debtor also questions whether Select Portfolio has the authority and the standing to
seek relief from the automatic stay. The Movant argues that Select Portfolio has standing
to bring the Motion based upon its status as “servicer” of the Mortgage, and attaches an
affidavit of a vice president of Select Portfolio attesting to that servicing relationship.
Caselaw has established that a mortgage servicer has standing to seek relief from the
automatic stay as a party in interest. See, e.g., Greer v. O’Dell, 305 F.3d 1297
(11th Cir. 2002); In re Woodberry, 383 B.R. 373 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2008). This presumes,
however, that the lender for whom the servicer acts validly holds the subject note and
mortgage. Thus, this Decision will focus on whether U.S. Bank validly holds the subject
note and mortgage.
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record.” As such, it argues that any member/lender which holds a note secured by real property,
that assigns that note to another member by way of entry into the MERS database, need not also
assign the mortgage because legal title to the mortgage remains in the name of MERS, as agent
for any member/lender which holds the corresponding note. MERS’s position is that if a MERS
member directs it to provide a written assignment of the mortgage, MERS has the legal
authority, as an agent for each of its members, to assign mortgages to the member/lender
currently holding the note as reflected in the MERS database.
For the reasons that follow, the Debtor’s objection to the Motion is overruled and the
Motion is granted. The Debtor’s objection is overruled by application of either the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine, or res judicata. Under those doctrines, this Court must accept the state court
judgment of foreclosure as evidence of U.S. Bank’s status as a creditor secured by the Property.
Such status is sufficient to establish the Movant’s standing to seek relief from the automatic stay.
The Motion is granted on the merits because the Movant has shown, and the Debtor has not
disputed, sufficient basis to lift the stay under Section 362(d).
Although the Court is constrained in this case to give full force and effect to the state
court judgment of foreclosure, there are numerous other cases before this Court which present
identical issues with respect to MERS and in which there have been no prior dispositive state
court decisions. This Court has deferred rulings on dozens of other motions for relief from stay
pending the resolution of the issue of whether an entity which acquires its interests in a mortgage
by way of assignment from MERS, as nominee, is a valid secured creditor with standing to seek
relief from the automatic stay. It is for this reason that the Court’s decision in this matter will
address the issue of whether the Movant has established standing in this case notwithstanding the
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existence of the foreclosure judgment. The Court believes this analysis is necessary for the
precedential effect it will have on other cases pending before this Court.
The Court recognizes that an adverse ruling regarding MERS’s authority to assign
mortgages or act on behalf of its member/lenders could have a significant impact on MERS and
upon the lenders which do business with MERS throughout the United States. However, the
Court must resolve the instant matter by applying the laws as they exist today. It is up to the
legislative branch, if it chooses, to amend the current statutes to confer upon MERS the requisite
authority to assign mortgages under its current business practices. MERS and its partners made
the decision to create and operate under a business model that was designed in large part to avoid
the requirements of the traditional mortgage recording process. This Court does not accept the
argument that because MERS may be involved with 50% of all residential mortgages in the
country, that is reason enough for this Court to turn a blind eye to the fact that this process does
not comply with the law.
Facts
Procedural Background
On September 20, 2010, the Debtor filed for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy
Code. In Schedule A to the petition, the Debtor lists a joint ownership interest in the Property
described as follows:
A “[s]ingle family home owned with son, deed in son’s name since 2007; used as
primary residence . . .. Debtor was on original deed and is liable on the mortgage,
therefore has equitable title. Debtor is in default of the mortgage with a principal
balance of over $450,000.00. The house is worth approximately $350,000. A
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foreclosure sale was scheduled 9/21/10.”
According to Schedule D, the Property is valued at $350,000 and is encumbered by a mortgage
in the amount of $536,920.67 held by “SPS Select Portfolio Servicing.”
On October 14, 2010, the Movant filed the Motion seeking relief from the automatic stay
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §362(d) to foreclose on the Property. The Motion does not state that a
foreclosure proceeding had been commenced or that a judgment of foreclosure was granted prior
to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Nor does it mention that the Debtor holds only equitable
title and does not hold legal title to the Property. Instead, Movant alleges that U.S. Bank is the
“holder” of the Mortgage; that the last mortgage payment it received from the Debtor was
applied to the July, 2008 payment; and that the Debtor has failed to make any post-petition
payments to the Movant. Movant also asserts that as of September 24, 2010, the total
indebtedness on the Note and Mortgage was $542,902.33 and the Debtor lists the value of the
Property at $350,000 in its schedules. On that basis, Movant seeks entry of an order vacating the
stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) and (d)(2).
Annexed to the Motion are copies of the following documents:
• Adjustable Rate Note, dated June 9, 2006, executed by the Debtor as borrower and listing
First Franklin a Division of Na. City Bank of In. (“First Franklin”) as the lender
(“Note”);
• Balloon Note Addendum to the Note, dated June 9, 2006;
• Mortgage, dated June 9, 2006 executed by the Debtor and listing First Franklin as lender,
and MERS as nominee for First Franklin and First Franklin’s successors and assigns
(“Mortgage”);
• Adjustable Rate and Balloon Rider, dated June 9, 2006;
• Addendum to Promissory Note and Security Agreement executed by the Debtor; and
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• Assignment of Mortgage, dated February 1, 2008, listing MERS as nominee for First
Franklin as assignor, and the Movant, U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee for
First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006- FF12, Mortgage Pass-through Certificates,
Series 2006-FF12, as assignee (“Assignment of Mortgage”).
The Arguments of the Parties
On October 27, 2010, the Debtor filed “limited opposition” to the Motion, alleging that
the Movant lacks standing to seek the relief requested because MERS, the purported assignor to
the Movant, did not have authority to assign the Mortgage and therefore the Movant cannot
establish that it is a bona fide holder of a valid secured interest in the Property.
The Movant responded to the Debtor’s limited opposition regarding MERS’s authority to
assign by referring to the provisions of the Mortgage which purport to create a “nominee”
relationship between MERS and First Franklin. In conclusory fashion, the Movant states that it
therefore follows that MERS’s standing to assign is based upon its nominee status.
On November 15, 2010, a hearing was held and the Court gave both the Debtor and
Movant the opportunity to file supplemental briefs on the issues raised by the Debtor’s limited
opposition.
On December 8, 2010, the Movant filed a memorandum of law in support of the Motion
arguing that this Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue of whether MERS had authority
to assign the Mortgage, and even assuming the Court did have jurisdiction to decide this issue,
under New York law the MERS assignment was valid. In support of its jurisdictional argument,
the Movant advises the Court (for the first time) that a Judgement of Foreclosure and Sale
(“Judgment of Foreclosure”) was entered by the state court in favor of the Movant on November
24, 2008, and any judicial review of the Judgment of Foreclosure is barred by the doctrines of
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res judicata, Rooker-Feldman, and judicial estoppel.2 The Movant argues that the Debtor had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate these issues in state court, but chose to default, and cannot
now challenge the state court’s adjudication as to the Movant’s status as a secured creditor or
holder of the Note and Mortgage, or its standing to seek relief from the automatic stay in this
Court. The Movant also notes that the Debtor admits in her petition and schedules that she is
liable on the Mortgage, that it was in default and the subject of a foreclosure sale, and thus
judicial estoppel bars her arguments to the contrary.
In addition to its preclusion arguments, on the underlying merits of its position the
Movant cites to caselaw holding that MERS assignments similar to the assignment in this case,
are valid and enforceable. See U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Flynn, 897 N.Y.S. 2d 855, 858 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2010); Kiah v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121252, at *1 (D. Mass. Nov.
16, 2010); Perry v. Nat’l Default Servicing Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92907, at *1 (Dist.
N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2010). It is the Movant’s position that the provisions of the Mortgage grant
to MERS the right to assign the Mortgage as “nominee,” or agent, on behalf of the lender, First
Franklin. Specifically, Movant relies on the recitations of the Mortgage pursuant to which the
“Borrower” acknowledges that MERS holds bare legal title to the Mortgage, but has the right
“(A) to exercise any or all those rights, including, but not limited to, the right to foreclose and
2
The Judgment of Foreclosure names the Debtor and an individual, Shelly English, as
defendants. Shelly English is the Debtor’s daughter-in-law. At a hearing held on
December 13, 2010, the Debtor’s counsel stated that he “believed” the Debtor transferred
title to the Property to her son, Leroy English, in 2007. This is consistent with
information provided by the Debtor in her petition and schedules. Leroy English,
however, was not named in the foreclosure action. No one in this case has addressed the
issue of whether the proper parties were named in the foreclosure action. However,
absent an argument to the contrary, this Court can only presume that the Judgment of
Foreclosure is a binding final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction.
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sell the Property; and (B) to take any action required of Lender including, but not limited to,
releasing and canceling [the Mortgage].” In addition, the Movant argues that MERS’s status as a
“mortgagee” and thus its authority to assign the Mortgage is supported by the New York Real
Property Actions and Proceedings Law (“RPAPL”) and New York Real Property Law (“RPL”).
Movant cites to RPAPL § 1921-a which allows a “mortgagee” to execute and deliver partial
releases of lien, and argues that MERS falls within the definition of “mortgagee” which includes
the “current holder of the mortgage of record . . . or . . . their . . . agents, successors or assigns.”
N.Y. Real Prop. Acts. Law § 1921(9)(a) (McKinney 2011). Although the definition of
“mortgagee” cited to by the Movant only applies to RPAPL § 1921, Movant argues that it is a
“mortgagee” vested with the authority to execute and deliver a loan payoff statement; execute
and deliver a discharge of mortgage and assign a mortgage pursuant to RPL §§ 274 and 275.
In addition to its status as “mortgagee,” Movant also argues that the assignment is valid
because MERS is an “agent” of each of its member banks under the general laws of agency in
New York, see N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-1501(1) (McKinney 2011),3 and public policy requires
the liberal interpretation and judicial recognition of the principal-agent relationship. See Arens v.
Shainswitt, 37 A.D.2d 274 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971), aff’d 29 N.Y.2d 663 (1971). In the instant
case, Movant argues, the Mortgage appoints MERS as “nominee,” read “agent,” for the original
3 Movant cites to New York General Obligations Law for the proposition that “an agency
agreement may take any form ‘desired by the parties concerned.’” The direct quote
“desired by the parties concerned” seems to be attributed to the General Obligations Law
citation, however, the Court could find no such language in the current version of § 5-
1501(1). That provision, rather, defines an agent as “a person granted authority to act as
attorney-in-fact for the principal under a power of attorney, and includes the original
agent and any co-agent or successor agent. Unless the context indicates otherwise, an
‘agent’ designated in a power of attorney shall mean ‘attorney-in-fact’ for the purposes of
this title. An agent acting under a power of attorney has a fiduciary relationship with the
principal.” N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-1501(1) (McKinney 2011) (emphasis added).
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lender and the original lender’s successors and assigns. As nominee/agent for the lender, and as
mortgagee of record, Movant argues MERS had the authority to assign the Mortgage to the
Movant, U.S. Bank, “in accordance with the principal’s instruction to its nominee MERS, to
assign the mortgage lien to U.S. Bank . . . .”
Finally, Movant argues that even absent a legally enforceable assignment of the
Mortgage, it is entitled to enforce the lien because U.S. Bank holds the Note. The Movant
argues that if it can establish that U.S. Bank is the legal holder the Note, the Mortgage by
operation of law passes to the Movant because the Note and the Mortgage are deemed to be
inseparable. See In re Conde-Dedonato, 391 B.R. 247 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2008). The Movant
represents, but has not proven, that U.S. Bank is the rightful holder of the Note, and further
argues that the assignment of the Note has to this point not been contested in this proceeding.
MERS moved to intervene in this matter pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7024 because:
12. The Court’s determination of the MERS Issue directly affects the
business model of MERS. Additionally, approximately 50% of all consumer
mortgages in the United States are held in the name of MERS, as the mortgagee
of record.
13. The Court’s determination of the MERS Issue will have a
significant impact on MERS as well as the mortgage industry in New York and
the United States.
14. MERS has a direct financial stake in the outcome of this contested
matter, and any determination of the MERS Issue has a direct impact on MERS.
(Motion to Intervene, ¶¶12-14).
Permission to intervene was granted at a hearing held on December 13, 2010.
In addition to adopting the arguments asserted by the Movant, MERS strenuously
defends its authority to act as mortgagee pursuant to the procedures for processing this and other
mortgages under the MERS “system.” First, MERS points out that the Mortgage itself
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designates MERS as the “nominee” for the original lender, First Franklin, and its successors and
assigns. In addition, the lender designates, and the Debtor agrees to recognize, MERS “as the
mortgagee of record and as nominee for ‘Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns’” and as
such the Debtor “expressly agreed without qualification that MERS had the right to foreclose
upon the premises as well as exercise any and all rights as nominee for the Lender.” (MERS
Memorandum of Law at 7). These designations as “nominee,” and “mortgagee of record,” and
the Debtor’s recognition thereof, it argues, leads to the conclusion that MERS was authorized as
a matter of law to assign the Mortgage to U.S. Bank.
Although MERS believes that the mortgage documents alone provide it with authority to
effectuate the assignment at issue, they also urge the Court to broaden its analysis and read the
documents in the context of the overall “MERS System.” According to MERS, each
participating bank/lender agrees to be bound by the terms of a membership agreement pursuant
to which the member appoints MERS to act as its authorized agent with authority to, among
other things, hold legal title to mortgages and as a result, MERS is empowered to execute
assignments of mortgage on behalf of all its member banks. In this particular case, MERS
maintains that as a member of MERS and pursuant to the MERS membership agreement, the
loan originator in this case, First Franklin, appointed MERS “to act as its agent to hold the
Mortgage as nominee on First Franklin’s behalf, and on behalf of First Franklin’s successors and
assigns.” MERS explains that subsequent to the mortgage’s inception, First Franklin assigned
the Note to Aurora Bank FSB f/k/a Lehman Brothers Bank (“Aurora”), another MERS member.
According to MERS, note assignments among MERS members are tracked via self-effectuated
and self-monitored computer entries into the MERS database. As a MERS member, by
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operation of the MERS membership rules, Aurora is deemed to have appointed MERS to act as
its agent to hold the Mortgage as nominee. Aurora subsequently assigned the Note to U.S. Bank,
also a MERS member. By operation of the MERS membership agreement, U.S. Bank is deemed
to have appointed MERS to act as its agent to hold the Mortgage as nominee. Then, according to
MERS, “U.S. Bank, as the holder of the note, under the MERS Membership Rules, chose to
instruct MERS to assign the Mortgage to U.S. Bank prior to commencing the foreclosure
proceedings by U.S. Bank.” (Affirmation of William C. Hultman, ¶12).
MERS argues that the express terms of the mortgage coupled with the provisions of the
MERS membership agreement, is “more than sufficient to create an agency relationship between
MERS and lender and the lender’s successors in interest” under New York law and as a result
establish MERS’s authority to assign the Mortgage. (MERS Memorandum of Law at 7).
On December 20, 2010, the Debtor filed supplemental opposition to the Motion. The
Debtor argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine should not preclude judicial review in this case
because the Debtor’s objection to the Motion raises issues that could not have been raised in the
state court foreclosure action, namely the validity of the assignment and standing to lift the stay.
The Debtor also argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply because the Judgment
of Foreclosure was entered by default. Finally, she also argues that the bankruptcy court can
review matters “which are void or fraudulent on its face.” See In re Ward, 423 B.R. 22 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 2010). The Debtor says that she is “alleging questionable, even possibly fraudulent
conduct by MERS in regards to transferring notes and lifting the stay.” (Debtor’s Supplemental
Opposition at 3).
The Movant filed supplemental papers on December 23, 2010 arguing that the Motion is
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moot because the Property is no longer an asset of the estate as a result of the Chapter 7
Trustee’s “report of no distribution,” and as such, the Section 362(a) automatic stay was
dissolved upon the entry of a discharge on December 14, 2010. See Brooks v. Bank of New York
Mellon, No. DKC 09-1408, 2009 WL 3379928, at *2 (D. Md. Oct. 16, 2009); Riggs Nat’l Bank
of Washington, D.C. v. Perry, 729 F.2d 982, 986 (4th Cir. 1984).
The Movant also maintains that Rooker-Feldman does apply to default judgments
because that doctrine does not require that the prior judgment be a judgment “on the merits.”
Charchenko v. City of Stillwater, 47 F.3d 981, 983 n.1 (8th Cir. 1995); see also Kafele v. Lerner,
Sampson & Rothfuss, L.P.A., No. 04-3659, 2005 WL 3528921, at *2-3 (6th Cir. Dec. 22, 2005);
In re Dahlgren, No. 09-18982, 2010 WL 5287400, at *1 (D.N.J. Dec. 17, 2010). The Movant
points out that the Debtor seems to be confusing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine with issue and
claim preclusion and that the Debtor has misapplied Chief Judge Craig’s ruling in In re Ward.
Discussion
As a threshold matter, this Court will address the Movant’s argument that this Motion has
been mooted by the entry of the discharge order.
Effect of the Chapter 7 discharge on the automatic stay
Section 362(c) provides that:
Except as provided in subsections (d), (e), (f), and (h) of this section–
(1) the stay of an act against property of the estate under subsection (a) of this
section continues until such property is no longer property of the estate;
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(2) the stay of any other act under subsection (a) of this section continues until the
earliest of–
(A) the time the case is closed;
(B) the time the case is dismissed; or
(C) if the case is a case under chapter 7 of this title concerning an individual or a case
under chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13 of this title, the time a discharge is granted or denied;
11 U.S.C. § 362(c) (emphasis added).
Pursuant to Section 362(c)(1), the automatic stay which protects “property of the estate,”
as opposed to property of the debtor, continues until the property is no longer property of the
estate regardless of the entry of the discharge. The provision of the statute relied upon by the
Movant for the proposition that the automatic stay terminates upon the entry of a discharge,
relates only to the stay of “any other act under subsection(a),”, i.e., an act against property that is
not property of the estate, i.e., is property “of the debtor.” The relationship between property of
the estate and property of the debtor is succinctly stated as follows:
Property of the estate consists of all property of the debtor as of the date of the
filing of the petition. 11 U.S.C. § 541. It remains property of the estate until it has
been exempted by the debtor under § 522, abandoned by the trustee under §
554(a), or sold by the trustee under § 363. If property of the estate is not claimed
exempt, sold, or abandoned by the trustee, it is abandoned to the debtor at the
time the case is closed if the property was scheduled under § 521(1). If the
property is not scheduled by the debtor and is not otherwise administered, it
remains property of the estate even after the case has been closed.
If the property in question is property of the estate, it remains subject to the
automatic stay until it becomes property of the debtor and until the earlier of the
time the case was closed, the case is dismissed, or a discharge is granted or denied
in a chapter 7 case.
In re Pullman, 319 B.R. 443, 445 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2004).
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Movant’s position seems to be that the Chapter 7 Trustee’s filing of a “report of no
distribution,” otherwise known as a “no asset report,” effectuated an abandonment of the real
property at issue in this case, and therefore the Property has reverted back to the Debtor.
However, Movant fails to cite the relevant statute. Section 554(c) provides that “[u]nless the
court orders otherwise, any property scheduled under section 521(1) of this title not otherwise
administered at the time of the closing of a case is abandoned to the debtor and administered for
purposes of section 350 of this title.” 11 U.S.C. § 554(c) (emphasis added); Fed. R. Bankr. P.
6007. Cases interpreting Section 554(c) hold that the filing of a report of no distribution does
not effectuate an abandonment of estate property. See, e.g., In re Israel, 112 B.R. 481, 482 n.3
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1990) (“The filing of a no-asset report does not close a case and therefore does
not constitute an abandonment of property of the estate.”) (citing e.g., Zlogar v. Internal Revenue
Serv. (In re Zlogar), 101 B.R. 1, 3 n.3 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989); Schwaber v. Reed (In re Reed), 89
B.R. 100, 104 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988); 11 U.S.C. § 554(c)).
Because the real property at issue in this case has not been abandoned it remains property
of the estate subject to Section 362(a) unless and until relief is granted under Section 362(d).
Rooker-Feldman and res judicata4
The Movant argues that U.S. Bank’s status as a secured creditor, which is the basis for its
standing in this case, already has been determined by the state court and that determination
cannot be revisited here. The Movant relies on both the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and res
4 Because the Debtor’s objection is overruled under Rooker-Feldman and res judicata, the
Court will not address the merits of the Movant’s judicial estoppel arguments.
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judicata principles to support this position.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is derived from two Supreme Court cases, Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462
(1983), which together stand for the proposition that lower federal courts lack subject matter
jurisdiction to sit in direct appellate review of state court judgments. The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine is a narrow jurisdictional doctrine which is distinct from federal preclusion doctrines.
See McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 96-97 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi
Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005), and Hoblock v. Albany County Board of Elections,
422 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2005)). In essence, the doctrine bars “cases brought by state-court
losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.
Rooker-Feldman does not otherwise override or supplant preclusion doctrine or augment the
circumscribed doctrines that allow federal courts to stay or dismiss proceedings in deference to
state-court actions.” Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 283.
The Second Circuit has delineated four elements that must be satisfied in order for
Rooker-Feldman to apply:
First, the federal-court plaintiff must have lost in state court. Second, the plaintiff
must “complain [ ] of injuries caused by [a] state-court judgment[.]” Third, the
plaintiff must “invit[e] district court review and rejection of [that] judgment [ ].”
Fourth, the state-court judgment must have been “rendered before the district
court proceedings commenced”-i.e., Rooker-Feldman has no application to
federal-court suits proceeding in parallel with ongoing state-court litigation. The
first and fourth of these requirements may be loosely termed procedural; the
second and third may be termed substantive.
McKithen, 481 F.3d at 97 (internal citation omitted and alteration in original) (quoting Hoblock,
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422 F.3d at 85).
In a case with facts similar to the instant case, Chief Judge Craig applied the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine to overrule a debtor’s objection to a motion for relief from the automatic stay.
See In re Ward, 423 B.R. 22 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2010). In In re Ward, a foreclosure sale was
conducted prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. When the successful purchaser sought
relief from stay in the bankruptcy case to proceed to evict the debtor, the debtor opposed the
motion. The debtor argued that the foreclosure judgment was flawed because “no original note
was produced”, “the mortgage was rescinded”, “the plaintiff in the action doesn’t exist” or “was
not a proper party to the foreclosure action”, and that “everything was done irregularly and
underneath [the] table.” In re Ward, 423 B.R. at 27. Chief Judge Craig overruled the debtor’s
opposition and found that each of the elements of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine were satisfied:
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies in this case because the Debtor lost in the
state court foreclosure action, the Foreclosure Judgment was rendered before the
Debtor commenced this case, and the Debtor seeks this Court’s review of the
Foreclosure Judgment in the context of her opposition to the Purchaser’s motion
for relief from the automatic stay. The injury complained of, i.e., the foreclosure
sale to the Purchaser, was “caused by” the Foreclosure Judgment because “the
foreclosure [sale] would not have occurred but-for” the Foreclosure Judgment.
Accordingly, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not permit this Court to
disregard the Foreclosure Judgment.
In re Ward, 423 B.R. at 28 (citations omitted and alteration in original).
In the instant case, the Debtor argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply
because the Judgment of Foreclosure was entered on default, not on the merits. She also argues
that Rooker-Feldman should not apply because she is alleging that the Judgment of Foreclosure
was procured by fraud in that the MERS system of mortgage assignments was fraudulent in
nature or void. However, this Court is not aware of any exception to the Rooker-Feldman
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doctrine for default judgments, or judgments procured by fraud and the Court will not read those
exceptions into the rule. See Salem v. Paroli, 260 B.R. 246, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (applying
Rooker-Feldman to preclude review of state court default judgment); see also Lombard v.
Lombard, No. 00-CIV-6703 (SAS), 2001 WL 548725, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2001)
(applying Rooker-Feldman to preclude review of stipulation of settlement executed in
connection with state court proceeding even though applicant argued that the stipulation should
be declared null and void because he was under duress at the time it was executed).
The Debtor also argues that Rooker-Feldman does not apply in this case because she is
not asking this Court to set aside the Judgment of Foreclosure, but rather is asking this Court to
make a determination as to the Movant’s standing to seek relief from stay. The Debtor argues
that notwithstanding the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the bankruptcy court must have the ability to
determine the standing of the parties before it.
Although the Debtor says she is not seeking affirmative relief from this Court, the net
effect of upholding the Debtor’s jurisdictional objection in this case would be to deny U.S. Bank
rights that were lawfully granted to U.S. Bank by the state court. This would be tantamount to a
reversal which is prohibited by Rooker-Feldman.
Even if Rooker-Feldman were found not to apply to this determination, the Court still
would find that the Debtor is precluded from questioning U.S. Bank’s standing as a secured
creditor under the doctrine of res judicata. The state court already has determined that U.S.
Bank is a secured creditor with standing to foreclose and this Court cannot alter that
determination in order to deny U.S. Bank standing to seek relief from the automatic stay.
The doctrine of res judicata is grounded in the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United
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States Constitution. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. It prevents a party from re-litigating any issue or
defense that was decided by a court of competent jurisdiction and which could have been raised
or decided in the prior action. See Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 789 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying
New York preclusion rules); Swiatkowski v. Citibank, No. 10-CV-114, 2010 WL 3951212, at
*14 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2010) (citing Waldman v. Vill. of Kiryas Joel, 39 F.Supp.2d 370, 377
(S.D.N.Y. 1999)). Res judicata applies to judgments that were obtained by default, see Kelleran
v. Andrijevic, 825 F.2d 692, 694-95 (2d Cir. 1987), but it may not apply if the judgment was
obtained by extrinsic fraud or collusion. “Extrinsic fraud involves the parties’ ‘opportunity to
have a full and fair hearing,’ while intrinsic fraud, on the other hand, involves the ‘underlying
issue in the original lawsuit.’” In re Ward, 423 B.R. at 29. The Debtor’s assertions that the
MERS system of assignments may have been fraudulent is more appropriately deemed an
intrinsic fraud argument. The Debtor has not alleged any extrinsic fraud in the procurement of
the Judgment of Foreclosure which prevented a full and fair hearing before the state court.
As a result, the Court finds that the Judgment of Foreclosure alone is sufficient evidence
of the Movant’s status as a secured creditor and therefore its standing to seek relief from the
automatic stay. On that basis, and because the Movant has established grounds for relief from
stay under Section 362(d), the Motion will be granted.
MERS
Because of the broad applicability of the issues raised in this case the Court believes that
it is appropriate to set forth its analysis on the issue of whether the Movant, absent the Judgment
of Foreclosure, would have standing to bring the instant motion. Specifically MERS’s role in
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the ownership and transfer of real property notes and mortgages is at issue in dozens of cases
before this Court. As a result, the Court has deferred ruling on motions for relief from stay
where the movants’ standing may be affected by MERS’s participation in the transfer of the real
property notes and mortgages. In the instant case, the issues were resolved under the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine and the application of res judicata. Most, if not all, of the remainder of the
“MERS cases” before the Court cannot be resolved on the same basis. For that reason, and
because MERS has intervened in this proceeding arguing that the validity of MERS assignments
directly affects its business model and will have a significant impact on the national mortgage
industry, this Court will give a reasoned opinion as to the Movant’s standing to seek relief from
the stay and how that standing is affected by the fact that U.S. Bank acquired its rights in the
Mortgage by way of assignment from MERS.
Standing to seek relief from the automatic stay
The Debtor has challenged the Movant’s standing to seek relief from the automatic stay.
Standing is a threshold issue for a court to resolve. Section 362(d) states that relief from stay
may be granted “[o]n request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing.” 11 U.S.C. §
362(d). The term “party in interest” is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, however the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit has stated that “[g]enerally the ‘real party in interest’ is the
one who, under the applicable substantive law, has the legal right which is sought to be enforced
or is the party entitled to bring suit.” See Roslyn Savings Bank v. Comcoach (In re Comcoach),
698 F.2d 571, 573 (2d Cir. 1983). The legislative history of Section 362 “suggests that,
notwithstanding the use of the term ‘party in interest’, it is only creditors who may obtain relief
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from the automatic stay.” Id. at 573-74. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 175,
reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 5787, 6136); see also Greg Restaurant Equip.
And Supplies v. Toar Train P’ship (In re Toar Train P’ship), 15 B.R. 401, 402 (Bankr. D.
Vt.1981) (finding that a judgment creditor of the debtor was not a “party in interest” because the
judgment creditor was not itself a direct creditor of the bankrupt).
Using the standard established by the Second Circuit, this Court must determine whether
the Movant is the “one who, under applicable substantive law, has the legal right” to enforce the
subject Note and Mortgage, and is therefore a “creditor” of this Debtor. See In re Toar, 15 B.R.
at 402; see also In re Mims, 438 B.R. 52, 55 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010). The Bankruptcy Code
defines a “creditor” as an “entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or
before the order for relief . . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 101(10). “Claim” is defined as the “right to
payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed,
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured . . .
.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). In the context of a lift stay motion where the movant is seeking to
commence or continue with an action to foreclose a mortgage against real property, the movant
must show that it is a “party in interest” by showing that it is a creditor with a security interest in
the subject real property. See Mims, 438 B.R. at 57 (finding that as movant “failed to prove it
owns the Note, it has failed to establish that it has standing to pursue its state law remedies with
regard to the Mortgage and Property”). Cf. Brown Bark I L.P. v. Ebersole (In re Ebersole), 440
B.R. 690, 694 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2010) (finding that movant seeking relief from stay must prove
that it is the holder of the subject note in order to establish a ‘colorable claim’ which would
establish standing to seek relief from stay).
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Noteholder status
In the Motion, the Movant asserts U.S. Bank’s status as the “holder” of the Mortgage.
However, in order to have standing to seek relief from stay, Movant, which acts as the
representative of U.S. Bank, must show that U.S. Bank holds both the Mortgage and the Note.
Mims, 438 B.R. at 56. Although the Motion does not explicitly state that U.S. Bank is the holder
of the Note, it is implicit in the Motion and the arguments presented by the Movant at the
hearing. However, the record demonstrates that the Movant has produced no evidence,
documentary or otherwise, that U.S. Bank is the rightful holder of the Note. Movant’s reliance
on the fact that U.S. Bank’s noteholder status has not been challenged thus far does not alter or
diminish the Movant’s burden to show that it is the holder of the Note as well as the Mortgage.
Under New York law, Movant can prove that U.S. Bank is the holder of the Note by
providing the Court with proof of a written assignment of the Note, or by demonstrating that
U.S. Bank has physical possession of the Note endorsed over to it. See, eg., LaSalle Bank N.A. v.
Lamy, 824 N.Y.S.2d 769, 2006 WL 2251721, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 7, 2006). The only
written assignment presented to the Court is not an assignment of the Note but rather an
“Assignment of Mortgage” which contains a vague reference to the Note. Tagged to the end of
the provisions which purport to assign the Mortgage, there is language in the Assignment stating
“To Have and to Hold the said Mortgage and Note, and also the said property until the said
Assignee forever, subject to the terms contained in said Mortgage and Note.” (Assignment of
Mortgage (emphasis added)). Not only is the language vague and insufficient to prove an intent
to assign the Note, but MERS is not a party to the Note and the record is barren of any
representation that MERS, the purported assignee, had any authority to take any action with
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respect to the Note. Therefore, the Court finds that the Assignment of Mortgage is not sufficient
to establish an effective assignment of the Note.
By MERS’s own account, it took no part in the assignment of the Note in this case, but
merely provided a database which allowed its members to electronically self-report transfers of
the Note. MERS does not confirm that the Note was properly transferred or in fact whether
anyone including agents of MERS had or have physical possession of the Note. What remains
undisputed is that MERS did not have any rights with respect to the Note and other than as
described above, MERS played no role in the transfer of the Note.
Absent a showing of a valid assignment of the Note, Movant can demonstrate that U.S.
Bank is the holder of the Note if it can show that U.S. Bank has physical possession of the Note
endorsed to its name. See In re Mims, 423 B.R. at 56-57. According to the evidence presented
in this matter the manner in which the MERS system is structured provides that, “[w]hen the
beneficial interest in a loan is sold, the promissory note is [] transferred by an endorsement and
delivery from the buyer to the seller [sic], but MERS Members are obligated to update the
MERS® System to reflect the change in ownership of the promissory note. . . .” (MERS
Supplemental Memorandum of Law at 6). However, there is nothing in the record to prove that
the Note in this case was transferred according to the processes described above other than
MERS’s representation that its computer database reflects that the Note was transferred to U.S.
Bank. The Court has no evidentiary basis to find that the Note was endorsed to U.S. Bank or
that U.S. Bank has physical possession of the Note. Therefore, the Court finds that Movant has
not satisfied its burden of showing that U.S. Bank, the party on whose behalf Movant seeks relief
from stay, is the holder of the Note.
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Mortgagee status
The Movant’s failure to show that U.S. Bank holds the Note should be fatal to the
Movant’s standing. However, even if the Movant could show that U.S. Bank is the holder of the
Note, it still would have to establish that it holds the Mortgage in order to prove that it is a
secured creditor with standing to bring this Motion before this Court. The Movant urges the
Court to adhere to the adage that a mortgage necessarily follows the same path as the note for
which it stands as collateral. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Perry, 875 N.Y.S.2d 853, 856 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2009). In simple terms the Movant relies on the argument that a note and mortgage are
inseparable. See Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. 271, 274 (1872). While it is generally true that a
mortgage travels a parallel path with its corresponding debt obligation, the parties in this case
have adopted a process which by its very terms alters this practice where mortgages are held by
MERS as “mortgagee of record.” By MERS’s own account, the Note in this case was
transferred among its members, while the Mortgage remained in MERS’s name. MERS admits
that the very foundation of its business model as described herein requires that the Note and
Mortgage travel on divergent paths. Because the Note and Mortgage did not travel together,
Movant must prove not only that it is acting on behalf of a valid assignee of the Note, but also
that it is acting on behalf of the valid assignee of the Mortgage.5
5 MERS argues that notes and mortgages processed through the MERS System are never
“separated” because beneficial ownership of the notes and mortgages are always held by
the same entity. The Court will not address that issue in this Decision, but leaves open
the issue as to whether mortgages processed through the MERS system are properly
perfected and valid liens. See Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. at 274 (finding that an
assignment of the mortgage without the note is a nullity); Landmark Nat’l Bank v. Kesler,
216 P.3d 158, 166-67 (Kan. 2009) (“[I]n the event that a mortgage loan somehow
separates interests of the note and the deed of trust, with the deed of trust lying with some
independent entity, the mortgage may become unenforceable”).
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MERS asserts that its right to assign the Mortgage to U.S. Bank in this case, and in what
it estimates to be literally millions of other cases, stems from three sources: the Mortgage
documents; the MERS membership agreement; and state law. In order to provide some context
to this discussion, the Court will begin its analysis with an overview of mortgage and loan
processing within the MERS network of lenders as set forth in the record of this case.
In the most common residential lending scenario, there are two parties to a real property
mortgage – a mortgagee, i.e., a lender, and a mortgagor, i.e., a borrower. With some nuances
and allowances for the needs of modern finance this model has been followed for hundreds of
years. The MERS business plan, as envisioned and implemented by lenders and others involved
in what has become known as the mortgage finance industry, is based in large part on amending
this traditional model and introducing a third party into the equation. MERS is, in fact, neither a
borrower nor a lender, but rather purports to be both “mortgagee of record” and a “nominee” for
the mortgagee. MERS was created to alleviate problems created by, what was determined by the
financial community to be, slow and burdensome recording processes adopted by virtually every
state and locality. In effect the MERS system was designed to circumvent these procedures.
MERS, as envisioned by its originators, operates as a replacement for our traditional system of
public recordation of mortgages.
Caselaw and commentary addressing MERS’s role in the mortgage recording and
foreclosure process abound. See Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage
Lending, and the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 78 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1359 (2010). In a
2006 published opinion, the New York Court of Appeals described MERS system as follows:
In 1993, the MERS system was created by several large participants in the real
estate mortgage industry to track ownership interests in residential mortgages.
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Mortgage lenders and other entities, known as MERS members, subscribe to the
MERS system and pay annual fees for the electronic processing and tracking of
ownership and transfers of mortgages. Members contractually agree to appoint
MERS to act as their common agent on all mortgages they register in the MERS
system.
The initial MERS mortgage is recorded in the County Clerk’s office with
‘Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.’ named as the lender’s nominee
or mortgagee of record on the instrument. During the lifetime of the mortgage,
the beneficial ownership interest or servicing rights may be transferred among
MERS members (MERS assignments), but these assignments are not publicly
recorded; instead they are tracked electronically in MERS’s private system. In the
MERS system, the mortgagor is notified of transfers of servicing rights pursuant
to the Truth in Lending Act, but not necessarily of assignments of the beneficial
interest in the mortgage.
Merscorp, Inc., v. Romaine, 8 N.Y.3d 90 (N.Y. 2006) (footnotes omitted).
In the words of MERS’s legal counsel, “[t]he essence of MERS’ business is to hold legal
title to beneficial interests under mortgages and deeds of trust in the land records. The MERS®
System is designed to allow its members, which include originators, lenders, servicers, and
investors, to accurately and efficiently track transfers of servicing rights and beneficial
ownership.” (MERS Memorandum of Law at 5). The MERS® System “. . . eliminate[s] the
need for frequent, recorded assignments of subsequent transfers.” (MERS Supplemental
Memorandum of Law at 4). “Prior to MERS, every time a loan secured by a mortgage was sold,
the assignee would need to record the assignment to protect the security interest. If a servicing
company serviced the loan and the servicing rights were sold, – an event that could occur
multiple times during the life of a single mortgage loan – multiple assignments were recorded to
ensure that the proper servicer appeared in the land records in the County Clerk’s office.”
(MERS Supplemental Memorandum of Law at 4-5).
“When the beneficial interest in a loan is sold, the promissory note is still transferred by
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an endorsement and delivery from the buyer to the seller, but MERS Members are obligated to
update the MERS® System to reflect the change in ownership of the promissory note. . . . So
long as the sale of the note involves a MERS Member, MERS remains the named mortgagee of
record, and continues to act as the mortgagee, as the nominee for the new beneficial owner of the
note (and MERS’ Member). The seller of the note does not and need not assign the mortgage
because under the terms of that security instrument, MERS remains the holder of title to the
mortgage, that is, the mortgagee, as the nominee for the purchaser of the note, who is then the
lender’s successor and/or assign.” (MERS Supplemental Memorandum of Law at 6). “At all
times during this process, the original mortgage or an assignment of the mortgage to MERS
remains of record in the public land records where the security real estate is located, providing
notice of MERS’s disclosed role as the agent for the MERS Member lender and the lender’s
successors and assigns.” (Declaration of William C. Hultman, ¶9).
MERS asserts that it has authority to act as agent for each and every MERS member
which claims ownership of a note and mortgage registered in its system. This authority is based
not in the statutes or caselaw, but rather derives from the terms and conditions of a MERS
membership agreement. Those terms and conditions provide that “MERS shall serve as
mortgagee of record with respect to all such mortgage loans solely as a nominee, in an
administrative capacity, for the beneficial owner or owners thereof from time to time.”
(Declaration of William C. Hultman, ¶5). MERS “holds the legal title to the mortgage and acts
as the agent or nominee for the MERS Member lender, or owner of the mortgage loan.”
(Declaration of William C. Hultman, ¶6). According to MERS, it is the “intent of the parties . . .
for MERS to serve as the common nominee or agent for MERS Member lenders and their
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successors and assigns.” (MERS Supplemental Memorandum of Law at 19) (emphasis added by
the Court). “Because MERS holds the mortgage lien for the lender who may freely transfer its
interest in the note, without the need for a recorded assignment document in the land records,
MERS holds the mortgage lien for any intended transferee of the note.” (MERS Supplemental
Memorandum of Law at 15) (emphasis added by the Court). If a MERS member subsequently
assigns the note to a non-MERS member, or if the MERS member which holds the note decides
to foreclose, only then is an assignment of the mortgage from MERS to the noteholder
documented and recorded in the public land records where the property is located. (Declaration
of William C. Hultman, ¶12).
Before commenting on the legal effect of the MERS membership rules or the alleged
“common agency” agreement created among MERS members, the Court will review the relevant
portions of the documents presented in this case to evaluate whether the documentation, on its
face, is sufficient to prove a valid assignment of the Mortgage to U.S. Bank.
The Mortgage
First Franklin is the “Lender” named in the Mortgage. With reference to MERS’s role in
the transaction, the Mortgage states:
MERS is a separate corporation that is acting solely as a nominee for Lender and
Lender’s successors and assigns. MERS is organized and existing under the laws
of Delaware, and has an address and telephone number of P.O. Box 2026, Flint,
MI 48501-2026, tel. (888) 679 MERS. FOR PURPOSES OF RECORDING
THIS MORTGAGE, MERS IS THE MORTGAGEE OF RECORD.
(Mortgage at 1 (emphasis added by the Court)).
The Mortgage also purports to contain a transfer to MERS of the Borrower’s (i.e., the
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Debtor’s) rights in the subject Property as follows:
BORROWER’S TRANSFER TO LENDER OF RIGHTS IN THE PROPERTY
[The Borrower] mortgage[s], grant[s] and convey[s] the Property to MERS
(solely as nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors in interest) and its
successors in interest subject to the terms of this Security Instrument. This means
that, by signing this Security Instrument, [the Borrower is] giving Lender those
rights that are stated in this Security Instrument and also those rights that
Applicable Law gives to lenders who hold mortgage on real property. [The
Borrower is] giving Lender these rights to protect Lender from possible losses
that might result if [the Borrower] fail[s] to [comply with certain obligations
under the Security Instrument and accompanying Note.]
[The Borrower] understand[s] and agree[s] that MERS holds only legal title to the
rights granted by [the Borrower] in this Security Instrument, but, if necessary to
comply with law or custom, MERS (as nominee for Lender and Lenders’s
successors and assigns) has the right: (A) to exercise any or all those rights,
including, but not limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the Property; and (B)
to take any action required of Lender including, but not limited to, releasing and
canceling this Security Instrument.
[The Borrower gives] MERS (solely as nominee for Lender and Lender’s
successors in interest), rights in the Property . . .
(Mortgage at 3) (emphasis added).
The Assignment of Mortgage references the Mortgage and defines the “Assignor” as
“‘Mers’ Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 2150 North First Street, San Jose,
California 95131, as nominee for First Franklin, a division of National City Bank of IN, 2150
North First Street San Jose, California 95153.” (Emphasis added by the Court). The “Assignee”
is U.S. Bank.
Premised on the foregoing documentation, MERS argues that it had full authority to
validly execute the Assignment of Mortgage to U.S. Bank on February 1, 2008, and that as of the
date the foreclosure proceeding was commenced U.S. Bank held both the Note and the
Mortgage. However, without more, this Court finds that MERS’s “nominee” status and the
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rights bestowed upon MERS within the Mortgage itself, are insufficient to empower MERS to
effectuate a valid assignment of mortgage.
There are several published New York state trial level decisions holding that the status of
“nominee” or “mortgagee of record” bestowed upon MERS in the mortgage documents, by
itself, does not empower MERS to effectuate an assignment of the mortgage. These cases hold
that MERS may not validly assign a mortgage based on its nominee status, absent some evidence
of specific authority to assign the mortgage. See Bank of New York v. Mulligan, No. 29399/07,
2010 WL 3339452, at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 25, 2010); One West Bank, F.S.B. v. Drayton, 910
N.Y.S.2d 857, 871 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010); Bank of New York v. Alderazi, 900 N.Y.S.2d 821, 824
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (the “party who claims to be the agent of another bears the burden of
proving the agency relationship by a preponderance of the evidence”); HSBC Bank USA v.
Yeasmin, No. 34142/07, 2010 WL 2089273, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 2010); HSBC Bank
USA v. Vasquez, No. 37410/07, 2009 WL 2581672, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 21, 2010); LaSalle
Bank N.A. v. Lamy, 824 N.Y.S.2d 769, 2006 WL 2251721, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 7, 2006)
(“A nominee of the owner of a note and mortgage may not effectively assign the note and
mortgage to another for want of an ownership interest in said note and mortgage by the
nominee.”). See also MERS v. Saunders, 2 A.3d 289, 295 (Me. 2010) (“MERS’s only right is to
record the mortgage. Its designation as the ‘mortgagee of record’ in the document does not
change or expand that right…”). But see US Bank, N.A. v. Flynn, 897 N.Y.S.2d 855 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2010) (finding that MERS’s “nominee” status and the mortgage documents give MERS
authority to assign); Crum v. LaSalle Bank, N.A., No. 2080110, 2009 WL 2986655, at *3 (Ala.
Civ. App., Sept. 18, 2009) (finding MERS validly assigned its and the lender’s rights to
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assignee); Blau v. America’s Servicing Company, et al., No. CV-08-773-PHX-MHM, 2009 WL
3174823, at *8 (D. Ariz. Sept. 29, 2009) (finding that assignee of MERS had standing to
foreclose).
In LaSalle Bank, N.A. v. Bouloute, No. 41583/07, 2010 WL 3359552, at *2 (N.Y. Sup.
Aug. 26, 2010), the court analyzed the relationship between MERS and the original lender and
concluded that a nominee possesses few or no legally enforceable rights beyond those of a
principal whom the nominee serves. The court stated:
MERS . . . recorded the subject mortgage as “nominee” for FFFC. The word
“nominee” is defined as “[a] person designated to act in place of another, usu. in a
very limited way” or “[a] party who holds bare legal title for the benefit of
others.” (Black’s Law Dictionary 1076 [8th ed 2004] ). “This definition suggests
that a nominee possesses few or no legally enforceable rights beyond those of a
principal whom the nominee serves.” (Landmark National Bank v. Kesler, 289
Kan 528, 538 [2009] ). The Supreme Court of Kansas, in Landmark National
Bank, 289 Kan at 539, observed that:
The legal status of a nominee, then, depends on the context of the
relationship of the nominee to its principal. Various courts have
interpreted the relationship of MERS and the lender as an agency
relationship. See In re Sheridan, 2009 WL631355, at *4 (Bankr. D. Idaho,
March 12, 2009) (MERS “acts not on its own account. Its capacity is
representative.”); Mortgage Elec. Registrations Systems, Inc. v. Southwest,
2009 Ark. 152 —-, 301 SW3d 1, 2009 WL 723182 (March 19, 2009)
(“MERS, by the terms of the deed of trust, and its own stated purposes,
was the lender’s agent”); La Salle Nat. Bank v. Lamy, 12 Misc.3d 1191[A],
at *2 [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 2006] ) … (“A nominee of the owner of a
note and mortgage may not effectively assign the note and mortgage to
another for want of an ownership interest in said note and mortgage by the
nominee.”).
LaSalle Bank, N.A. v. Bouloute, No. 41583/07, 2010 WL 3359552, at *2; see also Bank of New
York v. Alderazi, 900 N.Y.S.2d 821, 823 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (nominee is “‘[a] person
designated to act in place of another, usually in a very limited way.’”) (quoting Black’s Law
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Dictionary)).
In LaSalle Bank, N.A. v. Bouloute the court concluded that MERS must have some
evidence of authority to assign the mortgage in order for an assignment of a mortgage by MERS
to be effective. Evidence of MERS’s authority to assign could be by way of a power of attorney
or some other document executed by the original lender. See Bouloute, 2010 WL 3359552, at
*1; Alderazi, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 823 (“‘To have a proper assignment of a mortgage by an
authorized agent, a power of attorney is necessary to demonstrate how the agent is vested with
the authority to assign the mortgage.’”) (quoting HSBC Bank USA, NA v. Yeasmin, 866 N.Y.S.2d
92 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008)).
Other than naming MERS as “nominee”, the Mortgage also provides that the Borrower
transfers legal title to the subject property to MERS, as the Lender’s nominee, and acknowledges
MERS’s rights to exercise certain of the Lender’s rights under state law. This too, is insufficient
to bestow any authority upon MERS to assign the mortgage. In Bank of New York v. Alderazi,
the court found “[t]he fact that the borrower acknowledged and consented to MERS acting as
nominee of the lender has no bearing on what specific powers and authority the lender granted
MERS.” Alderazi, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 824. Even if it did bestow some authority upon MERS, the
court in Alderazi found that the mortgage did not convey the specific right to assign the
mortgage.
The Court agrees with the reasoning and the analysis in Bouloute and Alderazi, and the
other cases cited herein and finds that the Mortgage, by naming MERS a “nominee,” and/or
“mortgagee of record” did not bestow authority upon MERS to assign the Mortgage.
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The MERS membership rules
According to MERS, in addition to the alleged authority granted to it in the Mortgage
itself, the documentation of the Assignment of Mortgage comports with all the legal
requirements of agency when read in conjunction with the overall MERS System. MERS’s
argument requires that this Court disregard the specific words of the Assignment of Mortgage or,
at the very least, interpret the Assignment in light of the overall MERS System of tracking the
beneficial interests in mortgage securities. MERS urges the Court to look beyond the four
corners of the Mortgage and take into consideration the agency relationship created by the
agreements entered into by the lenders participating in the MERS System, including their
agreement to be bound by the terms and conditions of membership.
MERS has asserted that each of its member/lenders agrees to appoint MERS to act as its
agent. In this particular case, the Treasurer of MERS, William C. Hultman, declared under
penalty of perjury that “pursuant to the MERS’s Rules of Membership, Rule 2, Section 5. . . First
Franklin appointed MERS to act as its agent to hold the Mortgage as nominee on First Franklin’s
behalf, and on behalf of First Franklin’s successors and assigns.” (Affirmation of William C.
Hultman, ¶7). However, Section 5 of Rule 2, which was attached to the Hultman Affirmation as
an exhibit, contains no explicit reference to the creation of an agency or nominee relationship.
Consistent with this failure to explicitly refer to the creation of an agency agreement, the rules of
membership do not grant any clear authority to MERS to take any action with respect to the
mortgages held by MERS members, including but not limited to executing assignments. The
rules of membership do require that MERS members name MERS as “mortgagee of record” and
that MERS appears in the public land records as such. Section 6 of Rule 2 states that “MERS
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shall at all times comply with the instructions of the holder of mortgage loan promissory notes,”
but this does not confer any specific power or authority to MERS.
State law
Under New York agency laws, an agency relationship can be created by a “manifestation
of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his
control, and the consent by the other to act.” Meisel v. Grunberg, 651 F.Supp.2d 98, 110
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing N.Y. Marine & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Tradeline, L.L.C., 266 F.3d 112, 122 (2d
Cir.2001)).
‘Such authority to act for a principal may be actual or apparent.’ . . . Actual
authority arises from a direct manifestation of consent from the principal to the
agent. . . . . The existence of actual authority ‘depends upon the actual interaction
between the putative principal and agent, not on any perception a third party may
have of the relationship.’
Meisel v. Grunberg, 651 F.Supp.2d at 110 (citations omitted).
Because MERS’s members, the beneficial noteholders, purported to bestow upon MERS
interests in real property sufficient to authorize the assignments of mortgage, the alleged agency
relationship must be committed to writing by application of the statute of frauds. Section 5-
703(2) of the New York General Obligations Law states that:
An estate or interest in real property, other than a lease for a term not exceeding
one year, or any trust or power, over or concerning real property, or in any
manner relating thereto, cannot be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or
declared, unless by act or operation of law, or by a deed or conveyance in writing,
subscribed by the person creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring
the same, or by his lawful agent, thereunto authorized by writing.
See N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-703(1) (McKinney 2011); Republic of Benin v. Mezei, No. 06 Civ.
870 (JGK), 2010 WL 3564270, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2010); Urgo v. Patel, 746 N.Y.S.2d 733
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(N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (finding that unwritten apparent authority is insufficient to satisfy the
statute of frauds) (citing Diocese of Buffalo v. McCarthy, 91 A.D.2d 1210 (4th Dept. 1983)); see
also N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-1501 (McKinney 2011) (“‘agent’ means a person granted
authority to act as attorney-in-fact for the principal under a power of attorney. . .”). MERS asks
this Court to liberally interpret the laws of agency and find that an agency agreement may take
any form “desired by the parties concerned.” However, this does not free MERS from the
constraints of applicable agency laws.
The Court finds that the record of this case is insufficient to prove that an agency
relationship exists under the laws of the state of New York between MERS and its members.
According to MERS, the principal/agent relationship among itself and its members is created by
the MERS rules of membership and terms and conditions, as well as the Mortgage itself.
However, none of the documents expressly creates an agency relationship or even mentions the
word “agency.” MERS would have this Court cobble together the documents and draw
inferences from the words contained in those documents. For example, MERS argues that its
agent status can be found in the Mortgage which states that MERS is a “nominee” and a
“mortgagee of record.” However, the fact that MERS is named “nominee” in the Mortgage is
not dispositive of the existence of an agency relationship and does not, in and of itself, give
MERS any “authority to act.” See Steinbeck v. Steinbeck Heritage Foundation, No. 09-18360cv,
2010 WL 3995982, at *2 (2d Cir. Oct. 13, 2010) (finding that use of the words “attorney in fact”
in documents can constitute evidence of agency but finding that such labels are not dispositive);
MERS v. Saunders, 2 A.3d 289, 295 (Me. 2010) (designation as the ‘mortgagee of record’ does
not qualify MERS as a “mortgagee”). MERS also relies on its rules of membership as evidence
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of the agency relationship. However, the rules lack any specific mention of an agency
relationship, and do not bestow upon MERS any authority to act. Rather, the rules are
ambiguous as to MERS’s authority to take affirmative actions with respect to mortgages
registered on its system.
In addition to casting itself as nominee/agent, MERS seems to argue that its role as
“mortgagee of record” gives it the rights of a mortgagee in its own right. MERS relies on the
definition of “mortgagee” in the New York Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law Section
1921 which states that a “mortgagee” when used in the context of Section 1921, means the
“current holder of the mortgage of record . . . or their agents, successors or assigns.” N.Y. Real
Prop. Acts. L. § 1921 (McKinney 2011). The provisions of Section 1921 relate solely to the
discharge of mortgages and the Court will not apply that definition beyond the provisions of that
section in order to find that MERS is a “mortgagee” with full authority to perform the duties of
mortgagee in its own right. Aside from the inappropriate reliance upon the statutory definition
of “mortgagee,” MERS’s position that it can be both the mortgagee and an agent of the
mortgagee is absurd, at best.
Adding to this absurdity, it is notable in this case that the Assignment of Mortgage was
by MERS, as nominee for First Franklin, the original lender. By the Movant’s and MERS’s
own admission, at the time the assignment was effectuated, First Franklin no longer held any
interest in the Note. Both the Movant and MERS have represented to the Court that subsequent
to the origination of the loan, the Note was assigned, through the MERS tracking system, from
First Franklin to Aurora, and then from Aurora to U.S. Bank. Accordingly, at the time that
MERS, as nominee of First Franklin, assigned the interest in the Mortgage to U.S. Bank, U.S.
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Bank allegedly already held the Note and it was at U.S. Bank’s direction, not First Franklin’s,
that the Mortgage was assigned to U.S. Bank. Said another way, when MERS assigned the
Mortgage to U.S. Bank on First Franklin’s behalf, it took its direction from U.S. Bank, not First
Franklin, to provide documentation of an assignment from an entity that no longer had any rights
to the Note or the Mortgage. The documentation provided to the Court in this case (and the
Court has no reason to believe that any further documentation exists), is stunningly inconsistent
with what the parties define as the facts of this case.
However, even if MERS had assigned the Mortgage acting on behalf of the entity which
held the Note at the time of the assignment, this Court finds that MERS did not have authority,
as “nominee” or agent, to assign the Mortgage absent a showing that it was given specific
written directions by its principal.
This Court finds that MERS’s theory that it can act as a “common agent” for undisclosed
principals is not support by the law. The relationship between MERS and its lenders and its
distortion of its alleged “nominee” status was appropriately described by the Supreme Court of
Kansas as follows: “The parties appear to have defined the word [nominee] in much the same
way that the blind men of Indian legend described an elephant – their description depended on
which part they were touching at any given time.” Landmark Nat’l Bank v. Kesler, 216 P.3d
158, 166-67 (Kan. 2010).
Conclusion
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the Motion in this case should be
granted. However, in all future cases which involve MERS, the moving party must show that it
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validly holds both the mortgage and the underlying note in order to prove standing before this
Court.
Dated: Central Islip, New York
February 10, 2011 /s/ Robert E. Grossman
Hon. Robert E. Grossman
United States Bankruptcy Judge
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The law of capitalism

The Impact of Citizens United on Judicial Elections. Further why can’t I find a judge willing to follow the law. It is clear that the concerned citizen or dispossessed homeowner has no dog in the fight. The result is clear judges will support the banks the FDIC because there support and bias is now tied to the law of Capitalism. As can be seen in the sweetheart deal that One West Bank gets when they agree to buy Inymac Bank they get 90% buyback guarantee for paper they only pay a fraction of face value. Then we look to see who the major stockholders are and it becomes clear who benefits at the expense of the taxpayer. Oh whops i went to find the major stock holders where on yahoo only to find they are not publicly held that explains a lot.It’s privately held by a “consortium of private investors.” That means there’s no public stock, and presumably no stock symbol. This privacy is presumably why it gets away with being one of only four major mortgage companies who have not signed on to the “Making Home Affordable” Plan, as of 6/30/09.Read more: http://wiki.answers.com Q/OneWest_Bank_Group_LLC_stock_symbol#ixzz1E8b8GmYj
In enforcing its rights under the loans purchased from IndyMac, OneWest Bank has taken a much more aggressive approach to foreclosing on properties.

In Citizens United v. FEC,[1] the United States Supreme Court struck down the long-standing federal ban on corporate independent expenditures in elections.[ii] The transformational effect that unrestricted corporate and union spending will have on elections for legislative and executive offices has been widely denounced.[iii] But the most severe impact of Citizens United may be felt in state judicial elections.

Just last year, the Supreme Court ordered a West Virginia judge disqualified from hearing the case of a campaign supporter who had spent extravagantly to elect the judge. It did so after concluding that, by refusing to step aside from hearing his benefactor’s case, the judge had violated the opposing party’s constitutional right to a fair hearing before an impartial court.[iv] Yet, by opening the door to expanded corporate spending in judicial races, Citizens United is likely to make this type of conflict of interest more common, and to increase pressures on judges who seek to remain independent and impartial.

Equally important, heightened spending in judicial races will almost certainly exacerbate existing public concerns that justice is for sale to the highest bidder. As Justice John Paul Stevens noted in dissent, the Citizens United decision came at a time “when concerns about the conduct of judicial elections have reached a fever pitch.”[v] And after Citizens United, if retired Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s predictions are correct, “the problem of campaign contributions in judicial elections might get considerably worse and quite soon.”[vi]

This paper examines the damage that runaway spending in judicial elections is having on our state judiciaries, and offers several policy recommendations that states should consider in responding to the threat that outsized campaign spending poses to fair and independent courts. It first summarizes recent trends in judicial election spending and documents the impact that escalating spending is having on public confidence in the courts. Next, the paper highlights seven states in which Citizens United’s impact on judicial campaigns is likely to be significant, and explains why the decision is likely to spur increased special interest spending in judicial elections. The paper concludes with proposals for responding to our increasingly expensive judicial elections: public financing for judicial campaigns; enhanced disclosure and disqualification rules; and replacing judicial elections with merit selection systems in which bipartisan committees nominate the most qualified applicants, governors appoint judges from the nominees, and voters choose whether to retain the judges at the ballot box.
Introduction

Retired Justice Sandra Day O’Connor recently explained the risks that unlimited campaign spending poses to fair and independent courts — and the likelihood that Citizens United will intensify these risks:

If you’re a litigant appearing before a judge, it makes sense to invest in that judge’s campaign. No states can possibly benefit from having that much money injected into a political judicial campaign. The appearance of bias is high, and it destroys any credibility in the courts.

[After Citizens United], we can anticipate labor unions’ trial lawyers might have the means to win one kind of an election, and that a tobacco company or other corporation might win in another election. If both sides open up their spending, mutually assured destruction is probably the most likely outcome. It would end both judicial impartiality and public perception of impartiality.[vii]

The threat to our state courts is real — and serious. Thirty-nine states use elections to select some or all of their judges.[viii] According to the National Center on State Courts, nearly 9 in 10 — fully 87% — of all state judges run in elections, either to gain a seat on the bench in the first place, or to keep the seat once there.[ix] In a 2001 poll of state and local judges, more than 90% of all elected judges nationwide said they are under pressure to raise money in election years, and almost every elected judge on a state high court — 97% — said they were under a “great deal” or at least some pressure to raise money in the years they faced election.[x]

Corporations and special interests are already major spenders in judicial campaigns. As repeat players in high-stakes litigation, these groups have strong incentives to support judges they believe are likely to favor their interests. This is particularly true on state high courts, where electing a majority or a crucial swing vote can make the difference in litigation involving multi-million dollar claims. As a result, business interests and lawyers account for nearly two-thirds of all contributions to state supreme court candidates. Pro-business groups have a distinct advantage: in 2005-2006, for example, they were responsible for 44% of all contributions to supreme court candidates, compared with 21% for lawyers.[xi] In 2006, pro-business groups were responsible for more than 90% of all spending by interest groups on television advertising in supreme court campaigns.[xii]

This special interest spending has occurred in judicial elections despite the fact that approximately half the states previously banned or sharply restricted corporations from using treasury funds for campaign advocacy. None of these restrictions is permissible after Citizens United. The inevitable result will be increased corporate spending in judicial elections — and increased threats to independent and impartial courts.

Lawler: How Many Folks Have “Lost Their Homes” to Foreclosure/Short Sales/DILs?


by CalculatedRisk on 2/02/2011 05:30:00 PM

CR: This is an interesting question and hard to answer … the following is from economist Tom Lawler …

How Many Folks Have “Lost Their Homes” to Foreclosure/ShortSales/DILs Over the Past Few Years?

According toHope Nowestimates, completed foreclosure sales (rounded) were about as follows over the past few years.

Year Completed Foreclosure
2007 514,000
2008 914,000
2009 949,000
2010 1,070,000

 

While these numbers are disturbingly high, they are not nearly as large as one would have expected given the surge in seriously delinquent loans and loans in the process of foreclosure. For the latter, here is a chart based on data from the MBA’s National Delinquency Survey, which covers “over 85%” of total 1-4 family first-lienmortgages.MBA Delinquency
On one side, the “completed foreclosure sales” understates the number of homes “lost,” given that many homeowners have “lost” their homes but been able to negotiate a short sale or (much less likely) done a deed in lieu of foreclosure. While there are no official estimates of either short sales or DILs, there is no doubt that the volume of short sales increased dramatically in 2009 and 2010.

Using CoreLogic’s estimates and grossing them up to reflect its incomplete geographic coverage, one would get short sales estimates of around 78,000 for 2007, 164,000 for 2008, 278,000 for 2009, and 331,000 for 2010. However, based on data reported by lenders on short sales in the OCC/OTS mortgage metricsreports, the CoreLogic estimates of short sales look way too high for 2007 and 2008 (the 2009 estimates look OK, but the 2010 estimates – which admittedly are not available for the full year – look a tad low). Using instead my own estimates for 2008 through 2010, here’s what completed foreclosure sales plus short sales might look like (I don’t have a DIL estimate, but it appears as if the volume of DILs was pretty low).

Year Completed Foreclosure Sales Short Sales Total
2008 914,000 95,000 1,009,000
2009 949,000 263,000 1,212,000
2010 1,070,000 375,000 1,445,000

 

On the other hand, the above numbers could well OVERSTATE significantly the number of homeowners who lost their primary home either to foreclosure or to a short sale. A “significant” % of completed foreclosure sales has been completed foreclosures on non-owner-occupied homes, though estimates vary as to what that % has been. In addition, not all short sales have involved homeowners “involuntarily” leaving their home, but who instead wanted to (for economic or other reasons) move and who were able to negotiate a short sale with their lender.So what is the right number for folks who lost their residence to foreclosure, a short sales, or a DIL? I don’t rightly know.

It is pretty clear, however, that overall foreclosure moratoria, foreclosure delays, modifications, and other workout activity continued to keep the number of homeowners who “lost” their homes to foreclosure massively lower than one would have expected given the delinquency/in foreclosure numbers.

Year Completed Foreclosure Sales plus Short Sales Loans in Foreclosure/90+ Delinquent at end of previous year
2008 1,009,000 1,664,760
2009 1,212,000 2,859,959
2010 1,445,000 4,296,018

 

Note: the loans in foreclosure/90+ delinquent are derived from the MBA National Delinquency Survey, which only covers somewhere around 85-87% of the total 1-4 family first-lien mortgage market. A crude estimate of the “total” market would “gross up” the above numbers by around 1.163 (or 1/0.86).CR Note: This was from housing economist Tom Lawler.

Temporary injunction granted !

Attorney Lenore L. Albert in Huntington beach, CA, attorney for Plaintiffs and the Class Action has secured an order that is worth reading both from the standpoint of what you should be looking for as well as what should be in your pleadings. The Court has obviously been convinced that Deutsch, Aurora, Quality Loan Service et al are involved in an enterprise that if not criminal, does not meet the standards of due process or even just plain common sense and fairness.


J Selna is paving the way for a permanent injunction against them for much the same reasons as we have seen in the high Court decisions around the country including the recent Ibanez decision in Massachusetts, and the very recent New jersey decision. The Order is important not only for its content but because of its form which is why I want you to read it.

The Order 1st prohibits the Defendants from taking ANY action with respect to the properties, and second sets the stage for making that prohibition permanent. What is interesting to me about this order is the specificity of the order and the timing in which it takes effect. See if you don’t agree.

selna-ca-tro-deutsch-aurora-quality

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., v. SANDRA A. FORD | NJ APPELLATE DIVISION Reverses Foreclosure Due to Lack of Standing

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., v. SANDRA A. FORD | NJ APPELLATE DIVISION Reverses Foreclosure Due to Lack of Standing
Today, January 30, 2011, 9 hours ago | Foreclosure FraudGo to full article

Below is a well thought out decision by the SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION.

The court decided that Wells Fargo lacked standing to foreclose.

Some excerpts from the opinion…
(Emphasis added by 4F)
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,
as Trustee,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
SANDRA A. FORD,
Defendant-Appellant.

This appeal presents significant issues regarding the evidence required to establish the standing of an alleged assignee of a mortgage and negotiable note to maintain a foreclosure action.

On March 6, 2005, defendant Sandra A. Ford executed a negotiable note to secure repayment of $403,750 she borrowed from Argent Mortgage Company (Argent) and a mortgage on her residence in Westwood. Defendant alleges that Argent engaged in various predatory and fraudulent acts in connection with this transaction.

Five days later, on March 11, 2005, Argent purportedly assigned the mortgage and note to plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo). Wells Fargo claims that it acquired the status of a holder in due course as a result of this assignment and therefore is not subject to any of the defenses defendant may have been able to assert against Argent.

Defendant allegedly stopped making payments on the note in the spring of 2006, and on July 14, 2006, Wells Fargo filed this mortgage foreclosure action. In an amended complaint, Wells Fargo asserted that Argent had assigned the mortgage and note to Wells Fargo but that the assignment had not yet been recorded.

Wells Fargo subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment. This motion was supported by a certification of Josh Baxley, who identified himself as “Supervisor of Fidelity National as an attorney in fact for HomEq Servicing Corporation as attorney in fact for [Wells Fargo].” Baxley’s certification stated: “I have knowledge of the amount due Plaintiff for principal, interest and/or other charges pursuant to the mortgage due upon the mortgage made by Sandra A. Ford dated March 6, 2005, given to Argent Mortgage Company, LLC, to secure the sum of $403,750.00.” . Baxley’s certification also alleged that Wells Fargo is “the holder and owner of the said Note/Bond and Mortgage” executed by defendant and that the exhibits.

Attached to his certification, which appear to be a mortgage and note signed by defendant, were “true copies.” Again, the source of this purported knowledge was not indicated. The exhibits attached to the Baxley certification did not include the purported assignment of the mortgage.

The trial court issued a brief oral opinion granting Wells Fargo’s motion for summary judgment. The court observed that defendant “has raised numerous serious disturbing allegations relating to the originator of this loan [Argent], which if true would be a substantial violation of law and substantial violation of her rights.” Nevertheless, the court concluded that those allegations did not provide a defense to Wells Fargo’s foreclosure action because Wells Fargo was a “holder in due course” of the mortgage and note. The court apparently based this conclusion in part on a document attached to Wells Fargo’s reply brief, entitled “Assignment of Mortgage,” which was not referred to in Baxley’s certification or authenticated in any other manner.

Defendant filed a notice of appeal from the judgment.

On appeal, defendant argues that (1) Wells Fargo failed to establish that it is the holder of the negotiable note she gave to Argent and therefore lacks standing to pursue this foreclosure action; (2) even if Wells Fargo is the holder of the note, it failed to establish that it is a holder in due course and therefore, the trial court erred in concluding that Wells Fargo is not subject to the defenses asserted by defendant based on Argent’s alleged predatory and fraudulent acts in connection with execution of the mortgage and note; and (3) even if Wells Fargo is a holder in due course, it still would be subject to certain defenses and statutory claims defendant asserted in her answer and counterclaim.

We conclude that Wells Fargo failed to establish its standing to pursue this foreclosure action. Therefore, the summary judgment in Wells Fargo’s favor must be reversed and the case remanded to the trial court.

The Baxley certification Wells Fargo submitted in support of its motion for summary judgment alleged that “[p]laintiff is still the holder and owner of the said Note/Bond and mortgage,” and a copy of the mortgage and note was attached to the certification. In addition, Wells Fargo submitted a document that purported to be an assignment of the mortgage, which stated that it was an assignment of “the described Mortgage, together with the certain note(s) described
therein with all interest, all liens, and any rights due or to become due thereon.”

If properly authenticated, these documents could be found sufficient to establish that Wells Fargo was a “nonholder in possession of the [note] who has the rights of a holder.”

Baxley’s certification does not allege that he has personal knowledge that Wells Fargo is the holder and owner of the note. In fact, the certification does not give any indication how Baxley obtained this alleged knowledge. The certification also does not indicate the source of Baxley’s alleged knowledge that the attached mortgage and note are “true copies.”

Furthermore, the purported assignment of the mortgage, which an assignee must produce to maintain a foreclosure action, see N.J.S.A. 46:9-9, was not authenticated in any manner; it was simply attached to a reply brief. The trial court should not have considered this document unless it was authenticated by an affidavit or certification based on personal knowledge.

For these reasons, the summary judgment granted to Wells Fargo must be reversed and the case remanded to the trial court because Wells Fargo did not establish its standing to pursue this foreclosure action by competent evidence. On the remand, defendant may conduct appropriate discovery, including taking the deposition of Baxley and the person who purported to assign the mortgage and note to Wells Fargo on behalf of Argent. Our conclusion that the summary judgment must be reversed because Wells Fargo failed to establish its standing to maintain this action makes it unnecessary to address defendant’s other arguments. However, for the guidance of the trial court in the event Wells Fargo is able to establish its standing on remand, we note that even though Wells Fargo could become a “holder” of the note under N.J.S.A. 12A:3-201(b) if Argent indorsed the note to Wells Fargo even at this late date, see UCC Comment 3 to N.J.S.A. 12A:3-203, Wells Fargo would not thereby become a “holder in due course” that could avoid whatever defenses defendant would have to a claim by Argent because Wells Fargo is now aware of those defenses.

Consequently, if Wells Fargo produces an indorsed copy of the note on the remand, the date of that indorsement would be a critical factual issue in determining whether Wells Fargo is a holder in due course. Accordingly, the summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.

mass joinder litigation complaint

And the first “meaty” part of the complaint….

5. The fraud perpetrated by the Countrywide Defendants from 2003 through 2007, including by BofA starting no later than 2007, was willful and pervasive. It begin with simple greed and then accelerated when Countrywide founder and CEO Angelo Mozilo (“Mozilo”) discovered that Countrywide could not sustain its business, unless it used its size and large market share in California to systematically create false and inflated property appraisals throughout California. Countrywide then used these false property valuations to induce Plaintiffs and other borrowers into ever-larger loans on increasingly risky terms. As Mozilo knew from no later than 2004, these loans were unsustainable for Countrywide and the borrowers and to a certainty would result in a crash that would destroy the equity invested by Plaintiffs and other Countrywide borrowers.

In other words, Countrywide is alleged to not only have made bad loans, but also to have intentionally inflated appraisals.

6. Hand-in-hand with its fraudulently-obtained mortgages, Mozilo and others at Countrywide hatched a plan to “pool” the foregoing mortgages and sell the pools for inflated value. Rapidly, these two intertwined schemes grew into a brazen plan to disregard underwriting standards and fraudulently inflate property values – county-by-county, city-by-city, person-by-person – in order to take business from legitimate mortgage-providers, and moved on to massive securities fraud hand-in-hand with concealment from, and deception of, Plaintiffs and other mortgagees on an unprecedented scale.

Oh, that’s rich. So not only (it is alleged) did Countrywide bamboozle borrowers, they also bamboozled investors.

9. It is now all too clear that this was the ultimate high-stakes fraudulent investment scheme of the last decade. Couched in banking and securities jargon, the deceptive gamble with consumers’ primary assets – their homes – was nothing more than a financial fraud perpetrated by Defendants and others on a scale never before seen. This scheme led directly to a mortgage meltdown in California that was substantially worse than any economic problems facing the rest of the United States. From 2008 to the present, Californians’ home values decreased by considerably more than most other areas in the United States as a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ scheme set forth herein. The Countrywide Defendants’ business premise was to leave the borrowers, including Plaintiffs, holding the bag once Countrywide and its executives had cashed in reaping huge salaries and bonuses and selling Countrywide’s shares based on their inside information, while investors were still buying the increasingly overpriced mortgage pools and before the inevitable dénouement. This massive fraudulent scheme was a disaster both foreseen by Countrywide and waiting to happen. Defendants knew it, and yet Defendants still induced the Plaintiffs into their scheme without telling them.

There’s the base of it all….

24. Defendants have gone to great lengths to avoid producing documents in this litigation because they know that such documents will establish all details of the massive fraud they perpetrated on Plaintiffs and other Californians. PennyMac, the Granada Network and Defendants’ overseas operations are used by Defendants to systematically hide documents. By delaying production of documents, the Defendants are buying time as they (a) accept the benefits of the scheme described herein, (b) cover up their fraud, and (c) make it materially more expensive and difficult for Plaintiffs and their counsel to obtain a just result.

Of course there’s the famous “let’s hide Waldo” game once the gig is pretty much up. After all, if we have to produce the documents, well, our goose might be cooked – and that would be bad.

So what else is presented in here? Oh, all sorts of good stuff. Here’s a sampling:

275. Defendant CT REAL ESTATE SERVICES, INC. is a California corporation – corporation number C0570795 – and is a resident of Ventura County, California. Defendant CT REAL ESTATE SERVICES has acted alongside and in concertwith BofA in carrying out the concealment described herein and in continuing to conceal from Plaintiffs, from the California general public, and from regulators the details of the securitization and sale of deeds of trust and mortgages (including those of Plaintiffs herein) that would expose all Defendants herein to liability for sale of mortgages of California citizens – including all Plaintiffs herein – for more than the actual value of the mortgage loans. The sale and particularly the undisclosed sale of mortgage loans in excess of actual value violates California Civil Code, §§ 1709 and 1710, and California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1641 et seq. and other applicable laws.

That sounds like a problem to me……

290. At the time of entering into the notes and deeds of trust referenced herein with respect to each Plaintiff, the Countrywide Defendants were bound and obligated to fully and accurately disclose:

a. Who the true lender and mortgagee were.

b. That to induce a Plaintiff to enter into the mortgage, the Countrywide Defendants caused the appraised value of Plaintiff’s home to be overstated.

c. That to disguise the inflated value of Plaintiff’s home, Countrywide was orchestrating the over-valuation of homes throughout Plaintiff’s community.

d. That to induce a Plaintiff to enter into a mortgage, the Countrywide Defendants disregarded their underwriting requirements, thereby causing Plaintiff to falsely believe that Plaintiff was financially capable of performing Plaintiff’s obligations under the mortgage, when the Countrywide Defendants knew that was untrue. One way they systematically disregarded the underwriting requirements was through the use of the Granada Network, another fact which Defendants systematically failed to disclose to any California borrower.

Ding ding ding ding ding ding!

One of the keys to this mess is that the lenders knew full well that the borrowers could not pay “as agreed”, yet made the loans anyway.

i. The sales would include sales to nominees who were not authorized under law at the time to own a mortgage, including, among others, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc., a/k/a MERSCORP, Inc. (“MERS”), which according to its website was created by mortgage banking industry participants to be only a front or nominee to “streamline” the mortgage re-sale and securitization process;

ii. Plaintiff’s true financial condition and the true value of Plaintiff’s home and mortgage would not be disclosed to investors to whom the mortgage would be sold;

iii. Countrywide intended to sell the mortgage together with other mortgages as to which it also intended not to disclose the true financial condition of the borrowers or the true value of their homes or mortgages;

iv. The consideration to be sought from investors would be greater than the actual value of the said notes and deeds of trust;

and

v.The consideration to be sought from investors would be greater than the income stream that could be generated from the instruments even assuming a 0% default rate thereon;

You mean basically everything important about the loans, their quality, who they were going to be sold to, why and how was all bogus? And in addition, the price to be sought from investors exceeded the income stream that could be achieved even if nobody defaulted at all?

Heh, that’s a good gig if you can get it – and if you can find a way to do it legally.

Are there some facts behind this? Oh it appears there are…

The credit losses experienced by Countrywide in 2007 not only were foreseeable by the proposed defendants, they were in fact foreseen at least as early as September 2004. [¶ 33 (Emphasis in original)]

. . .

The credit risk described in the September 2004 warning worsened from September 2004 to August 2007. [¶ 35 (Emphasis in original)]

. . .

By no later than 2006, Mozilo and Sambol were on notice that Countrywide’s exotic loan products might not continue to be saleable into the secondary market, yet this material risk was not disclosed in Countrywide’s periodic filings. [¶ 45]

. . .

Mozilo and Sambol made affirmative misleading public statements in addition to those in the periodic filings that were designed to falsely reassure investors about the nature and quality of Countrywide’s underwriting. [¶ 91]

Oh my. 2004 eh? I seem to remember tAngelo on CNBS making multiple appearances talking about how his company was going to take market share from all these subprime lenders that collapsed, and this was going to be great for his company. Indeed, I remember chortling at the time that I believed he was a lying SOB, and of course the so-called “Fantastic Mainstream Media” lapped it up – and helped support his stock price.

It appears that the intrepid attorneys who filed this action remember that too…. and the pages surrounding 100 in the complaint document a whole bunch of them, including statements in 10Ks and 10Qs that, it is alleged, were flatly false.

And, of course, there’s this one, which I have referred to many times over the last three and a half years:

363. In the January 30, 2007 earnings conference call, Mozilo attempted to distinguish Countrywide from other lenders by stating “we backed away from the subprime area because of our concern over credit quality.” On March 13, 2007, in an interview with Maria Bartiromo on CNBC, Mozilo said that it would be a “mistake” to compare monoline subprime lenders to Countrywide. He then went on to state that the subprime market disruption in the first quarter of 2007 would “be great for Countrywide at the end of the day because all of the irrational competitors will be gone.”

I distinctly remember the cheesy suits and ties, not to mention the sprayed-on-looking tan.

370. In fact, the appraisals were inflated. Countrywide did not utilize quality underwriting processes. Countrywide’s financial condition was not sound, but was a house of cards ready to collapse, as Countrywide well knew, but Plaintiffs did not. Further, Plaintiffs’ mortgages were not refinanced with fixed rate mortgages and neither Agate nor Countrywide ever intended that they would be.

As I have repeatedly pointed out, the entire intent of these loans was not to be a mortgage at all. It was, I allege, more akin to an asset-stripping scheme where the borrower would be effectively forced to come back to the lender after a couple of years when the teaser expired or the inevitable reset or recast occurred and effectively hand over his accumulated “appreciation” in price through yet more fees to be paid to the “lender.”

I believe that for all intents and purposes, from the lender’s point of view, this was nothing more than renting the house, as passing of a clear title to the buyer was never part of what was contemplated by the lender – but of course the borrower wasn’t told this in advance – or at all.

There’s much more in the complaint, but this will do for a start.

Incidentally, the banks tried to get this removed to Federal Court and kill it, and were rebuffed, so it appears that it’s headed to trial. Plaintiff’s Bar 1, Banksters 0 thus far – I will be providing updates on this case as I become aware of them. Southern California (909)890-9192 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (909)890-9192 end_of_the_skype_highlighting in Northern California(925)957-9797

getting a mod with a 998

Some folks have told me that they got their modification approved using a California Civil Code 998.

Now a 998 traditionally was used in personal injury cases to put pressure on the insurance companies to settle rather than incur both sides of the litigation cost. But it applies to all civil actions. I see the advantage of a 998 in that you don’t have to file litigation to use it. This could be a useful way to start negotiation without incurring the expense of a lawsuit. Once again it costs nothing to try. The other benefit is it may get your case transferred to legal rather than some loss mitigator hence a better result in a faster time frame.

1. What is a California Code of Civil Procedure Section 998 offer to compromise?
CCP Section 998 is a statute that gives litigants leverage to settle cases. The mechanism of Section 998 is for a party to make an offer to compromise and settle a case. The offer must be in writing and must offer something in consideration for settlement. This does not necessarily need to be a dollar amount but must be something of value, such as an offer to waive costs.

There can be significant consequences to failing to accept an offer to compromise and then not securing a judgment or award better than the offer. For plaintiffs who refuse a defendant’s offer and then either suffer a defense verdict or a judgment or award less than that offer, they do not recover their post-offer statutory costs normally allowed by CCP Sections 1032 and 1033.5, and they must pay the defendant’s same costs. Further, they may be required to pay the defendant’s “actually incurred and reasonably necessary” expert witness costs, including costs incurred pre-offer.1 For defendants who reject a plaintiff’s offer and then suffer a verdict or judgment in excess of the value of the offer, they may be required to pay the plaintiff’s statutory costs, as well as post-offer expert witness costs. In personal injury actions, defendants also will be liable for prejudgment interest.2

A statutory offer also can be a strategic tool to force a settlement. Applied with care and foresight, counsel can structure the value of an offer as a reasonable settlement amount, which then puts pressure on the other party to either accept the offer or risk having to reimburse the other side’s regular and expert witness costs.

Class Actions or Mass joinder cases Widespread Wrongful Foreclosures, Failure to Reinstate Loans

It is no secret that the United States remains in the throes of one of the worst “mortgage meltdowns” in history. The problem is so widespread that the numbers are almost hard to believe. The consensus is that it will take years for the effects of this economic disaster to be unwound through any process, whether free market, government run or a combination of both. Just days ago, CNBC reported that the monthly foreclosures for January was an ALL TIME HIGH. This story ran simultaneously with the emergence of allegations of widespread “robo-signing” borrowerrs into foreclosure without regard to the actual status of their loan.

In the case of the wrongful foreclosure, the fact pattern generally goes as follows. First, borrower takes out a mortgage on his property and lender takes back a promissory note and deed of trust. Second, the borrower misses one or two payments, or falls behind one or two payments, and then catches up. Third, the lender notifies the borrower that the loan is in default, fails to reinstate the loan, and begins to generate fees and costs that must be paid by the borrower — before the lender will reinstate its loan — including but not limited to: (1) attorneys fees; (2) default interest; (3) late charges; (4) appraisal fees and (5) other costs. The lender goes on to threaten the buyer with foreclosure if the buyer fails to pay all the banks fees and costs, in addition to the principal and interest on the underlying loan this is called reinstatement.

What’s the big deal? These “default” fees and costs are quickly piled on, eroding any equity that the borrower may have slowly built up on the property (in effect paying it to the Bank), draining the borrower’s bank account and leaving the borrower unable to make up the payments or resist foreclosure. On the bank side, it’s a beautifully profitable transaction, they bleed the borrower dry, and then take the property back. Additionally they could not even initiate foreclosure in California till they comply with civil code 2923.5. One problem…..it’s illegal.

The recent case against Bank of America was based on abusive practices such as these, and resulted in a settlement of $108 million, affecting nearly 200,000 borrowers!

In California, borrowers also have the protection of a special statute, California Civil Code Section 2924c. California Civil Code § 2924c applies to any obligation secured by a deed of trust on real property, and permits the trustor, who is in default under the terms of the deed of trust, to cure the default unilaterally, by paying to the beneficiary or the successor in interest:

“(A) all amounts of principal, interest, taxes, assessments, insurance premiums, or advances actually known by the beneficiary to be, and that are, in default and shown by the beneficiary to be, and that are, in default and shown in the notice of default, under the terms of the deed of trust or mortgage and the obligation secured thereby, (B) all amounts in default on recurring obligations not shown in the notice of default, and (C) all reasonable costs and expenses, subject to subdivision (c), which are actually incurred in enforcing the terms of the obligation, deed of trust, or mortgage, and trustee’s or attorney’s fees, subject to subdivision (d), other than the portion of principal as would not then be due had no default occurred…”

If the trustor cures the default pursuant to this section, then “all proceedings theretofore had or instituted shall be dismissed or discontinued and the obligation and deed of trust or mortgage shall be reinstated and shall be and remain in force and effect, the same as if the acceleration had not occurred”. Bottom line, if a borrower tenders payment to the lender as required under 2924c, reinstatement is mandatory!

A recently filed a class action in LA Superior Court against Greystone Bank for alleged violations of California Civil Code 2924c. Read Complaint. If you are a borrower that has been: (1) subjected to, or threatened with wrongful foreclosure, or (2) forced to pay improper fees and costs in order to avoid foreclosure, by Greystone Bank or Greystone Servicing Corporation, we would like to talk with you about your situation.

Also, if you have had a wrongful foreclosure experience with any other large bank, other than Greystone Bank or Greystone Servicing Corporation, we would like to talk with you about your experience as well. Call Southern California 909-890-9192 in Northern California 925-957-9797

mers in court cases

MERS v. Nebraska Dept of Banking and Finance – State Appellate, MERS demands to be recognized as having no actionable interest in title. 2005, Cite as 270 Neb 529
Merscorp, Inc., et al., Respondents, v Edward P. Romaine, & c., et al., Appellants, et al., Defendant the fact that the Mortgage and Deed of Trust are separated is recognized (concurring opinion). While affirming MERS could enter in the records as “nominee”, the court recognized many inherent problems. Rather than resolve them, they sloughed them off to the legislature. 2006
The Boyko Decision -Federal District Judge Christopher Boyko of the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Ohio Federal Court overturns 14 foreclosure actions with a well reasoned opinion outlining the failure of the foreclosing party to prove standing. This decision started the movement of challenging the standing of the foreclosing party. Oct 2007
Landmark National Bank v Kesler – KS State Supreme Court – MERS has no standing to foreclose and is, in fact, a straw man. Oct 2009.
The importance of the findings of the Supreme Court of Kansas cannot be overemphasized. It is generally the law in all states that if the law of one state has not specifically addressed a specific legal issue that the court may look to the law of states which have. The Kansas Court acknowledged that the case was one of “first impression in Kansas”, which is why the Kansas Court looked to legal decisions from California, Idaho, New York, Missouri, and other states for guidance and to support its decision. As we have previously reported, the Ohio Courts have looked to the legal decisions of New York to resolve issues in foreclosure defense, most notably issues of standing to institute a foreclosure.
It is practically certain that this decision will be the subject of review by various courts. MERS has already threatened a “second appeal” (by requesting “reconsideration” by the Supreme Court of Kansas of its decision by the entire panel of Judges in that Court). However, for now, the decision stands, which decision is of monumental importance for borrowers. It thus appears that the tide is finally starting to turn, and that the courts are beginning to recognize the extent of the wrongful practices and fraud perpetrated by “lenders” and MERS upon borrowers, which conduct was engaged in for the sole purpose of greed and profit for the “lenders” and their ilk at the expense of borrowers.
MERS, Inc., Appellant v Southwest Homes of Arkansas, Appellee The second State Supreme Court ruling – AR 2009
BAC v US Bank – FL Appellate court upholds the concept of determining the standing of the foreclosing party before allowing summary judgement. All cases in FL must now go through this process. If you want to have fun, read the plaintiff’s brief. 2007
Wells Fargo NAS v Farmer Motion to vacate in Supreme Court, Kings County, NY 2009
In Re: Joshua & Stephanie Mitchell – US Federal Bankruptcy Court, NV 2009
In Re: Wilhelm et al., Case No. 08-20577-TLM (opinion of Hon. Terry L. Myers, Chief U.S. Bankruptcy Judge, July 9, 2009) – Chief US Bankruptcy Judge, ID – MERS, by its construction, separates the Deed from the Mortgage
MERS v Johnston – Vermont Superior Court Decision
Wells Fargo v Jordon – OH Appellate Court
Weingartner et al v Chase Home Finance et al – US District Court (Nev): Two pro se plaintiffs sue for relief re: MERS assignments. Very technical decision but two things are apparent. First, the court has little patience for pro se plaintiffs who throw everything out there wasting the court’s time and second, even though the court threw out most of what the plaintiffs were arguing for, they did side with the plaintiff. Provides a good insight to the court’s reasoning vis a vis MERS assignments. Also makes clear you shouldn’t try this from home. Please seek legal counsel.
Schneider et al v Deutsche Bank et al (FL): Class action suit (the filing) seeking to recover actual and statutory damages for violations of the foreclosure process. Provides an excellent description of the securitization process and the problems with assignments. Any person named as a defendant in a suit by Deutsche Bank should contact the firms involved for inclusion in this suit.
JP Morgan Chase v New Millenial et. al. – FL Appellate which clearly demonstrates the chaos which can ensue when there is a failure to register changes of ownership at the county recorder’s office. Everyone operates in good faith, then out of nowhere, someone shows up waving a piece of paper. The MERS system, while not explicitly named, is clearly the culprit of the chaos. 2009
In Re: Walker, Case No. 10-21656-E-11 – Eastern District of CA Bankruptcy court rules MERS has NO actionable interest in title. “Any attempt to transfer the beneficial interest of a trust deed without ownership of the underlying note is void under California law.” “MERS could not, as a matter of law, have transferred the note to Citibank from the original lender, Bayrock Mortgage Corp.” The Court’s opinion is headlined stating that MERS and Citibank are not the real parties in interest.
In re Vargas, 396 B.R. at 517-19. Judge Bufford made a finding that the witness called to testify as to debt and default was incompetent. All the witness could testify was that he had looked at the MERS computerized records. The witness was unable to satisfy the requirements of the Federal Rules of Evidence, particularly Rule 803, as applied to computerized records in the Ninth Circuit. See id. at 517-20. The low level employee could really only testify that the MERS screen shot he reviewed reflected a default. That really is not much in the way of evidence, and not nearly enough to get around the hearsay rule.
In Re: Joshua and Stephanie Mitchell, Case No. BK-S-07-16226-LBR [U.S. Bankruptcy Court, District of Nevada, Memorandum Opinion of August 19, 2008]. Federal Court in Nevada attacked MERS’ purported “authority”, finding that there was no evidence that MERS was the agent of the note’s holder
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Girdvainis, Sumter County, South Carolina Court of Common Pleas Case No. 2005-CP-43-0278 (Order dated January 19, 2006, citing to the representations of MERS and court findings in Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Nebraska Dept. of Banking and Finance, 270 Neb. 529, 704 NW 2d. 784). As such, ALL MERS assignments are suspect at best, and may in fact be fraudulent. The Court of Common Pleas of Sumter County, South Carolina also found that MERS’ rights were not as they were represented to be; that MERS had no rights to collect on any debt because it did not extend any credit; none of the borrowers owe MERS any money; that MERS does not own the promissory notes secured by the mortgages; and that MERS does not acquire any loan or extension of credit secured by a lien on real property.
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. v. SAUNDERS 2010 ME 79 Docket: Cum-09-640.Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. | Ordered dated August 12, 2010. We conclude that although MERS is not in fact a “mortgagee” within the meaning of our foreclosure statute, 14 M.R.S. §§ 6321-6325, and therefore had no standing to institute foreclosure proceedings, the real party in interest was the Bank and the court did not abuse its discretion by substituting the Bank for MERS. Because, however, the Bank was not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings.
MERS ‘AGENT’ PREVIOUS MTG FRAUD SCHEME| Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Folkes, 2010 NY Slip Op 32007 – NY: Supreme Court The settlement agent on all of the MERS documents was listed as Peter Port, Esq., undeniably plaintiffs agent. According to an affidavit, with documents attached from Ms. Nichole M. Orr, identified as an Assistant Vice President and Senior Operational Risk Specialist for Bank of America Home Loans, the successor-in-interest to plaintiff America’s Wholesale Lender (April 1, 2010)[1] certain wire transfers were made on November 23, 2004 to Mr. Port. The money appears to have come from an account with JP Morgan, but one of the documents also shows, inexplicably, that Mr. Port then sent $435,067.73 of this money to Cheron A. Ramphal at 14917 Motley Road, Silver Springs, MD. It should also be noted, as it was in the decision of February 5, 2008 by Judge Payne, that Mr. Port pled guilty in March 2006 in Federal District Court in New Jersey to providing false documents in a scheme to commit mortgage fraud.
‘NO PROOF’ MERS assigned BOTH Mortgage and NOTE to HSBC|HSBC Bank, etc. v. Miller, et al. The “Assignment of Mortgage,” which is attached as exhibit E to the opposition papers, makes no reference to the note, and only makes reference to the mortgage being assigned. The Assignment has a vague reference to note wherein it states that “the said assignor hereby grants and conveys unto the said assignee, the assignor’s beneficial interest under the mortgage, “but this is the only language in the Assignment which could possibly be found to refer to the note.
Contrary to the affirmation of Ms. Szeliga in which she represented, in paragraph 17, that there was language in the assignment which specifically referred to the note, the assignment in this case does not contain °a specific reference to the Note.
In light of the foregoing, the Court is satisfied that there is insufficient proof to establish that both the note and the mortgage have been assigned to the Plaintiff, and therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that the Plaintiff has no standing to maintain the foreclosure action; and it is further ORDERED that the application of Defendant, Jeffrey F. Miller, to dismiss is granted, without prejudice, to renew upon proof of a valid assignment of the note.
Judge ARTHUR SCHACK’s COLASSAL Steven J. BAUM “MiLL” SMACK DOWN!! MERS TWILIGHT ZONE! | HSBC BANK v. Yeasmin The MERS mortgage twilight zone was created in 1993 by several large “participants in the real estate mortgage industry to track ownership interests in residential mortgages. Mortgage lenders and other entities, known as MERS members, subscribe to the MERS system and pay annual fees for the electronic processing and tracking of ownership and transfers of mortgages. Members contractually agree to appoint MERS to act as their common agent on all mortgages they register in the MERS system.
UNION BANK CO. v. NORTH CAROLINA FURNITURE EXPRESS, LLC.: MERS ‘GETS FORECLOSED’| ASSIGNS NADA TO BAC fka COUNTRYWIDE OHIO COURT OF APPEAL: While an assignment typically transfers the lien of the mortgage on the property described in the mortgage, as BAC acknowledged in its reply brief, an assignee can only take, and the assignor can only give, the interest currently held by the assignor. R.C. 5301.31. With that stated, it is clear under the facts of this case that BAC never obtained an interest in the property; thus, it could not have been substituted as a party-defendant in the 2008 foreclosure action. Here, with respect to the 2008 foreclosure action, the date the last party was served with notice was on January 28, 2009, which was almost six months before the purported assignment from MERS to BAC. Next, on March 11, 2009, the trial court issued a judgment entry of default against MERS foreclosing on its interest in the property. Once again, this default judgment was entered against MERS almost three months before the purported assignment from MERS to BAC occurred. The effect of this default judgment against MERS resulted in MERS having “no interest in and to said premises and the equity of redemption of said Defendants in the real estate described in Plaintiff’s Complaint shall be forever cut off, barred, and foreclosed.” (2008 CV 0267, Mar. 10, 2009 JE). Nevertheless, according to the documents filed by BAC to evidence its assignment from MERS, MERS assigned its interest to BAC on June 1, 2009. (2009 CV 312, Oct. 7, 2009 JE, Ex. A). Consequently, as a result of the already entered default judgment against MERS, when BAC was assigned MERS’ interest in the property on June 1, 2009, BAC did not receive a viable interest in the property. See Quill v. Maddox (May 31, 2002), 2nd Dist. No. 19052, at *2 (mortgagee’s assignee failed to establish that it had an interest in the property, as mortgagee’s interest was foreclosed by the court before mortgagee assigned its interest to assignee, which could acquire no more interest than mortgagee held). Thus, we find that it was reasonable for the trial court to have denied the motion to substitute BAC as a party-defendant for MERS given its lack of interest in the property.
HSBC v. Thompson: HSBC’s Irregularities: Mortgage Documentation and Corporate Relationships with Ocwen, MERS, and Delta Even if HSBC had provided support for the proposition that ownership of the note is not required, the evidence about the assignment is not properly before us. The alleged mortgage assignment is attached to the rejected affidavits of Neil. Furthermore, even if we were to consider this “evidence,” the mortgage assignment from MERS to HSBC indicates that the assignment was prepared by Ocwen for MERS, and that Ocwen is located at the same Palm Beach, Florida address mentioned in Charlevagne and Antrobus. See Exhibit 3 attached to the affidavit of Chomie Neil. In addition, Scott Anderson, who signed the assignment, as Vice-President of MERS, appears to be the same individual who claimed to be both Vice-President of MERS and Vice-President of Ocwen. See Antrobus, 2008 WL 2928553, * 4, and Charlevagne, 2008 WL 2954767, * 1.
MERS v. TORR NY JUDGE SPINNER DENIES Deutsche & MERS for NOT Recording Mortgage, Make up Affidavit and Assignment! MERS ‘QUIET TITLE’ FAIL: To establish a claim of lien by a lost mortgage there must be certain evidence (e.s.) demonstrating that the mortgage was properly executed with all the formalities required by law and proof of the contents (e.s.) of such instrument. … Here Burnett’s affidavit simply states that the original mortgage is not in Deutsch Bank’s files, and that he is advised(e.s.) that the title company is out of business. Burnett gives no specifics as to what efforts were made to locate the lost mortgage…. More importantly, there is no affidavit from MLN by an individual with personal knowledge of the facts that the complete file concerning this mortgage was transferred to Deutsch Bank and that the copy of the mortgage submitted to the court is an authentic copy of Torr’s Mortgage.” (e.s.)
LPP MORTGAGE v. SABINE PROPERTIES: FINAL DISPOSITION| NO Evidence ‘MERS’ Owned The NOTE, Could NOT ASSIGN IT NY SUPREME COURT: FINAL DISPOSITION
Here, there are no allegations or evidence that MERS was the owner of the note such that it could assign it to LPP. Thus, the assignment from MERS was insufficient to confer ownership of the note to LPP and it has no standing to bring this action. Kluge v. F umz ~1, 45 AD2d at 538 (holding that the assignment of a mortgage without transfer of the debt is a nullity); Johnson v. Melnikoff, 20 Misc3d 1142(A), “2 (Sup Ct Kings Co. 2008), n. 2, afr, 65 AD3d 519 (2d Dept 20 1 Oj(noting that assignments by MERS which did not include the underlying debt were a legal nullity); m e Elect ro pic Registration Svstem v, Coakley, 41 AD3d 674 (2d Dept 2007)(holding that MERS had standing to bring foreclosure proceeding based on evidence that MERS was the lawful holder of the promissory note and the mortgage).
Thus, even assuming arguendo that the language of the assignment from MERS to LPP could be interpreted as purporting to assign not only the mortgage but also the note, such assignment is invalid since based on the record, MERS lacked an ownership interest in the note. $ee LaSalle Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Lamv, 12 Misc3d 1191(A), “3 (Sup Ct Suffolk Co. 2006) (noting that “the mortgage is merely an incident of and collateral security for the debt and an assignment of the mortgage does not pass ownership of the debt itself ’);
WACHOVIA BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, against –STUART BRENNER, et aI. : Defendant’ s answer contains a defense of “lack of standing.” Plaintiff has failed to establish it was the holder of the note and the mortgage securing it when the action was commenced. In that regard, plaintiff relies on an undated assignment of the mortgage by MERS as nominee acknowledged by a Texas notary on July 18, 2009. The note sued on does not contain an indication it has been negotiated. The undated assignment by MERS contains a provision at the assignment of the mortgage is “TOGETHER with the notes described in said mortgage.” The record before me is devoid of proof that MERS as nominee for purposes of recording had authority to assign the mortgage. However, assuming it had such authority since it is a party to the mortgage and such authority might be implied , there has been a complete failure to establish MERS, as a non-party to the note, to negotiate its transfer. A transfer of the note effects a transfer of the mortgage MERS vs. Coakley, 41 AD3 674), the assignment of a mortgage without a valid transfer of the mortgage note is a nullity(Kluge vs. Fugazv, 145 AD2 537).

Foreclosure attorney

Our Bankruptcy Attorneys and Foreclosure Prevention Attorneys have options for every situation…you just need to call. Don’t wait any longer, it may only get worse…

Bankruptcy Attorneys and Foreclosure Prevention Attorneys

We know times are tough, you aren’t sure what to do, but you know one thing, you need to do something.  Maybe you are upside down in your home and tired of throwing good money at a bad problem, maybe you can’t afford your house payments anymore due to an adjusting loan, you’ve tried talking with your  lender and after months you have gotten nowhere and you are frusterated and scared.

Your bills are mounting, your credit cards are maxed, you are starting to receive creditor calls…it is time to let the experienced bankruptcy and real estate attorneys at the McCandless  Law Firm step in and help you with all of your problems, we will steer you in the right direction for YOU. We are one of the few law firms that can assist with BOTH your real estate needs (short sales, foreclosure assistance, deed-in-lieu of foreclosure, rescission of foreclosure, etc) and/or your bankruptcy needs so whichever option fits you and your needs the best, you can rest assured that our experienced attorneys can assist you quickly and competently.  And with our offer of a free consultation you have nothing to lose and everything to gain.

Call the Mcandless Law Firm today to schedule your free one-on-one confidential consultation with one of our experienced and caring Bankruptcy and Foreclosure Prevention Attorneys.


Don’t wait any longer, it may only get worse…

Our Bankruptcy Attorneys and Foreclosure Prevention Attorneys have options for every situation…you just need to call. Don’t wait any longer, it may only get worse…

Bankruptcy Attorneys and Foreclosure Prevention Attorneys

We know times are tough, you aren’t sure what to do, but you know one thing, you need to do something.  Maybe you are upside down in your home and tired of throwing good money at a bad problem, maybe you can’t afford your house payments anymore due to an adjusting loan, you’ve tried talking with your  lender and after months you have gotten nowhere and you are frusterated and scared.

Your bills are mounting, your credit cards are maxed, you are starting to receive creditor calls…it is time to let the experienced bankruptcy and real estate attorneys at the McCandless  Law Firm step in and help you with all of your problems, we will steer you in the right direction for YOU. We are one of the few law firms that can assist with BOTH your real estate needs (short sales, foreclosure assistance, deed-in-lieu of foreclosure, rescission of foreclosure, etc) and/or your bankruptcy needs so whichever option fits you and your needs the best, you can rest assured that our experienced attorneys can assist you quickly and competently.  And with our offer of a free consultation you have nothing to lose and everything to gain.

Call the Mcandless Law Firm today to schedule your free one-on-one confidential consultation with one of our experienced and caring Bankruptcy and Foreclosure Prevention Attorneys.


Bank Of America foreclosure fraud

The Devastating Report On Bank Of America That Everyone Is Talking About

Posted by Foreclosure Fraud on October 17, 2010 · 3 Comments 

Full report below, but first some background…

First from Business Insider…

Here’s That Devastating Report On Bank Of America That Everyone Is Talking About Today

Editors note: This was originally published yesterday, but continues to get plenty of attention today, and was just referenced by David Fasber on CNBC. Without further ado...

Earlier, we wrote about Felix Salmon’s contention that there’s a new mortgage fraud scandal that has the potential to dwarf Goldman’s ABACUS dealings. In this fraud scenario, banks took advantage of their information advantage and sold CDOs with mortgages they knew to be bad without clear representation to investors.

In August, Manal Mehta and Branch Hill Capital put together a presentation targeting Bank of America’s potential exposure to this mortgage fraud, as well as other problems in the mortgage market.

The presentation comes to a pretty damning conclusion: Bank of America’s exposure could nearly halve its share price.

Read more: http://www.businessinsider.com/bank-of-america-mortgage-report-2010-10#ixzz12dvMtRAf

Then we have the spin zone…

CNBC

Sorry Folks, The Put-Back Apocalypse Ain’t Gonna Happen

You should probably be a buyer of Bank of America right now.

But Bank of America’s recent decline—down almost 10% this week—is driven by fears that the bank could be hit with huge liabilities for faulty mortgage pools. And I’m pretty sure that is not going to happen.

Why not?

Because the politicians will not let the financial stability of the largest bank in the nation be threatened by contractual rights. Not when there’s an easy fix available that won’t cost taxpayers a dime.

Here’s what is going to happen: Congress will pass a law called something like “The Financial Modernization and Stability Act of 2010” that will retroactively grant mortgage pools the rights in the underlying mortgages that people are worried about. All the screwed up paperwork, lost notes, unassigned security interests will be forgiven by a legislative act.

There’s a big difference between the financial crisis of 2008 and the new crisis. In 2008, banks were destabilized by the growing realization that they were over-exposed to the real estate market. Huge portions of their balance sheets were committed to mortgage-linked investments that were no longer generating the expected revenues or producing losses. That was a problem of economics that could only be solved by recapitalizing banks or letting some of the biggest banks in the U.S. fail.

The put-back crisis is not driven by economics. It is driven by legal rights. And there’s simply zero probability that the politicians in Washington are going to let Bank of America or Citigroup or JP Morgan Chase fail because of a legal issue.

So here’s what I expect will happen. The lame duck session of Congress will pass a bill that essentially papers over the misdeeds of the banks that originated mortgage securities. Every member of Congress and every Senator who has been voted out of office will cast a vote for the bill. And the President will sign it.

You can check out the rest of this along with comments here…

If the latter is what comes to be, am I terrified on what the repercussions will bring…

There will be no rule of law left in America.

If wall street does not have follow the law, why should main street?

We are in critical times here folks…

Oh, and one more thing.

How do you defraud the investor without defrauding the borrower?

They were both sold an empty box…

What is Causing All of These Bankruptcy Filings?

There are several common causes which lead to filing for bankruptcy.  These included, but are not limited to the following:

1. Lawsuits/Garnishments

Nobody wants to be sued and brought to judgment.  Nobody wants to have 10%-25% of their hard earned wages deducted from their pay.  In many cases, the taking of 10%-25% of one’s wages leads to the inability of that person to pay his rent, utilities or auto payment.  Just the thought of the employer potentially having to garnish wages leads many to panic.  Debtors do not want their employers or co-workers knowing of their financial troubles.

2. Auto Repossessions

Imagine waking one morning, heading out the door to work, only to find that your car is not where you parked it.  Sure you were a little late on the auto payment, but you thought the finance company would wait for you to get current on your own.  Auto lenders will do whatever it takes to get you financed, regardless of whether you are actually capable of affording the car.  They realize that if you can’t pay the installment, they can take back their vehicle and re-sell it before it fully depreciates.  They do this through the use of auto auctions where the vehicle sells for substantially less than what is owed.  This leads to a deficiency amount which the lender seeks to recover from the debtor, you.  Talk about insult to injury, the debtor first loses possession of the vehicle and then gets sued for the outstanding deficiency balance.  Who wants to pay for something that they no longer have?

3. Unpaid Medicals

With more and more Americans going without medical insurance (45.8 million, per the U.S. Census Bureau press release dated 8/30/05), they risk losing whatever they have earned throughout their lifetime should a major medical problem occur.  Most claim that they can’t afford to carry medical insurance.  In reality, they can’t afford not to.  The rising cost of health care could significantly deplete one’s savings should a serious illness or injury occur.  Even those with co-payment coverages are having a difficult time meeting their burden of the bill.

4. High Interest Loans

There have always been high interest personal loans from many sources.  In recent times, the advent of the payday loan has surfaced.  These loans have exorbitant interest, which is often carried over to extend the loan.  People who cannot survive until their next payday are giving up a huge portion of their paycheck to get the money in advance.  This dangerous cycle leads to further borrowing with less and less money actually going into the worker’s pocket.

6. Foreclosures

The pride and joy of being a homeowner can be easily tempered by the hard work and cost of maintaining the home.  Calling the landlord to make repairs is not an option; you are your own landlord.  When the water is not flowing to the main sewer, you have no option, but to make the repairs.  Additionally, the mortgage needs to be timely paid no matter what your special circumstance may be.  Real estate taxes and homeowner’s insurance are also required to be paid regularly or you face a foreclosure suit.  Changes in employment, health, income and marital status can lead to one’s failure to make timely payments.  Many take second mortgages or lines of credit which simply create an additional, financial burden on the homeowner.  When faced with the reality that they cannot afford the home, debtors can vacate the home and extinguish any mortgage liability through  bankruptcy.

7. Overzealous Lending

How many credit card applications have you received in the mail this year?  If you are like many Americans, the applications continue to appear regularly.  Have you received convenience checks or offers for additional lines of credit?  If so, you may have taken advantage of the use of the credit without any feasible way of repaying the debt.  Many people are receiving pre-approved credit applications when they are in fact, not credit worthy.  The credit card lenders point fault at the debtors for accepting the credit without the means to repay it.  It seems more logical to fault lenders who do not undertake to check the credit worthiness of particular debtors.

8. Consumer Overspending

Many people see what they want, acquire it, and decide later how they will pay for it.  People want to possess the latest clothing, jewelry, electronics, etc.  Most stores now offer the ability to take the product home through the use of store credit cards or outside financing.  You may even get a modest percentage discount off the purchase price if you open or use the store charge card.  Many people charge their groceries, restaurant and transportation expenses believing that if they just make the minimum payments everything will be alright.

The Devil’s in the Details – Foreclosure


By Numerian Posted by Michael Collins

It seems, therefore, that millions of foreclosures that have occurred in the past two years may be invalid. Investors who were part of the $8,000 tax credit program may not have valid mortgages and may not legally have the right to live in their home. Title insurance companies have stopped accepting mortgage titles from GMAC and other financial firms implicated in this situation. Numerian

What appeared at first to be an isolated problem with home mortgage foreclosures at GMAC has morphed into a serious conundrum for just about everyone involved in the residential home market: homeowners, banks, mortgage servicers, investors, and even the US government. The problem goes beyond finding which lender has legal title to a home, and therefore the right to foreclose on a defaulted mortgage. The problem has become how to prepare for a possible behavioral change among homeowners, if more than a small percentage of them decide to stop paying on their mortgage. (Image)

Strategic Defaults are Already On the Rise

What would motivate a homeowner to stop paying their mortgage principal and interest? So far, severe financial problems, combined with a drastic fall in house prices, have been the main causes of most mortgage defaults by homeowners. When the value of the house falls below the mortgage balance due, homeowners are even more liable to default on their loan, and the greater this difference (referred to as the homeowner being “underwater”), the more likely it is that a strategic default will take place. This is an industry term for defaults that occur even though the borrower has the financial means to continue paying down the mortgage.

Strategic defaults are a rational decision by the homeowner, who believes the value of the home is so far below the mortgage balance that it would take years for market values to catch up. Why pay off a loan on a depreciating asset, especially if the homeowner can rent the same size home for much less than their mortgage payment? Depending on the location, strategic defaults represent from 10% – 20% of all defaults. There is also more of a tendency for owners of expensive homes to strategically default than owners of average size homes, so strategic defaults are of serious concern to the banking industry.

The initial reaction of banks to the rising level of mortgage defaults was to foreclose and dispose of the property as soon as possible. When home values were in a free-fall up to the summer of 2009, the banking industry frenetically processed tens of thousands of foreclosures each month, evicting homeowners in every metropolitan area across the US. This process slowed down last year for two reasons. First, the federal government imposed a moratorium on foreclosures, and second, the banks were achieving less and less on foreclosed homes. In previous recessions, banks could recover around 40% of the value of the outstanding mortgage from a foreclosure and bank sale of the property. Today the recovery rate has fallen to an unprecedented low of 5% of the loan value, which is hardly worth the expense, time, and trouble of foreclosing on the property.

You would think, therefore, that banks would be eager to work out a deal with the homeowner, lowering their mortgage balance to some level that meets the financial capabilities of the borrower. This isn’t happening either. To do this, the bank would still have to declare a loss on its books, and even the biggest banks don’t have enough capital to do this on a wholesale scale. Another factor is that the banks may only own a small portion of the mortgage, the rest being sold off to investors in a mortgage-backed security deal. These investors would have to consent to taking a loss as well, and this is almost impossible to arrange.

Where is the Title to the Home?

Now comes a third problem. The GMAC revelations showed that this mortgage company has been foreclosing on thousands of properties each month, filing incomplete or possibly fraudulent documents with the court approving the foreclosures. The process of foreclosing on a home mortgage is complex and governed by both federal and state laws, but in any event the process requires that someone working for the foreclosing bank assert in writing that they are personally familiar with all the documents submitted, and that these documents are accurate. GMAC has not been meeting this standard. A middle level executive has been signing over 10,000 foreclosure documents for GMAC each month and could not possibly have “personal knowledge” of the details of each foreclosure.

It gets worse. GMAC has been asserting that it is in possession of the lien representing the mortgage, and much more importantly – it is also in possession of the title to the home. It is the title which is of far more importance here, because without clear title a bank has no foreclosure rights. GMAC has been going in front of courts all over the US claiming it holds title to the property in question, when in fact the person making this claim has no personal knowledge of the documents, and GMAC cannot in many cases produce the title.

Who has the title? GMAC may have lost it within its own files, or may have passed the title on to a mortgage servicer when the mortgage was sold off to investors. The mortgage servicer may have sold the title to another servicer, or to a clearing house that supposedly was protecting the legal rights of the lenders and investors in mortgage securities. As the mortgage market became frenzied at the height of the bubble, the financial industry became very sloppy about documentation and is now having serious trouble producing the necessary documents to proceed with a foreclosure.

Quite a few real estate lawyers believe that what GMAC did, whether through sloppiness or deliberately, constitutes a fraud upon the court, which is subject to criminal penalties. GMAC has halted all foreclosures until it straightens out the document mess, but there is increasing suspicion in the mortgage market that these problems are not going to be solved in just a month or two, if at all. JP Morgan Chase has admitted that it too has a middle level executive who was submitting personal attestations to the foreclosure courts, when she could not possibly have known the facts behind each mortgage. Chase is probably in very good company with Citigroup, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo, all of which are likely to have similar processing problems.

It seems, therefore, that millions of foreclosures that have occurred in the past two years may be invalid. Investors who were part of the $8,000 tax credit program may not have valid mortgages and may not legally have the right to live in their home. Title insurance companies have stopped accepting mortgage titles from GMAC and other financial firms implicated in this situation.

Foreclosure Market is Coming to a Halt

The foreclosure market in the US is slowly grinding to a halt, with all this uncertainty about past and future mortgage rights, and with banks now recovering only 5% of the mortgage value in a forced sale. Professionals in the market are now speculating that the federal government may be forced to outlaw all home foreclosures, since there is so much doubt on whether banks have any legal right to foreclose on residential property. If this were to happen, the market mechanism essential to clearing defaulted properties from the market would cease to exist. Lost too would be the process known as price discovery, wherein neighboring properties can be appraised, making it much harder for any homeowner wishing to sell to do so. Not only is the foreclosure market subject to a freeze, but the entire home resale market could be crippled as well.

In fact, there may be yet another incentive for homeowners to strategically default, if theoretically the defaulter could live in the home free of charge should the party holding the mortgage be unable to produce the title. Already there are thousands of homeowners in the US who are living “rent free”, so to speak, while they wait for the bank to foreclose or for the courts to honor a bank’s foreclosure claim. These people are socking away tens of thousands of dollars in savings, or spending it for that matter, while the disposition of their property is in limbo. Even when the bank is finally able to proceed with the foreclosure, they are not suing the homeowner for back principal and interest due, in part because the delay may have been caused by the bank itself, and in part because some states do not allow banks to go after other homeowner assets once a default occurs.

As the months go by, the difference between a homeowner living rent free in their home, and de facto owning the home free and clear through a form of squatters rights, is becoming very gray. This is not going to sit well with the people who continue to pay down their mortgage even if they are underwater, nor will it sit well with those who paid off their mortgage. Good financial stewardship, a virtue in the past, is looking more and more like foolhardiness. There is both a legal and social breakdown that is occurring here, upending over a century of contract law and prudent behavior that underlay the housing market.

If strategic defaults spread in part because of this new uncertainty over foreclosure and who has the title to the home, the banks and the mortgage backed securities market would be put in a dreadful position. The day in and day out cash flow expected from millions of mortgage principal and interest payments would be impacted far more than it is already, with the banks unable to access their collateral to stanch the bleeding. Insolvencies among the banks and the investors holding mortgage securities would certainly rise.

The Federal Government is Ultimately Going to Own this Problem

How bad this could get is anyone’s guess, but continued deterioration will inevitably drag in the US government, which owns both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, by far the biggest issuers and guarantors of mortgage backed securities. The federal government also has an ownership stake in Citigroup and is sitting on billions of dollars of mortgage securities bought from all the big banks and from failing institutions like Bear Stearns. If the largest US banks are pushed into technical insolvency because of this problem, the federal government would inevitably own them too.

What is currently a legal problem could turn into a behavioral problem affecting the entire mortgage market, which in turn creates a massive political problem for the federal government. It is the behavioral problem which has to be of most concern for the government, because if people who could pay their mortgage decide it is uneconomic or unfair for them to do so, the relationship between borrower and lender is broken. Currently it is slightly fractured, and the government as well as industry leaders will do everything possible to downplay this situation, characterizing it as a technical matter that will be easily and quickly cleared up.

So far, though, the courts aren’t buying the quick fixes being proposed by the industry. The foreclosure laws that have arisen over the past 100 years are designed to protect the homeowner from hasty and incomplete processes, and as well from fraudulent foreclosures. The courts are saying that the banking industry not only was hasty and reckless in its mortgage securitization process, but that homeowner rights are being trampled upon, and the courts themselves are being defrauded along with the homeowners. More and more judges across the country are coming to this conclusion, and if they believe the rule of law has been seriously undermined in the mortgage market, why should any homeowner feel a moral or legal compulsion to continue to pay down their mortgage?

ASSAILING THE FORECLOSURE

ASSAILING THE FORECLOSURE

Introduction

Neither the beneficiary nor the trustee needs to invoke any judicial procedure or obtain any judicial process to cause the sale of property pursuant to a power of sale. The only court procedure needed to complete the full foreclosure process is an action for unlawful detainer, after the consummation of the sale, to oust the former owner from possession.

The onus of challenging the merit of the foreclosure and the fairness and regularity of the process is placed on the trustor or junior lienholder. Thus, judicial supervision, examination, and intervention would come almost exclusively through an action instituted by the trustor or, to a lesser extent, a junior encumbrancer. The notion is that the minimum period of three months coupled with the succeeding 20-day period is sufficient time for the trustor to take appropriate action to stop the foreclosure sale. [See generally Smith v. Allen (1968) 68 Cal.2d 93, 96; 65 Cal.Rptr. 153.] In Py v. Pleitner (1945) 70 Cal.App.2d 576, 582; 161 P.2d 393, for example, the court denied the trustor any relief but commented that “[w]e appreciate the unfortunate position in which appellant finds herself because she did not seek legal advice to protect her legal rights.”

The foreclosure proceeding can be attacked before and after the sale; however, as discussed below, the trustor may be unable to successfully assert claims, regarding the invalidity of the proceeding, against a bona fide purchaser for value and without notice. If an action is initiated prior to the sale, the basic remedy sought is an injunction to restrain the foreclosure sale in addition to other remedies such as quiet title or cancellation of the trust deed. If an action is initiated after the foreclosure sale, the trustor will seek various remedies and will attempt to vacate the sale and to enjoin the purchaser from attempting to oust the trustor from possession. After the sale, the battleground may be in unlawful detainer proceedings where raising defenses based on the obligation or the trust deed may not be allowed or, if allowed, would be perilous.

Grounds for Attacking the Foreclosure

One of the fundamental grounds for attacking a foreclosure is that the lien is invalid. The lien may be invalid and unenforceable because of defects related to its negotiation and execution. Moreover, since the lien is a mere incident to the obligation which it secures, the lien cannot be enforced if the obligation is invalid or if the obligation has not been breached. The lien also may not be enforced if the breach is less than the amount stated in the notice of default and the trustor cures the

default by paying the lesser amount.

In addition, the foreclosure can be stopped if the procedural requirements and safeguards established by statute are not followed. Thus, defects in the notice of default, notice of sale, the reinstatement procedure, or the proposed or actual conduct of the sale afford grounds for preventing or voiding the sale.

The Obligation is Unenforceable

Various common law theories (e.g., fraud in factum, fraud in inducement, duress, failure of consideration, unconscionability, forgery, etc.) may be raised to render the obligation unenforceable.

The Lien is Unenforceable

Common Law Theories

Various common law theories (e.g., fraud, mistake, no delivery, forgery, community property but both spouses did not encumber, etc.) may be raised to render the lien unenforceable.  105 Cal.App.3d 65, 75-80; 164 Cal.Rptr. 279; Thomas v. Wright (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 921; 98 Cal.Rptr. 874; Brewer v. Home Owners Auto Finance Co. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 337; 89 Cal.Rptr. 231.]

One form of transaction involving seller participation in the financing is the seller assisted loan. In this type of loan, the seller assists the buyer in obtaining a loan for all or part of the purchase price of the vehicle from a third party lender. If the seller is significantly involved in the procurement of the loan, the Rees-Levering Act applies. [See Hernandez v. Atlantic Finance Co. of Los Angeles, supra, 105 Cal.App.3d 65, 70, 73-80.] Rees-Levering exempts loans made by supervised financial organizations, such as banks and consumer finance lenders, and security interests taken in connection with such loans from the Act’s coverage [Civ. Code § 2982.5(a)]; however, this exemption applies only to loans independently obtained by purchasers without seller assistance. [See Hernandez v. Atlantic Finance Co. of Los Angeles, supra, 105 Cal.App.3d 65, 70.] If Rees-Levering applies to a seller assisted loan, any trust deed or other real property lien securing the loan will be void. [See Civ. Code § 2984.2(c); Brewer v. Home Owners Auto Finance Co.. supra, 10 Cal.App.3d 337.]

After Hernandez was decided, the Legislature amended the Rees-Levering Act to include special provisions for seller assisted loans.  [Civ. Code § 2982.5(d).]  The seller may assist the buyer

in obtaining a loan for all or part of the purchase price; however, any real property lien securing the loan is void and unenforceable unless the loan is for $7,500 or more and is used for certain recreational vehicles. [Civ. Code § 2982.5(d)(1) and (2).] This section does not apply to seller assisted loans made by banks and savings and loan associations which continue to be governed by Hernandez principles.

Neither Hernandez nor Civil Code section 2982.5(d) defines seller assisted loan. In Hernandez, the seller completed the buyer’s credit application, repeatedly called the buyer to inform her that credit had been approved, picked her up and drove her to the seller’s place of business to sign documents, and drove her to the lender’s place of business to sign more documents. (105 Cal.App.3d at 73.) Hernandez, presents an extreme example of seller involvement in obtaining financing. A seller assisted loan may occur without the degree of seller involvement present in Hernandez. For example, a seller assisted loan embraces a loan in which the seller prepares or helps the buyer prepare a loan application and forwards it to the lender. [See Eldorado Bank v. Lytle (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d Supp. 17, 21; 195 Cal.Rptr. 499.] Although a precise definition of seller assisted loan does not appear in the cases or the statute, the term appears to be broad and at least includes loans arranged or facilitated by the direct involvement of the seller in preparing and/or submitting loan information to the creditor.

The Rees-Levering Act does not specifically address the situation of a seller assisted loan which is used partly for a vehicle purchase and partly for some other purpose such as a home improvement or bill consolidation. A creditor could argue that the lien covering the non-vehicle portion of the loan is not in violation of the statute and, therefore, is not void to the extent the lien secures repayment of the nonvehicle loan. However, the lien is taken as part of an entire loan transaction. The purpose of the transaction was to obtain a vehicle loan. Other portions of the loan may have been required by the creditor as a condition to giving the vehicle loan, such as a pay off of other creditors. The creditor may use the setting of the vehicle loan negotiation as a method of persuading buyers to obtain loans which they neither sought nor needed. Since the Legislature apparently did not want a buyer to enter the door of a vehicle dealer and come out with a trust deed on the buyer’s home, the broad language invalidating

real property security interests should extend to the entire vehicle inspired loan. [See Civ. Code §§ 2982.5(d)(1) and 2984.2(c).]

The creditor could argue that it may be entitled to an equitable lien for the non-vehicle portion of the loan. An equitable lien may be created when justice requires if a party intends to give a mortgage as security for a debt. [See generally Estate of Pitts (1933) 218 Cal. 184, 189; 22 P.2d 694; McColaan v. Bank of California Nat. Assn. (1929) 208 Cal. 329, 338; 281 P. 381; Lentz v. Lentz (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 891, 894; 73 Cal.Rptr. 686; see also Forte v. Nolfi (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 656, 692; 102 Cal.Rptr. 455 in which the court gave an unwitting assignee of a forged trust deed an equitable lien to the extent of the consideration received by the debtor who had originally intended to execute a trust deed.] However, the buyer cannot waive rights against the seller. [See Civ. Code 2983.7(c) and (e).] Thus, the buyer’s intent is essentially irrelevant since the buyer cannot waive the prohibition against trust deeds in transactions covered under Rees-Levering even if the buyer intends to do so. Moreover, the creditor’s right to an equitable lien, in any case, will depend on the circumstances of the case and whether justice would be served by the imposition of an equitable lien. If, for example, the creditor required an unsophisticated buyer to pay other obligations,  particularly unsecured or low interest rate secured

obligations, as a condition to obtaining an automobile loan unlawfully secured by a trust deed, the creditor may have worsened the buyer’s financial condition. As a result, an equitable lien for the nonvehicle portion of the loan which the buyer did not seek or require would inequitably reward the creditor’s conduct; thus, the creditor should be left unsecured. Even if the creditor could receive an equitable lien for the non-vehicle portion of the loan, the creditor cannot nonjudically foreclose it. Since there is no power of sale, the equitable lien can be enforced only by judicial foreclosure.  [See Code of Civ. Proc. § 726.]

An exception to the general rule that Rees-Levering prohibits real property liens may be found in Civil Code section 2982.5(b). That section permits the seller to assist the buyer in obtaining a loan “upon any security” for all or part of the down payment “or any other payment” on a conditional sale contract or purchase order. Rees-Levering does not prohibit a real property lien for such a loan. [See Civ. Code §§ 2982.5(b), 2984.2(b).]

The validity of a real property lien taken in connection with seller assisted financing may turn on whether the loan falls within Civil Code section 2982.5(b) or section 2982.5(d). These sections do not specify the size of the loans to which they respectively apply; therefore, there may be a dispute over whether a loan is for a downpayment or “any other payment” [Civ. Code § 2982.5(b)] or a

loan for “the full purchase price, or any part thereof.” [Civ. Code § 2982.5(d).] The legislative scheme apparently contemplates that the loans covered under Civil Code section 2982.5(b) are small in amount and are used for modest downpayments or pickup payments (the difference between the downpayment demanded by the seller and the amount given by the buyer toward the downpayment.) [ See Hernandez v. Atlantic Finance Co. of Los Angeles, supra, 105 Cal.App.3d 65, 76-77.] Lenders such as banks normally do not take real property liens for such relatively small amounts, and personal property brokers and consumer finance lenders which regularly make small loans for car purchases are precluded from taking any real property lien for loans under $5,000. [See Fin. Code §§ 22466 and 24466.] Thus, a specific prohibition on real property liens for small loans covered under Civil Code section 2982.5(b) was probably thought unnecessary. Since real property liens cannot be taken to secure loans for all or part of the purchase price or for financing under conditional sales contracts, it would be absurd to sanction a real property lien for a small loan. Given the protective purpose and policy of the Rees-Levering Act and its hostility to real property security, a seller assisted loan involving real property security should be deemed to be covered by Civ. Code §§ 2982.5(d) and 2984.2(a) and (c). Otherwise, Civ. Code § 2982.5(b) would become an exception which would destroy the rule.

Retail Installment Sales

The Unruh Act [Civ. Code § 1801 et seq.] governs the sale of goods and services for a deferred payment price, including finance charges, payable in installments. [See Civ. Code §§ 1802.3 -1802.6.] Any real property lien taken to secure payment on a contract for goods which are not to be attached to real property is void. [Civ. Code §§ 1804.3(b), 1804.4.) Thus, for example, liens securing contracts for carpeting installed by the tackless strip method are void because carpeting so installed is not attached to real property. [See People v. Custom Craft Carpets, Inc. (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 676, 685; 206 Cal.Rptr. 12.]

In Custom Craft, the Court observed that whether goods are attached to real property is a question of fact. However, neither the Unruh Act nor Custom Craft equate an article’s being “attached to real property” with being a fixture. Therefore, the facts to be analyzed relate to the goods’ method and degree of attachment to the real property and not to the parties’ intent which is a fundamental element in establishing fixture status.

Other provisions of the Unruh Act affect the validity of a security interest in real property. For example, a retail installment contract for goods or services which contains a lien must contain a statutorily designated warning notice printed in a prescribed manner in the same language used in the contract; otherwise the lien is void and unenforceable. [Civ. Code § 1803.2(b)(3).] The Unruh Act also includes the following requirements:

1. A contract providing for a real property security interest must have the phrase “Security Agreement” printed in at least 12-point type at the top of the contract.  [Civ. Code § 1803.2(b)(1)];

2. The entire agreement of the parties regarding cost and terms of payment including any promissory note or any other evidence of indebtedness must be contained in a single document. [Civ. Code § 1803.2(a); see Morgan v. Reasor Corp. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 881; 73 Cal.Rptr. 398];

3. The contract must contain all of the disclosures required by Regulation Z. [Civ. Code § 1803.3(b).] Regulation Z requires, in part, the disclosure of the existence of a security interest in property [12 C.F.R. § 226.18(m)] and the disclosure of the right of rescission. [12 C.F.R. § 226.23(b)];

4. The seller must not obtain the buyer’s signature on a contract containing blank spaces to be filled in

after it has been signed.  [Civ. Code § 1803.4.]

Any prohibited contract provision is void. [Civ. Code § 1804.4.] Thus, for example, if the lien provision were blank when the customer signed the contract and were subsequently completed or if the lien were not part of a single document containing all of the costs or terms of payment, the lien provision should be declared void. Even if the lien were not declared void, the penalty against the seller for the violation of the Unruh Act is the loss of all finance charges, including those already collected [Civ. Code § 1812.7], which might sufficiently offset the amount in default to stop the foreclosure.

The Unruh Act applies to credit sales. The statutory scheme specifically deals with retail installment sales in which the seller extends credit by permitting the buyer to obtain the goods and services on a deferred payment basis. [See, e.g., Civ. Code §§ 1802.5, 1802.6.] The essence of the transaction is the sale, and the credit terms merely facilitate the sale. In practice, the seller frequently assigns the installment contract to a third party creditor such as a bank or finance company in the business of supplying consumer credit. Indeed, a seller under a retail installment contract often has no intention of extending credit to a buyer through the maturity date of the contract but nevertheless

enters into the contract with a view to assigning the contract soon after the sale to a creditor with which the seller had made previous arrangements for financing. See Morgan v. Reasor Corp., supra, 69 Cal.2d 881, 895.] Such prearranged assignment of the credit sale contract does not alter the characterization of the transaction as a credit sale. [See Boerner v. Colwell Co. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 37, 50; 145 Cal.Rptr. 380.]

The Unruh Act also applies to transactions, involving sales financed from the proceeds of seller assisted loans, that are credit sales in substance. [Civ. Code § 1801.6(a).] A seller assisted loan transaction has the same attributes as a credit sale. The buyer is willing to buy only on credit. The seller arranges for credit; however, instead of using a retail installment contract which is assigned to a third party creditor, the seller arranges for the creditor to loan the money directly to the buyer, and the seller receives the proceeds of the loan.

The conventional retail installment sale and the seller assisted loan transaction embody similar relationships and objectives. The buyer obtains goods on a deferred payment basis, but instead of making monthly payments to the creditor as the assignee of the installment contract, the buyer makes monthly payments to the creditor as the lender. The seller has arranged for credit for the buyer either through a direct loan by the

creditor or an “indirect loan” consisting of the creditor’s advancing money for the buyer’s purchase in exchange for receiving an assignment of the buyer’s installment obligation. The seller receives payment either in the form of the proceeds from the loan or the proceeds from the assignment. A transaction in the form of a sale financed by a seller assisted loan is strikingly similar to the transaction held to be a credit sale in Boerner v. Colwell Co., supra, 21 Cal.3d 37, 41-42, 50-51. The Legislature has declared that Boerner should be considered in determining whether a transaction is in substance a credit sale. [Civ. Code §1801.6(a).] Since a seller assisted loan transaction is in substance a credit sale, it should be governed by the Unruh Act restrictions regarding credit sales. [See 64 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 722; see also Hernandez v. Atlantic Finance Co. of Los Angeles, supra, 105 Cal.App.3d 65 holding that seller assisted loans for automobile purchases were governed by the Rees-Levering Act.]

The Unruh Act also provides coverage for transactions which are loans both in substance and in form. This coverage applies when the lender and the seller share in the profits and losses of the sale and/or the loan or when the lender and the seller are related by common ownership and control and that relationship is a material factor in the loan transaction.  [See Civ. Code § 1801.6(b).]

Creditors  may attempt  to  shield  seller assisted  loan

transactions from the requirements of the Unruh Act by claiming that transactions in the form of loans are exempt from the Unruh Act unless the lender and seller share profits and losses or have common ownership and control as described in Civil Code section 1801.6(b). However, Civil Code section 1801.6(a) declares that the substance, not the form, of the transaction is paramount. The legislative intent expressed in Civil Code section 1801.6(a) dictates the construction of section 1801.6(b); thus, section 1801.6(b) cannot be read to exempt all transactions in the form of a loan regardless of the transactions true substance. Accordingly, section 1801.6(b) must be viewed as exempting certain actual loan transactions from the Unruh Act but not exempting credit sales cast in the form of loans.

3.   Dispute as to What, if any. Amount Owed

a.   Disputed Amount Owed

The notice of default should appropriately describe the nature of the breach. As the Court of Appeal observed, “The provisions of section 2924 of the Civil Code with reference to inclusion, in the notice of default, of a statement setting forth the nature of the breach ‘must be strictly followed.'”  System Inv. Corp. v. Union Bank (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 137, 152-53; 98 Cal.Rptr. 735.] A foreclosure sale should not be permitted if the amount of the

debt is disputed or uncertain. [See More v. Calkins (1892) 85 Cal. 177, 188; 24 P. 729; cf. Sweatt v. Foreclosure Co, (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 273, 276; 212 Cal.Rptr. 350; but see Ravano v. Sayre (1933) 135 Cal.App. 60; 26 P.2d 515.] Accordingly, the sale may be enjoined until the court determines the correct amount owed. [See Producers Holding Co. v. Hills (1927) 201 Cal. 204, 209; 256 P. 207; More v. Calkins, supra, 85 Cal. 177, 188, 190; see also Hunt v. Smyth (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 807, 837; 101 Cal.Rptr. 4; Lockwood v. Sheedy (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 741, 742; 321 P.2d 862.] If some liability is admitted, then that amount may have to be tendered to do equity [see Meetz v. Mohr (1904) 141 Cal. 667, 673; 75 P. 298]; however, the court could enjoin the entire sale, under a defective notice of default which improperly states the nature of the default, notwithstanding the existence of a clear breach, and could permit the beneficiary to file a proper notice of default upon which the foreclosure may proceed. (See Lockwood v. Sheedy, supra, 157 Cal.App.2d 741, 742.) Of course, if there is no default (e.g. the full amount due has been tendered), a foreclosure is void. [See e.g., Lichty v. Whitney (1947) 80 Cal.App.2d 696, 702; 182 P.2d 582 (tender of amount due); Huene v. Cribb (1908) 9 Cal.App. 141, 144; 98 P. 78; see also Winnett v. Roberts (1979) 179 Cal.App.3d 909, 921-22, 225.]

b. Payment Excused

The trustor may also dispute whether any amount is owed if the beneficiary breaches its obligation to the trustor and the breach excuses the trustor’s performance. [See System Inv. Corp, v. Union Bank, supra, 21 Cal.App.3d 137, 154.]

c. Waiver or Estoppel to Claim Payment or Default

The trustor may deny that any amount is owed at that particular time, or may deny that the prescribed amount demanded is owed, if the beneficiary has waived the time requirements contained in the obligation by accepting late payments or if the beneficiary has accepted payments smaller than that permitted in the contract.

A waiver is unlikely to be construed as permanent in the absence of a writing or new consideration. A permanent waiver is, in effect, a change in the agreement equivalent to a novation requiring new consideration. [E.g., Hunt v. Smyth, supra, 25 Cal.App.3d 807, 819; Bledsoe v. Pacific Ready Cut Homes, Inc. (1928) 92 Cal.App. 641, 644-45; 268 P. 697.] The beneficiary and trustor may modify their payment schedule in writing without new consideration. [See Civ. Code §§1698(a), 2924c (b)(1).] The beneficiary’s conduct, however, may constitute a temporary waiver.

The beneficiary cannot declare the trustor in default of the terms of the obligation where the beneficiary has temporarily waived such terms — until the beneficiary has given definite notice demanding payment in accord with the obligation and has provided the trustor a reasonable length of time to comply. In addition, the beneficiary must give the trustor definite notice that future payments must comply with the terms of the obligation. [E.g., Hunt v. Smyth. supra, 25 Cal.App.3d 807, 822-23; Lopez v. Bell (1962) 207 Cal.App.2d 394, 398-99; 24 Cal.Rptr. 626; Bledsoe v. Pacific Ready Cut Homes, Inc., supra, 92 Cal.App. 641, 645.] Even if the beneficiary’s conduct does not constitute a knowing relinquishment of rights, it may create an equitable estoppel. [See e.g., Altman v. McCollum (1951) 107 Cal.App.2d Supp. 847; 236 P.2d 914.]

d.   Offsetting Obligation

The trustor also may offset against the amount claimed by the beneficiary any amount due the trustor from the beneficiary. [See Hauger v. Gates (1954) 42 Cal.2d 752, 755; 249 P.2d 609; Richmond v. Lattin (1883) 64 Cal. 273; 30 P. 818; Goodwin v. Alston (1955) 130 Cal.App.2d 664, 669; 280 P.2d 34; Cohen v. Bonnell (1936) 14 Cal.App.2d 38; 57 P.2d 1326; Zarillo v. Le Mesnacer (1921) 51 Cal.App. 442; 1196 P.902 (damages for conversion offset against debt secured by chattel mortgage); Williams v. Pratt (1909) 10 Cal.App. 625, 632; 103 P. 151.]  In Goodwin, supra, the mortgagor

established that the mortgagee charged usurious interest, and the penalty of the trebled interest payments along with other amounts were setoff against the mortgage debt. As a result, the debt was effectively satisfied, the mortgage was thereby extinguished and no foreclosure was permitted, and the mortgagee was held liable to the mortgagor for damages.  (See 130 Cal.App.2d at 668-69.)

The Supreme Court made clear in Hauaer, supra, that the trustor, in the context of the nonjudicial foreclosure of a deed of trust, could use the right of setoff. [See 42 Cal.2d at 755.] Normally, setoff is employed defensively through an affirmative defense or cross-complaint (or formerly counterclaim) in response to an action for money. The court in Hauaer, however, saw no distinction between the right of setoff held by a trustor defending a foreclosure action or by a trustor affirmatively attacking a nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding. (Id. at 755-56.) Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the trustor, as plaintiff, could establish the impropriety of a foreclosure by showing that the trustor was not in default on his obligation since the obligation was offset by an obligation which the beneficiary owed to him. (Id. at 753, 755.) The court further held that the trustor did not have to bring an independent action to establish the setoff. (Id. at 755.) Moreover, the court declared that unliquidated as well as liquidated amounts could be setoff; thus, the court allowed the trustor to setoff an unliquidated claim for damages for breach of

contract.  (Id.)

Hauaer and the other cases cited above are based on former Code of Civ. Proc. § 440 which has been superseded by Code of Civ. Proc. § 431.70. The rule of these cases should not be altered because the new section appears broader than the old. Furthermore, the Legislative Committee Comment to section 431.70 not only states that the new section continues the substantive effect of section 440 but also approvingly cites Hauaer.

The right of setoff has substantial significance in contesting the validity of any foreclosure since the trustor may establish that no default occurred or, indeed, no indebtedness exists because of an offsetting amount owed by the beneficiary to the trustor. As discussed above, this offset may be a liquidated or an unliquidated claim. In addition, the claim which the trustor may wish to offset may be barred by the statute of limitations at the time of the foreclosure, but as long as the trustor’s claim and the beneficiary’s claim coexisted at any time when neither claim was barred, the claims are deemed to have been offset. [See Code of Civ. Proc. § 431.70.] The theory is that the competing claims which coexisted when both were enforceable were offset to the extent they equaled each other without the need to bring an action on the claims. Therefore, since the offsetting claim is deemed satisfied to the extent it equaled the other claim, there was no

existing claim against which the statute of limitation operates. See Jones v. Mortimer (1946) 28 Cal.2d 627, 632-33; 170 P.2d 893; Singer Co. v. County of Kings (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 852, 869; 121 Cal.Rptr. 398; see also Hauger v. Gates, supra, 42 Cal.2d 752, 755.]

The right of setoff not only gives the trustor the ability to setoff liquidated and unliquidated claims for money paid or for damages, but also permits setoffs for statutory penalties to which the trustor may be entitled because of the beneficiary’s violation of the law. In Goodwin v. Alston, supra, 130 Cal.App.2d 664 the debtor in a foreclosure action offset his obligation against the treble damages awarded to him for the creditor’s usury violations. Similarly, the penalty for violating the federal Truth in Lending Act — twice the amount of the finance charge but not less than $100 or more than $1,000 [15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A)(i)] — may be offset against the obligation owed the creditor.-‘ [See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(h); Reliable Credit Service, Inc. v. Bernard (La.App. 1976) 339 So.2d 952, 954, cert, den. 341 So.2d 1129, cert, den. 342 So.2d 215; Martin v. Body (Tex.Civ.App. 1976) 533 S.W.2d 461, 467-68].

Although Truth in Lending penalties may be offset against the creditor’s claim, the debtor may not unilaterally deduct the penalty; rather, the offset must be raised in a judicial proceeding, and the offset’s validity must be adjudicated.  [15 U.S.C. § 1640(h); see e.g., Pacific Concrete Fed. Credit Union v. Kauanoe (Haw. 1980) 614 P.2d 936, 942-43; Lincoln First Bank of Rochester v. Rupert (App.Div. 1977) 400 N.Y.S. 618, 621.]

Although no cases have authorized the trustor’s offset of punitive damages against the obligation owed, no reason appears to prevent the offset of punitive damages. Normally, if punitive damages were appropriate, sufficient fraud, oppression, or other misconduct would be established to vitiate the entire transaction. But even if the transaction were rescinded, the injured trustor likely would be required to return any consideration given by the offending beneficiary. The trustor almost always will have spent the money, usually to satisfy another creditor or to purchase goods or services which cannot be returned for near full value. A punitive damage offset may reduce or eliminate the trustor’s obligation to restore consideration paid in a fraudulent, oppressive, or similarly infirm transaction.

4. De Minimis Breach

Foreclosure is a drastic remedy, and courts will not enforce a forfeiture if the default is de minimis in nature such as a minor delay in making an installment payment. [See Bavpoint Mortgage Corp. v. Crest Premium Real Estate etc. Trust (1988) 168 Cal.App.3d 818, 829-32; 214 Cal.Rptr. 531.]

5. Defective Procedure

The trustee’s failure to comply with the statutorily mandated

procedures for a foreclosure sale is an important basis for attacking the foreclosure sale. The trustor bears the onus of establishing the impropriety of the sale, for a foreclosure is presumed to be conducted regularly and fairly in the absence of any contrary evidence Stevens v. Plumas Eureka Annex Min. Co. (1935) 2 Cal.2d 493, 497; 41 P.2d 927; Sain v. Silvestre (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 461, 471 n. 10; 144 Cal.Rptr. 478; Hohn v. Riverside County Flood Control & Wat. Conserv. Dist. (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 605, 612; 39 Cal.Rptr. 647; Brown v. Busch (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 200, 204; 313 P.2d 19.] The presumption can be rebutted by contrary evidence [See, e.g., Wolfe v. Lipsv (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 633,639; 209 Cal.Rptr. 801] and the courts will carefully scrutinize the proceedings to assure that the trustor’s rights were not violated. [See e.g., System Inv. Corp. v. Union Bank, supra, 21 Cal.App.3d 137, 153; Stirton v. Pastor (1960) 177 Cal.App.2d 232, 234; 2 Cal.Rptr. 135; Brown v. Busch, supra, 152 Cal.App.2d 200, 203-04; Pierson v. Fischer (1955) 131 Cal.App.2d 208, 214; 280 P.2d 491; Pv v. Pleitner, supra, 70 Cal.App.2d 576, 579.]

a.  Defective Notice of Default

A foreclosure may not be predicated on a notice of default which fails to comply strictly with legal requirements: “. . . a trustee’s sale based on a statutorily deficient notice of default is invalid.”   Miller v. Cote (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 888, 894; see

System Inv. Corp. v. Union Bank, supra, 21 Cal.App.3d 137, 152-53; Lockwood v. Sheedy. supra, 157 Cal.App.2d 741, 742.] Defective service of the notice of default will also invalidate the sale procedure. [See discussion in Chapter II, supra, “Adequacy of Notice to Trustor.]

b.  Defective Notice of Sale

Some cases hold that a sale held without proper notice of sale is void. [See Scott v. Security Title Ins. & Guar. Co. (1937) 9 Cal.2d 606, 613; 72 P.2d 143; United Bank & Trust Co. v. Brown (1928) 203 Cal. 359; 264 P. 482; Standlev v. Knapp (1931) 113 Cal.App. 91, 100-02; 298 P. 109; Seccombe v. Roe (1913) 22 Cal.App. 139, 142-43; 133 P. 507; see also discussion in Chapter II B 4 supra, “Giving the Notice of Sale”.] However, if a trustee’s deed has been issued that states a conclusive presumption that all notice requirements have been satisfied, the sale is voidable and may be vacated if the trustor proves that the conclusive presumption does not apply and that notice was defective. The conclusive presumption may not apply if there are equitable grounds for relief such as fraud or if the purchaser is not a bona fide purchaser for value. [See Little v. CFS Service Corp. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1354, 1359; 233 Cal.Rptr. 923;

Moreover, a serious notice defect that was directly prejudicial to the rights of parties who justifiably relied on notice procedures may independently justify setting aside a sale, especially if the trustee’s deed has not been issued and the highest bidder’s consideration has been returned. [See Little v. CFS Service Corp., supra. 188 Cal.App.3d 1354, 1360-61.]

c.  Improper Conduct of Sale

As discussed above, the trustee must strictly follow the statutes and the terms of the deed of trust in selling the property. [See discussion in Chapter II B, supra, “Nonjudicial Foreclosure”.] For example, the Court of Appeal has declared that:

The power of sale under a deed of trust will be strictly construed, and in its execution the trustee must act in good faith and strictly follow the requirements of the deed with respect to the manner of sale. The sale will be scrutinized by courts with great care and will not be sustained unless conducted with all fairness, regularity and scrupulous integrity …. Pierson v. Fischer, supra, 131 Cal.App.2d 208, 214.

Postponements

One of the major problems occurring at sales involves postponements: the trustee may fail to postpone a sale when the trustor needs a postponement or the trustee may unnecessarily postpone the sale and thereby discourage the participation of bidders. Current law expressly gives the trustee discretion to postpone the sale upon the written request of the trustor for the purpose of obtaining cash sufficient to satisfy the obligation or bid at the sale. [Civ. Code § 2924g(c) (1). ] There are no limitations on the number of times the trustee may postpone the sale to enable the trustor to obtain cash. The trustor is entitled to one such requested postponement, and any postponement for this reason cannot exceed one business day. (Id.) Failure to grant this postponement will invalidate the sale. [See discussion in Chapter II B 7, supra, “Conduct of the Foreclosure Sale”.] However, the trustee is under no general obligation to postpone the sale to enable the trustor to obtain funds, particularly when the trustor receives the notices of default and sale and has months to raise the money. [See Oiler v. Sonoma County Land Title Co. (1955) 137 Cal.App.2d 633, 634-35; 290 P.2d 880.] In addition, the trustee’s duty to exercise its discretion to favor the trustor is tempered by the trustee’s duty to the beneficiary; thus, for example, the trustee may be more obliged to postpone the sale at the trustor’s request if only the beneficiary appears at the sale

to bid than if other bidders appear who are qualified to bid enough to satisfy the unpaid debt.

The foreclosure sale may also have to be postponed if there is an agreement between the beneficiary and the trustor for a postponement. An agreement to postpone a trustee’s sale is deemed an alteration of the terms of the deed of trust and is enforceable only if it assumes the form of a written agreement or an executed oral agreement. [See Civ. Code § 1698; Karlsen v. American Sav. & Loan Assn. (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 112, 121; 92 Cal.Rptr. 851; Stafford v. Clinard (1948) 87 Cal.App.2d 480, 481; 197 P.2d 84.] Thus, a gratuitous oral promise generally is insufficient to support an agreement to continue the sale; however, if the oral agreement is predicated on a promissory estoppel or if the trustor fully performs the trustor’s consideration for the oral agreement, the trustor may enforce the beneficiary’s oral promise to postpone. Raedeke v. Gilbraltar Sav. & Loan Assn. (1974) 10 Cal.3d 665; 111 Cal.Rptr. 693.] In Raedeke, the trustor could obtain a responsible purchaser for the property, and the beneficiary agreed. The trustor obtained the purchaser, but the beneficiary foreclosed. The Supreme Court held that the trustor fully performed its promise — to procure a buyer — which was good consideration for the agreement to postpone and that the beneficiary’s breach entitled the trustor to damages for the wrongful foreclosure.

Although the failure to postpone may be a problem, the trustee’s improper granting of postponements is generally a far greater problem. Notice of a postponement must be given “by public declaration” at the time and place “last appointed for sale,” and no other notice need be supplied. [Civ. Code § 2924g(d).] Therefore, any prospective bidder will have to attend each appointed time for sale to discover whether the sale will occur or be postponed. As a result, prospective bidders will be discouraged from participating in a sale involving numerous postponements, and there will be less chance that an active auction will occur which will generate surplus funds to which the trustor may be entitled. [Cf. Block v. Tobin (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 214; 119 Cal.Rptr. 288.]

The abuse of the postponement procedure prompted the Legislature to curb the trustee’s ability to make discretionary postponements. The trustee may make only three postponements at its discretion or at the beneficiary’s direction without re­commencing the entire notice procedure prescribed in Civ. Code § 2924f. [Civ. Code § 2924g(c)(1).] In addition, the trustee must publicly announce the reason for every postponement and must maintain records of each postponement and the reason for it. [Civ. Code § 2924g(d).]

A lawyer representing a client whose home has been sold at a foreclosure sale involving discretionary or beneficiary directed

postponements should, at the first opportunity for discovery, obtain production of the foreclosure file and any documents relating to it, and any documents relating to the postponement and reasons for it, including the statutorily mandated record concerning the postponement, as well as any notes, telephone messages, logs, or calendar entries relating to the postponement. In addition, the lawyer should quickly discover who attended the sale to determine whether the reason for the postponement was given “by public declaration” and, if so, whether the same reason is indicated for the postponement in the record maintained by the trustee.

The failure to postpone properly should invalidate the sale. Certainly, a sale held without any public announcement of the date, time, and place to which the sale has been postponed is invalid. [See Holland v. Pendelton Mortgage Co. (1943) 61 Cal.App.2d 570, 573-74; 143 P.2d 493.] The cases upholding sales made on postponed dates are based on the trustee’s compliance with the notice of postponement requirements prescribed by statute or contained in the trust deed. [See e.g., Cobb v. California Bank (1946) 6 Cal.2d 389, 390; 57 P.2d 924; Craig v. Buckley (1933) 218 Cal. 78, 80-81; 21 P.2d 430; Alameda County Home Inv. Co. v. Whitaker (1933) 217 Cal. 231, 234-35; 18 P.2d 662.] Since the trustee sale must be conducted in strict compliance with the notice requirements, a notice of postponement which does not contain a statement of the

reason for the postponement is defective.  Any sale held pursuant to the defective notice may be held to be improper.

Moreover, the records relating to the postponement may reveal that the postponement was unnecessary or may lead to evidence establishing that the postponement was made in bad faith. As discussed above, fraud, unfairness, and irregularity in the conduct of the sale should render the sale invalid.

e.  Bidder Collusion

One of the more pernicious aspects of foreclosure sales — and one of the most difficult to prove — is the existence of agreements among bidders to suppress bidding. The arrangement may consist of one bidder paying the others not to bid. The bidders may also agree that one of the group will buy the property without competition and that then the group will hold a secret auction among themselves to determine who will be the ultimate purchaser. The difference between the purchase price at the public auction and the ultimate purchase price determined at the secret auction will be divided among the colluding parties; thus, junior lienholders and the trustor are deprived of surplus funds which would have resulted from open and competitive bidding.

Such bid rigging is clearly illegal.  Offering or accepting

consideration not to bid, or fixing or restraining bidding at a foreclosure sale, is specifically declared unlawful and constitutes a crime. [Civ. Code § 2924h(f).] Agreements between bidders to fix or restrain bidding, to make sham bids, or to become a party to a fake sale have been routinely denounced as illegal, void, unenforceable and a fraud on the public. [See Russell v. Soldinaer (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 633, 641-45; 131 Cal.Rptr. 145; Roberts v. Salot (1958) 166 Cal.App.2d 294, 298-99; 333 P.2d 232; see also Haley v. Bloomouist (1928) 204 Cal. 253, 256-67; 268 P. 365; Packard v. Bird (1870) 40 Cal. 378, 383; Jenkins v. Frink (1866) 30 Cal. 586, 591-92; 89 Am.Dec. 134.] The problem of determining market price by secret arrangement rather than by open bidding was most clearly addressed in Crawford v. Maddux (1893) 100 Cal. 222; 34 P. 651. In Crawford, a bidder at an execution sale was willing to purchase the property at several times the amount of the judgment. The bidder agreed with another that the other person should refrain from bidding, that the bidder would buy the property for the minimum amount, and that the bidder would pay the other person the difference between the purchase price and the maximum price the bidder would have been willing to pay if the sale were open and competitive. The Supreme Court had no difficulty in concluding that the arrangement “was against public policy, and wholly void.”  (Id. at 225.)

The chilling of bidding at a trustee’s sale is a fraud on the

trustor, and the trustor may have the sale vacated. [Bank__of America Nat1!. Trust & Sav. Ass’n. v. Reidv (1940) 15 Cal.2d 243, 248; 101 P.2d 77; Roberts v. Salot, supra, 166 Cal.App.2d 294, 299; see Bertschman v. Covell (1928) 205 Cal. 707, 710; 272 P. 571 (dictum).] The fraudulent bidder not only will have to return the property but also will be liable for any encumbrances placed on the property. See Roberts v. Salot, supra, 166 Cal.App.3d 294, 301.] The trustor’s damage is not measured by the difference between the artificially low public sale price and the secret price paid by one of the bidders to his co-conspirators. The appropriate measure of damages should be the fair market value of the property at the time of the sale less the value of the liens against the property. [See Munaer v. Moore (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 1, 11; 89 Cal.Rptr. 323.] The bidding restraint is illegal regardless of whether small or large amounts are involved; the bidders cannot determine the trustor’s damage by their own private manipulations. [See Crawford v. Maddux, supra, 100 Cal. 222, 225.]

The bidding conspiracy may also be actionable under the Cartwright Act which denounces combinations of two or more people to restrain trade or commerce. [See Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 16720(a), 16726.] Violations of the Cartwright Act contain substantial sanctions: “Any person who is injured in his business or property by reason of . . .” an unlawful restraint of trade may recover treble damages and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.  [Bus. &

Prof. Code § 16750(a).] The Cartwright Act is patterned after the Sherman Act, and federal cases interpreting federal law apply to the construction of state law. [E.g., Partee v. San Diego Chargers Football Co. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 378, 392; 466 U.S. 904, cert, den.; 194 Cal.Rptr. 367; Mailand v. Burckle (1978) 20 Cal.3d 367, 376; 143 Cal.Rptr. 1; Marin County Bd. of Realtors v. Palsson (1976) 16 Cal.3d 920, 925; 130 Cal.Rptr. 1.]

Proving a Cartwright violation may be a difficult task. The threshold question is whether there was an agreement to restrain bidding. The answer to this question, of course, is crucial not only to the antitrust claim but also to attacking the sale on common law grounds. In the absence of direct evidence, circumstantial evidence may point to a conspiracy. For example, A, B, and C are professional and experienced bidders at foreclosure sales. Each has had substantial dealings with the others. A, B, and C attend the foreclosure sale and each qualifies to bid more than $10,000 over the minimum opening bid placed by the beneficiary. A buys the property for $1 over the minimum bid. Eight days later, A deeds the property to B for $6,000 more than A’s purchase price. Similar transactions have occurred involving the three bidders, and each has become the ultimate purchaser at different times. Such pattern of conduct evinces a bidding agreement. In order to gather other evidence needed to establish an agreement, a lawyer representing a homeowner should obtain,

through discovery from the trustee, all records revealing who attended the sale, who qualified to bid and for how much, and to whom the trustee’s deed was issued.

If a conspiracy can be shown, the Cartwright plaintiff will have to address the legal issue of whether the bidding is trade or commerce. This should not be difficult. The Cartwright Act has been expansively interpreted: “. . .it forbids combinations of the kind described with respect to every type of business.” Soeeale v. Board of Fire Underwriters (1946) 29 Cal.2d 34, 43; 172 P.2d 867; see Marin County Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Palsson, supra, 16 Cal.3d 920, 925-28.] The Speeale court also recognized that the Cartwright Act reflects this state’s common law proscriptions against competitive restraints and price fixing. [See 29 Cal.2d at 44.] Virtually any business carried on for gain is embraced in the antitrust laws [see United States v. National Assn. of Real Estate Bds. (1950) 339 U.S. 485, 490-92; 70 S.Ct. 711], and the antitrust laws, in reaching all commerce, touch transactions which may be noncommercial in character and may involve illegal or sporadic activity. [See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn. (1944) 322 U.S. 533, 549-50; 64 S.Ct. 1162.]

Agreements restraining bidding are clearly the type of combinations prohibited under the antitrust laws. Price fixing agreements are per se unlawful under the Cartwright Act.  [E.g.,

Mailand v. Burckle (1978) 20 Cal.3d 367, 376-77; 143 Cal.Rptr. 1; Kollincr v. Dow Jones & Co. (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 709, 721; 189 Cal.Rptr. 797; Rosack v. Volvo of America Corp. (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 741, 751; 182 Cal.Rptr. 800, cert, den. (1983) 460 U.S. 1012.] An agreement to submit collusive, rigged bids is likewise a per se violation. [See e.g., United States v. Brighton Bldq. & Maintenance Co. (7th Cir. 1979) 598 F.2d 1101, 1106, cert. den. 444 U.S. 840; United States v. Champion International Corp. (9th Cir. 1977) 557 F.2d 1270, cert, den. 434 U.S. 938; United States v. Flom (5th Cir. 1977) 558 F.2d 1179, 1183.]

After establishing bidder conspiracy and a violation of the Cartwright Act, the complainant property owner then will have to show injury emanating from the violation to establish entitlement to the treble damage and the attorney’s fee and cost remedies. [Bus. & Prof. Code § 16750(a); see A. B.C. Distrib.’ Co. v. Distillers Distrib. Corp. (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 175, 191; 316 P.2d 71.] The property owner need not show a competitive injury, for the protections of the Cartwright Act extend to consumers and all others who are victimized by the violation of law. [See Saxer v. Philip Morris, Inc. (1975) 54 Cal.App.3d 7, 26; 126 Cal.Rptr. 327.] The nature and extent of the injury, however, may be difficult to prove because of the difficulty in determining the price at which the property would have sold in the absence of a conspiracy to fix the price.

For example, suppose property worth $100,000 is sold to satisfy the $19,990 unpaid balance of a note secured by a first trust deed. Only two bidders attend the sale, and they conspire. One of the bidders purchases the property for $20,000 and pays the other $10,000. Has the trustor been injured by $10,000, $80,000, or some other amount? Crawford v. Maddux, supra, 100 Cal. 222, 225; 34 P. 651 indicates that the consideration paid for the suppression of bidding is not the common law measure of damage for the illegal bidding restraint; however, that amount should logically be the minimum amount of the injury under the Cartwright Act. The purchaser would have paid at least that additional amount to acquire the property at the public sale in the absence of collusion since the purchaser in fact paid that amount as part of the collusive sale.

Normally, the damages in a price fixing case consist of the full amount of the overcharge — i.e., the difference between the artificially high price and the price that would have otherwise prevailed. [See e.g., National Constructors Assn. v. National Electrical Contractors (D. Md. 1980) 498 F.Supp. 510, 538, mod. on other grounds (4th Cir. 1982) 678 F.2d 492.] Similarly, if prices are set artificially low, the damages will be the difference between the artificially low price and the price which would have been charged to fully maximize profits. [See Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc. (9th Cir. 1976) 548 F.2d 795, 812, cert. den. (1977)

433 U.S. 910.] Although no cases are specifically on point, an argument should be made that the antitrust injury suffered by a property owner whose home was sold through collusive bidding should be the difference between the artificially low price and the reasonable or fair value of the property at foreclosure. This view is buttressed by the holding in Munaer v. Moore, supra, 11 Cal.App.3d 1, 11 that the trustee’s or beneficiary’s liability for an improper sale should be the fair market value of the property in excess of encumbrances.

However, it could be argued that even in the absence of collusive bidding, “. . . it is common knowledge that at forced sales such as a trustee’s sale the full potential value of the property being sold is rarely realized . . . .” strutt v. Ontario Sav. & Loan Assn. (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 866, 876; 105 Cal.Rptr. 395.] Complete fair market value cannot be realistically expected in the context of a foreclosure sale. Consequently, it would be unlikely that the property’s full value would be realized at a foreclosure sale even without the bidding conspiracy. On the other hand, some courts consider foreclosure sales prices at less than 70 percent of fair market value to be unfair, at least for bankruptcy purposes. [See e.g., Durrett v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co. (5th Cir. 1980) 621 F.2d 201; the rejection of the Durrett fair value rationale in In re Madrid (Bank.App.Pan. 9th Cir. 1982) 21 B.R. 424, aff’d on other grounds (9th Cir. 1984) 725 F.2d 1197 was

predicated on a noncollusive, regularly conducted sale.] Accordingly, as an alternative to the fair market value measure of damage, the measure of damages could be deemed the difference between the collusive bid price and 70 percent of the fair market value of the property less encumbrances.

The collusive bidder should not be permitted to complain that a more precise measure of damage based on the ultimate sale price in an open and competitive public auction was not used, because the bidding conspiracy itself prevented a more precise evaluation of the measure of damages. As the United States Supreme Court observed,

Where the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment of the amount of damages with certainty, it would be a perversion of fundamental principles of justice to deny all relief to the injured person, and thereby relieve the wrongdoer from making any amend for his acts. In such case, while the damages may not be determined by mere speculation or guess, it will be enough if the evidence shows the extent of the damages as a matter of just and reasonable inference, although the result be only approximate. The wrongdoer is not entitled to complain that they cannot be measured with the exactness and precision that would be possible if the

case, which he alone is responsible for making, were otherwise.

There is no sound reason in such a case, as there may be, to some extent, in actions upon contract, for throwing any part of the loss upon the injured party, which the jury believe from the evidence he has sustained; though the precise amount cannot be ascertained by a fixed rule, but must be matter of opinion and probable estimate. And the adoption of any arbitrary rule in such a case, which will relieve the wrong-doer from any part of the damages, and throw the loss upon the injured party, would be little less than legalized robbery.

Whatever of uncertainty there may be in this mode of estimating damages, is an uncertainty caused by the defendant’s own wrongful act; and justice and sound public policy alike require that he should bear the risk of the uncertainty thus produced. . . . [citation omitted]. Story Parchment Co. v. Patterson Paper Co. (1931) 282 U.S. 555, 563-65; 51 S.Ct. 248.

See Biaelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. (1946) 327 U.S. 251, 264-66; 66 S.Ct. 574.]

Trustee’s Unfair Conduct

As previously mentioned, the trustee must conduct the sale “fairly, openly, reasonably, and with due diligence and sound discretion to protect the rights of the mortgagor and others, using all reasonable efforts to secure the best possible or reasonable price.” Baron v. Colonial Mortgage Service Co. (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 316, 323; 168 Cal.Rptr. 450.] The trustee’s obligations in conducting a sale and its duty to the trustor are discussed in detail in Chapter II B 7, supra, “Conduct of the Foreclosure Sale”.] Obviously, a sale tainted with the trustee’s fraud or improper conduct is subject to attack, and the trustee may be liable to the trustor as well as to innocent bidders. (See Block v. Tobin, supra, 45 Cal.App.3d 214.]

Inadequacy of Price

The cases are legion that inadequacy of price, even gross inadequacy of price, will not justify a repudiation of a trustee’s sale in the absence of fraud, unfairness, or irregularity of some type. [See e.g., Scott v. Security Title Inc. & Guar. Co., supra, 9 Cal.2d 606, 611; Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Sly (1937) 7 Cal.2d 728, 731; 62 P.2d 740, cert. den. 301 U.S. 690; Encelbertson v. Loan & Building Assn. (1936) 6 Cal.2d 477, 479; 58 P.2d 647; Central Nat. Bank of Oakland v. Bell (1927) 5 Cal.2d 324, 328; 54

P.2d 1107; Stevens v. Plumas Eureka Annex Min. Co., supra. 2 Cal.2d 493, 496; 41 P.2d 927; Baldwin v. Brown (1924) 193 Cal. 345; 352-53; 224 P. 462; Sargent v. Shumaker. supra, 193 Cal. 122, 129; 223 P. 464; Winbialer v. Sherman (1917) 175 Cal. 270, 275; 165 P. 943; Crummer v. Whitehead (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 264, 266; 40 Cal.Rptr. 826; Lancaster Security Inv. Corp. v. Kessler (1958) 159 Cal.App.2d 649, 655; 324 P.2d 634.]

The fraud, unfairness, or irregularity which must accompany inadequate price in order for the sale to be set aside, must be such “as accounts for and brings about the inadequacy of price.” Stevens v. Plumas Eureka Annex Min. Co., supra, 2 Cal.2d 493, 496.] Thus, the inadequacy of price must be caused by or related to the irregularity or to some misconduct by the trustee. [See e.g., Sargent v. Shumaker. supra, 193 Cal. 122, 131-33; Crofoot v. Tarman (1957) 147 Cal.App.2d 443, 446-47; 305 P.2d 56; Bank of America Nat’l. Trust & Sav. Ass’n. v. Century Land & Wat. Co. (1937) 19 Cal.App.2d 194, 196; 65 P.2d 109.] In Crofoot, for example, the trustee had done no wrong, and the court rejected the trustor’s argument that misinformation supplied by someone other than the trustee when coupled with inadequate price afforded grounds for relief.

The quantum of fraud, unfairness, or irregularity needed to avoid a foreclosure sale may be slight,  especially if the

inadequacy of price is great. [See e.g., Sargent v. Shumaker, supra, 193 Cal. 122, 129; Winbialer v. Sherman, supra, 175 Cal. 270, 275; Bank of Seoul & Trust Co. v. Marcione (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 113, 119; Whitman v. Transtate Title Co. (1988) 165 Cal.App.3d 312, 323.] Inadequacy of price is indicative of fraud and will support a trial court’s finding of fraud if one is made. [See Scott v. Security Title Inc. & Guar. Co., supra, 9 Cal.2d 606, 612.]

If the trustor’s property is sold for an inadequate price, the trustor’s loss for breaching the obligation and trust deed far exceeds the beneficiary’s damage from the breach. Indeed, the beneficiary reaps a windfall if the beneficiary purchases the property at the foreclosure sale for an inadequate price. Arguably, the clause in the trust deed which permits the sale at such a dramatically low price could be construed to be a provision authorizing an impermissible forfeiture or penalty or providing for what is in effect punitive damages for the breach. The Supreme Court has apparently rejected this viewpoint and has stated that the trustor has ample opportunity after the recordation of the notice of default to avoid the potentially harsh consequences of foreclosure. See Smith v. Allen, supra, 68 Cal.2d 93.] In Smith, the Supreme Court observed that if:

. the borrower has a substantial equity in the

property, the above mentioned statutory provisions (Civ. Code §§ 2924 et sea.) afford him an opportunity to refinance his monetary obligations or to sell his equity to a third party.  (Id. at 96.)

The court concluded that the Legislature intended that a proper “foreclosure sale should constitute a final adjudication of the rights of the borrower and the lender.”  (Id.)

The recent legislative denunciation of unconscionability may point to a different result in cases involving significantly inadequate prices. Indeed, the new statutes regarding unconscionability may lead California to recognize the well established equity rule that extreme inadequacy of price in itself justifies the overturning of a foreclosure sale. [See Washburn, “The Judicial and Legislative Response to Price Inadequacy in Mortgage Foreclosure Sales,” 53 So.Cal.L.Rev. 843, 862-69.] The new statutes and accompanying legislative findings may also undermine the rationale of cases like Smith holding that the nonjudicial foreclosure process does not produce forfeitures or other impermissible, inequitable results.

The insertion of an unconscionable provision into a contract is deemed unfair or deceptive. [Civ. Code § 1770(s).] If a court finds  that  a  contract or any clause of  the  contract  is

unconscionable, the court may refuse to enforce the contract or the unconscionable provision or may limit the unconscionable provision to avert any unconscionable result. [Civ. Code § 1670.5(a).] It is unlawful, and perhaps criminal, for any person to participate in a transaction involving a residence already in foreclosure whereby that person takes unconscionable advantage of the homeowner. [Civ. Code § 1695.13.] Any such transaction resulting in unconscionable advantage is subject to rescission. [Civ. Code § 1695.14.]

Moreover, the express policy of this state is “to preserve and guard the precious asset of home equity, and the social as well as economic value of homeownership.” [Civ. Code § 1695(b).] This state has adopted the national housing goal — “the provision of a decent and a suitable living environment for every American family. …” [Health & Safety Code § 50002.] The Legislature has recognized the “vital statewide importance” of housing, in part, “as an essential motivating force in helping people achieve self-fulfillment in a free and democratic society.” [Health & Safety Code § 50001(a).] Accordingly, “It is the policy of the State of California to preserve home ownership.” [Stats. 1979, c. 655, § 1(g), p. 2016.] The Legislature was mindful, however, that the foreclosure process does not provide complete protection to homeowners whose homes are in jeopardy:

Many homeowners in this state are unaware of the legal rights and options available to them once foreclosure proceedings have been initiated against their homes. The present foreclosure process fails to provide sufficient meaningful information to homeowners to enable them to avoid foreclosure or save the equity in their homes. (Stats. 1979, c. 655, § 1(c), p. 2016.)

In light of the legislative concern about continued home ownership, the preservation of home equity, and the operation of unconscionable contracts, the courts should not tolerate the use of the power of sale to deprive a homeowner of substantial equity. The loss of equity may not only be financially disastrous but may prevent the homeowner from acquiring another home immediately after the foreclosure or likely ever thereafter. Sales made at unconscionably low prices should be voided under the enhanced power of the court to avoid unconscionable results in the enforcement of contracts.

Traditionally, courts in the United States adopted Lord Eldon’s rule that “a sale will not be set aside for inadequacy of price, unless the inadequacy be so great as to shock the conscience, or unless there be additional circumstances against its unfairness . . . .* Graffam v. Burgess (1886) 117 U.S. 180, 191-92.] This rule was adopted in California with respect to execution

sales, and, in Odell v. Cox (1907) 151 Cal. 70, 74; 90 P. 194, the California Supreme Court recognized that:

. . . according to very respectable authority, inadequacy of price may be so gross as in itself to furnish satisfactory evidence of fraud or misconduct on the part of the officer or purchaser, and justify vacating the sale.

See Young v. Barker (1948) 83 Cal.App.2d 654, 659; 189 P.2d 521.]

The California cases dealing with inadequacy of price in trustee’s sales are based on execution sale cases such as Odell, supra♦ [See e.g., Winbialer v. Sherman, supra, 175 Cal. 270, 275.] California courts have not expressly adopted the first element of Lord Eldon’s rule—that inadequacy of price so great as to shock the conscience will invalidate a sale—in examining trustee’s sales; the courts have expressly accepted only the second element--that inadequate price, when coupled with unfairness which produces the inadequacy, will render a sale voidable. The cases have neither expressly rejected the first element of Lord Eldon’s rule nor explained the element’s omission from the general formulation of the rule on inadequacy of sale’s price. Federal common law, however, recognizes that a trustee’s sale may be invalidated if the sale price is so low that it shocks the conscience.  [See United

States v. Wells (5th Cir. 1968) 403 F.2d 596, 598; United States v. MacKenzie (D. Nev. 1971) 322 F.Supp. 1058, 1059, aff’d. (9th Cir. 1973) 474 F.2d 1008.] Since California now statutorily acknowledges the equitable power of the court to safeguard parties from the oppression of unconscionable contractual terms, California courts should embrace the rule prohibiting sales based on shockingly insignificant sales prices.

Enjoining the Sale

1.  Propriety of Injunctive Relief

An action to enjoin a foreclosure sale is a well recognized remedy to prevent an unwarranted foreclosure. [See 2 Ogden’s, Rev. Cal. Real Prop. Law 959.] An injunction may issue to prevent acts which: (a) cause great or irreparable injury; (b) violate the party’s rights and tend to render the judgment ineffectual; (c) create harm for which money damages are inadequate; (d) may lead to a multiplicity of actions; and (e) violate a trust. [Code of Civ. Proc. § 526; see Civ. Code §§ 3368, 3422.]

In determining whether to issue any preliminary injunction, the trial court must examine two interrelated factors:

The first is the likelihood that the plaintiff will

prevail on the merits at trial. The second is the interim harm that the plaintiff is likely to sustain if the injunction were denied as compared to the harm that the defendant is likely to suffer if the preliminary injunction were issued. IT Corp. v. County of Imperial (1983) 35 Cal.3d 63, 69-70; 196 Cal.Rptr. 715.

[See e.g., Robbins v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 199, 206; 211 Cal.Rptr. 398; Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 527-28; 67 Cal.Rptr. 761; Baypoint Mortgage Corp. v. Crest Premium Real Estate etc. Trust, supra, 168 Cal.App.3d 818, 824.] Whether or not the trustor is likely to prevail on the merits is obviously a question of fact in each case. If the trustor is not likely to prevail, the injunction may be denied notwithstanding any irreparable harm which may attend the foreclosure:

In a practical sense it is appropriate to deny an injunction where there is no showing of reasonable probability of success, even though the foreclosure will create irreparable harm, because there is no justification in delaying that harm where, although irreparable, it is also inevitable. Jessen v. Keystone Sav. & Loan Assn. (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 454, 459; 191 Cal.Rptr. 104.

Foreclosure is a “drastic sanction.” Bavpoint Mortgage Corp.

v. Crest Premium Real Estate etc. Trust, supra, 168 Cal.App.3d 818, 837.] Irreparable injury will almost always be involved in a home foreclosure, especially if the grounds for invalidating the foreclosure rest on the voidability rather than the voidness of the transaction. Since a bona fide purchaser may buy the property at a foreclosure sale free of many, if not all, of a particular trustor’s defenses to the sale, the court’s failure to enjoin an improper foreclosure may doom the trustor to the loss of the property. “The Status of Bona Fide Purchaser or Encumbrancer”.] Furthermore, courts presume in a foreclosure context that the property is unique, that its loss is irreparable, and that money damages are inadequate unless the property is being openly marketed and has no special value to the owner other than its market price. [See Jessen v. Keystone Sav. & Loan Assn.. 142 Cal.App.3d 454, 457-58; 191 Cal.Rptr. 104; Stockton v. Newman (1957) 148 Cal.App.2d 558, 564; 307 P.2d 56.] In addition, the trustor will suffer irreparable injury because the trustor generally has no right of redemption after a foreclosure sale.  [See discussion in Chapter II B 10a, supra, “Redemption”.]

A foreclosure will often render ineffectual any ultimate relief that may be awarded. If the trustor, for example, is entitled to damages but not rescission in a particular transaction, the trustor would be allowed to retain the property and would be compensated in damages.  But, such a judgment would be rendered

ineffectual through the loss of the property at foreclosure. [See Stockton v. Newman, supra, 148 Cal.App.2d 558, 563-64.] Similarly, a foreclosure would render moot the trustor’s attempt to cancel a trust deed if the property were to be sold to a bona fide purchaser. Thus, an injunction is necessary to preserve the status quo. [See Weinqand v. Atlantic Sav. & Loan Assn. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 806, 819; 83 Cal.Rptr. 650.]

Courts have held that injunctions are appropriate to restrain foreclosure sales in various contexts. The following is an illustrative but not exclusive list: (a) no default [see Freeze v. Salot (1954) 122 Cal.App.2d 561, 564; 266 P.2d 140; cf. Salot v. Wershow (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 352, 355; 320 P.2d 926]; (b) disputes about the amount owed [see e.g., Paramount Motors Corp. v. Title Guar. & Trust Co. (9th Cir. 1926) 15 F.2d 298, 299; More v. Calkins, supra, 85 Cal. 177, 188]; (c) disputes about the amount owed because of the trustor’s offsetting claims [see Hauger v. Gates (1954) 42 Cal.2d 752, 756]; (d) fraud [see e.g., Stockton v. Newman, supra, 148 Cal.App.2d 558, 563-64; Daniels v. Williams (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 310, 312-13; 270 P.2d 556; see also U.S. Hertz, Inc. v. Niobrara Farms (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 68, 79; 116 Cal.Rptr. 44]; (e) no consideration [see Ybarra v. Solarz (1942) 56 Cal.App.2d 342; 132 P.2d 880 (no consideration for novation creating balloon payment)]; (f) improper notice of default [see Lockwood v. Sheedv, supra, 157 Cal.App.2d 741, 742; see also Strike

v. Trans-West Discount Corp. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 735; 155 Cal.Rptr. 132 (court vacates notice of default and permits new notice, but disallows usurious interest), app. dis. 444 U.S. 948; System Inv. Corp. v. Union Bank, supra, 21 Cal.App.3d 137, 152-53; (g) trustee’s breach of duty in conducting the sale [see Baron v. Colonial Mortgage Service Co., supra, 111 Cal.App.3d 316, 324]; (h) trustor’s minor delays in making installment payments [see Bavpoint Mortgage Corp. v. Crest Premium Real Estate etc. Trust, supra, 168 Cal.App.3d 818, 827.]

Unless the obligation or trust deed is fundamentally infirm so that no foreclosure would be proper, most preliminary injunctive relief will only temporarily halt the foreclosure until corrective measures are taken. For example, if the amount is disputed, the foreclosure may be enjoined until the court determines the amount properly owed. [See Producers Holding Co. v. Hill, supra, 201 Cal. 204, 209; More v. Calkins, supra, 85 Cal. 177, 188.] If the notice of default is defective, the court may enjoin the sale on that particular notice of default without prejudice to the beneficiary’s recording a proper notice of default. [See Lockwood v. Sheedv, supra, 157 Cal.App.2d 741, 742.] Alternatively, the court could vacate a notice of default containing an improper demand (e.g., usurious interest) without issuing a preliminary injunction and permit the beneficiary to file a proper notice. [See Strike v. Trans-West Discount Corp., supra, 92 Cal.App.3d 735; 155 Cal.Rptr.

132.]

2.  Scope of Injunctive Relief

The injunctive relief requested should be for an order restraining the trustee and the beneficiary. If only the trustee is enjoined, the beneficiary might be able to circumvent the order by substituting a new trustee. [See Civ. Code § 2934a.] A trustee can employ an agent or subagent to perform the trustee’s tasks under a trust deed. [See Civ. Code § 2924d(d); Orloff v. Pece (1933) 134 Cal.App. 434, 436; 25 P.2d 484.] Therefore, the injunction should cover all agents, subagents, employees, representatives and all other persons, corporations, or other entities which act by, on behalf of, or in concert with the trustee and beneficiary.

The injunction should apply not only to selling, attempting to sell, or causing the sale of the property, but also should enjoin any act authorized or permitted by Civil Code §§ 2924, 2924b, 2924f, 2924g, and 2934a in connection with or incident to the sale. Some of the acts authorized or permitted by these sections may not be construed to be covered by a general anti-sale injunction.

For example, in American Trust Co. v. De Albergria (1932) 123 Cal.App. 76, 78; 10 P.2d 1016, the trustee postponed a sale after

a temporary restraining order issued and held the sale on the postponed date after the order was dissolved. The court held that the order restraining the continuing of the sale did not preclude postponements. Frequently, if a temporary restraining order prevents a sale, the trustee will postpone the sale so that it will be held on the same day as and immediately after the hearing on the preliminary injunction. If the preliminary injunction is denied, the sale will take place post haste. If, however, the trustee is prevented from postponing the sale, a new notice of sale will have to be given, and the trustor will have the opportunity to use the new notice of sale period to raise money or consider other appropriate remedies, including bankruptcy. If the sale is postponed in violation of a restraining order, the sale will be voidable. See Powell v. Bank of Lemoore (1899) 125 Cal. 468, 472; 58 P. 83; Baalev v. Ward (1869) 37 Cal. 121 139; 10 P.2d 1016; American Trust Co. v. De Alberqria, supra, 123 Cal.App. 76, 78.]

The injunction should also restrain the beneficiary from transferring the note and trust deed without informing the transferee of the trustor’s claims and defenses. Otherwise, the transferee may be a holder in due course and take the obligation and security free of the trustor’s rights. [See e.g., Szczotka v. Idelson (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 399; 39 Cal.Rptr. 466;

National Banks

The statute precluding preliminary injunctions against national banks [12 U.S.C. § 91] does not prevent a state court from issuing a preliminary injunction against a national bank to restrain a nonjudicial foreclosure pending the adjudication of the trustor’s rights. [See Third National Bank In Nashville v. Impac Ltd., Inc. (1977) 432 U.S. 312; 97 S.Ct. 2307.] Kemple v. Security-First Nat. Bank (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 719; 57 Cal.Rptr. 838 and First Nat. Bank of Oakland v. Superior Court (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 109; 49 Cal.Rptr. 358 are contra but no longer good authority.]

Tender

The general rule is that the trustor cannot obtain an injunction against a foreclosure without tendering the amount owed. see Sipe v. McKenna (1948) 88 Cal.App.2d 1001, 1006; 200 P.2d 61.] Similarly, the court may dissolve an injunction it issued if the trustor does not tender what is owed. [See Meetz v. Mohr, supra, 141 Cal. 667, 672-73.] If the injunction action is commenced during the reinstatement period, the tender would have to be the amount needed to cure the default. [See Civ. Code § 2924c; Bisno v. Sax (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 714, 724; 346 P.2d 814.]

A tender is an offer of full performance. An offer of partial performance has no effect. [Civ. Code § 1486; see e.g., Gaffrev v. Downey Savings & Loan Assn. (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1154, 1165; 246 Cal.Rptr. 421.] The tender cannot be conditioned on any act of the beneficiary which the beneficiary is not required to perform. [Civ. Code § 1494; see e.g., Karlsen v. American Sav. & Loan Assn.. supra, 15 Cal.App.3d 112, 118.]

A tender is effective only if the trustor has the present ability to fulfill the tender. [See Civ. Code § 1495; see e.g., Napue v. Gor-Mev West, Inc. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 608, 621; Karlsen v. American Sav. & Loan Assn., supra, 15 Cal.App.3d 112, 118.] If the trustor’s continued ability to perform is at issue during or at the conclusion of an action, the court may consider the trustor’s ability at that time. [See Napue v. Gor-Mev West, Inc., supra, 175 Cal.App.3d 608, 621-22.] The trustor’s offer to sell the property to pay the debt is a sufficient tender of full payment if the property is worth considerably more than the debt. [See In re Worcester (9th Cir. 1987) 811 F.2d 1224, 1231.] On the other hand, the trustor’s mere hope that a lender would release property from the lien, that the property would be sold, and that any additional amount owed would be refinanced is an insufficient tender. [See Karlsen v. American Sav. & Loan Assn., supra, 15 Cal.App.3d 112, 118.)

A proper tender “stops the running of interest on the obligation, and has the same effect upon all its incidents as performance thereof.” [Civ. Code § 1504.] A valid tender of a payment, even if refused, precludes a foreclosure based on the failure to make that payment unless the entire balance of the obligation has been accelerated. [See Bisno v. Sax, supra, 175 Cal.App.2d 714, 724.]

If the entire amount of the obligation is tendered, the lien created by the deed of trust is discharged even if the tender is refused: the creditor maintains the right to collect the amount owed but loses its security interest. [See Civ. Code §§ 1504, 2905; Sondel v. Arnold (1934) 2 Cal.2d 87, 89; 39 P.2d 793; Lichtv v. Whitney, supra, 80 Cal.App.2d 696, 701-02; Wagner v. Shoemaker (1938) 29 Cal.App.2d 654, 657; 85 P.2d 229; Wiemever v. Southern T. & C. Bank (1930) 107 Cal.App. 165, 173-74; 290 P. 70.] As a result of the discharge of the trust deed, the trustee has no power to proceed with a foreclosure. [See Winnett v. Roberts, supra, 179 Cal.App.3d 909, 922; Biusno v. Sax, supra, 175 Cal.App.2d 714, 724; Kleckner v. Bank of America (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 30, 33; 217 P.2d 28.] Accordingly, any foreclosure sale that has been conducted is void and conveys no title. r Lichtv v. Whitney, supra, 80 Cal.App.2d 696, 702.]

There are, however, several notable exceptions to the rule

requiring tender. Tender is not required if the trustor seeks to rescind the obligation and trust deed on the ground of fraud because payment would be an affirmance of the debt. [See Stockton v. Newman, supra, 148 Cal.App.2d 558, 564.] No tender is required when nothing is owed such as, for example, when the trustor’s obligation is offset by the beneficiary’s obligation to the trustor. [See Hauqer v. Gates, supra, 42 Cal.2d 752, 753; see also In re Worchester. supra, 811 F.2d 1224, 1230 n.6.] Moreover, tender is not required when the amount owed is in dispute and the foreclosure should be stayed to permit an accounting or adjudication of the amount of the debt. [See More v. Calkins, supra, 85 Cal. 177, 188-90; see also Stockton v. Newman, supra, 148 Cal.App.2d 558.] The Supreme Court has also recognized that a tender is not necessary when the trustor is willing to make a tender but is frustrated in doing so by the beneficiary’s bad faith conduct.  [See McCue v. Bradbury (1906) 149 Cal. 108; 84 P. 993.]

5.  Bank Deposit

A tender does not discharge the ultimate obligation to make the payment tendered. Tender is an offer of performance, not performance itself.  [See e.g., Walker v. Houston (1932) 215 Cal.742, 745; 12 P. 2d 952.] However, a tender of full payment accompanied by a deposit of that amount in the name of the creditor with a bank or savings and loan association and notice to the creditor extinguishes the payment obligation. [Id* at 746; Civ. Code § 1500.] The deposit must be unconditional. [See e.g., Gaff rev v. Downey Sav. & Loan Assn., supra, 200 Cal.App.3d 1154, 1167.]

A bank deposit does not have to be made when tender is required to prevent a foreclosure or vacate a sale. For example, the tender of the amount owed to reinstate an obligation is sufficient to cure the default and reinstate the obligation; a bank deposit is not necessary, rMagnus v. Morrison (1949) 93 Cal.App.2d 1, 3; 208 P.2d 407.]

Bond or Undertaking

If an injunction is granted, the law requires that an undertaking be given. [Code of Civ. Proc. § 529(a)(c).] This statutory requirement does not specifically apply to temporary restraining orders. The Supreme Court advises that the “better practice” is for the trial court to require a bond for a temporary restraining order, but such an order is not void if a bond is not required. Biasca v. Superior Court (1924) 194 Cal. 366; 228 P. 861; see River Farms Co. v. Superior Court (1933) 131 Cal.App. 365,

370; 21 P.2d 643.] A bond, however, is required for a preliminary injunction. [Code of Civ. Proc. § 529; Neumann v. Moretti (1905) 146 Cal. 31, 32-33; 79 P. 512.]

Significantly, the court can waive the bond requirement for poor litigants. The party seeking a preliminary injunction without bond need not proceed in forma pauperis; however, the court will use in forma pauperis standards in determining whether to grant the injunction without bond. Conover v. Hall (1974) 11 Cal.3d 842, 850-52; 114 Cal.Rptr. 642.]

If a bond is required, the lawyer representing the homeowner should assure that the bond is not too large, especially because the homeowner likely will be unable to afford any bond, let alone a large one. The purpose of the bond is to protect the defendant against damages in the event the court determines that the injunction should not have been issued. [Code of Civ. Proc. § 529.] The deed of trust, however, covers the trustor’s continuing default and accruing unpaid interest. Therefore, the deed of trust should be ample security for the beneficiary if there is sufficient equity in the property to cover additional interest and other expenses emanating from the delay. As a result, any bond should be nominal unless the equity in the property is insufficient; in that event, the bond should only be large enough to cover anticipated damage not covered by the security.  Moreover, a bond

which is significantly larger than necessary to protect against damages may improperly restrict the trustor’s access to the courts and thus may infringe on the trustor’s due process rights. [See Lindsev v. Normet (1972) 405 U.S. 56, 74-79; 92 S.Ct. 862.]

7.  Appeals

An appeal is allowed from an order of the trial court granting or denying a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or final injunction. [Code of Civ. Proc. §§ 904.1(a), 904.1(f); U.S. Hertz, Inc. v. Niobrara Farms, supra, 41 Cal.App.3d 68, 72.] The trial court may restrain the foreclosure pending appeal even though the court may have denied a final injunction. [See City of Pasadena v. Superior Court (1910) 157 Cal. 781, 787-88; 109 P. 620.]  In City of Pasadena, the Supreme Court observed that:

Common fairness and a sense of justice readily suggests that while plaintiffs were in good faith prosecuting their appeals, they should be in some manner protected in having the subject-matter of the litigation preserved intact until the appellate court could settle the controversy . . . in order that, if it be ultimately decided that the judgment appealed from was erroneous, his property may be saved to him.  (.Id. at 795-96.)

The appellate courts likewise can issue a stay order or writ of supersedeas which is injunctive in nature to preserve the status quo pending appeal. [Code of Civ. Proc. § 923; see generally, Agricultural Labor Relations Board v. Tex-Cal Land Management, Inc. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 696, 708; 238 Cal.Rptr. 780; People ex rel. San Francisco Bay Conserv. & Dev. Comm. v. Emeryville (1968) 69 Cal.2d 533; 72 Cal.Rptr. 790.]

8.  Notice of Rescission and Lis Pendens

If the sale is not enjoined, the trustor is in serious jeopardy of losing the right to regain the property in the event it is sold to a bona fide purchaser or the purchaser uses the property for security for a loan from a bona fide encumbrancer. Although the bona fides doctrine will not vitiate those claims predicated on voidness which the trustor is not barred from asserting after a foreclosure sale, the doctrine will hamper, if not preclude, the ability of the trustor to vacate the sale based on claims that render the obligation, the trust deed, or the sale voidable., “The Status of Bona Fide Purchaser or Encumbrancer”. ] Therefore, a lawyer representing a homeowner in foreclosure should immediately take steps to avert the application of the bona fides doctrine by giving constructive notice of the homeowner’s claims.

Notice of Rescission

Every acknowledged conveyance of real property which is recorded with the County Recorder provides constructive notice to subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers. [Civ. Code § 1213.] A conveyance is defined to include any instrument which affects the title to real property [Civ. Code § 1215], and any instrument affecting title to real property may be recorded. [Gov. Code § 27280.] The effect of the recordation is to make every conveyance, except a lease not exceeding one year, void as to all subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers in good faith and for a valuable consideration who record their conveyance prior to the recordation of the earlier conveyance.  [Civ. Code § 1214.]

In Dreifus v. Marx (1940) 40 Cal.App.2d 461, 466; 104 P.2d 1080, the Court of Appeal held that a recorded notice or rescission of a deed, which had been served on the defendants and which states grounds for rescission based on fraud, undue influence, and lack of consideration, affected title to real property and imparted constructive notice of the rightful owner’s claims and assertions of title. [See Civ. Code § 1215 defining conveyance to include a document affecting title.]  As the court held,

Its effect was to declare to the world that the author of the notice had by delivery of a deed been defrauded by the

party upon whom the notice had been served, or had failed to receive consideration for the deed, which fact was notice of the invalidity of such prior deed. By the presence of said notice upon the official records of the county, appellant [a subsequent encumbrancer] had constructive notice of the contents of the instrument which was her initial step in her rescissory proceedings to nullify the alleged fraudulent transaction. (.Id. at 466.)

Since the notice of rescission becomes effective upon its service on the persons against whom rescission is sought, the notice must be served in addition to being recorded to impart constructive notice. [See Brown v. Johnson (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 844, 850; 159 Cal.Rptr. 675.] Although not specifically required by the cases, the recordation of a declaration of service along with the notice of rescission appears to be advisable.

The recognition of a recorded and served notice of rescission as a document imparting constructive notice should not be interpreted to mean that any recorded document purporting to affect title will create constructive notice: “It is settled that an instrument which is recorded but which is not authorized to be recorded and given constructive notice effect by statute does not impart constructive notice to subsequent purchasers.” Brown v.

Johnson, supra, 98 Cal.App.3d 844, 849; see e.g., Owens v. Palos Verdes Monaco (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 855, 868; 191 Cal.Rptr. 381 (partnership statement); Lawyers Title Co. v. Bradbury (1981) 127 Cal.App.3d 41, 45; 179 Cal.Rptr. 363 (court order for child and spousal support); Brown v. Johnson, supra, 98 Cal.App.3d 844; (notice of vendor’s lien); Stearns v. Title Ins. & Trust Co. (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 162, 169; 95 Cal.Rptr. 682 (surveys); Black v. Solano Co. (1931) 114 Cal.App. 170, 173-74; 299 P. 843 (royalty agreement); Hale v. Penderarast (1919) 42 Cal.App. 104, 107-08; 183 P. 833 (notice of property repurchase agreement); Rowley v. Davis (1917) 34 Cal.App. 184, 190-91; 167 P. 162 (notice that absolute deed intended as mortgage).] Therefore, any document contesting the transaction should be recorded in the form of a notice of rescission.

b.  Lis Pendens

As soon as a complaint is filed, a lis pendens should be recorded. The recordation of this lis pendens gives constructive notice to prospective purchasers and lenders of the claims asserted in the action. [Code of Civ. Proc. § 409(a); see e.g., Putnam Sand & Gravel Co., Inc. v. Albers (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 722, 725; 92 Cal.Rptr. 636.] Therefore, even if the temporary restraining order or the preliminary injunction is denied, subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers will take their interest subject to the plaintiff’s

claims and will not have a bona fide status.

A lis pendens is simply a notice that there is pending litigation “concerning real property or affecting the title or the right of possession of real property.” [Code of Civ. Proc. § 409(a).] The notice must include the names of the parties, the object of the action, and a description of the property. (Id.) Prior to recording, the notice must be served by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested to all known addresses of the adverse parties and all owners of record as shown in the latest assessment information in the possession of the county assessor’s office. [Code of Civ. Proc. § 409(c).] A copy of the lis pendens must also be filed with the court in which the action is filed. fid.) A proof of service must be recorded with the lis pendens or, in lieu thereof, a declaration under penalty of perjury stating that the address of the adverse party is unknown. [Code of Civ. Proc. § 409(d).] If the service and proof of service requirements are not satisfied, the lis pendens is void.  (Id.)

D.  Attack on the Sale’s Validity

1.  Vacating the Foreclosure Sale and Obtaining Damages

The traditional method of challenging a foreclosure sale is through a suit inequity,  Anderson v. Heart Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn.

(1989) 1989 Cal.App. LEXIS 141.]

The trustor can seek to set aside any improper foreclosure sale:

It is the general rule that courts have power to vacate a foreclosure sale where there has been fraud in the procurement of the foreclosure decree or where the sale has been improperly, unfairly or unlawfully conducted, or is tainted by fraud, or where there has been such a mistake that to allow it to stand would be inequitable to purchaser and parties. Sham bidding and the restriction of competition are condemned, and inadequacy of price when coupled with other circumstances of fraud may also constitute ground for setting aside the sale. Bank of America v. Reidy, supra. 15 Cal.2d 243, 248.

[See e.g., Stirton v. Pastor, supra, 177 Cal.App.2d 232, 234; Brown v. Busch. supra, 152 Cal.App.2d 200, 203-04; Pv v. Pleitner, supra, 70 Cal.App.2d 576, 579.] In a more modern formulation of the rule, the Court of Appeal has stated that —

“The courts scrutinize a sale held under power in a trust deed carefully, and will not sustain it unless it is conducted with fairness, openness, scrupulous integrity, and the trustee exercises sound discretion to protect the rights of all

interested parties and obtain the best possible price.” Bank of Seoul & Trust Co. v. Marcione, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d 113, 119.

The plaintiff bears the burden of proof and, if the action is based on irregularities in the sale process, must show injury from the claimed irregularities. [See e.g., Stevens v. Plumas Eureka Annex Min. Co., supra. 2 Cal.2d 493, 497; Sargent v. Shumaker, supra, 193 Cal. 122; Anderson v. Heart Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., supra, 1989 Cal.App. LEXIS 141.] The injured trustor does not have to attempt to enjoin the sale before bringing an action to vacate the sale. [See Hauaer v. Gates, supra, 42 Cal.2d 752, 756.] The trustor is not estopped from raising claims concerning the sale’s validity which could have been raised before the sale. (Id. ) However, the trustor’s action may be barred by laches. [See Smith v. Sheffev (1952) 113 Cal.App.2d 741, 744; 248 P.2d 959.]

The trustor may seek damages instead of, or as an alternative to, setting aside the sale. [See Munaer v. Moore, supra, 11 Cal.App.3d 1, 7; Standlev v. Knapp, supra, 113 Cal.App. 91, 100-02; see also Stockton v. Newman, supra, 148 Cal.App.2d 558, 563-64. ] The decision to seek damages and/or the rescission of the trustee’s sale may be influenced by whether a jury trial is desired. An action to vacate a trustee’s sale is equitable in nature and, hence, the trustor would not be entitled to a jury

trial. An action for damages, however, is an action at law in which the right to jury trial ordinarily exists. If the legal and equitable issues are joined, the trial court has the discretion to try the equitable issues first, and if the trial court’s determination of these issues is dispositive, nothing remains to be considered by the jury. [See Raedeke v. Gibraltar Sav. & Loan Assn. (1974) 10 Cal.3d 665, 671; 111 Cal.Rptr. 693.]

2. Grounds for Attacking the Sale

The grounds for attacking the sale are discussed above.

3. Tender

Since the action to set aside the sale is equitable in nature, the trustor seeking equity is compelled to do equity by tendering the amount of the obligation owed. [See e.g., Shimpones v. Sticknev (1934) 219 Cal. 637, 649; 28 P.2d 673; Napue v. Gor-Mev West, Inc. . supra, 175 Cal.App.3d 608, 621; Karlsen v. American Sav. & Loan Assn.. supra, 15 Cal.App.3d 112, 117; Crummer v. Whitehead, supra, 230 Cal.App.2d 264, 268; Foae v. Schmidt (1951) 101 Cal.App.2d 681, 683. Pv v. Pleitner, supra, 70 Cal.App.2d 576, 582.]

For a discussion of tender and the circumstances which excuse tender, A junior lienor seeking to set aside the sale of a senior lienor because of irregularities that impaired the junior lienor’s opportunity to reinstate or redeem must tender the full amount owing on the senior obligation. [See FPCI RE-HAB 01 v. E&G Investments, Ltd. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1018, 1021-22; 255 Cal.Rptr. 157; Arnolds Management Corp. v. Eischen (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 575; 205 Cal.Rptr. 15 (junior lienor had no notice of sale but its right of reinstatement had elapsed); but see United States Cold Storage v. Great Western Sav. & Loan Assn. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 1214, 1223-25; 212 Cal.Rptr. 232.] If the ground for vacating the sale does not involve an irregularity precluding the exercise of the right of reinstatement or redemption, tender is not necessary. [See FPCI RE-HAB 01 v. E&G Investments, Ltd., supra, 207 Cal.App.3d 1018, 1022.]

4.  Conclusiveness of Deed Recitals

Trustee’s deeds routinely contain a series of recitals concerning the propriety of the foreclosure. The recitals usually cover every aspect of the foreclosure and purport to be conclusive evidence that the recited facts occurred. The authority of the trustee to make these recitals which ostensibly bind the trustor

is derived from the trust deed. [See Little v. CFS Service Corp., supra, 188 Cal.App.3d 1354, 1358.] The recitals include such facts as the following: a default occurred and still existed at the time of sale, a properly completed notice of default was properly mailed to all parties, not less than three months elapsed between the recordation of the notice of default and the posting and the first publication of the notice of sale, all posting and mailing requirements specified in the trust deed and by statute for the notice of sale were met, the beneficiary properly demanded that the trustee sell the property, and the trustee properly sold the property in full accordance with the terms of the trust deed and all laws. Obviously, this formidable array of recitals, if conclusively binding on the trustor, would be an insuperable obstacle to setting aside the sale. The courts and the Legislature have traditionally recognized the validity of some of these recitals, but the courts have fashioned important exceptions which must be considered by counsel representing a homeowner trying to vacate a trustee’s sale.

As a general proposition, California courts have historically sustained the validity of trustee’s deed recitals regarding the regularity of sale procedures, such as properly publishing and posting notices, as conclusive evidence of the facts recited. [See e.g., Pacific States Sav. & Loan Co. v. O’Neill, supra, 7 Cal.2d 596, 599; 61 P.2d 1160; Cobb v. California Bank, supra, 6 Cal.2d

389, 390; Central Nat. Bank v. Bell, supra, S Cal.2d 324, 327; Sorensen v. Hall (1934) 219 Cal. 680, 682; 28 P.2d 667; Simson v. Eckstein (1863) 22 Cal. 580, 592; 54 P.2d 1107.] The theory underlying this rule is that the trustee, as the trustor’s agent, has been empowered by the trustor in the terms of the deed of trust to bind the trustor in making conclusive admissions regarding the regularity of the sale process. [See Mersfelder v. Spring (1903) 139 Cal. 593, 595; 73 P. 452; Little v. CFS Service Corp., supra, 188 Cal.App.3d 1354, 1358; Pierson v. Fischer, supra, 131 Cal.App.2d 208, 216-17; 280 P.2d 491.] However, the trustee is not obliged to issue a trustee’s deed containing conclusive presumptions regarding the regularity of sales procedures if the procedures were defective. [See Little v. CFS Service Corp., supra, 188 Cal.App.3d 1354, 1360.]

The Legislature has provided that recitals dealing with compliance with all legal requirements for mailing copies of notices, publishing or personally delivering a copy of the notice of default and posting and publishing the notice of sale are prima facie evidence of compliance and conclusive evidence in favor of a bona fide purchaser. [Civ. Code § 2924; see Garfinkle v. Superior Court, supra, 21 Cal.3d 268, 279 n.16; (Supreme Court withholds opinion on validity and effect of Civ.Code §2924 presumptions); a discussion of what is a “bona fide purchaser” is contained in, “The Status of a Bona Fide Purchaser or Encumbrancer” . ] Thus, recitals regarding the mailing, posting, and publishing of notices are conclusive only as to a bona fide purchaser but are rebuttable as to everyone else. [See Napue v. Gor-Mev West. Inc., supra, 175 Cal.App.3d 608, 620-21; Wolfe v. Lipsev, supra, 163 Cal.App.3d 633, 639-40.] The obvious purpose of the presumption is to protect a bona fide purchaser at a trustee’s sale from certain claims of procedural defects. [See Napue v. Gor-Mev West, Inc.. supra, 175 Cal.App.3d 608, 615.]

The statute does not deal with the effect of purported conclusive recitals regarding matters other than the mailing, posting, and publishing of notices. [See Wolfe v. Lipsev, supra, 163 Cal.App.3d 633, 640 (application of presumptions in Civ.Code §2924 to notices of postponement is “questionable”). The courts, however, recognized that the recitals did not prevent an examination into any fraud or unfairness in the sale process about which the purchaser has notice. Thus, for example, the Supreme Court declared that conclusive recitals “would not, perhaps, preclude the inquiry in an equitable proceeding into the fairness of the sale, or with other matters which on equitable principles might entitle the party injured to relief . . . .” Mersfelder v. Spring, supra, 139 Cal. 593, 595; see e.g., Taliaferro v. Crola (1957) 152 Cal.App’.2d 448, 449-50; 313 P.2d 136; Karrell v. First Thrift of Los Angeles (1951) 104 Cal.App.2d 536, 539; 232 P.2d 1; Seccombe v. Roe (1913) 22 Cal.App. 139, 143; 133 P. 507.]

The courts have also declared that no recitals are conclusive between the beneficiary and the trustor. As the Court of Appeal held,

We are of the opinion that this stipulation as to conclusiveness, reading the whole deed and various requirements together, was only intended and only had the effect to protect an innocent purchaser or a third party to the transaction who acquired at such sale the legal title, but that as between the trustor and the beneficiary, when such beneficiary takes the legal title under a sale made in violation of terms of the trust, the trustor is not estopped to deny the regularity of the sale and to obtain equitable relief through a redemption thereof …. Seccombe v. Roe, supra, 22 Cal.App. 139, 143-44.

[See Beck v. Reinholtz (1956) 138 Cal.App.2d 719, 723; Security-First National Bank v. Crver (1940) 39 Cal.App.2d 757, 762; 104 P.2d 66; see also Tomczak v. Ortega, supra, 240 Cal.App.2d 902, 907; see generally 20th Century Plumbing Co. v. Sfreaola (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 851, 854; 179 Cal.Rptr. 144 (judgment creditor buying at sale is not a bona fide purchaser).]

Moreover, the trustor may not waive any- rights under Civil Code §§ 2924, 2924b, and 2924c. [Civ. Code § 2953.] Therefore, any provision in the trust deed by which the trustor purportedly authorized the trustee to admit conclusively that the protections afforded by these sections have been extended, when they have not been extended, should be construed as an invalid waiver. [See Tomczak v. Ortega, supra, 240 Cal.App.2d 902, 907; but see Pierson v. Fischer, supra, 131 Cal.App.2d 208, 216-17, which is completely contrary to the public policy expressed in Civ. Code §§ 2924 and 2953; but see also Leonard v. Bank of America, supra, 16 Cal.App.2d 341, 345-46, the analysis of which should be superseded by Civ. Code § 2953 and Tomczak.)

The continued viability of these conclusive presumptions is open to challenge. The California Supreme Court declined to express any opinion on the validity and effect of the conclusive recital provisions of Civil Code § 2924. [See Garfinkle v. Superior Court, supra, 21 Cal.3d 268, 279 n. 16.]

The constitutionality of the conclusiveness of the recitals is also questionable. That issue has heretofore been avoided by California courts. [See Lancaster Security Inv. Corp. v. Kessler, supra, 159 Cal.App.2d 649, 655.] The effect of the conclusive presumption is dramatic: a trustor is irretrievably precluded by the trustee’s recitals from introducing evidence at trial that the

trustee illegally sold the trustor’s property. For example, in attempting to recover possession of the property through unlawful detainer proceedings after sale, a purchaser must prove that the property was “duly sold” and that the purchaser’s title has been “duly perfected.” [See Code of Civ. Proc. § 1161a; see discussion, “Attacking the Sale or Defending Possession in Unlawful Detainer Proceedings.”] Nevertheless, a bona fide purchaser can rely solely on the recitals to prove the case, and the trustor is barred from introducing contrary evidence to prevent being ousted from possession. [See e.g., Cruce v. Stein (1956) 146 Cal.App.2d 688, 693; 304 P.2d 118; Abrahamer v. Parks (1956) 141 Cal.App.2d 82, 84; 296 P.2d 343.]

Although a general discussion of the possible due process and equal protection infirmities to this statutory scheme is beyond the scope of this handbook, a lawyer representing a homeowner in foreclosure should consider several decisions of the United States Supreme Court which declared certain conclusive presumptions unconstitutional. rCleveland Bd. of Education v. LaFleur (1974) 414 U.S. 632; United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Murrv (1973) 413 U.S. 508; Vlandis v. Kline (1973) 412 U.S. 441; Stanley v. Illinois (1972) 405 U.S. 645. ] The gravamen of these cases is that due process forbids the use of irrebuttable presumptions to establish the truth of facts which are neither universally nor necessarily true when the state has reasonable alternative means

to determine the existence of the facts. [See e.g., landis v. Kline (1973) 412 U.S. 441, 452.] Although the Legislature is not prevented from establishing objective, rational criteria for determining the existence or nonexistence of facts, the Legislature cannot make the existence of a fact an issue and then make inadmissible patently relevant evidence tending to prove or disprove the fact. [See Weinberger v. Salfi (1975) 422 U.S. 749, 772.] Even as limited by Salfi, Vlandis and the other similar cases appear to prohibit the state’s predicating the validity of a foreclosure sale and unlawful detainer proceeding on the regularity of the foreclosure sale process and then prohibiting the introduction of admissible evidence to disprove the regularity of the process. [See generally, Western & A.R.R. v. Henderson (1929) 279 U.S. 639 (invalidating arbitrary rebuttable presumption).]

Whether or not the conclusiveness of the presumptions is constitutional, a lawyer representing a homeowner in foreclosure should attempt to prevent the operation of the conclusive presumptions by preventing the execution and delivery of the trustee’s deed. The bona fide purchaser obtains the benefit of the conclusive presumptions from the deed recitals; if the purchaser does not receive a deed, the purchaser will have no conclusive presumptions on which to rely. Little v. CFS Service Corp., supra, 188 Cal.App.3d 1354, 1360-61.] Therefore, if property has been sold through foreclosure but the trustee’s deed has not been

executed and delivered, the lawyer representing the trustor should attempt to enjoin the execution and delivery of the deed on the grounds of whatever irregularity may have existed in the sale and on the ground that the trustor will suffer irreparable injury as a result of the creation of the conclusive presumptions. (See generally, 3 Witkin, Summary of California Law, § 108, at 1577.)

E.  Attacking the Sale or Defending Possession in Unlawful Detainer Proceedings

Generally, the purchaser at a trustee’s sale may institute an unlawful detainer action to obtain possession if the “property has been duly sold in accordance with Section 2924 of the Civil Code” and if “title under the sale has been duly perfected.” [Code of Civ. Proc. § 1161a(b) (3). ] A transferee of the purchaser also has standing to use the unlawful detainer process. [See Evans v. Superior Court (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 162, 169-70; 136 Cal.Rptr. 596.] The action may be brought after the failure to vacate following the service of a three-day notice to quit. [Code of Civ. Proc. § 116la(b).] However, unlawful detainer proceedings may be used against a tenant or subtenant only after the service of notice to quit at least as long as the periodic tenancy but not exceeding 30 days. [Code Civ. Pro. § 1161a(c).] The remedy is cumulative to common law actions such as ejectment which may be brought to obtain possession.  [See Duckett v. Adolph Wexler Bldg. & Fin.

Corp. (1935) 2 Cal.2d 263, 265-66; 40 P.2d 506; Mutual Bldo. & Loan Assn. v. Corum (1934) 3 Cal.App.2d 56, 58; 38 P.2d 793.] With very rare exceptions, the purchaser will invoke summary unlawful detainer proceedings rather than other proceedings to gain possession.

However, the purchaser is precluded from invoking unlawful detainer if a local ordinance, such as a rent control law, does not permit eviction after foreclosure. [See Gross v. Superior Court (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 265; 217 Cal.Rptr. 284.] The purchaser may also be bound to rent ceilings. [See People v. Little (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d Supp. 14; 192 Cal.Rptr. 619.]

The courts have charted inconsistent paths in determining what defenses may be raised in unlawful detainer proceedings and to what extent the trustor may be able to attack the purchaser’s title. In the early cases, the courts concluded that the purchaser had the burden of proving that the purchaser acquired the property in the manner expressed in the unlawful detainer statute; i.e., the property was duly sold and the purchaser duly perfected title. No other questions of title could be litigated. [See e.g., Nineteenth Realty Co. v. Diacrs (1933) 134 Cal.App. 278, 288-89; 25 P.2d 522; Hewitt v. Justice’s Court (1933) 131 Cal.App. 439, 443; 21 P.2d 641.]

This rule was adopted by the Supreme Court in Cheney v. Trauzettel (1937) 9 Cal.2d 158; 69 P.2d 832. The Supreme Court held that:

… in the summary proceeding in unlawful detainer the right to possession alone was involved, and the broad question of title could not be raised and litigated by cross-complaint or affirmative defense. [Citations omitted.] It is true that where the purchaser at a trustee’s sale proceeds under section 1161a of the Code of Civil Procedure he must prove his acquisition of title by purchase at the sale; but it is only to this limited extent, as provided by statute, that the title may be litigated in such a proceeding. [Citations omitted.] . . . the plaintiff need only prove a sale in compliance with the statute and deed of trust, followed by purchase at such sale, and the defendant may raise objections only on that phase of the issue of title. Matters affecting the validity of the trust deed or primary obligation itself, or other basic defects in the plaintiff’s title, are neither properly raised in this summary proceeding for possession, nor are they concluded by the judgment. (Id. at 159-60.)

Accordingly, in numerous cases trustors have been forbidden from defending against the unlawful detainer on grounds other than

showing that the sale was not conducted pursuant to Civil Code § 2924. [See e.g., California Livestock Production Credit Assn. v. Sutfin, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d 136, 140 n.2; Evans v. Superior Court, supra, 67 Cal.App.3d 162, 170-71; MCA. Inc. v. Universal Diversified Enterprises Corp. (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 170, 176-77; 103 Cal.Rptr. 522; Cruce v. Stein, supra, 146 Cal.App.2d 688, 692; Abrahamer v. Parks, supra, 141 Cal.App.2d 82, 84; Hiaoins v. Covne (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 69, 72-73, 75; 170 P.2d 25; Delov v. Ono (1937) 22 Cal.App.2d 301, 303; 70 P.2d 960.]

Other courts, on the other hand, have considered defenses extrinsic to compliance with statutory foreclosure procedure in determining unlawful detainer matters. In Seidell v. Anglo-California Trust Co. (1942) 55 Cal.App.2d 913, 921; 132 P.2d 12, the Court of Appeal construed Cheney to prohibit only equitable but not legal defenses. Therefore, the Court thought that lack of consideration and other issues going to the validity of the note and the trust deed were proper defenses. (Id. at 922.) Other cases have permitted the unlawful detainer defenses whether or not the grounds were technically legal or equitable. [See e.g., Kartheiser v. Superior Court (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 617, 621; 345 P.2d 135 (beneficiary’s waiver of default); Freeze v. Salot, supra, 122 Cal.App.2d 561; (no default); Kessler v. Bridge (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d Supp. 837; 327 P.2d 241 (rescission, lack of delivery); Altman v. McCollum. supra, 107 Cal.App.2d Supp. 847; (estoppel to

assert default).]

The issue of what defenses can or should be raised also significantly affects the application of the res judicata doctrine to any action by the trustor after the unlawful detainer to challenge the trustee’s sale. Cases, proceeding from Seidell, which hold that potential defenses are far ranging, have also held that issues which were, or might have been, determined in the unlawful detainer proceeding are barred by res judicata in subsequent proceedings. [See Freeze v. Salot. supra, 122 Cal.App.2d 561, 565-66; Bliss v. Security-First Nat. Bank (1947) 81 Cal.App.2d 50, 58; Seidell v. Analo-California Trust Co., supra, 55 Cal.App.2d 913.]

The Court of Appeal, however, ruled differently in Gonzales v. Gem Properties, Inc., supra, 37 Cal.App.3d 1029, 1036. The court recognized the extreme difficulty of conducting complicated defenses in the context of a summary proceeding; investigation and discovery procedures are limited, and the proceeding is too swift to afford sufficient time for preparation. Therefore, the court denied a res judicata effect to issues such as fraud.

The resolution of the problems raised by these cases appears in Vella v. Hudoins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251; 142 Cal.Rptr. 414 and Asuncion v. Superior Court (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 141; 166 Cal.Rptr.

306. In Vella, the Supreme Court held generally that only claims “bearing directly upon the right of immediate possession are permitted; consequently, a judgment in unlawful detainer usually has very limited res judicata effect and will not prevent one who is dispossessed from bringing a subsequent action to resolve questions of title [citations omitted], or to adjudicate other legal and equitable claims between the parties [citations omitted].” (20 Cal.3d at 255.) The purchaser, however, must show that the sale was regularly conducted and that the purchaser’s title was duly perfected.  (Id.)

The court reaffirmed the holding in Cheney that claims dealing with the validity of the trust deed or the obligation or with other basic defects in the purchaser’s title should not be litigated in unlawful detainer proceedings, and that determination made regarding such claims should not be given res judicata effect. (Id. at 257.) Defenses which need not be raised may nonetheless be considered if there is no objection. [See Stephens, Partain & Cunningham v. Hollis, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d 948, 953.] Res judicata will apply only to defenses, including those ordinarily not cognizable but raised without objection, if there is a fair opportunity to litigate, vella v. Hudgins, supra, 20 Cal.3d 251, 256-57.] Since complex claims, such as for fraud, can very rarely be fairly litigated in summary unlawful detainer proceedings, the trustor is not required to raise those issues as a defense.  Although not required and ordinarily not allowed to litigate critical issues involving the obligation, the trust deed, and title, the homeowner-trustor is practically impelled to litigate these issues or be dispossessed since an unlawful detainer hearing will certainly precede a trial on a quiet title action. [See Code of Civ. Proc. § 1179a; Kartheiser v. Superior Court, supra, 174 Cal.App.2d 617, 621-23.] The California Supreme Court, citing Justice Douglas, aptly observed:

. . . the home, even though it be in the slums, is where man’s roots are. To put him into the street . . . deprives the tenant of a fundamental right without any real opportunity to defend. Then he loses the essence of the controversy, being given only empty promises that somehow, somewhere, someone may allow him to litigate the basic question in the case. S. P. Growers Assn. v. Rodriguez (1976) 17 Cal.3d 719, 730; 131 Cal.Rptr. 761.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeal held in Asuncion, supra, that “homeowners cannot be evicted, consistent with due process guaranties, without being permitted to raise the affirmative defenses which if proved would maintain their possession and ownership.”  (108 Cal.App.3d at 146.)  Nonetheless, the Court was

mindful that an unlawful detainer action was “not a suitable vehicle to try complicated ownership issues. …” [Id. at 144; see Mehr v. Superior Court (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 1044, 1049; 189 Cal.Rptr. 138; Gonzales v. Gem Properties, Inc., supra, 37 Cal.App.3d 1029, 1036.] The Court thus prescribed the following procedure when the trustor had on file a superior court action contesting title: (a) the municipal court should transfer the unlawful detainer proceeding to the superior court because that action ultimately involves the issue of title which is beyond the municipal court’s jurisdiction; and (b) the superior court should stay the eviction action, subject to a bond if appropriate, until trial of the action dealing with title, or (c) the superior court should consolidate the actions.  (Id. at 146-47.)

If the challenge to title is based on fraud in the acquisition of title, improper sales methods, or other improprieties that directly impeach the unlawful detainer plaintiff’s title or the procedures followed in the foreclosure sale, Asuncion and Mehr dictate that the unlawful detainer should be stayed. On the other hand, if the challenge to title is based on a claim unrelated to the specific property in question, such as a fraud not directly related to the obtaining of title to the property that is the subject of the unlawful detainer, the rule in Asuncion does not apply. [See Old National Financial Services, Inc. v. Seibert (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 460, 464-67.]

Asuncion should also be distinguished from Mobil Oil Corp. v. Superior Court (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 486; 145 Cal.Rptr. 17, which is frequently cited in opposition to the procedure authorized in Asuncion♦ In Mobil, the court ruled that statutory procedure accorded unlawful detainer proceedings precluded staying the unlawful detainer action until the tenant gas station operator could try his action alleging unfair practices in the termination of his franchise. (Id. at 494.) The Asuncion court noted some procedural distinctions: the commercial lessee did not seek a preliminary injunction and obtained a stay on apparently inadequate factual grounds, while the Asuncions had not yet had the opportunity to present facts on which a preliminary injunction might issue.  (See 108 Cal.App.3d at 146 n. 1.)

In addition, the differences between the interests presented in commercial and residential transactions suggest that different considerations may apply to each. The courts have recognized a distinction between commercial and residential cases and have been more willing to allow affirmative defenses in residential cases. [See S. P. Growers Assn., supra, 17 Cal.3d 719, 730; 131 Cal.Rptr. 761; Custom Parking, Inc. v. Superior Court (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 90, 96-100; 187 Cal.Rptr. 674; Schulman v. Vera (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 552, 560-63; 166 Cal.Rptr. 620; Asuncion v. Superior Court, supra, 108 Cal.App.3d 141, 145, 146 n. 1;  Mobil Oil Corp.

v, Handlev (1976) 76 Cal.App.3d 956, 966;- 143 Cal.Rptr. 321; see generally, Union Oil Co. v. Chandler (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 716, 725; 84 Cal.Rptr. 756.]

The commercial lessee may be able to establish its rights in an action apart from the unlawful detainer. The trustor, however, will lose possession of the trustor’s home. While the lessee’s loss is likely compensable in money, the loss of the home and the attendant adverse impact on the psychological well being of the residents and the family structure will not as easily be amenable to compensation. Moreover, the family cast out onto the streets may be unable to maintain an action which may come to trial years later. [See S. P. Growers Assn. v. Rodriguez, supra, 17 Cal.3d 719, 730.] In addition, the affirmative defenses alleged in the recent commercial lease cases have presented substantial and complex issues [see e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 79 Cal.App.3d 486, 495 (unfair business practice charge involving all Mobil service station operators); Onion Oil Co. v. Chandler, supra, 4 Cal.App.3d 716, 725-26 (antitrust violations)] and would likely consume more trial time than most trustee’ s sale cases.

Moreover, the court’s decision on whether to recognize various affirmative defenses in unlawful detainer proceedings results from a balancing of the public policies furthered by protecting the tenant or property owner from eviction against the state’s interest

in the expediency of a summary proceeding. [See e.g., Barela v. Superior Court (1981) 30 Cal.3d 244, 250; 178 Cal.Rptr. 618; S. P. Growers Assn. v. Rodriguez, supra, 17 Cal.3d 719, 729-30; Custom Parking, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 138 Cal.App.3d 90.] There is a strong public policy supporting homeownership and the conservation of neighborhoods from destabilizing influences. [See “Propriety of Injunctive Relief”.] These interests when coupled with the due process concerns mentioned in Asuncion militate for the hearing of affirmative defenses in accord with the procedure set forth in Asuncion.

As an alternative to an Asuncion motion prior to the hearing of the unlawful detainer action, the homeowner’s counsel could file a superior court action to challenge title and to restrain the purchasers from initiating or prosecuting an unlawful detainer. If the homeowner has lost the unlawful detainer, the injunction could be aimed at restraining the purchasers from enforcing the writ of possession or from taking possession of the premises.

Counsel should not direct the injunction against the municipal court or the sheriff or marshall since the superior court has no jurisdiction to enjoin a judicial proceeding or a public officer’s discharge of regular duties. [See e.g., Code of Civ. Proc. § 526.]

The courts have not ruled on whether traditional landlord-tenant defenses could ever be invoked in unlawful detainer

proceedings between the purchaser at the foreclosure sale and the person in possession. However, these defenses do not apply if the person in possession has no independent right to possession after the foreclosure. [See California Livestock Production Credit Assn. v. Sutfin. supra, 165 Cal.App.3d 136, 143.] In Sutfin, for example, the court held that a trustor could not invoke a retaliatory eviction defense because the trustor had no lease agreement giving the trustor a right to possession and the trustor’s only claim to possession derived from his title to the property which was lost at a valid foreclosure sale.  (Id.)

F.  The Status of Bona Fide Purchaser or Encumbrancer

The trustor may be unable to vacate a sale made to a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the trustor’s claim. The general rules of bona fide purchase apply to trustee’s sales: a “good faith purchaser for value and without notice of the fraud or imposition is not chargeable with the fraud or imposition of his predecessor and takes title free of any equity of the person thus defrauded or imposed upon.” strutt v. Ontario Sav. & Loan Assn. (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 547, 554; accord, Karrell v. First Thrift of Los Angeles, supra, 104 Cal.App.2d 536, 539; see Gonzales v. Gem Properties, Inc., supra, 37 Cal.App.3d 1029, 1037; 112 Cal.Rptr. 884.]

Notice

The trustor’s best chance for attacking someone’s alleged status as a bona fide purchaser or encumbrancer will be to show that the purchaser had knowledge of the trustor’s claims and equities. The notice can be actual or constructive. (See Civ. Code § 18.)

a.  Actual Notice

The bona fide purchase doctrine does not benefit a subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer who takes with actual notice of a prior, though unrecorded, claim to property. [See e.g., Civ. Code §§ 1214, 1217; Slaker v. McCormick-Saeltzer Co. (1918) 179 Cal. 387, 388; 177 P. 155.] Actual notice may be acquired in many ways including the following: (a) seeing a document relating to someone’s claim [see e.g., Beverly Hills Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Seres (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 255, 264; 172 P.2d 894 (letter)]; (b) being told of someone’s interest [see e.g., Laucrhton v. McDonald (1923) 61 Cal.App. 678, 683; 215 P. 707]; (c) listening to or participating in a conversation regarding someone’s claim [see e.g., Williams v. Miranda (1958) 159 Cal.App.2d 143, 153; 323 P.2d 794]; (d) actually viewing a public record [see e.g., Warden v. Wyandotte Sav. Bank (1941) 47 Cal.App.2d 352, 355; 117 P.2d 910]; (e) actually viewing a recorded document which is not entitled to recordation and which, therefore, would not impart constructive notice [see Parkside Realty Co. v. MacDonald (1913) 166 Cal. 426, 431; 137 P. 21]; (f) viewing a preliminary title report which refers to someone’s interest [see Sain v. Silvestre, supra, 78 Cal.App.3d 461, 469-70; Rice v. Capitol Trailer Sales of Redding (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d 690, 692-94; 53 Cal.Rptr. 384].

Constructive Notice

Subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers have constructive notice of the contents of all acknowledged and recorded conveyances from the time of their recordation. [See Civ. Code § 1213.] A conveyance that is not property indexed does not impart constructive notice [see Rice v. Taylor (1934) 220 Cal. 629, 633-34; 32 P.2d 381]; however, a properly indexed conveyance imparts constructive notice even if the document were recorded in an incorrect book of record. [Gov. Code § 27327.] Not every recorded document imparts constructive notice; if the document is not deemed a conveyance, as broadly defined [see Civ. Code § 1215], its recordation will not give constructive notice. [See discussion in If the document is properly recordable as an instrument which may affect title to real property, the recorded instrument not only gives constructive notice of its own contents but also of the contents of other documents to which the recorded instrument refers.  [See Caito v.United California Bank, supra, 20 Cal.3d 694, 702; American Medical International, Inc. v. Feller (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 1008, 1020; 131 Cal.Rptr. 270; see also Pacific Trust Co. TTEE v. Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., supra, 184 Cal.App.3d 817, 825.]

If the document is unacknowledged or defectively acknowledged, the document does not impart constructive notice until one year after its recordation. [See Civ. Code § 1207; see e.g., Frederick v. Louis (1935) 10 Cal.App.2d 649, 651; 52 P. 2d 533.] An acknowledgment cannot be properly taken unless the notary “personally knows, or has satisfactory evidence that the person making the acknowledgement is the individual who is described in and who executed the instrument.” (Civ. Code § 1185.) A broad standard has been adopted to satisfy this requirement. For example, the notary may rely on the statement of a “credible witness,” personally known to the notary, that the person making the acknowledgment is personally known to the witness [Civ. Code § 1185(c)(1)]; the notary may also rely on a driver’s license.

[Civ. Code § 1185(c)(2)(A).]

If a trust deed is forged, it is void even in the hands of a person who would otherwise be a bona fide purchaser.  [See e.g., Trout v. Taylor, supra, 220 Cal. 652, 656; see discussion on forgery, Chapter V A 6, “Forgery and Fraud in The Factum”.] infra.1  Therefore, if a notary falsely certifies a forged trust deed, the notary will not be liable to the purported trustor for the amount of the trust deed since the purported trustor has no obligation to pay it.  [See Preder v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. (1931) 116 Cal.App. 17; 2 P.2d 223.]  However, the notary may be liable to the trustor for expenses involved in clearing title (see Preder, supra).  The trustor whose genuine signature is obtained on a document through fraud may be able to recover for the fraud.

Constructive notice is also imputed from known circumstances. Civil Code § 19 provides that:

Every person who has actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry as to a particular fact, has constructive notice of the fact itself in all cases in which, by prosecuting such inquiry, he might have learned such fact.

see Olson v. Comwell (1933) 134 Cal.App. 419, 428; 25 P.2d 879.] Thus, the Court of Appeal has held that:

one who purchases at a trustee’ s sale with knowledge, express or implied, that the trustor is contesting the right to sell, is presumed to know the course of the proceedings and state of record from which the title of his grantor proceeded, and he is presumed to know, too, that the right of the defendant is to take an appeal within the statutory period, and also the consequences of the successful prosecution of this right;

notary’s false certification if the trust deed is acquired by a bona fide purchaser.  [See MacBride v. Schoen (1932) 121 Cal.App. 321; 8 P.2d 888.]  Generally, a notary and the notary’s sureties on the notary bond are liable for all the damages sustained by any person injured by the notary’s official misconduct.  (Gov. Code § 8214.)  The notary’s official misconduct must be related to notary duties.  [See e.g., Heidt v. Minor (1891) 89 Cal. 115, 118-19; 26 P. 627.]  The misconduct must also be the proximate cause of the injury.  (See MacBride v. Schoen, supra.)and he must be supposed to purchase with reference to these things. Bisno v. Sax, supra, 175 Cal.App.2d 714, 732; 346 P.2d 814.

Other circumstances will prompt inquiry. For example, if the purchase price of property is grossly disproportionate to its value, the low price is sufficient to put a prudent person on inquiry of a defect in title. [See e.g., Jordan v. Warnke (1962) 205 Cal.App.2d 621, 629; 23 Cal.Rptr. 300; Rabbit v. Atkinson (1944) 44 Cal.App.2d 752, 757; 113 P.2d 14.]

A corollary to this principle of inquiry notice is that “possession of real property is constructive notice to any intending purchaser or encumbrancer of the property of all of the rights and claims of the person in possession which would be disclosed by the inquiry.” Asisten v. Underwood (1960) 183 Cal.App.2d 304, 309; 7 Cal.Rptr. 84.] Although most of the cases involve purchases, the rule applies as well to encumbrances as indicated by the court in Asisten. [See J. R. Garrett Co. v. States (1935) 3 Cal.2d 379; 44 P.2d 538.]

The Supreme Court early noted that “[t]he simple, independent fact of possession is sufficient to raise a presumption of interest in the premises on behalf of the occupant.” Pell v. McElrov (1868) 36 Cal. 268, 273.]   The possession, however, must be

sufficiently open, notorious, and visible to impart the fact of possession. [See e.g., Taber v. Beske (1920) 182 Cal. 214, 217; 187 P. 746; High Fidelity Enterprises. Inc. v. Hull (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 279, 281; 26 Cal.Rptr. 654.] In addition, the possession must be inconsistent with record title. [See e.g., Evans v. Faught (1965) 231 Cal.App.2d 698, 705; 42 Cal.Rptr. 133.] Thus, for example, a subsequent purchaser from a purchaser at a foreclosure sale could not claim bona fide purchaser status against one in open and notorious possession of the premises. (See Evans v. Superior Court, supra, 67 Cal.App.3d 162, 169.] In addition, possession can be shown by the use of the property by tenants. [See e.g., Manig v. Bachman (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 216, 221-22; 273 P.2d 596.] Although generally the burden of proof is placed on the person claiming to be a bona fide purchaser [see e.g., Beattie v. Crewdson (1899) 124 Cal. 577, 579; 57 P. 463; Hodges v. Lochhead (1963) 217 Cal.App.2d 199, 203-05; 31 Cal.Rptr. 879], the burden is switched to the party claiming that notice should be implied from possession. [See High Fidelity Enterprises, Inc. v. Hull, supra, 210 Cal.App.2d 279, 281.]

Even though notice may have to be taken, the purchaser is only subject to the facts which would have been uncovered by an inquiry. In Keim v. Roether (1939) 32 Cal.App.2d 70; 89 P.2d 187, the plaintiff was induced to deed property to another knowing that it was going to be used as security for loans to be invested in an

enterprise which the plaintiff did not know to be a sham. The property was subsequently encumbered. After discovering the fraud, plaintiff attempted to invalidate the encumbrance. Plaintiff contended that plaintiff’s possession of the property when the encumbrance was placed on the property by a different owner of record, gave the encumbrancer notice of the plaintiff’s rights. The court rejected plaintiff’s position since any inquiry made by the encumbrancer would not have revealed any fraud because the fraud was then unknown to the plaintiff.

Certain defects in a trust deed will render it void even in the hands of a bona fide purchaser. A forged trust deed is absolutely invalid. However, a bona fide purchaser may still prevail if the grantor or trustor ratified or is estopped to deny the signature. [See Trout v. Tavlor, supra, 220 Cal. 652, 656-57; Blaisdell v. Leach, supra, 101 Cal. 405, 409; Crittenden v. McCloud (1951) 106 Cal.App.2d 42, 50; 234 P.2d 642.] If a trust deed is not delivered, it is invalid. If a trust deed is altered before delivery, it is void; however, if it is altered after delivery, a bona fide purchaser takes the instrument according to its original tenor. (See 2 Miller & Starr, Current Law of California Real Estate 590-91.) If the trust deed was procured through fraud in the factum (as opposed to fraud in the inducement), the trust deed is void. (See discussion in section on fraud in the factum, Chapter V A 6, infra, “Forgery and Fraud in the Factum”.]

A lawyer representing a homeowner in foreclosure should assure that actual or constructive notice of the homeowner’s claims are given to all potential purchasers. If rescission is an appropriate remedy, a notice of rescission should be recorded and served as soon as possible. A lis pendens should also be prepared when the action is commenced. Any temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction enjoining the sale should be recorded. If there is insufficient time to prepare these documents prior to the sale, the lawyer should consider sending the client to the sale with others to inform potential bidders orally and in writing of the trustor’s claims.

Brown Asks for Halt to All GMAC/Ally Financial Evictions in California


By: David Dayen Saturday September 25, 2010 7:37 am

When Ally Financial, formerly GMAC Mortgage, appeared to suspend foreclosure evictions in 23 states, they left out the ones where a judge is not required to sign off on foreclosures, including California, one of the four “sand states” with a massive amount of delinquencies and defaults. However, Attorney General Jerry Brown, who is running for Governor, has found a reason to demand a delay to any Ally/GMAC foreclosures:

California officials today demanded that Ally Financial Inc. stop foreclosing on homes in the state, citing reports indicating the big mortgage lender is violating the law.

The cease-and-desist letter, issued by Attorney General Jerry Brown, came as officials in several other states began investigating Ally’s operations […]

According to Brown, California law forbids a lender from issuing a notice of default – the first step toward foreclosure – unless it can show it has tried to contact the borrower. The law covers mortgages originated between 2003 and 2007.

If Jeffrey Stephan, the robo-signer who processed thousands of Ally/GMAC foreclosure affadavits with the courts, spent around a minute on each set of documentation, he cannot possibly say with any certainty that the lender contacted the borrowers. As Yves Smith says, Stephan could also have been engaged in a cover-up, knowingly signing off on documents where the lender never made the contact.

The New York Times has finally jumped in on this, assigning the article to David Streitfeld, who has revealed his bias against homeowners in previous stories. Streitfeld generally gets this one right, although you can see his slip showing at various points.

Florida lawyers representing borrowers in default said they would start filing motions as early as next week to have hundreds of foreclosure actions dismissed.

While GMAC is the first big lender to publicly acknowledge that its practices might have been improper, defense lawyers and consumer advocates have long argued that numerous lenders have used inaccurate or incomplete documents to remove delinquent owners from their houses.

The issue has broad consequences for the millions of buyers of foreclosed homes, some of whom might not have clear title to their bargain property. And it may offer unforeseen opportunities for those who were evicted.

“You know those billboards that lawyers put up seeking divorcing or bankrupt clients?” asked Greg Clark, a Florida real estate lawyer. “It’s only a matter of time until they start putting up signs that say, ‘You might be entitled to cash payment for wrongful foreclosure.’”

I hope he’s not intimating that the borrowers are taking advantage of the poor lenders and servicers, and using fly-by-night ambulance chasers to boot. GMAC/Ally, and many other lenders, broke the rules, lied to the judges, forged signatures, and took people’s homes under false pretenses. I know this isn’t normal practice in this country anymore, but they’re supposed to face the consequences.

Streitfeld also gets the Treasury Department on the record. The federal government is the majority owner in GMAC during the bank bailout.

“We have discussed the current situation with GMAC and expect them to take prompt action to correct any errors,” said Mark Paustenbach, a spokesman for the Treasury Department.

Sounds pretty hands-off to me. But they’re going to have to face up to this problem soon, because it’s about to spread nationwide.

CLASS ACTION VIDEO

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YRGr9sGlIpg&feature=player_embedded

Southern California (909)890-9192 in Northern California(925)957-9797

Bombshell – Judge Orders Injunction Stopping ALL Foreclosure Proceedings by Bank of America; Recontrust; Home Loan Servicing; MERS et al

June 7, 2010 by TheWryEye
Filed under New World order

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Posted by Foreclosure Fraud on June 6, 2010
(St. George, UT) June 5, 2010 – A court order issued by Fifth District Court Judge James L. Shumate May 22, 2010 in St. George, Utah has stopped all foreclosure proceedings in the State of Utah by Bank of America Corporation, ; Recontrust Company, N.A; Home Loans Servicing, LP; Bank of America, FSB; http://www.envisionlawfirm.com. The Court Order if allowed to become permanent will force Bank of America and other mortgage companies with home loans in Utah to adhere to the Utah laws requiring lenders to register in the state and have offices where home owners can negotiate face-to-face with their lenders as the state lawmakers intended (Utah Code ‘ 57-1-21(1)(a)(i).). Telephone calls by KCSG News for comment to the law office of Bank of America counsel Sean D. Muntz and attorney Amir Shlesinger of Reed Smith, LLP, Los Angeles, CA and Richard Ensor, Esq. of Vantus Law Group, Salt Lake City, UT were not returned.

The lawsuit filed by John Christian Barlow, a former Weber State University student who graduated from Loyola University of Chicago and receive his law degree from one of the most distinguished private a law colleges in the nation, Willamette University founded in 1883 at Salem, Oregon has drawn the ire of the high brow B of A attorney and those on the case in the law firm of Reed Smith, LLP, the 15th largest law firm in the world.

Barlow said Bank of America claims because it’s a national chartered institution, state laws are trumped, or not applicable to the bank. That was before the case was brought before Judge Shumate who read the petition, supporting case history and the state statute asking for an injunctive relief hearing filed by Barlow. The Judge felt so strong about the case before him, he issued the preliminary injunction order without a hearing halting the foreclosure process. The attorney’s for Bank of America promptly filed to move the case to federal court to avoid having to deal with the Judge who is not unaccustomed to high profile cases and has a history of watching out for the “little people” and citizen’s rights.

The legal gamesmanship has begun with the case moved to federal court and Barlow’s motion filed to remand the case to Fifth District Court. Barlow said is only seems fair the Bank be required to play by the rules that every mortgage lender in Utah is required to adhere; Barlow said, “can you imagine the audacity of the Bank of America and other big mortgage lenders that took billions in bailout funds to help resolve the mortgage mess and the financial institutions now are profiting by kicking people out of them homes without due process under the law of the State of Utah.

Barlow said he believes his client’s rights to remedies were taken away from her by faceless lenders who continue to overwhelm home owners and the judicial system with motions and petitions as remedies instead of actually making a good-faith effort in face-to-face negotiations to help homeowners. “The law is clear in Utah,” said Barlow, “and Judge Shumate saw it clearly too. Mortgage lender are required by law to be registered and have offices in the State of Utah to do business, that is unless you’re the Bank of America or one of their subsidiary company’s who are above the law in Utah.”

Barlow said the Bank of America attorneys are working overtime filing motions to overwhelm him and the court. “They simply have no answer for violating the state statutes and they don’t want to incur the wrath of Judge Shumate because of the serious ramifications his finding could have on lenders in Utah and across the nation where Bank of America and other financial institutions, under the guise of a mortgage lender have trampled the rights of citizens,” he said.

“Bank of America took over the bankrupt Countrywide Home Loan portfolio June 3, 2009 in a stock deal that has over 1100 home owners in foreclosure in Utah this month alone, and the numbers keep growing,” Barlow said.

The second part of the motion, Barlow filed, claims that neither the lender, nor MERS*, nor Bank of America, nor any other Defendant, has any remaining interest in the mortgage Promissory Note. The note has been bundled with other notes and sold as mortgage-backed securities or otherwise assigned and split from the Trust Deed. When the note is split from the trust deed, “the note becomes, as a practical matter, unsecured.” Restatement (Third) of Property (Mortgages) § 5.4 cmt. a (1997). A person or entity only holding the trust deed suffers no default because only the Note holder is entitled to payment. Basically, “[t]he security is worthless in the hands of anyone except a person who has the right to enforce the obligation; it cannot be foreclosed or otherwise enforced.” Real Estate Finance Law (Fourth) § 5.27 (2002).

*MERS is a process that is designed to simplifies the way mortgage ownership and servicing rights are originated, sold and tracked. Created by the real estate finance industry, MERS eliminates the need to prepare and record assignments when trading residential and commercial mortgage loans. http://www.mersinc.org

Does MERS Registration and Mortgage Fractionalization Extinguish Mortgage Rights?

By: Cynthia Kouril Wednesday September 30, 2009 5:00 pm

Mortgage – Rev Dan Catt

The Kansas Court of Appeals has issued a decision that is both stunning in its own right, but also demonstrates the trend in courts all over this nation which spells HUGE changes in the real estate and mortgage landscape. Realtors and banksters take note:

In a long and thoughtful decision in the case of Landmark Nat’l Bank v. Kessler the Kansas Court of Appeals has held that MERS (Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.) does not have standing to bring foreclosure actions on behalf of the owners of mortgage notes archived in its system.

Some background:

In the good old days, the legislatures of the various states set up a system for recording mortgages, usually in the County Clerk’s Office. Anyone wishing to know what obligations were imposed upon the real estate, like for instance a title search company, could go to the County Clerk’s Office and look up the block and lot number of the property and know who owned what, who owed what and to whom and whether there were any liens or mortgages on the property and who had what priority.

If you took out a mortgage from bank A, and A later resold your mortgage to refinance company B, well B would go to the County Clerk’s Office and record the transfer of the mortgage. Are you following me so far? B would also receive the original signature copy-the one where you wrote your name in blue ink-of the mortgage paperwork. In order to foreclose, the mortgagee/creditor is supposed to present the original documents in court as one way of proving that it is the true party to whom the debt is own and for whom the mortgage trust (the interest in the real estate) exists.

There are filing fees and costs to have a person go down to the County Clerk’s Office to record the mortgage transfer.

Some “genius” got the bright idea of forming a private entity to circumvent the government filing system; and “poof” MERS was born.

Banks pay a fee to “join” MERS. They then send all their mortgage records or at least their mortgage record information (MERS is very secretive about just how they do what they do) to MERS. MERS is supposed to keep track of the information about each mortgage. Then the mortgage gets split. The Promissory Note, that is the right to receive payments from the borrower, gets either sold or farmed out to a servicer who is paid “fees” to collect the payments and do other administrative tasks like manage any payments for taxes and the like out of escrow funds.

The mortgage deed or mortgage trust, that is the legal interest in the real estate that would normally give a lender the right to foreclose in the event of non-payment-may be sold to someone else. The payments themselves are “securitized” that is bundled with other mortgages and sold as Credit Backed Securities, which we now know as Wall Street Toxic Assets.

Up until recently when a homeowner fell behind in the mortgage payments and the it came time to foreclose, the servicer – who owned no interest whatsoever in the real estate – would appear as plaintiff and the lawyer would fill out an affidavit saying that the actual, blue ink signature, original copy of the mortgage documents were lost, or destroyed, but that the court should waive that requirement because MERS can appear on behalf of the owner of the right to foreclose and certify that the owner is somewhere in the MERS system. The transfers are not recorded in the County Clerk’s Office and all you will see is the transfer to MERS, if that, but not any subsequent transfers within MERS.

In the beginning, homeowners did not realize and often stipulated to waive presentation of the original documents. STUPID, STUPID, STUPID. Then a few wised up and found that their cases got postponed indefinitely. Not a “win” but at least they still had a roof over their heads for the time being.

Then banks got the bright idea of saying that MERS was the agent for the true owner. The Kansas decision says that won’t fly either.

BUT, now for the good part:

The court opined that

Indeed, an assignment of a mortgage without the debt transfers nothing. 55 Am. Jur. 2d, Mortgages § 1002. Thus, the mortgagee, who must have an interest in the debt, is the lender in a typical home mortgage.

Understand the possible implications of this. If other states take the same approach as Kansas, that means the splitting of the debt from the mortgage note effectively cancels the “mortgage interest” that is the power over the real property and converts the debt to a simple unsecured personal debt just on a promissory note. Which means they couldn’t take your house in foreclosure, though they can sue you personally on the debt, just like any other unsecured creditor can. I am assuming, without going to deep into it today, that as a personal debt, it may be dischargeable in bankruptcy. But we will have to wait for a few test cases to prove this.

What this also means is, that in the meantime, if you are trying to buy a house, you have to find out if your seller has a mortgage that may have been repackaged and lodged in MERS because you will have no way of knowing – since your title company cannot tell who actually might own the mortgage interest in your real estate if all the County Clerk’s records say is “MERS”.

This makes for a scary time for title insurers, I’m guessing.

There will be more on this case, I’m sure, it will just take some time to suss out all the ramifications.

Update: The NYTimes take on it.

Possession of the note “NO” recorded assignment “YES” civil code 2932.5 CARTER v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY (N.D.Cal. 1-27-2010)

Some courts appear to have reasoned that plaintiff’s position
Page 29
would create an explicit conflict with the statute’s provisions.
The statute authorizes the “trustee, mortgagee, or beneficiary,
or any of their authorized agents” to initiate foreclosure. Cal.
Civ. Code § 2924(a)(1). Under California Civil Code
section 2924(b)(4), a “person authorized to record the notice of default
or the notice of sale” includes “an agent for the mortgagee or
beneficiary, an agent of the named trustee, any person designated
in an executed substitution of trustee, or an agent of that
substituted trustee.” Several courts have held that this language
demonstrates that possession of the note is not required,
apparently concluding that the statute authorizes initiation of
foreclosure by parties who would not be expected to possess the
note. See, e.g., Spencer v. DHI Mortg. Co., No. 090925,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55191, *23*
24 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2009)
(O’Neill, J.). However, the precise reasoning of these cases is
unclear.[fn14]
A second argument adopted by sister district courts is that
even if requiring possession of the promissory note does not
contradict the statute’s provisions, it nonetheless extends them,
and such extensions are impermissible. See, e.g., Bouyer v.
Countrywide Bank, FSB, No. C 085583,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53940, *23*
24 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2009). California courts have
described the statute as establishing a “comprehensive scheme”
for nonjudicial
foreclosures. Homestead Sav. v. Darmiento,
Page 30
230 Cal. App. 3d 424, 433 (1991)). Because this scheme “is intended to be
exhaustive,” California courts have refused to incorporate
additional obligations, such as allowing a debtor to invoke a
separate statutory right to cure a default. Moeller,
25 Cal. App. 4th at 834 (refusing to apply Cal. Civ. Code § 3275). The
California Supreme Court has similarly held that “[t]he rights
and powers of trustees in nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings
have long been regarded as strictly limited and defined by the
contract of the parties and the statutes.” I.E. Associates v.
Safeco Title Ins. Co., 39 Cal. 3d 281, 288 (1985). I.E.
Associates held that while a trustee has a statutory duty to
contact a trustor at the trustor’s last known address prior to
nonjudicial
foreclosure, the Court could not impose a further
duty to search for the trustor’s actual current address. Id.
District courts have applied I.E. Associates and Moeller to hold
that the trustee’s duties are “strictly limited” to those
contained specifically in the nonjudicial
foreclosure statute,
section 2924 et seq. See, e.g., Bouyer v. Countrywide Bank, FSB,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53940, *23*
24 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2009).
These courts have held that because section 2924 does not specify
that any party must possess the note, such possession is not
required. Id. Courts have similarly refused to require a trustee
“to identify the party in physical possession of the original
promissory note prior to commencing a nonjudicial foreclosure.”
Ritchie v. Cmty. Lending Corp.,
Page 31
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73216, *20 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2009).[fn15]
contained specifically in the nonjudicial
foreclosure statute,
section 2924 et seq. See, e.g., Bouyer v. Countrywide Bank, FSB,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53940, *23*
24 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2009).
These courts have held that because section 2924 does not specify
that any party must possess the note, such possession is not
required. Id. Courts have similarly refused to require a trustee
“to identify the party in physical possession of the original
promissory note prior to commencing a nonjudicial foreclosure.”
Ritchie v. Cmty. Lending Corp.,
Page 31
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73216, *20 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2009).[fn15]
Finally, while the above arguments have focused on and rejected
a requirement of production of the note, a series of opinions by
Judge Ishii have held that under California law, possession of
the note is not required either. Garcia v. HomEq Servicing Corp.,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77697 *11 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2009), Topete
v. ETS Servs., LLC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77761 *10*
11(E.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2009), Wood v. Aegis Wholesale Corp.,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57151, *14 (E.D. Cal. July 2, 2009). These opinions
reason as follows. Under Cal. Civ. Code § 2932.5, when the
beneficial interest under the promissory note is assigned, the
assignee may exercise a security interest in real property
provided that the assignment is “duly acknowledged and recorded.”
See, e.g., Wood, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57151 at *14.
The Ninth
Circuit has applied California law to hold that promissory notes
arising out of real estate loans could be sold without transfer
of possession of the documents themselves. Id. (citing In re
Golden Plan of Cal., Inc., 829 F.2d 705, 707, 708 n. 2, 710 (9th
Cir. 1986)). Judge Ishii concluded that because a party may come
to validly own a beneficial interest in a promissory note without
possession of the promissory note itself, and because this
Page 32
interest, if recorded on the deed of trust, carries with it the
right to foreclose, possession of the promissory note is not a
prerequisite to nonjudicial
foreclosure. Id.
Having reviewed the arguments adopted by the district courts,
the court is left with the sense that reasonable minds could
disagree. Notably, I.E. Associates held that trustee’s duties are
“strictly limited” to those arising under the “statutes,” and a
reasonable jurist could conclude that the plural “statutes”
incorporates the Commercial Code. Although the Civil Code
authorizes a number of parties to initiate nonjudicial
foreclosure, it could be that whichever of those parties
possesses the note may foreclose.
At some point, however, the opinion of a large number of
decisions, while not in a sense binding, are by virtue of the
sheer number, determinative. I cannot conclude that the result
reached by the district courts is unreasonable or does not accord
with the law. I further note that this conclusion is not
obviously at odds with the policies underlying the California
statutes. The apparent purpose of requiring possession of a
negotiable instrument is to avoid fraud. In the context of
nonjudicial
foreclosures, however, the danger of fraud is
minimized by the requirement that the deed of trust be recorded,
as must be any assignment or substitution of the parties thereto.
While it may be that requiring production of the note would have
done something to limit the mischief that led to the economic
pain the nation has suffered, the great weight of authority has
reasonably concluded that California law does not
CARTER v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY (N.D.Cal. 1-27-2010)

Page 33
impose this requirement.
While the court concludes that neither production nor
possession is required, the court need not decide whether this is
because promissory notes are not “negotiable instruments,” or
instead because Cal. Civ. Code § 2924 et seq. render the
Commercial Code inapplicable. The court leaves that question for
the California courts. The court solely concludes that neither
possession of the promissory note nor identification of the party
in possession is a prerequisite to nonjudicial
foreclosure.

MERS’s Authority to Operate in California CARTER v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY (N.D.Cal. 1-27-2010)

2. MERS’s Authority to Operate in California
The FAC fleetingly alleges that “MERS [is] not registered to do
business in California.” FAC ¶ 9. While MERS’s registration
status receives no other mention in the complaint, plaintiff’s
opposition memorandum purports to support several of plaintiff’s
claims with this allegation, and defendant’s reply discusses it
on the merits. The court therefore discusses this issue here.
The California Corporations Code requires entities that
“transact[] intrastate business” in California to acquire a
“certificate of qualification” from the California Secretary of
State. Cal. Corp. Code § 2105(a). MERS argues that its activities
fall within exceptions to the statutory definition of transacting
intrastate business, such that these requirement does not apply.
See Cal. Corp. Code § 191. It is not clear to the court that
MERS’s activity is exempt.
Page 23
MERS primarily relies on Cal. Corp. Code § 191(d)(3). Cal.
Corp. Code § 191(d) enumerates various actions that do not
trigger the registration requirement when performed by “any
foreign lending institution.” Because neither the FAC nor the
exhibits indicate that MERS is such an institution, MERS cannot
protect itself under this exemption at this stage. The statute
defines “foreign lending institution” as “including, but not
limited to: [i] any foreign banking corporation, [ii] any foreign
corporation all of the capital stock of which is owned by one or
more foreign banking corporations, [iii] any foreign savings and
loan association, [iv] any foreign insurance company or [v] any
foreign corporation or association authorized by its charter to
invest in loans secured by real and personal property[.]” Cal.
Corp. Code § 191(d). Neither any published California decision
nor any federal decision has interpreted these terms. Because
plaintiff alleges that MERS does not itself invest in loans or
lend money, it appears that [i], [iii], and [v] do not apply.
MERS does not claim to be an insurance company under [ii].
Finally, it is certainly plausible that not all of MERS’s owners
are foreign corporations. At this stage of litigation, the court
cannot conclude that MERS falls within any of the five enumerated
examples of “foreign lending institutions,” and the court
declines to address sua sponte whether MERS otherwise satisfies
subsection (d).
Corp. Code § 191(d). Neither any published California decision
nor any federal decision has interpreted these terms. Because
plaintiff alleges that MERS does not itself invest in loans or
lend money, it appears that [i], [iii], and [v] do not apply.
MERS does not claim to be an insurance company under [ii].
Finally, it is certainly plausible that not all of MERS’s owners
are foreign corporations. At this stage of litigation, the court
cannot conclude that MERS falls within any of the five enumerated
examples of “foreign lending institutions,” and the court
declines to address sua sponte whether MERS otherwise satisfies
subsection (d).
Defendants also invoke a second exemption, Cal. Corp. Code
§ 191(c)(7). While section 191(c) is not restricted to “lending
institutions,” MERS’s acts do not fall into the categories
Page 24
enumerated under the section, including subsection (c)(7).
Plaintiff alleges that MERS directed the trustee to initiate
nonjudicial
foreclosure on the property. Section 191(c)(7)
provides that “[c]reating evidences of debt or mortgages, liens
or security interests on real or personal property” is not
intrastate business activity. Although this language is
unexplained, directing the trustee to initiate foreclosure
proceedings appears to be more than merely creating evidence of a
mortgage. This is supported by the fact that a separate statutory
section, § 191(d)(3) (which MERS cannot invoke at this time, see
supra), exempts “the enforcement of any loans by trustee’s sale,
judicial process or deed in lieu of foreclosure or otherwise.”
Interpreting section (c)(7) to include these activities would
render (d)(3) surplusage, and such interpretations of California
statutes are disfavored under California law. People v. Arias,
45 Cal. 4th 169, 180 (2008), Hughes v. Bd. of Architectural
Examiners, 17 Cal. 4th 763, 775 (1998). Accordingly,
section 191(c)(7) does not exempt MERS’s activity.[fn12]
For these reasons, plaintiff’s argument that MERS has acted
Page 25
in violation of Cal. Corp. Code § 2105(a) is plausible, and
cannot be rejected at this stage in the litigation.
3. Whether MERS Has Acted UltraVires
Plaintiff separately argues that MERS has acted in violation of
its own “terms and conditions.” These “terms” allegedly provide
that
MERS shall serve as mortgagee of record with respect to
all such mortgage loans solely as a nominee, in an
administrative capacity, for the beneficial owner or
owners thereof from time to time. MERS shall have no
rights whatsoever to any payments made on account of
such mortgage loans, to any servicing rights related to
such mortgage loans, or to any mortgaged properties
securing such mortgage loans. MERS agrees not to assert
any rights (other than rights specified in the
Governing Documents) with respect to such mortgage
loans or mortgaged properties. References herein to
“mortgage(s)” and “mortgagee of record” shall include
deed(s) of trust and beneficiary under a deed of trust
and any other form of security instrument under
applicable state law.”
FAC ¶ 10. The FAC does not specify the source of these “terms and
conditions.” Plaintiff’s opposition memorandum states that they
are taken from MERS’s corporate charter, implying that an action
in violation thereof would be ultra vires. Opp’n at 4. Plaintiff
then alleges that these terms do not permit MERS to “act as a
nominee or beneficiary of any of the Defendants.” FAC ¶ 32.
However, the terms explicitly permit MERS to act as nominee.
Plaintiff has not alleged a violation of these terms.
4. Defendants’ Authority to Foreclose
Another theme underlying many of plaintiff’s claims is that
defendants have attempted to foreclose or are foreclosing on the
Page 26
property without satisfying the requirements for doing so.
Plaintiff argues that foreclosure is barred because no defendant
is a person entitled to enforce the deed of trust under the
California Commercial Code and because defendants failed to issue
a renewed notice of default after the initial trustee’s sale was
4. Defendants’ Authority to Foreclose
Another theme underlying many of plaintiff’s claims is that
defendants have attempted to foreclose or are foreclosing on the
Page 26
property without satisfying the requirements for doing so.
Plaintiff argues that foreclosure is barred because no defendant
is a person entitled to enforce the deed of trust under the
California Commercial Code and because defendants failed to issue
a renewed notice of default after the initial trustee’s sale was
rescinded.

A Home Owners Nightmare Sweeping The US And Beyond

Foreclosures

“Foreclosure” A home owners nightmare currently sweeping the US and beyond as result of, principally, the “Sub-Prime Mortgage” market collapse. A market designed by skilled “Gamblers” who, unlike their lesser counter parts playing a straight “Game of Chance” in the Nevada casinos – Set out to established a game, to be backed by vast sums of international money, and, where the principal players could only win irrespective of any monies lost by their organizations at the end of the day.

Recent news articles report that “The FBI’s investigation of sub-prime lending practices could take a long time, officials say” – The SEC has opened about three dozen civil investigations into the sub-prime market collapse” A FBI spokesman has indicated they now have “34 mortgage fraud task forces and working groups that included other federal agencies and state and local law enforcement officials” and that “We consider it a significant and growing crime problem”

So What! at the end of the day, apart from a few “Fall Guys” to feed the media and public needs, the real parties responsible, financially able to buy the best in legal representation, will remain free to sit back to enjoy their gains. Or, perhaps not so this time.

As the full realizations of the effects of the massive negative financial impact on the US economy sweeps the population and its ongoing effects world wide most will appreciate that we are entering into very new era with new economic giants entering the world arena. Some of these financial giants have already provided “bail Out” monies to US financial institutions and no doubt will provide more throughout the coming years(s).

They are not doing it for love. Self interest and investment? yes. As new masters with major interests they may not be conducive to a future repeat performance of such financial set back and are expecting some sign of serious action by the US. One must wonder at how might the Peoples Republic of China or some of the Arab states deal with persons who were responsible for wrecking their economy. It was not to far past in history when the description for such action was called “Treason”

Many, Mr & Mrs decent Americans may lose not only their homes but also possibly their saving and investments to institutions who were once pillars of good ethics, responsibility and ethical standing.

While untold number will effectively be “losers” to this fiasco there will, by the law of nature, also be some “Winners” As in the great depression of 1929 there were those who emerged with greater strength and wealth and, so to will it be again.

New Jersy on MERS standing and lost note

This case wrestles with all issues of MERS and standing read it it is insightful its long but focused upon the MERS and lost note argument. And by the way in this case they did find the note.
nycasewin

Another win against Downey Savings

645068 – US BANK VS. MARTIN, A – Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment – DENIED. The Plaintiff as moving party has established a prima facie showing that it is entitled to judgment for possession against Defendant as a matter of law. However, Defendant’s objections Nos. 1, 3-6, 8, 9, and 11 to the Johnson Declaration are overruled; and objections Nos. 2, 7 and 10 are sustained, based on a lack personal knowledge and/or hearsay, regarding the alleged transfer of the beneficial interest to Plaintiff and as to the reasonable rental value.

Further, the Court finds the Defendant has met his burden of establishing triable issues of fact to rebut the presumption of validity of the sale and the issue of whether Plaintiff had the right to proceed with foreclosure. Namely the evidence of a gap in title and security interest from Downey Savings & Loan through the FDIC to Plaintiff during the time of the foreclosure proceeding, as well as missing evidence to show whether the Trustee, DSL Service Company, was authorized to act as Plaintiff’s agent in continuing to pursue the sale once Downey Savings & Loan had lost its security interest. (See Plaintiff’s undisputed fact # 7 and Defendant’s objection thereto; and Declaration of Defense counsel, McCandless, paragraphs 2, 8, 9, 10, 12 and 13). As such, triable issues of material fact remain and the motion for summary judgment is denied.

Where and when does the fraud begin

This document is meant to take the reader down a road they have
likely never traveled. This is a layman’s explanation of what has
been happening in this country that most have no idea or inkling
of. It is intended to give the reader an overview of a systemic
Fraud in this country that has reached epic proportions and
provoke action to eradicate this scourge that has descended upon
the people of America. This is intended as an overview of the process. Is
is one thing to have a grasp on what actually happened in our capitalistic
society it is quit another to convince a judge on these facts. The Judge
has his or her hands tied by the very system that allowed the
fraud in the first place.
Depending on what your situation is, you
may react with disbelief, fear, anger or outright disgust at what you
are about to learn. The following information is supported with
facts, exhibits, law and is not mere opinion.

Let’s start our journey of discovery with the purchase of a home
and subsequent steps in the financial process through the life of
the “mortgage loan”. It all starts at the “closing” where we gather
with other people that are “involved” in the process to sign the
documents to purchase our new home. Do we really know what
goes on at the closing? Are we ever told who all the participants
are in that entire process? Are we truly given “full disclosure” of all
the various aspects of that entire transaction regarding what, for
most people, is the single largest purchase they will make in their
entire life?

Let’s start with the very first part of the transaction. We have a
virtual stack of papers placed in front of us and we are instructed
where we are supposed to start signing or initialing on those
“closing documents”. There seems to be so many different
documents with enough legal language that we could read for
hours just to get through them the first time, much less begin to
fully understand them. Are we given a copy of all these documents
at least 7 days prior to the closing so we can read and study these
documents so we fully understand what it is that we are signing
and agreeing to? That has never happened for the average
consumer and purchaser of a property in the last 30 years or more
if it ever has at all. WHY? We have a stack of documents placed
before us at the “closing” that we haven’t ever seen before and are
instructed where to sign or initial to complete the transaction and
“get our new home”. We depend on the real estate agent, in most
cases, to bring the parties together at the closing after we have
supplied enough financial data and other requested information so
that the “lender” can determine whether we can qualify for our
“loan”. Obviously we have the “three day right of rescission” but do
we really stop to read all the documents after we have just
purchased our home and want to move in? Is the thought that
there might be something wrong with what we have just signed a
primary thought in our mind at that time? Did we trust the people
involved in the transaction? Are we naturally focusing on getting
moved into our new home and getting settled with our family?

Who are the players involved in the transaction from the
perspective of the consumer purchasing a property and signing a
“Mortgage Note” and “Deed” or similar “Security Instrument” at the
closing? There is, of course, the seller, the real estate agent(s), title
insurance company, property appraiser who is supposed to
properly determine the value of the property, and the most
obvious one being who we believe to be “the lender” in the
transaction. We are led, by all involved, to believe that we are, in
fact, borrowing money from the “lender” which is then paid to the
current owner of the property as compensation for them
relinquishing any “claim of ownership” to the property and
transferring that “claim of ownership” to us as the purchaser. It all
seems so simple and clear on its face and then the transaction is
completed. After the “closing” everyone is all smiles and you
believe you have a new home and have to repay the “lender”, over a
period of years, the money which you believe you have “borrowed”.

IS THERE SOMETHING WE DON’T KNOW?

Everything appears to be relatively simple and straightforward
but is that really the case? Could it be that there are other players
involved in this whole transaction that we know nothing about that
have a very substantial financial interest in what has just
occurred? Could it be that those players that we are totally
unaware of have somehow used us without our knowledge or

consent to secure a spectacular financial gain for themselves with
absolutely no investment or risk to themselves whatsoever? Could
it be that there is a hidden aspect of this whole transaction that is
“standard operating procedure” in an industry where this hidden
“aspect of a transaction” occurs every single banking day across
this country and beyond? Could it be that this hidden “aspect of a
transaction” is a deliberate process to unjustly enrich certain
individuals and entities at the expense of the public as a whole?
Could it be that there was not full disclosure of the “true nature” of
the transaction as it actually occurred which is required for a
contract to be valid and enforceable?

THE DOCUMENTS INVOLVED

The two most important and valuable documents that are signed
at a closing are the “Note” and the “Deed” in various forms. When
looking at the definition of a “Mortgage Note” it is obvious that it is
a “Security Instrument”. It is a promise to pay made by the maker
of that “Note”. When looking at a copy of a “Deed of Trust” such as
the attached Exhibit “A”, which is a template of a Tennessee “Deed
of Trust” form that is directly from the freddiemac.com website, it
is very obvious that this document is also a “Security Instrument”.
This is a template that is used for MOST government purchased
loans. You will note that the words “Security Instrument” are
mentioned no less than 90 times in that document. Is there ANY
doubt it is a “Security”? When at the closing, the “borrower” is led

to believe that the “Mortgage Note” that he signs is a document that
binds him to make repayment of “money” that the “lender” is
loaning him to purchase the property he is acquiring. Is there
disclosure to the “borrower” to the effect that the “lender” is not
really loaning any of their money to the “borrower” and therefore
is taking no risk whatsoever in the transaction? Is it disclosed to
the “borrower” that according to FEDERAL LAW, banks are not
allowed to loan credit and are also not allowed to loan their own or
their depositor’s money? If that is the case, then how could this
transaction possibly take place? Where does the money come
from? Is there really any money to be loaned? The answer to this
last question is a resounding NO! Most people are not aware that
there has been no lawful money since the bankruptcy of the United
States in 1933.

Since House Joint Resolution 192 (HJR 192) (Public law 7310)
was passed in 1933 we have only had debt, because all property
and gold was seized by the government as collateral in the
bankruptcy of the United States. Most people today would think
they have money in their hand when they pull something out of
their pocket and look at the paper that is circulated by the banks
that they have been told is “money”. In reality they are looking at a
“Federal Reserve Note” which is stated right on the face of the piece
of paper we have come to know as “money”. It is NOT really
“money”, it is debt, a promise to pay made by the United States! If
you take a “Federal Reserve Note” showing a value of ten dollars

and buy something, you are then making a purchase with a “Note”
(a promise to pay). There is absolutely no gold or silver backing
the Federal Reserve Notes that we refer to as “money” today.

When you sit down at the closing table to complete the
transaction to purchase your home aren’t you tendering a “Note”
with your signature which would be considered money? That is
exactly what you are doing. A “Note” is money in our monetary
system today! You can deposit the “Federal Reserve Note” (a
promise to pay) with a denomination of $10 at the bank and they
will credit your account in that same amount. Why is it that when
you tender your “Note” at the closing that they don’t tell you that
your home is paid for right on the spot? The fact is that it IS PAID
FOR ON THE SPOT. Your signature on a “Note” makes that “Note”
money in the amount that is stated on the “Note”! Was this
disclosed to you at the “closing” in either verbal or written form?
Could this be the place where the other players come into the
transaction at or near the time of closing? What happens to the
“Note” (promise to pay) that you sign at the closing table? Do they
put it in their vault for safe keeping as evidence of a debt that you
owe them as you are led to believe? Do they return that note to you
if you pay off your mortgage in 5, 10 or 20 years? Do they disclose
to you that they do anything other than put it away for safe keeping
once it is in their possession?

WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENS TO THE “NOTE”?

Unknown to almost everyone, there is something VERY different
that happens with your “Mortgage Note” immediately after closing.

Your “Mortgage Note” is endorsed and deposited in the bank as a
check and becomes “MONEY”! See attached (Exhibit “B” para 13)
The document that you just gave the bank with your signature on
it, that you believe is a promise to pay them for money loaned to
you, has just been converted to money in THEIR ACCOUNT. You
just gave the “lender” the exact dollar value of what they said they
just loaned you! Who is the REAL creditor in this “Closing
Transaction”? Who really loaned who anything of value or any
money? You actually just paid for your own home with your
promissory “Mortgage Note” that you gave the bank and the bank
gave you what in return? NOTHING!!! For any contract to be valid
there must be consideration given by both parties. But don’t they
tell you that you must now pay back the “Loan” that they have
made to you?

How can it be that you could just write a “Note” and pay for your
home? This leads us back to the bankruptcy of the United States in
1933. When FDR and Congress took all the property and gold from
the people in 1933 they had to give something in return for that
confiscation of property. See attached (Exhibit “B” para 6) What
the people got in return was the promise that all of their needs
would be met by the government because the assets and the labor
of the people were collateral for the debt of the United States in the

bankruptcy. All of their debts would be “discharged”. This was
done without the consent of the people of America and was an act
of Treason by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. The problem
comes in where they never told us how we could accomplish that
discharge and have what we were entitled to after the bankruptcy.
Why has this never been taught in the schools in this country?
Could it be that it would expose the biggest fraud in the history of
this entire country and in the world? If the public is purposely not
educated about certain things then certain individuals and entities
can take full financial advantage of virtually the entire population.
Isn’t this “selective education” more like “indoctrination”? Could
this be what has happened? In Fina Supply, Inc. v. Abilene Nat.
Bank, 726 S.W.2d 537, 1987 it says “Party having superior
knowledge who takes advantage of another’s ignorance of the law
to deceive him by studied concealment or misrepresentation can
be held responsible for that conduct.” Does this mean that if there
are people with superior knowledge as a party in this “Loan
Transaction” that take advantage of the “ignorance of the law”,
(through indoctrination) of the public to unjustly enrich
themselves, that they can be held responsible? Can they be held
responsible in only a civil manner or is there a more serious
accountability that falls into the category of criminal conduct?

It is well established law that Fraud vitiates (makes void) any
contract that arises from it. Does this mean that this intentional
“lack of disclosure” of the true nature of the contract we have

entered into is Fraud and would make the mortgage contract void
on its face? Could it be that the Fraud could actually be “studied
concealment or misrepresentation” that makes those involved in
the act responsible and accountable? What happens to the “Note”
once it is deposited in the bank and is converted to “money”? Are
there different kinds of money? There is money of exchange and
money of account. They are two very different things. See attached
(Exhibit “B” para 11), Affidavit of Expert Witness Walker Todd.
Walker Todd explains in his expert witness affidavit that the banks
actually do convert signatures into money. The definition of
“money” according to the Uniform Commercial Code: “Money” means a
medium of exchange authorized or adopted by a domestic or foreign
government and includes a monetary unit of account established by an
intergovernmental organization or by agreement between two or more nations. Money can actually be in different forms other than what we are
accustomed to thinking. When you sign your name on a
promissory note it becomes money whether you are talking a
mortgage note or a credit card application! Did the bankers ever
“disclose” this to us? Were we ever taught anything about this in
the school system in this country? Could it be that this whole idea
of being able to convert our signature to money is a “studied
concealment” or “misrepresentation” where those involved
become responsible if we are harmed by their actions? What
happens if you have signed a “Mortgage Note” and already paid for
your home and they come at a later date and foreclose and take it
from you? Would you consider yourself to be harmed in any way?
We will bring this up again very shortly but we need to look at the

other document that is signed at the “closing” that is of great
significance.

THE DEED OF TRUST

Why do we need a Deed of Trust? What exactly IS a Deed of
Trust or other similar “Security Instrument”? It spells out all the
details of the contract that you are signing at the “closing”,
including such things as insurance requirements, preservation and
maintenance and all of the financial details of how, when, where
and why you are going to make payments to the “lender” for years
and years. Wait a minute!!!!! Make payments to the “lender”????
Why do you have to make payments to the “lender”??? Didn’t we
just establish the fact that your house was paid for by YOU, with
your “Mortgage Note” that is converted to money by THE BANK
DEPOSITING IT? Is there something wrong with this picture? We
have just paid for our “home” but now we are told we have to sign a
Deed of Trust or similar “Security Instrument” that binds us to pay
the “lender” back? Pay the “lender” back for what? Did they loan
us any money? Remember the part about banks not being able to
loan “their or their depositors money” under FEDERAL LAW? What
about: “In the federal courts, it is well established that a national bank
has no power to lend its credit to another by becoming surety, indorser,
or guarantor for him.” Farmers and Miners Bank v. Bluefield Nat ‘l
Bank, 11 F 2d 83, 271 U.S. 669; “A national bank has no power to lend
its credit to any person or corporation.” Bowen v. Needles Nat. Bank, 94

F 925, 36 CCA 553, certiorari denied in 20 S.Ct 1024, 176 US 682, 44
LED 637?

What is happening here with this “Deed of Trust” or similar
“Security Instrument” that says we have to pay all this money back
and if we don’t, they can foreclose and take our home? Why do we
have to have this kind of agreement when we have already paid for
our home through our “Mortgage Note” which was converted to
money BY THE BANK? Could this possibly be another example of
“studied concealment or misrepresentation” where those involved
could be held accountable for their conduct? What happens to this
Deed of Trust or similar “Security Instrument” after we sign it?
Where does it go? Does it go into the vault for safekeeping like we
might think? See attached Exhibit “C” for substantially more
information.

WHO ARE THE OTHER PLAYERS?

We have already found out that the “Note” doesn’t go into the vault
for safe keeping but instead is deposited into an account at the
bank and becomes money. Where does the Note go then? This is
where things get VERY interesting because your “Mortgage Note” is
then used to access your Treasury Account (that you know nothing
about) and get credit in the amount of your “Mortgage Note” from
your “Prepaid Treasury Account”. If they process the “Note” and
get paid for it then they have received the funds from YOUR

account at Treasury to pay for YOUR home correct? They then turn
around and bundle the “Note” and sell it to investors on Wall Street
and get paid again! Now let’s see what happens to the “Deed of
Trust” or similar “Security Instrument” after you have signed it.
You may be quite surprised to know that not only does it not go
into “safekeeping” it is immediately SOLD as an INVESTMENT
SECURITY to one of any number of investors tied to Wall Street.
There is a ready, and waiting, market for all of the “mortgage
paper” that is produced by the banks. What happens is the “Deed
of Trust” or other similar “Security Instrument” is bundled and
SOLD to a buyer and the BANK GETS PAID FOR THE VALUE OF THE
MORTGAGE AGAIN!! Haven’t the bankers just transferred any risk
on that mortgage to someone else and they have their money?
That is a pretty slick way of doing things! They ALWAYS get their
money right away and everyone else connected to the transaction
has the liabilities! Is there something wrong with THIS picture?
How can it possibly be that the bank has now been paid three times
in the amount of your “purported” mortgage? How is it that you
still have to pay years and years on this “purported” loan? Was any
of this disclosed to you before you signed the “Deed of Trust” or
other similar “Security Instrument”? Would you have signed ANY
of those documents including the “Mortgage Note” if you knew that
this is what was actually happening? Do you think there were any
“copies” of the “Mortgage Note” and “Deed of Trust” or other
similar “Security Instrument” made during this process? Are those

“copies” just for the records to be put in a file somewhere or is
there another purpose for them?

CAN REPRODUCING A NOTE OR DEED OF TRUST BE
ILLEGAL?

We have already established that the “Mortgage Note” and the
“Deed of Trust” or other similar “Security Instrument” are
“Securities” by definition under the law. Securities are regulated
by the Securities and Exchange Commission which is an agency of
the Federal Government. There are very strict regulations about
what can and cannot be done with “Securities”. There are very
strict regulations that apply to the reproduction or “copying” of
“Securities”:

The Counterfeit Detection Act of 1992, Public Law 102-550, in Section 411 of Title 31 of the Code of Federal Regulations, permits color illustr

ations of U.S. currency provided: . The illustration is of a size less than three-fourths or more than one and one-ch part of the item illustrated

half, in linear dimension, of ea

. The illustration is one-sided All negatives, plates, positives, digitized storage medium, graphic files, magnetic medium, optical storage devices, and any other thing used in the making of the illustration that contain an image of the illustration or any part thereof are destroyed and/or deleted or erased after their final use

Other

Obligations and Securities
. Photographic or other likenesses of other United States obligations and securities and foreign currencies are permissible for any non-fraudulent purpose, provided the items are reproduced in black and white and are less

than three-quarters or greater than one-and-one-half times the size, in linear dimension, of any part of the original item being reproduced. Negatives and plates used in making the likenesses must be destroyed after their use for the purpose for which they were made.

Title 18 USC § 472 Uttering counterfeit obligations or securities
Whoever, with intent to defraud, passes, utters, publishes, or sells, or attempts to pass, utter, publish, or sell, or with like intent brings into the United States or keeps in possession or conceals any falsely made, forged, counterfeited, or altered obligation or other security of the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.

Title 18 USC § 473 Dealing in counterfeit obligations or securities Whoever buys, sells, exchanges, transfers, receives, or delivers any false, forged, counterfeited, or altered obligation or other security of the United States, with the intent that the same be passed, published, or used as true and genuine, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.

Title 18 USC § 474 Plates, stones, or analog, digital, or electronic

images for counterfeiting obligations or securities Whoever, with intent to defraud, makes, executes, acquires, scans, captures, records, receives, transmits, reproduces, sells, or has in such person’s control, custody, or ossession, an analog, digital, or electronic image of any obligation or other security f the United States is guilty of a class B felony.

p

o

Are these regulations always adhered to by the “lender” when
they have possession of these “original” SECURITIES and make
reproductions of them before they are “sold to investors? How
much has been in the media in the past 2 years about people
demanding to see the “wet ink signature Note” when there is a
foreclosure action initiated against them? You hear it all the time.
Why is that such a big issue? Shouldn’t the “lender” be able to just
bring the “Note” and the “Deed of Trust” or similar “Security
Instrument” to the Court and show that they have the original

documents and are the “holder in due course” and therefore have a
legal right to foreclose? To foreclose they must have BOTH the
“Mortgage Note” and “Deed of Trust” or other similar “Security
Instrument” ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS in their possession at the time
the foreclosure action is initiated. Furthermore, IS there a real
honest to goodness obligation to be collected on?

Why is it that there is such a problem with “lost Mortgage Notes”
as is claimed by numerous lenders that are trying to foreclose
today? How could it be that there could be so many “lost”
documents all of a sudden? Could it be that the documents weren’t
really lost at all, but were actually turned into a source of revenue
that was never disclosed as being a part of the transaction? To
believe that so many “original” documents could be legitimately
“lost” in such a short period of time stretches the credibility of such
claims beyond belief. Could this be the reason that MERS (Mortage
Electronic Registration Systems) was formed in the 1990’s as a way
to supposedly “transfer ownership of a mortgage” without having
to have the “original documents” that would be required to be
presented to the various county recorders? Could it be they KNEW
THEY WOULDN’T HAVE THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS FOR
RECORDING and had to devise a system to get around that
requirement? When the foreclosure action is filed in the court the
attorney for the purported “party of interest”, usually the “lender”
who is foreclosing, files a “COPY” of the “Deed of Trust” or similar
“Investment Security” with the Complaint to begin foreclosure

proceedings. Is that “COPY” of the “Security Instrument” within the
“regulations” of Federal Law under 18 U.S.C. § 474? Is it usually the
same size or very nearly the same size as the original document?
Yes it is and without question it is a COUNTERFEIT SECURITY! Who
was it that produced that COUNTERFEIT SECURITY? Who was
involved in taking that COUNTERFEIT SECURITY to the Court to file
the foreclosure action? Who is it that is now legally in possession
of that COUNTERFEIT SECURITY? Has everyone from the original
“lender” down to the Clerk of the Court where the foreclosure is
now being litigated been in possession or is currently in possession
of that COUNTERFEIT SECURITY? What about the Trustees who are
involved in the process of selling foreclosed properties in nonjudicial
states? What about the fact that there is no judicial
proceeding in those states where the documentation purported to
be legal and proper to bring a foreclosure action can be verified
without expensive litigation by the alleged “borrower”? All the
trustee has to do is send a letter to the alleged “borrower” stating
they are in default and can sell their property at public auction. It
is just ASSUMED that they have the “ORIGINAL” documents in their
possession as required by law. In reality, in almost every situation,
they do NOT!!! They are using a COUNTERFEIT SECURITY as the
basis to foreclose on a property that was paid for by the person
who signed the “Mortgage Note” at the closing table that was
converted to money by the bank. When it is demanded they
produce the actual “original signed documents” they almost always
refuse to do so and ask the Court to “take their word for it” that

they have
. They have,
instead, submitted a COUNTERFEIT SECURITY to the Court as their
“proof of claim” to attempt to unjustly enrich themselves through a
blatantly fraudulent foreclosure action. One often cited example of
this was the decision handed down by U. S. Federal District Court
Judge Christopher A. Boyko of Ohio, who on October 31, 2007
dismissed 14 foreclosure actions at one time with scathing
footnote comments about the actions of the Plaintiffs and their
attorneys. See (Exhibit “E”). Not long after that came the dismissal
of 26 foreclosure cases in Ohio by U.S. District Court Judge Thomas
M. Rose who referenced the Boyko ruling in his decision. See
(Exhibit “F”). How many other judges have not been so brave as to
stand on the principles of law as Judges Boyko and Rose did, but
need to start doing so TODAY?
BOTH of the original documents which are absolutely
required to be in their possession to begin foreclosure actions.
Almost every time the people that are being foreclosed on are able
to convince the Court (in judicial foreclosures) to demand that
those “original documents” be produced in Court by the Plaintiff,
the foreclosure action stops and it is obvious why that happens!
THEY DON’T HAVE THE “ORIGINAL” DOCUMENTS

Has any of this foreclosure activity crossed state lines in
communications or other activities? Have there been at least two
predicate acts of Fraud by the parties involved? Have the people
involved used any type of electronic communication in this Fraud
such as telephone, faxing or email? It is obvious that those

questions have to be answered with a resounding YES! If that is the
case, then the Fraud that has been discussed here falls under the
RICO statutes of Federal Law. Didn’t they eventually take down the
mob for Racketeering under RICO statutes years ago? Is it time to
take down the “NEW MOB” with RICO once again?

HOW RAMPANT IS THIS FRAUD?

How could this kind of situation ever occur in this country?
Could it be that this whole entire process could be “studied
concealment or misrepresentation” where the parties involved are
responsible under the law for their conduct? Could it be that it is
no “accident” that so many “wet ink signature” Notes cannot be
produced to back up the foreclosure actions that are devastating
this country? Could it be that the overwhelming use of
COUNTERFEIT SECURITIES, as purported evidence of a debt in
foreclosure cases, is BY DESIGN and “studied concealment or
misrepresentation” so as to strip the people of this country of their
property and assets? Could it be that a VERY substantial number of
Banks, Mortgage Companies, Law Firms and Attorneys are guilty of
outright massive Fraud, not only against the people of this country,
but of massive Fraud on the Court as well because of this
COUNTERFEITING? How could one possibly come to any other
conclusion after learning the facts and understanding the law?
How many other people are implicated in this MASSIVE FRAUD
such as Trustees and Sheriffs that have sold literally millions of

homes after foreclosure proceedings based on these COUNTERFEIT
SECURITIES submitted as evidence of a purported obligation? How
many judges know about this Fraud happening right in their own
courtrooms and never did anything? How many of them have
actually been PAID for making judgments on foreclosures?
Wouldn’t that be a felony or at the very least, misprision of felony,
to know what is going on and not act to stop it or make it known to
authorities in a position to investigate and stop it?

How is it that so many banks could recover financially, so
rapidly, from the financial debacle of 200809,
with foreclosures
still running at record levels, and yet pay back taxpayer money that
was showered on them and do it so quickly? Could it be that when
they take back a property in foreclosure where they never risked
any money and actually were unjustly enriched in the previous
transaction, that it is easy to make huge sums by reselling that
property and then beginning the whole “Unconscionable” process
all over again with a new “borrower”? How is it that just three
years ago a loan was available to virtually almost anyone who
could “fog a mirror” with no documentation of income or ability to
repay a loan? Common sense makes you ask how “lenders” could
possibly take those kinds of risks. Could it be that the ability to
“repay a loan” was not an issue at all for the lenders because they
were going to get their profits immediately and risk absolutely
nothing at all? Could it be that, if anything, they stood to make
even more money if a person defaulted on the “alleged loan” in a

short period of time? They could literally obtain the property for
nothing other than some legal fees and court filing costs through
foreclosure. They could then resell the property and reap
additional unjust profits once again! One does not need to have
been a finance major in college to figure out what has been
happening once you are enlightened to the FACTS.

WHAT ACTIONS HAVE PEOPLE TAKEN TO AVOID LOSING
THEIR HOMES IN FORECLOSURE?

There have been a number of different actions taken by people
to keep from losing their homes in foreclosure. The first and most
widely used tactic is to demand that the party bringing the
foreclosure action does, in fact, have the standing to bring the
action. The most important issue of standing is whether that party
has actual possession of the “original wet ink signature”
documents from the closing showing they are the “holder in due
course”. As previously mentioned, in almost ALL cases the Plaintiff
bringing the action refuses to make these documents available for
inspection by the Defendant in the foreclosure action so they can,
in fact, determine the authenticity of those documents that are
claimed to be “original” and purportedly giving the legal right to
foreclose. The fact that the Courts allow this to happen repeatedly
without demanding the Plaintiff bring the ”wet ink signature
documents” into the court for inspection by the Defendant, begs
the question of whether some of the judiciary are involved in this

Fraud. Where is due process under the law for the Defendant when
the Plaintiff is NOT REQUIRED by the Court to meet that burden of
proof of standing, when demanded, to bring their action of
foreclosure?

One other option that has been used more and more frequently
in recent months to deal with foreclosure actions is the issuing of a
“Bonded Promissory Note” or “Bill of Exchange” as payment to the
alleged “lender” as satisfaction of any amounts allegedly owed by
the Defendant. As was earlier described, a “Note” is money and as
the banks demonstrated after the closing, it can be deposited in the
bank and converted to money. SOME of the “Bonded Promissory
Notes” and “Bills of Exchange” are, in fact, negotiated and credit is
given to the accounts specified and all turns out well. See (Exhibit
“B” para 12) The problem that has occurred is that MANY of the
“lenders” say that the “Bonded Promissory Notes” and “Bills of
Exchange” are bogus documents and are worthless and fraudulent
and they refuse to give credit for the amount of the “Note” they
receive as payment of an alleged debt even though they are given
specific instructions on how to negotiate the “Note”. Isn’t it
interesting that THEY can take a “Note” that THEY print and put
before you to sign at the closing table and deposit it in the bank
and it is converted to money immediately, but the “Note” that YOU
issue is worthless and fraudulent? The only difference is WHO
PRINTS THE NOTE!!!! They are both signed by the same
“borrower” and it is that person’s credit that backs that “Note”.

The “lenders” don’t want the people to know they can use your
“Prepaid Treasury Account”, just as the banks do without your
knowledge and consent. See (Exhibit “D”) for more information on
“Bills of Exchange”. The fact that SOME of the “Bonded Promissory
Notes” are negotiated and accounts are settled, proves beyond a
shadow of a doubt that they are legal SECURITIES just like the one
that the bank got from the “borrower” at the closing. Why then
aren’t ALL of the “Notes” processed and credit given to the accounts
and the foreclosure dismissed? Because by doing so you would be
lowering the National Debt and the bankers would make less
money!!!!

One very interesting thing that happens with these “Bonded
Promissory Notes” or “Bills of Exchange” that are submitted as
payment, is that they are VERY RARELY RETURNED TO THE ISSUER
yet credit is not given to the intended account. They are not
returned, and the issuer is told they are “bogus, fraudulent and
worthless” but they are NOT RETURNED! Why would someone
keep something that is allegedly “bogus, fraudulent and
worthless”? Could it be that they are NOT REALLY “BOGUS,
FRAUDULENT AND WORTHLESS” and the “lender” has, in fact,
actually negotiated them for YET EVEN MORE UNJUST
ENRICHMENT? That is exactly what happens in many instances.
There could be no other explanation for the failure to return the
allegedly “worthless” documents WHICH ARE ACTUALLY
SECURITIES!!! Does the fact that they keep the “Note” that was

submitted and refuse to credit the account that it was written to
satisfy, rise to the level of THEFT OF SECURITIES? This is just one
more example of the Fraud that is so obvious. This is but one more
example of the ruthless nature of those who would defraud the
people of this country.

CONCLUSIONS

One of the incredible aspects of this whole debacle is the fact
that the very people who are participants in this Fraud are victims
as well. How many bank employees, judges, court clerks, lawyers,
process servers, Sheriffs and others have mortgages? How many of
the people who work in law offices, Courthouses, Sheriffs
Departments and other entities that are directly involved in this
Fraud have been fraudulently foreclosed on themselves? How
many people in our military, law enforcement, firefighting and
medical fields have lost their homes to this Fraud? How many of
your friends or neighbors have lost their homes to these
fraudulent foreclosures? Everyone who has a mortgage is a VICTIM
of this fraud but some of the most honest, trusting, hardest
working and most dedicated people in this country have been the
biggest victims. Who are those who have been the major
beneficiaries of this massive Fraud? Those with the “superior
knowledge” that enables them to take advantage of another’s
ignorance of the law to deceive them by “studied concealment or
misrepresentation”. This group of beneficiaries includes many on
Wall Street, large investors, and most notoriously, the bankers at
the top and the lawyers who work so hard to enhance their profits

and protect the Fraud by them from being exposed. The time has
now come to make those having superior knowledge who HAVE
taken advantage of another’s ignorance of the law to deceive them
by studied concealment or misrepresentation to be held
responsible for that conduct. This isn’t just an idea. It is THE LAW
and it is time to enforce it starting with the criminal aspect of the
fraud! Under the doctrine of “Respondeat Superior” the people at
the top of these organizations are responsible for the actions of
those in their employ. That is where the investigations and arrests
need to start.

What is it going to take to put a stop to the destruction of this
country and the lives of the people who live here? It is going to
take an uprising of the people of this country, as a whole, to finally
say that they have had enough. The information presented here is
but one part of the beginning of that uprising and the beginning of
the end of the Fraud upon the people of America. It is obvious, as
has been pointed out here, with supporting evidence, that Fraud is
rampant. You now know the story and can no longer say you are
totally uninformed about this subject. This is only an outline of
what needs to, and will, become common knowledge to the people
and law enforcement agencies in this country. If you are in law
enforcement it is YOUR DUTY to take what you have been given
here and move forward with your own intense investigation and
root out the Fraud and stop the theft of people’s homes. Your

failure to do so would make you an accessory to the fraud through
your inaction now that you have been noticed of what is occurring.

If you are an attorney and receive this information it would do
you well to take it to heart, and understand there is no place for
your participation in this Fraud and if you participate you will
likely become liable for substantial damages, if not more severe
consequences such as prison. If you are in the judiciary you would
do well to start following the letter of the law if you haven’t been,
and start making ALL of those in your Court do likewise, lest you
find yourself looking for employment as so many others are, if you
are not incarcerated as a result of your participation in the fraud.
If you are part of the law enforcement community that enforces
legal matters regarding foreclosure you would do well to make
sure that ALL things have been done legally and properly rather
than just taking the position “I am just doing my job” and turn a
blind eye to what you now know. If you are a banker, you must
know that you are now going to start being held accountable for
the destruction you have wreaked on this country. You have every
right to be, and should be, afraid…….very afraid. If you are one of
the ruthless foreclosure lawyers that has prayed on the numerous
people who have lost their homes, you need to be afraid also. Very
VERY afraid. When people learn the truth about what you have
done to them you can expect to see retaliation for what you have
done. People are going to want to see those who defrauded them
brought to justice. These are not threats by any stretch of the

imagination. These are very simple observations and the study of
human behavior shows us that when people find out they have
been defrauded in such a grand manner as this, they tend to
become rather angry and search for those who perpetrated the
fraud upon them. The foreclosure lawyers and the bankers will be
standing clearly in their sights.

The question of WHERE DOES THE FRAUD BEGIN has been
answered. It began right at the closing table and was perpetuated
all the way to the loss of property through foreclosure or the
incredible payment of 20 or 30 years of payments and interest by
the alleged “borrower” to those who would conspire to commit
Fraud, collusion and counterfeiting and practice “studied
concealment or misrepresentation” for their own unjust
enrichment.

The simplest of analogies: What would happen if you were to
make a copy of a $100 Federal Reserve Note and go to Walmart and
attempt to use it to fraudulently acquire items that you wanted?
You more than likely would be arrested and charged with
counterfeiting under Title 18 USC § 474 and go to prison. What is
the difference, other than the magnitude of the fraud, between that
scenario and someone who makes a copy of a mortgage security,
and using it through foreclosure, attempts to fraudulently acquire
a property? Shouldn’t they be treated exactly the same under the
law? The answer is obvious and now it is starting to happen.

Title 18 USC § 474

Whoever, with intent to defraud, makes, executes,
acquires, scans, captures, records, receives, transmits,
reproduces, sells, or has in such person’s control, custody,
or possession, an analog, digital, or electronic image of any
obligation or other security of the United States is guilty of
a class B felony.

“Fraud vitiates the most solemn Contracts, documents and
even judgments” [U.S. vs. Throckmorton, 98 US 61, at pg.
65].

“It is not necessary for rescission of a contract that the
party making the misrepresentation should have known
that it was false, but recovery is allowed even though
misrepresentation is innocently made, because it would be
unjust to allow one who made false representations, even
innocently, to retain the fruits of a bargain induced by
such representations.” [Whipp v. Iverson, 43 Wis 2d 166].

“Any false representation of material facts made with
knowledge of falsity and with intent that it shall be acted
on by another in entering into contract, and which is so
acted upon, constitutes ‘fraud,’ and entitles party deceived
to avoid contract or recover damages.” Barnsdall Refining
Corn. v. Birnam Wood Oil Co. 92 F 26 817.

Exhibit B Walker Todd_Note Expert Witness

Exhibit D Mem of Law Bills of Exch

Exhibit A Deed Trust Tenn

Exhibit C Mem of Law Bank Fraud_Foreclosures

Exhibit E Boyko_Foreclosure Case

Challenges to Foreclosure Docs Reach a Fever Pitch

American Banker | Wednesday, June 16, 2010

By Kate Berry

Correction: An earlier version of this story misidentified the court
where Judge J. Michael Traynor presides. It is a Florida state court,
not a federal one. An editing error was to blame.

The backlash is intensifying against banks and mortgage servicers that
try to foreclose on homes without all their ducks in a row.

Because the notes were often sold and resold during the boom years, many
financial companies lost track of the documents. Now, legal officials
are accusing companies of forging the documents needed to reclaim the
properties.

On Monday, the Florida Attorney General’s Office said it was
investigating the use of “bogus assignment” documents by Lender
Processing Services Inc. and its former parent, Fidelity National
Financial Inc. And last week a state judge in Florida ordered a hearing
to determine whether M&T Bank Corp. should be charged with fraud after
it changed the assignment of a mortgage note for one borrower three
separate times.

“Mortgage assignments are being created out of whole cloth just for the
purposes of showing a transfer from one entity to another,” said James
Kowalski Jr., an attorney in Jacksonville, Fla., who represents the
borrower in the M&T case.

“Banks got away from very basic banking rules because they securitized
millions of loans and moved them so quickly,” Kowalski said.

In many cases, Kowalski said, it has become impossible to establish when
a mortgage was sold, and to whom, so the servicers are trying to
recreate the paperwork, right down to the stamps that financial
companies use to verify when a note has changed hands.

Some mortgage processors are “simply ordering stamps from stamp makers,”
he said, and are “using those as proof of mortgage assignments after the
fact.”

Such alleged practices are now generating ire from the bench.

In the foreclosure case filed by M&T in February 2009, the bank
initially claimed it lost the underlying mortgage note, and then later
claimed the mortgage was owned by First National Bank of Nevada, which
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. shut down in 2008, before the
foreclosure had been started.

M&T then claimed Wells Fargo & Co. owned the note, “contradicting all of
its previous claims,” according to Circuit Court Judge J. Michael
Traynor, who ordered the evidentiary hearing last week into whether M&T
perpetrated a fraud on the court.

“The court has been misled by the plaintiff from the beginning,” Judge
Traynor said in his order, which also dismissed M&T’s foreclosure action
with prejudice.

The Marshall Watson law firm in Fort Lauderdale, Fla., which represents
M&T in the case, declined to comment and the bank said it could not
comment.

In a notice on its website, the Florida attorney general said it is
examining whether Docx, an Alpharetta, Ga., unit of Lender Processing
Services, forged documents so foreclosures could be processed more
quickly.

“These documents are used in court cases as ‘real’ documents of
assignment and presented to the court as so, when it actually appears
that they are fabricated in order to meet the demands of the institution
that does not, in fact, have the necessary documentation to foreclose
according to law,” the notice said.

Docx is the largest lien release processor in the United States working
on behalf of banks and mortgage lenders.

Peter T. Sadowski, an executive vice president and general counsel at
Fidelity National in Fort Lauderdale, said that more than a year ago his
company began requiring that its clients provide all paperwork before
the company would process title claims.

Michelle Kersch, a spokeswoman for Lender Processing Services, said the
reference on the Florida attorney general’s website to “bogus
assignments” referred to documents in which Docx used phrases like
“bogus assignee” as placeholders when attorneys did not provide specific
pieces of information.

“Unfortunately, on occasion, incomplete documents were inadvertently
recorded before the missing information was obtained,” Kersch said. “LPS
regrets these errors and the use of this particular placeholder
phrasing.”

The company, which was spun off from Fidelity National two years ago, is
cooperating with the attorney general and conducting its own internal
investigation.

Lender Processing Services disclosed in its annual report in February
that federal prosecutors were reviewing the business processes of Docx.
The company said it was cooperating with that investigation.

“This is systemic,” said April Charney, a senior staff attorney at
Jacksonville Area Legal Aid and a member of the Florida Supreme Court’s
foreclosure task force.

“Banks can’t show ownership for many of these securitized loans,”
Charney continued. “I call them empty-sack trusts, because in the rush
to securitize, the originating lender failed to check the paper trial
and now they can’t collect.”

In Florida, Georgia, Maryland and other states where the foreclosure
process must be handled through the courts, hundreds of borrowers have
challenged lenders’ rights to take their homes. Some judges have
invalidated mortgages, giving properties back to borrowers while lenders
appeal.

In February, the Florida state Supreme Court set a new standard
stipulating that before foreclosing, a lender had to verify it had all
the proper documents. Lenders that cannot produce such papers can be
fined for perjury, the court said.

Kowalski said the bigger problem is that mortgage servicers are working
“in a vacuum,” handing out foreclosure assignments to third-party firms
such as LPS and Fidelity.

“There’s no meeting to get everybody together and make sure they have
their ducks in a row to comply with these very basic rules that banks
set up many years ago,” Kowalski said. “The disconnect occurs not just
between units within the banks, but among the servicers, their bank
clients and the lawyers.”

He said the banking industry is “being misserved,” because mortgage
servicers and the lawyers they hire to represent them in foreclosure
proceedings are not prepared.

“We’re tarring banks that might obviously do a decent job, and the banks
are complicit because they hired the servicers,” Kowalski said.

Tort damges for Wrongful Foreclosure

It will be interesting to see how the damages in tort cases develop with the holding in the Mabry case.The case holds that tender is not necessary. Most likely contract damages would be waived because the value of the property lost most likely is less than the loan. Soooo…. whats left tort damage. In tort what is the value of a case where the lender refuses to, and factually fails, to comply with 2923.5 and in good faith negotiate with a homeowner. Bad Faith ??? punitive ??? Class action tort ??? intentional infliction of emotional distress??? what’s more stressful than being evicted ??? I have one client who had to undress in front of a Marshall so she could be put out of her home !!!

Munger v. Moore (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 1 , 89 Cal.Rptr. 323
[Civ. No. 25853. Court of Appeals of California, First Appellate District, Division One. September 3, 1970.]

MAYNARD MUNGER, JR., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ROBERT MOORE, Defendant and Appellant

(Opinion by Molinari, P. J., with Sims and Elkington, JJ., concurring.) [11 Cal.App.3d 2]

COUNSEL

Bruce Oneto for Defendant and Appellant.

Field, DeGoff & Rieman and Sidney F. DeGoff for Plaintiff and Respondent. [11 Cal.App.3d 5]

OPINION

MOLINARI, P. J.

Defendant appeals from a judgment in the sum of $30,000 plus accrued interest entered in favor of plaintiff after a trial by the court upon a supplemental complaint for tortious damages for wrongfully effecting a trustee’s sale of a parcel of real property. fn. 1

The facts, essentially undisputed, are as follows: In 1959 defendant was the owner of a parcel of unimproved real property situated in Santa Clara County. Defendant exchanged such property with Mr. and Mrs. Atwill for a parcel in Los Angeles. The Atwills then sold the Santa Clara property to Geld, Inc. Geld gave the Atwills and defendant notes and executed a deed of trust as security. Defendant’s note was for $13,393.41, while the Atwills’ was for $36,606.59. Thus, the total encumbrance against the property was $50,000. Valley Title Company (hereinafter “Valley”), a codefendant below, was named trustee.

Geld, Inc. then granted the subject property to one Reichert. Reichert, who intended to build an apartment complex on the parcel, executed a second deed of trust in favor of Home Foundation Savings and Loan (hereafter “Home”) as security for a $283,000 building loan from the latter. Shortly thereafter, the Atwills and defendant agreed with Home to subordinate their deed of trust to that of Home. Accordingly, the Atwill-defendant deed of trust, although first in time, became second in priority.

Plaintiff then entered the picture by lending Reichert some $15,000 for construction of the apartment building. This loan was represented by a promissory note in the face value of $18,000 and was secured by a third deed of trust on the subject parcel. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff advanced an additional sum of $10,000 to Reichert to be used to defray costs in the construction of said apartment building. In exchange for this loan plaintiff received a grant deed to the property from Reichert, but gave Reichert an option to repurchase the property for the sum of $25,000.

Subsequently, the payments on the Atwill-defendant note became in default. Accordingly, defendant caused to be published a notice of default and intent to sell. Apprised of such default notice, plaintiff duly and timely tendered to Valley the sum of $4,000 representing the sum needed [11 Cal.App.3d 6] to cure the default. Contrary to its advice to defendant and based upon his insistence, Valley refused plaintiff’s tender. Defendant advised Valley that the note to Home, fn. 2 which was secured by the first deed of trust, was also in default and therefore plaintiff’s tender was an insufficient cure of the default. Accordingly, the trustee’s sale was had on May 22, 1963, and defendant, along with the Atwills, purchased the property at such sale for $57,920.94. Defendant held the property for several years and in 1965 “exchanged” the property for a price of $475,000.

On appeal defendant makes two contentions: (1) That the trial court used the wrong standard for measuring damages; and (2) that in any event there was no evidentiary support for the court’s finding as to damages. We observe here that no contention is made that damages may not be assessed where a trustee illegally, fraudulently or oppressively sells property under a power of sale contained in a deed of trust. We note that in California the traditional method by which such a sale is attacked is by a suit in equity to set aside the sale. (See Taliaferro v. Crola, 152 Cal.App.2d 448, 449-450 [313 P.2d 136]; Crummer v. Whitehead, 230 Cal.App.2d 264, 266, 268 [40 Cal.Rptr. 826]; Central Nat. Bank v. Bell, 5 Cal.2d 324, 328 [54 P.2d 1107].)

The only California case which has come to our attention involving an analogous situation is Murphy v. Wilson, 153 Cal.App.2d 132 [314 P.2d 507]. In that case the plaintiff and the defendant entered into an agreement whereby the defendant loaned $50,000 to the plaintiff who, pursuant to the agreement, placed a bill of sale to and chattel mortgage on certain personalty and a deed to his home in escrow and agreed that if he did not pay the sum of $75,000 to the defendant before a certain date the conveyances would go to the defendant. The defendant subsequently took possession of the property and sold it. The plaintiff then brought a declaratory relief action to have the conveyances adjudged to be mortgages. The trial court found that the agreement was in fact a mortgage loan and that since the defendant had not foreclosed the chattel mortgage and had sold the home outright he was liable to the plaintiff for damages. (At p. 134.) The reviewing court, although it disagreed with the computation of the damages, upheld the trial court’s determination that the plaintiff was entitled to damages. The appellate court held that the defendant had converted the property to his own use and that he was required to pay to the plaintiff the fair market value of the property converted as of the date he took it into his possession together with interest on the value of the property converted. (At pp. 135-136.) [11 Cal.App.3d 7]

In analyzing the holding in Murphy we observe that it makes no distinction between the real and personal property and holds that both had been converted. We note here that it is generally acknowledged that conversion is a tort that may be committed only with relation to personal property and not real property. (See Graner v. Hogsett, 84 Cal.App.2d 657, 662 [191 P.2d 497]; Reynolds v. Lerman, 138 Cal.App.2d 586, 591 [292 P.2d 559]; Vuich v. Smith, 140 Cal.App. 453, 455 [35 P.2d 365]; 48 Cal.Jur.2d, Trover and Conversion, § 8; but see Katz v. Enos, 68 Cal.App.2d 266, 269 [156 P.2d 461] where an action was brought for what was there stated as an action “to recover damages for the alleged wrongful conversion by her of 42 acres of land” and damages were assessed.) fn. 3

Since conversion is a tort which applies to personal property, we disagree with the Murphy case to the extent that it purports to indicate that there may be a conversion of real property. fn. 4 We are inclined, however, to believe that with respect to real property the Murphy case was articulating a rule that has been applied in other jurisdictions. [1] That rule is that a trustee or mortgagee may be liable to the trustor or mortgagor for damages sustained where there has been an illegal, fraudulent or wilfully oppressive sale of property under a power of sale contained in a mortgage or deed of trust. (See Davenport v. Vaughn, 193 N.C. 646 [137 S.E. 714, 716]; Sandler v. Green, 287 Mass. 404 [192 N.E. 39, 40]; Edwards v. Smith (Mo.) 322 S.W.2d 770, 776; Dugan v. Manchester Federal Sav. & Loan Assn., 92 N.H. 44 [23 A.2d 873, 876]; Harper v. Interstate Brewery Co., 168 Ore. 26 [120 P.2d 757, 764]; Black v. Burd (Tex. Civ. App.) 255 S.W.2d 553, 556; Holman v. Ryon (D.C. App.) 56 F.2d 307, 310-311; Royall v. Yudelevit, 268 F.2d 577, 580 [106 App. D.C. 1].) fn. 5 This rule of liability is also applicable in California, we believe, upon the basic principle of tort liability declared in the Civil Code that every person is bound by law not to injure the person or property of another or infringe on any of his rights. (Civ. Code, § 1708; see Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728 [69 Cal.Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912, 29 A.L.R.3d 1316].)

Accordingly, since the subject tort liability inures to the benefit of a [11 Cal.App.3d 8] mortgagor or trustor, it also inures to the benefit of the successor in interest to the trust property. [2] Pursuant to Civil Code section 2924c, such successor has the statutory right to cure a default of the obligation secured by a deed of trust or mortgage within the time therein prescribed. Plaintiff, therefore, as Reichert’s successor in interest in the trust property was entitled to tender the amount due to cure any default in the obligation to defendant and to institute the instant action for damages for the illegal sale which resulted from the failure to accept the timely tender.

Before proceeding to discuss the proper measure of damages we observe that in the instant case plaintiff has brought the instant action against both the trustee and the beneficiary of the deed of trust. [3] Since the trustee acts as an agent for the beneficiary, there can be no question that liability for damages may be imposed against the beneficiary where, as here, the trustee in exercising the power of sale is acting as the agent of the beneficiary. (See Davenport v. Vaughn, supra, 137 S.E. 714, 716; Edwards v. Smith, supra, 322 S.W.2d 770, 777.) In the instant case the trial court made unchallenged findings that the trustee Valley was acting as the agent for and pursuant to the instructions and directions of defendant and the Atwills, the beneficiaries of the subject deed of trust.

Adverting to the measure of damages we observe that defendant asserts that the proper measure in the instant case is that which applies to damages occasioned by the wrongful loss of security. fn. 6 In this context defendant argues that plaintiff has only suffered a loss of security for the promissory notes executed and delivered by Reichert to plaintiff. In essence defendant is contending that the deed absolute in form from Reichert to Plaintiff was in fact a mortgage because it was intended as security for a debt. (See Civ. Code, § 2924.) In considering this contention we note initially that the trial court found that plaintiff purchased the subject property from Reichert and that such purchase was evidenced by a grant deed given for a valuable consideration.

The record is silent as to whether the issue was tendered below that defendant had no standing to make the claim that the subject deed was in fact a mortgage. [4] As we apprehend the rule declaring that a deed absolute may be shown to have been intended as a mortgage, it applies only to the parties to the transaction and those claiming under them. (See Jackson v. Lodge, 36 Cal. 28, 40 [overruled on another ground by Hughes v. Davis, 40 Cal. 117]; Ahern v. McCarthy, 107 Cal. 382, 383-384 [11 Cal.App.3d 9] [40 P. 482]; Taylor v. McClain, 60 Cal. 651, 652; Bell v. Pleasant, 145 Cal. 410, 417-418 [78 P. 957]; 33 Cal.Jur.2d, Mortgages and Trust Deeds, §§ 54, 56 and 57.) Accordingly, Reichert and those claiming under him were entitled to assert that the deed was in fact a mortgage and that plaintiff acquired merely a lien. They could not, however, make this assertion against an innocent purchaser or encumbrancer from plaintiff since such purchaser or encumbrancer was entitled, on the theory of estoppel, to claim that he was the real owner of the property. (See Civ. Code, § 2925; Carpenter v. Lewis, 119 Cal. 18, 21 [50 P. 925]; Bell v. Pleasant, supra; Jackson v. Lodge, supra.) [5] Here defendant was not claiming under any of the parties to the subject transaction, but he was a stranger to it. Moreover, since defendant’s encumbrance was prior in time and superior to Reichert’s interest, defendant’s interest was unaffected by the transaction between Reichert and plaintiff.

Assuming arguendo that defendant has standing to challenge the nature of the deed from Reichert to plaintiff, our inquiry would be directed, in view of the court’s finding, to whether the subject instrument was in fact a deed and to whether this finding is supported by substantial evidence. We shall proceed to do so mindful that in making this determination our power begins and ends in ascertaining whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the finding. (Green Trees Enterprises, Inc. v. Palm Springs Alpine Estates, Inc., 66 Cal.2d 782, 784 [59 Cal.Rptr. 141, 427 P.2d 805]; Brewer v. Simpson, 53 Cal.2d 567, 583 [2 Cal.Rptr. 609, 349 P.2d 289].)

[6] We first observe that Civil Code section 1105 provides that “A fee simple title is presumed to be intended to pass by a grant of real property, unless it appears from the grant that a lesser estate was intended.” This statute establishes a rebutable presumption. (Evid. Code, § 602.) Such presumption is one affecting the burden of proof since it is a presumption which, in addition to the policy of facilitating the trial of actions, is established to implement the public policy favoring the stability of titles to property. (See Evid. Code, § 604, and Law Revision Com. comment thereto.) [7] Accordingly, the effect of this presumption was to impose upon defendant the burden of proving the nonexistence of the presumed fact, i.e., that the grant deed conveyed a fee simple title to plaintiff. (See Evid. Code, § 606.) fn. 7 This burden required that defendant [11 Cal.App.3d 10] produce clear and convincing proof. (Beeler v. American Trust Co., 24 Cal.2d 1, 7 [147 P.2d 583]; Spataro v. Domenico, 96 Cal.App.2d 411, 413 [216 P.2d 32]; Cavanaugh v. High, 182 Cal.App.2d 714, 718 [6 Cal.Rptr. 525]; Borton v. Joslin, supra, 88 Cal.App. 515, 520 [263 P. 1033]; see Legislative Committee comment to Evid. Code, § 606.) [8] The question whether the evidence offered to change the ostensible character of the instrument carries that much weight is for the trial judge and not the court of review. (Beeler v. American Trust Co., supra; Cavanaugh v. High, supra; Spataro v. Domenico, supra.) “On appeal the question is governed by the substantial evidence rule like any other issue of fact.” (Cavanaugh v. High, supra, at p. 718; Beeler v. American Trust Co., supra; Borton v. Joslin, supra.)

[9] In the present case there is conflicting evidence on the cardinal issue of the intent of the parties in deeding the property. Although there was testimony that plaintiff took the grant deed as better security for his loan, plaintiff testified that when he made the second loan to Reichert, plaintiff, at Reichert’s instructions, paid the proceeds of the loan directly to the contractor who was constructing the apartment building; that Reichert gave plaintiff a grant deed which he recorded; and that Reichert’s indebtedness to plaintiff was cancelled. Under familiar appellate principles we must, where there is conflicting evidence, accept as established that evidence which is favorable to plaintiff. That evidence is sufficient to sustain the trial court’s finding upon the conclusion that defendant has failed to overcome by clear and convincing evidence the presumption which arises from the face of the deed. We note here that an important consideration is whether plaintiff’s notes evidencing the indebtedness from Reichert survived the conveyance. (See Borton v. Joslin, supra, 88 Cal. App. 515, 518; Cavanaugh v. High, supra, 182 Cal.App.2d 714, 718; Spataro v. Domenico, supra, 96 Cal.App.2d 411, 416.) Here, there was evidence adduced by plaintiff’s testimony that there was no survival of the indebtedness upon the execution and delivery of the grant deed. This circumstance is strongly indicative of a grant rather than a mortgage. (Beeler v. American Trust Co., supra, 24 Cal.2d 1, 17-18; Cavanaugh v. High, supra, 182 Cal.App.2d 714, 718; Workmon Constr. Co. v. Weirick, supra, 223 Cal.App.2d 487, 492.)

Having determined that plaintiff was not a security holder but the owner of the subject property, we proceed to inquire as to the proper standard for measuring plaintiff’s loss. In making this inquiry we first note that the trial court found that defendant, in instructing Valley to foreclose upon the subject real property, did so intentionally, wrongfully and pursuant to an intentional design with regard to plaintiff and that because of such conduct plaintiff lost all of his right, title and interest in [11 Cal.App.3d 11] said property, damaging plaintiff in the sum of $30,000. The trial court also found that the fair market value of the subject property on the date of the foreclosure was $30,000 more than the composite liens and encumbrances against it on that date.

Civil Code section 3333 provides that the measure of damages for a wrong other than breach of contract will be an amount sufficient to compensate the plaintiff for all detriment, foreseeable or otherwise, proximately occasioned by the defendant’s wrong. [10] In applying this measure it must be noted that the primary object of an award of damages in a civil action, and the fundamental theory or principle on which it is based is just compensation or indemnity for the loss or injury sustained by the plaintiff and no more. (Estate of De Laveaga, 50 Cal.2d 480, 488 [326 P.2d 129].) Accordingly, where a mortgagee or trustee makes an unauthorized sale under a power of sale he and his principal are liable to the mortgagor for the value of the property at the time of the sale in excess of the mortgages and liens against said property. fn. 8 (Murphy v. Wilson, supra, 153 Cal.App.2d 132, 135-136; Edwards v. Smith, supra, 322 S.W.2d 770, 777; Silver v. First Nat. Bank, 108 N.H. 390 [236 A.2d 493, 495]; Black v. Burd, supra, 255 S.W.2d 553, 556-557.) In Murphy this rule was applied when the court awarded the plaintiff his equity in the home sold by the defendant.

[11] We turn now to the question whether there was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding of damages. Defendant points out that the composite of the two prior encumbrances amounted to $411,562.74, that is, $352,562.74 plus $9,000 interest on the Home obligation and $50,000 on the defendant-Atwill obligation. This computation is conceded to be correct. It is defendant’s contention, therefore, that such aggregate sum exceeds the sum of $408,000 which plaintiff’s expert appraiser testified was the fair market value of the property. Accordingly, he argues that since this valuation was the highest appraisal and the fair market value of the property was less than the sum of encumbrances, there was no evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the fair market value at the time of the sale exceeded by $30,000 the sum of the outstanding encumbrances. This contention is without merit since it assumes that the trial court was bound to accept the valuation placed upon the property by plaintiff’s appraiser. We observe that although there was testimony by defendant’s [11 Cal.App.3d 12] appraiser that on the date of the foreclosure sale the fair market value of the property was $360,000 and that defendant himself testified that on said date said value was $400,000, there was also evidence from which the trial court could infer that on the subject date the fair market value of the property was approximately $450,000.

When defendant testified that the fair market value was $400,000 on the date of the foreclosure, he was cross-examined as to whether this was not in fact his valuation on the date of the recordation of the notice of completion of the apartment building, since in his deposition defendant had so testified. Defendant responded that the value on the date the notice of completion was recorded was approximately $350,000 and explained that in his deposition he understood the reference to the notice of completion to mean the completion of the building so that it was ready for occupancy. The trial court was not required to accept this explanation but was justified in believing that from the time the notice of completion was recorded and the foreclosure sale the value of the building had enhanced approximately $50,000. Moreover, the trial court was justified in believing, in the light of defendant’s experience, fn. 9 that when he testified that the value of the property was $400,000 at the time the notice of completion was filed he understood the meaning of “notice of completion.” Under the state of the record the trial court would have been justified in concluding that plaintiff’s equity was the difference between $450,000 and $411,562.74 or $38,437.26, and a finding to that effect would have been supportable. The trial court, however, found this equity to be the sum of $30,000 apparently on the basis that defendant’s valuations were approximations. fn. 10 Under the circumstances defendant cannot complain.

The judgment is affirmed.

Sims, J., and Elkington, J., concurred.

­FN 1. Defendant also appealed from that portion of the judgment in the sum of $4,500 entered in favor of defendant and cross-complainant Valley Title Company, a corporation. We have been advised that the matter has been settled with respect to Valley and that it is no longer a party to the proceedings. Defendant has not argued or presented any points with respect to any issues having to do with Valley. Accordingly, under the circumstances, although no formal dismissal as to Valley has been filed, we deem the appeal as to Valley abandoned. (See White v. Shultis, 177 Cal.App.2d 641, 648 [2 Cal.Rptr. 414].)

­FN 2. Home, in the meantime, had made an additional advance under the terms of the first deed of trust in the sum of $69,562.74, making the total sum loaned by Home $352,562.74.

­FN 3. Katz does not discuss whether the tort of conversion may be committed with relation to real property but apparently assumed that it was the subject of conversion since the issue was not tendered.

­FN 4. No petition for a hearing in the Supreme Court was made in the Murphy case.

­FN 5. We note that in 59 C.J.S., Mortgages, section 603, subdivision a, footnote 91 (1970 Cum. Annual Pocket Part) the Murphy case is cited as authority for this principle which is there stated thusly: “Where a sale by a mortgagee or by a trustee in a deed of trust is illegal, fraudulent, or willfully oppressive, the mortgagor may maintain an action for damages against the mortgagee or trustee, …” (At p. 1068.)

­FN 6. We observe in passing that as defendant properly asserts, the proper standard for wrongful deprivation of security is the fair market value at the time of sale less outstanding encumbrances and/or taxes due at such time, not in any event to exceed the amount due plaintiff on his loans. (See Howe v. City Title Ins. Co., 255 Cal.App.2d 85, 87 [63 Cal.Rptr. 119]; Stephans v. Herman, 225 Cal.App.2d 671, 673-674 [37 Cal.Rptr. 746].)

­FN 7. A deed absolute on its face may be shown to be a mortgage by parol evidence of such contradictory intent. (Workmon Constr. Co. v. Weirick, 223 Cal.App.2d 487, 490 [36 Cal.Rptr. 17]; Greene v. Colburn, 160 Cal.App.2d 355, 358 [325 P.2d 148]; Borton v. Joslin, 88 Cal.App. 515, 520 [263 P. 1033]; see Civ. Code, §§ 1105, 2925.)

­FN 8. We observe here that this is the same measure of damages for loss of security urged by defendant, except that in such case the damages may not exceed the amount due on the note for which the real property was security. (Stephans v. Herman, supra, 225 Cal.App.2d 671, 673-674; Howe v. City Title Ins. Co., supra, 255 Cal.App.2d 85, 87.) It would appear that even under this theory plaintiff could recover damages up to $28,000, the amount of plaintiff’s notes, if that sum exceeded the fair market value of the real property security, less prior liens and taxes.

­FN 9. The record discloses that defendant had a law school degree.

­FN 10. In testifying to the $400,000 and $350,000 valuations, defendant stated “These are both rough guesses.” Although defendant used the term “guesses” it is obvious from his testimony generally that he equated the term “guess” to an opinion.

MABRY tip no injunction needed to stop foreclosure TERRY MABRY et al., opinion 2923.5 Cilvil code

The court in Mabry

Civil Code 2924

CA Foreclosure Law – Civil Code 2924
Civil Code 2924

2924.
(a) Every transfer of an interest in property, other than in trust, made only as a security for the performance of another act, is to be deemed a mortgage, except when in the case of personal property it is accompanied by actual change of possession, in which case it is to be deemed a pledge. Where, by a mortgage created after July 27, 1917, of any estate in real property, other than an estate at will or for years, less than two, or in any transfer in trust made after July 27, 1917, of a like estate to secure the performance of an obligation, a power of sale is conferred upon the mortgagee, trustee, or any other person, to be exercised after a breach of the obligation for which that mortgage or transfer is a security, the power shall not be exercised except where the mortgage or transfer is made pursuant to an order, judgment, or decree of a court of record, or to secure the payment of bonds or other evidences of indebtedness authorized or permitted to be issued by the Commissioner of Corporations, or is made by a public utility subject to the provisions of the Public Utilities Act, until all of the following apply:

(1) The trustee, mortgagee, or beneficiary, or any of their authorized agents shall first file for record, in the office of the recorder of each county wherein the mortgaged or trust property or some part or parcel thereof is situated, a notice of default. That notice of default shall include all of the following:

(A) A statement identifying the mortgage or deed of trust by stating the name or names of the trustor or trustors and giving the book and page, or instrument number, if applicable, where the mortgage or deed of trust is recorded or a description of the mortgaged or trust property.

(B) A statement that a breach of the obligation for which the mortgage or transfer in trust is security has occurred.

(C) A statement setting forth the nature of each breach actually known to the beneficiary and of his or her election to sell or cause to be sold the property to satisfy that obligation and any other obligation secured by the deed of trust or mortgage that is in default.

(D) If the default is curable pursuant to Section 2924c, the statement specified in paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of Section 2924c.

(2) Not less than three months shall elapse from the filing of the notice of default.

(3) After the lapse of the three months described in paragraph (2), the mortgagee, trustee or other person authorized to take the sale shall give notice of sale, stating the time and place thereof, in the manner and for a time not less than that set forth in Section 2924f.

(b) In performing acts required by this article, the trustee shall incur no liability for any good faith error resulting from reliance on information provided in good faith by the beneficiary regarding the nature and the amount of the default under the secured obligation, deed of trust, or mortgage. In performing the acts required by this article, a trustee shall not be subject to Title 1.6c (commencing with Section 1788) of Part 4.

(c) A recital in the deed executed pursuant to the power of sale of compliance with all requirements of law regarding the mailing of copies of notices or the publication of a copy of the notice of default or the personal delivery of the copy of the notice of default or the posting of copies of the notice of sale or the publication of a copy thereof shall constitute prima facie evidence of compliance with these requirements and conclusive evidence thereof in favor of bona fide purchasers and encumbrancers for value and without notice.

(d) All of the following shall constitute privileged communications pursuant to Section 47:

(1) The mailing, publication, and delivery of notices as required by this section.

(2) Performance of the procedures set forth in this article.

(3) Performance of the functions and procedures set forth in this article if those functions and procedures are necessary to carry out the duties described in Sections 729.040, 729.050, and 729.080 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

(e) There is a rebuttable presumption that the beneficiary actually knew of all unpaid loan payments on the obligation owed to the beneficiary and secured by the deed of trust or mortgage subject to the notice of default. However, the failure to include an actually known default shall not invalidate the notice of sale and the beneficiary shall not be precluded from asserting a claim to this omitted default or defaults in a separate notice of default.

2924.3.
(a) Except as provided in subdivisions (b) and (c), a person who has undertaken as an agent of a mortgagee, beneficiary, or owner of a promissory note secured directly or collaterally by a mortgage or deed of trust on real property or an estate for years therein, to make collections of payments from an obligor under the note, shall mail the following notices, postage prepaid, to each mortgagee, beneficiary or owner for whom the agent has agreed to make collections from the obligor under the note:

(1) A copy of the notice of default filed in the office of the county recorder pursuant to Section 2924 on account of a breach of obligation under the promissory note on which the agent has agreed to make collections of payments, within 15 days after recordation.

(2) Notice that a notice of default has been recorded pursuant to Section 2924 on account of a breach of an obligation secured by a mortgage or deed of trust against the same property or estate for years therein having priority over the mortgage or deed of trust securing the obligation described in paragraph (1), within 15 days after recordation or within three business days after the agent receives the information, whichever is later.

(3) Notice of the time and place scheduled for the sale of the real property or estate for years therein pursuant to Section 2924f under a power of sale in a mortgage or deed of trust securing an obligation described in paragraphs (1) or (2), not less than 15 days before the scheduled date of the sale or not later than the next business day after the agent receives the information, whichever is later.

(b) An agent who has undertaken to make collections on behalf of mortgagees, beneficiaries or owners of promissory notes secured by mortgages or deeds of trust on real property or an estate for years therein shall not be required to comply with the provisions of subdivision (a) with respect to a mortgagee, beneficiary or owner who is entitled to receive notice pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 2924b or for whom a request for notice has been recorded pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 2924b if the agent reasonably believes that the address of the mortgagee, beneficiary, or owner described in Section 2924b is the current business or residence address of that person.

(c) An agent who has undertaken to make collections on behalf of mortgagees, beneficiaries or owners of promissory notes secured by mortgages or deeds of trust on real property or an estate for years therein shall not be required to comply with the provisions of paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (a) if the agent knows or reasonably believes that the default has already been cured by or on behalf of the obligor.

(d) Any failure to comply with the provisions of this section shall not affect the validity of a sale in favor of a bona fide purchaser or the rights of an encumbrancer for value and without notice.

2924.5.
No clause in any deed of trust or mortgage on property containing four or fewer residential units or on which four or fewer residential units are to be constructed or in any obligation secured by any deed of trust or mortgage on property containing four or fewer residential units or on which four or fewer residential units are to be constructed that provides for the acceleration of the due date of the obligation upon the sale, conveyance, alienation, lease, succession, assignment or other transfer of the property subject to the deed of trust or mortgage shall be valid unless the clause is set forth, in its entirety in both the body of the deed of trust or mortgage and the promissory note or other document evidencing the secured obligation. This section shall apply to all such deeds of trust, mortgages, and obligations secured thereby executed on or after July 1, 1972.

2924.6.
(a) An obligee may not accelerate the maturity date of the principal and accrued interest on any loan secured by a mortgage or deed of trust on residential real property solely by reason of any one or more of the following transfers in the title to the real property:

(1) A transfer resulting from the death of an obligor where the transfer is to the spouse who is also an obligor.

(2) A transfer by an obligor where the spouse becomes a coowner of the property.

(3) A transfer resulting from a decree of dissolution of the marriage or legal separation or from a property settlement agreement incidental to such a decree which requires the obligor to continue to make the loan payments by which a spouse who is an obligor becomes the sole owner of the property.

(4) A transfer by an obligor or obligors into an inter vivos trust in which the obligor or obligors are beneficiaries.

(5) Such real property or any portion thereof is made subject to a junior encumbrance or lien.

(b) Any waiver of the provisions of this section by an obligor is void and unenforceable and is contrary to public policy.

(c) For the purposes of this section, “residential real property” means any real property which contains at least one but not more than four housing units.

(d) This act applies only to loans executed or refinanced on or after January 1, 1976.

2924.7.
(a) The provisions of any deed of trust or mortgage on real property which authorize any beneficiary, trustee, mortgagee, or his or her agent or successor in interest, to accelerate the maturity date of the principal and interest on any loan secured thereby or to exercise any power of sale or other remedy contained therein upon the failure of the trustor or mortgagor to pay, at the times provided for under the terms of the deed of trust or mortgage, any taxes, rents, assessments, or insurance premiums with respect to the property or the loan, or any advances made by the beneficiary, mortgagee, or his or her agent or successor in interest shall be enforceable whether or not impairment of the security interest in the property has resulted from the failure of the trustor or mortgagor to pay the taxes, rents, assessments, insurance premiums, or advances.

(b) The provisions of any deed of trust or mortgage on real property which authorize any beneficiary, trustee, mortgagee, or his or her agent or successor in interest, to receive and control the disbursement of the proceeds of any policy of fire, flood, or other hazard insurance respecting the property shall be enforceable whether or not impairment of the security interest in the property has resulted from the event that caused the proceeds of the insurance policy to become payable.

2924a.
If, by the terms of any trust or deed of trust a power of sale is conferred upon the trustee, the attorney for the trustee, or any duly authorized agent, may conduct the sale and act in the sale as the auctioneer for the trustee.

2924b.
(a) Any person desiring a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale under any deed of trust or mortgage with power of sale upon real property or an estate for years therein, as to which deed of trust or mortgage the power of sale cannot be exercised until these notices are given for the time and in the manner provided in Section 2924 may, at any time subsequent to recordation of the deed of trust or mortgage and prior to recordation of notice of default thereunder, cause to be filed for record in the office of the recorder of any county in which any part or parcel of the real property is situated, a duly acknowledged request for a copy of the notice of default and of sale. This request shall be signed and acknowledged by the person making the request, specifying the name and address of the person to whom the notice is to be mailed, shall identify the deed of trust or mortgage by stating the names of the parties thereto, the date of recordation thereof, and the book and page where the deed of trust or mortgage is recorded or the recorder’ s number, and shall be in substantially the following form:

“In accordance with Section 2924b, Civil Code, request is hereby made
that a copy of any notice of default and a copy of any notice of sale
under the deed of trust (or mortgage) recorded ______, ____, in
Book_____ page ____ records of ____ County, (or filed for record with
recorder’s serial number ____, _______County) California, executed
by ____ as trustor (or mortgagor) in which ________ is named as
beneficiary (or mortgagee) and ______________ as
trustee be mailed to
_________________ at ____________________________.
Name Address

NOTICE: A copy of any notice of default and of
any notice of sale will be sent only to the address contained in this
recorded request. If your address changes, a new
request must be recorded.

Signature _________________”

Upon the filing for record of the request, the recorder shall index in the general index of grantors the names of the trustors (or mortgagor) recited therein and the names of persons requesting copies.

(b) The mortgagee, trustee, or other person authorized to record the notice of default or the notice of sale shall do each of the following:

(1) Within 10 business days following recordation of the notice of default, deposit or cause to be deposited in the United States mail an envelope, sent by registered or certified mail with postage prepaid, containing a copy of the notice with the recording date shown thereon, addressed to each person whose name and address are set forth in a duly recorded request therefor, directed to the address designated in the request and to each trustor or mortgagor at his or her last known address if different than the address specified in the deed of trust or mortgage with power of sale.

(2) At least 20 days before the date of sale, deposit or cause to be deposited in the United States mail an envelope, sent by registered or certified mail with postage prepaid, containing a copy of the notice of the time and place of sale, addressed to each person whose name and address are set forth in a duly recorded request therefor, directed to the address designated in the request and to each trustor or mortgagor at his or her last known address if different than the address specified in the deed of trust or mortgage with power of sale.

(3) As used in paragraphs (1) and (2), the “last known address” of each trustor or mortgagor means the last business or residence physical address actually known by the mortgagee, beneficiary, trustee, or other person authorized to record the notice of default. For the purposes of this subdivision, an address is “actually known” if it is contained in the original deed of trust or mortgage, or in any subsequent written notification of a change of physical address from the trustor or mortgagor pursuant to the deed of trust or mortgage. For the purposes of this subdivision, “physical address” does not include an e-mail or any form of electronic address for a trustor or mortgagor. The beneficiary shall inform the trustee of the trustor’s last address actually known by the beneficiary. However, the trustee shall incur no liability for failing to send any notice to the last address unless the trustee has actual knowledge of it.

(4) A “person authorized to record the notice of default or the notice of sale” shall include an agent for the mortgagee or beneficiary, an agent of the named trustee, any person designated in an executed substitution of trustee, or an agent of that substituted trustee.

(c) The mortgagee, trustee, or other person authorized to record the notice of default or the notice of sale shall do the following:

(1) Within one month following recordation of the notice of default, deposit or cause to be deposited in the United States mail an envelope, sent by registered or certified mail with postage prepaid, containing a copy of the notice with the recording date shown thereon, addressed to each person set forth in paragraph (2), provided that the estate or interest of any person entitled to receive notice under this subdivision is acquired by an instrument sufficient to impart constructive notice of the estate or interest in the land or portion thereof which is subject to the deed of trust or mortgage being foreclosed, and provided the instrument is recorded in the office of the county recorder so as to impart that constructive notice prior to the recording date of the notice of default and provided the instrument as so recorded sets forth a mailing address which the county recorder shall use, as instructed within the instrument, for the return of the instrument after recording, and which address shall be the address used for the purposes of mailing notices herein.

(2) The persons to whom notice shall be mailed under this subdivision are:

(A) The successor in interest, as of the recording date of the notice of default, of the estate or interest or any portion thereof of the trustor or mortgagor of the deed of trust or mortgage being foreclosed.

(B) The beneficiary or mortgagee of any deed of trust or mortgage recorded subsequent to the deed of trust or mortgage being foreclosed, or recorded prior to or concurrently with the deed of trust or mortgage being foreclosed but subject to a recorded agreement or a recorded statement of subordination to the deed of trust or mortgage being foreclosed.

(C) The assignee of any interest of the beneficiary or mortgagee described in subparagraph (B), as of the recording date of the notice of default.

(D) The vendee of any contract of sale, or the lessee of any lease, of the estate or interest being foreclosed which is recorded subsequent to the deed of trust or mortgage being foreclosed, or recorded prior to or concurrently with the deed of trust or mortgage being foreclosed but subject to a recorded agreement or statement of subordination to the deed of trust or mortgage being foreclosed.

(E) The successor in interest to the vendee or lessee described in subparagraph (D), as of the recording date of the notice of default.

(F) The office of the Controller, Sacramento, California, where, as of the recording date of the notice of default, a “Notice of Lien for Postponed Property Taxes” has been recorded against the real property to which the notice of default applies.

(3) At least 20 days before the date of sale, deposit or cause to be deposited in the United States mail an envelope, sent by registered or certified mail with postage prepaid, containing a copy of the notice of the time and place of sale addressed to each person to whom a copy of the notice of default is to be mailed as provided in paragraphs (1) and (2), and addressed to the office of any state taxing agency, Sacramento, California, which has recorded, subsequent to the deed of trust or mortgage being foreclosed, a notice of tax lien prior to the recording date of the notice of default against the real property to which the notice of default applies.

(4) Provide a copy of the notice of sale to the Internal Revenue Service, in accordance with Section 7425 of the Internal Revenue Code and any applicable federal regulation, if a “Notice of Federal Tax Lien under Internal Revenue Laws” has been recorded, subsequent to the deed of trust or mortgage being foreclosed, against the real property to which the notice of sale applies. The failure to provide the Internal Revenue Service with a copy of the notice of sale pursuant to this paragraph shall be sufficient cause to rescind the trustee’s sale and invalidate the trustee’s deed, at the option of either the successful bidder at the trustee’s sale or the trustee, and in either case with the consent of the beneficiary. Any option to rescind the trustee’s sale pursuant to this paragraph shall be exercised prior to any transfer of the property by the successful bidder to a bona fide purchaser for value. A recision of the trustee’ s sale pursuant to this paragraph may be recorded in a notice of recision pursuant to Section 1058.5.

(5) The mailing of notices in the manner set forth in paragraph (1) shall not impose upon any licensed attorney, agent, or employee of any person entitled to receive notices as herein set forth any duty to communicate the notice to the entitled person from the fact that the mailing address used by the county recorder is the address of the attorney, agent, or employee.

(d) Any deed of trust or mortgage with power of sale hereafter executed upon real property or an estate for years therein may contain a request that a copy of any notice of default and a copy of any notice of sale thereunder shall be mailed to any person or party thereto at the address of the person given therein, and a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale shall be mailed to each of these at the same time and in the same manner required as though a separate request therefor had been filed by each of these persons as herein authorized. If any deed of trust or mortgage with power of sale executed after September 19, 1939, except a deed of trust or mortgage of any of the classes excepted from the provisions of Section 2924, does not contain a mailing address of the trustor or mortgagor therein named, and if no request for special notice by the trustor or mortgagor in substantially the form set forth in this section has subsequently been recorded, a copy of the notice of default shall be published once a week for at least four weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in which the property is situated, the publication to commence within 10 business days after the filing of the notice of default. In lieu of publication, a copy of the notice of default may be delivered personally to the trustor or mortgagor within the 10 business days or at any time before publication is completed, or by posting the notice of default in a conspicuous place on the property and mailing the notice to the last known address of the trustor or mortgagor.

(e) Any person required to mail a copy of a notice of default or notice of sale to each trustor or mortgagor pursuant to subdivision (b) or (c) by registered or certified mail shall simultaneously cause to be deposited in the United States mail, with postage prepaid and mailed by first-class mail, an envelope containing an additional copy of the required notice addressed to each trustor or mortgagor at the same address to which the notice is sent by registered or certified mail pursuant to subdivision (b) or (c). The person shall execute and retain an affidavit identifying the notice mailed, showing the name and residence or business address of that person, that he or she is over the age of 18 years, the date of deposit in the mail, the name and address of the trustor or mortgagor to whom sent, and that the envelope was sealed and deposited in the mail with postage fully prepaid. In the absence of fraud, the affidavit required by this subdivision shall establish a conclusive presumption of mailing.

(f) No request for a copy of any notice filed for record pursuant to this section, no statement or allegation in the request, and no record thereof shall affect the title to real property or be deemed notice to any person that any person requesting copies of notice has or claims any right, title, or interest in, or lien or charge upon the property described in the deed of trust or mortgage referred to therein.

(g) “Business day,” as used in this section, has the meaning specified in Section 9.

2924c.
(a)

(1) Whenever all or a portion of the principal sum of any obligation secured by deed of trust or mortgage on real property or an estate for years therein hereafter executed has, prior to the maturity date fixed in that obligation, become due or been declared due by reason of default in payment of interest or of any installment of principal, or by reason of failure of trustor or mortgagor to pay, in accordance with the terms of that obligation or of the deed of trust or mortgage, taxes, assessments, premiums for insurance, or advances made by beneficiary or mortgagee in accordance with the terms of that obligation or of the deed of trust or mortgage, the trustor or mortgagor or his or her successor in interest in the mortgaged or trust property or any part thereof, or any beneficiary under a subordinate deed of trust or any other person having a subordinate lien or encumbrance of record thereon, at any time within the period specified in subdivision (e), if the power of sale therein is to be exercised, or, otherwise at any time prior to entry of the decree of foreclosure, may pay to the beneficiary or the mortgagee or their successors in interest, respectively, the entire amount due, at the time payment is tendered, with respect to (A) all amounts of principal, interest, taxes, assessments, insurance premiums, or advances actually known by the beneficiary to be, and that are, in default and shown in the notice of default, under the terms of the deed of trust or mortgage and the obligation secured thereby, (B) all amounts in default on recurring obligations not shown in the notice of default, and (C) all reasonable costs and expenses, subject to subdivision (c), which are actually incurred in enforcing the terms of the obligation, deed of trust, or mortgage, and trustee’s or attorney’s fees, subject to subdivision (d), other than the portion of principal as would not then be due had no default occurred, and thereby cure the default theretofore existing, and thereupon, all proceedings theretofore had or instituted shall be dismissed or discontinued and the obligation and deed of trust or mortgage shall be reinstated and shall be and remain in force and effect, the same as if the acceleration had not occurred. This section does not apply to bonds or other evidences of indebtedness authorized or permitted to be issued by the Commissioner of Corporations or made by a public utility subject to the Public Utilities Code. For the purposes of this subdivision, the term “recurring obligation” means all amounts of principal and interest on the loan, or rents, subject to the deed of trust or mortgage in default due after the notice of default is recorded; all amounts of principal and interest or rents advanced on senior liens or leaseholds which are advanced after the recordation of the notice of default; and payments of taxes, assessments, and hazard insurance advanced after recordation of the notice of default. Where the beneficiary or mortgagee has made no advances on defaults which would constitute recurring obligations, the beneficiary or mortgagee may require the trustor or mortgagor to provide reliable written evidence that the amounts have been paid prior to reinstatement.

(2) If the trustor, mortgagor, or other person authorized to cure the default pursuant to this subdivision does cure the default, the beneficiary or mortgagee or the agent for the beneficiary or mortgagee shall, within 21 days following the reinstatement, execute and deliver to the trustee a notice of rescission which rescinds the declaration of default and demand for sale and advises the trustee of the date of reinstatement. The trustee shall cause the notice of rescission to be recorded within 30 days of receipt of the notice of rescission and of all allowable fees and costs.

No charge, except for the recording fee, shall be made against the trustor or mortgagor for the execution and recordation of the notice which rescinds the declaration of default and demand for sale.

(b)

(1) The notice, of any default described in this section, recorded pursuant to Section 2924, and mailed to any person pursuant to Section 2924b, shall begin with the following statement, printed or typed thereon:

“IMPORTANT NOTICE (14-point boldface type if printed or in
capital letters if typed)

IF YOUR PROPERTY IS IN FORECLOSURE BECAUSE YOU ARE BEHIND IN YOUR
PAYMENTS, IT MAY BE SOLD WITHOUT ANY COURT ACTION, (14-point boldface
type if printed or in capital letters if typed) and you may have the
legal right to bring your account in good standing by paying all of
your past due payments plus permitted costs and expenses within the
time permitted by law for reinstatement of your account, which is
normally five business days prior to the date set for the sale of
your property. No sale date may be set until three months from the
date this notice of default may be recorded (which date of
recordation appears on this notice).

This amount is ___________________ as of ______________________
(Date)
and will increase until your account becomes current.

While your property is in foreclosure, you still must pay other
obligations (such as insurance and taxes) required by your note and
deed of trust or mortgage. If you fail to make future payments on
the loan, pay taxes on the property, provide insurance on the
property, or pay other obligations as required in the note and deed
of trust or mortgage, the beneficiary or mortgagee may insist that
you do so in order to reinstate your account in good standing. In
addition, the beneficiary or mortgagee may require as a condition to
reinstatement that you provide reliable written evidence that you
paid all senior liens, property taxes, and hazard insurance premiums.

Upon your written request, the beneficiary or mortgagee will give
you a written itemization of the entire amount you must pay. You may
not have to pay the entire unpaid portion of your account, even
though full payment was demanded, but you must pay all amounts in
default at the time payment is made. However, you and your
beneficiary or mortgagee may mutually agree in writing prior to the
time the notice of sale is posted (which may not be earlier than the
end of the three-month period stated above) to, among other things,
(1) provide additional time in which to cure the default by transfer
of the property or otherwise; or (2) establish a schedule of payments
in order to cure your default; or both (1) and (2).
Following the expiration of the time period referred to in the
first paragraph of this notice, unless the obligation being
foreclosed upon or a separate written agreement between you and your
creditor permits a longer period, you have only the legal right to
stop the sale of your property by paying the entire amount demanded
by your creditor.
To find out the amount you must pay, or to arrange for payment to
stop the foreclosure, or if your property is in foreclosure for any
other reason, contact:

______________________________________
(Name of beneficiary or mortgagee)

______________________________________
(Mailing address)

______________________________________
(Telephone)

If you have any questions, you should contact a lawyer or the
governmental agency which may have insured your loan.
Notwithstanding the fact that your property is in foreclosure, you
may offer your property for sale, provided the sale is concluded
prior to the conclusion of the foreclosure.
Remember, YOU MAY LOSE LEGAL RIGHTS IF YOU DO NOT TAKE PROMPT
ACTION. (14-point boldface type if printed or in capital letters if
typed)”

Unless otherwise specified, the notice, if printed, shall appear in at least 12-point boldface type.

If the obligation secured by the deed of trust or mortgage is a contract or agreement described in paragraph (1) or (4) of subdivision (a) of Section 1632, the notice required herein shall be in Spanish if the trustor requested a Spanish language translation of the contract or agreement pursuant to Section 1632. If the obligation secured by the deed of trust or mortgage is contained in a home improvement contract, as defined in Sections 7151.2 and 7159 of the Business and Professions Code, which is subject to Title 2 (commencing with Section 1801), the seller shall specify on the contract whether or not the contract was principally negotiated in Spanish and if the contract was principally negotiated in Spanish, the notice required herein shall be in Spanish. No assignee of the contract or person authorized to record the notice of default shall incur any obligation or liability for failing to mail a notice in Spanish unless Spanish is specified in the contract or the assignee or person has actual knowledge that the secured obligation was principally negotiated in Spanish. Unless specified in writing to the contrary, a copy of the notice required by subdivision (c) of Section 2924b shall be in English.

(2) Any failure to comply with the provisions of this subdivision shall not affect the validity of a sale in favor of a bona fide purchaser or the rights of an encumbrancer for value and without notice.

(c) Costs and expenses which may be charged pursuant to Sections 2924 to 2924i, inclusive, shall be limited to the costs incurred for recording, mailing, including certified and express mail charges, publishing, and posting notices required by Sections 2924 to 2924i, inclusive, postponement pursuant to Section 2924g not to exceed fifty dollars ($50) per postponement and a fee for a trustee’s sale guarantee or, in the event of judicial foreclosure, a litigation guarantee. For purposes of this subdivision, a trustee or beneficiary may purchase a trustee’s sale guarantee at a rate meeting the standards contained in Sections 12401.1 and 12401.3 of the Insurance Code.

(d) Trustee’s or attorney’s fees which may be charged pursuant to subdivision (a), or until the notice of sale is deposited in the mail to the trustor as provided in Section 2924b, if the sale is by power of sale contained in the deed of trust or mortgage, or, otherwise at any time prior to the decree of foreclosure, are hereby authorized to be in a base amount that does not exceed three hundred dollars ($300) if the unpaid principal sum secured is one hundred fifty thousand dollars ($150,000) or less, or two hundred fifty dollars ($250) if the unpaid principal sum secured exceeds one hundred fifty thousand dollars ($150,000), plus one-half of 1 percent of the unpaid principal sum secured exceeding fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) up to and including one hundred fifty thousand dollars ($150,000), plus one-quarter of 1 percent of any portion of the unpaid principal sum secured exceeding one hundred fifty thousand dollars ($150,000) up to and including five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000), plus one-eighth of 1 percent of any portion of the unpaid principal sum secured exceeding five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000). Any charge for trustee’s or attorney’s fees authorized by this subdivision shall be conclusively presumed to be lawful and valid where the charge does not exceed the amounts authorized herein. For purposes of this subdivision, the unpaid principal sum secured shall be determined as of the date the notice of default is recorded.

(e) Reinstatement of a monetary default under the terms of an obligation secured by a deed of trust, or mortgage may be made at any time within the period commencing with the date of recordation of the notice of default until five business days prior to the date of sale set forth in the initial recorded notice of sale.

In the event the sale does not take place on the date set forth in the initial recorded notice of sale or a subsequent recorded notice of sale is required to be given, the right of reinstatement shall be revived as of the date of recordation of the subsequent notice of sale, and shall continue from that date until five business days prior to the date of sale set forth in the subsequently recorded notice of sale.

In the event the date of sale is postponed on the date of sale set forth in either an initial or any subsequent notice of sale, or is postponed on the date declared for sale at an immediately preceding postponement of sale, and, the postponement is for a period which exceeds five business days from the date set forth in the notice of sale, or declared at the time of postponement, then the right of reinstatement is revived as of the date of postponement and shall continue from that date until five business days prior to the date of sale declared at the time of the postponement.

Nothing contained herein shall give rise to a right of reinstatement during the period of five business days prior to the date of sale, whether the date of sale is noticed in a notice of sale or declared at a postponement of sale.

Pursuant to the terms of this subdivision, no beneficiary, trustee, mortgagee, or their agents or successors shall be liable in any manner to a trustor, mortgagor, their agents or successors or any beneficiary under a subordinate deed of trust or mortgage or any other person having a subordinate lien or encumbrance of record thereon for the failure to allow a reinstatement of the obligation secured by a deed of trust or mortgage during the period of five business days prior to the sale of the security property, and no such right of reinstatement during this period is created by this section. Any right of reinstatement created by this section is terminated five business days prior to the date of sale set forth in the initial date of sale, and is revived only as prescribed herein and only as of the date set forth herein.

As used in this subdivision, the term “business day” has the same meaning as specified in Section 9.

2924d.
(a) Commencing with the date that the notice of sale is deposited in the mail, as provided in Section 2924b, and until the property is sold pursuant to the power of sale contained in the mortgage or deed of trust, a beneficiary, trustee, mortgagee, or his or her agent or successor in interest, may demand and receive from a trustor, mortgagor, or his or her agent or successor in interest, or any beneficiary under a subordinate deed of trust, or any other person having a subordinate lien or encumbrance of record those reasonable costs and expenses, to the extent allowed by subdivision (c) of Section 2924c, which are actually incurred in enforcing the terms of the obligation and trustee’s or attorney’s fees which are hereby authorized to be in a base amount which does not exceed four hundred twenty-five dollars ($425) if the unpaid principal sum secured is one hundred fifty thousand dollars ($150,000) or less, or three hundred sixty dollars ($360) if the unpaid principal sum secured exceeds one hundred fifty thousand dollars ($150,000), plus 1 percent of any portion of the unpaid principal sum secured exceeding fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) up to and including one hundred fifty thousand dollars ($150,000), plus one-half of 1 percent of any portion of the unpaid principal sum secured exceeding one hundred fifty thousand dollars ($150,000) up to and including five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000), plus one-quarter of 1 percent of any portion of the unpaid principal sum secured exceeding five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000). For purposes of this subdivision, the unpaid principal sum secured shall be determined as of the date the notice of default is recorded. Any charge for trustee’s or attorney’ s fees authorized by this subdivision shall be conclusively presumed to be lawful and valid where that charge does not exceed the amounts authorized herein. Any charge for trustee’s or attorney’s fees made pursuant to this subdivision shall be in lieu of and not in addition to those charges authorized by subdivision (d) of Section 2924c.

(b) Upon the sale of property pursuant to a power of sale, a trustee, or his or her agent or successor in interest, may demand and receive from a beneficiary, or his or her agent or successor in interest, or may deduct from the proceeds of the sale, those reasonable costs and expenses, to the extent allowed by subdivision (c) of Section 2924c, which are actually incurred in enforcing the terms of the obligation and trustee’s or attorney’s fees which are hereby authorized to be in an amount which does not exceed four hundred twenty-five dollars ($425) or one percent of the unpaid principal sum secured, whichever is greater. For purposes of this subdivision, the unpaid principal sum secured shall be determined as of the date the notice of default is recorded. Any charge for trustee’s or attorney’s fees authorized by this subdivision shall be conclusively presumed to be lawful and valid where that charge does not exceed the amount authorized herein. Any charges for trustee’s or attorney’s fees made pursuant to this subdivision shall be in lieu of and not in addition to those charges authorized by subdivision (a) of this section and subdivision (d) of Section 2924c.

(c)

(1) No person shall pay or offer to pay or collect any rebate or kickback for the referral of business involving the performance of any act required by this article.

(2) Any person who violates this subdivision shall be liable to the trustor for three times the amount of any rebate or kickback, plus reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, in addition to any other remedies provided by law.

(3) No violation of this subdivision shall affect the validity of a sale in favor of a bona fide purchaser or the rights of an encumbrancer for value without notice.

(d) It shall not be unlawful for a trustee to pay or offer to pay a fee to an agent or subagent of the trustee for work performed by the agent or subagent in discharging the trustee’s obligations under the terms of the deed of trust. Any payment of a fee by a trustee to an agent or subagent of the trustee for work performed by the agent or subagent in discharging the trustee’s obligations under the terms of the deed of trust shall be conclusively presumed to be lawful and valid if the fee, when combined with other fees of the trustee, does not exceed in the aggregate the trustee’s fee authorized by subdivision (d) of Section 2924c or subdivision (a) or (b) of this section.

(e) When a court issues a decree of foreclosure, it shall have discretion to award attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses as are reasonable, if provided for in the note, deed of trust, or mortgage, pursuant to Section 580c of the Code of Civil Procedure.

2924e.
(a) The beneficiary or mortgagee of any deed of trust or mortgage on real property either containing one to four residential units or given to secure an original obligation not to exceed three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000) may, with the written consent of the trustor or mortgagor that is either effected through a signed and dated agreement which shall be separate from other loan and security documents or disclosed to the trustor or mortgagor in at least 10-point type, submit a written request by certified mail to the beneficiary or mortgagee of any lien which is senior to the lien of the requester, for written notice of any or all delinquencies of four months or more, in payments of principal or interest on any obligation secured by that senior lien notwithstanding that the loan secured by the lien of the requester is not then in default as to payments of principal or interest.

The request shall be sent to the beneficiary or mortgagee, or agent which it might designate for the purpose of receiving loan payments, at the address specified for the receipt of these payments, if known, or, if not known, at the address shown on the recorded deed of trust or mortgage.

(b) The request for notice shall identify the ownership or security interest of the requester, the date on which the interest of the requester will terminate as evidenced by the maturity date of the note of the trustor or mortgagor in favor of the requester, the name of the trustor or mortgagor and the name of the current owner of the security property if different from the trustor or mortgagor, the street address or other description of the security property, the loan number (if available to the requester) of the loan secured by the senior lien, the name and address to which notice is to be sent, and shall include or be accompanied by the signed written consent of the trustor or mortgagor, and a fee of forty dollars ($40). For obligations secured by residential properties, the request shall remain valid until withdrawn in writing and shall be applicable to all delinquencies as provided in this section, which occur prior to the date on which the interest of the requester will terminate as specified in the request or the expiration date, as appropriate. For obligations secured by nonresidential properties, the request shall remain valid until withdrawn in writing and shall be applicable to all delinquencies as provided in this section, which occur prior to the date on which the interest of the requester will terminate as specified in the request or the expiration date, as appropriate. The beneficiary or mortgagee of obligations secured by nonresidential properties that have sent five or more notices prior to the expiration of the effective period of the request may charge a fee up to fifteen dollars ($15) for each subsequent notice. A request for notice shall be effective for five years from the mailing of the request or the recording of that request, whichever occurs later, and may be renewed within six months prior to its expiration date by sending the beneficiary or mortgagee, or agent, as the case may be, at the address to which original requests for notice are to be sent, a copy of the earlier request for notice together with a signed statement that the request is renewed and a renewal fee of fifteen dollars ($15). Upon timely submittal of a renewal request for notice, the effectiveness of the original request is continued for five years from the time when it would otherwise have lapsed. Succeeding renewal requests may be submitted in the same manner. The request for notice and renewals thereof shall be recorded in the office of the county recorder of the county in which the security real property is situated. The rights and obligations specified in this section shall inure to the benefit of, or pass to, as the case may be, successors in interest of parties specified in this section. Any successor in interest of a party entitled to notice under this section shall file a request for that notice with any beneficiary or mortgagee of the senior lien and shall pay a processing fee of fifteen dollars ($15). No new written consent shall be required from the trustor or mortgagor.

(c) Unless the delinquency has been cured, within 15 days following the end of four months from any delinquency in payments of principal or interest on any obligation secured by the senior lien which delinquency exists or occurs on or after 10 days from the mailing of the request for notice or the recording of that request, whichever occurs later, the beneficiary or mortgagee shall give written notice to the requester of the fact of any delinquency and the amount thereof.

The notice shall be given by personal service, or by deposit in the mail, first-class postage paid. Following the recording of any notice of default pursuant to Section 2924 with respect to the same delinquency, no notice or further notice shall be required pursuant to this section.

(d) If the beneficiary or mortgagee of any such senior lien fails to give notice to the requester as required in subdivision (c), and a subsequent foreclosure or trustee’s sale of the security property occurs, the beneficiary or mortgagee shall be liable to the requester for any monetary damage due to the failure to provide notice within the time period specified in subdivision (c) which the requester has sustained from the date on which notice should have been given to the earlier of the date on which the notice is given or the date of the recording of the notice of default under Section 2924, and shall also forfeit to the requester the sum of three hundred dollars ($300). A showing by the beneficiary or mortgagee by a preponderance of the evidence that the failure to provide timely notice as required by subdivision (c) resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error shall be a defense to any liability for that failure.

(e) If any beneficiary or mortgagee, or agent which it had designated for the purpose of receiving loan payments, has been succeeded in interest by any other person, any request for notice received pursuant to this section shall be transmitted promptly to that person.

(f) Any failure to comply with the provisions of this section shall not affect the validity of a sale in favor of a bona fide purchaser or the rights of an encumbrancer for value and without notice.

(g) Upon satisfaction of an obligation secured by a junior lien with respect to which a notice request was made pursuant to this section, the beneficiary or mortgagee that made the request shall communicate that fact in writing to the senior lienholder to whom the request was made. The communication shall specify that provision of notice pursuant to the prior request under this section is no longer required.

2924f.
(a) As used in this section and Sections 2924g and 2924h, “property” means real property or a leasehold estate therein, and “calendar week” means Monday through Saturday, inclusive.

(b)

(1) Except as provided in subdivision (c), before any sale of property can be made under the power of sale contained in any deed of trust or mortgage, or any resale resulting from a rescission for a failure of consideration pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 2924h, notice of the sale thereof shall be given by posting a written notice of the time of sale and of the street address and the specific place at the street address where the sale will be held, and describing the property to be sold, at least 20 days before the date of sale in one public place in the city where the property is to be sold, if the property is to be sold in a city, or, if not, then in one public place in the judicial district in which the property is to be sold, and publishing a copy once a week for three consecutive calendar weeks, the first publication to be at least 20 days before the date of sale, in a newspaper of general circulation published in the city in which the property or some part thereof is situated, if any part thereof is situated in a city, if not, then in a newspaper of general circulation published in the judicial district in which the property or some part thereof is situated, or in case no newspaper of general circulation is published in the city or judicial district, as the case may be, in a newspaper of general circulation published in the county in which the property or some part thereof is situated, or in case no newspaper of general circulation is published in the city or judicial district or county, as the case may be, in a newspaper of general circulation published in the county in this state that (A) is contiguous to the county in which the property or some part thereof is situated and (B) has, by comparison with all similarly contiguous counties, the highest population based upon total county population as determined by the most recent federal decennial census published by the Bureau of the Census. A copy of the notice of sale shall also be posted in a conspicuous place on the property to be sold at least 20 days before the date of sale, where possible and where not restricted for any reason. If the property is a single-family residence the posting shall be on a door of the residence, but, if not possible or restricted, then the notice shall be posted in a conspicuous place on the property; however, if access is denied because a common entrance to the property is restricted by a guard gate or similar impediment, the property may be posted at that guard gate or similar impediment to any development community. Additionally, the notice of sale shall conform to the minimum requirements of Section 6043 of the Government Code and be recorded with the county recorder of the county in which the property or some part thereof is situated at least 14 days prior to the date of sale. The notice of sale shall contain the name, street address in this state, which may reflect an agent of the trustee, and either a toll-free telephone number or telephone number in this state of the trustee, and the name of the original trustor, and also shall contain the statement required by paragraph (3) of subdivision (c). In addition to any other description of the property, the notice shall describe the property by giving its street address, if any, or other common designation, if any, and a county assessor’s parcel number; but if the property has no street address or other common designation, the notice shall contain a legal description of the property, the name and address of the beneficiary at whose request the sale is to be conducted, and a statement that directions may be obtained pursuant to a written request submitted to the beneficiary within 10 days from the first publication of the notice. Directions shall be deemed reasonably sufficient to locate the property if information as to the location of the property is given by reference to the direction and approximate distance from the nearest crossroads, frontage road, or access road. If a legal description or a county assessor’s parcel number and either a street address or another common designation of the property is given, the validity of the notice and the validity of the sale shall not be affected by the fact that the street address, other common designation, name and address of the beneficiary, or the directions obtained therefrom are erroneous or that the street address, other common designation, name and address of the beneficiary, or directions obtained therefrom are omitted. The term “newspaper of general circulation,” as used in this section, has the same meaning as defined in Article 1 (commencing with Section 6000) of Chapter 1 of Division 7 of Title 1 of the Government Code.

The notice of sale shall contain a statement of the total amount of the unpaid balance of the obligation secured by the property to be sold and reasonably estimated costs, expenses, advances at the time of the initial publication of the notice of sale, and, if republished pursuant to a cancellation of a cash equivalent pursuant to subdivision (d) of Section 2924h, a reference of that fact; provided, that the trustee shall incur no liability for any good faith error in stating the proper amount, including any amount provided in good faith by or on behalf of the beneficiary. An inaccurate statement of this amount shall not affect the validity of any sale to a bona fide purchaser for value, nor shall the failure to post the notice of sale on a door as provided by this subdivision affect the validity of any sale to a bona fide purchaser for value.

(2) If the sale of the property is to be a unified sale as provided in subparagraph (B) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 9604 of the Commercial Code, the notice of sale shall also contain a description of the personal property or fixtures to be sold. In the case where it is contemplated that all of the personal property or fixtures are to be sold, the description in the notice of the personal property or fixtures shall be sufficient if it is the same as the description of the personal property or fixtures contained in the agreement creating the security interest in or encumbrance on the personal property or fixtures or the filed financing statement relating to the personal property or fixtures. In all other cases, the description in the notice shall be sufficient if it would be a sufficient description of the personal property or fixtures under Section 9108 of the Commercial Code. Inclusion of a reference to or a description of personal property or fixtures in a notice of sale hereunder shall not constitute an election by the secured party to conduct a unified sale pursuant to subparagraph (B) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 9604 of the Commercial Code, shall not obligate the secured party to conduct a unified sale pursuant to subparagraph (B) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 9604 of the Commercial Code, and in no way shall render defective or noncomplying either that notice or a sale pursuant to that notice by reason of the fact that the sale includes none or less than all of the personal property or fixtures referred to or described in the notice. This paragraph shall not otherwise affect the obligations or duties of a secured party under the Commercial Code.

(c)

(1) This subdivision applies only to deeds of trust or mortgages which contain a power of sale and which are secured by real property containing a single-family, owner-occupied residence, where the obligation secured by the deed of trust or mortgage is contained in a contract for goods or services subject to the provisions of the Unruh Act (Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 1801) of Title 2 of Part 4 of Division 3).

(2) Except as otherwise expressly set forth in this subdivision, all other provisions of law relating to the exercise of a power of sale shall govern the exercise of a power of sale contained in a deed of trust or mortgage described in paragraph (1).

(3) If any default of the obligation secured by a deed of trust or mortgage described in paragraph (1) has not been cured within 30 days after the recordation of the notice of default, the trustee or mortgagee shall mail to the trustor or mortgagor, at his or her last known address, a copy of the following statement:

YOU ARE IN DEFAULT UNDER A
___________________________________________________,
Deed of trust or mortgage
DATED ______. UNLESS YOU TAKE ACTION TO PROTECT
YOUR PROPERTY, IT MAY BE SOLD AT A PUBLIC SALE.
IF YOU NEED AN EXPLANATION OF THE NATURE OF THE
PROCEEDING AGAINST YOU, YOU SHOULD CONTACT A LAWYER.

(4) All sales of real property pursuant to a power of sale contained in any deed of trust or mortgage described in paragraph (1) shall be held in the county where the residence is located and shall be made to the person making the highest offer. The trustee may receive offers during the 10-day period immediately prior to the date of sale and if any offer is accepted in writing by both the trustor or mortgagor and the beneficiary or mortgagee prior to the time set for sale, the sale shall be postponed to a date certain and prior to which the property may be conveyed by the trustor to the person making the offer according to its terms. The offer is revocable until accepted. The performance of the offer, following acceptance, according to its terms, by a conveyance of the property to the offeror, shall operate to terminate any further proceeding under the notice of sale and it shall be deemed revoked.

(5) In addition to the trustee fee pursuant to Section 2924c, the trustee or mortgagee pursuant to a deed of trust or mortgage subject to this subdivision shall be entitled to charge an additional fee of fifty dollars ($50).

(6) This subdivision applies only to property on which notices of default were filed on or after the effective date of this subdivision.

2924g.
(a) All sales of property under the power of sale contained in any deed of trust or mortgage shall be held in the county where the property or some part thereof is situated, and shall be made at auction, to the highest bidder, between the hours of 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. on any business day, Monday through Friday.

The sale shall commence at the time and location specified in the notice of sale. Any postponement shall be announced at the time and location specified in the notice of sale for commencement of the sale or pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (c).

If the sale of more than one parcel of real property has been scheduled for the same time and location by the same trustee, (1) any postponement of any of the sales shall be announced at the time published in the notice of sale, (2) the first sale shall commence at the time published in the notice of sale or immediately after the announcement of any postponement, and (3) each subsequent sale shall take place as soon as possible after the preceding sale has been completed.

(b) When the property consists of several known lots or parcels, they shall be sold separately unless the deed of trust or mortgage provides otherwise. When a portion of the property is claimed by a third person, who requires it to be sold separately, the portion subject to the claim may be thus sold. The trustor, if present at the sale, may also, unless the deed of trust or mortgage otherwise provides, direct the order in which property shall be sold, when the property consists of several known lots or parcels which may be sold to advantage separately, and the trustee shall follow that direction. After sufficient property has been sold to satisfy the indebtedness, no more can be sold.

If the property under power of sale is in two or more counties, the public auction sale of all of the property under the power of sale may take place in any one of the counties where the property or a portion thereof is located.

(c)

(1) There may be a postponement or postponements of the sale proceedings, including a postponement upon instruction by the beneficiary to the trustee that the sale proceedings be postponed, at any time prior to the completion of the sale for any period of time not to exceed a total of 365 days from the date set forth in the notice of sale. The trustee shall postpone the sale in accordance with any of the following:

(A) Upon the order of any court of competent jurisdiction.

(B) If stayed by operation of law.

(C) By mutual agreement, whether oral or in writing, of any trustor and any beneficiary or any mortgagor and any mortgagee.

(D) At the discretion of the trustee.

(2) In the event that the sale proceedings are postponed for a period or periods totaling more than 365 days, the scheduling of any further sale proceedings shall be preceded by giving a new notice of sale in the manner prescribed in Section 2924f. New fees incurred for the new notice of sale shall not exceed the amounts specified in Sections 2924c and 2924d, and shall not exceed reasonable costs that are necessary to comply with this paragraph.

(d) The notice of each postponement and the reason therefor shall be given by public declaration by the trustee at the time and place last appointed for sale. A public declaration of postponement shall also set forth the new date, time, and place of sale and the place of sale shall be the same place as originally fixed by the trustee for the sale. No other notice of postponement need be given. However, the sale shall be conducted no sooner than on the seventh day after the earlier of (1) dismissal of the action or (2) expiration or termination of the injunction, restraining order, or stay that required postponement of the sale, whether by entry of an order by a court of competent jurisdiction, operation of law, or otherwise, unless the injunction, restraining order, or subsequent order expressly directs the conduct of the sale within that seven-day period. For purposes of this subdivision, the seven-day period shall not include the day on which the action is dismissed, or the day on which the injunction, restraining order, or stay expires or is terminated. If the sale had been scheduled to occur, but this subdivision precludes its conduct during that seven-day period, a new notice of postponement shall be given if the sale had been scheduled to occur during that seven-day period. The trustee shall maintain records of each postponement and the reason therefor.

(e) Notwithstanding the time periods established under subdivision

(d), if postponement of a sale is based on a stay imposed by Title 11 of the United States Code (bankruptcy), the sale shall be conducted no sooner than the expiration of the stay imposed by that title and the seven-day provision of subdivision (d) shall not apply.

2924h.
(a) Each and every bid made by a bidder at a trustee’s sale under a power of sale contained in a deed of trust or mortgage shall be deemed to be an irrevocable offer by that bidder to purchase the property being sold by the trustee under the power of sale for the amount of the bid. Any second or subsequent bid by the same bidder or any other bidder for a higher amount shall be a cancellation of the prior bid.

(b) At the trustee’s sale the trustee shall have the right (1) to require every bidder to show evidence of the bidder’s ability to deposit with the trustee the full amount of his or her final bid in cash, a cashier’s check drawn on a state or national bank, a check drawn by a state or federal credit union, or a check drawn by a state or federal savings and loan association, savings association, or savings bank specified in Section 5102 of the Financial Code and authorized to do business in this state, or a cash equivalent which has been designated in the notice of sale as acceptable to the trustee prior to, and as a condition to, the recognizing of the bid, and to conditionally accept and hold these amounts for the duration of the sale, and (2) to require the last and highest bidder to deposit, if not deposited previously, the full amount of the bidder’s final bid in cash, a cashier’s check drawn on a state or national bank, a check drawn by a state or federal credit union, or a check drawn by a state or federal savings and loan association, savings association, or savings bank specified in Section 5102 of the Financial Code and authorized to do business in this state, or a cash equivalent which has been designated in the notice of sale as acceptable to the trustee, immediately prior to the completion of the sale, the completion of the sale being so announced by the fall of the hammer or in another customary manner. The present beneficiary of the deed of trust under foreclosure shall have the right to offset his or her bid or bids only to the extent of the total amount due the beneficiary including the trustee’s fees and expenses.

(c) In the event the trustee accepts a check drawn by a credit union or a savings and loan association pursuant to this subdivision or a cash equivalent designated in the notice of sale, the trustee may withhold the issuance of the trustee’s deed to the successful bidder submitting the check drawn by a state or federal credit union or savings and loan association or the cash equivalent until funds become available to the payee or endorsee as a matter of right.

For the purposes of this subdivision, the trustee’s sale shall be deemed final upon the acceptance of the last and highest bid, and shall be deemed perfected as of 8 a.m. on the actual date of sale if the trustee’s deed is recorded within 15 calendar days after the sale, or the next business day following the 15th day if the county recorder in which the property is located is closed on the 15th day. However, the sale is subject to an automatic rescission for a failure of consideration in the event the funds are not “available for withdrawal” as defined in Section 12413.1 of the Insurance Code. The trustee shall send a notice of rescission for a failure of consideration to the last and highest bidder submitting the check or alternative instrument, if the address of the last and highest bidder is known to the trustee.

If a sale results in an automatic right of rescission for failure of consideration pursuant to this subdivision, the interest of any lienholder shall be reinstated in the same priority as if the previous sale had not occurred.

(d) If the trustee has not required the last and highest bidder to deposit the cash, a cashier’s check drawn on a state or national bank, a check drawn by a state or federal credit union, or a check drawn by a state or federal savings and loan association, savings association, or savings bank specified in Section 5102 of the Financial Code and authorized to do business in this state, or a cash equivalent which has been designated in the notice of sale as acceptable to the trustee in the manner set forth in paragraph (2) of subdivision (b), the trustee shall complete the sale. If the last and highest bidder then fails to deliver to the trustee, when demanded, the amount of his or her final bid in cash, a cashier’s check drawn on a state or national bank, a check drawn by a state or federal credit union, or a check drawn by a state or federal savings and loan association, savings association, or savings bank specified in Section 5102 of the Financial Code and authorized to do business in this state, or a cash equivalent which has been designated in the notice of sale as acceptable to the trustee, that bidder shall be liable to the trustee for all damages which the trustee may sustain by the refusal to deliver to the trustee the amount of the final bid, including any court costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.

If the last and highest bidder willfully fails to deliver to the trustee the amount of his or her final bid in cash, a cashier’s check drawn on a state or national bank, a check drawn by a state or federal credit union, or a check drawn by a state or federal savings and loan association, savings association, or savings bank specified in Section 5102 of the Financial Code and authorized to do business in this state, or a cash equivalent which has been designated in the notice of sale as acceptable to the trustee, or if the last and highest bidder cancels a cashiers check drawn on a state or national bank, a check drawn by a state or federal credit union, or a check drawn by a state or federal savings and loan association, savings association, or savings bank specified in Section 5102 of the Financial Code and authorized to do business in this state, or a cash equivalent that has been designated in the notice of sale as acceptable to the trustee, that bidder shall be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500).

In the event the last and highest bidder cancels an instrument submitted to the trustee as a cash equivalent, the trustee shall provide a new notice of sale in the manner set forth in Section 2924f and shall be entitled to recover the costs of the new notice of sale as provided in Section 2924c.

(e) Any postponement or discontinuance of the sale proceedings shall be a cancellation of the last bid.

(f) In the event that this section conflicts with any other statute, then this section shall prevail.

(g) It shall be unlawful for any person, acting alone or in concert with others, (1) to offer to accept or accept from another, any consideration of any type not to bid, or (2) to fix or restrain bidding in any manner, at a sale of property conducted pursuant to a power of sale in a deed of trust or mortgage. However, it shall not be unlawful for any person, including a trustee, to state that a property subject to a recorded notice of default or subject to a sale conducted pursuant to this chapter is being sold in an “as-is” condition.

In addition to any other remedies, any person committing any act declared unlawful by this subdivision or any act which would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any beneficiary, trustor, or junior lienor shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or imprisoned in the county jail for not more than one year, or be punished by both that fine and imprisonment.

2924i.
(a) This section applies to loans secured by a deed of trust or mortgage on real property containing one to four residential units at least one of which at the time the loan is made is or is to be occupied by the borrower if the loan is for a period in excess of one year and is a balloon payment loan.

(b) This section shall not apply to (1) open end credit as defined in Regulation Z, whether or not the transaction is otherwise subject to Regulation Z, (2) transactions subject to Section 2956, or (3) loans made for the principal purpose of financing the construction of one or more residential units.

(c) At least 90 days but not more than 150 days prior to the due date of the final payment on a loan that is subject to this section, the holder of the loan shall deliver or mail by first-class mail, with a certificate of mailing obtained from the United States Postal Service, to the trustor, or his or her successor in interest, at the last known address of that person, a written notice which shall include all of the following:

(1) A statement of the name and address of the person to whom the final payment is required to be paid.

(2) The date on or before which the final payment is required to be paid.

(3) The amount of the final payment, or if the exact amount is unknown, a good faith estimate of the amount thereof, including unpaid principal, interest and any other charges, such amount to be determined assuming timely payment in full of all scheduled installments coming due between the date the notice is prepared and the date when the final payment is due.

(4) If the borrower has a contractual right to refinance the final payment, a statement to that effect.

If the due date of the final payment of a loan subject to this section is extended prior to the time notice is otherwise required under this subdivision, this notice requirement shall apply only to the due date as extended (or as subsequently extended).

(d) For purposes of this section:

(1) A “balloon payment loan” is a loan which provides for a final payment as originally scheduled which is more than twice the amount of any of the immediately preceding six regularly scheduled payments or which contains a call provision; provided, however, that if the call provision is not exercised by the holder of the loan, the existence of the unexercised call provision shall not cause the loan to be deemed to be a balloon payment loan.

(2) “Call provision” means a loan contract term that provides the holder of the loan with the right to call the loan due and payable either after a specified period has elapsed following closing or after a specified date.

(3) “Regulation Z” means any rule, regulation, or interpretation promulgated by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System under the Federal Truth in Lending Act, as amended (15 U.S.C. Sec. 1601 et seq.), and any interpretation or approval thereof issued by an official or employee of the Federal Reserve System duly authorized by the board under the Truth in Lending Act, as amended, to issue such interpretations or approvals.

(e) Failure to provide notice as required by subdivision (a) does not extinguish any obligation of payment by the borrower, except that the due date for any balloon payment shall be the date specified in the balloon payment note, or 90 days from the date of delivery or mailing of the notice required by subdivision (a), or the due date specified in the notice required by subdivision (a), whichever date is later. If the operation of this section acts to extend the term of any note, interest shall continue to accrue for the extended term at the contract rate and payments shall continue to be due at any periodic interval and on any payment schedule specified in the note and shall be credited to principal or interest under the terms of the note. Default in any extended periodic payment shall be considered a default under terms of the note or security instrument.

(f)

(1) The validity of any credit document or of any security document subject to the provisions of this section shall not be invalidated solely because of the failure of any person to comply with this section. However, any person who willfully violates any provision of this section shall be liable in the amount of actual damages suffered by the debtor as the proximate result of the violation, and, if the debtor prevails in any suit to recover that amount, for reasonable attorney’s fees.

(2) No person may be held liable in any action under this section if it is shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adopted to avoid any such error.

(g) The provisions of this section shall apply to any note executed on or after January 1, 1984.

2924j.
(a) Unless an interpleader action has been filed, within 30 days of the execution of the trustee’s deed resulting from a sale in which there are proceeds remaining after payment of the amounts required by paragraphs (1) and (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 2924k, the trustee shall send written notice to all persons with recorded interests in the real property as of the date immediately prior to the trustee’s sale who would be entitled to notice pursuant to subdivisions (b) and (c) of Section 2924b. The notice shall be sent by first-class mail in the manner provided in paragraph (1) of subdivision (c) of Section 2924b and inform each entitled person of each of the following:

(1) That there has been a trustee’s sale of the described real property.

(2) That the noticed person may have a claim to all or a portion of the sale proceeds remaining after payment of the amounts required by paragraphs (1) and (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 2924k.

(3) The noticed person may contact the trustee at the address provided in the notice to pursue any potential claim.

(4) That before the trustee can act, the noticed person may be required to present proof that the person holds the beneficial interest in the obligation and the security interest therefor. In the case of a promissory note secured by a deed of trust, proof that the person holds the beneficial interest may include the original promissory note and assignment of beneficial interests related thereto. The noticed person shall also submit a written claim to the trustee, executed under penalty of perjury, stating the following:

(A) The amount of the claim to the date of trustee’s sale.

(B) An itemized statement of the principal, interest, and other charges.

(C) That claims must be received by the trustee at the address stated in the notice no later than 30 days after the date the trustee sends notice to the potential claimant.

(b) The trustee shall exercise due diligence to determine the priority of the written claims received by the trustee to the trustee’ s sale surplus proceeds from those persons to whom notice was sent pursuant to subdivision (a). In the event there is no dispute as to the priority of the written claims submitted to the trustee, proceeds shall be paid within 30 days after the conclusion of the notice period. If the trustee has failed to determine the priority of written claims within 90 days following the 30-day notice period, then within 10 days thereafter the trustee shall deposit the funds with the clerk of the court pursuant to subdivision (c) or file an interpleader action pursuant to subdivision (e). Nothing in this section shall preclude any person from pursuing other remedies or claims as to surplus proceeds.

(c) If, after due diligence, the trustee is unable to determine the priority of the written claims received by the trustee to the trustee’s sale surplus of multiple persons or if the trustee determines there is a conflict between potential claimants, the trustee may file a declaration of the unresolved claims and deposit with the clerk of the superior court of the county in which the sale occurred, that portion of the sales proceeds that cannot be distributed, less any fees charged by the clerk pursuant to this subdivision. The declaration shall specify the date of the trustee’s sale, a description of the property, the names and addresses of all persons sent notice pursuant to subdivision (a), a statement that the trustee exercised due diligence pursuant to subdivision (b), that the trustee provided written notice as required by subdivisions (a) and (d) and the amount of the sales proceeds deposited by the trustee with the court. Further, the trustee shall submit a copy of the trustee’s sales guarantee and any information relevant to the identity, location, and priority of the potential claimants with the court and shall file proof of service of the notice required by subdivision (d) on all persons described in subdivision (a).

The clerk shall deposit the amount with the county treasurer or, if a bank account has been established for moneys held in trust under paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 77009 of the Government Code, in that account, subject to order of the court upon the application of any interested party. The clerk may charge a reasonable fee for the performance of activities pursuant to this subdivision equal to the fee for filing an interpleader action pursuant to Chapter 5.8 (commencing with Section 70600) of Title 8 of the Government Code. Upon deposit of that portion of the sale proceeds that cannot be distributed by due diligence, the trustee shall be discharged of further responsibility for the disbursement of sale proceeds. A deposit with the clerk of the court pursuant to this subdivision may be either for the total proceeds of the trustee’ s sale, less any fees charged by the clerk, if a conflict or conflicts exist with respect to the total proceeds, or that portion that cannot be distributed after due diligence, less any fees charged by the clerk.

(d) Before the trustee deposits the funds with the clerk of the court pursuant to subdivision (c), the trustee shall send written notice by first-class mail, postage prepaid, to all persons described in subdivision (a) informing them that the trustee intends to deposit the funds with the clerk of the court and that a claim for the funds must be filed with the court within 30 days from the date of the notice, providing the address of the court in which the funds were deposited, and a telephone number for obtaining further information.

Within 90 days after deposit with the clerk, the court shall consider all claims filed at least 15 days before the date on which the hearing is scheduled by the court, the clerk shall serve written notice of the hearing by first-class mail on all claimants identified in the trustee’s declaration at the addresses specified therein. Where the amount of the deposit is twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) or less, a proceeding pursuant to this section is a limited civil case. The court shall distribute the deposited funds to any and all claimants entitled thereto.

(e) Nothing in this section restricts the ability of a trustee to file an interpleader action in order to resolve a dispute about the proceeds of a trustee’s sale. Once an interpleader action has been filed, thereafter the provisions of this section do not apply.

(f) “Due diligence,” for the purposes of this section means that the trustee researched the written claims submitted or other evidence of conflicts and determined that a conflict of priorities exists between two or more claimants which the trustee is unable to resolve.

(g) To the extent required by the Unclaimed Property Law, a trustee in possession of surplus proceeds not required to be deposited with the court pursuant to subdivision (b) shall comply with the Unclaimed Property Law (Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 1500) of Title 10 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure).

(h) The trustee, beneficiary, or counsel to the trustee or beneficiary, is not liable for providing to any person who is entitled to notice pursuant to this section, information set forth in, or a copy of, subdivision (h) of Section 2945.3.

2924k.
(a) The trustee, or the clerk of the court upon order to the clerk pursuant to subdivision (d) of Section 2924j, shall distribute the proceeds, or a portion of the proceeds, as the case may be, of the trustee’s sale conducted pursuant to Section 2924h in the following order of priority:

(1) To the costs and expenses of exercising the power of sale and of sale, including the payment of the trustee’s fees and attorney’s fees permitted pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 2924d and subdivision (b) of this section.

(2) To the payment of the obligations secured by the deed of trust or mortgage which is the subject of the trustee’s sale.

(3) To satisfy the outstanding balance of obligations secured by any junior liens or encumbrances in the order of their priority.

(4) To the trustor or the trustor’s successor in interest. In the event the property is sold or transferred to another, to the vested owner of record at the time of the trustee’s sale.

(b) A trustee may charge costs and expenses incurred for such items as mailing and a reasonable fee for services rendered in connection with the distribution of the proceeds from a trustee’s sale, including, but not limited to, the investigation of priority and validity of claims and the disbursement of funds. If the fee charged for services rendered pursuant to this subdivision does not exceed one hundred dollars ($100), or one hundred twenty-five dollars ($125) where there are obligations specified in paragraph (3) of subdivision (a), the fee is conclusively presumed to be reasonable.

2924l.
(a) In the event that a trustee under a deed of trust is named in an action or proceeding in which that deed of trust is the subject, and in the event that the trustee maintains a reasonable belief that it has been named in the action or proceeding solely in its capacity as trustee, and not arising out of any wrongful acts or omissions on its part in the performance of its duties as trustee, then, at any time, the trustee may file a declaration of nonmonetary status. The declaration shall be served on the parties in the manner set forth in Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 1010) of Title 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

(b) The declaration of nonmonetary status shall set forth the status of the trustee as trustee under the deed of trust that is the subject of the action or proceeding, that the trustee knows or maintains a reasonable belief that it has been named as a defendant in the proceeding solely in its capacity as a trustee under the deed of trust, its reasonable belief that it has not been named as a defendant due to any acts or omissions on its part in the performance of its duties as trustee, the basis for that knowledge or reasonable belief, and that it agrees to be bound by whatever order or judgment is issued by the court regarding the subject deed of trust.

(c) The parties who have appeared in the action or proceeding shall have 15 days from the service of the declaration by the trustee in which to object to the nonmonetary judgment status of the trustee. Any objection shall set forth the factual basis on which the objection is based and shall be served on the trustee.

(d) In the event that no objection is served within the 15-day objection period, the trustee shall not be required to participate any further in the action or proceeding, shall not be subject to any monetary awards as and for damages, attorneys’ fees or costs, shall be required to respond to any discovery requests as a nonparty, and shall be bound by any court order relating to the subject deed of trust that is the subject of the action or proceeding.

(e) In the event of a timely objection to the declaration of nonmonetary status, the trustee shall thereafter be required to participate in the action or proceeding.

Additionally, in the event that the parties elect not to, or fail to, timely object to the declaration of nonmonetary status, but later through discovery, or otherwise, determine that the trustee should participate in the action because of the performance of its duties as a trustee, the parties may file and serve on all parties and the trustee a motion pursuant to Section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure that specifies the factual basis for the demand. Upon the court’s granting of the motion, the trustee shall thereafter be required to participate in the action or proceeding, and the court shall provide sufficient time prior to trial for the trustee to be able to respond to the complaint, to conduct discovery, and to bring other pretrial motions in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure.

(f) Upon the filing of the declaration of nonmonetary status, the time within which the trustee is required to file an answer or other responsive pleading shall be tolled for the period of time within which the opposing parties may respond to the declaration. Upon the timely service of an objection to the declaration on nonmonetary status, the trustee shall have 30 days from the date of service within which to file an answer or other responsive pleading to the complaint or cross-complaint.

(g) For purposes of this section, “trustee” includes any agent or employee of the trustee who performs some or all of the duties of a trustee under this article, and includes substituted trustees and agents of the beneficiary or trustee.

MERS Brief

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES …………………………………………………………………………. i
INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE…………………………………………………………………..1
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT …………………………………………………………………….2
ARGUMENT……………………………………………………………………………………………….4
I. The MERS System Was Designed Without Regard to Consumers’ Rights4
II. MERS’ Claims That the MERS System Is Beneficial to
Consumers Are Unsupported. …………………………………………………………….6
III. Homeowners Have a Right to Know Who Owns Their Loans………………..8
IV. The MERS System Causes Significant Confusion Among Borrowers,
and Has a Particularly Detrimental Impact on the Elderly and
Other Vulnerable Borrowers Frequently Victimized by
Predatory Lenders. ………………………………………………………………………… 14
V. The Public Has a Significant and Enduring Interest in Preserving and
Protecting the Free Public Databases Created by the Land and Court
Records of This Nation. …………………………………………………………………. 18
A. Public land and court data records facilitate research investigating
the root causes of a variety of mortgage and other land related
problems………………………………………………………………………………….. 18
B. The public databases have played an important role in facilitating
understanding and government response to the recent “foreclosure
boom.”…………………………………………………………………………………….. 23
C. Through its penetration of the public databases MERS has caused
a dramatic deterioration in the quality and quantity of publicly
available information. ……………………………………………………………….. 28
D. The MERS Shield Creates an Irretrievable Void in the Property
Records that Harms Many Constituencies……………………………………. 32
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E. Restoration and enhancement of the public database is critical to enable
government to function effectively……………………………………………… 33
F. More, not less public data is needed to enable a carefully targeted and
rapid governmental response to problems in the housing market. …… 35
VI. MERS’ Subversion of the Public Policy Behind Public Recordings Costs
County and City Clerks Over a Billion Dollars. ………………………………… 38
VII. MERS Lacks Standing to Bring Foreclosure Actions in Its Name……….. 39
CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………………………………. 46
i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Altegra Credit Co. v. Tin Chu et al.,
No. 04326-2004 (Kings County Supreme Ct. March 25, 2004) ………………. 24, 36
Associates Home Equity v. Troup,
343 N.J. Super. 254 (App. Div. 2001)……………………………………………………….. 21
Countrywide Home Loans v. Hannaford,
2004 WL 1836744 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2004). ……………………………………. 17
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company as Trustee v. Primrose,
No. 05-25796 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Suffolk Cty., July 13, 2006);…………………………. 46
Everhome Mortgage Company v. Hendriks,
No. 05-024042 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Suffolk Cty., June 27, 2006);………………………. 46
Freedom Mortg. Corp. v. Burnham Mortg., Inc.,
2006 WL 695467 (N.D. Ill., Mar. 13, 2006) ………………………………………………. 17
In re BNT Terminals, Inc.,
125 B.R. 963, 970 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990)…………………………………………………. 45
Kluge v. Fugazy,
145 A.D.2d 537, 536 N.Y.S.2d 92 (2d Dept. 1988)…………………………………….. 44
LaSalle Bank v. Holguin, No. 06-9286, slip opinion (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Suffolk Cty.,
Aug. 9, 2006);…………………………………………………………………………………… 43, 45
LaSalle Bank v. Lamy,
2006 N.Y. Misc. Lexis 2127 (NY. Sup. Ct., Suffolk Cty., Aug. 17, 2006)……. 46
MERS v. Bomba,
No. 1645/03 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Kings County). ……………………………………………… 48
MERS v. DeMarco,
No. 05-1372, slip op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Suffolk Cty., April 11, 2005) ……………… 46
MERS v. Griffin,
No.16-2004-CA-002155, slip op. (Fla. Cir. Ct. May 27, 2004)…………………….. 49
MERS v. Ramdoolar,
No. 05-019863 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Suffolk Cty., Mar. 7, 2006);………………………… 46
MERS v. Shuster,
No. 05-26354/06 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Suffolk Cty., July 13, 2006)………………… 44, 46
MERS v. Trapani,
No. 04-19057, slip op. at 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Suffolk Cty., Mar. 7, 2005):……….. 48
MERS v. Wells,
No. 06-5242, slip op. at 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Suffolk Cty., Sept. 25, 2006)………… 45
MERS v.Delzatto,
No. 05-020490 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Suffolk Cty., Dec. 9, 2005)…………………………. 46
ii
MERS, Inc. v. Parker,
No. 017622/2004, slip op. at 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Suffolk Cty. Oct. 19, 2004) …… 46
MERS, Inc. v. Schoenster,
No. 16969-2004, (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Suffolk Cty., Sept. 15, 2004); …………………… 47
MERS. v. Burek,
798 N.Y.S.2d 346 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004)…………………………………………………….. 44
MERS. v. Burek,
798 N.Y.S.2d 346, 347 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Richmond Cty. 2004)……………………… 46
Merscorp, Inc. v. Romaine,
No. 9688/01, slip op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Suffolk Co. May 12, 2004)…………………….8
Miguel v. Country Funding Corp.,
309 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2002). …………………………………………………………………. 16
Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys. v. Estrella,
390 F.3d 522 (7th Cir. 2004) ……………………………………………………………………. 16
Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys. v. Neb. Dep’t of Banking & Fin.,
704 N.W.2d 784 (Neb. 2005) ……………………………………………………………… 16, 17
Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Griffin,
No.16-2004-CA-002155, slip op. (Fla. Cir. Ct. May 27, 2004)…………………….. 47
Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Azize,
No. 05-001295-CI-11 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Pinellas Cty. Apr. 18, 2005)………………….. 47
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Rees,
2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2437 (Conn. Superior Ct. September 4, 2003). ……. 44
People v. Albertina,
09141-2005 (Kings County Supreme Ct. Sept. 28, 2006) ………………………. 24, 36
People v. Constant,
No. 01843A-2006 (Suffolk Supreme Ct. Oct. 12, 2006)( ……………………….. 24, 36
People v. Larman,
No. 06253-2005 (Kings County Supreme Ct. Sept. 20, 2006) ………………… 24, 36
People v. Sandella,
No. 02899-2006 (Kings County Supreme. Ct. Sept. 27, 2006) ……………….. 24, 36
Roberts v. WMC Mortg. Corp.,
173 Fed. Appx. 575 (9th Cir. 2006). …………………………………………………………. 16
Taylor, Bean & Whitaker, Mortg. Corp. v. Brown,
583 S.E.2d 844 (Ga. 2003) ………………………………………………………………………. 47
Statutes
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 12 USC § 2801 et. seq ………………………………… 28
N.Y. Banking Law § 6-1…………………………………………………………………………….. 31
N.Y. General Business Law § 349……………………………………………………………….. 18
iii
N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 771-a……………………………………………………………………….. 31
N.Y. Real Prop. Acts. Law § 1302 ………………………………………………………………. 31
Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq………………………………………… 15, 16
Truth in Lending Act, Regulation Z § 226.23 ……………………………………………….. 15
U.C.C. §§ 9-203(g), 9-308(e); …………………………………………………………………….. 44
Regulations
69 Fed. Reg. 16,769 (Mar. 31, 2004),…………………………………………………………… 16
Secondary Sources
40 Millionth Loan Registered on MERS (Inside MERS, May/ June 2006),
available at http://www. mersinc.com/newsroom/currentnews.aspx …………….. 42
Alan M. White and Cathy Lesser Mansfield,
Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L & POL’Y REV 233 …………………………………. 19
Andrew Harris,
Suffolk Judge Denies Requests by Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems,
N.Y. LAW J. (Aug. 31, 2004) ……………………………………………………………………. 47
Bunce, Harold, Gruenstein, Debbie et al.,
Subprime Lending: The Smoking Gun of Predatory Lending? (HUD 2001),
http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/brd/12Bunce.pdf ………………. 24, 27, 32
D. Rose, Chicago Foreclosure Update 2005, http://www.nticus.
org/currentevents/press/pdf/chicagoforeclosure_update.pdf…………………….. 25
D. Rose, Chicago Foreclosure Update 2006 (July), http://www.nticus.
org/documents/ChicagoForeclosureUpdate2006.pdf ………………………………. 25
Daniel Immergluck & Geoff Smith,
The External Costs of Foreclosure: The Impact of Single-Family Mortgage
Foreclosures on Property Values,
17 Housing Pol’y Debate, Issue 1 (2006)……………………………………………… 28, 39
David Rice, Predatory Lending Bill Caught in Debate, Winston-Salem Journal,
April 27, 1999………………………………………………………………………………………… 30
Debbie Gruenstein & Christopher Herbert,
Analyzing Trends in Subprime Originations and Foreclosures: A Case Study of
the Boston Metro Area, 1995-1999 (2000), http://www.abtassociates.com
/reports/20006470781991.pdf ………………………………………………………………….. 27
Duda & Apgar, Mortgage Foreclosures in Atlanta: Patterns and Policy Issues,
2000-2005 (2005) …………………………………………………………………… 30, 35, 38, 39
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council,
A Guide to HMDA: Getting it Right! (Dec. 2003). ……………………………………… 41
iv
Jill D. Rein,
Significant Changes to Commencing Foreclosure Actions in the Name of MERS,
available at http://www.usfn.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=
Article_Library&template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentID=3899……….. 49
Kathe Newman & Elvin K. Wyly,
Geographies of Mortgage Market Segmentation: The Case of Essex County,
New Jersey, 19 Housing Stud. 53, 54 (Jan. 2004) ………………………………………. 38
Kathleen C. Engel, Do Cities Have Standing? Redressing the Externalities of
Predatory Lending, 38 Conn. L. Rev. 355 (2006). ……………………………………… 25
Kimberly Burnett, Bulbul Kaul, & Chris Herbert,
Analysis of Property Turnover Patterns in Atlanta, Baltimore, Cleveland and
Philadelphia (2004), http://
http://www.abtassociates.com/reports/analysis_property_turnover_patterns.pdf 27, 31
Kimberly Burnett, Chris Herbert et al.,
Subprime Originations and Foreclosures in New York State: A Case Study of
Nassau, Suffolk, and Westchester Counties (2002)……………………… 21, 24, 30, 31
Les Christie, “Foreclosures Spiked in August,” (Sept. 13, 2006), available at:
http://money.cnn.com/2006/09/13/real_estate/foreclosures_spiking/index.htm?po
stversion=2006091305 ……………………………………………………………………………. 39
Lindley Higgins, Effective Community-Based Strategies for Preventing
Foreclosures,1993-2004 (2005) ………………………………………………………….. 26, 27
Lorain County Reinvestment Fund,
The Expanding Role of Subprime Lending in Ohio’s Burgeoning Foreclosure
Problem: A Three County Study of a Statewide Problem, (2002),
http://cohhio.org/projects/ocrp/SubprimeLendingReport.pdf……………………&#8230;.. 23
Lynne Dearborn, Mortgage Foreclosures and Predatory Lending in St. Clair
County, Illinois 1996-2000 (2003) ……………………………………………………………. 23
Margot Saunders and Alys Cohen,
Federal Regulation of Consumer Credit: The Cause or the Cure for Predatory
Lending? (Joint Center for Housing Studies 2004)……………………………………… 28
Neal Walters & Sharon Hermanson,
Subprime Mortgage Lending and Older Borrowers (AARP Public Policy
Institute), Data Digest Number 74 (2001)………………………………………………….. 28
Neighborhood Housing Services (NHS) of Chicago,
Preserving Homeownership: Community-Development Implications of the New
Mortgage Market (2004) …………………………………………………………………………. 26
Paul Bellamy, The Expanding Role of Subprime Lending in Ohio’s Burgeoning
Foreclosure Problem: A Three County Study of a Statewide Problem, 1994-2001
(2002)……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 29
v
Phyllis K. Slesinger and Daniel McLaughlin,
Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 805, 811, 814-15
(1995)……………………………………………………………………………………………………….9
Ramon Garcia, Residential Foreclosures in the City of Buffalo,
1990-2000 (2003) ……………………………………………………………………………… 24, 27
Richard Lord, AMERICAN NIGHTMARE: PREDATORY LENDING AND THE
FORECLOSURE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 157 (Common Courage Press 2005). 22
Richard Stock, Center for Business and Economic Research,
Predation in the Sub-Prime Lending Market: Montgomery County Vol. I., 1994-
2001 (2001), http://www.mvfairhousing.com/cber/pdf/
Executive%20summary.PDF………………………………………………………………. 26, 29
Robert Avery, Kenneth Brevoort, Glenn Canner,
Higher-Priced Home Lending and the 2005 HMDA Data (Sept. 8, 2006) …….. 28
Steve C. Bourassa, Predatory Lending In Jefferson County: A Report to the
Louisville Urban League (Urban Studies Institute, University of Louisville)
(December 2003) ……………………………………………………………………………………. 35
T. Nagazumi & D. Rose,
Preying on Neighborhoods: Subprime mortgage lending and Chicagoland
foreclosures, 1993-1998 (Sept. 21, 1999 …………………………………… 25, 26, 31, 34
The Reinvestment Fund, Mortgage Foreclosure Filings in Delaware (2006) …… 23
The Reinvestment Fund, A Study of Mortgage Foreclosures in Monroe County and
The Commonwealth’s Response (2004) …………………………………………………….. 23
The Reinvestment Fund, Mortgage Foreclosure Filings in Pennsylvania (2005). 23
William C. Apgar & Mark Duda, Collateral Damage: The Municipal Impact of
Today’s Mortgage Foreclosure Boom 1996-2000 (May 11, 2005),
http://www.nw.org/Network/neighborworksprogs/
foreclosuresolutions/documents/Apgar-DudaStudyFinal.pdf…………………. passim
William Apgar, The Municipal Cost of Foreclosures: A Chicago Case Study
(Feb. 27, 2005) http://www.hpfonline.org/PDF/Apgar-
Duda_Study_Full_Version.pdf………………………………………………………. 25, 26, 38
Zach Schiller, Foreclosure Growth in Ohio (2006) ………………………………………… 23
Zach Schiller and Jeremy Iskin, Foreclosure Growth in Ohio: A Brief Update
(2005), http://www.policymattersohio.org/pdf/
Foreclosure_Growth_Ohio_2005.pdf………………………………………………………… 23
Zach Schiller, Whitney Meredith, & Pam Rosado, Home Insecurity 2004:
Foreclosure Growth in Ohio, available at
http://www.policymattersohio.org/pdf/Home_Insecurity_2004.pdf……………&#8230;. 23
Treatises
Restatement (3d), Property (Mortgages) § 5.4(a) (1997) ………………………………… 44
vi
Other Authorities
American Community Survey, U.S. Census Bureau (2005). …………………………… 21
Black’s Law Dictionary 727 (6th ed. abr.) ……………………………………………………. 17
Consumer Protection: Federal and State Agencies in Combating Predatory
Lending, United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman and
Ranking Minority Member, Special Committee on Aging, U.S. Senate (January
2004), pp. 99-102……………………………………………………………………………………. 20
Curbing Predatory Home Mortgage Lending, U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban
Development and U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, 47 (2000), available at
http://www.huduser.org/publications/hsgfin/curbing.html ………………… 19, 32, 41
Housing Characteristics: 2000 (US Census Bureau 10/01)……………………………… 19
Informal Op. New York State Att’y Gen 2001-2 (April 5, 2001);………………… 8, 13
Inside B&C Lending at 2 (February 3, 2006)………………………………………………… 13
Pennsylvania Department of Banking, Losing the American Dream: A Report on
Residential Mortgage Foreclosures and Abusive Lending Practices in
Pennsylvania (2005). ………………………………………………………………………………. 23
Press Release, Office of Attorney General, N.J. Div. of Criminal Justice Targets
financial crime (Nov. 14, 2004),
http://nj.gov/lps/newsreleases04/pr20041117b.html…………………………………&#8230;. 25
Press Release, Sen. Mikulski Formed Task Force and Secured Federal Assistance
to Address Flipping Problem (Oct. 9, 2003) ………………………………………………. 25
U.S. Census 2000………………………………………………………………………………………. 21
1
INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici are non-profit legal services and public interest organizations who
have special expertise in defending foreclosures and in documenting how the
mortgage market works. Amici South Brooklyn Legal Services, Jacksonville Area
Legal Aid, Inc., Empire Justice Center, Legal Services for the Elderly, Queens
Legal Aid, Legal Aid Bureau of Buffalo, Legal Services of New York City–Staten
Island, Fair Housing Justice Center of HELP USA, and AARP’s Foundation
Litigation and Legal Counsel for the Elderly provide free legal representation to
low-income individuals and families who are victims of abusive mortgage lending
and servicing practices, and who are at risk of foreclosure. Amici Center for
Responsible Lending, National Consumer Law Center, National Association of
Consumer Advocates, and Neighborhood Economic Development Advocacy
Project are non-profit research and policy organizations dedicated to exposing and
eliminating abusive practices in the mortgage market. AARP advocates on behalf
of consumers in the mortgage marketplace and through its Public Policy Institute
conducts research on a wide variety of issues affecting older persons, including
subprime mortgage lending and mortgage broker practices.
Collectively, amici represent or counsel thousands of low to moderate
income homeowners each year. Amici prevent foreclosures through defense of
foreclosure actions in court; negotiating with foreclosing lenders to address
2
servicing abuses that inflate mortgage balances and to modify mortgages to give
homeowners a fresh start; filing administrative claims with city, state, and federal
agencies; conducting community outreach and education to address predatory
lending and abusive servicing; and working on various policy issues to protect
consumers and prevent abusive mortgage lending and servicing practices.
The Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) has a
substantial and detrimental impact on amici as it curtails their ability to conduct
research and advocacy and impairs the rights of their homeowner clients. In
particular, MERS’ failure to conform to New York law significantly undermines
the public interest in preserving the free public database created by land and court
records and imposes substantial harms on amici’s homeowner clients. Therefore
amici urge this court to reverse the decision below and to find in favor of
Respondents-Appellants.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Through their extensive experience representing individual homeowners and
closely studying both the national and local mortgage markets, amici have learned
first-hand the detrimental effect of MERS’ electronic registration system on
homeowners, and its destructive impact on the public land records that serve the
public interest in a variety of critical ways. Although this case turns on a question
of New York law, amici and the homeowners they represent nationwide have
3
experienced the same obstacles, confusion, and frustration that are created by the
MERS system in New York State.
The MERS system harms homeowners and undermines the public interest
by concealing information that is essential both to the maintenance of accurate
public land and court records, and to individual homeowners, particularly those
who seek redress for predatory mortgages or face foreclosure. Three issues
highlight the importance of these concerns to homeowners and to the public
interest. First, because MERS obfuscates the true owner of the note, MERS
creates significant and detrimental confusion among borrowers and homeowners,
their advocates, and the courts. Second, MERS frustrates established public
policy, which dictates that title information must be publicly available, thus
causing harm to state and local governments, advocacy groups, and academic
researchers who routinely rely on public database information to inform legislative
decision-making, to support law enforcement, and to advance policy solutions to a
wide variety of housing and mortgage issues. Third, MERS’ routine practice of
improperly commencing foreclosure actions solely in its name, even though it is
not the true owner of the note, flaunts courts rules and raises significant standing
concerns. Accordingly, amici urge this Court to reverse the decision of the court
below and find in favor of Respondents-Appellants Edward P. Romaine and the
County of Suffolk, and against Petitioners-Respondents MERS.
4
ARGUMENT
I. The MERS System Was Designed Without Regard to Consumers’
Rights
MERS is the brainchild of the mortgage industry, designed to facilitate the
transfer of mortgages on the secondary mortgage market and save lenders the cost
of filing assignments. See, e.g., Br. for Petitioners-Respondents MERS
(hereinafter “MERS Br.”) at 6-7 (listing the founding members of MERS as, inter
alia, Mortgage Bankers Association of America, the Federal National Mortgage
Association…and others within the real estate finance industry); Record on Appeal
(hereinafter “R.__”) at 604-6. (MERS is in an “administrative capacity to serve the
sole purpose of appearing in the county land records”). MERS is not a mortgage
lender; nor does it ever own or have any beneficial interest in the note or mortgage.
See, e.g., Merscorp, Inc. v. Romaine, No. 9688/01, slip op. at 2 n.3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.,
Suffolk Co. May 12, 2004); Informal Op. New York State Att’y Gen 2001-2 (April
5, 2001), 2001 N.Y. AG LEXIS 2; R. at 727-28. Nevertheless, MERS substitutes
its name on the public records for the name of the actual owners of mortgage loans.
In so doing, MERS is rapidly undermining the accuracy of the public land and
court records databases, establishing in their place a proprietary national electronic
registry system that “tracks” beneficial ownership and servicing rights and whose
information is inaccessible to the public. Yet the design of MERS’ registration
system and foreclosure procedures considered neither the public’s interest, nor the
5
rights and interests of consumers. See, e.g., Phyllis K. Slesinger and Daniel
McLaughlin, Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 805,
811, 814-15 (1995) (MERS initially sought input from industry representatives; no
input sought from consumers).
Not surprisingly, MERS operates in derogation of the rights and interests of
consumers and the public interest. MERS claims that the MERS system is
beneficial to consumers because the “cost savings are substantial,” the flow of
funds are sped up, and the consumer can determine which company services her
mortgage by calling a toll-free number. MERS Br. at 9-11, 37-38. However, these
arguments are unsupported and disregard the significant obstacles and confusion
that MERS creates. As described below, the detrimental effects of MERS—the
hiding of the true note and mortgage holder and the insulation of the holder from
potential liability in situations involving predatory loans— substantially outweigh
any purported benefit to consumers of the MERS system. Indeed, MERS is
fundamentally unfair to homeowners who are trapped in the system because it
transmutes public mortgage loan ownership information, required to be recorded in
the public databases, into secret and proprietary information, inaccessible to both
the borrower and the public.
6
II. MERS’ Claims That the MERS System Is Beneficial to Consumers Are
Unsupported.
MERS has not ushered in a beneficent new regime in the mortgage lending
industry, nor does it impart cost savings or greater access to information to
homeowners. See MERS Br. at 11, 37, 39. In fact, the opposite is true. The only
beneficiaries of the MERS system are MERS and its member lenders and servicers.
The losers are millions of homeowners who are unwittingly drawn into MERS’
virtual black hole of information, and the public at large. Far from filling an
information void, the MERS system creates an information drain, removing the
true note holder’s identity from the public records and substituting MERS in its
stead. Significantly, while systematically eliminating any public record of
mortgage loan ownership and assignments, MERS has not even bothered to
maintain a private database of intermediate assignments—tracking only the
identity of the loan servicer. R. at 635-637. As a result, the judges and court staff
who are forced to deal with the confusion spawned by the increasing number of
land records and foreclosures filed in the name of MERS can also be counted
among the casualties of the MERS system.
Any cost savings resulting from the MERS system benefit its member
lenders, who are freed from the costs of filing mortgage assignments, not
homeowners or the public. These cost savings are touted as MERS’ core purpose:
“This [MERS process] eliminates the need to record an assignment to your
7
MERS® Ready buyer, saving on average $22 per loan.” (“What is MERS?”
promotional materials) and “Save at least $22 on each loan by eliminating
assignments.” (MERS benefit materials). See also
http://www.mersinc.com/why_mers (last visited September 20, 2006).
Moreover, MERS’ assertion that homeowners are the beneficiaries of the
MERS system simply cannot be reconciled with the practices espoused by MERS
or those of its members. MERS Br. at 11, 38. While MERS claims that its
member lenders pass on savings to their borrowers, MERS Br. at 11, there is no
indication this is actually happening; nor is it any part of the MERS sales pitch to
lenders. To the contrary, thanks to MERS, an additional fee frequently appears on
the HUD-1 Settlement Statement: a MERS fee of $3.95. See R. at 48. MERS
encourages its members to charge this additional fee:
Q. Can I pass the MERS registration fee on to the borrower?
A. YES. On conventional loans you may be able to pass this fee
on to the borrower, but you should check with your legal
advisors to ensure that you are in compliance with federal and
state laws. On government loans, please check with your local
field office for availability and approval.
(MERS promotional FAQ).
There is no record evidence that any costs savings are passed on to
borrowers. The opposite is true. The $3.95 MERS assignment fee is built into the
standard fees charged by lenders at closing and variously denominated as
8
“origination fee,” “underwriting fee,” “processing fee,” “administration fee,”
“funding fee,” etc. on the HUD-1 settlement sheet. Under the MERS system, it is
MERS and its members who are gaining financially, clerk’s offices which are
deprived of valuable operating funds, and consumers who are losing ground.
MERS erroneously touts its system as providing greater access to
information through the availability of a toll-free number to identify the
homeowner’s loan servicer. See R. at 48; MERS Br. at 37, 39. MERS’ repeated
emphasis, MERS Br. at 9-10, 39, on this issue is a red herring. The identity of the
servicer is well known to the homeowner, who receives the servicer’s monthly bills
and makes mortgage payments to the servicer. In fact, the identity of the servicer
is perhaps the only information homeowners know about their loan once MERS is
involved. MERS does not offer homeowners a toll-free number to learn who
actually owns their note and mortgage; indeed MERS does not track that
information itself. Yet this is the key piece of information that homeowners no
longer possess and are unable to access because MERS has eliminated it from the
public records.
III. Homeowners Have a Right to Know Who Owns Their Loans.
MERS’ existence is justified by a slender reed of an opinion letter of its
counsel, a letter which cavalierly asserts that “there is no reason why, under a
mortgage, the entity holding or owning the note may not keep the fact of its
9
ownership confidential. . . The public has no significant interest in learning the true
identity of the holder of the note.” R. at 731. This self-serving opinion is utterly
incorrect, and dangerously ignores consumer rights and the strong public interest in
maintaining an accurate and complete public recordation system.
The 2001 Opinion of the Attorney General of the State of New York is a
clear refutation of MERS’ foundational principle that MERS’ elimination of public
records does not violate public policy:
Designating MERS as the mortgagee in the mortgagor-mortgagee
indices would not satisfy the intent of Real Property Law’s recording
provisions to inform the public about the existence of encumbrances,
and to establish a public record containing identifying information as
to those encumbrances. If MERS ever went out of business, for
example, it would be virtually impossible for someone relying on the
public record to ascertain the identity of the actual mortgagee if only
MERS had been designated as the mortgagee of record.
2001 N.Y. Op. Attorney General 1010; 2001 N.Y. AG LEXIS 2.
Moreover, the importance of maintaining public records that accurately
identify the mortgage holder has assumed greater importance in recent years, as
mortgages are increasingly transferred into the secondary market and are only
rarely retained by the originating mortgage lender. A booming secondary
mortgage market has emerged with the issuance of mortgage-backed securities
which are sold to Wall Street firms in pools and securitized. These securitized
mortgages have skyrocketed from $11 billion in 1994 to more than $500 billion in
2005. Inside B&C Lending at 2 (February 3, 2006).
10
What this securitization boom means for consumers is that the entity that
owns the note and mortgage is likely to change several times over the life of the
loan. Before MERS, the easiest way to determine the current owner was to check
the public records for the last assignment of the mortgage.1 In the MERS system,
however, assignments are never filed except when the mortgage is initially
assigned to MERS or assigned to a non-MERS member mortgagee. As a result,
when MERS is the nominee for a mortgage, the homeowner cannot determine who
owns her note by checking the public records, nor can she obtain this information
from MERS. The MERS system thus actively subverts the public policy of
maintaining a transparent, public title history of real property.
It is essential for consumers to be able to identify the owner of their loan,
since the owner alone retains the power to make certain decisions about the loan,
particularly when borrowers fall behind. Knowing the identity of the servicer is
rarely sufficient for consumers who are having problems with their loans, as
servicers often lack the necessary authority to enter into loan modifications with
borrowers or restructure overdue payments. Borrowers may also benefit from
direct contact with owners when servicers’ interests in collecting late fees and
collection fees run counter to borrowers’ interests in bringing their loans current.
1 The recording of an assignment is beneficial to the borrower, and the public, by openly stating
the current owner of the mortgage.
11
Thus, the homeowner’s ability to locate the owner of the note and mortgage is
important both to informal resolution of payment delinquencies and when more
serious problems arise.
The homeowner’s inability to determine quickly who owns the note and
mortgage also prevents the exercise of important rights under federal and state law
and makes it difficult to adequately defend foreclosure proceedings. Federal law
creates a right of rescission whenever a homeowner refinances a home, or
otherwise enters into a nonpurchase money mortgage. If the lender fails to comply
fully with the dictates of the Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., the
borrower is entitled to exercise the right of rescission for an extended three year
period. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f). When exercised, this right is extremely powerful: it
cancels the lender’s security interest or mortgage, credits all payments entirely to
principal, relieves the homeowner of the obligation to repay any closing costs or
fees financed, and provides the possibility of recovering statutory and
compensatory damages. 12 C.F.R. § 226.23. Of critical importance in the context
of this proceeding, the right to rescind may be asserted against assignees of the
obligation, i.e. the note holder itself; in fact, rescission is one of the few tools
available to homeowners to stop a foreclosure. 15 U.S.C. § 1641(c).
Unlike note holders, servicers are not liable for rescission, 15 U.S.C.
§1641(f)(1), and some courts have refused to honor a homeowner’s rescission even
12
where the servicer’s identity is the only information available to the homeowner.
See Miguel v. Country Funding Corp., 309 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2002). While the
Federal Reserve Board subsequently amended its Official Staff Commentary to
clarify that service upon an agent of the holder, as defined by state law, is
sufficient, where the creditor does not designate a person to receive the notice of
rescission, 69 Fed. Reg. 16,769 (Mar. 31, 2004), many ambiguities remain and
courts have continued to question the adequacy of notice unless given to the holder
of the loan. See, e.g., Roberts v. WMC Mortg. Corp., 173 Fed. Appx. 575 (9th Cir.
2006). Prudent practice makes it essential for a rescinding homeowner to identify
and notify the holder.
Identifying the holder of the note is dependent upon accurate land records, as
servicers incur no liability for withholding this information. While the Truth-in-
Lending Act requires servicers to tell borrowers, upon request, who the holder is,
15 U.S.C. §1641(f)(2), there is no requirement that the response be timely and
there is no remedy for its violation. The experience of amici is that servicers rarely,
if ever, provide this information.
Service upon MERS is likewise ineffective, as MERS is neither the holder
nor the servicer. See Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys. v. Estrella, 390 F.3d 522 (7th
Cir. 2004) (MERS is a nominee on the mortgage only); Mortg. Elec. Registration
Sys. v. Neb. Dep’t of Banking & Fin., 704 N.W.2d 784 (Neb. 2005) (MERS argues
13
that it is only nominee of mortgages). As “nominee,” MERS is not an agent of the
holder for purposes of receipt of rescission notices. Cf., e.g., Black’s Law
Dictionary 727 (6th ed. abr.) (defining nominee as “one designated to act for
another as his representative in a rather limited sense”); Mortg. Elec. Registration
Sys. v. Neb. Dep’t of Banking & Fin., 704 N.W.2d 784 (Neb. 2005) (MERS argues
that it is only nominee of mortgages and is contractually prohibited from
exercising any rights to the mortgages). Moreover, the history of litigation
involving MERS confirms that it would be foolish to rely on notice to MERS as
notice to the holder of the mortgage. See, e.g., Freedom Mortg. Corp. v. Burnham
Mortg., Inc., 2006 WL 695467 (N.D. Ill., Mar. 13, 2006) (lender arguing that it is
not bound by foreclosure bids of MERS as its nominee); Countrywide Home Loans
v. Hannaford, 2004 WL 1836744 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2004).
This leaves a homeowner in a trick box. In order to exercise an important
right, the homeowner must provide notice to the holder of the note or its agent.
MERS does not serve as the holder, nor does it serve as the holder’s agent for this
purpose; it does not believe it is required to comply with the Truth-in-Lending Act
at all, according to a memo prepared by MERS’ counsel (R. at 745-6); and it
refuses or is incapable of providing the homeowner with the name or address of the
holder of the note. Surely this is not an unexpected consequence of the MERS
system. As architect of a system that, by design, withholds information from
14
homeowners that is key to their exercising a critical federal right, MERS has and
continues to infringe on homeowners’ rights of rescission.
MERS’ obfuscation of the true holder of the note further infringes on
homeowners’ rights to rescind abusive, high-cost home loans pursuant to New
York State’s Banking Law 6-l, which was enacted in October 2002 to counter
predatory lending abuses in the mortgage market. Many other state and common
law rights of borrowers are also imperiled by the MERS system. In foreclosure
proceedings, assignee note holders often claim that they are a holder in due course
when a consumer raises certain defenses such as common law fraud or deceptive
acts and practices (codified in New York State as General Business Law § 349).
Before MERS, consumers could easily access the complete chain of title through
the public records by identifying each assignment of the loan. Under the MERS
system, all of this information is lost to the homeowner, putting homeowners at a
significant and unwarranted disadvantage in defending foreclosures.
IV. The MERS System Causes Significant Confusion Among Borrowers,
and Has a Particularly Detrimental Impact on the Elderly and Other
Vulnerable Borrowers Frequently Victimized by Predatory Lenders.
In the last decade scholars and government regulatory agencies examining
mortgage lending practices, including predatory lending, have spotlighted the
importance of creating transparency in the mortgage marketplace through
improved disclosures to borrowers and enhanced consumer literacy. See Curbing
15
Predatory Home Mortgage Lending, U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban
Development and U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, 47 (2000), available at
http://www.huduser.org/publications/hsgfin/curbing.html (“HUD-Treasury
Report”). The MERS system flies in the face of this goal—obfuscating the
mortgage process and violating consumers’ right to know. The confusion
engendered by MERS has a particularly detrimental impact on the most vulnerable
homeowners.
According to the 2000 Census, 12.9 percent of New York State’s population
is comprised of people who are 65 years and older. Of these elderly state residents,
over 66% are homeowners, while 42.8% of seniors residing in New York City own
their homes.2 These numbers suggest that a large number of the consumers
affected by the MERS system are older New Yorkers.
Declining vision, hearing, mobility and cognitive skills make it more
difficult for older borrowers to extract the critical information they need from
federally mandated disclosure documents. See Alan M. White and Cathy Lesser
Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L & POL’Y REV 233. Like many
consumers, older adults often can not understand mortgage documents, as they are
written in extremely complex and technical language. MERS amplifies this
2 See Housing Characteristics: 2000 (US Census Bureau 10/01).
16
problem by intentionally layering new legal terms, and inserting a new and foreign
legal entity, into already complicated consumer contracts and transactions.
As a result, many of amici’s clients are unaware of MERS’ involvement and
are thoroughly confused when MERS begins to act on behalf of their servicer or
mortgagee. The confusion and obstacles that are created by this MERS system are
significant, particularly for homeowners whose predatory loans put them at an
increased risk of default and foreclosure. For example, one of SBLS’ elderly
clients, in default on her mortgage, was receiving a tremendous number of
solicitations from “foreclosure rescue” companies and mortgage brokers and
lenders which promised to save her from foreclosure. When she received the
foreclosure summons and complaint naming MERS as the plaintiff, she
disregarded it because she thought that MERS was simply another company trying
to scare her. As a result of her confusion over MERS, the client nearly lost her
home.
Government agencies and consumer organizations consistently report that
older citizens are disproportionately victimized by predatory mortgage brokers and
lenders. See Consumer Protection: Federal and State Agencies in Combating
Predatory Lending, United States General Accounting Office, Report to the
Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Special Committee on Aging, U.S.
Senate (January 2004), pp. 99-102. Older homeowners are more likely to have
17
substantial equity in their homes, making them attractive targets. Their fixed
incomes (over 20% of elderly city residents live below the poverty level) and agerelated
mental and physical impairments, affecting nearly half of city residents,
make them more vulnerable to mortgage abuse. 3 In addition, many older New
Yorkers living in inner-city homes lack access to traditional lending institutions,
placing them at greater risk of becoming victims of high cost, predatory, subprime
lenders. See Associates Home Equity v. Troup, 343 N.J. Super. 254 (App. Div.
2001).4
Subprime lending has proven to offer opportunities for unscrupulous – or
predatory-lenders to take advantage of borrowers by charging excessive
interest rates and fees and using mortgage proceeds to pay inflated costs for
home repairs or insurance products. The most common victims of these
predatory lending practices have been found to include the elderly,
minorities, and low income households.
Kimberly Burnett, Chris Herbert, et al., Subprime Originations and Foreclosures
in New York State: A Case Study of Nassau, Suffolk, and Westchester Counties
(2002) at ii.
By creating an additional, confusing overlay to the predatory loan
transaction, MERS’ involvement serves to compound the very significant problems
3 See U.S. Census 2000; see also American Community Survey, U.S. Census Bureau (2005).
4 After finding that the lender had targeted a 74 year old African American home owner in
Newark, the Court in Troup held that the lender “participated in the targeting of inner-city
borrowers who lack access to traditional lending institutions, charged them a discriminatory
interest rate, and imposed unreasonable terms.” Associates Home Equity, 343 N.J. Super.254
(App. Div. 2001).
18
that already exist for homeowners with predatory loans. MERS shields these
unscrupulous lenders, hiding the identities of assignees and muddying records
which are vital to victims seeking immediate redress.
V. The Public Has a Significant and Enduring Interest in Preserving and
Protecting the Free Public Databases Created by the Land and Court
Records of This Nation.
MERS . . . represents the future of foreclosure: a brave new world of
anonymity and unaccountability . . . The ostensible purpose is to save
companies the county filing fees they often must pay when they buy
mortgages or transfer servicing. An added benefit: if a foreclosure
filing becomes necessary that filing, too, can be in MERS’ name.
That makes it harder for journalists, community groups and
researchers to determine whose mortgages are actually ending in
foreclosure. If MERS has its way, it will become increasingly
difficult to tell whose mortgages are failing.
Richard Lord, AMERICAN NIGHTMARE: PREDATORY LENDING AND THE
FORECLOSURE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 157 (Common Courage Press 2005).
A. Public land and court data records facilitate research
investigating the root causes of a variety of mortgage and other
land related problems.
The public land and court records have served as a vitally important, free
and accessible source of data that have been relied upon by broad constituencies,
including government, academics, non-profit advocacy organizations, businesses
and private individuals throughout the past century. These records have assisted
the legislative branches of government in formulating policy and providing a
legislative response to crises, including redressing abusive mortgage lending
19
practices. 5 See Zach Schiller, Foreclosure Growth in Ohio (2006), available at
available at: http://www.policymattersohio.org/pdf/foreclosure_growth_
ohio_2006 (supporting recently enacted Amended Substitute Senate Bill No. 185,
126th Cong., which expanded the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act to cover
mortgage lending; 6 TRF, Mortgage Foreclosure Filings in Pennsylvania (2005),
available at http://www.trfund.com/resource/downloads/policypubs/Mortgage-
Foreclosure-Filings.pdf (Study resulting from Pennsylvania state legislative
request to gather information and analyze foreclosures); 7 Burnett et.al, Subprime
5 The studies listed represent only a small sampling of the numerous studies and reports reliant
on public land and court records data that have influenced legislative decision-making. See e.g.,
The Reinvestment Fund (“TRF”), Mortgage Foreclosure Filings in Delaware (2006),
http://www.trfund.com/resource/downloads/policypubs/Delaware_Foreclosure.pdf (Study
commissioned by the Office of the State Bank Commissioner to analyze foreclosure activity in
Delaware); TRF, A Study of Mortgage Foreclosures in Monroe County and The
Commonwealth’s Response (2004), http://www.banking.state.pa.us/banking/cwp/
view.asp?a=1354&q=547305 (Study commissioned by the Pennsylvania Department of Banking
and the Housing Finance Agency to investigate foreclosure trends in Monroe County); Lynne
Dearborn, Mortgage Foreclosures and Predatory Lending in St. Clair County, Illinois 1996-
2000 (2003) (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) funded study of
loan terms and foreclosure trends commissioned by St. Clair County); Lorain County
Reinvestment Fund, The Expanding Role of Subprime Lending in Ohio’s Burgeoning
Foreclosure Problem: A Three County Study of a Statewide Problem, (2002), http://cohhio.org/
projects/ocrp/SubprimeLendingReport.pdf (Study of foreclosure trends in three Ohio counties).
6 See also Zach Schiller and Jeremy Iskin, Foreclosure Growth in Ohio: A Brief Update (2005),
http://www.policymattersohio.org/pdf/Foreclosure_Growth_Ohio_2005.pdf; Zach Schiller,
Whitney Meredith, & Pam Rosado, Home Insecurity 2004: Foreclosure Growth in Ohio,
available at http://www.policymattersohio.org/pdf/Home_Insecurity_2004.pdf.
7See also Pennsylvania Department of Banking, Losing the American Dream: A Report on
Residential Mortgage Foreclosures and Abusive Lending Practices in Pennsylvania (2005),
available at http://www.banking.state.pa.us/banking/lib/banking/about_dob/special%20
initiatives/mortgage%20forecloser/statewide%20foreclosure%20report.pdf. This report was
presented to the Pennsylvania House of Representatives by the Secretary of the Pennsylvania
20
Originations and Foreclosures in New York State (Study supported passage of
New York predatory lending law, N.Y. Banking Law § 6-1).8
The land and court records data have been utilized by the executive branches
of government to inform their regulatory activities related to land ownership, see
e.g. Ramon Garcia, Residential Foreclosures in the City of Buffalo, 1990-2000
(2003)9 (New York Federal Reserve Bank investigation),10 and are a source of
information for law enforcement agencies seeking to prosecute offenders for
mortgage fraud, property flipping and other criminal mortgage-related offenses.11
See e.g. People v. Larman, No. 06253-2005 (Kings County Supreme Ct. Sept. 20,
2006) (Indictment for fraudulent mortgage transactions); People v. Sandella, No.
02899-2006 (Kings County Supreme. Ct. Sept. 27, 2006) (indictments for multi-
Department of Banking and includes information from several sources, including TRF, Mortgage
Foreclosures in Pennsylvania.
8 Executive Summary available at: http://www.abtassociates.com/reports/ESSuburban_
NY_Foreclosures_study_final.pdf (Public records and HMDA data demonstrated that
subprime foreclosures impacted both urban and suburban communities)
9 This report is available at: http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/
buffalo/foreclosure_study.pdf (10 year study of foreclosure trends in Buffalo)
10 The following are a small sampling of executive branch studies relying on data in the public
domain. See e.g., Bunce, Harold, Gruenstein, Debbie et al., Subprime Lending: The Smoking Gun
of Predatory Lending? (HUD 2001), http://www.huduser.org/Publications/ pdf/brd/12Bunce.pdf;
Dearborn, Mortgage Foreclosures in St. Clair.
11 For a sampling of New York criminal indictments relying on land records data, see People v.
Albertina, 09141-2005 (Kings County Supreme Ct. Sept. 28, 2006) (Attorney General indictment
for a multi-million dollar scheme to sell houses with fake deeds); People v. Constant, No.
01843A-2006 (Suffolk Supreme Ct. Oct. 12, 2006)(Suffolk County grand jury indictment of six
for roles in real estate scam); Altegra Credit Co. v. Tin Chu, et al., No. 04326-2004 (Kings
County Supreme Ct. March 25, 2004)
21
million dollar residential property flipping scheme).12 These data also inform local
governments about the cost and impact of abusive lending practices on both their
constituents and the public purse. See T. Nagazumi & D. Rose, Preying on
Neighborhoods: Subprime mortgage lending and Chicagoland foreclosures, 1993-
1998 (Sept. 21, 1999) 13 (NTIC study investigated the effects of subprime mortgage
lending on foreclosures in Chicago); Kathleen C. Engel, Do Cities Have Standing?
Redressing the Externalities of Predatory Lending, 38 Conn. L. Rev. 355 (2006).
12 Criminal property flipping is rampant throughout the country. For a sampling of this problem
see e.g. Press Release, Office of Attorney General, N.J. Div. of Criminal Justice Targets
financial crime (Nov. 14, 2004), http://nj.gov/lps/newsreleases04/pr20041117b.html (Indictment
of North Jersey businessman for mortgage fraud scheme that netted more than $677,000 in
fraudulent loans); Lessons learned from the laboratory (Community Law Center (CLC) 2002)(A
report by the CLC – Baltimore City flipping and Predatory Lending Task Force (47 individuals
were indicted, pled guilty, or were convicted in federal court for property flipping and mortgage
fraud)), http://www.communitylaw.org/Executive%20 Summary.htm; see also Press Release,
Sen. Mikulski Formed Task Force and Secured Federal Assistance to Address Flipping Problem
(Oct. 9, 2003), http://mikulski.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=213248 (70 people convicted of
property flipping in Baltimore); Press Release, FBI, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Ohio, (May 9,
2006); Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, S.D. Mississippi (Feb.16, 2006); Press Release,
Office of the Attorney General, Florida (June 25, 2004)
13 This report is available at: http://www.ntic-us.org/preying/preying.pdf ; For a sampling of
other relevant studies, see D. Rose, Chicago Foreclosure Update 2006 (July), http:// http://www.nticus.
org/documents/ChicagoForeclosureUpdate2006.pdf (NTIC study analyzes foreclosure trends
in Chicago); D. Rose, Chicago Foreclosure Update 2005, http://www.nticus.
org/currentevents/press/pdf/chicagoforeclosure_update.pdf; William C. Apgar & Mark Duda.
Collateral Damage: The Municipal Impact of Today’s Mortgage Foreclosure Boom 1996-2000
(May 11, 2005), http://
http://www.nw.org/Network/neighborworksprogs/foreclosuresolutions/documents/Apgar-
DudaStudyFinal.pdf (Documents the financial costs of foreclosure to municipalities); Apgar, The
Municipal Cost of Foreclosures: A Chicago Case Study (Feb. 27, 2005), http://
http://www.hpfonline.org/PDF/Apgar-Duda_Study_Full_Version.pdf (Also documents indirect costs
that result from the domino effect that foreclosures have on communities).
22
Non-profit groups and academics rely upon data in the public domain to
illustrate trends, spotlight the impact of various mortgage practices on minority and
low income communities and uncover abusive practices that injure their
constituencies. They use this information to advocate for policy initiatives that
benefit the public interest. See e.g. Nagazumi, Chicago Update 2006; Apgar and
Duda, Collateral Damage; Apgar, Municipal Cost of Foreclosures; Lindley
Higgins, Effective Community-Based Strategies for Preventing Foreclosures,1993-
2004 (2005), 14 (A 2005 analysis of the factors that led to foreclosure generated
proposals for foreclosure prevention programs)15; Neighborhood Housing Services
(NHS) of Chicago, Preserving Homeownership: Community-Development
Implications of the New Mortgage Market (2004) (Study of foreclosures from
1998-2003 proposes foreclosure prevention initiatives for community based
organizations working cooperatively with private industry and federal, state, and
local governments).16
14 This report is available at: http://www.nw.org/network/pubs/studies/documents
/foreclosureReport092905.pdf.
15 See also Nagazumi, Preying on Neighborhoods; Richard Stock, Center for Business and
Economic Research (CBER), Predation in the Sub-Prime Lending Market: Montgomery County
Vol. I., 1994-2001 (2001), http://www.mvfairhousing.com/cber/pdf/Executive%20summary.PDF
(Study examines predatory lending in Montgomery County, Ohio).
16 This report is available at: http://www.nw.org/network/pubs/studies/documents/
preservingHomeownershipRpt2004_000.pdf. See also Nagazumi, Preying on Neighborhoods at
36-37 (urging legislature to pass Illinois legislation to end predatory subprime lending and to
disclose predatory pricing and practices to Illinois regulators and the public); Higgins,
Community-Based Strategies at i. (Objective is to increase capacity of local community based
23
Businesses utilize the public land and court records data as the providers of
research services that convert public information into customized databases. See
e.g. NYForeclosures.com; Atlanta Foreclosure Report;17 Boston Foreclosure
Report and Foreclosure Report of Chicago 18). These data collection businesses
serve a wide variety of business customers, including mortgage brokers seeking
leads, bankruptcy attorneys, and real estate agents, as well as government and nonprofit
research entities. See id.19
B. The public databases have played an important role in facilitating
understanding and government response to the recent
“foreclosure boom.”
Land and court records data have become a particularly important public
resource over the past decade, as the nation has experienced what some have
characterized as a “foreclosure boom.” See generally Apgar and Duda, Collateral
organizations to revitalize communities); Apgar & Duda, Collateral Damage at 16 (Report
identifies foreclosure avoidance strategies for municipalities).
17 See http://www.equitydepot.net.
18 See http://www.chicagoforeclosurereport.com.
19 Non-profit and government researchers that have relied on these data collection businesses to
do the primary research legwork that provides them with land and court records data to support
their analyses include, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Buffalo Branch, see Ramon
Garcia, Residential Foreclosures in the City of Buffalo, 1990-2000 (2003); see Bunce, Subprime
Lending; Kimberly Burnett, Bulbul Kaul, & Chris Herbert, Analysis of Property Turnover
Patterns in Atlanta, Baltimore, Cleveland and Philadelphia (2004),
http://www.abtassociates.com/reports/analysis_property_turnover_patterns.pdf; Debbie
Gruenstein & Christopher Herbert, Analyzing Trends in Subprime Originations and
Foreclosures: A Case Study of the Boston Metro Area, 1995-1999 (2000),
http://www.abtassociates.com/reports/20006470781991.pdf; Nagazumi, Preying on
Neighborhoods; Rose, Chicago Foreclosure Update 2006.
24
Damage; see also Daniel Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The External Costs of
Foreclosure: The Impact of Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Property
Values, 17 Housing Pol’y Debate, Issue 1 (2006).20 As subprime mortgage lending
escalated from $35 billion in 1994 to $140 billion in 200021 to more than $600
billion in 2005, foreclosure rates jumped by an alarming 335.6%. See Robert
Avery, Kenneth Brevoort, Glenn Canner, Higher-Priced Home Lending and the
2005 HMDA Data at A125 (Sept. 8, 2006).22 These skyrocketing subprime
foreclosures disproportionately impacted low-income and minority communities.
Id. at 63.
Struggling to understand the origins of this foreclosure crisis, government
and researchers have turned to the public data. See supra Schiller; TRF, Delaware;
TRF, Pennsylvania; Dearborn, Mortgage Foreclosures in St. Clair; Paul Bellamy,
The Expanding Role of Subprime Lending in Ohio’s Burgeoning Foreclosure
20 This report is available at: http://www.fanniemaefoundation.org/programs/hpd/pdf/
hpd_1701_immergluck.pdf#search=%22%22Immergluck%22%20and%20%22Geoff%22%22
21 See Neal Walters & Sharon Hermanson, Subprime Mortgage Lending and Older Borrowers
(AARP Public Policy Institute), Data Digest Number 74 (2001). Data Digest available at:

Click to access dd74_finance.pdf

22 This report is available at:
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2006/hmda/bull06hmda.pdf; “HMDA” refers to the
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 12 USC § 2801 et. seq.; see also Margot Saunders and Alys
Cohen, Federal Regulation of Consumer Credit: The Cause or the Cure for Predatory Lending?
at 11 (Joint Center for Housing Studies 2004),

Click to access babc_04-21.pdf

25
Problem: A Three County Study of a Statewide Problem, 1994-2001 (2002).23 This
effort to learn the root causes of the “foreclosure boom,” to understand whether
particular regions or demographic groups are most affected by rising foreclosures,
to evaluate the impact of these foreclosures on the surrounding community, and to
address and seek to remedy any abuses that enabled this crisis to develop, has
spawned a virtual explosion of research studies. See e.g. TRF, Delaware; Rose,
Chicago (2006); Engel, Do Cities Have Standing?; Rose, Chicago Foreclosure
Update 2006; Rose, Chicago Foreclosure Update 2005 (Updating foreclosure
activity in Chicago); Apgar & Duda, Collateral Damage; Apgar, Municipal Cost of
Foreclosures; TRF, Pennsylvania; TRF, Monroe County; Nagazumi, Preying on
Neighborhoods; NHS of Chicago, Preserving Homeownership; Dearborn,
Mortgage Foreclosures in St. Clair; Paul Bellamy, The Expanding Role; Burnett,
Subprime Originations; Garcia, Buffalo supra note 10; Bunce, Subprime Lending;
Nagazumi, Preying on Neighborhoods.
Standing alone, land and court records data serve as a valuable resource to
confirm the existence of the foreclosure boom, identify any key participants in the
foreclosure process, and identify those geographic areas hardest hit. See supra,
Dearborn, Mortgage Foreclosures in St. Clair; Stock, Predation at 8; Apgar,
23 This report is available at: http://www.cohhio.org/projects/ocrp/ SubprimeLendingReport.pdf
26
Chicago at 5.24 In fact, research derived from courthouse and public land records
motivated the North Carolina legislature to become one of the first states to crack
down on predatory mortgage lending. See Habitat for Humanity Refinances,
Coalition for Responsible Lending (updated July 25, 2000) (This ground breaking
study examined refinances of affordable Habitat for Humanity mortgages into
unaffordable predatory loans); David Rice, Predatory Lending Bill Caught in
Debate, Winston-Salem Journal, April 27, 1999.
Land and court records data are even more valuable and informative when
analyzed in conjunction with several other “puzzle pieces” of publicly available
data. See e.g. Duda & Apgar, Mortgage Foreclosures in Atlanta: Patterns and
Policy Issues, 2000-2005 (2005)25; see Apgar, Collateral Damage; Rose, Chicago
Foreclosure Update 2006; Burnett, Subprime Originations. When combined with
other sources of data, such as census tract and HMDA data, land and court records
data enable researchers to layer information to develop a comprehensive picture
that identifies the leading foreclosure filers, the geographic location and racial
composition of foreclosure hotspots and the loan characteristics associated with
concentrated and quick foreclosures. See e.g. Duda, Atlanta at 15; see also
24Similarly, Mountain State Justice, a West Virginia legal services organization that represents
victims of predatory lending, has conducted an annual review of foreclosure filings in the state
since July 2001. See Report of West Virginia Foreclosures, available from Mount State Justice.
25This report is available at: http://www.nw.org/network/neighborworksprogs/
foreclosuresolutions/documents/foreclosure1205.pdf
27
Burnett, Atlanta, Baltimore, Cleveland and Philadelphia at iii; Nagazumi, Preying
on Neighborhoods at 9; Stock, Predation at 1.
In the past, the availability of detailed public information has enabled
researchers to pinpoint some of the root causes of increased foreclosures and, for
example, informed the New York State legislature in crafting a legislative response
to abusive practices associated with high cost loans. There, a New York study
which combined public records data with HMDA data to identify subprime lenders
and the distribution of subprime foreclosures demonstrated that subprime
foreclosures were prevalent in suburban as well as urban areas.26 See Burnett,
Subprime Originations. Comprehensive research similarly enabled the State of
Illinois and the City of Chicago to redress abusive lending practices and thereby
put the brakes on the foreclosure boom in Chicago. See e.g. Nagazumi, Preying on
Neighborhoods (study demonstrated that subprime foreclosures were both an urban
and suburban problem; that most non-performing loans were subprime, and
identified the top foreclosers of high interest loans); see also, subsequently enacted
Illinois predatory lending law, 815 ILCS § 137. Data from land and court records
26 The New York predatory lending law enacted April 1, 2003 can be found at N.Y.
Banking Law § 6-1, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 771-a, and N.Y. Real Prop. Acts. Law § 1302.
28
has played an important role in analyzing other trends in the mortgage market,
such as identifying unfair or discriminatory lending patterns and practices.27
Unfortunately, in recent years MERS’ increasing emergence as a
placeholder for the true note and mortgage holders in land and court records
databases has corrupted these sources of data and undermined their utility as a
research source.
C. Through its penetration of the public databases MERS has caused
a dramatic deterioration in the quality and quantity of publicly
available information.
In New York city alone, MERS has rapidly replaced true owners in the city
maintained public database—ACRIS—increasing its filings from a nominal fewer
than 100 in 2000, to approximately 90,000 in 2005 and an expected 120,000 filings
in 2006.28 Since the MERS label on the public records shields the identity of the
27 Bunce, Subprime Lending; In 2001, a joint HUD and U.S. Dept. of the Treasury report found
that “[i]n predominantly black neighborhoods, subprime lending accounted for 51 percent of
refinance loans in 1998 – compared with only 9 percent in predominantly white neighborhoods.”
Curbing Predatory Home Mortgage Lending, U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development
and U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, 47 (2000),
http://www.huduser.org/publications/hsgfin/curbing.html.
28 AARP accessed the New York City Department of Finance’s Automated City Register
Information System (ACRIS) website on September 12, 2006 to research the number of MERS,
MERS as nominee and Mortgage Electronic Registration System filings in all boroughs for each
of two months—March and August during the years 2000 through 2006. The results of this
search are included below.
March 2000 7; August 2000 8; March 2001 610; August 2001 126;
March 2002 414; August 2002 663; March 2003 1,277; August 2003 2,785;
March 2004 4,384; August 2004 4,697; March 2005 7,064; August 2005 8,009;
March 2006 10,619; August 2006 10,411.
29
actual participants in the mortgage and foreclosure processes—the true noteholders
and mortgagees, the MERS filings have created a significant hole in this
important public database.
The void in the mortgage database will directly and measurably harm the
constituents of community groups, such as the University Neighborhood Housing
Program (UNHP), who will no longer reap benefits achieved through negotiations
with the largest foreclosing entities in the Bronx, entities which have been
identified through UNHP’s tracking of information about Bronx residential
lending.29 These benefits have included negotiated loss mitigation procedures and
the creation of an Asset Control Area program to renovate and sell 300 FHA
insured foreclosed homes to qualified first time moderate-income homebuyers.
Moreover, MERS’ anticipated penetration of the Bronx multi-family market will
likely cripple UNHP’s Building Indicator Project (BIP), whose database has
enabled the identification and repair of distressed rental housing. The BIP’s
database of more than 7,000 Bronx multifamily apartment buildings, including
ownership, building size, housing code violation, city lien, and critically, mortgage
Estimated annual filings for 2000 and 2006 were based on the two months of filings for those
years.
29 UNHP’s research shows MERS was plaintiff in 305 (11%) of the 2,770 auctions scheduled in
the Bronx over the past 4 ½ years. If the use of MERS continues to grow, it will become
increasingly difficult for groups like UNHP to track who is foreclosing in their neighborhoods
and to undertake remediation efforts with the foreclosers that they have successfully engaged in
the past.
30
holder data, has enabled UNHP to engage lenders who, in turn, have pressured
building owners to make numerous repairs to Bronx rental housing stock.30
New York is not alone in facing the deterioration of its public mortgage
databases. MERS’ penetration of the City of Chicago’s database starkly presents
this problem. In 1999, NTIC undertook its comprehensive study of subprime
lending in the Chicago area over a five year period from 1993-1998. At that time,
no lender or mortgagee’s identity was hidden by the MERS label. See Nagazumi,
Preying on Neighborhoods at 25. (Figure 10 displays the top 34 lenders
responsible for high interest rate foreclosures in 1998). By 2005 MERS itself was
identified as the largest foreclosing entity in Chicagoland, with 1,100 foreclosure
filings. Hidden from public view were the identities of the actual foreclosing
lenders and possibly the perpetrators of the most egregious lending practices. See
Rose, Chicago Update 2006 at 11 (Table 8 shows the most active foreclosing
institutions in 2005). As in Chicago, MERS topped the list of the largest
foreclosure filers during the period 2000-2005 in Atlanta, named as the foreclosing
agent on 41,467 or 16.1 percent of all filings, and was the largest filer in
30 Similarly, St. Ambrose Housing Aid Center, a housing advocacy group in Baltimore,
Maryland representing homeowners victimized by predatory mortgage lending regularly
searched the land records to identify homeowner victims of suspect lenders and to identify any
assignees. St. Ambrose is no longer able to identify many of these assignees and can no longer
assess their complicity in promoting the origination of abusive mortgages.
31
foreclosure tracts with very high foreclosure rates. Duda, Atlanta at 15 -17 &
Figure 3-1.31
The erroneous identification of MERS as lender of record in Jefferson
County and throughout the state during 2000 to 2002 tainted research into
foreclosure trends in Kentucky. See Steve C. Bourassa, Predatory Lending In
Jefferson County: A Report to the Louisville Urban League, 2 (Urban Studies
Institute, University of Louisville) (December 2003).32 As one of the largest
foreclosers of predatory loans, MERS’ presence on the public record masked the
identity of its constituent lenders, the true mortgagees, and obscured the true make
up of the loan portfolio foreclosed upon.
The MERS filing spreads a cloak of invisibility over any member
mortgage/note-holder that purchases a loan following origination. The lender
whose loose underwriting guidelines or careless oversight facilitated the
origination and sale of foreclosure-prone loans is carefully hidden from public
view by the MERS system. See e.g. Duda, Atlanta at 19. In shielding the identity
of these mortgage transaction participants, the MERS label hobbles researchers,
who, because of missing data, are less able to ascertain whether escalating
31Over the past year, from July 1, 2005-June 30, 2006, MERS, has also become one of the four
top foreclosers in West Virginia. See Report of West Virginia Foreclosures, available from
Mountain State Justice.
32 This report is available at: http://www.lul.org/Predatory%20Lending%20Report.pdf
32
foreclosures are caused by a small number of rogue players—who may be dealt
with through enforcement actions—or are part of a systemic problem that requires
a targeted legislative response. Whether this cloaking of its members’ transactions
resulted from a conscious plan or was simply a felicitous byproduct of MERS’
money saving scheme, the result is the same—a dangerous and destructive attack
on the public databases.
D. The MERS Shield Creates an Irretrievable Void in the Property
Records that Harms Many Constituencies.
The void in the property records harms a broad array of entities and, unless
this process is reversed, these data will be irretrievably lost to the public. Law
enforcement agencies may be stymied in their efforts to investigate and prosecute
criminal mortgage fraud and property flipping if deprived of important data
sources on which they have relied in the past. See, e.g., People v. Albertina;
People v. Larman; People v. Sandella; People v. Constant; Altegra Credit Co. v.
Tin Chu, supra. State legislatures will face obstacles to understanding the root
causes of mortgage-related problems and will be unable to identify offending
entities if they can no longer rely on public databases that have served to inform
them about past foreclosure crises in their jurisdictions. Similarly, local
governments which have turned to the land and court records data to understand
the origins of escalating foreclosures in their communities will no longer have the
necessary data upon which to base their analyses. Instead, those lenders and
33
investors who are the primary offenders will be able to hide behind the cloak of
invisibility provided by MERS.
E. Restoration and enhancement of the public database is critical to
enable government to function effectively.
It is essential that the land and court records of this nation remain public and
contain the information required by law—namely, the true identity of the
participants in the mortgage transaction. Governments and researchers must
continue to have the ability to evaluate the full range of public data, including the
land and court records, in investigating the root causes of foreclosures and other
problems and trends in the housing markets. Without this data they will be unable
to discover whether specific entities are primarily responsible for increased
foreclosures, or whether there is an industry-wide problem. They will be unable to
assess which secondary market lenders facilitate abusive lending, or which
servicers are quick to foreclose.
State and local government have a particular interest in preserving the
integrity of the public data sources in the land and court records, as these records
have been a key component of research analyzing the costs imposed by
foreclosures on municipalities and neighboring homeowners and businesses.
Concentrations of foreclosures impose a particularly high societal cost on
surrounding neighborhoods (through reduced property values) and on government
for neighborhood services (for increased policing, social services, fire and trash)
34
and reductions in the tax base. One recent study estimated that foreclosures in high
foreclosure areas imposed costs up to $34,000 on the city and up to $220,000 on
neighboring homeowners. See Apgar, Municipal Cost of Foreclosures; Apgar,
Collateral Damage; Duda, Atlanta at 15 33 These studies have also revealed the
devastating impact of predatory lending on long overdue gains in inner city
minority homeownership, as foreclosures have decimated equity and destroyed
neighborhood vitality virtually overnight. See Kathe Newman & Elvin K. Wyly,
Geographies of Mortgage Market Segmentation: The Case of Essex County, New
Jersey, 19 Housing Stud. 53, 54 (Jan. 2004); Housing Council (2003), Residential
Foreclosures in Rochester, New York 10 (foreclosures erode sales prices of nearby
homes). Government has a right to seek to minimize these societal costs and to
transfer those costs to the mortgage participants responsible for the transactions.
However, since foreclosure avoidance strategies, targeted legislation and
regulation depend on the availability of data to inform decision-making, where
MERS has caused a critical source of heretofore public data to disappear, states,
cities and advocates no longer have sufficient information to respond in a carefully
33 See also Immergluck, External Costs of Foreclosure; Daniel Immergluck & Geoff Smith,
There Goes the Neighborhood: The Effect of Single-Family Mortgage and Foreclosures on
Property Values at 9. (2005). This report is available at:
http://www.woodstockinst.org/publications/task,doc_download/gid,52/Itemid,%2041/
(Homes in low and moderate income neighborhoods in Chicago experience between 1.44 and 1.8
percent decline in value for every home foreclosed within one-eighth of a mile).
35
targeted and not overly inclusive way. See Duda, Atlanta at viii. Thus, “in Fulton
County [GA] and other places with foreclosure problems, the fact that entities
without the legal ability to make servicing decisions [MERS] are registered with
the county has been identified as a major obstacle to municipal foreclosureavoidance
efforts. . . .” Duda, Atlanta at 15. Similarly, the University
Neighborhood Housing Program in the Bronx and many other community groups
are losing an important tool that has enabled them to improve the communities of
their constituents.
F. More, not less public data is needed to enable a carefully targeted
and rapid governmental response to problems in the housing
market.
Foreclosure remains34 a key problem in today’s housing markets.
Particularly in low-income neighborhoods, foreclosures can lead to vacant or
abandoned properties that, in turn, contribute to physical disorder in a community.
See Immergluck, External Costs of Foreclosure, supra. This disorder can create a
haven for criminal activity, discourage the formation of social capital, and lead to
disinvestment in communities.
34 Foreclosure rates continue their meteoric rise, presenting significant problems and hardships
for affected homeowners, their surrounding communities and local governments. In August
2006, 115,292 properties throughout the nation entered foreclosure, a 24 percent increase over
the foreclosure level in July and 53 percent increase over foreclosures in 2005. See Les Christie,
“Foreclosures Spiked in August,” (Sept. 13, 2006), available at:
http://money.cnn.com/2006/09/13/real_estate/foreclosures_spiking/index.htm?postversion=2006
091305.
36
The costs flowing from problems in the housing market impact not only
lenders and borrowers directly involved in the sale or purchase of homes. The
costs can have a significant effect on entire communities. See id. For instance,
concentrated foreclosures can affect the property values of homes in the same or
adjoining neighborhoods. If policymakers are to truly understand the context in
which foreclosures take place and subsequently create legislation to obviate the
problems created by foreclosures (and thereby alleviate related social and
economic difficulties faced by individuals and communities), more data is
necessary and its accessibility to the public is imperative.
Researchers agree and have suggested that the solution to understanding
complex mortgage related problems is to require more not less information and to
further impose more not fewer costs on mortgage participants. See NHS of
Chicago, Preserving Homeownership, supra. Contrary to the attack on the public
databases and public revenues undertaken by MERS, the authors recommend
creating loan performance and foreclosure databases that contain sufficient
information to enable the tracking and assessment of key causes of delinquency
and default.35 These databases would be used to shape more effective legislation,
mitigate public costs and abusive practices and target foreclosure hotspots “without
35 Apgar and Duda recommend tracking all loans, all parties to the loans, loan terms, and would
at a minimum require the disclosure of the note holder and servicer whenever foreclosure is
threatened.
37
stemming the flow of credit to low-income, low-wealth and credit-impaired
borrowers. Id. at 84.
States such as Illinois have already demonstrated a strong interest in
gathering more information about high cost mortgage loans. Illinois’s newly
created data collection program requires all licensed mortgage brokers and loan
originators to enter detailed information into a database for residential mortgage
loans in designated areas in Chicago. See Public Act 094-0280 (HB 4050). This
database project is designed to address predatory practices and high foreclosure
rates. The federal government has also moved to increase data collection for high
cost loans.36
Another key recommendation that has emerged from municipal studies is to
increase public awareness of the significant foreclosure costs imposed on
communities by mortgage participants and reallocate those costs that are
“rightfully the responsibility of borrowers, lenders and others that are direct parties
to the mortgage transaction” to the transactions that created them through increased
filing fees and creation of an industry fund. Duda, Atlanta at 26-27; see also
36 Reacting to a 2001 joint HUD-U.S. Department of the Treasury report that found a
disproportionately high level of high cost, subprime refinance lending in predominantly black
neighborhoods, as compared to predominantly white neighborhoods, the Federal Reserve Board
ramped up its HMDA data reporting requirements in 2004. See HUD-Treasury Report 2000,
supra. Lenders who make high cost, subprime loans must now provide pricing information for
these loans. See Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, A Guide to HMDA: Getting
it Right! (Dec. 2003).
38
Apgar, Municipal Cost of Foreclosures at 35. Such fees would reduce the
municipal expenditures and loss of neighboring equity that currently function as
effective subsidies to the most abusive transactions.
Land and court records serve as vitally important research tools for
government, community organizations and academic researchers. A private entity,
such as MERS, must not be allowed to deplete the public databases of land and
court records or to undermine the public’s significant and enduring interest in
preserving the integrity of these public databases of land and court records.
VI. MERS’ Subversion of the Public Policy Behind Public Recordings Costs
County and City Clerks Over a Billion Dollars.
MERS’ erosion of the public databases has, as its designers intended, created
a drain on the public treasuries. This transfer of significant revenues from county
and city clerks throughout the country to MERS and its members, is an
unwarranted interference with the clerks’ public recordation function.
In April 2006, MERS announced that 40 million mortgages were registered
with MERS. 40 Millionth Loan Registered on MERS (Inside MERS, May/ June
2006), available at http://www. mersinc.com/newsroom/currentnews.aspx. MERS
admits that a loan is transferred many times during its life. MERS Br. at 51. With
an average recordation cost of $22 for each mortgage assignment, multiplied by 40
million loans and then multiplied again to account for the many transfers that occur
during the life of a loan, the appropriation of public funds effected by the MERS
39
system is staggering. See http://www.mersinc.com/why_mers/index.aspx (last
visited October 4, 2006). Based on a conservative estimate that each of the 40
million loans on the MERS system is assigned three times each during the life of
the loan, the cost to county and city clerks nationwide from the inception of the
MERS system through April 2006, has been an astounding $2.64 billion. This
figure is continuing to grow as new mortgages are registered daily on the MERS
system.
Through its charge of $3.95 per loan, MERS has instead diverted gross
revenues of $158 million to itself. The MERS artifice has enabled the redirection
of far greater revenues away from the public treasuries and back to lenders through
improper avoidance of recordation costs. In so doing, MERS has subverted the
important public function of the county clerks and interfered with the rightful
collection of funds owing to the public treasuries.
VII. MERS Lacks Standing to Bring Foreclosure Actions in Its Name.
MERS’ standing to commence a foreclosure action in New York is a matter
of great dispute, and has led to much confusion in the courts. As a general matter,
standing to foreclose in New York requires ownership of the note. See, e.g.,
LaSalle Bank National Ass’n. v. Holguin, No. 06-9286, slip opinion at 1 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Suffolk Cty., Aug. 9, 2006); Kluge v. Fugazy, 145 A.D.2d 537, 536 N.Y.S.2d
40
92 (2d Dept. 1988). Neither MERS’ status as nominee for the beneficial owner nor
its status as mortgagee is sufficient to create standing.
As noted in a Connecticut case denying MERS summary judgment due to a
dispute as to ownership of the note, MERS, as nominee, generally has rather
limited rights and standing:
A nominee is one designated to act for another as his/her
representative in a rather limited sense…in its commonly accepted
meaning, the word ‘nominee’ connotes the delegation of authority to
the nominee in a representative capacity only, and does not connote
the transfer or assignment to the nominee of any property in or
ownership of the rights of the person nominating him/her.
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Rees, 2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS
2437 (Conn. Superior Ct. September 4, 2003). See also MERS v. Shuster, No. 05-
26354/06 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Suffolk Cty., July 13, 2006) (denying MERS’s motion
for default since MERS is merely nominee); MERS. v. Burek, 798 N.Y.S.2d 346
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (distinguishing Fairbanks Capital Corp. v. Nagel, 289
A.D.2d 99, 735 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1st Dep’t 2001), since Fairbanks was a servicer and
identified itself as such).
The splitting of the ownership of the note and the mortgage is even more
problematic. Under well-established principles, the mortgage follows the note. See
U.C.C. §§ 9-203(g), 9-308(e); Restatement (3d), Property (Mortgages) § 5.4(a)
(1997). As an Illinois court noted, “It is axiomatic that any attempt to assign the
41
mortgage without transfer of the debt will not pass the mortgagee’s interest to the
assignee.” In re BNT Terminals, Inc., 125 B.R. 963, 970 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990).
MERS has no status as mortgagee if the note is in fact owned and held by another
entity, as is always the case with MERS. Thus, MERS’ status as mere nominee is
insufficient to give it standing to foreclose, or take any legal action against a
borrower whatsoever. The recording of MERS as mortgagee when it does not and
cannot own the note is inherently confusing and misleading.
There have now been a large number of recent New York decisions denying
foreclosures brought by MERS, on the basis that MERS does not own the note and
mortgage, and therefore does not have either standing to sue or the right to assign
ownership of the note and mortgage to a foreclosing plaintiff. See, e.g., MERS v.
Wells, No. 06-5242, slip op. at 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Suffolk Cty., Sept. 25, 2006) (“It
is axiomatic that the Court, for the security of ensuring a proper chain of title, must
be able to ascertain from the papers before it that the Plaintiff has the clear
authority to foreclose on property and bind all other entities by its actions”);
LaSalle Bank Natl Assn. v. Holguin, supra., slip op. at 2 (“Since MERS was
without ownership of the note and mortgage at the time of its assignment thereof to
the plaintiff, the assignment did not pass ownership of the note and mortgage to the
plaintiff”, and the plaintiff thus failed to establish ownership of the note and
mortgage); LaSalle Bank v. Lamy, 2006 N.Y. Misc. Lexis 2127 (NY. Sup. Ct.,
42
Suffolk Cty., Aug. 17, 2006) (the “assignment of the mortgage to the plaintiff,
upon which the plaintiff originally predicated its claims of ownership to the subject
mortgage, was made by an entity (MERS) which had no ownership interest in
either the note or the mortgage at the time the purported assignment thereof was
made”); MERS. v. Burek, 798 N.Y.S.2d 346, 347 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Richmond Cty.
2004) (denying summary judgment to MERS since MERS “is merely the selfdescribed
agent of a principal”); MERS v. Shuster, No. 05-26354/06 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct., Suffolk Cty., July 13, 2006) (denying MERS’s motion for default since MERS
owns neither the note or mortgage); MERS v. DeMarco, No. 05-1372, slip op. at 1-
2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Suffolk Cty., April 11, 2005) (ex-parte motion for default denied
because: a) the plaintiff was not named as the lender in either the note or
mortgage, and b) there was no proof that the plaintiff was the owner of the note
and mortgage at the time the action was commenced by reason of assignment or
otherwise”); Deutsche Bank National Trust Company as Trustee v. Primrose, No.
05-25796 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Suffolk Cty., July 13, 2006); Everhome Mortgage
Company v. Hendriks, No. 05-024042 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Suffolk Cty., June 27, 2006);
MERS v. Ramdoolar, No. 05-019863 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Suffolk Cty., Mar. 7, 2006);
MERS v.Delzatto, No. 05-020490 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Suffolk Cty., Dec. 9, 2005);
MERS, Inc. v. Parker, No. 017622/2004, slip op. at 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Suffolk Cty.
Oct. 19, 2004) (denying MERS’ motion for default judgment since MERS does not
43
own the note); MERS, Inc. v. Schoenster, No. 16969-2004, (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Suffolk
Cty., Sept. 15, 2004); see also Andrew Harris, Suffolk Judge Denies Requests by
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, N.Y. LAW J. (Aug. 31, 2004)
(discussing four foreclosure cases in Suffolk County that were dismissed in one
day because the judge held that MERS cannot foreclose because it is not the owner
of the note or mortgage).
Other state courts have also questioned MERS’ standing to proceed with
foreclosures. For example, in Florida, there have been a string of decisions
dismissing foreclosures brought by MERS based on its lack of standing. See, e.g.,
Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Azize, No. 05-001295-CI-11 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
Pinellas Cty. Apr. 18, 2005) (dismissing 28 individual foreclosures brought by
MERS on the basis of MERS’ lack of ownership of the notes), appeal docketed,
No. 2D05-4544 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2005); Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys.,
Inc. v. Griffin, No.16-2004-CA-002155, slip op. at 1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. May 27, 2004)
(dismissing foreclosure initiated by MERS based on lack of standing); see also
MERS v. Rees, supra. (denying summary judgment to MERS because a genuine
issue of fact existed regarding the current ownership of the note; a discrepancy
existed between the affidavit submitted by MERS claiming that it owned the note
and the information on the note); Taylor, Bean & Whitaker, Mortg. Corp. v.
Brown, 583 S.E.2d 844 (Ga. 2003) (reserving for the trial court a determination of
44
whether “MERS as nominee for the original lender and its successors, has the
power to foreclose . . .”).
Amici have represented homeowners in many cases in which MERS has
commenced a foreclosure in its name claiming to own the note and mortgage yet
has never been able to adduce any proof of its ownership of either. For example,
in Kings County Supreme Court, MERS sued Jean Roger M. Bomba and Martin C.
Bomba in a foreclosure action. MERS v. Bomba, No. 1645/03 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.,
Kings County). The Bomba complaint is riddled with mistruths and obfuscations,
including: (1) the true note holder is never mentioned; (2) MERS alleges that its
address is 400 Countrywide Way, Simi Valley, CA 93065 (which is actually
Countrywide Home Loans’ address, not MERS’ address); and (3) MERS alleges
on information and belief that it is the “sole, true and lawful owner of said
bond/note and mortgage.” Id. Amicus SBLS is representing Martin C. Bomba, and
has raised defenses, including the lack of MERS’ standing to bring the foreclosure,
but the merits have not yet been reached in the case. The confusion that MERS
engenders in the courts is typified by the judge’s order denying MERS’ unopposed
motion for an order appointing a referee in MERS v. Trapani, No. 04-19057, slip
op. at 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Suffolk Cty., Mar. 7, 2005):
The submissions reflect that neither the nominal plaintiff, Mortgage
Electronic Recording Systems, Inc. (“MERS”), nor Countrywide
Home Loans, Inc. (“Countrywide”), for which MERS purports to be
the “nominee”, is the record owner of the mortgage sought to be
45
foreclosed herein. The note and mortgage that are the subject of this
foreclosure action identify the lender as Alliance Mortgage Banking
Corp. MERS is identified in the mortgage instrument only as ‘a
separate corporation that is acting solely as a nominee for Lender and
Lender’s successors and assigns.’ There is no allegation or proof in
the submissions as to any assignment of the note and mortgage to
Countrywide, to MERS, or to any other entity, and plaintiff’s counsel
has asserted no authority, statutory or otherwise, for the bare assertion
that ‘[w]here ‘MERS’ is the mortgagee of record there is no need to
prepare an assignment.’
MERS has, in revisions to its Rule 8 governing how foreclosures are
brought, attempted to address the standing problem.37 Now foreclosures can no
longer be brought in MERS’ name in Florida. They may be brought in MERS’
name elsewhere only if the note is endorsed in blank, held by the servicer, and
MERS cannot be pled as the note holder. MERS thus admits that it does not own
the note, and never owns the note. MERS also admits that it is not the entity
initiating or controlling the foreclosure. However, MERS still continues to endorse
hiding the true owner from the borrower: MERS does not require the note holder
to be identified; and MERS permits the owner of the note to designate anyone,
other than MERS, to foreclose, so long as the mortgage, but not the note, is
assigned to the third party.
In its brief, MERS attempts to characterize the various cases denying
standing to MERS to foreclose as cases that are decided based on defective
37 See Jill D. Rein, Significant Changes to Commencing Foreclosure Actions in the Name of
MERS, available at http://www.usfn.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Article_Library&amp;
template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentID=3899.
46
pleading rather than on fundamental standing problems. MERS Br. at 57-66.
However, the pleading defects and the standing problems are one and the same.
MERS creates categories not recognized by the law, and intentionally and
systematically conceals from borrowers, attorneys, and judges the true owner of
the note. It is this concealment that consistently causes both the pleading defects
and the standing problems. MERS continues to flaunt rules of civil procedure for
private gain, causing massive confusion among borrowers, counsel, and the courts.
CONCLUSION
Without any legal authority, MERS is eroding the public databases of this
nation and unjustly withholding critically important information from
homeowners. MERS is designed as a profit-engine for the mortgage industry,
without regard to its infringement of essential public and individual rights.
Because MERS has no beneficial interest in mortgages and should not be permitted
to forcibly effect its intentionally obfuscating recordations, this Court should find
in favor of Respondents-Appellants, Edward P. Romaine and the County of
Suffolk and against Petitioners-Appellants-Respondents, MERS.
Dated: October 6, 2006
Brooklyn, NY
47
Respectfully Submitted,
___________________________
Meghan Faux, Esq.
Josh Zinner, Esq.
Foreclosure Prevention Project
SOUTH BROOKLYN LEGAL SERVICES
105 Court Street
Brooklyn, NY 11201
(718) 237-5500
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
Nina F. Simon, Esq.*
AARP FOUNDATION LITIGATION
601 E Street, NW
Washington, DC 20049
(202) 434-2059
For Amicus Curiae AARP
Seth Rosebrock, Esq.*
CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING
910 17th Street, N.W., Suite 500
Washington, D.C. 20006
202-349-1850
James B. Fishman, Esq., Of Counsel
NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER
77 Summer Street, 10th Floor
Boston, MA 02110-1006
(617) 542-8010
(Fishman & Neil, LLP
305 Broadway Suite 900
New York, NY 10007)
Brian L. Bromberg, Esq., Of Counsel
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CONSUMER ADVOCATES
1730 Rhode Island Ave., NW, #805
Washington, D.C. 20038
(202) 452-1989
(Bromberg Law Office, P.C.
48
40 Exchange Place, Suite 2010
New York, NY 10005)
April Carrie Charney, Esq.*
JACKSONVILLE AREA LEGAL AID, INC.
126 West Adams Street
Jacksonville, FL 32202
(904) 356-8371
Ruhi Maker, Esq.
EMPIRE JUSTICE CENTER
One West Main Street, 2nd Floor
Rochester, NY 14614
(585) 295-5808
Donna Dougherty, Esq.
Dianne Woodburn, Esq.
LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE ELDERLY IN QUEENS
97-77 Queens Blvd. Suite 600
Rego Park, New York 11374
Ph 718-286-1500, ext 1515
Diane Houk, Esq.
Pamela Sah, Esq.
FAIR HOUSING JUSTICE CENTER
HELP USA
5 Hanover Square, 17th Floor
New York, NY 10004
(212) 400-7000
Sarah Ludwig, Esq.
NEIGHBORHOOD ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ADVOCACY PROJECT
73 Spring Street, Suite 50
New York, NY 10012
212-680-5100, ext. 207
Oda Friedheim, Esq.
THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY
120-46 Queens Boulevard
49
Kew Gardens, New York 11415
Tel 718 286 2450
Margaret Becker, Esq.
Foreclosure Prevention Project
LEGAL SERVICES FOR NEW YORK CITY – STATEN ISLAND
36 Richmond Terrace
Staten Island, NY 10301
(718) 233-6480
Treneeka Cusack, Esq.
LEGAL AID BUREAU OF BUFFALO
237 Main Street, Suite 1602
Buffalo, New York 14203
(716) 853-9555, ext 522
* Pro Hac Vice
50
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I hereby certify that the above brief was prepared on a computer using
Microsoft Word, and using Point 14 Times New Roman typeface, in double space.
The total word count, exclusive of the cover, table of contents, table of citations,
proof of service, and certificate of compliance, is 9,451.
__________________________
Meghan Faux

TERRY MABRY et al., opinion 2923.5 Cilvil code

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

TERRY MABRY et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE COUNTY,

Respondent;

AURORA LOAN SERVICES, et al.,

Real Parties in Interest.

G042911

(Super. Ct. No. 30-2009-003090696)

O P I N I O N

Original proceedings; petition for a writ of mandate to challenge an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, David C. Velazquez, Judge. Writ granted in part and denied in part.
Law Offices of Moses S. Hall and Moses S. Hall for Petitioners.
No appearance for Respondent.
Akerman Senterfitt, Justin D. Balser and Donald M. Scotten for Real Party in Interest Aurora Loan Services.
McCarthy & Holthus, Matthew Podmenik, Charles E. Bell and Melissa Robbins Contts for Real Party in Interest Quality Loan Service Corporation.
Bryan Cave, Douglas E. Winter, Christopher L. Dueringer, Sean D. Muntz and Kamae C. Shaw for Amici Curiae Bank of America and BAC Home Loans Servicing on behalf of Real Parties in Interest.
Wright, Finlay & Zak, Thomas Robert Finlay and Jennifer A. Johnson for Amici Curiae United Trustee’s Association and California Mortgage Association.
Leland Chan for Amicus Curiae California Bankers Association.

I. SUMMARY
Civil Code section 2923.5 requires, before a notice of default may be filed, that a lender contact the borrower in person or by phone to “assess” the borrower’s financial situation and “explore” options to prevent foreclosure. Here is the exact, operative language from the statute: “(2) A mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall contact the borrower in person or by telephone in order to assess the borrower’s financial situation and explore options for the borrower to avoid foreclosure.” There is nothing in section 2923.5 that requires the lender to rewrite or modify the loan.
In this writ proceeding, we answer these questions about section 2923.5, also known as the Perata Mortgage Relief Act :
(A) May section 2923.5 be enforced by a private right of action? Yes. Otherwise the statute would be a dead letter.
(B) Must a borrower tender the full amount of the mortgage indebtedness due as a prerequisite to bringing an action under section 2923.5? No. To hold otherwise would defeat the purpose of the statute.
(C) Is section 2923.5 preempted by federal law? No — but, we must emphasize, it is not preempted because the remedy for noncompliance is a simple postponement of the foreclosure sale, nothing more.
(D) What is the extent of a private right of action under section 2923.5? To repeat: The right of action is limited to obtaining a postponement of an impending foreclosure to permit the lender to comply with section 2923.5.
(E) Must the declaration required of the lender by section 2923.5, subdivision (b) be under penalty of perjury? No. Such a requirement is not only not in the statute, but would be at odds with the way the statute is written.
(F) Does a declaration in a notice of default that tracks the language of section 2923.5, subdivision (b) comply with the statute, even though such language does not on its face delineate precisely which one of the three categories set forth in the declaration applies to the particular case at hand? Yes. There is no indication that the Legislature wanted to saddle lenders with the need to “custom draft” the statement required by the statute in notices of default.
(G) If a lender did not comply with section 2923.5 and a foreclosure sale has already been held, does that noncompliance affect the title to the foreclosed property obtained by the families or investors who may have bought the property at the foreclosure sale? No. The Legislature did nothing to affect the rule regarding foreclosure sales as final.
(H) In the present case, did the lender comply with section 2923.5? We cannot say on this record, and therefore must return the case to the trial court to determine which of the two sides is telling the truth. According to the lender, the borrowers themselves initiated a telephone conversation in which foreclosure-avoidance options were discussed, and there were many, many phone calls to the borrowers to attempt to discuss foreclosure-avoidance options. According to the borrowers, no one ever contacted them about nonforeclosure options. The trial judge, however, never reached this conflict in the facts, because he ruled strictly on legal grounds: namely (1) that section 2923.5 does not provide for a private right of action and (2) section 2923.5 is preempted by federal law. As indicated, we have concluded otherwise as to those two issues.
(I) Can section 2923.5 be enforced in a class action in this case? Not under these facts. The operation of section 2923.5 is highly fact-specific, and the details as to what might, or might not, constitute compliance can readily vary from lender to lender and borrower to borrower.
II. BACKGROUND
In December 2006, Terry and Michael Mabry refinanced the loan on their home in Corona from Paul Financial, borrowing about $700,000. In April 2008, Paul Financial assigned to Aurora Loan Services the right to service the loan. In this opinion, we will treat Aurora as synonymous with the lender and use the terms interchangeably.
According to the lender, in mid-July 2008 — before the Mabrys missed their August 2008 loan payment — the couple called Aurora on the telephone to discuss the loan with an Aurora employee. The discussion included mention of a number of options to avoid foreclosure, including loan modification, short sale, deed-in-lieu of foreclosure, and even a special forbearance. The Aurora employee sent a letter following up on the conversation. The letter explained the various options to avoid foreclosure, and asked the Mabrys to forward current financial information to Aurora so it could consider the Mabrys for these options.
According to the lender, the Mabrys missed their September 2008 payment as well, and mid-month Aurora sent them another letter describing ways to avoid foreclosure. Aurora employees called the Mabrys “many times” to discuss the situation. The Mabrys never picked up.
It is undisputed that later in September, the Mabrys filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy and Aurora did not contact the Mabrys while the bankruptcy was pending. (See 11 U.S.C. § 362 [automatic stay].) The Mabrys had their Chapter 11 case dismissed, however, in late March 2009.
According to the lender, Aurora once again began trying to call the Mabrys, calling them “numerous times,” including “three times on different days.” Meanwhile, in mid-April the Mabrys sent an authorization to discuss the loan with their lawyers.
According to the lender, finally, in June, the Mabrys sent two faxes to Aurora, the aggregate effect of which was to propose a short sale to the Mabrys’ attorney, Moses S. Hall, for $350,000. If accepted, the short sale would have meant a loss of over $400,000 on the loan. Aurora rejected that offer, and an attorney in Hall’s law office proposed a sale price of $425,000, which would have meant a loss to the lender of about $340,000.
It is undisputed that on June 18, 2009, Aurora recorded a notice of default. The notice of default used this (obviously form) language: “The Beneficiary or its designated agent declares that it has contacted the borrower, tried with due diligence to contact the borrower as required by California Civil Code section 2923.5, or the borrower has surrendered the property to the beneficiary or authorized agent, or is otherwise exempt from the requirements of section 2923.5.” Aurora sent six copies of the recorded notice of default to the Mabrys’ home by certified mail, and the certifications showed they were delivered.
It is also undisputed that on October 7, the Mabrys filed a complaint in Orange County Superior Court based on Aurora’s alleged failure to comply with section 2923.5.
According to the borrowers, no one had ever contacted them about their foreclosure options. Michael Mabry stated the following in his declaration: “We have never been contacted by Aurora nor [sic] any of its agents in person, by telephone or by first class mail to explore options for us to avoid foreclosure as required in CC § 2923.5.”
The complaint sought a temporary restraining order to prevent the foreclosure sale then scheduled just a week away, on October 14, 2009. Based on the allegation of no contact, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order, and scheduled a hearing for October 20.
But exactly one week before the October 20 hearing, the Mabrys filed an amended complaint, this one specifically adding class action allegations and seeking injunctive relief for an entire class. This new filing came with another request for a temporary restraining order, which was also granted, with a hearing on that temporary restraining order scheduled for October 27 (albeit the order was directed at Aurora only).
The first restraining order was vacated on October 20, the second on October 27. The trial judge did not, however, resolve the conflict in the facts presented by the pleadings. Rather he concluded: (1) the action is preempted by federal law; (2) there is no private right of action under section 2923.5 — the statute can only be enforced by members of pooling and servicing agreements; and (3) the Mabrys were required to at least tender all arrearages to enjoin any foreclosure proceedings.
The Mabrys filed a motion for reconsideration and a third request for a restraining order based on supposedly new law. The new law was a now review-granted Court of Appeal opinion which, let us merely note here, appears to have been quite off-point in regards to any issue which the trial judge had just decided. So it is not surprising that the requested restraining order was denied. The foreclosure sale was now scheduled for November 30, 2009. Six days before that, though, the Mabrys filed this writ proceeding, and two days later this court stayed all proceedings. We invited amicus curiae to give their views on the issues raised by the petition, and subsequently scheduled an order to show cause to consider those issues.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Private Right of Action? Yes
1. Preliminary Considerations
A private right of action may inhere within a statute, otherwise silent on the point, when such a private right of action is necessary to achieve the statute’s policy objectives. (E.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago (1979) 441 U.S. 677, 683 [implying private right of action into Title IX of the Civil Rights Act because such a right was necessary to achieve the statute’s policy objectives]; Basic Inc. v. Levinson (1988) 485 U.S. 224, 230-231 [implying private right of action to enforce securities statute].)
That is, the absence of an express private right of action is not necessarily preclusive of such a right. There are times when a private right of action may be implied by a statute. (E.g., Siegel v. American Savings & Loan Assn. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 953, 966 [“Before we reach the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies, we must determine, therefore, whether plaintiffs have an implied private right of action under HOLA.”].)
California courts have, of recent date, looked to Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287 (Moradi-Shalal) for guidance as to whether there is an implied private right of action in a given statute. In Moradi-Shalal, for example, the presence of a comprehensive administrative means of enforcement of a statute was one of the reasons the court determined that there was no private right of action to enforce a statute (Ins. Code, § 790.03, subd. (h)) regulating general insurance industry practices. (See Moradi-Shalal, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 300.)
There is also a pre-Moradi Shalal approach, embodied in Middlesex Ins. Co. v. Mann (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 558, 570 (Middlesex). (The Middlesex opinion itself copied the idea from the Restatement Second of Torts, section 874A.) The approach looks to whether a private remedy is “appropriate” to further the “purpose of the legislation” and is “needed to assure the effectiveness of the provision.” (Middlesex, supra, 124 Cal.App.3d at p. 570.)
Obviously, where the two approaches conflict, the one used by our high court in Moradi-Shalal trumps the Middlesex approach. But we may note at this point that as regards section 2923.5, there is no alternative administrative mechanism to enforce the statute. By contrast, in Moradi-Shalal, there was an existing administrative mechanism at hand (by way of the Insurance Commissioner) available to enforce section 790.03, subdivision (h) of the Insurance Code.
There are other corollary principles as well.
First, California courts, quite naturally, do not favor constructions of statutes that render them advisory only, or a dead letter. (E.g., Petropoulos v. Department of Real Estate (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 554, 567; People v. Stringham (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 184, 197.) Our colleagues in Division One of this District nicely summarized this point in Goehring v. Chapman University (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 353, 375: “The question of whether a regulatory statute creates a private right of action depends on legislative intent . . . . In determining legislative intent, ‘[w]e first examine the words themselves because the statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent . . . . The words of the statute should be given their ordinary and usual meaning and should be construed in their statutory context. . . . These canons generally preclude judicial construction that renders part of the statute “meaningless or inoperative.”’” (Italics added.)
Second, statutes on the same subject matter or of the same subject should be construed together so that all the parts of the statutory scheme are given effect. (Lexin v. Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1050, 1090-1091.) This canon is particularly important in the case before us, where there is an enforcement mechanism available at hand to enforce section 2923.5, in the form, as we explain below, of section 2924g. Ironically though, the enforcement mechanism at hand, in direct contrast to the one in Moradi-Shalal, is one that strongly implies individual enforcement of the statute.
Third, historical context can also shed light on whether the Legislature intended a private right of action in a statute. As noted by one federal district court that has found a private right of action in section 2923.5, the fact that a statute was enacted as an emergency statute is an important factor in determining legislative intent. (See Ortiz v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc. (S.D. 2009) 639 F.Supp.2d 1159, 1166 [agreeing with argument that “the California legislature would not have enacted this ‘urgency’ legislation, intended to curb high foreclosure rates in the state, without any accompanying enforcement mechanism”]; cf. County of San Diego v. State of California (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 580, 609 [admitting that private right of action might exist, even if the Legislature did not imply one, if “‘compelling reasons of public policy’” required “judicial recognition of such a right”].) Section 2923.5 was enacted in 2008 as a manifestation of a felt need for urgent action in the midst of a cascading torrent of foreclosures.
Finally, of course, there is recourse to legislative history. Alas, in this case, there is silence on the matter as regards the existence of a private right of action in the final draft of the statute, and we have been cited to nothing in the history that suggests a clear legislative intent one way or the other. (See generally J.A. Jones Construction Co. v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1568, 1575 (J.A. Jones) [emphasizing importance of clear intent appearing in legislative history].) To be sure, as we were reminded at oral argument, an early version of section 2923.5 had an express provision for a private right of action and that provision did not make its way into the final version of the statute. And we recognize that this factor suggests the Legislature may not have wanted to have section 2923.5 enforced privately.
On the other hand, the bottom line was an outcome of silence, not a clear statement that there should be no individual enforcement. And silence, as this court pointed out in J.A. Jones, has its own implications. There, we cited Professor Eskridge’s work on statutory interpretation (see Eskridge, The New Textualism (1990) 37 U.C.L.A. L.Rev. 621, 670-671 (hereinafter “Eskridge on Textualism”)) to recognize that ambiguity in a statute may itself be the result of both sides in the legislative process agreeing to let the courts decide a point: “[I]f there is ambiguity it is because the legislature either could not agree on clearer language or because it made the deliberate choice to be ambiguous — in effect, the only ‘intent’ is to pass the matter on to the courts.” (J.A. Jones, supra, 27 Cal. App.4th at p. 1577.) As Professor Eskridge put it elsewhere in his article: “The vast majority of the Court’s difficult statutory interpretation cases involve statutes whose ambiguity is either the result of deliberate legislative choice to leave conflictual decisions to agencies or the courts.” (Eskridge on Textualism, supra, 37 UCLA L.Rev. at p. 677.)
We have a concrete example in the case at hand. Amicus curiae, the California Bankers Association, asserts that if section 2923.5 had included an express right to a private right of action, the association would have vociferously opposed the legislation. Let us accept that as true. But let us also accept as a reasonable premise that the sponsors of the bill (2008, Senate Bill No. 1137) would have vociferously opposed the legislation if it had an express prohibition on individual enforcement. The point is, the bankers did not insist on language expressly or even impliedly precluding a private right of action, or, if they did, they didn’t get it. The silence is consonant with the idea that section 2923.5 was the result of a legislative compromise, with each side content to let the courts struggle with the issue.
With these observations, we now turn to the language, structure and function of the statute at issue.
2. Operation of Section 2923.5
Section 2923.5 is one of a series of detailed statutes that govern mortgages that span sections 2920 to 2967. Within that series is yet another long series of statutes governing rules involving foreclosure. This second series goes from section 2924, and then follows with sections 2924a through 2924l. (There is no section 2924m . . . yet.)
Section 2923.5 concerns the crucial first step in the foreclosure process: The recording of a notice of default as required by section 2924. (Just plain section 2924 — this one has no lower case letter behind it.)
The key text of section 2923.5 — “key” because of the substantive obligation it imposes on lenders — basically says that a lender cannot file a notice of default until the lender has contacted the borrower “in person or by telephone.” Thus an initial form letter won’t do. To quote the text directly, lenders must contact the borrower by phone or in person to “assess the borrower’s financial situation and explore options for the borrower to avoid foreclosure.” The statute, of course, has alternative provisions in cases where the lender tries to contact a borrower, and the borrower simply won’t pick up the phone, the phone has been disconnected, the borrower hides or otherwise evades contact.
The contrast between section 2923.5 and one of its sister-statutes, section 2923.6, is also significant. By its terms, section 2923.5 operates substantively on lenders. They must do things in order to comply with the law. In Hohfeldian language, it both creates rights and corresponding obligations.
But consider section 2923.6, which does not operate substantively. Section 2923.6 merely expresses the hope that lenders will offer loan modifications on certain terms. By contrast, section 2923.5 requires a specified course of action. (There is a reason for the difference, as we show in part III.C., dealing with federal preemption. In a word, to have required loan modifications would have run afoul of federal law.)
As noted above, other steps in the foreclosure process are set forth in sections 2924a through 2924l. The topic of the postponement of foreclosure sales is addressed in section 2924g.
Subdivision (c)(1)(A) of section 2924g sets forth the grounds for postponements of foreclosure sales. One of those grounds is the open-ended possibility that any court of competent jurisdiction may issue an order postponing the sale. Section 2923.5 and section 2924g, subdivision (c)(1)(A), when read together, establish a natural, logical whole, and one wholly consonant with the Legislature’s intent in enacting 2923.5 to have individual borrowers and lenders “assess” and “explore” alternatives to foreclosure: If section 2923.5 is not complied with, then there is no valid notice of default, and without a valid notice of default, a foreclosure sale cannot proceed. The available, existing remedy is found in the ability of a court in section 2924g, subdivision (c)(1)(A), to postpone the sale until there has been compliance with section 2923.5. Reading section 2923.5 together with section 2924g, subdivision (c)(1)(A) gives section 2923.5 real effect. The alternative would mean that the Legislature conferred a right on individual borrowers in section 2923.5 without any means of enforcing that right.
By the same token, compliance with section 2923.5 is necessarily an individualized process. After all, the details of a borrower’s financial situation and the options open to a particular borrower to avoid foreclosure are going to vary, sometimes widely, from borrower to borrower. Section 2923.5 is not a statute, like subdivision (h) of section 790.03 of the Insurance Code construed in Moradi-Shalal, which contemplates a frequent or general business practice, and thus its very text is necessarily directed at those who regulate the insurance industry. (Insurance Code section 790.03, subdivision (h) begins with the words, “Knowingly committing or performing with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice any of the following unfair claims settlement practices: . . . .”; see generally Moradi-Shalal, supra, 46 Cal.3d 287.)
Rather, in order to have its obvious goal of forcing parties to communicate (the statutory words are “assess” and “explore”) about a borrower’s situation and the options to avoid foreclosure, section 2923.5 necessarily confers an individual right. The alternative proffered by the trial court — enforcement by the servicer of pooling agreements — involves the facially unworkable problem of fitting individual situations into collective pools.
The suggestion of one amicus that the Legislature intended enforcement of section 2923.5 to reside within the Attorney General’s office is one of which we express no opinion. Our decision today should thus not be read as precluding such enforcement by the Attorney General’s office. But we do note that the same individual-collective problem would dog Attorney General enforcement of the statute. To be sure (which is why the possibility should be left open), there might, ala Insurance Code section 790.03, subdivision (h), be lenders who systematically ignore section 2923.5, and their “general business practice” would be susceptible to some sort of collective enforcement. Even so, the Attorney General’s office can hardly be expected to take up the cause of every individual borrower whose diverse circumstances show noncompliance with section 2923.5.
3. Application
We now put the preceding ideas and factors together.
While the dropping of an express provision for private enforcement in the legislative process leading to section 2923.5 does indeed give us pause, it is outweighed by two major opposing factors. First, the very structure of section 2923.5 is inherently individual. That fact strongly suggests a legislative intention to allow individual enforcement of the statute. The statute would become a meaningless dead letter if no individual enforcement were allowed: It would mean that the Legislature created an inherently individual right and decided there was no remedy at all.
Second, when section 2923.5 was enacted as an urgency measure, there already was an existing enforcement mechanism at hand — section 2924g. There was no need to write a provision into section 2923.5 allowing a borrower to obtain a postponement of a foreclosure sale, since such a remedy was already present in section 2924g. Reading the two statutes together as allowing a remedy of postponement of foreclosure produces a logical and natural whole.
B. Tender Full Amount of Indebtedness? No
The right conferred by section 2923.5 is a right to be contacted to “assess” and “explore” alternatives to foreclosure prior to a notice of default. It is enforced by the postponement of a foreclosure sale. Therefore it would defeat the purpose of the statute to require the borrower to tender the full amount of the indebtedness prior to any enforcement of the right to — and that’s the point — the right to be contacted prior to the notice of default. Case law requiring payment or tender of the full amount of payment before any foreclosure sale can be postponed (e.g., Arnolds Management Corp. v. Eischen (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 575, 578 [“It is settled that an action to set aside a trustee’s sale for irregularities in sale notice or procedure should be accompanied by an offer to pay the full amount of the debt for which the property was security.”]) arises out of a paradigm where, by definition, there is no way that a foreclosure sale can be avoided absent payment of all the indebtedness. Any irregularities in the sale would necessarily be harmless to the borrower if there was no full tender. (See 4 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (2d ed. 1989) § 9:154, pp. 507-508.) By contrast, the whole point of section 2923.5 is to create a new, even if limited right, to be contacted about the possibility of alternatives to full payment of arrearages. It would be contradictory to thwart the very operation of the statute if enforcement were predicated on full tender. It is well settled that statutes can modify common law rules. (E.g., Evangelatos v. Superior Court
44 Cal.3d 1188, 1192 [noting that Civil Code sections 1431 to 1431.5 had modified traditional common law doctrine of joint and several liability].)
C. Preempted by Federal Law? No — As Long
As Relief Under Section 2923.5 is Limited to Just Postponement
1. Historical Context
A remarkable aspect of section 2923.5 is that it appears to have been carefully drafted to avoid bumping into federal law, precisely because it is limited to affording borrowers only more time when lenders do not comply with the statute. To explain that, though, we need to make a digression into state debtors’ relief acts as they have manifested themselves in four previous periods of economic distress.
The first period of economic distress was the depression of the mid-1780’s that played a large part in engendering the United States Constitution in the first place. As Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes would later note for a majority of the United States Supreme Court, there was “widespread distress following the revolutionary period and the plight of debtors, had called forth in the States an ignoble array of legislative schemes for the defeat of creditors and the invasion of contractual obligations.” (Home Building and Loan Ass’n. v. Blaisdell (1934) 290 U.S. 398, 427 (Blaisdell).) Consequently, the federal Constitution of 1789 contains the contracts clause, which forbids states from impairing contracts. (See Siegel, Understanding the Nineteenth Century Contract Clause: The Role of the Property-Privilege Distinction and ‘Takings’ Clause Jurisprudence (1986) 60 So.Cal. L.Rev. 1, 21, fn. 86 [“Although debtor relief legislation was frequently enacted in the Confederation era, it was intensely opposed. It was among the chief motivations for the convening of the Philadelphia convention, and the Constitution drafted there was designed to eliminate such legislation through a variety of means.”].)
The second period of distress arose out of the panic of 1837, which prompted, in 1841, the Illinois state legislature to enact legislation severely restricting foreclosures. The legislation (1) gave debtors 12 months after any foreclosure sale to redeem the property; and (2) prevented any foreclosure sale in the first place unless the sale fetched at least two-thirds of the appraised value of the property. (See Bronson v. Kinzie (1843) 42 U.S. 311 (Bronson); Blaisdell, supra, 290 U.S. at p. 431.) In an opinion, the main theme of which is the interrelationship between contract rights and legal remedies to enforce those rights (see generally Bronson, supra, 42 U.S. at pp. 315-321), the Bronson court reasoned that the Illinois legislation had effectively destroyed the contract rights of the lender as regards a mortgage made in 1838. (See id. at p. 317 [“the obligation of the contract, and the rights of a party under it, may, in effect, be destroyed by denying a remedy altogether”].)
The third period of distress was, of course, the Great Depression of the 1930’s. In 1933, the Minnesota Legislature enacted a mortgage moratorium law that extended the period of redemption under Minnesota law until 1935. (See Blaisdell, supra, 290 U.S. at pp. 415-416.) But — and the high court majority found this significant — the law required debtors, in applying for an extension of the redemption period — to pay the reasonable value of the income of the property, or reasonable rental value if it didn’t produce income. (Id. at. pp. 416-417.) The legislation was famously upheld in Blaisdell. In distinguishing Bronson, the Blaisdell majority made the point that the statute did not substantively impair the debt the way the legislation in Bronson had: “The statute,” said the court, “does not impair the integrity of the mortgage indebtedness.” (Id. at p. 425.) The court went on to emphasize the need to pay the fair rental value of the property, which, it noted, was “the equivalent of possession during the extended period.”
Finally, the fourth period was within the living memory of many readers, namely, the extraordinary inflation and high interest rates of the late 1970’s. That period engendered Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Association v. de la Cuesta (1982) 458 U.S. 141 (de la Cuesta). Many mortgages had (still have) what is known as a “due-on-sale” clause. As it played out in the 1970’s, the clause effectively required any buyer of a new home to obtain a new loan, but at the then-very high market interest rates. To circumvent the need for a new high rate mortgage, creative wrap-around financing was invented where a buyer would assume the obligation of the old mortgage, but that required the due-on-sale clause not be enforced.
An earlier decision of the California Supreme Court, Wellenkamp v. Bank of America (1978) 21 Cal.3d 943, had encouraged this sort of creative financing by holding that due-on-sale clauses violated California state law as an unreasonable restraint on alienation. Despite that precedent, the trial judge in the de la Cuesta case (Edward J. Wallin, who would later join this court) held that regulations issued by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, by the authority of the Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933 preempted state law that invalidated due-on-sale clause. A California appellate court in the Fourth District (in an opinion by Justice Marcus Kaufman, who would later join the California Supreme Court) reversed the trial court. The United States Supreme Court, however, agreed with Judge Wallin’s determination, and reversed the appellate judgment and squarely held the state law to be preempted.
The de la Cuesta court observed that the bank board’s regulations were plain — “even” the California appellate court had been required to recognize that. (de la Cuesta, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 154). On top of the express preemption, Congress had expressed no intent to limit the bank board’s authority to “regulate the lending practices of federal savings and loans.” (Id. at p. 161.) Further, going into the history of the Home Owners’ Loan Act, the de la Cuesta court pointed out that “mortgage lending practices” are a “critical” aspect of a savings and loan’s “‘operation,’” and the Home Loan Bank Board had issued the due-on-sale regulations in order to protect the economic solvency of such lenders. (See id. at pp. 167-168.) In what is perhaps the most significant part of the rationale for our purposes, the bank board had concluded that “the due-on-sale clause is ‘an important part of the mortgage contract,’” consequently its elimination would have an adverse effect on the “financial stability” of federally chartered lenders. (Id. at p. 168.) For example, invalidation of the due-on-sale clause would make it hard for savings and loans “to sell their loans in the secondary markets.” (Ibid.)
With this history behind us, we now turn to the actual regulations at issue in the case before us.
2. The HOLA Regulations
Under the Home Owner’s Loan Act of 1933 (12 U.S.C. § 1461 et seq.) the federal Office of Thrift Supervision has issued section 560.2 of title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations, a regulation that itself delineates what is a matter for federal regulation, and what is a matter for state law. Interestingly enough, section 560.2 is written in the form of examples, using the “ejusdem generis” approach of requiring a court to figure out what is, and what is not, in the same general class or category as the items given in the example.
On the preempted side, section 560.2 includes:
— “terms of credit, including amortization of loans and the deferral and capitalization of interest and adjustments to the interest rate” (§ 560.2(b)(4));
— “balance, payments due, or term to maturity of the loan” (§ 560.2(b)(4)); and, most importantly for this case,
— the “processing, origination, servicing, sale or purchase of, or investment or participation in, mortgages.” (§ 560.2(b)(10), italics added.)
On the other side, left for the state courts, is “Real property law.” (12 C.F.R. § 560.2(c)(2).)
We agree with the Mabrys that the process of foreclosure has traditionally been a matter of state real property law, a point both noted by the United States Supreme Court in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1994) 511 U.S. 531, 541-542, and academic commentators (e.g., Alexander, Federal Intervention in Real Estate Finance: Preemption and Federal Common Law (1993) 71 N.C. L. Rev. 293, 293 [“Historically, real property law has been the exclusive domain of the states.”]), including at least one law professor who laments that diverse state foreclosure laws tend to hinder efforts to achieve banking stability at the national level. (See Nelson, Confronting the Mortgage Meltdown: A Brief for the Federalization of State Mortgage Foreclosure Law (2010) 37 Pepperdine L.Rev. 583, 588-590 [noting that mortgage foreclosure law varies from state to state, and advocating federalization of mortgage foreclosure law].) By contrast, we have not been cited to anything in the federal regulations that govern such things as initiation of foreclosure, notice of foreclosure sales, allowable times until foreclosure, or redemption periods. (Though there are commentators, like Professor Nelson, who argue there should be.)
Given the traditional state control over mortgage foreclosure laws, it is logical to conclude that if the Office of Thrift Supervision wanted to include foreclosure as within the preempted category of loan servicing, it would have been explicit. Nothing prevented the office from simply adding the words “foreclosure of” to section 560.2(b)(10).
D. The Extent of Section 2923.5?
More Time and Only More Time
State law should be construed, whenever possible, to be in harmony with federal law, so as to avoid having the state law invalidated by federal preemption. (See Greater Westchester Homeowners Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1979) 26 Cal.3d 86, 93; California Arco Distributors, Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 349, 359.)
We emphasize that we are able to come to our conclusion that section 2923.5 is not preempted by federal banking regulations because it is, or can be construed to be, very narrow. As mentioned above, there is no right, for example, under the statute, to a loan modification.
A few more comments on the scope of the statute:
First, to the degree that the words “assess” and “explore” can be narrowly or expansively construed, they must be narrowly construed in order to avoid crossing the line from state foreclosure law into federally preempted loan servicing. Hence, any “assessment” must necessarily be simple — something on the order of, “why can’t you make your payments?” The statute cannot require the lender to consider a whole new loan application or take detailed loan application information over the phone. (Or, as is unlikely, in person.)
Second, the same goes for any “exploration” of options to avoid foreclosure. Exploration must necessarily be limited to merely telling the borrower the traditional ways that foreclosure can be avoided (e.g., deeds “in lieu,” workouts, or short sales), as distinct from requiring the lender to engage in a process that would be functionally indistinguishable from taking a loan application in the first place. In this regard, we note that section 2923.5 directs lenders to refer the borrower to “the toll-free telephone number made available by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to find a HUD-certified housing counseling agency.” The obvious implication of the statute’s referral clause is that the lender itself does not have any duty to become a loan counselor itself.
Finally, to the degree that the “assessment” or “exploration” requirements impose, in practice, burdens on federal savings banks that might arguably push the statute out of the permissible category of state foreclosure law and into the federally preempted category of loan servicing or loan making, evidence of such a burden is necessary before the argument can be persuasive. For the time being, and certainly on this record, we cannot say that section 2923.5, narrowly construed, strays over the line.
Given such a narrow construction, section 2923.5 does not, as the law in Blaisdell did not, affect the “integrity” of the basic debt. (Cf. Lopez v. World Savings & Loan Assn. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 729 [section 560.2 preempted state law that capped payoff demand statement fees].)
E. The Wording of the Declaration:
Okay If Not Under Penalty of Perjury
In addition to the substantive act of contacting the borrower, section 2923.5 requires a statement in the notice of default. The statement is found in subdivision (b), which we quote here: “(b) A notice of default filed pursuant to Section 2924 shall include a declaration that the mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent has contacted the borrower, has tried with due diligence to contact the borrower as required by this section, or that no contact was required pursuant to subdivision (h).” (Italics added.)
The idea that this “declaration” must be made under oath must be rejected. First, ordinary English usage of the word “declaration” imports no requirement that it be under oath. In the Oxford English Dictionary, for example, numerous definitions of the word are found, none of which of require a statement under oath or penalty of perjury. In fact, the second legal definition given actually juxtaposes the idea of a declaration against the idea of a statement under oath: “A simple affirmation to be taken, in certain cases, instead of an oath or solemn affirmation.” (4 Oxford English Dict. (2d. ed. 1991) at p. 336.)
Second, even the venerable Black’s Law Dictionary doesn’t define “declaration” to necessarily be under oath. Its very first definition of the word is: “A formal statement, proclamation or announcement, esp. one embodied in an instrument.” (Black’s Law Dict. (9th ed. 2009) at p. 467.)
Third, if the Legislature wanted to say that the statement required in section 2923.5 must be under penalty of perjury, it knew how to do so. The words “penalty of perjury” are used in other laws governing mortgages. (E.g., § 2941.7, subdivision (b) [“The declaration provided for in this section shall be signed by the mortgagor or trustor under penalty of perjury.”].)
And, finally — back to our point about the inherent individual operation of the statute — the very structure of subdivision (b) belies any insertion of a penalty of perjury requirement. The way section 2923.5 is set up, too many people are necessarily involved in the process for any one person to likely be in the position where he or she could swear that all three requirements of the declaration required by subdivision (b) were met. We note, for example, that subdivision (a)(2) requires any one of three entities (a “mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent”) to contact the borrower, and such entities may employ different people for that purpose. And the option under the statute of no contact being required (per subdivision (h) ) further involves individuals who would, in any commercial operation, probably be different from the people employed to do the contacting. For example, the person who would know that the borrower had surrendered the keys would in all likelihood be a different person than the legal officer who would know that the borrower had filed for bankruptcy.
The argument for requiring the declaration to be under penalty of perjury relies on section 2015.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but that reliance is misplaced. We quote all of section 2015.5 in the margin. Essentially the statute says if a statement in writing is required to be supported by sworn oath, making the statement under penalty of perjury will be sufficient. The key language is: “Whenever, under any law of this state . . . made pursuant to the law of this state, any matter is required . . . to be . . . evidenced . . . by the sworn . . . declaration . . . in writing of the person making the same . . . such matter may with like force and effect be . . . evidenced . . . by the unsworn . . . declaration . . . in writing of such person which recites that it is . . . declared by him or her to be true under penalty of perjury . . . .” (Italics added.) The section sheds no light on whether the declaration required in section 2923.5, subdivision (b) must be under penalty of perjury.
F. The Wording of the Declaration:
Okay If It Tracks the Statute
In light of what we have just said about the multiplicity of persons who would necessarily have to sign off on the precise category in subdivision (b) of the statute that would apply in order to proceed with foreclosure (contact by phone, contact in person, unsuccessful attempts at contact by phone or in person, bankruptcy, borrower hiring a foreclosure consultant, surrender of keys), and the possibility that such persons might be employees of not less than three entities (mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent), there is no way we can divine an intention on the part of the Legislature that each notice of foreclosure be custom drafted.
To which we add this important point: By construing the notice requirement of section 2923.5, subdivision (b), to require only that the notice track the language of the statute itself, we avoid the problem of the imposition of costs beyond the minimum costs now required by our reading of the statute.
G. Noncompliance Before Foreclosure
Sale Affect Title After Foreclosure Sale? No
A primary reason for California’s comprehensive regulation of foreclosure in the Civil Code is to ensure stability of title after a trustee’s sale. (Melendrez v. D & I Investment, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1249-1250 [“comprehensive statutory scheme” governing foreclosure has three purposes, one of which is “to ensure that a properly conducted sale is final between the parties and conclusive as to a bona fide purchaser” (internal quotations omitted)].)
There is nothing in section 2923.5 that even hints that noncompliance with the statute would cause any cloud on title after an otherwise properly conducted foreclosure sale. We would merely note that under the plain language of section 2923.5, read in conjunction with section 2924g, the only remedy provided is a postponement of the sale before it happens.
H. Lender Compliance in This Case?
Somebody is Not Telling the Truth
and It’s the Trial Court’s Job to
Determine Who It Is
We have already recounted the conflict in the evidence before the trial court regarding whether there was compliance with section 2923.5. Rarely, in fact, are stories so diametrically opposite: According to the Mabrys, there was no contact at all. According to Aurora, not only were there numerous contacts, but the Mabrys even initiated a proposal by which their attorney would buy the property.
Somebody’s not telling the truth, but appellate courts do not resolve conflicts in evidence. Trial courts do. (Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 697, fn. 23 [“Moreover, Diaz and Bezemek concede the proffered evidence is disputed; appellate courts will not resolve such factual conflicts.”].) This case will obviously have to be remanded for an evidentiary hearing.
I. Is This Case Suitable for
Class Action Treatment? No
As we have seen, section 2923.5 contemplates highly-individuated facts. One borrower might not pick up the telephone, one lender might only call at the same time each day in violation of the statute, one lender might (incorrectly) try to get away with a form letter, one borrower might, like the old Twilight Zone “pitchman” episode, try to keep the caller on the line but change the subject and talk about anything but alternatives to foreclosure, one borrower might, as Aurora asserts here, try to have his or her attorney do a deal that avoids foreclosure, etcetera.
In short, how in the world would a court certify a class? Consider that in this case, there is even a dispute over the basic facts as to whether the lender attempted to comply at all. We do not have, under these facts at least, a question of a clean, systematic policy on the part of a lender that might be amenable to a class action (or perhaps enforcement by the Attorney General). This case is not one, to be blunt, where the lender admits that it simply ignored the statute and proceeded on the theory that federal law had preempted it. We express no opinion as to any scenario where a lender simply ignored the statute wholesale — that sort of scenario is why we do not preclude, a priori, class actions and have not expressed an opinion as to whether the Attorney General or a private party in such a situation might indeed seek to enforce section 2923.5 in a class action.
Consequently, while we must grant the writ petition so as to allow the Mabrys a hearing on the factual merits of compliance, we deny it insofar as it seeks reinstatement of any claims qua class action. By the same token, in light of the limited right to time conferred under section 2923.5, we also deny the writ petition insofar as it seeks reinstatement of any claim for money damages.
IV. CONCLUSION
Let a writ issue instructing the trial court to decide whether or not Aurora complied with section 2923.5. To the degree that the trial court’s order precludes the assertion of any class action claims, we deny the writ. If the trial court finds that Aurora has complied with section 2923.5, foreclosure may proceed. If not, it shall be postponed until Aurora files a new notice of default in the wake of substantive compliance with section 2923.5.
Given that this writ petition is granted in part and denied in part, each side will bear its own costs in this proceeding.

SILLS, P. J.
WE CONCUR:

ARONSON, J.

IKOLA, J.

Fannie Mae Policy Now Admits Loan Not Secured

Posted 14 hours ago by Neil Garfield on Livinglies’s Weblog

29248253-Mers-May-Not-Foreclosure-for-Fannie-Mae

Editor’s Note: Their intention was to get MERS and servicers out of the foreclosure business. They now say that prior to foreclosure MERS must assign to the real party in interest.

Here’s their problem: As numerous Judges have pointed out, MERS specifically disclaims any interest in the obligation, note or mortgage. Even the language of the mortgage or Deed of Trust says MERS is mentioned in name only and that the Lender is somebody else.

These Judges who have considered the issue have come up with one conclusion, an assignment from a party with no right, title or interest has nothing to assign. The assignment may look good on its face but there still is the problem that nothing was assigned.

Here’s the other problem. If MERS was there in name only to permit transfers and other transactions off-record (contrary to state law) and if the original party named as “Lender” is no longer around, then what you have is a gap in the chain of custody and chain of title with respect to the creditor’s side of the loan. It is all off record which means, ipso facto that it is a question of fact as to whose loan it is. That means, ipso facto, that the presence of MERS makes it a judicial question which means that the non-judicial election is not available. They can’t do it.

So when you put this all together, you end up with the following inescapable conclusions:

* The naming of MERS as mortgagee in a mortgage deed or as beneficiary in a deed of trust is a nullity.
* MERS has no right, title or interest in any loan and even if it did, it disclaims any such interest on its own website.
* The lender might be the REAL beneficiary, but that is a question of fact so the non-judicial foreclosure option is not available.
* If the lender was not the creditor, it isn’t the lender because it had no right title or interest either, legally or equitably.
* Without a creditor named in the security instrument intended to secure the obligation, the security was never perfected.
* Without a creditor named in the security instrument intended to secure the obligation, the obligation is unsecured as to legal title.
* Since the only real creditor is the one who advanced the funds (the investor(s)), they can enforce the obligation by proxy or directly. Whether the note is actually evidence of the obligation and to what extent the terms of the note are enforceable is a question for the court to determine.
* The creditor only has a claim if they would suffer loss as a result of the indirect transaction with the borrower. If they or their agents have received payments from any source, those payments must be allocated to the loan account. The extent and measure of said allocation is a question of fact to be determined by the Court.
* Once established, the allocation will most likely be applied in the manner set forth in the note, to wit: (a) against payments due (b) against fees and (c) against principal, in that order.
* Once applied against payments, due the default vanishes unless the allocation is less than the amount due in payments.
* Once established, the allocation results in a fatal defect in the notice of default, the statements sent to the borrower, and the representations made in court. Thus at the very least they must vacate all foreclosure proceedings and start over again.
* If the allocation is less than the amount of payments due, then the investor(s) collectively have a claim for acceleration and to enforce the note — but they have no claim on the mortgage deed or deed of trust. By intentionally NOT naming parties who were known at the time of the transaction the security was split from the obligation. The obligation became unsecured.
* The investors MIGHT have a claim for equitable lien based upon the circumstances that BOTH the borrower and the investor were the victims of fraud.

MERS and civil code 2932.5 and Bankruptcy code 547 here is how it comes together

CA Civil Code 2932.5 – Assignment”Where a power to sell real property is
given to a mortgagee, or other encumbrancer, in an instrument intended
to secure the payment of money, the power is part of the security and
vests in any person who by assignment becomes entitled to payment of the
money secured by the instrument. The power of sale may be exercised by
the assignee if the assignment is duly acknowledged and recorded.”

Landmark vs Kesler – While this is a matter of first impression in
Kansas, other jurisdictions have issued opinions on similar and related
issues, and, while we do not consider those opinions binding in the
current litigation, we find them to be useful guideposts in our analysis
of the issues before us.”

“Black’s Law Dictionary defines a nominee as “[a] person designated to
act in place of another, usu. in a very limited way” and as “[a] party
who holds bare legal title for the benefit of others or who receives and
distributes funds for the benefit of others.” Black’s Law Dictionary
1076 (8th ed. 2004). This definition suggests that a nominee possesses
few or no legally enforceable rights beyond those of a principal whom
the nominee serves……..The legal status of a nominee, then, depends
on the context of the relationship of the nominee to its principal.
Various courts have interpreted the relationship of MERS and the lender
as an agency relationship.”

“LaSalle Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Lamy, 2006 WL 2251721, at *2 (N.Y. Sup.
2006) (unpublished opinion) (“A nominee of the owner of a note and
mortgage may not effectively assign the note and mortgage to another for
want of an ownership interest in said note and mortgage by the
nominee.”)”

The law generally understands that a mortgagee is not distinct from a
lender: a mortgagee is “[o]ne to whom property is mortgaged: the
mortgage creditor, or lender.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1034 (8th ed.
2004). By statute, assignment of the mortgage carries with it the
assignment of the debt. K.S.A. 58-2323. Although MERS asserts that,
under some situations, the mortgage document purports to give it the
same rights as the lender, the document consistently refers only to
rights of the lender, including rights to receive notice of litigation,
to collect payments, and to enforce the debt obligation. The document
consistently limits MERS to acting “solely” as the nominee of the
lender.

Indeed, in the event that a mortgage loan somehow separates interests of
the note and the deed of trust, with the deed of trust lying with some
independent entity, the mortgage may become unenforceable.

“The practical effect of splitting the deed of trust from the promissory
note is to make it impossible for the holder of the note to foreclose,
unless the holder of the deed of trust is the agent of the holder of the
note. [Citation omitted.] Without the agency relationship, the person
holding only the note lacks the power to foreclose in the event of
default. The person holding only the deed of trust will never experience
default because only the holder of the note is entitled to payment of
the underlying obligation. [Citation omitted.] The mortgage loan becomes
ineffectual when the note holder did not also hold the deed of trust.”
Bellistri v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 284 S.W.3d 619, 623 (Mo. App.
2009).

“MERS never held the promissory note,thus its assignment of the deed of
trust to Ocwen separate from the note had no force.” 284 S.W.3d at 624;
see also In re Wilhelm, 407 B.R. 392 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009) (standard
mortgage note language does not expressly or implicitly authorize MERS
to transfer the note); In re Vargas, 396 B.R. 511, 517 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
2008) (“[I]f FHM has transferred the note, MERS is no longer an
authorized agent of the holder unless it has a separate agency contract
with the new undisclosed principal. MERS presents no evidence as to who
owns the note, or of any authorization to act on behalf of the present
owner.”); Saxon Mortgage Services, Inc. v. Hillery, 2008 WL 5170180
(N.D. Cal. 2008) (unpublished opinion) (“[F]or there to be a valid
assignment, there must be more than just assignment of the deed alone;
the note must also be assigned. . . . MERS purportedly assigned both the
deed of trust and the promissory note. . . . However, there is no
evidence of record that establishes that MERS either held the promissory
note or was given the authority . . . to assign the note.”).

What stake in the outcome of an independent action for foreclosure could
MERS have? It did not lend the money to Kesler or to anyone else
involved in this case. Neither Kesler nor anyone else involved in the
case was required by statute or contract to pay money to MERS on the
mortgage. See Sheridan, ___ B.R. at ___ (“MERS is not an economic
‘beneficiary’ under the Deed of Trust. It is owed and will collect no
money from Debtors under the Note, nor will it realize the value of the
Property through foreclosure of the Deed of Trust in the event the Note
is not paid.”). If MERS is only the mortgagee, without ownership of the
mortgage instrument, it does not have an enforceable right. See Vargas,
396 B.R. 517 (“[w]hile the note is ‘essential,’ the mortgage is only ‘an
incident’ to the note” [quoting Carpenter v. Longan, 16 Wall. 271, 83
U.S. 271, 275, 21 L. Ed 313 (1872)]).

* MERS had no Beneficial Interest in the Note,
* MERS and the limited agency authority it has under the dot does
not continue with the assignment of the mortgage or dot absent a
ratification or a separate agency agreement between mers and the
assignee.
* The Note and the Deed of Trust were separated at or shortly
after origination upon endorsement and negotiation of the note rendering
the dot a nullity
* MERS never has any power or legal authority to transfer the note
to any entity;
* mers never has a beneficial interest in the note and pays
nothing of value for the note.

Bankr. Code 547 provides, among other things, that an unsecured
creditor who had won a race to an interest in the debtor’s property
using the state remedies system within 90 days of the filing of the
bankruptcy petition may have to forfeit its winnings (without
compensation for any expenses it may have incurred in winning the race)
for the benefit of all unsecured creditors. The section therefore
prevents certain creditors from being preferred over others (hence,
section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code is titled “Preferences).” An
additional effect of the section (and one of its stated purposes) may be
to discourage some unsecured creditors from aggressively pursuing the
debtor under the state remedies system, thus affording the debtor more
breathing space outside bankruptcy, for fear that money spent using the
state remedies system will be wasted if the debtor files a bankruptcy
petition.

. Bankr. Code 547(c) provides several important exceptions to the
preference avoidance power.

Bankr. Code 547 permits avoidance of liens obtained within the 90 day
(or one year) period: the creation of a lien on property of the debtor,
whether voluntary, such as through a consensual lien, or involuntary,
such as through a judicial lien, would, absent avoidance, have the same
preferential impact as a transfer of money from a debtor to a creditor
in payment of a debt. If the security interest was created in the
creditor within the 90 day window, and if other requirements of section
547(b) are satisfied, the security interest can be avoided and the real
property sold by the trustee free of the security interest (subject to
homestead exemption). All unsecured creditors of the debtor, including
the creditor whose lien has been avoided, will share, pro rata, in the
distribution of assets of the debtor, including the proceeds of the sale
of the real estate

Backdating assignments ??

Court denies Motion to Dismiss and holds backdated mortgage assignments may be invalid

On March 30, 2010, in the case of Ohlendorf v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, (2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31098) on Defendants’ 12(B)(6) Motion, United States District Court for the Eastern District of California denied the motion to dismiss Plaintiffs wrongful foreclosure claim on grounds that the assignment of mortgage was backdated and thus may have been invalid.

“On or about June 23, 2009, defendant T.D. Service Company [(a foreclosure processing service)] filed a notice of default in Placer County, identifying Deutsche Bank as beneficiary and AHMSI as trustee. In an assignment of deed of trust dated July 15, 2009, MERS assigned the deed of trust to AHMSI. This assignment of deed of trust purports to be effective as of June 9, 2009. A second assignment of deed of trust was executed on the same date as the first, July 15, 2009, but the time mark placed on the second assignment of deed of trust by the Placer County Recorder indicates that it was recorded eleven seconds after the first. In this second assignment of deed of trust, AHMSI assigned the deed of trust to Deutsche. This assignment indicates that it was effective as of June 22, 2009. Both assignments were signed by Korell Harp. The assignment purportedly effective June 9, 2009, lists Harp as vice president of MERS and the assignment purportedly effective June 22, 2009, lists him as vice president of AHMSI. Six days later, on July 21, 2009, plaintiff recorded a notice of pendency of action with the Placer County Recorder. In a substitution of trustee recorded on July 29, 2009, Deutsche, as present beneficiary, substituted ADSI as trustee.”

The court stated that “while California law does not require beneficiaries to record assignments, see California Civil Code Section 2934, the process of recording assignments with backdated effective dates may be improper, and thereby taint the notice of default.”

Plaintiff’s argument was interpreted by the court to be that the backdated assignments were not valid or at least were not valid on June 23, 2009, when the notice of default was recorded. As such the court assumed Plaintiff argued that MERS remained the beneficiary on that date and therefore was the only party who could enforce the default.

Judge Lawrence K. Karlton invited Defendants to file a motion to dismiss as to plaintiff’s wrongful foreclosure claim insofar as it is premised on the backdated assignments of the mortgage. You can read the full Opinion here.

Ohlendorf v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing

OPINION

ORDER

This case involves the foreclosure of plaintiff’s mortgage. His First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) names thirteen defendants and enumerates ten causes of action. Defendants American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc. (“AHMSI”), AHMSI Default Services, Inc. (“ADSI”), Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (“Deutsche”), and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) move to dismiss all claims against them, and in the alternative, for a more definite statement of plaintiff’s second and seventh causes of action. These defendants also move to expunge a Lis  [*2] Pendens recorded by plaintiff on the subject property and request an award of attorney fees. Defendant T.D. Service Company (“T.D.”) separately moves to dismiss all claims against it. The court concluded that oral argument was not necessary in this matter, and decides the motions on the papers. For the reasons stated below, the motions to dismiss are granted in part and denied in part, and the motion to expunge is denied. Because the court grants plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint, the alternative motion for a more definite statement is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Refinance of Plaintiff’s Mortgage 1

1   These facts are taken from the allegations in the FAC unless otherwise specified. The allegations are taken as true for purposes of this motion only.

On or about February 1, 2007, plaintiff was approached by defendant Ken Jonobi (“Jonobi”) of defendant Juvon, who introduced plaintiff to defendant Anthony Alfano (“Alfano”), a loan officer employed by defendant Novo Mortgage (“Novo”). FAC P 24. Defendant Alfano approached plaintiff, representing himself as the loan officer for defendant Novo, and solicited refinancing of a loan currently secured by plaintiff’s residence in New Castle,  [*3] California. FAC P 25. Defendant Alfano advised plaintiff that Alfano could get plaintiff the “best deal” and “best interest rates” available on the market. FAC P 26.

In a loan brokered by Alfano, plaintiff then borrowed $ 450,000, the loan being secured by a deed of trust on his residence. FAC P 28. Alfano advised plaintiff that he could get a fixed rate loan, but the loan sold to him had a variable rate which subsequently adjusted. Id. At the time of the loan, plaintiff’s Fair Isaac Corporation (“FICO”) score, which is used to determine the type of loans for which a borrower is qualified, should have classified him as a “prime” borrower, but Alfano classified plaintiff as a “sub-prime” borrower without disclosing other loan program options. FAC P 29. Plaintiff was advised by Alfano that if the loan became unaffordable, Alfano would refinance it into an affordable loan. FAC P 31. Plaintiff was not given a copy of any loan documents prior to closing, and at closing plaintiff was given only a few minutes to sign the documents and, as a result, could not review them. FAC P 32. Plaintiff did not receive required documents and disclosures at the origination of his refinancing loan, including  [*4] the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) disclosures and the required number of copies of the notice of right to cancel. FAC P 43. This new loan was completed on or about May 16, 2007.

The deed of trust identified Old Republic Title Company as trustee, defendant American Brokers Conduit as lender, and defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) as nominee for the lender and beneficiary. FAC PP 34-35. MERS’s conduct is governed by “Terms and Conditions” which provide that:

MERS shall serve as mortgagee of record with respect to all such mortgage loans solely as a nominee, in an administrative capacity, for the beneficial owner or owners thereof from time to time. MERS shall have no rights whatsoever to any payments made on account of such mortgage loans, to any servicing rights related to such mortgage loans, or to any mortgaged properties securing such mortgage loans. MERS agrees not to assert any rights (other than rights specified in the Governing Documents) with respect to such mortgage loans or mortgaged properties. References herein to “mortgage(s)” and “mortgagee of record” shall include deed(s) of trust and beneficiary under a deed of trust and any other form of  [*5] security instrument under applicable state law.

FAC P 10. MERS was not licensed to do business in California and was not registered with the state at the inception of the loan. FAC P 35.

On or about April 17, 2009, a letter was mailed to defendant AHMSI which plaintiff alleges was a qualified written request (“QWR”) under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), identifying the loan, stating reasons that plaintiff believed the account was in error, requesting specific information from defendant, and demanding to rescind the loan under the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”). FAC P 36. Plaintiff alleges that AHMSI never properly responded to this request. Id.

B. Events Subsequent to Refinance of Plaintiff’s Loan

On or about June 23, 2009, defendant T.D. filed a notice of default in Placer County, identifying Deutsche as beneficiary and AHMSI as trustee. FAC P 46. In an assignment of deed of trust dated July 15, 2009, MERS assigned the deed of trust to AHMSI. Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint and Motion to Expunge Notice of Pendency of Action (“Defs.’ RFJN”) Ex. 4. This assignment of deed of trust purports to  [*6] be effective as of June 9, 2009. Id. A second assignment of deed of trust was executed on the same date as the first, July 15, 2009, but the time mark placed on the second assignment of deed of trust by the Placer County Recorder indicates that it was recorded eleven seconds after the first. Defs.’ RFJN Exs. 4-5. In this second assignment of deed of trust, AHMSI assigned the deed of trust to Deutsche. Defs.’ RFJN Ex. 5. This assignment indicates that it was effective as of June 22, 2009. Id. Both assignments were signed by Korell Harp. The assignment purportedly effective June 9, 2009, lists Harp as vice president of MERS and the assignment purportedly effective June 22, 2009, lists him as vice president of AHMSI. Defs.’ RFJN Exs. 4-5. Six days later, on July 21, 2009, plaintiff recorded a notice of pendency of action with the Placer County Recorder. Defs.’ RFJN Ex. 6. In a substitution of trustee recorded on July 29, 2009, Deutsche, as present beneficiary, substituted ADSI as trustee. Defs.’ RFJN Ex. 7.

II. STANDARD

A. Standard for a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

A Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b).(6) motion challenges a complaint’s compliance with the pleading requirements provided  [*7] by the Federal Rules. In general, these requirements are provided by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, although claims that “sound[] in” fraud or mistake must meet the requirements provided by Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 317 F.3d 1097, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2003).

1. Dismissal of Claims Governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The complaint must give defendant “fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, at 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) (internal quotation and modification omitted).

To meet this requirement, the complaint must be supported by factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,     U.S.    , 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint,” neither legal conclusions nor conclusory statements are themselves sufficient, and such statements are not entitled to a presumption of truth. Id. at 1949-50. Iqbal and Twombly therefore prescribe a two step process for evaluation of motions to dismiss. The court first identifies the non-conclusory factual allegations,  [*8] and the court then determines whether these allegations, taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id.; Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007).

“Plausibility,” as it is used in Twombly and Iqbal, does not refer to the likelihood that a pleader will succeed in proving the allegations. Instead, it refers to whether the non-conclusory factual allegations, when assumed to be true, “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). A complaint may fail to show a right to relief either by lacking a cognizable legal theory or by lacking sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

2. Dismissal of Claims Governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)

A Rule 12..(b)..(6) motion to dismiss may also challenge a complaint’s compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). See Vess, 317 F.3d at 1107.  [*9] This rule provides that “In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.” These circumstances include the “time, place, and specific content of the false representations as well as the identities of the parties to the misrepresentations.” Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 764 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004)). “In the context of a fraud suit involving multiple defendants, a plaintiff must, at a minimum, ‘identif[y] the role of [each] defendant[] in the alleged fraudulent scheme.’” Id. at 765 (quoting Moore v. Kayport Package Express, 885 F.2d 531, 541 (9th Cir. 1989)). Claims subject to Rule 9(b) must also satisfy the ordinary requirements of Rule 8.

B. Standard for Motion for a More Definite Statement

“If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e).  [*10] “The situations in which a Rule 12(e) motion is appropriate are very limited.” 5A Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1377 (1990). Furthermore, absent special circumstances, a Rule 12(e) motion cannot be used to require the pleader to set forth “the statutory or constitutional basis for his claim, only the facts underlying it.” McCalden v. California Library Ass’n, 955 F.2d 1214, 1223 (9th Cir. 1990). However, “even though a complaint is not defective for failure to designate the statute or other provision of law violated, the judge may in his discretion . . . require such detail as may be appropriate in the particular case.” McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1996).

C. Standard for Motion to Expunge Notice of Pendency of Action (Lis Pendens)

A lis pendens is a “recorded document giving constructive notice that an action has been filed affecting title or right to possession of the real property described in the notice.” Urez Corp. v. Superior Court, 190 Cal. App. 3d 1141, 1144, 235 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1987). Once filed, a lis pendens prevents the transfer of that real property until the lis pendens is expunged or the litigation is resolved. BGJ Assoc., LLC v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 75 Cal. App. 4th 952, 966-67, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 693 (1999).

A  [*11] court must expunge a lis pendens without bond if the court makes any of these findings: (1) plaintiff’s complaint does not contain a “real property claim,” which is defined as one affecting title or possession of specific real property, Cal. Code. Civ. Pro. § 405.4; (2) plaintiff “has not established by a preponderance of the evidence the probably validity of a real property claim,” where probably validity requires a showing that it is more likely than not that the plaintiff will obtain a judgment against the defendant on the claim, id. §§ 405.3, 405.32; or (3) there was a defect in service or filing, id. § 405.32. See Castaneda v. Saxon Mortgage Servs., Inc., No. 2:09- 01124 WBS DAD, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17235, 2010 WL 726903, *8 (E.D. Cal. Feb 26, 2010).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Failure to Allege Ability to Make Tender

Defendants AHMSI, ADSI, Deutsche, and MERS argue that all of plaintiff’ claims are barred by plaintiff’s failure to allege his ability to tender the loan proceeds. Defendants assert that Abdallah v. United Savings Bank, 43 Cal. App. 4th 1101, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 286 (1996), requires a valid tender of payment to bring any claim that arises from a foreclosure sale. Abdallah, however, merely requires an allegation to tender for “any  [*12] cause of action for irregularity in the [foreclosure] sale procedure.” Id. at 1109. Here, plaintiff asserts no causes of action that rely on any irregularity in the foreclosure sale itself. Indeed, the only claim addressed by the motions that may concern irregularity in the foreclosure itself is the wrongful foreclosure claim, which the court rejects below. Accordingly, the court concludes that plaintiff need not allege tender, and defendants’ motion is denied on this ground.

B. Fraud

Plaintiff brings a claim for fraud against all defendants. The elements of a claim for intentional misrepresentation under California law are (1) misrepresentation (a false representation, concealment or nondisclosure), (2) knowledge of falsity, (3) intent to defraud (to induce reliance), (4) justifiable reliance, and (5) resulting damage. Agosta v. Astor, 120 Cal. App. 4th 596, 603, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 565 (2004). Claims for fraud are subject to a heightened pleading requirement under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), as discussed above. 2

2   Defendants also argue that California law requires a pleading of fraud against a corporation to be even more particular. However, as plaintiff points out, and defendants do not contest, pleading standards  [*13] are a procedural requirement and while federal courts are to apply state substantive law to state law claims, they must always apply federal procedural law. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465, 85 S. Ct. 1136, 14 L. Ed. 2d 8 (1965).

The FAC’s allegations in support of the claim for fraud as to moving defendants are that:

Defendant [AHMSI] misrepresented to Plaintiff that [AHMSI] has the right to collect monies from Plaintiff on its behalf or on behalf of others when Defendant [AHMSI] has no legal right to collect such moneys. [P] . . . Defendant MERS misrepresented to Plaintiff on the Deed of Trust that it is a qualified beneficiary with the ability to assign or transfer the Deed of Trust and/or Note and/or substitute trustees under the Deed of Trust. Further, Defendant MERS misrepresented that it followed the applicable legal requirements to transfer the Note and Deed of Trust to subsequent beneficiaries. [P] . . . Defendants T.D., [ADSI], and Deutsche misrepresented to Plaintiff that Defendants T.D., AHMSI, and Deutsche were entitled to enforce the security interest and has the right to institute a non-judicial foreclosure proceeding under the Deed of Trust when Defendant T.D. filed a Notice of Default on June 23,  [*14] 2009. . . .

FAC PP 110-12. As to plaintiff’s claims against AHMSI and MERS, plaintiff failed to plead the time, place or identities of the parties of the misrepresentation. Accordingly, the fraud claim is dismissed as to these defendants. Further, as to defendant Deutsche, plaintiff has not alleged any misrepresentation made by these defendants, but rather relies on alleged misrepresentations made by another defendant concerning them. A claim for fraud requires that plaintiff plead that the defendant made a misrepresentation. As such, here, where plaintiff alleges no statements by defendants ADSI and Deutsche, plaintiff has not pled a claim against them, and thus, the fraud claims against them are likewise dismissed. Plaintiff’s claim against T.D., while pleading the time and place of the alleged misrepresentation, nonetheless fails to allege the identity of the parties to the alleged misrepresentation, mainly who made the statement(s) on behalf of T.D. The court further notes, as described below, that to the extent that plaintiff’s claim relies on defendants’ possession of the note prior to foreclosure, this court recently decided that California law does not impose a requirement of  [*15] production or possession of the note prior to foreclosure, and sees no reason to depart from this reasoning. Champlaie v. BAC Home Loans Serv., No. S-09-1316 LKK/DAD, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102285, 2009 WL 3429622, at *12-14 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2009). Thus, plaintiff’s fraud claim is dismissed without prejudice as to all moving defendants.

C. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act

Plaintiff argues that AHMSI has violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) by failing to meet its disclosure requirements and failing to respond to a QWR. FAC PP 90-91. Defendant AHMSI argues that plaintiff has failed to attach the alleged QWR or to allege its full contents and that any QWR must inquire as to the account balance and relate to servicing of the loan, while plaintiff’s alleged QWR was nothing more than a request for documents. 12 U.S.C. 2605(e)(1) defines a QWR as written correspondence that identifies the name and account of the borrower and includes a statement of reasons the borrower believes the account is in error or provides sufficient detail regarding other information sought. Here, plaintiff alleges that its communication with AHMSI identified plaintiff’s name and loan number and included a statement  [*16] of reasons for plaintiff’s belief that the loan was in error. FAC P 91. This is a sufficient allegation of a violation of 12 U.S.C. 2605(e). Further, a plaintiff need not attach a QWR to a complaint to plead a violation of RESPA for failure to respond to a QWR.

AHSMI also argues that plaintiff must factually demonstrate that written correspondence inquired as to the status of his account balance and related to servicing of the loan, citing MorEquity, Inc. v. Naeem, 118 F. Supp. 2d 885 (N.D. Ill. 2000). This case held that allegations of a forged deed and irregularity with respect to recording did not relate to servicing as it is defined in 12 U.S.C. Section 2605(i)(3), and that only servicers are required to respond to a QWR under 12 U.S.C. Section 2605(e)(1)(A). Morequity, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 901. Section 2605(i)(3) defines servicing as the “receiving [of] any scheduled periodic payments from a borrower pursuant to the terms of any loan, including amounts for escrow accounts described in section 2609 of this title, and making [of] the payments of principal and interest and such other payments with respect to the amounts received from the borrower as may be required pursuant to the terms  [*17] of the loan.”

AHMSI does not contend that it is not a servicer but rather argues that the purported QWR here did not relate to servicing because it was merely a request for documents. However, 12 U.S.C. Section 2605(e)(1)(A) requires only that a QWR be received by a servicer, enable the servicer to identify the name and account of the borrower, and include a statement of reasons for the borrower’s belief that the account is in error or provide sufficient detail regarding other information sought. Here, plaintiff allegedly stated reasons for believing the account was in error and AHMSI does not contest that it was the servicer of plaintiff’s loan, distinguishing this case from MorEquity. Accordingly, plaintiff has stated a claim against AHMSI for violation of RESPA in failing to respond to a QWR.

Plaintiff also alleges that AHMSI violated RESPA by failing to provide notice to plaintiff of the assignment, sale, or transfer of servicing rights to plaintiff’s loan. FAC P 89. Notice by the transferor to the borrower is required by 12 U.S.C. Section 2605(b). AHMSI counters that plaintiff has failed to allege that servicing rights were actually transferred, that plaintiff is not even certain  [*18] which defendant was actually servicer at any given time, and plaintiff’s allegations that AHMSI is responsible for responding to a QWR creates an inference that plaintiff believes it is responsible for servicing (and therefore did not transfer servicing rights). However, moving defendants themselves ask this court to take judicial notice of an assignment of deed of trust in which AHMSI purports to assign the deed of trust to Deutsche. Defs.’ RFJN ex. 5. This document is judicially noticeable as a public record. Thus, despite plaintiff’s uncertainty about who held servicing rights when, AHMSI cannot both ask us to take judicial notice of a transfer of their rights and contend that a claim that they failed to give requisite notice pursuant to said transfer is non-cognizable.

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss plaintiff’s RESPA claim with respect to AHMSI is denied.

D. Violations of California’s Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

California’s Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“Rosenthal Act”) prohibits creditors and debt collectors from, among other things, making false, deceptive, or misleading representations in an effort to collect a debt. Cal. Civ. Code § 1788, et seq. [*19] Pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code Section 1788.17, the Rosenthal Act incorporates the provisions of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act prohibiting “[c]ommunicating or threatening to communicate to any person credit information which is known or which should be known to be false.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8).

Plaintiff alleges that AHMSI violated the Rosenthal Act by making false reports to credit reporting agencies, falsely stating the amount of debt, falsely stating a debt was owed, attempting to collect said debt through deceptive letters and phone calls demanding payment, and increasing plaintiff’s debt by stating amounts not permitted including excessive service fees, attorneys’ fees, and late charges. FAC P 73-75. AHMSI argues that foreclosing on a property is not collection of a debt, and so is not regulated by the Rosenthal Act, that the alleged prohibited activities resulted from plaintiff’s default, and plaintiff has not alleged when the violations occurred. AHMSI correctly points out that foreclosure on a property securing a debt is not debt collection activity encompassed by Rosenthal Act. Cal. Civ. Code § 2924(b), Izenberg, 589 F. Supp. 2d at 1199. However, plaintiff’s allegations  [*20] with respect to this cause of action do not mention foreclosure, instead alleging violations related to payment collection efforts. See Champlaie v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102285, 2009 WL 3429622 at *18 (E.D. Cal. October 22, 2009). Further, the actions of debt collectors under the act are not immunized if plaintiff actually owed money. Rather, the Rosenthal Act prohibits conduct in collecting a debt, whether valid or not. Accordingly, AHMSI’s second argument is without merit. Lastly, as to AHMSI’s third argument, plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the general time of the conduct he claims violates the Rosenthal Act. 3 Specifically, the court infers from the complaint, that the alleged conduct occurred after plaintiff stopped making his loan payments. Thus, AHMSI’s motion to dismiss this claim is denied.

3   AHMSI only appears to move under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, and not 9(b).

E. Wrongful Foreclosure

Plaintiff alleges wrongful foreclosure against AHMSI, T.D., ADSI, Deutsche, and MERS because they do not possess the note, are not beneficiaries, assignees, or employees of the person or entity in possession of the note, and are not otherwise entitled to payment, such that they are  [*21] not persons entitled to enforce the security interest under Cal. Com. Code Section 3301. FAC P 146. Plaintiff also alleges in his complaint that the foreclosure is wrongful because defendants failed to give proper notice of the notice of default under Cal. Civ. Code Section 2923.5 and AHMSI allegedly failed to respond to a QWR. 4 FAC PP 149-50.

4   Defendants only move to dismiss this claim based upon the first theory of liability. As such, plaintiff’s claim is not dismissed insofar as it depends on these other theories of liability articulated in his complaint.

AHMSI, ADSI, Deutsche, and MERS assert that they need not be in possession of the note in order to foreclose, and that recorded documents establish that Deutsche is holder in due course of the note and deed of trust and the foreclosing entity, and is thus legally entitled to enforce the power of sale provisions of the deed of trust. Defendant T.D. contends that the holder of the note theory is invalid, as a deed of trust is not a negotiable instrument, and that the requirements of Cal. Civ. Code Section 2923.5 have been met.

California’s non-judicial foreclosure process, Cal. Civ. Code Sections 2924-29241, establishes an exhaustive  [*22] set of requirements for non-judicial foreclosure, and the production of the note is not one of these requirements. Champlaie, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102285, 2009 WL 3429622 at *13. Accordingly, possession of the promissory note is not a prerequisite to non-judicial foreclosure in that a party may validly own a beneficial interest in a promissory note or deed of trust without possession of the promissory note itself. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102285, [WL] at *13-14. Consequently, defendants need not offer proof of possession of the note to legally institute non-judicial foreclosure proceedings against plaintiff, although, of course, they must prove that they have the right to foreclose. Thus, plaintiff’s wrongful foreclosure claim is dismissed insofar as it is premised upon this possession of the note theory.

Nonetheless, plaintiff may have stated a claim against defendants that they are not proper parties to foreclose. Plaintiff and AHMSI, Deutsche, and MERS have requested that the court take judicial notice of the assignment of deeds of trust which purport to assign the interest in the deed of trust first to AHMSI and then to Deutsche. As described above, the deed of trust listed MERS as the beneficiary. On June 23, 2009, T.D. recorded a notice of  [*23] default that listed Deutsche as the beneficiary and AHMSI as the trustee. Nearly a month later, on July 20, 2009, MERS first recorded an assignment of this mortgage from MERS to AHMSI, which indicated that the assignment was effective June 9, 2009. Eleven seconds later, AHMSI recorded an assignment of the mortgage from AHMSI to Deutsche, which indicated that the assignment was effective June 22, 2009. The court interprets plaintiff’s argument to be that the backdated assignments of plaintiff’s mortgage are not valid, or at least were not valid on June 23, 2009, and therefore, Deutsche did not have the authority to record the notice of default on that date. Essentially, the court assumes plaintiff argues that MERS remained the beneficiary on that date, and therefore was the only party who could enforce the default.

While California law does not require beneficiaries to record assignments, see California Civil Code Section 2934, the process of recording assignments with backdated effective dates may be improper, and thereby taint the notice of default. Defendants have not demonstrated that these assignments are valid or that even if the dates of the assignments are not valid, the notice  [*24] of default is valid. Accordingly, defendants motion to dismiss plaintiff’s wrongful foreclosure is denied insofar as it is premised on defendants being proper beneficiaries. As discussed below, defendant is invited, but not required, to file a motion addressing the validity of the notice of default given the suspicious dating in the assignments with respect to both their motion to dismiss and their motion to expunge the notice of pendency.

Thus, Plaintiff has not stated a claim that defendants did not possess the right to foreclose plaintiff’s loan because (1) defendants did not possess or produce the note or (2) Deutsche lacked the authority to record a notice of default. For the reasons described above, this claim is dismissed insofar as liability is based upon defendants’ not possessing the note.

F. Negligence

Plaintiff alleges negligence against all defendants, but only T.D. has moved to dismiss this claim. Under California law, the elements of a claim for negligence are “(a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach of such legal duty; and (c) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.” Ladd v. County of San Mateo, 12 Cal. 4th 913, 917, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 309, 911 P.2d 496 (1996) (internal citations  [*25] and quotations omitted); see also Cal Civ Code § 1714(a).

The other defendants do not directly counter the negligence claim, but T.D. argues that it fails because the FAC does not mention it by name or allege what it was supposed to do. The only notice T.D. received of the negligence allegations against it through plaintiff’s complaint are the words “Against all Defendants” and the incorporation of allegations set forth above. When a defendant must scour the entire complaint to learn of the basis of the charges against them, they have not received effective notice. See Baldain v. American Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., No. CIV. S-09-0931, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5671, 2010 WL 582059, *8 (E.D.Cal. Jan. 5, 2010). Accordingly, this claim is dismissed as to T.D., with leave to amend.

G. Violations of California Business and Professions Code Sec. 17200

California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, (“UCL”) proscribes “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent” business acts and practices. Plaintiff claims all defendants violated the UCL. The claim against AHMSI is based on its alleged violations of the Rosenthal Act, RESPA, negligence, fraud, and illegal foreclosure activities. FAC P 122. The claim against T.D.,  [*26] Deutsche, and MERS is based on allegations of negligence, fraud, and illegal foreclosure activities. FAC P 124.

As discussed above, plaintiff has alleged valid causes of action against AHMSI for violation of the Rosenthal Act and RESPA and for negligence. Plaintiff has also stated valid claims against Deutsche and MERS for negligence. However, the court has dismissed the negligence claim against T.D. and the fraud and wrongful foreclosure claims against all defendants, and thus, these claims cannot form the basis of a violation of UCL under the present complaint.

Plaintiff’ UCL claim is therefore dismissed as to T.D., and as to the AHMSI, Deutsche, and MERS insofar as the claim is predicated on fraud and wrongful foreclosure under the possession or production of the note theory.

H. Motion to Expunge Notice of Pendency of Action (Lis Pendens)

1. Merits of Motion

Defendants AHMSI, Deutsche, and MERS move to expunge notice of pendency of action. As described above, in order to succeed in opposing a motion to expunge a notice of pendency of action, plaintiff 5 must establish (1) that his complaint contains a real property claim, (2) that it is more likely than not that he will obtain a judgment  [*27] against the defendant, and (3) that there was a defect in service or filing. See Castaneda v. Saxon Mortgage Servs., Inc., No. 2:09-01124 WBS DAD, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17235, 2010 WL 726903, *8 (E.D. Cal. Feb 26, 2010). Accordingly, plaintiff must tender evidence to successfully demonstrate that he is more likely than not to obtain a judgment against defendants. Because plaintiff must prevail on all of these elements, the court need not resolve all three. Rather, the court grants defendants’ motion on all claims save one, because plaintiff has not established that it is more likely than not that he will obtain a judgment against the defendant.

5   Plaintiff bears the burden of proof. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 405.30.

As an initial matter, the only evidence plaintiff has presented to establish he is more likely than not to succeed on the merits of his claims are the recorded documents filed in defendants’ request for judicial notice. This in and of itself supports the granting of defendants’ motion on most of his claims. Instead of establishing his likelihood of success on the merits, plaintiff argues that the motion should be denied because he has stated a claim under the Rosenthal Act, the RESPA, and the Unfair Competition  [*28] Law (“UCL”) and for fraud and wrongful foreclosure. As described above, plaintiff has not stated a claim for fraud or wrongful foreclosure premised on the possession of the note he argues in his oppositions to defendants’ motions to dismiss and motion to expunge, 6 so even if the court adopted plaintiff’s standard, he has not demonstrated he is likely to succeed on these claims. Finally, the only relief provided by RESPA 7 and the Rosenthal Act 8 is damages, and therefore, even if plaintiff were likely to succeed on the merits of these claims, it would not entitle him to injunctive relief. The UCL does, however, provide for injunctive relief. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17203. In support of his argument as to why this cause of action should prevent this court from granting defendants motion, plaintiff merely states,

Plaintiff made viable charging allegations that named Defendants, moving Defendants included, have engaged in unfair and fraudulent business practices . . . [including] violations of . . . . RESPA . . ., fraud, negligence and [the] Rosenthal Act . . . .

Opposition at 23. Plaintiff continues to raise arguments concerning certain defendants alleged failures to make disclosures  [*29] at loan origination, and numerous arguments of which the court disposed above in plaintiff’s wrongful foreclosure claim. Plaintiff makes no argument as to why this claim would likely or even possibly support injunctive relief of enjoining foreclosure of plaintiffs’ home.

6   As noted above, plaintiff also alleges in his complaint that the foreclosure is wrongful because the defendants failed to give proper notice of the notice of default. As further noted, the documents that the defendants requested the court to judicially notice raise questions about the propriety of the notice. Under the circumstances, the court will not expunge the lis pendens.

7   RESPA only affords the following types of relief for individual plaintiffs:

(A) any actual damages to the borrower as a result of the failure; and

(B) any additional damages, as the court may allow, in the case of a pattern or practice of noncompliance with the requirements of this section, in an amount not to exceed $ 1,000.

12 U.S.C. § 2605(f)(1).

8   The Rosenthal Act affords the following types of relief:

(A) Any debt collector who violates this title . . . shall be liable to the debtor in an amount equal to the sum of any actual damages sustained  [*30] by the debtor as a result of the violation.

(B) Any debt collector who willfully and knowingly violates this title with respect to any debtor shall . . . also be liable to the debtor . . . for a penalty in such amount as the court may allow, which shall not be less than one hundred dollars ($ 100) nor greater than one thousand dollars ($ 1,000).

Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.30.

Nonetheless, as discussed above, plaintiff has raised a serious issue concerning the validity of the notice of default. Specifically, defendants’ have not persuaded the court that the backdated assignments are valid, and consequently, that they do not taint the notice of default. Accordingly, plaintiff may have demonstrated that it is more likely than not that he will be entitled to judgment on this real property claim that the backdated assignments invalidate the notice of default. Thus, the motion to expunge the notice of pendency of action is denied as to this claim only.

The court recognizes, however, that defendants may be able to demonstrate that the assignments are either valid or if invalid do not taint the notice of default. For this reason, the court invites to file a motion to dismiss and to expunge the notice  [*31] of pendency on this issue alone. This motion should await plaintiff’s filing of any amended complaint.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, defendants’ motions to dismiss, Doc. 21 and Doc. 23, are GRANTED IN PART.

The court DISMISSES the following claims:

1. Sixth Claim, for fraud, as to all moving defendants.

2. Tenth Claim, for wrongful foreclosure insofar as it is premised on the theory that the note must be possessed or produced to foreclose, as to AHMSI, T.D., and MERS.

All dismissals are without prejudice. Plaintiff is granted twenty-one (21) days to file an amended complaint. It appears to the court that the plaintiff may truthfully amend to cure defects on some of his claims. However, plaintiff is cautioned not to replead insufficient claims, or to falsely plead.

The court DENIES defendants’ motion as to the following claims, insofar as they are premised on the theories found adequate in the analysis above:

1. Second Claim, for violation of the Rosenthal Act.

2. Third Claim, for negligence, as to AHMSI, ADSI, Deutsche, and MERS.

3. Fourth Claim, for violation of RESPA.

4. Seventh Claim, under the UCL, as to AHMSI, ADSI, Deutsche, and MERS.

The court further orders that defendants’  [*32] motion to expunge notice of pendency of action, Doc. 22, is DENIED.

Defendants are invited to file a motion to dismiss and a motion to expunge the notice of pendency as to plaintiff’s wrongful foreclosure claim insofar as it is premised on the backdated assignments of the mortgage.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 30, 2010.

/s/ Lawrence K. Karlton

LAWRENCE K. KARLTON

SENIOR JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT