Why Robo-Signatures Are Illegal in California and Other Non-Judicial Foreclosure States

With all of the press robo-signing has gotten, it is a bit surprising that everyone is having such a hard time concluding whether these practices effect California foreclosures. My assistant even said to me today, “but the banks say that it doesn’t matter because California is non judicial.”

Because the topic has not gotten the treatment it deserves, I will gladly do the job. The following are by no means a complete list, but are the most clear LEGAL reasons (setting aside pure moral questions and the U.S. Constitution) that the Robo-Signer Controversy will lead to massive litigation in California.

In short, Robo Signers are illegal in California because good title cannot be based on fraud, robo signed non judicial foreclosure sales are void as a matter of law, the documents are not able to be recorded in California if they are not notarized, which we know was often not done properly, and finally, because they robo signed forgeries ARE intended for judicial proceedings, including evictions and bankruptcy relief from stay motions.

1. Good Title Cannot Be Based on Fraud (Even as to a 3d Party).

In the case of a fraudulent transaction California law is settled. The Court in Trout v. Trout, (1934), 220 Cal. 652 at 656 made as much plain:

“Numerous authorities have established the rule that an instrument wholly void, such as an undelivered deed, a forged instrument, or a deed in blank, cannot be made the foundation of a good title, even under the equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase. Consequently, the fact that defendant Archer acted in good faith in dealing with persons who apparently held legal title, is not in itself sufficient basis for relief.” (Emphasis added, internal citations omitted).

This sentiment was clearly echoed in 6 Angels, Inc. v. Stuart-Wright Mortgage, Inc. (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1279 at 1286 where the Court stated:

“It is the general rule that courts have power to vacate a foreclosure sale where there has been fraud in the procurement of the foreclosure decree or where the sale has been improperly, unfairly or unlawfully conducted, or is tainted by fraud, or where there has been such a mistake that to allow it to stand would be inequitable to purchaser and parties.” (Emphasis added).

Hence, if forged Robo Signed signatures are used to obtain the foreclosure, it CERTAINLY makes a difference in California and other non-judicial foreclosure states.

2. Any apparent sale based on Robosigned documents is void – without any legal effect – like Monopoly Money.

In Bank of America v. LaJolla Group II, the California Court of Appeals held that if a trustee is not contractually empowered under the Deed of Trust to hold a sale, it is totally void. It has no legal effect whatsoever. Title does not transfer. No right to evict arises. The property is not sold.

In turn, California Civil COde 2934a requires that the beneficiary execute and notarize and record a substitution for a valid substitution of trustee to take effect. Thus, if the Assignment of Deed of Trust is robo-signed, the sale is void. If the substitution of trustee is robo-signed, the sale is void. If the Notice of Default is Robo-Signed, the sale is void.

3. These documents are not recordable without good notarization.

In California, the reason these documents are notarized in the first place is because otherwise they will not be accepted by the County recorder. Moreover, a notary who helps commit real estate fraud is liable for $25,000 per offense.

Once the document is recorded, however, it is entitled to a “presumption of validity”, which is what spurned the falsification trend in the first place. Civil Code section 2924.

Therefore, the notarization of a false signature not only constitutes fraud, but is every bit intended as part of a larger conspiracy to commit fraud on the court.

4. The documents are intended for court eviction proceedings.

A necessary purpose for these documents, AFTER the non judicial foreclosure, is the eviction of the rightful owners afterward. Even in California, eviction is a judicial process, albeit summary and often sloppily conducted by judges who don’t really believe they can say no to the pirates taking your house. However, as demonstrated below, once these documents make it into court, the bank officers and lawyers become guilty of FELONIES:

California Penal Code section 118 provides (a) Every person who, having taken an oath that he or she will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly before any competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any of the cases in which the oath may by law of the State of California be administered, willfully and contrary to the oath, states as true any material matter which he or she knows to be false, and every person who testifies, declares, deposes, or certifies under penalty of perjury in any of the cases in which the testimony, declarations, depositions, or certification is permitted by law of the State of California under penalty of perjury and willfully states as true any material matter which he or she knows to be false, is guilty of perjury. This subdivision is applicable whether the statement, or the testimony, declaration, deposition, or certification is made or subscribed within or without the State of California.

Penal Code section 132 provides: Every person who upon any trial, proceeding, inquiry, or investigation whatever, authorized or permitted by law, offers in evidence, as genuine or true, any book, paper, document, record, or other instrument in writing, knowing the same to have been forged or fraudulently altered or ante-dated, is guilty of felony.

The Doctrine of Unclean Hands provides: plaintiff’s “unclean hands” bar injunctive relief when the plaintiff’s misconduct arose from the transaction pleaded in the complaint. California Satellite Sys. v Nichols (1985) 170 CA3d 56, 216 CR 180. The unclean hands doctrine demands that a plaintiff act fairly in the matter for which he or she seeks a remedy. The plaintiff must come into
court with clean hands, and keep them clean, or he or she will be denied relief, regardless of the merits of the claim. Kendall-Jackson Winery Ltd. v Superior Court (1999) 76 CA4th 970, 978, 90 CR2d 743. Whether the doctrine applies is a question of fact. CrossTalk Prods., Inc. v Jacobson (1998) 65 CA4th 631, 639, 76 CR2d 615.

5. Robo Signed Documents Are Intended for Use in California Bankruptcy Court Matters.

One majorly overlooked facet of California is our extremely active bankrtupcy court proceedings, where, just as in judicial foreclosure states, the banks must prove “standing” to proceed with a foreclosure. All declarations submitted in support of standing to file a proof of claim, objections to a plan and most importantly perhaps Relief from Stays are fraud upon bankruptcy court if signed by robo-signers.

Conclusion

Verified eviction complaints, perjured motions for summary judgment, and all other eviction paperwork after robo signed non judicial foreclosures in California and other states are illegal and void. The paperwork itself is void. The sale is void. But the only way to clean up the hundreds of thousands of effected titles is through litigation, because even now the banks will simply not do the right thing. And that’s why robo signers count in non-judicial foreclosure states. Victims of robosigners in California may seek declaratory relief, damages under the Rosenthal Act; an injunction and attorneys fees for Unfair Business practices, as well as claims for slander of title; abuse of process, civil theft, and conversion.Timothy McCandless Esq. and Associates
Offices Statewide

(909)890-9192 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (909)890-9192 end_of_the_skype_highlighting

(925)957-9797 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (925)957-9797 end_of_the_skype_highlighting

FAX (909) 382-9956
tim@Prodefenders.com

http://www.timothymccandless.com

Commercial property meltdown and Workout


Timothy McCandless Esq. and Associates
Offices Statewide

(909)890-9192
(925)957-9797
FAX (909) 382-9956
tim@Prodefenders.com

http://www.timothymccandless.com

Lawler: How Many Folks Have “Lost Their Homes” to Foreclosure/Short Sales/DILs?


by CalculatedRisk on 2/02/2011 05:30:00 PM

CR: This is an interesting question and hard to answer … the following is from economist Tom Lawler …

How Many Folks Have “Lost Their Homes” to Foreclosure/ShortSales/DILs Over the Past Few Years?

According toHope Nowestimates, completed foreclosure sales (rounded) were about as follows over the past few years.

Year Completed Foreclosure
2007 514,000
2008 914,000
2009 949,000
2010 1,070,000

 

While these numbers are disturbingly high, they are not nearly as large as one would have expected given the surge in seriously delinquent loans and loans in the process of foreclosure. For the latter, here is a chart based on data from the MBA’s National Delinquency Survey, which covers “over 85%” of total 1-4 family first-lienmortgages.MBA Delinquency
On one side, the “completed foreclosure sales” understates the number of homes “lost,” given that many homeowners have “lost” their homes but been able to negotiate a short sale or (much less likely) done a deed in lieu of foreclosure. While there are no official estimates of either short sales or DILs, there is no doubt that the volume of short sales increased dramatically in 2009 and 2010.

Using CoreLogic’s estimates and grossing them up to reflect its incomplete geographic coverage, one would get short sales estimates of around 78,000 for 2007, 164,000 for 2008, 278,000 for 2009, and 331,000 for 2010. However, based on data reported by lenders on short sales in the OCC/OTS mortgage metricsreports, the CoreLogic estimates of short sales look way too high for 2007 and 2008 (the 2009 estimates look OK, but the 2010 estimates – which admittedly are not available for the full year – look a tad low). Using instead my own estimates for 2008 through 2010, here’s what completed foreclosure sales plus short sales might look like (I don’t have a DIL estimate, but it appears as if the volume of DILs was pretty low).

Year Completed Foreclosure Sales Short Sales Total
2008 914,000 95,000 1,009,000
2009 949,000 263,000 1,212,000
2010 1,070,000 375,000 1,445,000

 

On the other hand, the above numbers could well OVERSTATE significantly the number of homeowners who lost their primary home either to foreclosure or to a short sale. A “significant” % of completed foreclosure sales has been completed foreclosures on non-owner-occupied homes, though estimates vary as to what that % has been. In addition, not all short sales have involved homeowners “involuntarily” leaving their home, but who instead wanted to (for economic or other reasons) move and who were able to negotiate a short sale with their lender.So what is the right number for folks who lost their residence to foreclosure, a short sales, or a DIL? I don’t rightly know.

It is pretty clear, however, that overall foreclosure moratoria, foreclosure delays, modifications, and other workout activity continued to keep the number of homeowners who “lost” their homes to foreclosure massively lower than one would have expected given the delinquency/in foreclosure numbers.

Year Completed Foreclosure Sales plus Short Sales Loans in Foreclosure/90+ Delinquent at end of previous year
2008 1,009,000 1,664,760
2009 1,212,000 2,859,959
2010 1,445,000 4,296,018

 

Note: the loans in foreclosure/90+ delinquent are derived from the MBA National Delinquency Survey, which only covers somewhere around 85-87% of the total 1-4 family first-lien mortgage market. A crude estimate of the “total” market would “gross up” the above numbers by around 1.163 (or 1/0.86).CR Note: This was from housing economist Tom Lawler.

HIGH COURTS KNOCKING DOWN PRETENDER SHELL GAME

Posted on February 1, 2011 by Neil Garfield
ONE ON ONE WITH NEIL GARFIELD
COMBO ANALYSIS TITLE AND SECURITIZATION

SEE nj-game-over-standing-required-no-pretender-lenders-allowed-personal-knowledge-required-to-authenticate
SEE ibanez-huge-win-for-borrowers-in-massachusetts-non-judicial-state-high-court
Maybe the Game IS Over
Show me the law! That was the answer I was getting from skeptical lawyers and Judges three years, 2 years ago and even six months ago. Now there are high Courts and trial courts from Coast to Coast that are answering. It isn’t “new law” as the lawyers for the banks are suggesting, and it isn’t about a free house for borrowers.
In plain language this is about the application of law that has governed business conduct for centuries with the consequential effect of (a) preventing intervening parties from avoiding the requirements of due process and getting title issued to a house in which they never had any interest (a free house for pretender lenders) and (b) opening the door to the inner sanctum where the real parties in interest can interact in ways that will settle the mortgage mess (corruption of title and fraud) in a direct manner as best as possible under the circumstances.
Wall Street and those who protect Wall Street in government having nothing left but scare tactics — as if overturning millions of fraudulent transactions and foreclosures would somehow result in in the end of the world or weaken our nation. President Sarkozy answered that ridiculous assertion in sharp words to Jamie Dimon at the Davos conference when he pointed to the wild irresponsible schemes that others have less gently refereed to as criminal fraud. Sarkozy was speaking for the head of every government in the world and every central banker except perhaps a select few who were providing lubricant to Wall Street’s contrivances during the period of 2001-2009.

If our position in the world depends upon protecting those who commit fraud, if our credibility is seen as depending upon maintaining a status quo in which millions go starving and homeless, if the light we shine blinds the eyes of people who wish to see, then we have forsaken our heritage, and forever changed and corrupted the ideal that the United States of America is a nation of laws, in which here, better than anywhere else on Earth, here is where the people are free to pursue truth, justice and prosperity under the watchful eye of a protective government

Foreclosures May Be Undone by State Ruling on Mortgage Transfer

Categorized | STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD

Foreclosures May Be Undone by State Ruling on Mortgage Transfer

Posted on06 January 2011. Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Foreclosures May Be Undone by State Ruling on Mortgage Transfer

By Thom Weidlich – Jan 6, 2011 12:01 AM ET

Massachusetts’s highest court is poised to rule on whether foreclosures in the state should be undone because securitization-industry practices violate real- estate law governing how mortgages may be transferred.

The fight between homeowners and banks before the Supreme Judicial Court in Boston turns on whether a mortgage can be transferred without naming the recipient, a common securitization practice. Also at issue is whether the right to a mortgage follows the promissory note it secures when the note is sold, as the industry argues.

A victory for the homeowners may invalidate some foreclosures and force loan originators to buy back mortgages wrongly transferred into loan pools. Such a ruling may also be cited in other state courts handling litigation related to the foreclosure crisis.

“This is the first time the securitization paradigm is squarely before a high court,” said Marie McDonnell, a mortgage-fraud analyst in Orleans, Massachusetts, who wrote a friend-of-the-court brief in favor of borrowers. The state court, under its practices, is likely to rule by next month.

Claims of wrongdoing by banks and loan servicers triggered a 50-state investigation last year into whether hundreds of thousands of foreclosures were properly documented as the housing market collapsed. The probe came after JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Ally Financial Inc. said they would stop repossessions in 23 states where courts supervise home seizures and Bank of America Corp. froze U.S. foreclosures. Massachusetts is one of 27 states where court supervision of foreclosures generally isn’t required.

Why modify

California Loan Modification Lawyer

(Effective October 11, 2009  The McCandless Firm complies with SB 94)

By now, you may have made your own attempts at loan modification. You now know what we have known: Despite all the government and media hype, the voluntary loan modifications are not the silver bullet to the foreclosure crisis. Even after President Obama introduced the HAMP program, only about 8% of the anticipated 9 million loan modification applications have been considered. Never forget that lenders and loan servicers are in the business of making money for their shareholders, not solving people’s financial problems. Despite the incentives created by the government, loan servicers remain inconsistent, negligent, understaffed, arrogant and just plain indifferent to the financial plight of most folks. If you’ve ever wondered why the bank doesn’t seem to care? Consider that it is the investor, not loan servicer, takes the financial hit when a property is foreclosed. Loan servicers make more money when a borrower falls into foreclosure. Servicers have an incentive to drag out the foreclosure and loan modification process. Despite what the government and the lenders may say, the loan modification or short sale process is not as quick and easy as has been portrayed.

VIOLATIONS CAN GIVE YOU LEVERAGE to secure a “SETTLEMENT”, not a LOAN MODIFICATION.

Whether hiring a lawyer will increase your chances for success a little or a lot depends on whether the lender has done something wrong. This is why Attorney Roberts encourages every client to commission an audit of the original loan documents, review the appraisal and take measure of any agency relationships between the broker, the lender, the appraiser, the escrow and the title companies. Anecdotally, Attorney Roberts believes that your chances of success increase fourfold if there is litigation or bankruptcy. Hiring a lawyer to review your options and handle the process makes sense. Your chances of obtaining a substantial loan modification will be greatly improved if the lender has violated the law…but how will you ever know? A lawyer can help you gain negotiating leverage on your behalf by finding violations of the law or capitalizing on provisions of the bankruptcy code.

FRONT DOOR LOAN MODIFICATIONS

A loan modification can still be secured even where violations do not exist or the borrower chooses to ignore them. In California, SB94 was recently signed into law effectively banning advance fee loan modification services by even lawyers. Attorney Roberts operates in full compliance of the new law. If you hire a lawyer to provide loan modification services rather than to pursue a violation of your rights, special rules now apply and specific disclosures must be made letting you know that you can do the loan modification yourself and avoid fees.

It’s true; you can pursue a loan modification yourself, just as you have the right to represent yourself in court. And to be honest, even with a lawyer, unless a violation has occurred, you are at the mercy of the loan servicer’s interpretation and analysis of your situation. If the servicer loses your paperwork, berates you, keeps you on hold for hours, ignores you, or simply denies the loan modification without explanation…you have NO RECOURSE. You are not entitled to a loan modification and you have no right to sue if denied. Even if the lender ignores the guidelines of the government’s HAMP program, you can’t sue. When you apply for a front door loan modification, you are asking for a break. It is you and not the lender, who seeks to break the mortgage contract. You have no leverage. You cannot force the lender to give you any consideration, whatsoever. Even if you clearly qualify for a loan modification under the printed guidelines of the government HAMP program, if the lender believes that it would make more money in the long run by foreclosing, you can legitimately be denied.

Why pay a lawyer to work on your loan modification? A lawyer adds attention to detail and diligence to the process, as well as a better idea of the location of each loan servicers’ “sweet spot”. Experience and daily contact with the loan servicers provides some advantage as well. The law firm may act as a force to counter act the incompetence built into the lender’s process. Attorney Roberts and his staff simply assume that the loan mod process will be screwed up by the lender, repeatedly. The firm expects that the lenders will lose paperwork, fail to respond and provide conflicting information. The firm is not shocked when a home is improperly sold despite an approval of a loan modification as it happens all the time. The Law Office of The McCandless Firm is there to respond to these constant lender screw ups and bear the brunt of your frustration.

The The McCandless Firm is always prepared to react to the latest bank screw-up or client crisis. One of the favorite tricks of the lenders is to wait to the very last minute before the sale to approve or deny a postponement or a loan modification. This game of chicken may happen every month as the loan modification process drones on. The firm is always ready with a PLAN B if the lender, in its sole discretion, denies the modification. Having the ability to plan and execute a contingency plan, whether it be Chapter 7, 11, 13, a short sale or a federal lawsuit, is truly the firm’s core strength.

A foreclosure relief company or real estate agent is unqualified to provide you with any of this legal insight – but a California loan modification lawyer at the The McCandless Firm has the knowledge and experience to help. California attorney Joseph Arthur “Joe” Roberts can act as your legal counselor and help you get out of the financial situation that you find yourself in. With offices located in Newport Beach, attorney Roberts helps clients throughout California, including Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside County and the surrounding areas.

Loan Modification Attorney in Los Angeles, Orange and Riverside County, California

In California, voluntary loan modification programs of different companies vary. Most loans are owned in pools by “trusts” and not by the servicing agent with whom you deal. The contract between the trust and the servicing agent, called a PSA, limits the number of loans that can be modified in a given pool. Typically, the PSA limits the number of loans that can be modified in a given pool at 5%. However, that restriction is lifted in the event of a bankruptcy or litigation.

Most servicing agents are understaffed, overwhelmed and for the most part…simply don’t care about you. The servicing companies typically make more money off of late fees, costs and penalties when you remain in default. If the property gets foreclosed on, it becomes the trust’s problem, not necessarily the service agent’s. The application process can take months and usually involves rejection or a token change in the loan terms. Amid the flood of modification requests, mistakes frequently get made and the ball gets dropped. In the meantime, the countdown to foreclosure sale continues. Homeowners already under distress get left with little time to act if a modification is not granted. You need to have a backup plan in place in case the lender’s process fails.

Loan modification is driven by income and complicated when there is a second mortgage company involved. If you lack the income to fund whatever plan the lender is willing to give you, you will be denied. Even if the first mortgage company is willing to modify your loan, it doesn’t mean that the second mortgage company will play ball. In the absence of litigation or bankruptcy, the loan modifications have economic limits. A reduction in principal balance is rare. A mortgage holder will not reduce the principal balance below the value of the property. Interest rate adjustments and recapitalization of back payments are more common. However, don’t expect to get an interest only or negative amortization loan. The very best you can hope for is a fixed rate amortized over 30 years at a decent rate based on the current value of the house. Finally, if the lender “cancels” some of your debt, it may still be considered taxable income by the IRS, despite the passage of the limited Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007. Only debt from buying or improving the property is covered by the new law.

How a California Loan Modification Lawyer Can Help

loan modification process can be complex, and it is easy for a lender or servicing agent to take advantage of you. Using an experienced lawyer to assert your rights gets you to the front of the line in this process. The possibility of litigation or bankruptcy may increase your negotiating leverage with your lender. Lenders are forced to get their own lawyers involved in your case, not just an administrative person from the loss mitigation department. We welcome you to contact our firm to discuss your loan, your budget and the benefits of attorney negotiated loan modification.

Contact  loan modification attorney The McCandless Firm today! Northern California 925-957-9797and in Southern California 909-890-9192

Foreclosure Deed may be Voided by Mortgage Transfer or Servicing Problems

By Max Gardner

A Federal District Court, in a December 7 order, has denied a motion to
dismiss a homeowner’s lawsuit to set aside the nonjudicial Missouri
foreclosure sale based on a deed of trust, based on allegations that 1)
the homeowner was not in default and 2) the nonjudicial sale was baed on
an invalid transfer of the mortgage and note. This decision illustrates
the potentially broad ramifications that defective mortgage transfers
and wrongful foreclosures will have for any house titles derived from
foreclosure sales in nonjudicial foreclosure states.
More specifically, the homeowner alleges that she made all payments when
due, until instructed by the servicer to stop making payments in order
to qualify for a modification. She also submitted the mortgage transfer
documents that showed a significant break in the chain of ownership. In
a deed of trust state, instead of a mortgage the loan originator
typically files a deed of trust, which transfers a power of sale from
the homeowner to a trustee, usually a local lawyer, on behalf of the
trust deed beneficiary, who is the lender or investor. In order to
transfer the mortgage, there needs to be a transfer of the note and a
change in the beneficiary of the trust deed. This is routinely done by
filing a substitution of trustee with the local recorder of deeds. The
substitution of trustee names a new trustee with a power of sale, and a
new beneficial owner of the mortgage/deed of trust. In this case the
substitution of trustee form listed a grantor of the transfer, i.e. the
prior owner of the loan, that did not match the identified beneficial
owner of the original deed of trust. This break in the chain, according
to the court and basic logic, would render the subsequent trustee deed
invalid.
A second, independent basis for setting aside the foreclosure deed was
the alleged absence of a default. In a nonjudicial foreclosure, there
is no court judgment establishing that the homeonwer defaulted on the
loan. For that reason, a completed foreclosure sale can later be set
aside if there was in fact no default. The homeowner’s allegation in
this case was that she was current in payments until the servicer
instructed her to stop paying so that it could modify her loan. This
type of servicer-induced payment interruption can be characterized as
either nondefault based on a modification of the contract, a waiver of
the payment obligation by the servicer as agent for the mortgagee, or
perhaps a repudiation by the servicer. In any case, this scenario is
sufficiently common to raise serious questions about large numbers of
property titles in nonjudicial foreclosure states.

Some judges chastise banks over foreclosure paperwork

Gallery
During the housing boom, millions of homeowners got easy access to mortgages. Now, some mortgage lenders and government officials are taking action after discovering that many mortgage documents were mishandled.

ST PATCHOGUE, N.Y. – A year ago, Long Island Judge Jeffrey Spinner concluded that a mortgage company’s paperwork in a foreclosure case was so flawed and its behavior in negotiations with the borrower so “repugnant” that he erased the family’s $292,500 debt and gave the house back for free.

The judgment in favor of the homeowner, Diane Yano-Horoski, which is being appealed, has alarmed the nation’s biggest lenders, who say it could establish a dramatic new legal precedent and roil the nation’s foreclosure system.

It is not the only case that has big banks worried. Spinner and some of colleagues in the New York City area estimate they are dismissing 20 to 50 percent of foreclosure cases on the basis of sloppy or fraudulent paperwork filed by lenders.

Their decisions illustrate the central role lower court judges will have in resolving the country’s foreclosure debacle. The mess came to light after lawsuits and media reports showed lenders were routinely filing shoddy or fraudulent papers to seize the homes of borrowers who had missed payments.

In millions of cases across the United States, local judges have wide latitude to impose sanctions on banks, free homeowners from their mortgage debts or allow the companies to proceed with flawed foreclosures. Ultimately, the industry is likely to face a messy scenario – different resolutions by courts in all 50 states.

The foreclosure dismissals in this area of New York have not delivered free homes for borrowers. With so much at stake, lenders in this part of New York are aggressively appealing foreclosure dismissals, which is likely to keep the legal system bogged down, foreclosed homes off the market, and homeowners like the Yano-Horoski family in legal limbo for years.

“We believe the Yano-Horoski ruling, if allowed to stand, has sweeping and dangerous implications for the entire mortgage lending industry,” said OneWest Bank, the family’s mortgage servicer.

The situation in Suffolk and Nassau counties on Long Island and Kings County in Brooklyn- which have among the highest rates of foreclosure in the state and where the 81 judges handling foreclosures have become infamous over the past few years for scrutinizing paperwork for errors – provides a window into how the crisis could unfold across in the country.

While the level of tolerance for document mistakes varies from judge to judge, the group as a whole has a reputation for ruling against mortgage companies when paperwork issues or other problems arise. At least one bank, J.P. Morgan Chase, requires document processors to separate foreclosures cases from these three counties from those in the rest of the country. A high-ranking executive of the company is specially assigned to sign off on the area’s foreclosure filings.

Judge Dana Winslow of Nassau County says he’s thought a lot about why judges in his area are more apt to question filings. He said it comes down to one thing: Lack of trust for Wall Street. In this region, judges have seen a lot of inaccurate filings from the financial sector.

Trust “of the lending institutions and Wall Street has eroded in some areas of the country more than others,” Winslow said.

Craig D. Robins, a foreclosure defense attorney who authors the Long Island Bankruptcy blog, said of the Yano-Horoski case: “I think we’re going to see more decisions like this across the country. Many judges are finding their court calendars clogged with cases that have all these flaws in them that never should have been brought in the first place or should never have been brought without more due diligence.”

Going forward, mortgage companies trying to foreclosure in the state of New York will face stiffer requirements. On Oct. 20, the state’s chief judge said attorneys for lenders will have to vouch personally for the accuracy of documents.

“We can’t have the process being a fraud,” New York State Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman said in announcing the new procedure. “It has to be real and based on credible information.”

Even before Lippman’s order, however, lower court judges were already raising questions about faulty paperwork in foreclosures.

On June 17, for example, Judge Karen Murphy of Nassau County ruled that Wachovia Bank lacked standing to foreclose on a home because the document used to prove ownership of the mortgage was incomplete.

On Sept. 21, Judge Peter Mayer of Suffolk County delayed a foreclosure by Ally Financial’s GMAC mortgage unit after noticing that the paperwork transferring the mortgage to the bank was dated two days after the foreclosure was initiated.

And on Oct. 21, Judge Arthur Schack of Kings County dismissed a OneWest foreclosure motion because the bank had not adequately documented how the mortgage had been sold and resold to investors. He also questioned why the employee who signed many of the documents claimed to be a vice president of several different mortgage companies at the same time.

In a different case in May, Schack ruled that HSBC Bank could not foreclose on a home because the paperwork that assigned the mortgage to HSBC from the original lender, Cambridge, was “defective.”

That didn’t mean the borrower, Lovely Yeasmin, a 28-year-old cashier who immigrated from Bangladesh, got her three-story townhouse in Brooklyn’s Bushwick neighborhood for free. Wells Fargo, the mortgage servicer for HSBC, has not appealed the case. Instead, it has offered to temporarily lower her monthly payment from $4,700 to $3,000.

Yeasmin’s eldest brother, Mohammed Parpez, 35, said that before the judge’s order, Wells Fargo was resistent to a loan modification. “The banks are crooks. They tell everyone they are trying to help people like us, but they are really doing the opposite,” Parpez said.

Tom Goyda, a Wells Fargo spokesman, said that although the company “disagrees with the court’s findings,” it is continuing to try to work out a longer-term solution with the family.Members of the Yano-Horoski family said they struggled similarly to get their lender to modify their loan after Greg Horoski fell ill in 2005 and his online business selling specialty dolls suffered. After he underwent a triple bypass surgery, two stents and two hip replacements, he and his wife, Diane – who teaches an online English composition course – found themselves unable to pay the bills.

Despite his pleas, Horoski said, he failed to get OneWest to come to an agreement, even though he became able to pay the debt after his company’s sales picked up.

In his November 2009 ruling, Judge Spinner of Suffolk County blasted OneWest for negotiating with an “opprobrious demeanor and condescending attitude.” He also cited the bank’s “duplicity” in offering a forbearance agreement with a deadline that had already passed and for presenting contradictory paperwork claiming different amounts for what the family owed.

With their case under appeal, the Yano-Horoskis now find themselves in a tricky position, wary of putting more money into a house that an appeals court could take away from them. While the other houses on their quiet suburban street are meticulously maintained, their front-porch light remains shattered and the paint on their house is peeling.

They’ve shelled out $3,000 for a new hot-water system. They paid $2,000 for tree trimming after a neighbor complained. But they’ve let the $10,000 property tax bill become delinquent, and they worry an appeals court could not only reverse the earlier ruling but demand that the family pay back the mortgage for every month that has passed since.

Nonetheless, Horoski remains optimistic.

“People thought people who didn’t pay their mortgages were automatically deadbeats,” he said. “People are educated now. They are realizing all of a sudden how many hundreds of thousands of these homes that were foreclosed may have been done so with fraudulent documents.”

Staff researchers Julie Tate, Alice Crites and Magda Jean-Louis contributed to this report. Faye Crosley forwarded this article to me and I have posted it for my readers. It would appear that some judges are beginning to thaw to the idea that this “bailout” is for the banks and the victims are being pushed aside by the foreclosure machine

BofA Finds Foreclosure Document Errors

BofA Finds Foreclosure Document Errors

 

By DAN FITZPATRICK

Bank of America Corp. for the first time acknowledged finding some mistakes in foreclosure files as it begins to resubmit documents in 102,000 cases.

The Charlotte, N.C., lender discovered errors in 10 to 25 out of the first several hundred foreclosure cases it examined starting last Monday. The problems included improper paperwork, lack of signatures and missing files, said people familiar with the results. In certain cases, information about the property and payment history didn’t match.

Some of the defects seem relatively minor, according to the bank, and bank officials said they haven’t uncovered any evidence of wrongful foreclosures. There was an address missing one of five digits, misspellings of borrowers’ names, a transposition of a first and last name and a missing signature on one document “underlying” an affidavit, a bank spokesman said.

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But the bank uncovered these mistakes while preparing less than 1% of the first foreclosure files that it intends to resubmit to the courts in 23 states. As the nation’s largest mortgage lender, the bank is under pressure to show that its mortgage process isn’t flawed amid revelations that many banks used “robo-signers” to approve large numbers of foreclosure documents without reading them closely.

State and federal agencies launched investigations into the allegations, and some officials, including Iowa’s attorney general, said they wouldn’t necessarily trust the banks’ self-assessments.

Several statements from bank officers about foreclosure practices have come under scrutiny. Wells Fargo & Co. Chief Executive John Stumpf on Oct. 20 said: “I don’t know how other companies do it, but in our company the affidavit signer and the reviewer are the same team member.” Days later a deposition emerged from a bankruptcy case indicating that Wells Fargo had in fact used a robo-signer who didn’t verify documents she approved.

A Wells Fargo spokeswoman said “we don’t believe any of those cases or depositions should be taken out of context. If we find some errors and need for improvements we will take that action.”

Bank of America in several recent public comments about the foreclosure issue hadn’t previously acknowledged even minor errors. Yet last week it uncovered a group of mistakes as it prepared to resubmit the first batch of documents and shared the information internally, according to people familiar with the matter. Executives are briefed twice daily about what was found.

When the bank announced Oct. 18 that it would lift a freeze on foreclosure sales in 23 states, it emphasized the accuracy of its internal review. “Our initial assessment findings show the basis for our foreclosure decisions is accurate,” the company said in a statement.

That conclusion, it turns out, was based on an earlier sample of fewer than 1,000 files. The bank found no mistakes in the sample, a spokesman said, but it decided to make changes to its affidavit approval procedures before going through all 102,000 cases. Now, for example, a notary will sit next to the signer of the affidavit as the documents are being reviewed.

The day after the bank began its comprehensive review of all documents, CEO Brian Moynihan told analysts on an Oct. 19 conference call that “the teams reviewing the data have not found information which was inaccurate, which would affect the plain facts of the foreclosure” such as whether the customer was actually delinquent on the loan. The errors uncovered so far support Mr. Moynihan’s statement, bank officials said, and all mistakes are being corrected before the bank resubmits documents to the courts.

Barbara Desoer, president of home loans for Bank of America, said Sunday that Mr. Moynihan’s Oct. 19 comments were “consistent” with the review findings. “The basis for the foreclosure decisions have been accurate and correct,” she said.

Bank Of America foreclosure fraud

The Devastating Report On Bank Of America That Everyone Is Talking About

Posted by Foreclosure Fraud on October 17, 2010 · 3 Comments 

Full report below, but first some background…

First from Business Insider…

Here’s That Devastating Report On Bank Of America That Everyone Is Talking About Today

Editors note: This was originally published yesterday, but continues to get plenty of attention today, and was just referenced by David Fasber on CNBC. Without further ado...

Earlier, we wrote about Felix Salmon’s contention that there’s a new mortgage fraud scandal that has the potential to dwarf Goldman’s ABACUS dealings. In this fraud scenario, banks took advantage of their information advantage and sold CDOs with mortgages they knew to be bad without clear representation to investors.

In August, Manal Mehta and Branch Hill Capital put together a presentation targeting Bank of America’s potential exposure to this mortgage fraud, as well as other problems in the mortgage market.

The presentation comes to a pretty damning conclusion: Bank of America’s exposure could nearly halve its share price.

Read more: http://www.businessinsider.com/bank-of-america-mortgage-report-2010-10#ixzz12dvMtRAf

Then we have the spin zone…

CNBC

Sorry Folks, The Put-Back Apocalypse Ain’t Gonna Happen

You should probably be a buyer of Bank of America right now.

But Bank of America’s recent decline—down almost 10% this week—is driven by fears that the bank could be hit with huge liabilities for faulty mortgage pools. And I’m pretty sure that is not going to happen.

Why not?

Because the politicians will not let the financial stability of the largest bank in the nation be threatened by contractual rights. Not when there’s an easy fix available that won’t cost taxpayers a dime.

Here’s what is going to happen: Congress will pass a law called something like “The Financial Modernization and Stability Act of 2010” that will retroactively grant mortgage pools the rights in the underlying mortgages that people are worried about. All the screwed up paperwork, lost notes, unassigned security interests will be forgiven by a legislative act.

There’s a big difference between the financial crisis of 2008 and the new crisis. In 2008, banks were destabilized by the growing realization that they were over-exposed to the real estate market. Huge portions of their balance sheets were committed to mortgage-linked investments that were no longer generating the expected revenues or producing losses. That was a problem of economics that could only be solved by recapitalizing banks or letting some of the biggest banks in the U.S. fail.

The put-back crisis is not driven by economics. It is driven by legal rights. And there’s simply zero probability that the politicians in Washington are going to let Bank of America or Citigroup or JP Morgan Chase fail because of a legal issue.

So here’s what I expect will happen. The lame duck session of Congress will pass a bill that essentially papers over the misdeeds of the banks that originated mortgage securities. Every member of Congress and every Senator who has been voted out of office will cast a vote for the bill. And the President will sign it.

You can check out the rest of this along with comments here…

If the latter is what comes to be, am I terrified on what the repercussions will bring…

There will be no rule of law left in America.

If wall street does not have follow the law, why should main street?

We are in critical times here folks…

Oh, and one more thing.

How do you defraud the investor without defrauding the borrower?

They were both sold an empty box…

What is Causing All of These Bankruptcy Filings?

There are several common causes which lead to filing for bankruptcy.  These included, but are not limited to the following:

1. Lawsuits/Garnishments

Nobody wants to be sued and brought to judgment.  Nobody wants to have 10%-25% of their hard earned wages deducted from their pay.  In many cases, the taking of 10%-25% of one’s wages leads to the inability of that person to pay his rent, utilities or auto payment.  Just the thought of the employer potentially having to garnish wages leads many to panic.  Debtors do not want their employers or co-workers knowing of their financial troubles.

2. Auto Repossessions

Imagine waking one morning, heading out the door to work, only to find that your car is not where you parked it.  Sure you were a little late on the auto payment, but you thought the finance company would wait for you to get current on your own.  Auto lenders will do whatever it takes to get you financed, regardless of whether you are actually capable of affording the car.  They realize that if you can’t pay the installment, they can take back their vehicle and re-sell it before it fully depreciates.  They do this through the use of auto auctions where the vehicle sells for substantially less than what is owed.  This leads to a deficiency amount which the lender seeks to recover from the debtor, you.  Talk about insult to injury, the debtor first loses possession of the vehicle and then gets sued for the outstanding deficiency balance.  Who wants to pay for something that they no longer have?

3. Unpaid Medicals

With more and more Americans going without medical insurance (45.8 million, per the U.S. Census Bureau press release dated 8/30/05), they risk losing whatever they have earned throughout their lifetime should a major medical problem occur.  Most claim that they can’t afford to carry medical insurance.  In reality, they can’t afford not to.  The rising cost of health care could significantly deplete one’s savings should a serious illness or injury occur.  Even those with co-payment coverages are having a difficult time meeting their burden of the bill.

4. High Interest Loans

There have always been high interest personal loans from many sources.  In recent times, the advent of the payday loan has surfaced.  These loans have exorbitant interest, which is often carried over to extend the loan.  People who cannot survive until their next payday are giving up a huge portion of their paycheck to get the money in advance.  This dangerous cycle leads to further borrowing with less and less money actually going into the worker’s pocket.

6. Foreclosures

The pride and joy of being a homeowner can be easily tempered by the hard work and cost of maintaining the home.  Calling the landlord to make repairs is not an option; you are your own landlord.  When the water is not flowing to the main sewer, you have no option, but to make the repairs.  Additionally, the mortgage needs to be timely paid no matter what your special circumstance may be.  Real estate taxes and homeowner’s insurance are also required to be paid regularly or you face a foreclosure suit.  Changes in employment, health, income and marital status can lead to one’s failure to make timely payments.  Many take second mortgages or lines of credit which simply create an additional, financial burden on the homeowner.  When faced with the reality that they cannot afford the home, debtors can vacate the home and extinguish any mortgage liability through  bankruptcy.

7. Overzealous Lending

How many credit card applications have you received in the mail this year?  If you are like many Americans, the applications continue to appear regularly.  Have you received convenience checks or offers for additional lines of credit?  If so, you may have taken advantage of the use of the credit without any feasible way of repaying the debt.  Many people are receiving pre-approved credit applications when they are in fact, not credit worthy.  The credit card lenders point fault at the debtors for accepting the credit without the means to repay it.  It seems more logical to fault lenders who do not undertake to check the credit worthiness of particular debtors.

8. Consumer Overspending

Many people see what they want, acquire it, and decide later how they will pay for it.  People want to possess the latest clothing, jewelry, electronics, etc.  Most stores now offer the ability to take the product home through the use of store credit cards or outside financing.  You may even get a modest percentage discount off the purchase price if you open or use the store charge card.  Many people charge their groceries, restaurant and transportation expenses believing that if they just make the minimum payments everything will be alright.

Is wall street stealing your home

“Just when you thought Wall Street couldn’t defraud the economy any further, it went ahead and did it. After pushing millions of borrowers into foreclosure with fraudulent loans, big banks are now being implicated in a massive new fraud scandal involving the foreclosure process itself. All over the country, banks and their lawyers are resorting to outright fraud in order to kick people out of their homes and slap them with huge, illegal fees. It may be the biggest scandal of the entire financial crisis, one that could result in epic losses for the nation’s largest banks.

We’ve been hearing for years about the horrific mortgages bankers pushed borrowers into, the outrageous scams they deployed in dumping these mortgages on investors, and the lies they told to their own shareholders about those mortgages in order to boost bonuses. Fraud was a major part of this machine at every stage of production, but the foreclosure fraud being uncovered by lawyers today appears to be the broadest scandal to emerge from the mortgage mess thus far.

Yves Smith has done an outstanding job covering this scandal, so be sure to check out her posts for all the details, but here’s the basic story: Banks intentionally skimped on their mortgage paperwork during the housing bubble—it cut their costs and made the sale of mortgage-backed securities more profitable. A basic, standardized part of the mortgage process at many banks included forging or destroying key documents, or never bothering to write them up in the first place. Those reckless procedures have been applied to millions of mortgages issued over the past decade, and allowed inflated bonus checks to be written for years. But things are about to get very ugly for the banks.

Mortgage documentation has been so shoddy that banks can’t actually prove that they own the mortgages they want to foreclose on. This isn’t a small scandal, it isn’t a minor clerical issue, and it isn’t a problem that banks deserve help from taxpayers to solve. Wall Street has simply not performed the basic tasks necessary to track ownership of its assets. Imagine a car manufacturer being unable to document the sale of automobiles. The basic business has broken.

If banks can’t prove that they have the right to foreclose, they’re not allowed to foreclose. The borrower gets to keep the house—even if he or she has stopped making payments on the mortgage. So banks—and the scummy law firms they hire—are resorting to all kinds of new tricks in order to foreclose (see Andy Kroll’s excellent article detailing the sharks who operate these law firms). They’re creating new documents, forging signatures and lying to judges. This is all fraud.

And this fraud doesn’t only help banks cut costs—it also enables lawyers to slap troubled borrowers with huge, illegal fees, squeezing them for money even after they’ve been tapped out on mortgage payments. If you can’t pay the foreclosure fees in court, debt collectors will chase you down and garnish your wages for years to come. These are massive fees—tens of thousands of dollars assessed on individual families for the luxury of being booted out of their home, all made possible by fraudulent documents, forged paperwork, and straightforward lies.

The ownership chain for mortgages is so complex—one bank issues a loan, which is sliced and diced into multiple mortgage-backed securities and sold to multiple investors—that the right to foreclose is not clear without precise and meticulous paperwork. If banks don’t keep these records, there is no way for them to prove the losses or profits they make from a given loan.

Banks can’t even keep track of what houses they actually have the right to foreclose on. In addition to slipping illegal fees into the mix, the financial establishment is slamming incorrect foreclosures through the legal pipeline. Banks are actually kicking people out of homes who have been paying their mortgages on time. In some cases, they’re even evicting borrowers who have already paid off their loan.

When banks can’t get the documents they want, they resort to still more drastic measures. Banks are violating the law by physically breaking into peoples’ homes, stealing their belongings and changing the locks. Add breaking and entering and larceny to the list of crimes committed by banks in the foreclosure process.

This scandal ought to put people behind bars. When somebody breaks into your home and steals your stuff, he goes to jail. But it also creates very serious problems for the entire financial system—if banks can’t prove they own mortgages, how can we trust their quarterly earnings statements? How can the bonuses based on those earnings be justified?

In other words, the inhumane and illegal way banks have treated their borrowers is only part of the fraud scandal Wall Street now faces. There is also the makings of a massive corporate accounting scandal—one that easily rivals Enron and WorldComm in its scope.

GMAC, Bank of America and JPMorgan Chase—three of the largest mortgage servicers in the nation—have already frozen foreclosures in 23 states. These are the states in which banks must obtain a court order to proceed with a foreclosure, but there is every reason to suspect that the same illegal practices are occurring in other states. Shoddy documentation has been a standardized element of the mortgage process for years—it has just been easier to prove this malfeasance in states that require courts to sign-off on foreclosures.

When housing prices are in decline, banks lose money on foreclosures. Today, the average loss on a foreclosed subprime or Alt-A mortgage is about 63 percent, according to data analyzed by Valparaiso University Law Professor Alan White. But if banks can’t actually take over the home, a foreclosure is far worse for the bank—it can’t cut its losses on an unpaid loan by seizing the house and selling it. If borrowers assert their rights, and courts uphold the law, some of the nation’s largest banks are about to take massive, unexpected losses.

That fact—combined with the prospect of shareholder lawsuits over improper accounting—should radically change the landscape for foreclosure relief and broader financial reform. Most banks cannot afford to go to zero on every mortgage they own from the housing bubble. If troubled borrowers stand up to their banks, the resulting losses could easily jeopardize the solvency of some major firms. This gives reformers and policymakers a critical tool to demand stronger medicine for Wall Street: Give us real reform, or we’ll let you go under.

JP Morgan Must Show Foreclosures Are Legal, Brown Says

October 01, 2010, 3:47 PM EDT

By Joel Rosenblatt

(Updates with Brown’s statement in fourth paragraph.)

Oct. 1 (Bloomberg) — JPMorgan Chase & Co., the third- biggest U.S. mortgage servicer, must prove its home foreclosures are legal, and if it can’t, must stop the practice, California Attorney General Jerry Brown said.

JPMorgan is asking courts to delay judgments in pending foreclosure cases while the bank reviews and possibly resubmits statements. JPMorgan said this week it is re-examining foreclosure filings after learning employees may have signed affidavits without personally reviewing underlying records, relying instead on other personnel.

Brown made a similar demand on Sept. 24 of Ally Financial Inc.’s GMAC Mortgage unit, which is being investigated by attorneys general in Texas, Iowa and Illinois after the lender said it would halt some evictions following a discovery of faulty documentation.

“JP Morgan Chase, like GMAC’s Ally Financial, has admitted that its review of key foreclosure documents was a ruse,” Brown said today in an e-mailed statement.

JPMorgan can’t record defaults on mortgages made from Jan. 1, 2003, to Dec. 31, 2007, unless, with “limited exceptions,” the lender had tried to determine whether the borrower is eligible for a loan modification, according to Brown.

Thomas Kelly, a spokesman for New York-based JPMorgan, declined to comment.

Yesterday, Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan, questioning whether JPMorgan is violating state consumer protection laws, demanded a meeting with the lender to discuss its foreclosures. Earlier today, Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal asked the state Judicial Department to freeze home foreclosures for 60 days, citing reports on GMAC and JPMorgan.

–With assistance from Dakin Campbell in San Francisco, Rick Green in New York and Andrew M. Harris in Chicago. Editors: Michael Hytha, Charles Carter.

To contact the reporter on this story: Joel Rosenblatt in San Francisco at jrosenblatt@bloomberg.net.

The Devil’s in the Details – Foreclosure


By Numerian Posted by Michael Collins

It seems, therefore, that millions of foreclosures that have occurred in the past two years may be invalid. Investors who were part of the $8,000 tax credit program may not have valid mortgages and may not legally have the right to live in their home. Title insurance companies have stopped accepting mortgage titles from GMAC and other financial firms implicated in this situation. Numerian

What appeared at first to be an isolated problem with home mortgage foreclosures at GMAC has morphed into a serious conundrum for just about everyone involved in the residential home market: homeowners, banks, mortgage servicers, investors, and even the US government. The problem goes beyond finding which lender has legal title to a home, and therefore the right to foreclose on a defaulted mortgage. The problem has become how to prepare for a possible behavioral change among homeowners, if more than a small percentage of them decide to stop paying on their mortgage. (Image)

Strategic Defaults are Already On the Rise

What would motivate a homeowner to stop paying their mortgage principal and interest? So far, severe financial problems, combined with a drastic fall in house prices, have been the main causes of most mortgage defaults by homeowners. When the value of the house falls below the mortgage balance due, homeowners are even more liable to default on their loan, and the greater this difference (referred to as the homeowner being “underwater”), the more likely it is that a strategic default will take place. This is an industry term for defaults that occur even though the borrower has the financial means to continue paying down the mortgage.

Strategic defaults are a rational decision by the homeowner, who believes the value of the home is so far below the mortgage balance that it would take years for market values to catch up. Why pay off a loan on a depreciating asset, especially if the homeowner can rent the same size home for much less than their mortgage payment? Depending on the location, strategic defaults represent from 10% – 20% of all defaults. There is also more of a tendency for owners of expensive homes to strategically default than owners of average size homes, so strategic defaults are of serious concern to the banking industry.

The initial reaction of banks to the rising level of mortgage defaults was to foreclose and dispose of the property as soon as possible. When home values were in a free-fall up to the summer of 2009, the banking industry frenetically processed tens of thousands of foreclosures each month, evicting homeowners in every metropolitan area across the US. This process slowed down last year for two reasons. First, the federal government imposed a moratorium on foreclosures, and second, the banks were achieving less and less on foreclosed homes. In previous recessions, banks could recover around 40% of the value of the outstanding mortgage from a foreclosure and bank sale of the property. Today the recovery rate has fallen to an unprecedented low of 5% of the loan value, which is hardly worth the expense, time, and trouble of foreclosing on the property.

You would think, therefore, that banks would be eager to work out a deal with the homeowner, lowering their mortgage balance to some level that meets the financial capabilities of the borrower. This isn’t happening either. To do this, the bank would still have to declare a loss on its books, and even the biggest banks don’t have enough capital to do this on a wholesale scale. Another factor is that the banks may only own a small portion of the mortgage, the rest being sold off to investors in a mortgage-backed security deal. These investors would have to consent to taking a loss as well, and this is almost impossible to arrange.

Where is the Title to the Home?

Now comes a third problem. The GMAC revelations showed that this mortgage company has been foreclosing on thousands of properties each month, filing incomplete or possibly fraudulent documents with the court approving the foreclosures. The process of foreclosing on a home mortgage is complex and governed by both federal and state laws, but in any event the process requires that someone working for the foreclosing bank assert in writing that they are personally familiar with all the documents submitted, and that these documents are accurate. GMAC has not been meeting this standard. A middle level executive has been signing over 10,000 foreclosure documents for GMAC each month and could not possibly have “personal knowledge” of the details of each foreclosure.

It gets worse. GMAC has been asserting that it is in possession of the lien representing the mortgage, and much more importantly – it is also in possession of the title to the home. It is the title which is of far more importance here, because without clear title a bank has no foreclosure rights. GMAC has been going in front of courts all over the US claiming it holds title to the property in question, when in fact the person making this claim has no personal knowledge of the documents, and GMAC cannot in many cases produce the title.

Who has the title? GMAC may have lost it within its own files, or may have passed the title on to a mortgage servicer when the mortgage was sold off to investors. The mortgage servicer may have sold the title to another servicer, or to a clearing house that supposedly was protecting the legal rights of the lenders and investors in mortgage securities. As the mortgage market became frenzied at the height of the bubble, the financial industry became very sloppy about documentation and is now having serious trouble producing the necessary documents to proceed with a foreclosure.

Quite a few real estate lawyers believe that what GMAC did, whether through sloppiness or deliberately, constitutes a fraud upon the court, which is subject to criminal penalties. GMAC has halted all foreclosures until it straightens out the document mess, but there is increasing suspicion in the mortgage market that these problems are not going to be solved in just a month or two, if at all. JP Morgan Chase has admitted that it too has a middle level executive who was submitting personal attestations to the foreclosure courts, when she could not possibly have known the facts behind each mortgage. Chase is probably in very good company with Citigroup, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo, all of which are likely to have similar processing problems.

It seems, therefore, that millions of foreclosures that have occurred in the past two years may be invalid. Investors who were part of the $8,000 tax credit program may not have valid mortgages and may not legally have the right to live in their home. Title insurance companies have stopped accepting mortgage titles from GMAC and other financial firms implicated in this situation.

Foreclosure Market is Coming to a Halt

The foreclosure market in the US is slowly grinding to a halt, with all this uncertainty about past and future mortgage rights, and with banks now recovering only 5% of the mortgage value in a forced sale. Professionals in the market are now speculating that the federal government may be forced to outlaw all home foreclosures, since there is so much doubt on whether banks have any legal right to foreclose on residential property. If this were to happen, the market mechanism essential to clearing defaulted properties from the market would cease to exist. Lost too would be the process known as price discovery, wherein neighboring properties can be appraised, making it much harder for any homeowner wishing to sell to do so. Not only is the foreclosure market subject to a freeze, but the entire home resale market could be crippled as well.

In fact, there may be yet another incentive for homeowners to strategically default, if theoretically the defaulter could live in the home free of charge should the party holding the mortgage be unable to produce the title. Already there are thousands of homeowners in the US who are living “rent free”, so to speak, while they wait for the bank to foreclose or for the courts to honor a bank’s foreclosure claim. These people are socking away tens of thousands of dollars in savings, or spending it for that matter, while the disposition of their property is in limbo. Even when the bank is finally able to proceed with the foreclosure, they are not suing the homeowner for back principal and interest due, in part because the delay may have been caused by the bank itself, and in part because some states do not allow banks to go after other homeowner assets once a default occurs.

As the months go by, the difference between a homeowner living rent free in their home, and de facto owning the home free and clear through a form of squatters rights, is becoming very gray. This is not going to sit well with the people who continue to pay down their mortgage even if they are underwater, nor will it sit well with those who paid off their mortgage. Good financial stewardship, a virtue in the past, is looking more and more like foolhardiness. There is both a legal and social breakdown that is occurring here, upending over a century of contract law and prudent behavior that underlay the housing market.

If strategic defaults spread in part because of this new uncertainty over foreclosure and who has the title to the home, the banks and the mortgage backed securities market would be put in a dreadful position. The day in and day out cash flow expected from millions of mortgage principal and interest payments would be impacted far more than it is already, with the banks unable to access their collateral to stanch the bleeding. Insolvencies among the banks and the investors holding mortgage securities would certainly rise.

The Federal Government is Ultimately Going to Own this Problem

How bad this could get is anyone’s guess, but continued deterioration will inevitably drag in the US government, which owns both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, by far the biggest issuers and guarantors of mortgage backed securities. The federal government also has an ownership stake in Citigroup and is sitting on billions of dollars of mortgage securities bought from all the big banks and from failing institutions like Bear Stearns. If the largest US banks are pushed into technical insolvency because of this problem, the federal government would inevitably own them too.

What is currently a legal problem could turn into a behavioral problem affecting the entire mortgage market, which in turn creates a massive political problem for the federal government. It is the behavioral problem which has to be of most concern for the government, because if people who could pay their mortgage decide it is uneconomic or unfair for them to do so, the relationship between borrower and lender is broken. Currently it is slightly fractured, and the government as well as industry leaders will do everything possible to downplay this situation, characterizing it as a technical matter that will be easily and quickly cleared up.

So far, though, the courts aren’t buying the quick fixes being proposed by the industry. The foreclosure laws that have arisen over the past 100 years are designed to protect the homeowner from hasty and incomplete processes, and as well from fraudulent foreclosures. The courts are saying that the banking industry not only was hasty and reckless in its mortgage securitization process, but that homeowner rights are being trampled upon, and the courts themselves are being defrauded along with the homeowners. More and more judges across the country are coming to this conclusion, and if they believe the rule of law has been seriously undermined in the mortgage market, why should any homeowner feel a moral or legal compulsion to continue to pay down their mortgage?

Trial Mods or forbearance agreements may be a waiver of Foreclosure

Trial Mods or forbearance agreements may be a waiver of Foreclosure

Waiver or Estoppel to Claim Payment or Default

May a client call me to say they where making there trial loan mod  payments but the lender foreclosed anyway. The trustor may deny that any amount is owed at that particular time, or may deny that the prescribed amount demanded is owed, if the beneficiary has waived the time requirements contained in the obligation by accepting late payments or if the beneficiary has accepted payments smaller than that permitted in the contract.

A waiver is unlikely to be construed as permanent in the absence of a writing or new consideration. A permanent waiver is, in effect, a change in the agreement equivalent to a novation requiring new consideration. [E.g., Hunt v. Smyth, supra, 25 Cal.App.3d 807, 819; Bledsoe v. Pacific Ready Cut Homes, Inc. (1928) 92 Cal.App. 641, 644-45; 268 P. 697.] The beneficiary and trustor may modify their payment schedule in writing without new consideration. [See Civ. Code §§1698(a), 2924c (b)(1).] The beneficiary’s conduct, however, may constitute a temporary waiver.

The beneficiary cannot declare the trustor in default of the terms of the obligation where the beneficiary has temporarily waived such terms — until the beneficiary has given definite notice demanding payment in accord with the obligation and has provided the trustor a reasonable length of time to comply. In addition, the beneficiary must give the trustor definite notice that future payments must comply with the terms of the obligation. [E.g., Hunt v. Smyth. supra, 25 Cal.App.3d 807, 822-23; Lopez v. Bell (1962) 207 Cal.App.2d 394, 398-99; 24 Cal.Rptr. 626; Bledsoe v. Pacific Ready Cut Homes, Inc., supra, 92 Cal.App. 641, 645.] Even if the beneficiary’s conduct does not constitute a knowing relinquishment of rights, it may create an equitable estoppel. [See e.g., Altman v. McCollum (1951) 107 Cal.App.2d Supp. 847; 236 P.2d 914.]

Foreclosure proof homes ? !!!

forclosure proof homes

LOAN MODIFICATIONS: IS THIS WHAT I’M SUPPOSED TO BELIEVE??

IS THIS WHAT I’M TO UNDERSTAND?

You don’t need to hire anyone to help you negotiate with your bank for a loan modification.

You don’t need an attorney, you don’t need a mortgage expert, and you don’t need a fraud examiner.

All of those people, the lawyers, the mortgage experts, the fraud examiners… they’re all scammers because they CHARGE for their services.

And everyone knows that loan modifications are FREE… like water in a stream, or the air that we breathe.

Banks, on the other hand, have plenty of lawyers, mortgage experts, credit specialists, underwriters, and professional negotiators.

You, however, should come alone.

Who says you should come alone? The banks say so, that’s who.

The banks are looking out for you. The banks are going to help you. The banks are on your side. You can trust the banks.

The same banks that put you into mortgages where the payments double as soon as the prepayment penalty period ends.

The same banks that blame you, the borrowers, for the meltdown, and have already foreclosed on millions of homes.

The same banks that just lobbied congress to kill the bankruptcy reform bill that would have allowed judges to modify mortgages in bankruptcy so that people going bankrupt could have a chance to keep their homes.

The same banks that just lobbied congress asking for a top allowable interest rate of 500%, and got 390%, while they charge you 29% on your credit card.

The same banks that fraudulently packaged mortgage backed securities as AAA rated bonds and in doing so destroyed the bond market, and left the world’s financial systems in ruin.

The same banks that paid their executives untold billions in compensation and bonuses as the entire country was sliding into the deepest recession since the 1930s.

The same banks that have received TRILLIONS OF DOLLARS in taxpayer money. TRILLIONS.

Those same banks are now going to help you … as long as you come alone to the negotiation. Don’t hire anyone to help you… and they’ll help you.

And our President and our government agrees.

But the FACT is that banks are REQUIRED BY LAW to negotiate in the banks best interest, not yours. The law says that the bank MUST do what’s in the bank’s best interest, not yours.

It’s called a “fiduciary duty,” and it means that the banks MUST do what’s in the best interests of their shareholders, or their shareholders can SUE them for lots of money.

Those are the facts. And while you are entitled to your own opinion, you are not entitled to your own set of facts.

Here’s another fact: The banks don’t want you to have representation. They’d prefer you come alone… without help… without an attorney… without a mortgage expert. They’d much rather negotiate with people who are scared, emotional, and unknowledgeable. It makes it easier and better for them.

But the 5th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution state that:

No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

This can be viewed as a person’s rights to fair governing.

In the United States of America there are two types of due process of law, “procedural” and “substantive”.

Procedural due process of law means that the procedures used by government in making, applying, interpreting, and enforcing laws be reasonable and consistent. Substantive due process of law means that the government cannot make laws that apply to situations in which the government has no business interfering. It means that the “substance” or purpose of laws be constitutional.

The Fourteenth Amendment continues and later talks about the “equal protection clause”. It states that no state may “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” The Fourteenth Amendment’s original purpose was to create a society in which all people were treated equally.

There have been three Taxpayer Bill of Rights passed by the United States Congress in the last 20 years. Here’s what the first right in the first Taxpayer Bill of Rights states:

Taxpayers have the right to legal representation similar to that of a criminal defendant. Taxpayers have the right to have the IRS processes explained to them. Taxpayers have the right to sue the government for damages caused by IRS officials.

Shouldn’t taxpayers have the same rights as homeowners when negotiating with their banks to avoid foreclosure and keep their homes?

How many scammers are there? No one knows. How many mortgages have been successfully modified with the help of a private sector law firm or mortgage firm? No one knows.

The government says we must protect homeowners from “scammers,” because homeowners can’t tell whether a given firm is a “scammer” or not. So, the banks and the government say they are all “scammers,” and you can tell because they charge a fee or retainer in advance of the work being completed… which is exactly the way all attorneys charge for every single case they take on.

Is it the scammers who cause the scam, or is it the homeowner who is in a panic? It’s the panic.

And who is causing the homeowner to be in a panic? Who defrauded the financial system and caused the housing meltdown and worst recession since The Great Depression? Who broke the bond market by selling bonds that were fraudulently packaged and sold to investors? Who put homeowners into loans they did not understand and could not afford?

The banks did all of that. The banks caused the panic. The panic leads to the scams.

SO, WHO ARE THE REAL SCAMMERS HERE?

Yes… that’s right.

SO, MAYBE IT’S TIME WE STOPPED LISTENING TO THEM. GET YOUR OWN REPRESENTATION BEFORE NEGOTIATING WITH YOUR BANK OVER A LOAN MODIFICATION. NO MATTER WHAT ANYONE TELLS YOU.

USE YOUR HEAD. THIS MESS WASN’T YOUR FAULT. POOR PEOPLE WHO WANTED HOMES DIDN’T CAUSE THE WORLD’S BANKING SYSTEM AND WALL ST. TO FAIL.

DON’T BE A SUCKER FOR THE BANKS… AGAIN.

In a related story…

Wells Fargo Bank killed a man recently. The man was in jeopardy of losing his home to foreclosure. He had raised his family there. He lived there with his wife. They lived in Agora, CA. He was trying to handle the negotiations himself. Because that’s what he was told to do…

The bank was refusing to work with him. They wouldn’t modify his loan. They told him he had to come up with tens of thousands of dollars or he’d have to get out. They were nasty with him. It was taking a toll on him. The stress must have been unbearable. He couldn’t stand the thought of losing what he had worked his entire life to protect.

Nothing worked. Now there was only ONE WEEK before his home would be sold in a foreclosure sale. He couldn’t stand it.

He had a massive heart attack.

He was 62 years old.

His widow buried him. She was scared that she would have to move from their home.

She hired the law firm of Serge, Rodnunsky & Jones in Woodland Hills. They called Wells Fargo and today they got the bank to agree to delay the sale until September. They’re confident they will be successful in obtaining a loan modification for the widow.

That’s all they needed… a loan modification.

But he is gone. Someone’s husband of decades. Someone’s father. Someone’s grandfather. A life ended.

Because the bank couldn’t modify the loan. A few dollars.

He worked his entire life in this country. His tax dollars made it possible for Wells Fargo to get bailed out by the government. And they killed him. And they didn’t and don’t care one bit.

And I will never forgive Wells Fargo or any of the banks for this. Never.

Taxpayers Bailout the Banks Nobody Bailsout the taxpayer!

Pain on Main Street

As lawmakers continue paying out the 17 trillion it will ultimately cost taxpayers to bailout the banks and lenders on Wall Street, the foreclosure machine grinds on and the mortgage crisis at the heart of the problem continues to worsen.

Every day, people show up looking for help at the modest offices of United Communities Against Poverty, a housing counseling agency in Prince George’s County, Md., in suburban Washington. Homes are going into foreclosure at one of the fastest rates in the nation here, and to chief counselor Caprice Coppedge, it’s hardly surprising that the bailout bill doesn’t have much in it to help them.

“I’m not shocked,” she said. “Each one of these so-called rescues hasn’t done much to help homeowners. There has to be a little bit more of a solid plan. I don’t understand why they [Congress and the Treasury Dept.] are not getting a clear understanding of what’s going on on the ground level — with homeowners.”

When it comes to the bailout, homeowners understand one thing for sure: They aren’t too big to fail. A long-sought measure that might help some of them — changing federal law to allow bankruptcy judges to modify mortgages — faces tough odds, with the lending industry strongly opposed to it.

Even if gets approved, some borrowers can’t afford bankruptcy attorneys or don’t want to file. Still, housing groups estimate the change would keep some 600,000 families in their homes, which is why they have been pushing the idea.

To help even more, Senate Democrats want the government to modify as many of the loans it buys as possible. But just because the government owns all those bad mortgages doesn’t mean it can do a massive restructuring to make them more affordable.

In taking on toxic loans, the government faces a huge Humpty-Dumpty problem — mortgage-backed securities were sliced into pieces and sold that way to investors around the globe. Spending all that taxpayer money to buy those securities still won’t ensure the government can own or control them all, so it can’t redo loans on a large scale. Even $700 billion won’t be enough to put all the pieces back together again, said Adam Levitin, a Georgetown University law professor and expert on the credit industry.

The small percentage of loan modifications that might get done will be “random and arbitrary,” and not based on the merit’s of a homeowner’s case, he said. Not to mention that second mortgage holders regularly refuse to do loan modifications, and many subprime homeowners took out two mortgages.

Given all this, the bailout ends up rewarding the most egregious of the subprime lenders — the ones who made the most abusive and predatory loans and who disproportionately targeted minority borrowers — since they’ll be the ones with the most toxic securities to buy. Banks that didn’t do as much subprime lending won’t need to sell off as many loans, and they won’t get as much government money, Levitin said.

And don’t count on banks being subject to tighter regulation in return for their bailout, he added. It’s possible that banks and lenders in a few years might use the same taxpayer dollars that rescued them to stave off regulatory reform of the financial markets, the ultimate irony of the bailout effort.

The banks seem to be escaping the consequences of their past lending behavior.

“It’s pretty insidious,” Levitin said. “We’re bailing out banks that got us into this mess because of years of abusive and predatory loans. And there’s no price to pay. I find that deeply troubling.”

No where is it more troubling than places like Prince George’s County, the nation’s wealthiest black suburb, which has been hard hit by subprime loans and foreclosures. Credit scores here rank at or above the national average, but the community has more than its share of subprime loans, with almost twice as many homeowners holding high-cost mortgages as the national average.

That pattern holds true elsewhere. In majority black and Latino communities nationwide, nearly half of all mortgages made in 2006 were subprime loans. All during the housing boom, racial differences became more pronounced as income increased — so middle-to-high income black and Latino borrowers were more likely than non-minority borrowers with modest incomes to have subprime mortgages.

Iris Pulliam, 51, a social worker in the District of Columbia public schools, refinanced her Prince George’s County home with a 9.5 percent Countywide loan three years ago. She tried to do some research before refinancing and refused the adjustable rate mortgage the lender first offered.

Looking back, Pulliam said she wasn’t aware she could have had a real estate attorney with her at the closing, and didn’t comprehend all the additional fees included in the loan before she signed. Still, she kept up the payments until her husband died almost two years ago, leaving her with just one income to pay the mortgage and take care of her 15-year-old son.

Pulliam began falling behind on her mortgage, and tried working out a loan modification with Countrywide. But the lender agreed only to a repayment plan that would increase her monthly payments.

She stood in a long line in the July heat to try to get a loan restructuring through the Neighborhood Assistance Corp. of America, a housing advocacy group. But Countrywide still hasn’t approved it. A Countrywide representative called her recently to discuss her case, but she called back again and again and couldn’t get through to anyone.

At this point, Pulliam has taken on a part-time job in addition to her full-time position and has dipped into most of her retirement savings to keep up with the mortgage. Her day starts at 5 a.m., and she gets home around 8 p.m. She’s thinking of trying to refinance again, if possible. One thing she’s well aware of: The bailout plan isn’t going to do a thing for her.

“It’s not taking the average homeowner into consideration, to me,” she said. “I feel that they’re putting all this money out for all these big money industries, investment companies and firms, and they should do something more for the average homeowner, to try to make sure we keep our homes.

“I think the scales are tipped toward the mortgager who has billions of dollars. For the little person, we might as well be off the scales.”

Modifying bankruptcy laws won’t help her, Pulliam said. She wouldn’t be able to afford a bankruptcy attorney. Congress could make a difference by forcing subprime lenders in future to be “upfront and above board,” she said. She’s not convinced that will happen.

To Coppedge, the housing counselor, part of the problem is that people need the sort of help neither Congress nor the Treasury Dept. is talking about. Coppedge, a former mortgage banker, is well aware that keeping credit flowing will help people in the long run to buy homes or take out loans — in that sense, she sees the need for a bailout.

But the people who come to her could use help too, like emergency assistance to cover even a month or two of mortgage payments to stay in their homes. For along with subprime loans, Coppedge noted, higher gas and food prices are cutting into the ability of the elderly and other homeowners on fixed incomes to pay their mortgages.

“I see a lot of clients who are not your typical five or six months behind on their mortgage,” Coppedge said. “I see some individuals, especially the elderly and the handicapped, who were preyed upon and asked to refinance their mortgages to make repairs or whatever the case may be. And these people just need one or two months of mortgage assistance to catch up, and catch their breath, and be able to get back on track.”

As part of the bailout, Democrats in the House and Senate want government agencies like the Federal Housing Admin. to expand their lending programs and help more homeowners, building on an effort included in the mortgage rescue bill. Under that program, the FHA will provide $300 billion in guarantees for lower-rate mortgages refinanced by lenders willing to accept a loss on the loans.

The program, which begins Oct. 1, is voluntary, and no one seems sure how well it will work. Coppedge noted that most of her clients either don’t have enough income or owe so much more on their mortgages than their homes are worth that they usually don’t qualify for FHA or other government programs.

On Capitol Hill, some lawmakers and economists are questioning whether the bailout plan will do enough to ease the credit crunch and to hold off a recession. But to groups like the Center for Responsible Lending, they are asking the wrong questions. Unless any bailout also deals with the problems of people facing foreclosures, it can’t fix the economy.

“The bailout will not solve our economic problems because it will do virtually nothing to stop the foreclosure epidemic,” the center said in a statement. “Continuing foreclosures will drag down the economy even further.”

John Taylor, president of the National Community Reinvestment Coalition, which represents housing advocacy groups, called it “unconscionable” for Congress to approve a plan that never addresses the underlying problem behind the crisis. His group met with Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke on Monday to complain that the government should first help homeowners facing foreclosure, before shoring up Wall Street.Its the classic case privatizing the profits of Bear Sterns and The Gang of Five and Socializing Losses.And you think it’s an accident, some “natural order of things? That’s what the super wealthy want us to think. And profit-driven establishment, celebrity media to plays along, because it’s a good deal for them. Ain’t it grand? I’m gonna be like that some day, so we better not tax them…. that would be spreading the wealth…. in the wrong direction.

Pulliam says the bailout for Wall Street mostly means that she’s on her own to save her home. Does anyone in power understand what she’s going through?

“The CEO of Countrywide wouldn’t know,” Pulliam said. “Or the vice president of Countrywide; or the Bank of America. They’re all out buying up other banks while the consumers have trouble keeping their houses.”
Pulliam grew up in a house with a white picket fence, and she wants that same sense of the benefits of homeownership for her son. She’s thinking about taking in a roommate to help pay the mortgage. Her sister is also facing foreclosure, and they’re considering sharing a household to solve both of their difficulties.
“I’ll do everything possible that’s legal and above board to keep my home,” Pulliam said. “That’s what I want for my son — a stable neighborhood environment.”

Like other troubled borrowers dealing with a crisis that seems far removed from the political posturing on Capitol Hill, Pulliam seems willing to pay whatever price it takes to keep it.

A Homeowners’ Rebellion: Could 62 Million Homes be Foreclosure-Proof?

62 MILLION HOMES ARE LEGALLY FORECLOSURE -PROOF

Posted 7 hours ago by Neil Garfield on Livinglies’s Weblog

EDITOR’S NOTE: YES IT MEANS WHAT IT SAYS — WHICH IS WHAT I HAVE BEEN SAYING FOR THREE YEARS. BUT JUST BECAUSE SOME JUDGES REALIZE THAT THIS IS THE ONLY CORRECT LEGAL INTERPRETATION DOESN’T MEAN ALL OF THEM WILL ABIDE BY THAT. QUITE THE REVERSE. MOST JUDGES REFUSE TO ACCEPT AND CAN’T WRAP THEIR BRAINS AROUND THE FACT THAT THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY THAT SET THE LEGAL STANDARDS FOR PERFECTING A SECURITY INTEREST IN RESIDENTIAL HOME MORTGAGES COULD HAVE SCREWED UP LIKE THIS.

THE ANSWER OF COURSE IS THAT THEY DIDN’T — WALL STREET DID IT. I KNOW FOR A FACT AND HAVE SEEN THE INTERNAL MEMORANDUM WRITTEN IN 2003-2006 THAT LAWYERS WHO WERE PREPARING THE SECURITIZATION DOCUMENTS KNEW AND INFORMED THEIR CLIENTS THAT THIS COULD NOT WORK.

THIS DOES NOT MEAN YOU GET A FREE HOUSE. BUT IT DOES MEAN THAT AT THE MOMENT ANY HOUSE IN WHICH MERS WAS INVOLVED DOES NOT HAVE A PERFECTED SECURITY INTEREST AS AN ENCUMBRANCE. AND THAT MEANS THAT ANY FORECLOSURE BASED UPON DOCUMENTS OR PRESUMPTIONS REGARDING MERS ARE VOID. AND THAT MEANS THAT IF YOU FALL INTO THIS CLASS OF PEOPLE — AND MOST PEOPLE DO — IT IS POSSIBLE AND EVEN PROBABLE THAT YOU COULD BE AWARDED QUIET TITLE ON A HOME THAT WAS FORECLOSED AND SOLD EVEN YEARS AGO.

BUT BEWARE: JUST BECAUSE THEY SCREWED UP THE PAPERWORK AND THEY DON’T HAVE THE REMEDY OF FORECLOSURE IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE DOESN’T MEAN THAT NOBODY LENT YOU MONEY NOR DOES IT MEAN THAT YOU DON’T OWE ANY MONEY NOR DOES IT MEAN THAT THEY COULD NOT CREATE AN EQUITABLE LIEN ON YOUR PROPERTY THAT COULD AMOUNT TO A MORTGAGE THAT COULD BE FORECLOSED. BUT THAT IS STRICTLY A JUDICIAL PROCESS EVEN IN SO-CALLED NON-JUDICIAL STATES.

WE ARE NOW CLOSING IN ON THE REALITY. THE INEVITABLE OUTCOME IS PRINCIPAL REDUCTION WHETHER THE BANKS LIKE IT OR NOT. EVEN IF THEIR LIEN WAS PERFECTED AND ENFORCEABLE THEY STILL CANNOT GET ANY MORE MONEY THAN THE HOUSE IS WORTH. WITHOUT THE ENCUMBRANCE, THEY ARE FORCED TO NEGOTIATE A WHOLE NEW PATH WITH ONLY THE PARTIES THAT ARE NOW LEFT HOLDING THE BAG ON THE LOSS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ORIGINAL LOAN ON YOUR PROPERTY, AFTER ADJUSTMENTS FOR PAYMENTS RECEIVED BUT NOT RECORDED OR ALLOCATED.

IN ORDER TO HOLD THEIR FEET TO THE FIRE, YOU HAVE TO KNOW THE ORIGINAL SECURITIZATION SCHEME AND INSIST ON PROOF OF WHAT HAPPENED AFTER THE INITIAL SECURITIZATION PLAN WAS PUT IN PLACE. REMEMBER THAT THIS IS NOT A FIXED EVENT. THIS IS SINGLE TRANSACTION BETWEEN THE BORROWER AND AN ONGOING PROCESSION OF SUCCESSORS EACH OF WHOM HAS QUESTIONABLE RIGHTS TO THE NOTE, MORTGAGE OR EVEN THE OBLIGATION SINCE THEY WERE ONLY ASSIGNED A RECEIVABLE FROM A PARTY WHO WAS NEITHER THE BORROWER NOR THE ORIGINATING LENDER.

A Homeowners’ Rebellion: Could 62 Million Homes be Foreclosure-Proof?

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Ellen Brown
Web of Debt
August 20, 2010

Over 62 million mortgages are now held in the name of MERS, an electronic recording system devised by and for the convenience of the mortgage industry. A California bankruptcy court, following landmark cases in other jurisdictions, recently held that this electronic shortcut makes it impossible for banks to establish their ownership of property titles—and therefore to foreclose on mortgaged properties. The logical result could be 62 million homes that are foreclosure-proof.

Victims of predatory lending could end up owning their homes free and clear—while the financial industry could end up skewered on its own sword.

Mortgages bundled into securities were a favorite investment of speculators at the height of the financial bubble leading up to the crash of 2008. The securities changed hands frequently, and the companies profiting from mortgage payments were often not the same parties that negotiated the loans. At the heart of this disconnect was the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, or MERS, a company that serves as the mortgagee of record for lenders, allowing properties to change hands without the necessity of recording each transfer.

MERS was convenient for the mortgage industry, but courts are now questioning the impact of all of this financial juggling when it comes to mortgage ownership. To foreclose on real property, the plaintiff must be able to establish the chain of title entitling it to relief. But MERS has acknowledged, and recent cases have held, that MERS is a mere “nominee”—an entity appointed by the true owner simply for the purpose of holding property in order to facilitate transactions. Recent court opinions stress that this defect is not just a procedural but is a substantive failure, one that is fatal to the plaintiff’s legal ability to foreclose.

That means hordes of victims of predatory lending could end up owning their homes free and clear—while the financial industry could end up skewered on its own sword.

California Precedent

The latest of these court decisions came down in California on May 20, 2010, in a bankruptcy case called In re Walker, Case no. 10-21656-E–11. The court held that MERS could not foreclose because it was a mere nominee; and that as a result, plaintiff Citibank could not collect on its claim. The judge opined:

Since no evidence of MERS’ ownership of the underlying note has been offered, and other courts have concluded that MERS does not own the underlying notes, this court is convinced that MERS had no interest it could transfer to Citibank. Since MERS did not own the underlying note, it could not transfer the beneficial interest of the Deed of Trust to another. Any attempt to transfer the beneficial interest of a trust deed without ownership of the underlying note is void under California law.

In support, the judge cited In Re Vargas (California Bankruptcy Court); Landmark v. Kesler (Kansas Supreme Court); LaSalle Bank v. Lamy (a New York case); and In Re Foreclosure Cases (the “Boyko” decision from Ohio Federal Court). (For more on these earlier cases, see here, here and here.) The court concluded:

Since the claimant, Citibank, has not established that it is the owner of the promissory note secured by the trust deed, Citibank is unable to assert a claim for payment in this case.

The broad impact the case could have on California foreclosures is suggested by attorney Jeff Barnes, who writes:

This opinion . . . serves as a legal basis to challenge any foreclosure in California based on a MERS assignment; to seek to void any MERS assignment of the Deed of Trust or the note to a third party for purposes of foreclosure; and should be sufficient for a borrower to not only obtain a TRO [temporary restraining order] against a Trustee’s Sale, but also a Preliminary Injunction barring any sale pending any litigation filed by the borrower challenging a foreclosure based on a MERS assignment.

While not binding on courts in other jurisdictions, the ruling could serve as persuasive precedent there as well, because the court cited non-bankruptcy cases related to the lack of authority of MERS, and because the opinion is consistent with prior rulings in Idaho and Nevada Bankruptcy courts on the same issue.

What Could This Mean for Homeowners?

Earlier cases focused on the inability of MERS to produce a promissory note or assignment establishing that it was entitled to relief, but most courts have considered this a mere procedural defect and continue to look the other way on MERS’ technical lack of standing to sue. The more recent cases, however, are looking at something more serious. If MERS is not the title holder of properties held in its name, the chain of title has been broken, and no one may have standing to sue. In MERS v. Nebraska Department of Banking and Finance, MERS insisted that it had no actionable interest in title, and the court agreed.

An August 2010 article in Mother Jones titled “Fannie and Freddie’s Foreclosure Barons” exposes a widespread practice of “foreclosure mills” in backdating assignments after foreclosures have been filed. Not only is this perjury, a prosecutable offense, but if MERS was never the title holder, there is nothing to assign. The defaulting homeowners could wind up with free and clear title.

In Jacksonville, Florida, legal aid attorney April Charney has been using the missing-note argument ever since she first identified that weakness in the lenders’ case in 2004. Five years later, she says, some of the homeowners she’s helped are still in their homes. According to a Huffington Post article titled “‘Produce the Note’ Movement Helps Stall Foreclosures”:

Because of the missing ownership documentation, Charney is now starting to file quiet title actions, hoping to get her homeowner clients full title to their homes (a quiet title action ‘quiets’ all other claims). Charney says she’s helped thousands of homeowners delay or prevent foreclosure, and trained thousands of lawyers across the country on how to protect homeowners and battle in court.

Criminal Charges?


Other suits go beyond merely challenging title to alleging criminal activity. On July 26, 2010, a class action was filed in Florida seeking relief against MERS and an associated legal firm for racketeering and mail fraud. It alleges that the defendants used “the artifice of MERS to sabotage the judicial process to the detriment of borrowers;” that “to perpetuate the scheme, MERS was and is used in a way so that the average consumer, or even legal professional, can never determine who or what was or is ultimately receiving the benefits of any mortgage payments;” that the scheme depended on “the MERS artifice and the ability to generate any necessary ‘assignment’ which flowed from it;” and that “by engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity, specifically ‘mail or wire fraud,’ the Defendants . . . participated in a criminal enterprise affecting interstate commerce.”

Local governments deprived of filing fees may also be getting into the act, at least through representatives suing on their behalf. Qui tam actions allow for a private party or “whistle blower” to bring suit on behalf of the government for a past or present fraud on it. In State of California ex rel. Barrett R. Bates, filed May 10, 2010, the plaintiff qui tam sued on behalf of a long list of local governments in California against MERS and a number of lenders, including Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase and Wells Fargo, for “wrongfully bypass[ing] the counties’ recording requirements; divest[ing] the borrowers of the right to know who owned the promissory note . . .; and record[ing] false documents to initiate and pursue non-judicial foreclosures, and to otherwise decrease or avoid payment of fees to the Counties and the Cities where the real estate is located.” The complaint notes that “MERS claims to have ‘saved’ at least $2.4 billion dollars in recording costs,” meaning it has helped avoid billions of dollars in fees otherwise accruing to local governments. The plaintiff sues for treble damages for all recording fees not paid during the past ten years, and for civil penalties of between $5,000 and $10,000 for each unpaid or underpaid recording fee and each false document recorded during that period, potentially a hefty sum. Similar suits have been filed by the same plaintiff qui tam in Nevada and Tennessee.

By Their Own Sword: MERS’ Role in the Financial Crisis

MERS is, according to its website, “an innovative process that simplifies the way mortgage ownership and servicing rights are originated, sold and tracked. Created by the real estate finance industry, MERS eliminates the need to prepare and record assignments when trading residential and commercial mortgage loans.” Or as Karl Denninger puts it, “MERS’ own website claims that it exists for the purpose of circumventing assignments and documenting ownership!”

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MERS was developed in the early 1990s by a number of financial entities, including Bank of America, Countrywide, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac, allegedly to allow consumers to pay less for mortgage loans. That did not actually happen, but what MERS did allow was the securitization and shuffling around of mortgages behind a veil of anonymity. The result was not only to cheat local governments out of their recording fees but to defeat the purpose of the recording laws, which was to guarantee purchasers clean title. Worse, MERS facilitated an explosion of predatory lending in which lenders could not be held to account because they could not be identified, either by the preyed-upon borrowers or by the investors seduced into buying bundles of worthless mortgages. As alleged in a Nevada class action called Lopez vs. Executive Trustee Services, et al.:

Before MERS, it would not have been possible for mortgages with no market value . . . to be sold at a profit or collateralized and sold as mortgage-backed securities. Before MERS, it would not have been possible for the Defendant banks and AIG to conceal from government regulators the extent of risk of financial losses those entities faced from the predatory origination of residential loans and the fraudulent re-sale and securitization of those otherwise non-marketable loans. Before MERS, the actual beneficiary of every Deed of Trust on every parcel in the United States and the State of Nevada could be readily ascertained by merely reviewing the public records at the local recorder’s office where documents reflecting any ownership interest in real property are kept….

After MERS, . . . the servicing rights were transferred after the origination of the loan to an entity so large that communication with the servicer became difficult if not impossible …. The servicer was interested in only one thing – making a profit from the foreclosure of the borrower’s residence – so that the entire predatory cycle of fraudulent origination, resale, and securitization of yet another predatory loan could occur again. This is the legacy of MERS, and the entire scheme was predicated upon the fraudulent designation of MERS as the ‘beneficiary’ under millions of deeds of trust in Nevada and other states.

Axing the Bankers’ Money Tree

If courts overwhelmed with foreclosures decide to take up the cause, the result could be millions of struggling homeowners with the banks off their backs, and millions of homes no longer on the books of some too-big-to-fail banks. Without those assets, the banks could again be looking at bankruptcy. As was pointed out in a San Francisco Chronicle article by attorney Sean Olender following the October 2007 Boyko [pdf] decision:

The ticking time bomb in the U.S. banking system is not resetting subprime mortgage rates. The real problem is the contractual ability of investors in mortgage bonds to require banks to buy back the loans at face value if there was fraud in the origination process.

. . . The loans at issue dwarf the capital available at the largest U.S. banks combined, and investor lawsuits would raise stunning liability sufficient to cause even the largest U.S. banks to fail . . . .

Nationalization of these giant banks might be the next logical step—a step that some commentators said should have been taken in the first place. When the banking system of Sweden collapsed following a housing bubble in the 1990s, nationalization of the banks worked out very well for that country.

The Swedish banks were largely privatized again when they got back on their feet, but it might be a good idea to keep some banks as publicly-owned entities, on the model of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia. For most of the 20th century it served as a “people’s bank,” making low interest loans to consumers and businesses through branches all over the country.

With the strengthened position of Wall Street following the 2008 bailout and the tepid 2010 banking reform bill, the U.S. is far from nationalizing its mega-banks now. But a committed homeowner movement to tear off the predatory mask called MERS could yet turn the tide. While courts are not likely to let 62 million homeowners off scot free, the defect in title created by MERS could give them significant new leverage at the bargaining table.

Countrywide settlement pays fraction to investors – Shell Game Continues

Countrywide settlement pays fraction to investors – Shell Game Continues
Posted on August 16, 2010 by Neil Garfield

EDITOR’S NOTE: The shell game continues. While the media picks up stories about “settlements” giving rise to the presumption that Countrywide Home Loans and Bank of America and the rest of the securitization players committed various violations of statutes, duties, rules and regulations, the main point gets lost. Where is this money going and WHY? What is the tacit or express admission in paying that money and what effect does it have on the average homeowner sitting with a loan whose obligation is being paid in these settlements?
Think about it. If Bank of America, which now owns Countrywide, is paying “fractions” to investors who purchased mortgage bonds then who is it that owns the underlying mortgages and loans? Did Bank of America pay the investors do it under a reservation of rights (subrogation) to enforce the underlying loans? If not, then why are they foreclosing? All evidence is to the contrary. There is no subrogation under these purchases, insurance, credit default swaps or any other contract — not that I ever saw and not that my sources in the industry tell me was ever even contemplated much less executed. The same holds true for all those bonds the Federal Reserve is holding.

If Bank of America is paying “fractions” to investors who purchased mortgage bonds, why was it a fraction? Is it because the value of the bond was much lower than the price paid by the investor? Is it just a convenient settlement? Or is it because the investors have also received funds from other sources?

This is what I am referring to when I address “factual constipation.” How are these payments being allocated? Did the owners of the bonds actually have any definable interest in the underlying mortgage loans? If they did, why are these payments not being allocated to the obligations or payments due under those underlying mortgage loans? If they didn’t, why did they get paid anything? How will we ever know without getting a full accounting from all the parties that claim some stake or ownership interest or receivable interest in me is underlying mortgage loans?

It is black letter law as well as common law dating back centuries that nobody can collect the same debt more than once. If they do collect more than once there is a clear right of action by the borrower to collect the excess payment through a lawsuit for unjust enrichment, breach of contract and other causes of action. Here we have an intentional act designed to collect the same debt multiple times. In my opinion this does not merely indicate the presence of an action for fraud, it clearly shows an interstate pattern of racketeering that at one time in our history had the Department of Justice and the FBI busy putting people in jail.

Only in America where the news has turned into an entertainment blitz used by those with the most power and the most money to get their message across, even if it is a total lie. Somehow many if not most people have the impression that the borrowers and the securitized mortgages executed between 2001 and 2009 are not entitled to the relief that any other debtor is entitled to receive––that is the obligation has been reduced for any reason, the borrowers should get credit and if any party receives money in excess of the net amount due after credits, the creditor becomes the debtor owing money to the former borrower.

The bullet point that is being used to distort the perception of our citizens and policymakers is that these borrowers should not get a “free house.” Without getting a full accounting from all parties that advanced funds to and from the original investors who purchased mortgage bonds or collateralized debt obligations and related hedge products, there is no way of knowing the amount of the credit which is due to the borrower. Yes, it is possible that the amount received by the various intermediaries in the securitization chain exceeded the original obligation due from the borrower.

In that case, the borrower owes nothing to the originating lender or the successors to that lender. But if there is still a class of investor or institution that can prove a loss resulting from the nonpayment of the obligation by the borrower (as opposed to non-payment from other parties in the securitization chain) then the law allows that party to recover the loss from those that caused it. That probably includes the borrower, which means that we are not seeking a free house, we are seeking a truthful accounting.

BUT the fact that this obligation theoretically exists does not mean and never did mean under any legal decision in existence that the obligation should be paid to anybody who claims it. By all substantive and procedural law, the obligation is payable to one who proves the obligation and to one who proves it is owed to them and nobody else.
Yet in the view of many judges the challenge by the borrower is viewed as a delay tactic or an attempt to use technical deficiencies to a gain a free house on a lawn that the borrower sought but could not pay. No doubt this is true in some cases. But in nearly all the cases, armies of salespeople using names like “loan expert” pounded on doors and rang the phones of people who had no thought of borrowing money on homes, in many cases, that were debt-free and had been in the family for generations. Now many of those homes are bank owned property.
The simple question that needs to be posed to anyone who looks at the borrower as anything other than a victim is which is more likely? Did the owners of 20 million homes enter into a conspiracy to defraud the financial system, half society and our taxpayers? Did these people have the sophistication, education, knowledge, experience or training to pull off such a caper? Or is it more likely that the Wall Street titans stepped over the line and instead of increasing liquidity for the benefit of consumers and small businesses, used their position to deplete the resources of unsuspecting citizens, pension funds, financial institutions and governmental units from the top federal levels down to the smallest local geographical areas?

Countrywide settlement pays fraction to investors

By ALAN ZIBEL (AP) – Aug 3, 2010

WASHINGTON — Former shareholders of fallen mortgage giant Countrywide Financial Corp. are in line to recoup a fraction of their investments now that a Los Angeles judge has approved a settlement worth more than $600 million settlement.

The payoff doesn’t come close to compensating for the money lost by investors. But it could prompt more lenders to settle legal disputes at the center of the housing bust.

Bank of America, which bought Countrywide two years ago, agreed to pay $600 million to end a class-action case filed against the company. KPMG, Countrywide’s accounting firm, will pay $24 million.

Several New York pension funds who served as lead plaintiffs alleged that Countrywide hid how risky its business had become during the housing market’s boom years. Calabasas, Calif.-based Countrywide was once the nation’s largest mortgage lender.

The agreement stands to return about 40 cents per share of Countrywide’s common stock, before legal fees and expenses. Consider that the stock peaked at $45 a share in February 2007, before the financial crisis. So an investor who held 100 shares could bank on receiving $40 for an investment that was once worth $4,500.

Shareholders did receive 0.1822 shares of Bank of America’s stock for each share of Countrywide they owned when Bank of America acquired Countrywide. That worked out to about one share for every 5.5 shares of Countrywide stock. Shares of Bank of America closed at $14.34 on Tuesday. So that same 100 shares of Countrywide would be worth about $261 today in Bank of America stock.

Add the $40 from the settlement and those shares are now worth little more than $300.

Lawyers for the pension funds are requesting $56 million, or 4 cents per share, for fees and other costs.

Investors “will be compensated for a significant portion of the legal damages that they suffered as a result of what we believe was a violation of the securities laws,” said Joel Bernstein, a lawyer for the pension funds. “They won’t be compensated for every penny of that.”

Bank of America has been trying to put Countrywide’s legal problems behind it. In June, the Charlotte, N.C.-based company agreed to pay $108 million to settle the Federal Trade Commission’s charges that Countrywide collected outsized fees from about 200,000 borrowers facing foreclosure.

It reached a settlement Monday primarily to keep legal fees from escalating, a bank spokeswoman said.

“Countrywide denies all allegations of wrongdoing and any liability under the federal securities laws,” said Shirley Norton, a spokeswoman for Bank of America. “We agreed to the settlement to avoid the additional expense and uncertainty associated with continued litigation.”

Plaintiffs attorneys have pursed lawsuits against numerous lenders and investment banks in the wake of the housing market’s devastating downturn, and the Countrywide settlement could encourage even more such cases, said Paul Hodgson, a senior research associate at The Corporate Library, an independent corporate governance research firm.

“There are a lot of suits out there waiting to get launched,” Hodgson said. “I think this is the opening of the floodgates.”

Former Countrywide CEO Angelo Mozilo, former President David Sambol, former CFO Eric Sieracki and former board members were named in the litigation but are not contributing to the settlement.

But it does not end their legal problems. More than a year ago the Securities and Exchange Commission brought civil fraud charges against Mozilo and the two other former executives. Mozilo, the most high-profile individual to face charges from the government in the aftermath of the financial crisis, has denied any wrongdoing.

For Countrywide, “This is only a chapter and not the end of the book,” said John Coffee, a securities law professor at Columbia University.

Filed under: CASES, CDO, CORRUPTION, GTC | Honor, HERS, Investor, MODIFICATION, Mortgage, Servicer, bubble, education, evidence, expert witness, foreclosure, foreclosure mill, foreign relations, investment banking, trustee | Tagged: KPMG, countrywide, Bank of America, ALAN ZIBEL, AP, New York pension funds, Joel Bernstein | 3 Comments »

Consumer Law E-mail Groups

NCLC
NATIONAL CONSUMER
LAW CENTER’
Advancing Fairness in the Marketplace for All

Why Join an E-Mail Group?
• They are free; all you need is an e-mail address
• Get instant answers to your questions from experts around the country
• Hear the latest developments, practice ideas, and litigation issues
• Obtain copies of pleadings and other useful documents
• Get into the nitty-gritty of the actual practice of consumer law
• Join a community of like-minded attorneys focused on the same subject area
NCLC and NACA sponsor a number of email groups for those representing consumer interests. These groups are not open to those who represent the industry that is the topic of the group or other adverse parties.
NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER E-MAIL GROUPS
1. Autofraud (Contact: Jon Sheldon) To join: owner-autofraud@lists.nclc.org
This is one of the oldest and most active consumer law e-mail groups with over 350 members, and much email traffic each day. The group focuses on many different issues related to motor vehicles, from financing to sales practices to lemons to repossessions. Like all NCLC e-mail groups, you can perform key-word searches in the archives for past e-mails.
2. Manufactured Homes (Contact: Odette Williamson)
To join: manufacturedhomes-request@lists.nclc.org and CC: owilliamson@nclc.org
If manufactured home cases ever come to your office, this is the e-mail group for you, covering issues of financing, defects, sales, and parks.
3. Student Loans (Contact: Deanne Loonin)
To join: studentloan-request@lists.nclc.org
(dloonin@nclc.org if experiencing technical problems)
This is NCLC’s first group, dating back over 10 years. The discussion covers student loan collections, offsets, vocational schools, and related topics.
4. FCRA – Fair Credit Reporting Act (Contact: Chi Chi Wu)
To join: cwu@nclc.org
A large group of experts exchanging ideas about credit reporting issues.
5. E-payments (Contact: Lauren Saunders) To join: http://lists.nclc.org/subscribe
This is the e-mail group for anyone concerned with the electronic payment of food stamps and other state benefits.
6. UtilityNetwork – Massachusetts (Contact: Charlie Harak)
To join: http://lists.nclc.org/subscribe
Covers issues of utility terminations, energy affordability, payment sources for utility bills, and low-income utility programs FOR MASSACHUSETTS ONLY.
7. EnergyNetwork – National (Contact: Charlie Harak, Olivia Wein, or John Howat)
To join: http://lists.nclc.org/subscribe
Covers issues of utility terminations, energy affordability, telephones, and low-income utility programs. Keep current on policy and programmatic issues.
8. Bankruptcy (Contact: John Rao) To join: http://lists.nclc.org/subscribe
This group is for legal services attorneys and pro bono coordinators and covers many issues relating to representation of low-income consumers in bankruptcy.
9. DC Updates (Contact: Lauren Saunders). To join: http://lists.nclc.org/subscribe
Provides updates on legislative and administrative developments in Washington, including agency comment opportunities and critical moments for legislative input. Open to NACA members and nonprofit consumer advocates (including non-attorneys).
10. California (Contact: Lauren Saunders). To join: http://lists.nclc.org/subscribe
Provides a forum for sharing of information on consumer law activities in California. Open to nonprofit attorneys and to NACA members willing to partner with or mentor nonprofit attorneys.
11. Carchange- Auto Ownership, Finance, and Policy (Contact John Van Alst)
To join: http://lists.nclc.org/subscribe
A new group for advocates seeking to improve the ability of low-income families to get, keep, and use a reliable, affordable car. Includes topics of car finance, sales, and ownership as well as anyone working on broader issues that affect access to transportation for low-income workers and their families (e.g., insurance, driver’s licenses, maintenance, etc.).
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CONSUMER ADVOCATES E-MAIL GROUPS Tlie lists operated by NACA require NACA membership for admission to those lists.
12. Mortgage (Contact: Jeff Dillman) To apply for admission: jdillman@thehousingcenter.org
This NACA group has over 600 members and covers all aspects of protecting a homeowner against foreclosure, from predatory lending to servicer abuses.
13. Class Action (Contact: Steve Gardner) To apply for admission: sgardner@cspinetorg
The place to be if your office handles class actions, if you are interested in co-counseling with other NACA offices experienced in class cases, or if you just want to learn more about the class action remedy.
14. Stop Binding Mandatory Arbitration Campaign (Contact: Cora Ganzglass)
To join: cora@naca.net
This NACA list is to help build awareness and support for state and federal legislation that fights back against binding mandatory arbitration clauses.
15. Statewide Listserves (Contact: Chris Wojcik) To join: chris@naca.net
NACA Statewide listserves exist for NACA members in Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, DC, Florida, Iowa, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, North Carolina, New York, New Jersey, Nevada, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Virginia, Washington state, and Wisconsin. The listserves provide support, share documents and information, call attention to recent developments, and facilitate group action to protect and promote consumer rights.
16. Military Statewide Listserves (Contact: Chris Wojcik) To join: chris@naca.net A special Military NACA list for military attorneys in any state.
17. Doing Well by Doing Good list (Contact: Chris Wojcik) To join: chris@naca.net A listserve open to all NACA members.

CLASS ACTION VIDEO

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YRGr9sGlIpg&feature=player_embedded

Southern California (909)890-9192 in Northern California(925)957-9797

GMAC FORECLOSING ON GM FAMILIES

Posted on August 3, 2010 by Foreclosureblues
GM, GMAC & the US Government… Have You No Shame?
Today, August 03, 2010, 2 hours ago | MandelmanGo to full article

Southern California (909)890-9192 in Northern California(925)957-9797

In 1984, General Motors and Toyota entered into a joint venture, and they called it the NUMMI plant in Freemont California. Up until May of 2010, NUMMI built an average of 6000 vehicles each week, or nearly eight million cars and trucks. GM saw the joint venture as an opportunity to learn about manufacturing from the Japanese company.

Then the financial meltdown of Wall Street came. Bankers constructed bonds that were designed to default, took advantage of holes in the ratings agencies systems, sold them around the world, leveraged themselves 30:1 and more, and profited immensely by betting against them with credit default swaps. It wasn’t the fault of the employees at GM’s NUMMI plant, they had nothing to do with it, but they were about to pay a steeper price than the Wall Street bankers would pay.

GM pulled out of the venture in June 2009, and several months later Toyota announced plans to pull out by March 2010. Roughly 5,000 people, many of whom had worked at the plant for twenty years would lose their jobs, their retirement plans… everything.

At 9:40am on April 1, 2010, the plant produced its last car, a red Toyota Corolla S. Production of Corollas in North America was moved to Canada. It was over.

The faces of the NUMMI plant.

Of course, it wasn’t the first time a GM plant had closed leaving thousands of workers without jobs, far from it. But this time it was different.

The NUMMI plant is in the Central Valley of California, the part of the state with the lowest literacy rates, and a favorite of home builders and Wall Street’s bankers. Billions of dollars were poured into the Central Valley and tens of thousands of homes were built and sold there during the real estate bubble. It would become Ground Zero of the foreclosure crisis.

The workers at the NUMMI plant were quite familiar with GMAC, because the mortgage lender was the only mortgage lender given access to the plant employees to sell them on refinancing their homes. “Put your cars, your credit cards… everything into a GMAC mortgage,” they were told at the numerous seminars held at the plant, “that way you won’t be in debt.”

GMAC actually had a booth inside the NUMMI plant… you could stop by for brochures 24/7 and 365 days a year. GMAC’s salespeople were on site at least two to three times a month to sell mortgages to plant workers. “GM employees pay no fees and no points with GMAC loans,” the workers were sold… I mean told. Everyone took out GMAC loans, it was like GMAC’s own personal gold mine.

Joe Phillippi, principal of AutoTrends, a consulting firm in Short Hills, N.J. said: “The thing that brought down GMAC was its sub-prime mortgage business.” GMAC lost $16.5 billion in its mortgage business from 2007 to 2009.

According to Bloomberg… GMAC Chief Executive Officer (for a month and a half of last year), and former Citibank executive, Michael Carpenter, was paid $1.2 million plus restricted stock options. He replaced former CEO Alvaro de Molina in mid-November of 2009, who received a $3.7 million salary.

But that’s not all… not even close. GMAC paid Chief Risk Officer Sam Ramsey $7.7 million, $5.7 million to Tom Marano, CEO of mortgage unit Residential Capital LLC. $4.9 million to finance chief Robert Hull, and Chief Marketing Officer Sanjay Gupta received about $4 million.

GMAC lost money in nine of the past 10 quarters. The company hasn’t reported earning a profit since the final quarter of 2008. The company posted a record $3.9 billion loss in the fourth quarter of 2009, and lost $10.3 billion for the year.

The Congressional Oversight Panel, in March of 2010 said that despite three separate bailouts of GMAC totaling $17.3 billion, GMAC Financial Services “continues to struggle with its troubled mortgage liabilities.”

The U.S. government now owns 56.3 percent of GMAC, which serves as the primary source of dealer and car buyer financing for GM and Chrysler. The Obama administration currently estimates that taxpayer losses on the GMAC bailout may be at least $6.3 billion.

The Congressional Oversight Panel said that bankruptcy, and merging GMAC back into GM, could have put GMAC on a sounder footing. Instead, the panel said, Treasury treated GMAC more like large banks such as Citigroup and Bank of America.

I just spent hours getting to know a couple that worked at the NUMMI plant for roughly twenty years. I don’t want to release their real name, so maybe we should just call them “THE DIRT FAMILY,” because that’s exactly how they’ve been treated by GMAC as they tried to apply for a loan modification.

They began their application for a loan modification in July 2009, they were current and had excellent credit… something in the FICO 750 range.

So, first they were told they had to be delinquent. Then, when they went delinquent, they were declined because the husband was told that he made enough to make the mortgage payment. They applied again… and were declined because he was told that he didn’t make enough to qualify for the loan modification.

Are we having fun yet?

They turned to Bruce Marks’ traveling tent show of an non-profit organization, NACA, for help. NACA said they’d put them at the front of the line, but months went by and nothing from NACA. A sale date was set and NACA told the DIRTS they would have to file bankruptcy to stop the sale, so they did, but within days GMAC filed for the removal of the stay, although no new sale date was scheduled.

NACA wanted to wait until MR. DIRT actually lost his job, saying that this would make obtaining the modification easier. GMAC sent a letter to the DIRT’S bankruptcy attorney saying that they couldn’t negotiate unless the lawyer signed a letter saying it was okay to speak directly with the DIRTS. Apparently GMAC was aware of California Civil Code 2923.5, which says the bank must engage in meaningful discussions with a homeowner about alternatives to foreclosure before they foreclose.

The bankruptcy lawyer signed the letter. GAMC never contacted the DIRTS to talk about anything. GMAC won’t tell them if there’s another sale date set. GAMC says they never got anything from NACA.

Next thing they hear is that they’re house is being auctioned in a matter of days. They hire a law firm to try to stop the sale. The DIRTS and their new law firm ask GMAC who is the owner of their loan. GMAC says its GMAC. As it turns out it’s Fannie Mae.

GMAC won’t postpone the sale. Why? Not enough time. GMAC says the DIRT’S waited until the last minute… they procrastinated… they’re procrastinators, shame on them.

He worked 21 years at the NUMMI plant. Four more years and he would have earned his retirement pension. She worked at the plant until she was injured on the job… GM’s work comp doctor said the pain was all in her head… until she needed multiple back and shoulder surgeries… didn’t sue GM because he was going to make supervisor. They raised three children. Next year will be twenty years of a loving marriage. Hard work, but his life was in that plant… until it wasn’t.

And GMAC sold their home. They couldn’t wait. Apparently the Central Valley needs another empty foreclosed home. Here’s the letter they found on their door the next day. It was from Steve Ewing of Keller Williams Realty in the Central Valley of California:

Steve Ewing
Keller Williams Realty
2291 West March Lane, Suite D-210
Stockton, CA 95207
THE NINES TEAM AT KELLER WILLIAMS, CENTRAL VALLEY

We all need a little help in difficult times…

We have been hired by the new owners of this property to bring it to market as quickly as possible. This bank owned property must be sold VACANT.

It is possible that we may be able to provide some financial help for your immediate move.

TIME IS NOT ON YOUR SIDE, PLEASE DON’T MISS THIS OPPORTUNITY!!

PLEASE CONTACT STEVE EWING
PHONE: 209-625-8231 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting              209-625-8231      end_of_the_skype_highlighting
FAX: 866-790-8285
EMAIL: STEVE@THENINESTEAM.NET

ALL OF OUR CONVERSATIONS ARE CONFIDENTIAL

Are they, Steve? You scavenger piece of crap. Are all of your conversations confidential? Just between us girls, is that what you were thinking would be the case? Well, surprise, Steve-O, because I hate secrets. And it’s no secret that you are an inconceivably inconsiderate and insensitive jackass who doesn’t deserve to stand within a hundred yards of anyone in this family.

Do you even know what a real day’s work is Steverino? Because the father in this family definitely does, while you… you puny pompous paper pusher in search of his next commission… obviously doesn’t. How dare you leave a letter like that on their door, and then weasel away in your Mercedes, or whatever kind of import car I’m betting you scamper around in. Did you even know there was a GM plant near by? Did you ever stop to care about the people that worked hard there… that gave their lives there?

No, Mr. Earwhig, I’m telling you that you didn’t care then, and you care even less now. These are people in your community that need your help… your empathy… your understanding… not your asinine “time is not on your side” threatening notes.

So, I have a suggestion for you and Keller Williams… leave this family alone. Don’t go knocking on their door… in fact, don’t bother them at all. They’ve already been inconceivably and undeservedly been treated like DIRT by GM, GMAC and my federal government, they certainly don’t need to concern themselves with the likes of you.

Besides, they’re filing a lawsuit asap, so don’t plan on selling that house anytime soon anyway.

And GMAC… I have only just begun to uncover what unethical, incompetent, money-grubbing, greedy predatory pigs you guys are. You haven’t heard anywhere near the last of me… no you haven’t… I’m just warming up, as far as you’re concerned.

Now you want to be known as “Ally Bank?” Because you actually think that’s how we’re going to think of you? Like our “ally”? Well, bang up job so far, you ally you. With allies like you, who needs the axis?

Now… GMAC, GM, and the Obama Administration… you have a responsibility to these people whose lives you’ve so carelessly thrown by the wayside. These are people that built 8 million cars and trucks in and for this country, so the way I see it, they are responsible for creating a whole lot more jobs in this country than this or any administration has, I’ll say that for sure. So, Mr. President, its time to do the right thing.
GMAC has to act human here. Taxpayers bailed them out to the tune of $17.3 billion. And for what? Was GMAC was too PIG to fail?
LIKE A ROCK, RIGHT?
Well, you’re going to just LOVE this!

Here’s GMAC Corp. contact information, which is found on their Website here:
https://www.gmacmortgage.com/About_Us/Company_Info/OperatingCenters.html
It shows the following under “About Us” and Company Info:
GMAC Mortgage Corporate Headquarters
1100 Virginia Drive
Fort Washington, PA 19034
(215) 734-8899

SEE WHAT HAPPENS WHEN YOU CALL THE NUMBER… COME ON… IT’S REALLY WORTH IT, I SWEAR IT IS. GRAB YOUR CELL RIGHT NOW AND CALL THE CORPORATE NUMBER FOR GMAC AFTER WE TAXPAYERS PUT $17.3 BILLION INTO IT. IT ONLY TAKES A MINUTE…
LIKE A ROCK! SING IT WITH ME… LIKE A ROCK!

Now, here’s a song performed by one of the unemployed workers from NUMMI:

Mandelman OUT!
Southern California (909)890-9192 in Northern California(925)957-9797

MERS to big to punish

The issue before the court boils down to whether MERS qualifies for certain exemptions from corporate tax registration required under section 23305 of the California Revenue and Tax Code. If it does not qualify for exemption, then MERS’ contracts are voidable under White Dragon Productions, Inc. vs. Performance Guarantees, Inc. (1987)
196 Cal.App.3d 163, and MERS may not appear to defend itself in this matter. (While Defendant presents a contrary 9th circuit decision on the issue of voidability of contract, the doctrine of stare decisis prevents the court from choosing to elect to follow that advisory opinion over California’s own precedent. Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 450 (1962). In Auto Equity Sales, the Court explained:
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, all tribunals exercising inferior jurisdiction are required to follow decisions of courts exercising superior jurisdiction. Otherwise, the doctrine of stare decisis makes no sense. The decisions of this court are binding upon and must be followed by all the state courts of California. Decisions of every division of the District Courts of Appeal are binding upon all the justice and municipal courts and upon all the superior courts of this state, and this is so whether or not the superior court is acting as a trial or appellate court. Courts exercising inferior jurisdiction must accept the law declared by courts of superior jurisdiction. It is not their function to attempt to overrule decisions of a higher court.” Therefore, White Dragon controls.)

With regard to the matter instantly before the court, MERS’ claimed exemptions are laid out at Corporations Code sections 191(c)(7) and 191(d)(3). Each of these statutory provisions provides narrow grounds for a foreign corporation to gain exemption from registration with our Secretary of State and payment of taxes so long as that corporation meets certain requirements and only conducts certain limited activities.
To rule on the question of MERS’ exemption under Corp. Code section 191(c)(7), the court must make three determinations: first, the court must make a legal determination as to the meaning of the language “creating evidences” in the statute; second and third, the court must make factual determinations to what activities MERS has been alleged in the FAC to have been conducting, and whether those activities are “creating evidences” and thereby exempted.
To answer the question of MERS’ exemption under Corp. Code section 191(d)(3), the court need make only two factual determinations, which are: is MERS a foreign lending institution, and if so, does it own the instant note, or any note in any of the thousands of MERS foreclosures in this state?
Finally, the court must decide whether, under either section, the operation of a database, selling memberships, and providing access to a database constitute exempted activities, and whether the acting as an agent of an exempt institution extends the exemption to MERS?

II. ARGUMENT
A. MERS DOES NOT QUALIFY FOR EXEMPTION UNDER CORPORATIONS
CODE SECTION 191(c)(7) BECAUSE 1) THE RULES OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION FORBID RENDERING SUBSECTION (d)(3) TO BE DEAD
LETTER; 2) ALL OF MERS’ ACTIVITIES GO BEYOND THE PLAIN MEANING
OF THE TERM, AND 3) NONE OF MERS’ ACTIVITIES COMPRISE THE PLAIN
MEANING OF THE TERM.
1. A Finding That MERS’ Foreclosure Activities Constitute Merely “Creating Evidences” Of Mortgages Would Render Subsection (d)(3) Dead Letter.

California Corporations Code section 191 (c)(7) provides an exemption to tax registration for foreign corporations engaged in “[c]reating evidences of debt or mortgages, liens or security interests on real or personal property.” Id. The statute does not expressly define “creating evidences,” and so the court is called upon to apply the rules of statutory construction to interpret the code prior to applying it. This is a matter of first impression, as there is no California precedent on this issue. (However, both parties have submitted federal court opinions on both sides of the issue).

California courts do not favor constructions of statutes that render them advisory only, or a dead letter. Petropoulos v. Department of Real Estate (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 554, 567; People v. Stringham (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 184, 197. Because Corp Code section 191(d)(7) expressly reserves the activities of assigning mortgages, conducting foreclosures, and substituting trustees for foreign lending institutions, these activities must, by definition, go beyond what is intended by “creating evidences” of transactions, or else, the gateway consideration of being a foreign lending institution required at section 191(d) would be dead letter, because such activities would already apply to ALL foreign corporations, who are exempted at (c)(7) for “creating evidences.” If the legislature included these foreclosurerelated activities in a new subsection expressly reserved for a certain type of foreign entity, then it clearly did not intend for them to be included by the term “creating evidences” which is provided to all foreign corporations.

2. All of MERS’ Activities Go Beyond The Plain Meaning Of The Term “Creating Evidences.”
Because there is no express definition of “creating evidences” provided in the Corporations Code, this phrase should be given its common meaning. “Creation” is defined by Mirriam Webster’s Dictionary as “the act of making, inventing or producing.”
“Evidence” is defined by the California Code of Evidence as “testimony, writings, material objects, or other things presented to the senses that are offered to prove the existence or nonexistence of a fact.” Evidence Code 140.
The evidences referred to in Corp. Code section 191(c)(7) are “of debt or mortgages, liens or security interest on real or personal property.”

Hence, when the words are taken together, the statute exempts: “making, inventing, or producing testimony, writings, material objects, or other things presented to the senses that are offered to prove the existence or nonexistence of debt or mortgages, liens or security interest on real or personal property.”

MERS’s California activities go far beyond these activities. In contrast to MERS, a foreign corporation who might qualify for exemption for “making, inventing, or producing testimony, writings, material objects, or other things presented to the senses that are offered to prove the existence or nonexistence of debt, mortgages, liens or security interest on real or personal property” is Socrates Legal Media, LLC, 227 West Monroe Suite 500 Chicago, IL 60606.

The business of Socrates Legal Media includes selling pre-packaged contract forms at Office Depot for people who conduct routine real estate transactions, such as taking liens on real property to secure debts. If a dispute arose between two parties to such an agreement within our state, and Socrates was brought in by the Plaintiff and alleged as being an unregistered foreign corporation who does not to have capacity to defend, Socrates could point out that it merely CREATES EVIDENCES of transactions, and seek exemption from the registration requirement to defend itself in the case. MERS, on the other hand, does not merely provide forms for agreements, or “create evidences” of them; MERS participates in California transactions.

Therefore, MERS’ activities go beyond what “creating evidences” could possibly mean. However, the trouble with MERS’s argument does not end with that.

3. None of MERS’ Activities Meet The Definition of “Creating Evidences.”

The real trouble with MERS’ argument is that it clearly did not even create these evidences to begin with, nor does it claim to. To wit, the evidences of debt, liens on property, or mortgages at issue in this case – the Note and the Deed of Trust – are “made, invented, and produced” respectively by the Lender and by federal government bodies known as “Fannie Mae” (short for the Federal National Mortgage Agency) and “Freddie Mac” (short for the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation).

The court may take judicial notice of the fact that these uniform instruments, used more commonly than any other to evidence the fact of a real estate mortgage transaction in our state, may be downloaded at http://www.freddiemac.com/uniform/. The mortgages at issue in this and every other MERS related case are not MERS’ forms. MERS did not “create” these “evidences.”

Rather, MERS’ involvement in the transaction was wholly participatory. MERS was named beneficiary on the deeds of trust. MERS participated in the foreclosure activities, though it was never entitled to collect a single penny under the notes. Characteristically, MERS only participated in the transaction for the sole purpose of avoiding paying California taxes. See: MERS’ admission in MERS v. Nebraska, that its purpose for being a phantom beneficiary on these deeds of trust is to avoid state real property transfer taxes at Plaintiff’s RJN in Support of Supplemental Briefing Exh. A (For the Nebraska Supreme Court’s finding that ” Mortgage lenders hire MERS to act as their nominee for mortgages, which allows the lenders to trade the mortgage note and servicing rights on the market without recording subsequent trades with the various register of deeds throughout Nebraska.”). See also: the admission of Bill Hultman at Plaintiffs RJN in Support of Supplemental Briefing Exh. B at Paragraph 8 (for MERS’ admission that “MERS is not a party to or obligee under the terms of the Promissory Note, and MERS does not appear on the Promissory Note.”).

Nor was the execution of the documents at closing MERS’ doing; that was conducted at a title company or by mobile notary. MERS does not claim that any person from MERS was present at a single mortgage closing in this state. Nor does MERS claim that any agent or representative of MERS even so much as signed the Fannie/Freddie uniform instruments.

The record in this case clearly establishes that only the Plaintiffs signed the Deed of Trust. Therefore, MERS’ activities do not render it exempt from tax registration under Corp Code 191(c)(7) because its activities go beyond “creating evidences” and do not include “creating evidences” in the first instance.

B. MERS DOES NOT QUALIFY UNDER SECTION 191(d)(3) BECAUSE IT IS NOT
A FOREIGN LENDING INSTITUTION AND BECAUSE IT DOES NOT OWN THE
NOTE.

1. As a Gateway Consideration, The Court Must Find That MERS Is A Foreign Lending Institution (Or Wholly Owned By One) to Qualify for ANY of the Exemptions at Corp. Code Section 191(d).

Under Corporations Code Section 191(d)(3), MERS must both 1) be the right type of entity (the gateway consideration to the exemptions), and 2) own the note to qualify for exemption.

Corporations Code Section 191(d) provides exemption solely for any:
“…foreign lending institution, including, but not limited to: any foreign banking corporation, any foreign corporation all of the capital stock of which is owned by one or more foreign banking corporations, any foreign savings and loan association, any foreign insurance company or any foreign corporation or association authorized by its charter to invest in loans secured by real and personal property, whether organized under the laws of the United States or of any other state, district or territory of the United States, shall not be considered to be doing, transacting or engaging in business in this state solely by reason of engaging in any or all of the following activities either on its own behalf or as a trustee of a pension plan, employee profit sharing or retirement plan, testamentary or inter vivos trust, or in any other fiduciary capacity…”

Firstly, MERS does not argue that it is a foreign lending institution in this case. In its Demurrer, Reply, oral argument, or anywhere on this record, there is NO factual averment that MERS is a foreign lending institution or wholly owned by one, or is an investor in mortgage notes.

Secondly, MERS has not submitted any evidence which would support such a finding.

Thirdly, in MERS v. Nebraska, MERS judicially admitted to the Supreme Court of Nebraska that it has never lent a dollar in any state, and is also not the holder of the note on any of its Deeds of Trust. Plaintiff’s Supplemental RJN Exh. A. In that case, MERS appealed a finding of the trial court that MERS was a foreign banking institution and therefore had to register as one in Nebraska. While the legal issue in the instant case is distinguishable, the factual problem before the court is identical to that case: is MERS a bank?.
Whereas there, MERS did everything it could to prove it was NOT a foreign lending institution, here MERS attempts the opposite. Where in Nebraska, MERS sought to avoid registration as a financial institution by swearing to God that it does not ever own the note, here MERS seeks to avail itself of an exemption reserved for foreign lending institutions, asserting the bald-faced conclusion that it should not have to register as a foreign corporation and pay California state taxes under a statute which clearly requires both status as a financial institution, AND ownership of the note, which it also disclaims.

B. MERS DOES NOT OWN THE NOTES AS REQUIRED BY 191(d)(3).

At Corporations Code Section 191(d)(3) the legislature expressly states MERS’claimed exemption:

“The ownership of any loans and the enforcement of any loans by trustee’s sale, judicial process or deed in lieu of foreclosure or otherwise.” Id. [Emphasis Added].

Corp. Code section 191(d)(3) is written in the conjunctive: “own and enforce.” MERS’ averments to its ability to participate in trustee sales without registration by way of this statute is therefore patently unfounded.

There is no averment in this case that MERS owns the note. In fact, by judicial admission, there is the opposite: MERS submits in its own joint Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Demurrer, an Assignment of the Deed of Trust to Wells Fargo. Consistent with MERS’ practice of hiding the true noteholder from the borrower to facilitate foreclosure fraud, the transfer to Wells Fargo suggests that it was Wells Fargo who had been the holder of the note entitled to enforce the Deed of Trust all along, never MERS.

C. MERS ACTIVITIES GO BEYOND THE SCOPE OF BOTH STATUTES; EVEN
IF MERS WERE EXEMPT UNDER EITHER STATUTE, ITS ACTIVITIES
INCLUDING OPERATING A MEMBERSHIP DATABASE GO BEYOND THE
SCOPE OF ANY OF THE ACTIVITIES INCLUDED IN EITHER EXEMPTION.

1. MERS’ Foreclosure Agent Activities Are Not Exempt Under Either Statute at Issue.

In reality, MERS operates as more of an agent than as a beneficiary on any given Deed of Trust (using the dubious title “nominee”). In support, MERS claims that Civil Code section 2924 allows “agents” to begin the non-judicial foreclosure process in California, and therefore, its agency activities should enjoy exemption from taxation. This is a non-sequitur.

The statutory exemption provided at Corp. Code section 191(d)(3) does not extend to companies in the business of “acting as foreclosure agents,” nor is any such interpretation of the statute even possible. While the Civil Code does allow agents to perform certain foreclosure functions, such allowance has no impact on the operation of the Tax Code.

MERS’ exemption argument leaps from one unfounded conclusion to the next. Nowhere in either statute does it aver that agents of the true noteholders are subject to the same exemptions simply by reason of agents being allowed to act on behalf of the noteholder.

Finally, and perhaps most telling, if you “follow the money” the distinction is clear: MERS profits by posing as the beneficiary to the deed of trust and generating foreclosure paperwork; a foreign lending institution profits by lending, and, when that doesn’t work out, by selling its security to collect on an unpaid debt. The business activities, or “profit generating activities”, of MERS are quite distinct from those of its principals, and there is no indication in any of the statutes that the legislature intended for the two to be interchangeable.

2. MERS’ Database Maintenance and Subscription Activities Are Not Exempt.

In their FAC, the Plaintiffs allege a set of activities which is neither included nor discussed above or by MERS at all in any of its arguments in favor of exemption: MERS operates a subscription-based information database for profit within the state of California.
MERS sells memberships to the database, provides access to records, and charges its customers accordingly. Similar to Westlaw, LexisNexis, or any other database provider, this activity is no more “creation of” the information contained therein, than is Westlaw the Creator of judicial opinion in any jurisdiction in this state or country.

Thus, regardless of the applicability to either claimed exemption to MERS’ other activities, MERS’ subscription-based activities exceed what the legislature intended a foreign corporation to do in this state without paying taxes to support the courts, schools, infrastructure, and other benefits of which it avails itself.

Therefore, MERS does not qualify for exemption from Revenue and Tax Code 23305 by way of either Corporations Code section 191(c)(7) or section 191(d)(3).

D. PUBLIC POLICY WEIGHS IN FAVOR OF MAKING MERS PAY ITS TAXES.

There is an argument that because MERS has embroiled itself in so many California mortgages, that it would be detrimental to industry to enforce our laws against it. However, because of the fact that the potential detriment to MERS pales in comparison to the impact MERS has had on this state, and will continue to have if allowed to be above our law, it would not be sound judicial policy to disregard the laws of California solely because of the sheer volume in which the defendant has violated them. It should be the opposite.

To enforce compliance with California’s tax code against MERS would not be any detriment to the mortgage industry, because the mortgage industry has already profited far beyond what was legal or fair in the first place due to these unlawful activities, as has MERS. To now disregard that those monies were ill-gotten based on the idea that it was just so much money that we’ll hurt the industry, truly, is to incentivize wholesale violation of California laws, as long as the issue stays under the radar long enough for the wrongful
conduct to become “too big to punish.”

Indeed, the mortgage industry has already received $700 billion in TARP funds, which came from taxpayer dollars, MERS itself as saved hundreds of millions of tax dollars by refusing to register in this state, and MERS’ customers have saved hundreds of millions by abusing the recording system and the unsupervised nonjudicial foreclosure statute.

It should be noted that secondary market mortgage holders have a remedy to all this: judicial foreclosure. The California codes are not set up without some recourse for those who are RIGHTFULLY owed a debt and RIGHTFULLY entitled to collect on it. Indeed, judicial foreclosure is the due process right of every California citizen whose mortgagee is not entitled to foreclose under Civil Code section 2924. (While Civil Code 2924 was not found to be a violation of due process by the California Supreme Court, a judicial seal of approval on abuse of that statute by those without any right title or interest most certainly is.)

On the flip side of this coin is the already felt crushing impact of these activities on the state of California. The courts are closed the third Wednesday of every month, and clerk staff has been cut to the bones. Public schools and universities are cutting both staff and course options as well as increasing tuition. The roads and bridges are in disrepair. Record foreclosures have caused record joblessness and record inflation. And meanwhile, MERS’ participation in the subprime securitized mortgage scheme was essential to the volume of bad loans being made, to the alacrity with which Wall Street was jamming these pools down our throats, and to the vigor with which mortgage brokers working for yield spread premiums were cold calling and loan flipping.

Clearly MERS was and is conducting business in this state, without paying a dollar on its own tax-free profits, and while aiding its customers in the avoidance of essential property transfer taxes. Its activities not only cost the state in the sheer loss of income, but also in the expense that will go into correcting thousands of real property records which have been deranged by MERS’ wholesale disregard for California law.

CLASS ACTION FILED AGAINST STERN, MERS


Posted on July 28, 2010 by Neil Garfield

Entered on the Court docket of the Southern District of Florida, a class action for damages has been filed against MERS, the Stern Law Firm and David Stern individually.The lawsuit alleges racketeering under the RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1962 and 1964) statute, alleging that MERS was created “in order to undermine and eventually eviscerate long-standing principles of real property law…”. It also cites the “lost note” syndrome we are all so familiar with by now.

The lawsuit filed by Kenneth Eric Trent, Esq. in Fort Lauderdale, Florida reads like a mystery novel. He probably has an incorrect chronology of a few details of the actual way securitization played out, but on the whole, the complaint is worth a read and he should get all the help you can give him. He includes actual testimony in the complaint taken from other cases in addition to a very well-written narrative. Here is one quote I liked —

“Unbeknownst to the borrowers and the public, the billions of dollars spent to fund these loans were expended to “prime the pump.” The big institutions and the conspirators were making an investment, but the expected return was NOT the interest they pretended to anticipate receiving as borrowers paid the mortgages. The lenders knew that the new loans were “bad paper;” this was of little concern to them because they intended to realize profits so great as to render such interest, even if it had been received, negligible by comparison. Part of the reason this fraudulent scheme has gone largely unnoticed for such an extended period of time is that its sophistication is beyond the imagination of average persons. Similarly beyond the imagination of most persons is and was the scope of the DISHONESTY of the lenders and those acting in furtherance of the scheme, including the present Defendants.”

Gretchen “Gets It” but misses the mark

Posted on July 25, 2010 by Neil Garfield

It’s no secret that I admire Gretchen Morgenson of the New York Times. Her articles have penetrated deeper and deeper into the realities and logistics of the Great Financial Meltdown. But she continues to drag myth alongside of reality. True, it is difficult to get your mind around the idea that Wall Street managers WANTED bad mortgages, but that simple piece of truth is unavoidable. In the article below she draws ever nearer to this truth, saying that the real question is “what did they know and when did they know it?”
She even spots the extremely important fact that the worse the loan the more money was made by Wall Street. My objection is why not ask the next obvious question, to wit: “If Wall Street’s profits went up as the quality of mortgages went down, isn’t the obvious incentive to create increasingly bad paper?” And in what world has Wall Street ever done anything to diminish profits on moral grounds?
But her spotting is defective. She sees a 5 point spread (Yield Spread Premium) between what was paid for the loans and the price charged to investors. She correctly points out that the most Wall Street usually gets on trades like this is around 2 points. But think about it. Could such a small spread actually account for the ensuing mayhem that resulted?
What she fails to point out is the actual logistics. Investors, and for that matter, even the rating agencies, were never given the actual loans to look at and kick the tires. They were given descriptions of the loans which were incorporated into a narrative that portrayed the loans in a much better light than anything a loan underwriter would agree with. The final description of the loans was so loaded with misrepresentations that even a small amount of due diligence would have revealed major discrepancies that would have stopped this money machine from operating, for good.
Gretchen’s error is reflected in most articles by journalists and government officials. They all miss a major part of the transaction. Do the math. How could a five point spread account for the actual 8-10 point spread that was used to massage the description of the pool? There is a whole other SIV transaction that everyone is ignoring. The size of it will astonish you.

If for the purpose of one extreme example we isolate a single loan transaction, you can see how it works.
John Smith, an unemployed, homeless migrant worker with a gross income of $500 per month is pulled off the street by a “loan adviser.” The salesman gets John to sign a bunch of papers and tells him to go move into a $500,000 house. The interest rate on the loan is 18%, which is $90,000 per year. John doesn’t have to pay anything for the first 3 months and then only $100 per month for the first year, when he must pay a higher amount, still not as much as the monthly interest of $7,500 per month, let alone amortization, taxes, and insurance.
Now go to the investor who has been promised, for this example 9% annual return. The investor gives the investment banker $1,000,000 dollars believing that the investment banker is taking a 2% fee ($20,000). In other words, the investor is expecting $980,000 of his money to be invested. But that is NOT what happened — not ever, in ANY example. The investor, expecting a 9% annual return on his $1 million is therefore expecting $90,000 per year in income.
So in our over-simplified example the investment banker goes to the mortgage aggregator, and says give me the crappiest mortgage you have that says the interest is $90,000 per year. The aggregator (Countrywide, for example) sells the John Smith Mortgage to a structured investment vehicle off-shore for $500,000. The SIV sells the John Smith Mortgage to another entity (Seller) created by the investment bank for $980,000. The Seller sells the John Smith Mortgage to an “investment pool” for $1 million.
Watch Carefully! What just happened is that the John Smith mortgage was created that would never be paid. The interest rate on that mortgage was 18% and the principal was $500,000. So the annual interest to be paid by borrower was $90,000. The investor gave $1 million to the investment banker and thus “bought” the $90,000 in “income” from John Smith.
The surface transaction that Gretchen and others are looking at is that last transaction where the investment banker appears to pick up a few points as a fee. The underlying transaction, the substance of the real deal, is that the investment banker took $1 million from the investor and funded a $500,000 mortgage, thus creating a yield spread premium total of $500,000. In other words, the investment banker, in our oversimplified example, made a profit EQUAL TO THE MORTGAGE PRINCIPAL.
Not all the borrowers were John Smith. They ranged from him to people with the ability to pay anything. But the Mary Jones Mortgage where she had a credit score of 815 and assets of over $10 million was a key ingredient to this fraud. May Jones Mortgage was put in the top level of the “pool.” She was the gold plating covering dog poop underneath.
The identity of Mary Jones and her credit score HAD to be there, HAD to be used without her permission in order to sell the John Smith Mortgage. I think that is called identity theft. I think it was interstate commerce and I think it was a pattern of conduct. I think that is racketeering, breach of the the Truth in Lending Act and Securities Fraud, based upon appraisal (ratings) fraud at both ends (borrower and investor) of the transaction.
And let’s not forget that all these sales and transfers were undocumented. The only thing that moved was the money. And of course there are all those third party insurance and bailout payments that were never credited to the investor or the borrower. The investment banker kept those too.
——————————————————————————————–
July 24, 2010
Seeing vs. Doing
By GRETCHEN MORGENSON

“WHAT did they know, and when did they know it?” Those are questions investigators invariably ask when trying to determine who’s responsible for an offense or a misdeed.

But for the Wall Street banks whose financing of the subprime mortgage machine placed them at the center of the credit crisis, it’s becoming clear that a third, equally important question must be asked: “What did they do once they knew what they knew?”

As investigators delve deeper into the mortgage mess, they are finding in too many cases that Wall Street firms did nothing when they learned about problem loans or improprieties in lending. Rather than stopping practices of profligate originators like New Century, Fremont and Ameriquest, Wall Street financiers, which held the purse strings for these companies, apparently decided to simply look the other way.

Recent cases have provided glimpses of this conduct. Last week, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority accused Deutsche Bank Securities, a unit of the huge German bank, of misleading investors about how many delinquent loans went into six mortgage securities worth $2.2 billion that the firm underwrote. Deutsche Bank underreported the delinquency rates among loans when it created the securities in 2006, Finra contends, and then sold them to investors.

Deutsche Bank also understated historical delinquency rates in 16 subprime securities it packaged in 2007, Finra said. Even after it discovered the errors, the authority added, Deutsche Bank continued to report the misstated figures on its Web site, where investors checked the performance of past mortgage pools.

Deutsche Bank settled without admitting or denying the allegations; it paid $7.5 million. The firm said Friday that it had cooperated and was pleased to have the matter behind it.

James S. Shorris, acting chief of enforcement at Finra, said that this was just the first of such cases and that he oversees a team of more than a dozen people investigating firms involved in mortgage securities.

While the Finra case showed Deutsche Bank failing to report problem loans in its securities, investigators in other matters are learning that some firms used information about lending misconduct to increase their profits from the securitization game — without telling investors, of course.

Here is what investigators have learned, according to two people briefed on the inquiries who spoke anonymously because they were not authorized to discuss them publicly. The large banks that provided money to mortgage originators during the mania hired outside analytics firms to conduct due diligence on the loans that Wall Street bought, bundled into securities and sold to investors.

These analysts looked for loans that failed to meet underwriting standards. Among the flagged loans were those in which appraisals seemed fishy or the mortgages went to borrowers with credit scores far below acceptable levels. Loans on vacation properties erroneously identified as primary residences were also highlighted.

The analysts would take their findings back to the Wall Street firms packaging the securities; the reports were not made available to investors.

In 2006-07, amid the mortgage craze, more loans didn’t meet the criteria. But instead of requiring lenders to replace these funky mortgages with proper loans, Wall Street firms kept funneling the junk into securities and selling them to investors, investigators have found.

Cases brought against Wall Street firms by Martha Coakley, attorney general of Massachusetts, have brought some of these practices to light. “Our focus has been on the borrower,” she said in an interview last week, “but as we’ve peeled back the onion we’ve gotten the picture of the role Wall Street played through the financing of these loans.”

But some on Wall Street went further than simply peddling loans they knew were bad, according to the people briefed on some investigators’ findings. They say the firms used these so-called scratch-and-dent loans to increase their profits in the securitization process.

When due-diligence reports turned up large numbers of defective loans — known as exceptions — the banks used this information to negotiate a lower price on the mortgages they bought from the original lenders.

So, instead of paying 99 cents on the dollar for the problem loans, the firm would force the lender to accept 97 cents or perhaps less. But the firm would still sell the mortgage pool to investors at 102 cents or higher, as was typical on high-quality loan pools.

Wall Street enjoyed the profits these practices generated. And because lenders were financed by the Wall Street firms bundling the mortgages into securities, they were hesitant to reject too many dubious loans because doing so would slow the securitization machine.

FOR their part, Wall Street loan packagers were loath to imperil their relationship with lenders like New Century; as long as Wall Street’s lucrative mortgage factories were humming, it needed loans to stoke them. Forcing New Century to eat its bad loans might prompt it to take its business elsewhere.

The bottom line: the more problematic the loans, the better the bargaining power and the higher the profits for Wall Street.

To be sure, the securities’ offering statements noted, in legalese, that the deals might contain “underwriting exceptions” and those exceptions could be “material.” But as investigators get closer to understanding how Wall Street used these exceptions to jack up its earnings, that disclosure defense may ring hollow.

Filed under:

Securitized Mortgage: A Basic Roadmap

The Parties and Their Roles

The first issue in reviewing a structured residential mortgage transaction is to differentiate between a private-label deal and an “Agency” (or “GSE”) deal. An Agency (or GSE) deal is one involving Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or Ginnie Mae, the three Government Sponsored Enterprises (also known as the GSEs). This paper will review the parties, documents, and laws involved in a typical private-label securitization. We also address frequently-occurring practical considerations for counsel dealing with securitized mortgage loans that are applicable across-the-board to mortgages into both private-label and Agency securitizations.

The parties, in the order of their appearance are:

Originator. The “originator” is the lender that provided the funds to the borrower at the loan closing or close of escrow. Usually the originator is the lender named as “Lender” in the mortgage Note. Many originators securitize loans; many do not. The decision not to securitize loans may be due to lack of access to Wall Street capital markets, or this may simply reflect a business decision not to run the risks associated with future performance that necessarily go with sponsoring a securitization, or the originator obtains better return through another loan disposition strategy such as whole loan sales for cash.

Warehouse Lender. The Originator probably borrowed the funds on a line of credit from a short-term revolving warehouse credit facility (commonly referred to as a “warehouse lender”); nevertheless the money used to close the loan were technically and legally the Originator’s funds. Warehouse lenders are either “wet” funders or “dry” funders. A wet funder will advance the funds to close the loan upon the receipt of an electronic request from the originator. A dry funder, on the other hand, will not advance funds until it actually receives the original loan documents duly executed by the borrower.

Responsible Party. Sometimes you may see another intermediate entity called a “Responsible Party,” often a sister company to the lender. Loans appear to be transferred to this entity, typically named XXX Asset Corporation.

Sponsor. The Sponsor is the lender that securitizes the pool of mortgage loans. This means that it was the final aggregator of the loan pool and then sold the loans directly to the Depositor, which it turn sold them to the securitization Trust. In order to obtain the desired ratings from the ratings agencies such as Moody’s, Fitch and S&P, the Sponsor normally is required to retain some exposure to the future value and performance of the loans in the form of purchase of the most deeply subordinated classes of the securities issued by the Trust, i.e. the classes last in line for distributions and first in line to absorb losses (commonly referred to as the “first loss pieces” of the deal).

Depositor. The Depositor exists for the sole purpose of enabling the transaction to have the key elements that make it a securitization in the first place: a “true sale” of the mortgage loans to a “bankruptcy-remote” and “FDIC-remote” purchaser. The Depositor purchases the loans from the Sponsor, sells the loans to the Trustee of the securitization Trust, and uses the proceeds received from the Trust to pay the Sponsor for the Depositor’s own purchase of the loans. It all happens simultaneously, or as nearly so as theoretically possible. The length of time that the Depositor owns the loans has been described as “one nanosecond.”

The Depositor has no other functions, so it needs no more than a handful of employees and officers. Nevertheless, it is essential for the “true sale” and “bankruptcy-remote”/“FDIC-remote” analysis that the Depositor maintains its own corporate existence separate from the Sponsor and the Trust and observes the formalities of this corporate separateness at all times. The “Elephant in the Room” in all structured financial transactions is the mandatory requirement to create at least two “true sales” of the notes and mortgages between the Originator and the Trustee for the Trust so as to make the assets of the Trust both “bankruptcy” and “FDIC” remote from the originator. And, these “true sales” will be documented by representations and attestations signed by the parties; by attorney opinion letters; by asset purchase and sale agreements; by proof of adequate and reasonably equivalent consideration for each purchase; by “true sale” reports from the three major “ratings agencies” (Standard & Poors, Moody’s, and Fitch) and by transfer and delivery receipts for mortgage notes endorsed in blank.

Trustee. The Trustee is the owner of the loans on behalf of the certificate holders at the end of the securitization transaction. Like any trust, the Trustee’s powers, rights, and duties are defined by the terms of the transactional documents that create the trust, and are subject to the terms of the trust laws of some particular state, as specified by the “Governing Law” provisions of the transaction document that created the trust. The vast majority of the residential mortgage backed securitized trusts are subject to the applicable trust laws of Delaware or New York. The “Pooling and Servicing Agreement” (or, in “Owner Trust” transactions as described below, the “Trust Indenture”) is the legal document that creates these common law trusts and the rights and legal authority granted to the Trustee is no greater than the rights and duties specified in this Agreement. The Trustee is paid based on the terms of each structure. For example, the Trustee may be paid out of interest collections at a specified rate based on the outstanding balance of mortgage loans in the securitized pool; the Master Servicer may pay the Trustee out of funds designated for the Master Servicer; the Trustee may receive some on the interest earned on collections invested each month before the investor remittance date; or the Securities Administrator may pay the Trustee out of their fee with no charges assessed against the Trust earnings. Fee amounts ranger for as low as .0025% to as high as .009%.

Indenture Trustee and Owner Trustee. Most private-label securitizations are structured to meet the Internal Revenue Code requirements for tax treatment as a “Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit (“REMIC”). However some securitizations (both private-label and GSE) have a different, non-REMIC structure usually called an “Owner Trust.” In an Owner Trust structure the Trustee roles are divided between an Owner Trustee and an Indenture Trustee. As the names suggest, the Owner Trustee owns the loans; the Indenture Trustee has the responsibility of making sure that all of the funds received by the Trust are properly disbursed to the investors (bond holders) and all other parties who have a financial interest in the securitized structure. These are usually Delaware statutory trusts, in which case the Owner Trustee must be domiciled in Delaware.

Primary Servicer. The Primary Servicer services the loans on behalf of the Trust. Its rights and obligations are defined by a loan servicing contract, usually located in the Pooling and Servicing Agreement in a private-label (non-GSE) deal. The trust may have more than one servicer servicing portions of the total pool, or there may be “Secondary Servicers,” “Default Servicers,” and/or “Sub-Servicers” that service loans in particular categories (e.g., loans in default). Any or all of the Primary, Secondary, or Sub-Servicers may be a division or affiliate of the Sponsor; however under the servicing contract the Servicer is solely responsible to the Trust and the Master Servicer (see next paragraph). The Servicers are the legal entities that do all the day-to-day “heavy lifting” for the Trustee such as sending monthly bills to borrowers, collecting payments, keeping records of payments, liquidating assets for the Trustee, and remitting net payments to the Trustee.

The Servicers are normally paid based on the type of loans in the Trust. For example, a typical annual servicing fee structure may be: .25% annually for a prime mortgage; .375% for an Alt-A or Option ARM; and .5% for a subprime loan. In this example, a subprime loan with an average balance over a given year of $120,000 would generate a servicing fee of $600.00 for that year. The Servicers are normally permitted to retain all “ancillary fees” such as late charges, check by phone fees, and the interest earned from investing all funds on hand in overnight US Treasury certificates (sometimes called “interest earned on the float”).

Master Servicer. The Master Servicer is the Trustee’s representative for assuring that the Servicer(s) abide by the terms of the servicing contracts. For trusts with more than one servicer, the Master Servicer has an important administrative role in consolidating the monthly reports and remittances of funds from the individual servicers into a single data package for the Trustee. If a Servicer fails to perform or goes out of business or suffers a major downgrade in its servicer rating, then the Master Servicer must step in, find a replacement and assure that no interruption of essential servicing functions occurs. Like all servicers, the Master Servicer may be a division or affiliate of the Sponsor but is solely responsible to the Trustee. The Master Servicer receives a fee, small compared to the Primary Servicer’s fee, based on the average balance of all loans in the Trust.

Custodian. The Master Document Custodian takes and maintains physical possession of the original hard-copy Mortgage Notes, Mortgages, Deeds of Trust and certain other “key loan documents” that the parties deem essential for the enforcement of the mortgage loan in the event of default.

• This is done for safekeeping and also to accomplish the transfer and due negotiation of possession of the Notes that is essential under the Uniform Commercial Code for a valid transfer to the Trustee to occur.
• Like the Master Servicer, the Master Document Custodian is responsible by contract solely to the Trustee (e.g., the Master Document Custodial Agreement). However unlike the Master Servicer, the Master Document Custodian is an institution wholly independent from the Servicer and the Sponsor.
• There are exceptions to this rule in the world of Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac (“GSE”) securitizations. The GSE’s may allow selected large originators with great secure storage capabilities (in other words, large banks) to act as their own Master Document Custodians. But even in those cases, contracts make clear that the GSE Trustee, not the originator, is the owner of the Note and the mortgage loan.
• The Master Document Custodian must review all original documents submitted into its custody for strict compliance with the specifications set forth in the Custodial Agreement, and deliver exception reports to the Trustee and/or Master Servicer as to any required documents that are missing or fail to comply with those specifications.
• In so doing the Custodian must in effect confirm that for each loan in the Trust there is a “complete and unbroken chain of transfers and assignments of the Notes and Mortgages.”
• This does not necessarily require the Custodian to find assignments or endorsements naming the Depositor or the Trustee. The wording in the Master Document Custodial Agreement must be read closely. Defined terms such as “Last Endorsee” may technically allow the Custodian to approve files in which the last endorsement is from the Sponsor in blank, and no assignment to either the Depositor or the Trustee has been recorded in the local land records.
• In many private-label securitizations a single institution fulfills all of the functions related to document custody for the entire pool of loans. In these cases, the institution might be referred to simply as the “Custodian” and the governing document as the “Custodial Agreement.”

Typical transaction steps and documents (in private-label, non-GSE securitizations)

1. The Originator sells loans (one-by-one or in bundles) to the Securitizer (a/k/a the Sponsor) pursuant to a Mortgage Loan Purchase and Sale Agreement (MLPSA) or similarly-named document. The purpose of the MLPSA is to sell all right, title, claims, legal, equitable and any and all other interest in the loans to the Securitizer-Sponsor. For Notes endorsed in “blank” which are bearer instruments under the UCC, the MLPSA normally requires acceptance and delivery receipts for all such Notes in order to fully document the “true sale.” Frequently a form is prescribed for the acceptance and delivery receipt and attached as an exhibit to the MLPSA.

The MLPSA will contain representations, attestations and warranties as to the enforceability and marketability of each loan, and specify the purchaser’s remedies for a breach of any “rep” or “warrant.” The primary remedy is the purchaser’s right to require the seller to repurchase any loan materially and adversely affected by a breach. Among the defects and events covered by “reps” and “warrants” are “Early Payment Defaults,” commonly referred to as “EPD’s.” An EDP occurs if a loan becomes seriously (usually, 60 or more days) delinquent within a specified period of time after it has been sold to the Trust. The EDP covenants are always limited in time and normally only cover EDPs that occur within 12 to 18 months of the original sale. If an EDP occurs, then the Trust can force the originator to repurchase the EPD note and replace it with a note of similar static qualities (amount, term, type, etc.)

2. The Securitizer-Sponsor sells the loans to the Depositor. This takes place in another MLPSA very similar to the first one and the same documents are created and exchange with the same or similar terms. These are typically included as exhibits to the PSA.

3. Depositor, Trustee, Master Servicer and Servicer enter into a Pooling and Servicing Agreement (“PSA”) in which:

— the Depositor sells all right, title, legal, equitable and any other interest in the mortgage loans to the Trustee, with requirements for acceptance and delivery receipts, often including the prescribed form as an exhibit, in similar fashion to the MLPSA’s;

— the PSA creates the trust, appoints the Trustee, and defines the classes of securities (often called “Certificates”) that the trust will issue to investors and establishes the order of priority between classes of Certificates as to distributions of cash collected and losses realized with respect to the underlying loans (the highest rated Certificates are paid first and the lowest rated Certificates suffer the first losses-thus the basis for the term “structured finance”); and

— the Servicer, Master Servicer and Trustee establish the Servicer’s rights and duties, including limits and extent of a Servicer’s right to deal with default, foreclosure, and Note modifications. Some PSA’s include detailed loss mitigation or modification rules, and others limit any substantive modifications (such as changing the interest rate, reducing the principal debt, waiving default debt, extending the repayment term, etc.)

4. All parties including the Custodian enter into the Custodial Agreement in which:

• the Depositor agrees to cause the Notes and other specified key loan documents (usually including an unrecorded, recordable Assignment “in blank”)(NB that several recent courts have raised serious legal questions about the assignment of a real estate instrument in blank under such theories as the statute of frauds and whether or not an assignment in blank is in fact a “recordable” legal real estate document) to be delivered to the Custodian (with the Securitizer to do the actual physical shipment);
• the Custodian agrees to inspect the Notes and other documents and to certify in designated written documents to the Trustee that the documents meet the required specifications and are in the Custodian’s possession; and
• establishes a (supposedly exclusive) procedure and specified forms whereby the Servicer can obtain possession of any Note, Mortgage, Deed of Trust or other custodial document for foreclosure or payoff purposes.

Finding Documents on the S.E.C.’s website (the EDGAR filing system):

• If you know the name of the Depositor and the name of the Trust (e.g. “Time Bomb Mortgage Trust 2006-2”) that contains the loan in question, then the PSA and Custodial Agreement probably can be found on the SEC’s website (www.sec.gov):
• On the SEC home page look for a link to “Search for Company Filings” and then choose to search by “Company Name,” using the name of the Depositor. (Alternatively, click on the “Contains” button on the search page and then search by the series, i.e. 2006-2 in the above example.)
• Hopefully, this will enable you to find the Trust in question. If so, the PSA and the Custodial Agreement should be available as attachments to one or more of the earliest-filed forms (normally the 8-K) shown on the list of available documents. Sometimes the PSA is listed as a named document but other times you just look for the largest document in terms of megabytes filed with the 8-K form.
• The available documents also should include the Prospectus and/or Prospectus Supplement (Form 424B5) and the Free Writing Prospectus (“FWP”). The latter documents (at least the sections written in English, as opposed to the many tables of financial data) can be very helpful in providing a concise and straightforward description of the parties, documents, and transaction steps and detailed transactional graphs and charts in the particular deal. And because these are SEC documents, the information serves as highly credible evidence on these points, and the Court can take judicial notice of any document filed with the SEC.
• For securitizations created after January 1, 2006, SEC “Regulation AB” requires the parties to file a considerable amount of detailed information about the individual loans included in the Trust. This information may be filed as an Exhibit to the PSA or to a Form 8-K. This loan-level data typically includes loan numbers, interest rates, principal amount of loan, origination date and (sometimes) property addresses and thus can be very useful in proving that a particular loan is in a particular Trust.

Dealing with Notes and Assignments:

There are two basic documents involved in a residential mortgage loan: the promissory note and the mortgage (or deed of trust). For brevity’s sake these are referred to simply as the Note and the Mortgage.

A Note is: a contract to repay borrowed money. It is a negotiable instrument governed by Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The Note, by itself, is an unsecured debt. Notes are personal property. Notes are negotiated by endorsement or by transfer and delivery as provided for by the UCC. Notes are separate legal documents from the real estate instruments that secure the loans evidenced by the Notes by liens on real property.

A Mortgage is: a lien on, and an interest in, real estate. It is a security agreement. It creates a lien on the real estate as collateral for a debt, but it does not create the debt itself. The rights created by a Mortgage are classified as real property and these instruments are governed by local real estate law in each jurisdiction. The UCC has nothing to do with the creation, drafting, recording or assignment of these real estate instruments.

A Note can only be transferred by: an “Endorsement” if the Note is payable to a particular party; or by transfer of possession of the Note, if the Note is endorsed “in blank.” Endorsements must be written or stamped on the face of the Note or on a piece of paper physically attached to the Note (the Allonge). See UCC §3-210 through §3-205. The UCC does not recognize an Assignment as a valid means of transferring a Note such that the transferee becomes a “holder”, which is what the owners of securitized mortgage notes universally claim to be.

In most states, an Allonge cannot be used to endorse a note if there is sufficient room at the “foot of the note” for such endorsements. The “foot of the note” refers to the space immediately below the signatures of the borrowers. Also, if an Allonge is properly used, then it must describe the terms of the note and most importantly must be “permanently affixed” to the Note. Most jurisdictions hold that “staples” and “tape” do not constitute a “permanent” attachment. And, the Master Document Custodial Agreement may specify when an Allonge can be used and how it must be attached to the original Note.

Mortgage rights can only be transferred by: an Assignment recorded in the local land records. Mortgage rights are “estates in land” and therefore governed by the state’s real property laws. These vary from state to state but in general Mortgage rights can only be transferred by a recorded instrument (the Assignment) in order to be effective against third parties without notice.

In discussions of exactly what documents are required to transfer a “mortgage loan” confusion often arises between Notes versus Mortgages and the respective documents necessary to accomplish transfers of each. The issue often arises from the standpoint of proof: Has Party A proven that a transfer has occurred to it from Party B? Does Party A need to have an Assignment? The answer often depends on exactly what Party A is trying to prove.

Scenario 1: Party A is trying to prove that the Trustee “owns the loan.” Here the likely questions are, did the transaction steps actually occur as required by the PSA and as represented in the Prospectus Supplement, and are the Trustee’s ownership rights subject to challenge in a bankruptcy case?

The answers lie in the UCC and in documents such as:

• the MLPSA’s;
• conveyancing rules of the PSA (normally Section 2.01);
• transfer and delivery receipts (look for these to be described in the “Conditions to Closing” or similarly named section of MLPSA’s and the PSA);
• funds transfer records (canceled checks, wire transfers, etc);
• compliance and exception reports provided by the Custodian pursuant to the Master Document Custodial Agreement; and
• the “true sale” legal opinions.

Some of these documents may or may not be available on the SEC’s EDGAR system; some may be obtainable only through discovery in litigation. The primary inquiry is whether or not the documents, money and records that were required to have been produced and change hands actually do so as required, and at the times required, by the terms of the transaction documents.

Another question sometimes asked when examining the “validity” of a securitization (or in other words, the rights of a securitization Trustee versus a bankruptcy trustee) is, must the Note be endorsed to the Trustee at the time of the securitization? Here are some points to consider:

• Frequently the only endorsement on the Note is from the Securitizer-Sponsor “in blank” and the only Assignment that exists, pre-foreclosure, is from the Securitizer-Sponsor “in blank” (in other words, the name of the transferee is not inserted in the instrument and this space is blank).
• The concept widely accepted in the securitization world (the issuers and ratings agencies, and the law firms advising them) is that this form of documentation was sufficient for a valid and unbroken chain of transfers of the Notes and assignments of the Mortgages as long as everything was done consistently with the terms of the securitization documents. This article is not intended to validate or defend either this concept or this practice, nor is it intended to represent in any way that the terms of the securitization documents were actually followed to the letter in every real-world case. In fact, and unfortunately for the certificate holders and the securitized mortgage markets, there are many instances in many reported cases where these mandatory rules of the securitization documents have not been followed but in fact, completely ignored.
• Often shortly before foreclosure (or in some cases afterwards) a mortgage assignment is produced from the Originator to the Trustee years after the Trust has closed out for the receipt of all mortgage loans. Such assignments are inconsistent with the mandatory conveyancing rules of the Trust Documents and are also inconsistent with the special tax rules that apply to these special trust structures. Most state law requires the chain of title not to include any mortgage assignments in blank, but assignments from A to B to C to D. Under most state statutes, an assignment in blank would be deemed an “incomplete real estate instrument.” Even more frequent than A to D assignments are MERS to D assignments, which suffer from the same transfer problems noted herein plus what is commonly referred to as the “MERS problem.”

Scenario 2: Party B seeks to prove standing to foreclose or to appear in court with the rights of a secured creditor under the Bankruptcy Code. OK, granted the UCC (§3-301) does provide that a negotiable instrument can be enforced either by “(i) the holder of the instrument, or (ii) a non-holder in possession of the instrument who has the rights of a holder.”

• Servicers and foreclosure counsel have been known to contend that this is the end of the story and that the servicer can therefore do anything that the holder of the Note could do, anywhere, anytime.

• The Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Guides contain many sections that appear to lend superficial support to this contention and frequently will be cited by Servicers and foreclosure counsel as though the Guides have the force of law, which of course they do not.

• There are many serious problems with this legal position, as recognized by an increasing number of reported court decisions.

Authors’ General Conclusions and Observations:

• Servicers and foreclosure firms are either wrong, or at least not being cautious, if they attempt to foreclose, or appear in court, without having a valid pre-complaint or pre-motion Assignment of the Mortgage. Yet at the same time, Servicers and note holders place themselves at risk of preference and avoidable transfer issues in bankruptcy cases if, for example, endorsements and Assignments that they rely upon to support claims to secured status occur or are recorded after or soon before bankruptcy filing.

• In addition any Servicer, Lender, or Securitization Trustee is either wrong, or at least not being cautious, if it ever: (1) claims in any communications to a consumer or to the Court in a judicial proceeding that it is the Note holder unless they are, at the relevant point in time, actually the holder and owner of the Note as determined under UCC law; or (2) undertakes to enforce rights under a Mortgage without having and recording a valid Assignment.
• The UCC deals only with enforcing the Note. Enforcing the Mortgage on the other hand is governed by the state’s real property and foreclosure laws, which generally contain crucial provisions regarding actions required to be taken by the “note holder” or “beneficiary.” State law may or may not authorize particular actions to be taken by servicers or agents of the holder of the Note.

• For the Servicer to have “the rights of the holder” under the UCC it must be acting in accordance with its contract. For example, if the Servicer claims to have possession of the Note, did it follow the procedures contained in the “Release of Documents” section of the Custodial Agreement in obtaining possession? Does the Servicer really have “constitutional” standing under either Federal or State law to enforce the Note even if it is a “holder” if it does not have any “pecuniary” or economic interest in the Note? In short, the concept of constitutional standing involves some injury in fact and it is hard to see how a mere “place-holder” or “Nominee” could ever over-come such a hurdle unless it actually owned the Note or some real interest in the same.

• The Servicer should have the burden of explaining the legal reasons supporting its standing and authority to act. Sometimes Servicers have difficulty maintaining a consistent story in this regard. Is the Servicer claiming to be the actual holder, or the holder and the owner, or merely an authorized agent of the true holder? If it is claiming some agency, what proof does it have to support such a claim? What proof is required? Sometimes this is just academic legal hair-splitting but many times it involves serious issues of fact. For example, what if the attorney for the Servicer asserts to the court that his or her client actually owns the Note, but the Fannie Mae website reports that Fannie is the owner? What if the MERS website reports that the Plaintiff is just the “Servicer?” What if the pre-complaint correspondence to the borrower names some entirely different party as the holder and indicated that the current plaintiff is only the Servicer?

• Finally, the Servicer always has an obligation to be factually accurate in borrower communications and legal proceedings, and to supervise employees and vendors and attorneys to assure that Note endorsements, Assignments of Mortgage, and affidavits are executed by persons with valid corporate authority, and not falsified nor offered for any improper purpose.

The focus of the default servicing industry must move from “how fast we can get things done” to “how honestly and accurately can we be in presenting the proper documentation to the courts and to the borrowers”. Judicial proceedings are not like NASCAR races where the fastest lawyer always wins. Judicial proceedings are all about finding the truth no matter how long it takes and regardless of the time and difficulties involved.

Another win against Downey Savings

645068 – US BANK VS. MARTIN, A – Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment – DENIED. The Plaintiff as moving party has established a prima facie showing that it is entitled to judgment for possession against Defendant as a matter of law. However, Defendant’s objections Nos. 1, 3-6, 8, 9, and 11 to the Johnson Declaration are overruled; and objections Nos. 2, 7 and 10 are sustained, based on a lack personal knowledge and/or hearsay, regarding the alleged transfer of the beneficial interest to Plaintiff and as to the reasonable rental value.

Further, the Court finds the Defendant has met his burden of establishing triable issues of fact to rebut the presumption of validity of the sale and the issue of whether Plaintiff had the right to proceed with foreclosure. Namely the evidence of a gap in title and security interest from Downey Savings & Loan through the FDIC to Plaintiff during the time of the foreclosure proceeding, as well as missing evidence to show whether the Trustee, DSL Service Company, was authorized to act as Plaintiff’s agent in continuing to pursue the sale once Downey Savings & Loan had lost its security interest. (See Plaintiff’s undisputed fact # 7 and Defendant’s objection thereto; and Declaration of Defense counsel, McCandless, paragraphs 2, 8, 9, 10, 12 and 13). As such, triable issues of material fact remain and the motion for summary judgment is denied.

Challenges to Foreclosure Docs Reach a Fever Pitch

American Banker | Wednesday, June 16, 2010

By Kate Berry

Correction: An earlier version of this story misidentified the court
where Judge J. Michael Traynor presides. It is a Florida state court,
not a federal one. An editing error was to blame.

The backlash is intensifying against banks and mortgage servicers that
try to foreclose on homes without all their ducks in a row.

Because the notes were often sold and resold during the boom years, many
financial companies lost track of the documents. Now, legal officials
are accusing companies of forging the documents needed to reclaim the
properties.

On Monday, the Florida Attorney General’s Office said it was
investigating the use of “bogus assignment” documents by Lender
Processing Services Inc. and its former parent, Fidelity National
Financial Inc. And last week a state judge in Florida ordered a hearing
to determine whether M&T Bank Corp. should be charged with fraud after
it changed the assignment of a mortgage note for one borrower three
separate times.

“Mortgage assignments are being created out of whole cloth just for the
purposes of showing a transfer from one entity to another,” said James
Kowalski Jr., an attorney in Jacksonville, Fla., who represents the
borrower in the M&T case.

“Banks got away from very basic banking rules because they securitized
millions of loans and moved them so quickly,” Kowalski said.

In many cases, Kowalski said, it has become impossible to establish when
a mortgage was sold, and to whom, so the servicers are trying to
recreate the paperwork, right down to the stamps that financial
companies use to verify when a note has changed hands.

Some mortgage processors are “simply ordering stamps from stamp makers,”
he said, and are “using those as proof of mortgage assignments after the
fact.”

Such alleged practices are now generating ire from the bench.

In the foreclosure case filed by M&T in February 2009, the bank
initially claimed it lost the underlying mortgage note, and then later
claimed the mortgage was owned by First National Bank of Nevada, which
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. shut down in 2008, before the
foreclosure had been started.

M&T then claimed Wells Fargo & Co. owned the note, “contradicting all of
its previous claims,” according to Circuit Court Judge J. Michael
Traynor, who ordered the evidentiary hearing last week into whether M&T
perpetrated a fraud on the court.

“The court has been misled by the plaintiff from the beginning,” Judge
Traynor said in his order, which also dismissed M&T’s foreclosure action
with prejudice.

The Marshall Watson law firm in Fort Lauderdale, Fla., which represents
M&T in the case, declined to comment and the bank said it could not
comment.

In a notice on its website, the Florida attorney general said it is
examining whether Docx, an Alpharetta, Ga., unit of Lender Processing
Services, forged documents so foreclosures could be processed more
quickly.

“These documents are used in court cases as ‘real’ documents of
assignment and presented to the court as so, when it actually appears
that they are fabricated in order to meet the demands of the institution
that does not, in fact, have the necessary documentation to foreclose
according to law,” the notice said.

Docx is the largest lien release processor in the United States working
on behalf of banks and mortgage lenders.

Peter T. Sadowski, an executive vice president and general counsel at
Fidelity National in Fort Lauderdale, said that more than a year ago his
company began requiring that its clients provide all paperwork before
the company would process title claims.

Michelle Kersch, a spokeswoman for Lender Processing Services, said the
reference on the Florida attorney general’s website to “bogus
assignments” referred to documents in which Docx used phrases like
“bogus assignee” as placeholders when attorneys did not provide specific
pieces of information.

“Unfortunately, on occasion, incomplete documents were inadvertently
recorded before the missing information was obtained,” Kersch said. “LPS
regrets these errors and the use of this particular placeholder
phrasing.”

The company, which was spun off from Fidelity National two years ago, is
cooperating with the attorney general and conducting its own internal
investigation.

Lender Processing Services disclosed in its annual report in February
that federal prosecutors were reviewing the business processes of Docx.
The company said it was cooperating with that investigation.

“This is systemic,” said April Charney, a senior staff attorney at
Jacksonville Area Legal Aid and a member of the Florida Supreme Court’s
foreclosure task force.

“Banks can’t show ownership for many of these securitized loans,”
Charney continued. “I call them empty-sack trusts, because in the rush
to securitize, the originating lender failed to check the paper trial
and now they can’t collect.”

In Florida, Georgia, Maryland and other states where the foreclosure
process must be handled through the courts, hundreds of borrowers have
challenged lenders’ rights to take their homes. Some judges have
invalidated mortgages, giving properties back to borrowers while lenders
appeal.

In February, the Florida state Supreme Court set a new standard
stipulating that before foreclosing, a lender had to verify it had all
the proper documents. Lenders that cannot produce such papers can be
fined for perjury, the court said.

Kowalski said the bigger problem is that mortgage servicers are working
“in a vacuum,” handing out foreclosure assignments to third-party firms
such as LPS and Fidelity.

“There’s no meeting to get everybody together and make sure they have
their ducks in a row to comply with these very basic rules that banks
set up many years ago,” Kowalski said. “The disconnect occurs not just
between units within the banks, but among the servicers, their bank
clients and the lawyers.”

He said the banking industry is “being misserved,” because mortgage
servicers and the lawyers they hire to represent them in foreclosure
proceedings are not prepared.

“We’re tarring banks that might obviously do a decent job, and the banks
are complicit because they hired the servicers,” Kowalski said.

JP Morgan 18,000 affidavids per month

Posted 3 days ago by Neil Garfield on Livinglies’s Weblog

The bottom line is that none of these signors of affidavits have ANY personal knowledge regarding any document, event, or transaction relating to any of the loans they are “processing.” It’s all a lie.

In a 35 hour workweek, 18,000 affidavits per month computes as 74.23 affidavits per JPM signor per hour and 1.23 per minute. Try that. See if you can review a file, verify the accounting, execute the affidavit and get it notarized in one minute. It isn’t possible. It can only be done with a system that incorporates automation, fabrication and forgery.
Editor’s Note: Besides the entertaining writing, there is a message here. And then a hidden message. The deponent is quoted as saying she has personal knowledge of what her fellow workers have as personal knowledge. That means the witness is NOT competent in ANY court of law to give testimony that is allowed to be received as evidence. Here is the kicker: None of these loans were originated by JPM. Most of them were the subject of complex transactions. The bottom line is that none of these signors of affidavits have ANY personal knowledge regarding any document, event, or transaction relating to any of the loans they are “processing.” It’s all a lie.
In these transactions, even though the investors were the owners of the loan, the servicing and other rights were rights were transferred acquired from WAMU et al and then redistributed to still other entities. This was an exercise in obfuscation. By doing this, JPM was able to control the distribution of profits from third party payments on loan pools like insurance contracts, credit defaults swaps and other credit enhancements.
Having that control enabled JPM to avoid allocating such payments to the investors who put up the bad money and thus keep the good money for itself. You see, the Countrywide settlement with the FTC focuses on the pennies while billions of dollars are flying over head.

The simple refusal to allocate third party payments achieves the following:

* Denial of any hope of repayment to the investors
* Denial of any proper accounting for all receipts and disbursements that are allocable to each loan account
* 97% success rate in sustaining Claims of default that are fatally defective being both wrong and undocumented.
* 97% success rate on Claims for balances that don’t exist
* 97% success rate in getting a home in which JPM has no investment

(THE DEPONENT’S NAME IS COTRELL NOT CANTREL)

JPM: Cantrel deposiition reveals 18,000 affidavits signed per month
HEY, CHASE! YEAH, YOU… JPMORGAN CHASE! One of Your Customers Asked Me to Give You a Message…

Hi JPMorgan Chase People!

Thanks for taking a moment to read this… I promise to be brief, which is so unlike me… ask anyone.

My friend, Max Gardner, the famous bankruptcy attorney from North Carolina, sent me the excerpt from the deposition of one Beth Ann Cottrell, shown below. Don’t you just love the way he keeps up on stuff… always thinking of people like me who live to expose people like you? Apparently, she’s your team’s Operations Manager at Chase Home Finance, and she’s, obviously, quite a gal.

Just to make it interesting… and fun… I’m going to do my best to really paint a picture of the situation, so the reader can feel like he or she is there… in the picture at the time of the actual deposition of Ms. Cottrell… like it’s a John Grisham novel…

FADE IN:

SFX: Sound of creaking door opening, not to slowly… There’s a ceiling fan turning slowly…

It’s Monday morning, May 17th in this year of our Lord, two thousand and ten, and as we enter the courtroom, the plaintiff’s attorney, representing a Florida homeowner, is asking Beth Ann a few questions… We’re in the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County, Florida.

Deposition of Beth Ann Cottrell – Operations Manager of Chase Home Finance LLC

Q. So if you did not review any books or records or electronic records before signing this affidavit of payments default, how is it that you had personal knowledge of all of the matters stated in this sworn document?

A. Well, it is pretty simple, I have personal knowledge that my staff has personal knowledge of what is in the affidavit on personal knowledge. That is how our process works.

Q. So, when signing an affidavit, you stated you have personal knowledge of the matters contained therein of Chase’s business records yet you never looked at the data bases or anything else that would contain those records; is that correct?

A. That is correct. I rely on my staff to do that part.

Q. And can you tell me in a given week how many of these affidavits you might sing?

A. Amongst all the management on my team we sign about 18,000 a month.

Q. And how many folks are on what you call the management?

A. Let’s see, eight.

And… SCENE.

Isn’t that just irresistibly cute? The way she sees absolutely nothing wrong with the way she’s answering the questions? It’s really quite marvelous. Truth be told, although I hadn’t realized it prior to reading Beth Ann’s deposition transcript, I had never actually seen obtuse before.

In fact, if Beth’s response that follows with in a movie… well, this is the kind of stuff that wins Oscars for screenwriting. I may never forget it. She actually said:

“Well, it is pretty simple, I have personal knowledge that my staff has personal knowledge of what is in the affidavit on personal knowledge. That is how our process works.”

No you didn’t.

Isn’t she just fabulous? Does she live in a situation comedy on ABC or something?

ANYWAY… BACK TO WHY I ASKED YOU JPMORGAN CHASE PEOPLE OVER…

Well, I know a homeowner who lives in Scottsdale, Arizona… lovely couple… wouldn’t want to embarrass them by using their real names, so I’ll just refer to them as the Campbell’s.

So, just the other evening Mr. Campbell calls me to say hello, and to tell me that he and his wife decided to strategically default on their mortgage. Have you heard about this… this strategic default thing that’s become so hip this past year?

It’s when a homeowner who could probably pay the mortgage payment, decides that watching any further incompetence on the part of the government and the banks, along with more home equity, is just more than he or she can bear. They called you guys at Chase about a hundred times to talk to you about modifying their loan, but you know how you guys are, so nothing went anywhere.

Then one day someone sent Mr. Campbell a link to an article on my blog, and I happened to be going on about the topic of strategic default. So… funny story… they had been thinking about strategically defaulting anyway and wouldn’t you know it… after reading my column, they decided to go ahead and commence defaulting strategically.

So, after about 30 years as a homeowner, and making plenty of money to handle the mortgage payment, he and his wife stop making their mortgage payment… they toast the decision with champagne.

You see, they owe $865,000 on their home, which was just appraised at $310,000, and interestingly enough, also from reading my column, they came to understand the fact that they hadn’t done anything to cause this situation, nothing at all. It was the banks that caused this mess, and now they were expecting homeowners like he and his wife, to pick up the tab. So, they finally said… no, no thank you.

Luckily, she’s not on the loan, so she already went out and bought their new place, right across the street from the old one, as it turns out, and they figure they’ve got at least a year to move, since they plan to do everything possible to delay you guys from foreclosing. They’re my heroes…

Okay, so here’s the message I promised I’d pass on to as many JPMorgan Chase people as possible… so, Mr. Campbell calls me one evening, and tells me he’s sorry to bother… knows I’m busy… I tell him it’s no problem and ask how he’s been holding up…

He says just fine, and he sounds truly happy… strategic defaulters are always happy, in fact they’re the only happy people that ever call me… everyone else is about to pop cyanide pills, or pop a cap in Jamie Dimon’s ass… one or the other… okay, sorry… I’m getting to my message…

He tells me, “Martin, we just wanted to tell you that we stopped making our payments, and couldn’t be happier. Like a giant burden has been lifted.”

I said, “Glad to hear it, you sound great!”

And he said, “I just wanted to call you because Chase called me this evening, and I wanted to know if you could pass a message along to them on your blog.”

I said, “Sure thing, what would you like me to tell them?”

He said, “Well, like I was saying, we stopped making our payments as of April…”

“Right…” I said.

“So, Chase called me this evening after dinner.”

“Yes…” I replied.

He went on… “The woman said: Mr. Campbell, we haven’t received your last payment. So, I said… OH YES YOU HAVE!”

Hey, JPMorgan Chase People… LMAO. Keep up the great work over there.

TERRY MABRY et al., opinion 2923.5 Cilvil code

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

TERRY MABRY et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE COUNTY,

Respondent;

AURORA LOAN SERVICES, et al.,

Real Parties in Interest.

G042911

(Super. Ct. No. 30-2009-003090696)

O P I N I O N

Original proceedings; petition for a writ of mandate to challenge an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, David C. Velazquez, Judge. Writ granted in part and denied in part.
Law Offices of Moses S. Hall and Moses S. Hall for Petitioners.
No appearance for Respondent.
Akerman Senterfitt, Justin D. Balser and Donald M. Scotten for Real Party in Interest Aurora Loan Services.
McCarthy & Holthus, Matthew Podmenik, Charles E. Bell and Melissa Robbins Contts for Real Party in Interest Quality Loan Service Corporation.
Bryan Cave, Douglas E. Winter, Christopher L. Dueringer, Sean D. Muntz and Kamae C. Shaw for Amici Curiae Bank of America and BAC Home Loans Servicing on behalf of Real Parties in Interest.
Wright, Finlay & Zak, Thomas Robert Finlay and Jennifer A. Johnson for Amici Curiae United Trustee’s Association and California Mortgage Association.
Leland Chan for Amicus Curiae California Bankers Association.

I. SUMMARY
Civil Code section 2923.5 requires, before a notice of default may be filed, that a lender contact the borrower in person or by phone to “assess” the borrower’s financial situation and “explore” options to prevent foreclosure. Here is the exact, operative language from the statute: “(2) A mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall contact the borrower in person or by telephone in order to assess the borrower’s financial situation and explore options for the borrower to avoid foreclosure.” There is nothing in section 2923.5 that requires the lender to rewrite or modify the loan.
In this writ proceeding, we answer these questions about section 2923.5, also known as the Perata Mortgage Relief Act :
(A) May section 2923.5 be enforced by a private right of action? Yes. Otherwise the statute would be a dead letter.
(B) Must a borrower tender the full amount of the mortgage indebtedness due as a prerequisite to bringing an action under section 2923.5? No. To hold otherwise would defeat the purpose of the statute.
(C) Is section 2923.5 preempted by federal law? No — but, we must emphasize, it is not preempted because the remedy for noncompliance is a simple postponement of the foreclosure sale, nothing more.
(D) What is the extent of a private right of action under section 2923.5? To repeat: The right of action is limited to obtaining a postponement of an impending foreclosure to permit the lender to comply with section 2923.5.
(E) Must the declaration required of the lender by section 2923.5, subdivision (b) be under penalty of perjury? No. Such a requirement is not only not in the statute, but would be at odds with the way the statute is written.
(F) Does a declaration in a notice of default that tracks the language of section 2923.5, subdivision (b) comply with the statute, even though such language does not on its face delineate precisely which one of the three categories set forth in the declaration applies to the particular case at hand? Yes. There is no indication that the Legislature wanted to saddle lenders with the need to “custom draft” the statement required by the statute in notices of default.
(G) If a lender did not comply with section 2923.5 and a foreclosure sale has already been held, does that noncompliance affect the title to the foreclosed property obtained by the families or investors who may have bought the property at the foreclosure sale? No. The Legislature did nothing to affect the rule regarding foreclosure sales as final.
(H) In the present case, did the lender comply with section 2923.5? We cannot say on this record, and therefore must return the case to the trial court to determine which of the two sides is telling the truth. According to the lender, the borrowers themselves initiated a telephone conversation in which foreclosure-avoidance options were discussed, and there were many, many phone calls to the borrowers to attempt to discuss foreclosure-avoidance options. According to the borrowers, no one ever contacted them about nonforeclosure options. The trial judge, however, never reached this conflict in the facts, because he ruled strictly on legal grounds: namely (1) that section 2923.5 does not provide for a private right of action and (2) section 2923.5 is preempted by federal law. As indicated, we have concluded otherwise as to those two issues.
(I) Can section 2923.5 be enforced in a class action in this case? Not under these facts. The operation of section 2923.5 is highly fact-specific, and the details as to what might, or might not, constitute compliance can readily vary from lender to lender and borrower to borrower.
II. BACKGROUND
In December 2006, Terry and Michael Mabry refinanced the loan on their home in Corona from Paul Financial, borrowing about $700,000. In April 2008, Paul Financial assigned to Aurora Loan Services the right to service the loan. In this opinion, we will treat Aurora as synonymous with the lender and use the terms interchangeably.
According to the lender, in mid-July 2008 — before the Mabrys missed their August 2008 loan payment — the couple called Aurora on the telephone to discuss the loan with an Aurora employee. The discussion included mention of a number of options to avoid foreclosure, including loan modification, short sale, deed-in-lieu of foreclosure, and even a special forbearance. The Aurora employee sent a letter following up on the conversation. The letter explained the various options to avoid foreclosure, and asked the Mabrys to forward current financial information to Aurora so it could consider the Mabrys for these options.
According to the lender, the Mabrys missed their September 2008 payment as well, and mid-month Aurora sent them another letter describing ways to avoid foreclosure. Aurora employees called the Mabrys “many times” to discuss the situation. The Mabrys never picked up.
It is undisputed that later in September, the Mabrys filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy and Aurora did not contact the Mabrys while the bankruptcy was pending. (See 11 U.S.C. § 362 [automatic stay].) The Mabrys had their Chapter 11 case dismissed, however, in late March 2009.
According to the lender, Aurora once again began trying to call the Mabrys, calling them “numerous times,” including “three times on different days.” Meanwhile, in mid-April the Mabrys sent an authorization to discuss the loan with their lawyers.
According to the lender, finally, in June, the Mabrys sent two faxes to Aurora, the aggregate effect of which was to propose a short sale to the Mabrys’ attorney, Moses S. Hall, for $350,000. If accepted, the short sale would have meant a loss of over $400,000 on the loan. Aurora rejected that offer, and an attorney in Hall’s law office proposed a sale price of $425,000, which would have meant a loss to the lender of about $340,000.
It is undisputed that on June 18, 2009, Aurora recorded a notice of default. The notice of default used this (obviously form) language: “The Beneficiary or its designated agent declares that it has contacted the borrower, tried with due diligence to contact the borrower as required by California Civil Code section 2923.5, or the borrower has surrendered the property to the beneficiary or authorized agent, or is otherwise exempt from the requirements of section 2923.5.” Aurora sent six copies of the recorded notice of default to the Mabrys’ home by certified mail, and the certifications showed they were delivered.
It is also undisputed that on October 7, the Mabrys filed a complaint in Orange County Superior Court based on Aurora’s alleged failure to comply with section 2923.5.
According to the borrowers, no one had ever contacted them about their foreclosure options. Michael Mabry stated the following in his declaration: “We have never been contacted by Aurora nor [sic] any of its agents in person, by telephone or by first class mail to explore options for us to avoid foreclosure as required in CC § 2923.5.”
The complaint sought a temporary restraining order to prevent the foreclosure sale then scheduled just a week away, on October 14, 2009. Based on the allegation of no contact, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order, and scheduled a hearing for October 20.
But exactly one week before the October 20 hearing, the Mabrys filed an amended complaint, this one specifically adding class action allegations and seeking injunctive relief for an entire class. This new filing came with another request for a temporary restraining order, which was also granted, with a hearing on that temporary restraining order scheduled for October 27 (albeit the order was directed at Aurora only).
The first restraining order was vacated on October 20, the second on October 27. The trial judge did not, however, resolve the conflict in the facts presented by the pleadings. Rather he concluded: (1) the action is preempted by federal law; (2) there is no private right of action under section 2923.5 — the statute can only be enforced by members of pooling and servicing agreements; and (3) the Mabrys were required to at least tender all arrearages to enjoin any foreclosure proceedings.
The Mabrys filed a motion for reconsideration and a third request for a restraining order based on supposedly new law. The new law was a now review-granted Court of Appeal opinion which, let us merely note here, appears to have been quite off-point in regards to any issue which the trial judge had just decided. So it is not surprising that the requested restraining order was denied. The foreclosure sale was now scheduled for November 30, 2009. Six days before that, though, the Mabrys filed this writ proceeding, and two days later this court stayed all proceedings. We invited amicus curiae to give their views on the issues raised by the petition, and subsequently scheduled an order to show cause to consider those issues.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Private Right of Action? Yes
1. Preliminary Considerations
A private right of action may inhere within a statute, otherwise silent on the point, when such a private right of action is necessary to achieve the statute’s policy objectives. (E.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago (1979) 441 U.S. 677, 683 [implying private right of action into Title IX of the Civil Rights Act because such a right was necessary to achieve the statute’s policy objectives]; Basic Inc. v. Levinson (1988) 485 U.S. 224, 230-231 [implying private right of action to enforce securities statute].)
That is, the absence of an express private right of action is not necessarily preclusive of such a right. There are times when a private right of action may be implied by a statute. (E.g., Siegel v. American Savings & Loan Assn. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 953, 966 [“Before we reach the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies, we must determine, therefore, whether plaintiffs have an implied private right of action under HOLA.”].)
California courts have, of recent date, looked to Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287 (Moradi-Shalal) for guidance as to whether there is an implied private right of action in a given statute. In Moradi-Shalal, for example, the presence of a comprehensive administrative means of enforcement of a statute was one of the reasons the court determined that there was no private right of action to enforce a statute (Ins. Code, § 790.03, subd. (h)) regulating general insurance industry practices. (See Moradi-Shalal, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 300.)
There is also a pre-Moradi Shalal approach, embodied in Middlesex Ins. Co. v. Mann (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 558, 570 (Middlesex). (The Middlesex opinion itself copied the idea from the Restatement Second of Torts, section 874A.) The approach looks to whether a private remedy is “appropriate” to further the “purpose of the legislation” and is “needed to assure the effectiveness of the provision.” (Middlesex, supra, 124 Cal.App.3d at p. 570.)
Obviously, where the two approaches conflict, the one used by our high court in Moradi-Shalal trumps the Middlesex approach. But we may note at this point that as regards section 2923.5, there is no alternative administrative mechanism to enforce the statute. By contrast, in Moradi-Shalal, there was an existing administrative mechanism at hand (by way of the Insurance Commissioner) available to enforce section 790.03, subdivision (h) of the Insurance Code.
There are other corollary principles as well.
First, California courts, quite naturally, do not favor constructions of statutes that render them advisory only, or a dead letter. (E.g., Petropoulos v. Department of Real Estate (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 554, 567; People v. Stringham (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 184, 197.) Our colleagues in Division One of this District nicely summarized this point in Goehring v. Chapman University (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 353, 375: “The question of whether a regulatory statute creates a private right of action depends on legislative intent . . . . In determining legislative intent, ‘[w]e first examine the words themselves because the statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent . . . . The words of the statute should be given their ordinary and usual meaning and should be construed in their statutory context. . . . These canons generally preclude judicial construction that renders part of the statute “meaningless or inoperative.”’” (Italics added.)
Second, statutes on the same subject matter or of the same subject should be construed together so that all the parts of the statutory scheme are given effect. (Lexin v. Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1050, 1090-1091.) This canon is particularly important in the case before us, where there is an enforcement mechanism available at hand to enforce section 2923.5, in the form, as we explain below, of section 2924g. Ironically though, the enforcement mechanism at hand, in direct contrast to the one in Moradi-Shalal, is one that strongly implies individual enforcement of the statute.
Third, historical context can also shed light on whether the Legislature intended a private right of action in a statute. As noted by one federal district court that has found a private right of action in section 2923.5, the fact that a statute was enacted as an emergency statute is an important factor in determining legislative intent. (See Ortiz v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc. (S.D. 2009) 639 F.Supp.2d 1159, 1166 [agreeing with argument that “the California legislature would not have enacted this ‘urgency’ legislation, intended to curb high foreclosure rates in the state, without any accompanying enforcement mechanism”]; cf. County of San Diego v. State of California (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 580, 609 [admitting that private right of action might exist, even if the Legislature did not imply one, if “‘compelling reasons of public policy’” required “judicial recognition of such a right”].) Section 2923.5 was enacted in 2008 as a manifestation of a felt need for urgent action in the midst of a cascading torrent of foreclosures.
Finally, of course, there is recourse to legislative history. Alas, in this case, there is silence on the matter as regards the existence of a private right of action in the final draft of the statute, and we have been cited to nothing in the history that suggests a clear legislative intent one way or the other. (See generally J.A. Jones Construction Co. v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1568, 1575 (J.A. Jones) [emphasizing importance of clear intent appearing in legislative history].) To be sure, as we were reminded at oral argument, an early version of section 2923.5 had an express provision for a private right of action and that provision did not make its way into the final version of the statute. And we recognize that this factor suggests the Legislature may not have wanted to have section 2923.5 enforced privately.
On the other hand, the bottom line was an outcome of silence, not a clear statement that there should be no individual enforcement. And silence, as this court pointed out in J.A. Jones, has its own implications. There, we cited Professor Eskridge’s work on statutory interpretation (see Eskridge, The New Textualism (1990) 37 U.C.L.A. L.Rev. 621, 670-671 (hereinafter “Eskridge on Textualism”)) to recognize that ambiguity in a statute may itself be the result of both sides in the legislative process agreeing to let the courts decide a point: “[I]f there is ambiguity it is because the legislature either could not agree on clearer language or because it made the deliberate choice to be ambiguous — in effect, the only ‘intent’ is to pass the matter on to the courts.” (J.A. Jones, supra, 27 Cal. App.4th at p. 1577.) As Professor Eskridge put it elsewhere in his article: “The vast majority of the Court’s difficult statutory interpretation cases involve statutes whose ambiguity is either the result of deliberate legislative choice to leave conflictual decisions to agencies or the courts.” (Eskridge on Textualism, supra, 37 UCLA L.Rev. at p. 677.)
We have a concrete example in the case at hand. Amicus curiae, the California Bankers Association, asserts that if section 2923.5 had included an express right to a private right of action, the association would have vociferously opposed the legislation. Let us accept that as true. But let us also accept as a reasonable premise that the sponsors of the bill (2008, Senate Bill No. 1137) would have vociferously opposed the legislation if it had an express prohibition on individual enforcement. The point is, the bankers did not insist on language expressly or even impliedly precluding a private right of action, or, if they did, they didn’t get it. The silence is consonant with the idea that section 2923.5 was the result of a legislative compromise, with each side content to let the courts struggle with the issue.
With these observations, we now turn to the language, structure and function of the statute at issue.
2. Operation of Section 2923.5
Section 2923.5 is one of a series of detailed statutes that govern mortgages that span sections 2920 to 2967. Within that series is yet another long series of statutes governing rules involving foreclosure. This second series goes from section 2924, and then follows with sections 2924a through 2924l. (There is no section 2924m . . . yet.)
Section 2923.5 concerns the crucial first step in the foreclosure process: The recording of a notice of default as required by section 2924. (Just plain section 2924 — this one has no lower case letter behind it.)
The key text of section 2923.5 — “key” because of the substantive obligation it imposes on lenders — basically says that a lender cannot file a notice of default until the lender has contacted the borrower “in person or by telephone.” Thus an initial form letter won’t do. To quote the text directly, lenders must contact the borrower by phone or in person to “assess the borrower’s financial situation and explore options for the borrower to avoid foreclosure.” The statute, of course, has alternative provisions in cases where the lender tries to contact a borrower, and the borrower simply won’t pick up the phone, the phone has been disconnected, the borrower hides or otherwise evades contact.
The contrast between section 2923.5 and one of its sister-statutes, section 2923.6, is also significant. By its terms, section 2923.5 operates substantively on lenders. They must do things in order to comply with the law. In Hohfeldian language, it both creates rights and corresponding obligations.
But consider section 2923.6, which does not operate substantively. Section 2923.6 merely expresses the hope that lenders will offer loan modifications on certain terms. By contrast, section 2923.5 requires a specified course of action. (There is a reason for the difference, as we show in part III.C., dealing with federal preemption. In a word, to have required loan modifications would have run afoul of federal law.)
As noted above, other steps in the foreclosure process are set forth in sections 2924a through 2924l. The topic of the postponement of foreclosure sales is addressed in section 2924g.
Subdivision (c)(1)(A) of section 2924g sets forth the grounds for postponements of foreclosure sales. One of those grounds is the open-ended possibility that any court of competent jurisdiction may issue an order postponing the sale. Section 2923.5 and section 2924g, subdivision (c)(1)(A), when read together, establish a natural, logical whole, and one wholly consonant with the Legislature’s intent in enacting 2923.5 to have individual borrowers and lenders “assess” and “explore” alternatives to foreclosure: If section 2923.5 is not complied with, then there is no valid notice of default, and without a valid notice of default, a foreclosure sale cannot proceed. The available, existing remedy is found in the ability of a court in section 2924g, subdivision (c)(1)(A), to postpone the sale until there has been compliance with section 2923.5. Reading section 2923.5 together with section 2924g, subdivision (c)(1)(A) gives section 2923.5 real effect. The alternative would mean that the Legislature conferred a right on individual borrowers in section 2923.5 without any means of enforcing that right.
By the same token, compliance with section 2923.5 is necessarily an individualized process. After all, the details of a borrower’s financial situation and the options open to a particular borrower to avoid foreclosure are going to vary, sometimes widely, from borrower to borrower. Section 2923.5 is not a statute, like subdivision (h) of section 790.03 of the Insurance Code construed in Moradi-Shalal, which contemplates a frequent or general business practice, and thus its very text is necessarily directed at those who regulate the insurance industry. (Insurance Code section 790.03, subdivision (h) begins with the words, “Knowingly committing or performing with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice any of the following unfair claims settlement practices: . . . .”; see generally Moradi-Shalal, supra, 46 Cal.3d 287.)
Rather, in order to have its obvious goal of forcing parties to communicate (the statutory words are “assess” and “explore”) about a borrower’s situation and the options to avoid foreclosure, section 2923.5 necessarily confers an individual right. The alternative proffered by the trial court — enforcement by the servicer of pooling agreements — involves the facially unworkable problem of fitting individual situations into collective pools.
The suggestion of one amicus that the Legislature intended enforcement of section 2923.5 to reside within the Attorney General’s office is one of which we express no opinion. Our decision today should thus not be read as precluding such enforcement by the Attorney General’s office. But we do note that the same individual-collective problem would dog Attorney General enforcement of the statute. To be sure (which is why the possibility should be left open), there might, ala Insurance Code section 790.03, subdivision (h), be lenders who systematically ignore section 2923.5, and their “general business practice” would be susceptible to some sort of collective enforcement. Even so, the Attorney General’s office can hardly be expected to take up the cause of every individual borrower whose diverse circumstances show noncompliance with section 2923.5.
3. Application
We now put the preceding ideas and factors together.
While the dropping of an express provision for private enforcement in the legislative process leading to section 2923.5 does indeed give us pause, it is outweighed by two major opposing factors. First, the very structure of section 2923.5 is inherently individual. That fact strongly suggests a legislative intention to allow individual enforcement of the statute. The statute would become a meaningless dead letter if no individual enforcement were allowed: It would mean that the Legislature created an inherently individual right and decided there was no remedy at all.
Second, when section 2923.5 was enacted as an urgency measure, there already was an existing enforcement mechanism at hand — section 2924g. There was no need to write a provision into section 2923.5 allowing a borrower to obtain a postponement of a foreclosure sale, since such a remedy was already present in section 2924g. Reading the two statutes together as allowing a remedy of postponement of foreclosure produces a logical and natural whole.
B. Tender Full Amount of Indebtedness? No
The right conferred by section 2923.5 is a right to be contacted to “assess” and “explore” alternatives to foreclosure prior to a notice of default. It is enforced by the postponement of a foreclosure sale. Therefore it would defeat the purpose of the statute to require the borrower to tender the full amount of the indebtedness prior to any enforcement of the right to — and that’s the point — the right to be contacted prior to the notice of default. Case law requiring payment or tender of the full amount of payment before any foreclosure sale can be postponed (e.g., Arnolds Management Corp. v. Eischen (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 575, 578 [“It is settled that an action to set aside a trustee’s sale for irregularities in sale notice or procedure should be accompanied by an offer to pay the full amount of the debt for which the property was security.”]) arises out of a paradigm where, by definition, there is no way that a foreclosure sale can be avoided absent payment of all the indebtedness. Any irregularities in the sale would necessarily be harmless to the borrower if there was no full tender. (See 4 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (2d ed. 1989) § 9:154, pp. 507-508.) By contrast, the whole point of section 2923.5 is to create a new, even if limited right, to be contacted about the possibility of alternatives to full payment of arrearages. It would be contradictory to thwart the very operation of the statute if enforcement were predicated on full tender. It is well settled that statutes can modify common law rules. (E.g., Evangelatos v. Superior Court
44 Cal.3d 1188, 1192 [noting that Civil Code sections 1431 to 1431.5 had modified traditional common law doctrine of joint and several liability].)
C. Preempted by Federal Law? No — As Long
As Relief Under Section 2923.5 is Limited to Just Postponement
1. Historical Context
A remarkable aspect of section 2923.5 is that it appears to have been carefully drafted to avoid bumping into federal law, precisely because it is limited to affording borrowers only more time when lenders do not comply with the statute. To explain that, though, we need to make a digression into state debtors’ relief acts as they have manifested themselves in four previous periods of economic distress.
The first period of economic distress was the depression of the mid-1780’s that played a large part in engendering the United States Constitution in the first place. As Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes would later note for a majority of the United States Supreme Court, there was “widespread distress following the revolutionary period and the plight of debtors, had called forth in the States an ignoble array of legislative schemes for the defeat of creditors and the invasion of contractual obligations.” (Home Building and Loan Ass’n. v. Blaisdell (1934) 290 U.S. 398, 427 (Blaisdell).) Consequently, the federal Constitution of 1789 contains the contracts clause, which forbids states from impairing contracts. (See Siegel, Understanding the Nineteenth Century Contract Clause: The Role of the Property-Privilege Distinction and ‘Takings’ Clause Jurisprudence (1986) 60 So.Cal. L.Rev. 1, 21, fn. 86 [“Although debtor relief legislation was frequently enacted in the Confederation era, it was intensely opposed. It was among the chief motivations for the convening of the Philadelphia convention, and the Constitution drafted there was designed to eliminate such legislation through a variety of means.”].)
The second period of distress arose out of the panic of 1837, which prompted, in 1841, the Illinois state legislature to enact legislation severely restricting foreclosures. The legislation (1) gave debtors 12 months after any foreclosure sale to redeem the property; and (2) prevented any foreclosure sale in the first place unless the sale fetched at least two-thirds of the appraised value of the property. (See Bronson v. Kinzie (1843) 42 U.S. 311 (Bronson); Blaisdell, supra, 290 U.S. at p. 431.) In an opinion, the main theme of which is the interrelationship between contract rights and legal remedies to enforce those rights (see generally Bronson, supra, 42 U.S. at pp. 315-321), the Bronson court reasoned that the Illinois legislation had effectively destroyed the contract rights of the lender as regards a mortgage made in 1838. (See id. at p. 317 [“the obligation of the contract, and the rights of a party under it, may, in effect, be destroyed by denying a remedy altogether”].)
The third period of distress was, of course, the Great Depression of the 1930’s. In 1933, the Minnesota Legislature enacted a mortgage moratorium law that extended the period of redemption under Minnesota law until 1935. (See Blaisdell, supra, 290 U.S. at pp. 415-416.) But — and the high court majority found this significant — the law required debtors, in applying for an extension of the redemption period — to pay the reasonable value of the income of the property, or reasonable rental value if it didn’t produce income. (Id. at. pp. 416-417.) The legislation was famously upheld in Blaisdell. In distinguishing Bronson, the Blaisdell majority made the point that the statute did not substantively impair the debt the way the legislation in Bronson had: “The statute,” said the court, “does not impair the integrity of the mortgage indebtedness.” (Id. at p. 425.) The court went on to emphasize the need to pay the fair rental value of the property, which, it noted, was “the equivalent of possession during the extended period.”
Finally, the fourth period was within the living memory of many readers, namely, the extraordinary inflation and high interest rates of the late 1970’s. That period engendered Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Association v. de la Cuesta (1982) 458 U.S. 141 (de la Cuesta). Many mortgages had (still have) what is known as a “due-on-sale” clause. As it played out in the 1970’s, the clause effectively required any buyer of a new home to obtain a new loan, but at the then-very high market interest rates. To circumvent the need for a new high rate mortgage, creative wrap-around financing was invented where a buyer would assume the obligation of the old mortgage, but that required the due-on-sale clause not be enforced.
An earlier decision of the California Supreme Court, Wellenkamp v. Bank of America (1978) 21 Cal.3d 943, had encouraged this sort of creative financing by holding that due-on-sale clauses violated California state law as an unreasonable restraint on alienation. Despite that precedent, the trial judge in the de la Cuesta case (Edward J. Wallin, who would later join this court) held that regulations issued by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, by the authority of the Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933 preempted state law that invalidated due-on-sale clause. A California appellate court in the Fourth District (in an opinion by Justice Marcus Kaufman, who would later join the California Supreme Court) reversed the trial court. The United States Supreme Court, however, agreed with Judge Wallin’s determination, and reversed the appellate judgment and squarely held the state law to be preempted.
The de la Cuesta court observed that the bank board’s regulations were plain — “even” the California appellate court had been required to recognize that. (de la Cuesta, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 154). On top of the express preemption, Congress had expressed no intent to limit the bank board’s authority to “regulate the lending practices of federal savings and loans.” (Id. at p. 161.) Further, going into the history of the Home Owners’ Loan Act, the de la Cuesta court pointed out that “mortgage lending practices” are a “critical” aspect of a savings and loan’s “‘operation,’” and the Home Loan Bank Board had issued the due-on-sale regulations in order to protect the economic solvency of such lenders. (See id. at pp. 167-168.) In what is perhaps the most significant part of the rationale for our purposes, the bank board had concluded that “the due-on-sale clause is ‘an important part of the mortgage contract,’” consequently its elimination would have an adverse effect on the “financial stability” of federally chartered lenders. (Id. at p. 168.) For example, invalidation of the due-on-sale clause would make it hard for savings and loans “to sell their loans in the secondary markets.” (Ibid.)
With this history behind us, we now turn to the actual regulations at issue in the case before us.
2. The HOLA Regulations
Under the Home Owner’s Loan Act of 1933 (12 U.S.C. § 1461 et seq.) the federal Office of Thrift Supervision has issued section 560.2 of title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations, a regulation that itself delineates what is a matter for federal regulation, and what is a matter for state law. Interestingly enough, section 560.2 is written in the form of examples, using the “ejusdem generis” approach of requiring a court to figure out what is, and what is not, in the same general class or category as the items given in the example.
On the preempted side, section 560.2 includes:
— “terms of credit, including amortization of loans and the deferral and capitalization of interest and adjustments to the interest rate” (§ 560.2(b)(4));
— “balance, payments due, or term to maturity of the loan” (§ 560.2(b)(4)); and, most importantly for this case,
— the “processing, origination, servicing, sale or purchase of, or investment or participation in, mortgages.” (§ 560.2(b)(10), italics added.)
On the other side, left for the state courts, is “Real property law.” (12 C.F.R. § 560.2(c)(2).)
We agree with the Mabrys that the process of foreclosure has traditionally been a matter of state real property law, a point both noted by the United States Supreme Court in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1994) 511 U.S. 531, 541-542, and academic commentators (e.g., Alexander, Federal Intervention in Real Estate Finance: Preemption and Federal Common Law (1993) 71 N.C. L. Rev. 293, 293 [“Historically, real property law has been the exclusive domain of the states.”]), including at least one law professor who laments that diverse state foreclosure laws tend to hinder efforts to achieve banking stability at the national level. (See Nelson, Confronting the Mortgage Meltdown: A Brief for the Federalization of State Mortgage Foreclosure Law (2010) 37 Pepperdine L.Rev. 583, 588-590 [noting that mortgage foreclosure law varies from state to state, and advocating federalization of mortgage foreclosure law].) By contrast, we have not been cited to anything in the federal regulations that govern such things as initiation of foreclosure, notice of foreclosure sales, allowable times until foreclosure, or redemption periods. (Though there are commentators, like Professor Nelson, who argue there should be.)
Given the traditional state control over mortgage foreclosure laws, it is logical to conclude that if the Office of Thrift Supervision wanted to include foreclosure as within the preempted category of loan servicing, it would have been explicit. Nothing prevented the office from simply adding the words “foreclosure of” to section 560.2(b)(10).
D. The Extent of Section 2923.5?
More Time and Only More Time
State law should be construed, whenever possible, to be in harmony with federal law, so as to avoid having the state law invalidated by federal preemption. (See Greater Westchester Homeowners Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1979) 26 Cal.3d 86, 93; California Arco Distributors, Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 349, 359.)
We emphasize that we are able to come to our conclusion that section 2923.5 is not preempted by federal banking regulations because it is, or can be construed to be, very narrow. As mentioned above, there is no right, for example, under the statute, to a loan modification.
A few more comments on the scope of the statute:
First, to the degree that the words “assess” and “explore” can be narrowly or expansively construed, they must be narrowly construed in order to avoid crossing the line from state foreclosure law into federally preempted loan servicing. Hence, any “assessment” must necessarily be simple — something on the order of, “why can’t you make your payments?” The statute cannot require the lender to consider a whole new loan application or take detailed loan application information over the phone. (Or, as is unlikely, in person.)
Second, the same goes for any “exploration” of options to avoid foreclosure. Exploration must necessarily be limited to merely telling the borrower the traditional ways that foreclosure can be avoided (e.g., deeds “in lieu,” workouts, or short sales), as distinct from requiring the lender to engage in a process that would be functionally indistinguishable from taking a loan application in the first place. In this regard, we note that section 2923.5 directs lenders to refer the borrower to “the toll-free telephone number made available by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to find a HUD-certified housing counseling agency.” The obvious implication of the statute’s referral clause is that the lender itself does not have any duty to become a loan counselor itself.
Finally, to the degree that the “assessment” or “exploration” requirements impose, in practice, burdens on federal savings banks that might arguably push the statute out of the permissible category of state foreclosure law and into the federally preempted category of loan servicing or loan making, evidence of such a burden is necessary before the argument can be persuasive. For the time being, and certainly on this record, we cannot say that section 2923.5, narrowly construed, strays over the line.
Given such a narrow construction, section 2923.5 does not, as the law in Blaisdell did not, affect the “integrity” of the basic debt. (Cf. Lopez v. World Savings & Loan Assn. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 729 [section 560.2 preempted state law that capped payoff demand statement fees].)
E. The Wording of the Declaration:
Okay If Not Under Penalty of Perjury
In addition to the substantive act of contacting the borrower, section 2923.5 requires a statement in the notice of default. The statement is found in subdivision (b), which we quote here: “(b) A notice of default filed pursuant to Section 2924 shall include a declaration that the mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent has contacted the borrower, has tried with due diligence to contact the borrower as required by this section, or that no contact was required pursuant to subdivision (h).” (Italics added.)
The idea that this “declaration” must be made under oath must be rejected. First, ordinary English usage of the word “declaration” imports no requirement that it be under oath. In the Oxford English Dictionary, for example, numerous definitions of the word are found, none of which of require a statement under oath or penalty of perjury. In fact, the second legal definition given actually juxtaposes the idea of a declaration against the idea of a statement under oath: “A simple affirmation to be taken, in certain cases, instead of an oath or solemn affirmation.” (4 Oxford English Dict. (2d. ed. 1991) at p. 336.)
Second, even the venerable Black’s Law Dictionary doesn’t define “declaration” to necessarily be under oath. Its very first definition of the word is: “A formal statement, proclamation or announcement, esp. one embodied in an instrument.” (Black’s Law Dict. (9th ed. 2009) at p. 467.)
Third, if the Legislature wanted to say that the statement required in section 2923.5 must be under penalty of perjury, it knew how to do so. The words “penalty of perjury” are used in other laws governing mortgages. (E.g., § 2941.7, subdivision (b) [“The declaration provided for in this section shall be signed by the mortgagor or trustor under penalty of perjury.”].)
And, finally — back to our point about the inherent individual operation of the statute — the very structure of subdivision (b) belies any insertion of a penalty of perjury requirement. The way section 2923.5 is set up, too many people are necessarily involved in the process for any one person to likely be in the position where he or she could swear that all three requirements of the declaration required by subdivision (b) were met. We note, for example, that subdivision (a)(2) requires any one of three entities (a “mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent”) to contact the borrower, and such entities may employ different people for that purpose. And the option under the statute of no contact being required (per subdivision (h) ) further involves individuals who would, in any commercial operation, probably be different from the people employed to do the contacting. For example, the person who would know that the borrower had surrendered the keys would in all likelihood be a different person than the legal officer who would know that the borrower had filed for bankruptcy.
The argument for requiring the declaration to be under penalty of perjury relies on section 2015.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but that reliance is misplaced. We quote all of section 2015.5 in the margin. Essentially the statute says if a statement in writing is required to be supported by sworn oath, making the statement under penalty of perjury will be sufficient. The key language is: “Whenever, under any law of this state . . . made pursuant to the law of this state, any matter is required . . . to be . . . evidenced . . . by the sworn . . . declaration . . . in writing of the person making the same . . . such matter may with like force and effect be . . . evidenced . . . by the unsworn . . . declaration . . . in writing of such person which recites that it is . . . declared by him or her to be true under penalty of perjury . . . .” (Italics added.) The section sheds no light on whether the declaration required in section 2923.5, subdivision (b) must be under penalty of perjury.
F. The Wording of the Declaration:
Okay If It Tracks the Statute
In light of what we have just said about the multiplicity of persons who would necessarily have to sign off on the precise category in subdivision (b) of the statute that would apply in order to proceed with foreclosure (contact by phone, contact in person, unsuccessful attempts at contact by phone or in person, bankruptcy, borrower hiring a foreclosure consultant, surrender of keys), and the possibility that such persons might be employees of not less than three entities (mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent), there is no way we can divine an intention on the part of the Legislature that each notice of foreclosure be custom drafted.
To which we add this important point: By construing the notice requirement of section 2923.5, subdivision (b), to require only that the notice track the language of the statute itself, we avoid the problem of the imposition of costs beyond the minimum costs now required by our reading of the statute.
G. Noncompliance Before Foreclosure
Sale Affect Title After Foreclosure Sale? No
A primary reason for California’s comprehensive regulation of foreclosure in the Civil Code is to ensure stability of title after a trustee’s sale. (Melendrez v. D & I Investment, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1249-1250 [“comprehensive statutory scheme” governing foreclosure has three purposes, one of which is “to ensure that a properly conducted sale is final between the parties and conclusive as to a bona fide purchaser” (internal quotations omitted)].)
There is nothing in section 2923.5 that even hints that noncompliance with the statute would cause any cloud on title after an otherwise properly conducted foreclosure sale. We would merely note that under the plain language of section 2923.5, read in conjunction with section 2924g, the only remedy provided is a postponement of the sale before it happens.
H. Lender Compliance in This Case?
Somebody is Not Telling the Truth
and It’s the Trial Court’s Job to
Determine Who It Is
We have already recounted the conflict in the evidence before the trial court regarding whether there was compliance with section 2923.5. Rarely, in fact, are stories so diametrically opposite: According to the Mabrys, there was no contact at all. According to Aurora, not only were there numerous contacts, but the Mabrys even initiated a proposal by which their attorney would buy the property.
Somebody’s not telling the truth, but appellate courts do not resolve conflicts in evidence. Trial courts do. (Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 697, fn. 23 [“Moreover, Diaz and Bezemek concede the proffered evidence is disputed; appellate courts will not resolve such factual conflicts.”].) This case will obviously have to be remanded for an evidentiary hearing.
I. Is This Case Suitable for
Class Action Treatment? No
As we have seen, section 2923.5 contemplates highly-individuated facts. One borrower might not pick up the telephone, one lender might only call at the same time each day in violation of the statute, one lender might (incorrectly) try to get away with a form letter, one borrower might, like the old Twilight Zone “pitchman” episode, try to keep the caller on the line but change the subject and talk about anything but alternatives to foreclosure, one borrower might, as Aurora asserts here, try to have his or her attorney do a deal that avoids foreclosure, etcetera.
In short, how in the world would a court certify a class? Consider that in this case, there is even a dispute over the basic facts as to whether the lender attempted to comply at all. We do not have, under these facts at least, a question of a clean, systematic policy on the part of a lender that might be amenable to a class action (or perhaps enforcement by the Attorney General). This case is not one, to be blunt, where the lender admits that it simply ignored the statute and proceeded on the theory that federal law had preempted it. We express no opinion as to any scenario where a lender simply ignored the statute wholesale — that sort of scenario is why we do not preclude, a priori, class actions and have not expressed an opinion as to whether the Attorney General or a private party in such a situation might indeed seek to enforce section 2923.5 in a class action.
Consequently, while we must grant the writ petition so as to allow the Mabrys a hearing on the factual merits of compliance, we deny it insofar as it seeks reinstatement of any claims qua class action. By the same token, in light of the limited right to time conferred under section 2923.5, we also deny the writ petition insofar as it seeks reinstatement of any claim for money damages.
IV. CONCLUSION
Let a writ issue instructing the trial court to decide whether or not Aurora complied with section 2923.5. To the degree that the trial court’s order precludes the assertion of any class action claims, we deny the writ. If the trial court finds that Aurora has complied with section 2923.5, foreclosure may proceed. If not, it shall be postponed until Aurora files a new notice of default in the wake of substantive compliance with section 2923.5.
Given that this writ petition is granted in part and denied in part, each side will bear its own costs in this proceeding.

SILLS, P. J.
WE CONCUR:

ARONSON, J.

IKOLA, J.

non-judicial sale is NOT an available election for a securitized loan

Posted 6 days ago by Neil Garfield on Livinglies’s Weblog
NON-JUDICIAL STATES: THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FORECLOSURE AND SALE:

FORECLOSURE is a judicial process herein the “lender” files a lawsuit seeking to (a) enforce the note and get a judgment in the amount owed to them (b) asking the court to order the sale of the property to satisfy the Judgment. If the sale price is lower than the Judgment, then they will ask for a deficiency Judgment and the Judge will enter that Judgment. If the proceeds of sale is over the amount of the judgment, the borrower is entitled to the overage. Of course they usually tack on a number of fees and costs that may or may not be allowable. It is very rare that there is an overage. THE POINT IS that when they sue to foreclose they must make allegations which state a cause of action for enforcement of the note and for an order setting a date for sale. Those allegations include a description of the transaction with copies attached, and a claim of non-payment, together with allegations that the payments are owed to the Plaintiff BECAUSE they would suffer financial damage as a result of the non-payment. IN THE PROOF of the case the Plaintiff would be required to prove each and EVERY element of their claim which means proof that each allegation they made and each exhibit they rely upon is proven with live witnesses who are competent — i.e., they take an oath, they have PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE (not what someone else told them),personal recall and the ability to communicate what they know. This applies to documents they wish to use as well. That is called authentication and foundation.

SALE: Means what it says. In non-judicial sale they just want to sell your property without showing any court that they can credibly make the necessary allegations for a judicial foreclosure and without showing the court proof of the allegations they would be required to make if they filed a judicial foreclosure. In a non-judicial state what they want is to SELL and what they don’t want is to foreclose. Keep in mind that every state that allows non-judicial sale treats the sale as private and NOT a judicial event by definition. In Arizona and many other states there is no election for non-judicial sale of commercial property because of the usual complexity of commercial transactions. THE POINT is that a securitized loan presents as much or more complexity than commercial real property loan transactions. Thus your argument might be that the non-judicial sale is NOT an available election for a securitized loan.

When you bring a lawsuit challenging the non-judicial sale, it would probably be a good idea to allege that the other party has ELECTED NON-JUDICIAL sale when the required elements of such an election do not exist. Your prima facie case is simply to establish that the borrower objects the sale, denies that they pretender lender has any right to sell the property, denies the default and that the securitization documents show a complexity far beyond the complexity of even highly complex commercial real estate transactions which the legislature has mandated be resolved ONLY by judicial foreclosure.

THEREFORE in my opinion I think in your argument you do NOT want to concede that they wish to foreclose. What they want to do is execute on the power of sale in the deed of trust WITHOUT going through the judicial foreclosure process as provided in State statutes. You must understand and argue that the opposition is seeking to go around normal legal process which requires a foreclosure lawsuit.

THAT would require them to make allegations about the obligation, note and mortgage that they cannot make (we are the lender, the defendant owes us money, we are the holder of the note, the note is payable to us, he hasn’t paid, the unpaid balance of the note is xxx etc.) and they would have to prove those allegations before you had to say anything. In addition they would be subject to discovery in which you could test their assertions before an evidentiary hearing. That is how lawsuits work.

The power of sale given to the trustee is a hail Mary pass over the requirements of due process. But it allows for you to object. The question which nobody has asked and nobody has answered, is on the burden of proof, once you object to the sale, why shouldn’t the would-be forecloser be required to plead and prove its case? If the court takes the position that in non-judicial states the private power of sale is to be treated as a judicial event, then that is a denial of due process required by Federal and state constitutions. The only reason it is allowed, is because it is private and “non-judicial.” The quirk comes in because in practice the homeowner must file suit. Usually the party filing suit must allege facts and prove a prima facie case before the burden shifts to the other side. So the Judge is looking at you to do that when you file to prevent the sale.

Legally, though, your case should be limited to proving that they are trying to sell your property, that you object, that you deny what would be the allegations in a judicial foreclosure and that you have meritorious defenses. That SHOULD trigger the requirement of re-orienting the parties and making the would-be forecloser file a complaint (lawsuit) for foreclosure. Then the burden of proof would be properly aligned with the party seeking affirmative relief (i.e., the party who wants to enforce the deed of trust (mortgage), note and obligation) required to file the complaint with all the necessary elements of an action for foreclosure and attach the necessary exhibits. They don’t want to do that because they don’t have the exhibits and the note is not payable to them and they cannot actually prove standing (which is a jurisdictional question). The problem is that a statute passed for judicial economy is now being used to force the burden of proof onto the borrower in the foreclosure of their own home. This is not being addressed yet but it will be addressed soon.

Fannie Mae Policy Now Admits Loan Not Secured

Posted 14 hours ago by Neil Garfield on Livinglies’s Weblog

29248253-Mers-May-Not-Foreclosure-for-Fannie-Mae

Editor’s Note: Their intention was to get MERS and servicers out of the foreclosure business. They now say that prior to foreclosure MERS must assign to the real party in interest.

Here’s their problem: As numerous Judges have pointed out, MERS specifically disclaims any interest in the obligation, note or mortgage. Even the language of the mortgage or Deed of Trust says MERS is mentioned in name only and that the Lender is somebody else.

These Judges who have considered the issue have come up with one conclusion, an assignment from a party with no right, title or interest has nothing to assign. The assignment may look good on its face but there still is the problem that nothing was assigned.

Here’s the other problem. If MERS was there in name only to permit transfers and other transactions off-record (contrary to state law) and if the original party named as “Lender” is no longer around, then what you have is a gap in the chain of custody and chain of title with respect to the creditor’s side of the loan. It is all off record which means, ipso facto that it is a question of fact as to whose loan it is. That means, ipso facto, that the presence of MERS makes it a judicial question which means that the non-judicial election is not available. They can’t do it.

So when you put this all together, you end up with the following inescapable conclusions:

* The naming of MERS as mortgagee in a mortgage deed or as beneficiary in a deed of trust is a nullity.
* MERS has no right, title or interest in any loan and even if it did, it disclaims any such interest on its own website.
* The lender might be the REAL beneficiary, but that is a question of fact so the non-judicial foreclosure option is not available.
* If the lender was not the creditor, it isn’t the lender because it had no right title or interest either, legally or equitably.
* Without a creditor named in the security instrument intended to secure the obligation, the security was never perfected.
* Without a creditor named in the security instrument intended to secure the obligation, the obligation is unsecured as to legal title.
* Since the only real creditor is the one who advanced the funds (the investor(s)), they can enforce the obligation by proxy or directly. Whether the note is actually evidence of the obligation and to what extent the terms of the note are enforceable is a question for the court to determine.
* The creditor only has a claim if they would suffer loss as a result of the indirect transaction with the borrower. If they or their agents have received payments from any source, those payments must be allocated to the loan account. The extent and measure of said allocation is a question of fact to be determined by the Court.
* Once established, the allocation will most likely be applied in the manner set forth in the note, to wit: (a) against payments due (b) against fees and (c) against principal, in that order.
* Once applied against payments, due the default vanishes unless the allocation is less than the amount due in payments.
* Once established, the allocation results in a fatal defect in the notice of default, the statements sent to the borrower, and the representations made in court. Thus at the very least they must vacate all foreclosure proceedings and start over again.
* If the allocation is less than the amount of payments due, then the investor(s) collectively have a claim for acceleration and to enforce the note — but they have no claim on the mortgage deed or deed of trust. By intentionally NOT naming parties who were known at the time of the transaction the security was split from the obligation. The obligation became unsecured.
* The investors MIGHT have a claim for equitable lien based upon the circumstances that BOTH the borrower and the investor were the victims of fraud.

Double dipping They foreclose, Get Insurance, Get Tarp, Get yeild prem, Bailout our tax money then they evict…

See this motion for discovery it shows all the sources of recovery for the lenders it also shows the trustees take the money and don’t even allocate to the investors but keep it

remic-brief-with-exhibits-and-bkr-decision-champerty-distribution-report-appraisal-reduction-event

Pretender Lenders

— read and weep. Game Over. Over the next 6-12 months the entire foreclosure mess is going to be turned on its head as it becomes apparent to even the most skeptical that the mortgage mess is just that — a mess. From the time the deed was recorded to the time the assignments, powers of attorneys, notarization and other documents were fabricated and executed there is an 18 minute Nixonian gap in the record that cannot be cured. Just because you produce documents, however real they appear, does not mean you can shift the burden of proof onto the borrower. In California our legislator have attempted to slow this train wreck but the pretender lenders just go on with the foreclosure by declaring to the foreclosure trustee the borrower is in default and they have all the documents the trustee then records a false document. A notice of default filed pursuant to Section 2924 shall include a declaration from the mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent that it has contacted the borrower, tried with due diligence to contact the borrower as required by this section, or the borrower has surrendered the property to the mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent.
Invalid Declaration on Notice of Default and/or Notice of Trustee’s Sale.

The purpose of permitting a declaration under penalty of perjury, in lieu of a sworn statement, is to help ensure that declarations contain a truthful factual representation and are made in good faith. (In re Marriage of Reese & Guy, 73 Cal. App. 4th 1214, 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339 (4th Dist. 1999).
In addition to California Civil Code §2923.5, California Code of Civil Procedure §2015.5 states:
Whenever, under any law of this state or under any rule, regulation, order or requirement made pursuant to the law of this state, any matter is required or permitted to be supported, evidenced, established, or proved by the sworn statement, declaration, verification, certificate, oath, or affidavit, in writing of the person making the same, such matter may with like force and effect be supported, evidenced, established or proved by the unsworn statement, declaration, verification, or certificate, in writing of such person which recites that is certified or declared by him or her to be true under penalty of perjury, is subscribed by him or her, and (1), if executed within this state, states the date and place of execution; (2) if executed at any place, within or without this state, states the date of execution and that is so certified or declared under the laws of the State of California. The certification or declaration must be in substantially the following form:
(a) If executed within this state:
“I certify (or declare) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct”:
_____________________ _______________________
(Date and Place) (Signature)

For our purposes we need not look any farther than the Notice of Default to find the declaration is not signed under penalty of perjury; as mandated by new Civil Code §2923.5(c). (Blum v. Superior Court (Copley Press Inc.) (2006) 141 Cal App 4th 418, 45 Cal. Reptr. 3d 902 ). The Declaration is merely a form declaration with a check box.

No Personal Knowledge of Declarant
According to Giles v. Friendly Finance Co. of Biloxi, Inc., 199 So. 2nd 265 (Miss. 1967), “an affidavit on behalf of a corporation must show that it was made by an authorized officer or agent, and the officer him or herself must swear to the facts.” Furthermore, in Giles v. County Dep’t of Public Welfare of Marion County (Ind.App. 1 Dist.1991) 579 N.E.2d 653, 654-655 states in pertinent part, “a person who verified a pleading to have personal knowledge or reasonable cause to believe the existence of the facts stated therein.” Here, the Declaration for the Notice of Default by the agent does not state if the agent has personal knowledge and how he obtained this knowledge.
The proper function of an affidavit is to state facts, not conclusions, ¹ and affidavits that merely state conclusions rather than facts are insufficient. ² An affidavit must set forth facts and show affirmatively how the affiant obtained personal knowledge of those facts. ³
Here, The Notice of Default does not have the required agent’s personal knowledge of facts and if the Plaintiff borrower was affirmatively contacted in person or by telephone
to assess the Plaintiff’s financial situation and explore options for the Plaintiff to avoid foreclosure. A simple check box next to the “facts” does not suffice.
Furthermore, “it has been said that personal knowledge of facts asserted in an affidavit is not presumed from the mere positive averment of facts, but rather, a court should be shown how the affiant knew or could have known such facts, and, if there is no evidence from which the inference of personal knowledge can be drawn, then it is
¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬____________________________________________________________________________
¹ Lindley v. Midwest Pulmonary Consultants, P.C., 55 S.W.3d 906 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 2001).
² Jaime v. St. Joseph Hosp. Foundation, 853 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 1993).
³ M.G.M. Grand Hotel, Inc. v. Castro, 8 S.W.3d 403 (Tex. App. Corpus Chrisit 1999).

presumed that from which the inference of personal knowledge can be drawn, then it is presumed that such does not exist.” ¹ The declaration signed by agent does not state anywhere how he knew or could have known if Plaintiff was contacted in person or by telephone to explore different financial options. It is vague and ambiguous if he himself called plaintiff.
This defendant did not adhere to the mandates laid out by congress before a foreclosure can be considered duly perfected. The Notice of Default states,

“That by reason thereof, the present beneficiary under such deed of trust, has executed and delivered to said agent, a written Declaration of Default and Demand for same, and has deposited with said agent such Deed of Trust and all documents evidencing obligations secured thereby, and has declared and does hereby declare all sums secured thereby immediately due and payable and has elected and does hereby elect to cause the trust property to be sold to satisfy the obligations secured thereby.”

However, Defendants do not have and assignment of the deed of trust nor have they complied with 2923.5 or 2923.6 or 2924 the Deed of Trust, nor do they provide any documents evidencing obligations secured thereby. For the aforementioned reasons, the Notice of Default will be void as a matter of law. The pretender lenders a banking on the “tender defense” to save them ie. yes we did not follow the law so sue us and when you do we will claim “tender” Check Mate but that’s not the law.

Recording a False Document
Furthermore, according to California Penal Code § 115 in pertinent part:
(a) Every person who knowingly procures or offers any false or forged instrument to be filed, registered, or recorded in any public office within this state, which instrument, if genuine, might be filed, registered, or recorded under any law of this state or of the United States, is guilty of a felony.

If you say you have a claim, you must prove it. If you say you are the lender, you must prove it. Legislators take notice: Just because bankers give you money doesn’t mean they can change 1000 years of common law, statutory law and constitutional law. It just won’t fly. And if you are a legislator looking to get elected or re-elected, your failure to act on what is now an obvious need to clear title and restore the wealth of your citizens who were cheated and defrauded, will be punished by the votes of your constituents.

The doan deal 3

California Civil Code 2923.6: California Courts’ Negative Rulings to Homeowners.

By Michael Doan on Apr 26, 2009 in Foreclosure Defense, Foreclosure News, Mortgage Servicer Abuses

In September, 2008, I wrote about the new effects of California Civil Code 2923.6 and how it would appear that home loans in California would require modifications to fair market value in certain situations.

Since then, many decisions have come down from local judges attempting to decipher exactly what it means. Unfortunately, most judges are of the opinion that newly enacted California Civil Code 2923.6 has no teeth, and is a meaningless statute.

Time and time again, California Courts are ruling that the new statute does not create any new duty for servicers of mortgages or that such duties do not apply to borrowers. These Courts then immediately dismiss the case, and usually do not even require the Defendant to file an Answer in Court, eliminating the Plaintiff’s right to any trial.

Notwithstanding some of these decisions, the statute was in fact specifically created to address the foreclosure crisis and help borrowers, as Noted in Section 1 of the Legislative Intent behind the Statute:

SECTION 1. The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:

(a) California is facing an unprecedented threat to its state economy and local economies because of skyrocketing residential property foreclosure rates in California. Residential property foreclosures increased sevenfold from 2006 to 2007. In 2007, more than 84,375 properties were lost to foreclosure in California, and 254,824 loans went into default, the first step in the foreclosure process.

(b) High foreclosure rates have adversely affected property values in California, and will have even greater adverse consequences as foreclosure rates continue to rise. According to statistics released by the HOPE NOW Alliance, the number of completed California foreclosure sales in 2007 increased almost threefold from 1,902 in the first quarter to 5,574 in the fourth quarter of that year. Those same statistics report that 10,556 foreclosure sales, almost double the number for the prior quarter, were completed just in the month of January 2008. More foreclosures means less money for schools, public safety, and other key services.

(c) Under specified circumstances, mortgage lenders and servicers are authorized under their pooling and servicing agreements to modify mortgage loans when the modification is in the best interest of investors. Generally, that modification may be deemed to be in the best interest of investors when the net present value of the income stream of the modified loan is greater than the amount that would be recovered through the disposition of the real property security through a foreclosure sale.

(d) It is essential to the economic health of California for the state to ameliorate the deleterious effects on the state economy and local economies and the California housing market that will result from the continued foreclosures of residential properties in unprecedented numbers by modifying the foreclosure process to require mortgagees, beneficiaries, or authorized agents to contact borrowers and explore options that could avoid foreclosure. These changes in accessing the state’s foreclosure process are essential to ensure that the process does not exacerbate the current crisis by adding more foreclosures to the glut of foreclosed properties already on the market when a foreclosure could have been avoided. Those additional foreclosures will further destabilize the housing market with significant, corresponding deleterious effects on the local and state economy.

(e) According to a survey released by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) on January 31, 2008, 57 percent of the nation’s late-paying borrowers do not know their lenders may offer alternatives to help them avoid foreclosure.

(f) As reflected in recent government and industry-led efforts to help troubled borrowers, the mortgage foreclosure crisis impacts borrowers not only in nontraditional loans, but also many borrowers in conventional loans.

(g) This act is necessary to avoid unnecessary foreclosures of residential properties and thereby provide stability to California’s statewide and regional economies and housing market by requiring early contact and communications between mortgagees, beneficiaries, or authorized agents and specified borrowers to explore options that could avoid foreclosure and by facilitating the modification or restructuring of loans in appropriate circumstances.

SEC. 7. Nothing in this act is intended to affect any local just-cause eviction ordinance. This act does not, and shall not be construed to, affect the authority of a public entity that otherwise exists to regulate or monitor the basis for eviction.

SEC. 8. The provisions of this act are severable. If any provision of this act or its application is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application.

The forgoing clearly illustrates that the California Legislature was specifically looking to curb foreclosures and provide modifications to homeowners in their statement of intent. Moreover, Section (a) of 2923.6 specifically references a new DUTY OWED TO ALL PARTIES in the loan pool:

(a) The Legislature finds and declares that any duty servicers may have to maximize net present value under their pooling and servicing agreements is owed to all parties in a loan pool, not to any particular parties,…..

California Civil Code 2923.6(a) specifically creates to a NEW DUTY not previously addressed in pooling and servicing agreements. It then states that such a DUTY not only applies to the particular parties of the loan pool, but ALL PARTIES. So here we have the clear black and white text of the law stating that if a duty exists in the pooling and servicing agreement to maximize net present value between particular parties of that pool(and by the way, every pooling and servicing agreement I have ever read have such duties), then those same duties extend to all parties in the pool.

So how do these Courts still decide that NO DUTY EXISTS??? How do these Courts dismiss cases by finding that the thousands of borrowers of the loan pool that FUND the entire loan pool are not parties to that pool?

Hmm, if they are really not parties to the loan pool, then why are they even required to make payments on the loans to the loan pools? As you can see, the logic from these courts that there is no duty or that such a duty does not extend to the borrower is nothing short of absurd.

To date, there are no appellate decision on point, but many are in the works. Perhaps these courts skip the DUTY provisions in clause (a) and focus on the fact that no remedy section exists in the statute (notwithstanding the violation of any statute is “Tort in Se”). Perhaps their dockets are too full to fully read the legislative history of the statute (yes, when printed out is about 6 inches thick!) Whatever the reason, it seems a great injustice is occurring to defaulting homeowners, and the housing crisis is only worsening by these decisions.

Yet the reality is that much of the current housing crisis has a solution in 2923.6, and is precisely why the legislature created this EMERGENCY LEGISLATION. Its very simple: Modify mortgages, keep people in their homes, foreclosures and housing supplies goes down, and prices stabilize. More importantly, to the Servicers and Lenders, is the fact that they are now better off since THEY GENERALLY SAVE $50,000 OR MORE in foreclosure costs when modifying a loan(yes, go ahead and google the general costs of foreclosure and you will see that a minimum of $50,000.00 in losses is the average). Thus it is strange why most Courts are ruling that the California Legislature spent a lot of time and money writing a MEANINGLESS STATUTE with no application or remedy to those in need of loan modification.

Well, at least one Judge recently got it right. On April 6, 2009, in Ventura, California, in Superior Court case number 56-2008-00333790-CU-OR-VTA, Judge Fred Bysshe denied Metrocities Mortgage’ motion to dismiss a lawsuit brought under 2923.6. Judge Bysshe ruled that 2923.6 is not a matter of law that can be decided in the beginning of a lawsuit to dismiss it, but is instead a matter of fact that needs to be decided later:

THE COURT: Well, at this juncture in this case the Court holds that section 2923.6 was the legislature’s attempt to deal with a collapsing mortgage industry, and also to stabilize the market. And the Court’s ruling is to overrule the demurrer. Require the defendant to file an answer on or before April 27, 2009. And at this juncture with regard to the defendant’s request to set aside the Lis Pendens, that request is denied without prejudice.

Hopefully, more judges will now follow suit and appeals courts will have the same rulings. To read the actual transcript of the forgoing case, please click to my other blog here.

Written by Michael Doan

Countrywide complaint

countrywide_fin_class_action_defense_mdl

Homecomings TILA complaint GMAC

homecomingstila

Leman Tila complaint

Lemantilacomp

Lender class action

Mortgageinvestorgroupclass

Option One Complaint Pick a payment lawsuit

optionone

What is worse bankruptcy or foreclosure?

So what is worse, bankruptcy or foreclosure? Which will have the biggest impact on my credit score? Both bankruptcy and foreclosure will have serious negative affects on your personal credit report and your credit score as well. With re-established credit after a bankruptcy and/or foreclosure you can possibly qualify for a good mortgage once again in as little as 24 months. Therefore, it is very difficult to say one is worse than the other, but the bottom line is that they are both very bad for you and should be avoided if all possible.

Foreclosure is worse then bankruptcy because you are actually losing something of value, your home. Once you are in foreclosure you will lose any and all equity in your home. If there is no equity in the home you will be responsible for the remaining balance after the property auction. With chapter 7 bankruptcy all of your unsecured debts are erased and you start over and in most cases you will not lose anything other then your credit rating.

Many times qualifying for a mortgage after a foreclosure is more difficult than applying for a home after a bankruptcy. With that said, that could possibly lead you to believe that foreclosure is worse than bankruptcy. Most people who have a home foreclosed upon end up filing bankruptcy as well.

Bankruptcy and Foreclosure filings are public records, however no one would know about your proceedings under normal circumstances. The Credit Bureaus will record your bankruptcy and a foreclosure. Bankruptcies will remain on your credit record for 10 years while foreclosures can stay on your report for up to 7 years.

In some cases, one can refinance out of a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy with a 12 month trustee payment history and a timely mortgage history. It is much more difficult to obtain financing with a foreclosure on your record.

Foreclosure is worse because of the loss of value. You will not receive any compensation for the equity in your home if it proceeds to foreclosure.

Standing argument

judge-youngs-decision-on-nosek

Ameriquest’s final argument, that the sanctions are a
criminal penalty, is bereft of authority. Ameriquest cites F.J.
Hanshaw Enterprises, Inc. v. Emerald River Development, Inc., 244
F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2001), a case about inherent powers – not
Rule 11 –

This is an excerpt from the decision just this bloggers note the Hanshaw Case was my case. I argued this case at the 9th circuit court of appeals

http://openjurist.org/244/f3d/1128/fj-v-emeraldfj-v-emerald

If you will grasp the implications of this judge-youngs-decision-on-nosekdecision all or most all the evictions and  foreclosures are being litigated by the wrong parties that is to say parties who have no real stake in the outcome. they are merely servicers not the real investors. They do not have the right to foreclose or evict. No assignment No note No security interest No standing They do not want to be listed anywhere. They (the lenders) have caused the greatest damage to the American Citizen since the great depression and they do not want to be exposed or named in countless lawsuits. Time and time again I get from the judges in demurer hearings ” I see what you are saying counsel but your claim does not appear to be against this defendant” the unnamed investment pool of the Lehman Brothers shared High yield equity Fund trustee does not exist and so far can’t be sued.

Coalition sues lenders

Coalition Sues lenders

They are to give options to foreclosure 2923.5

(a) (1) A mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized
agent may not file a notice of default pursuant to Section 2924 until
30 days after contact is made as required by paragraph (2) or 30
days after satisfying the due diligence requirements as described in
subdivision (g).
   (2) A mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall contact
the borrower in person (and this does not mean agent for the foreclosure company) or by telephone in order to assess the
borrower's financial situation and explore options for the borrower
to avoid foreclosure. During the initial contact, the mortgagee,
beneficiary, or authorized agent shall advise the borrower that he or
she has the right to request a subsequent meeting and, if requested,
the mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall schedule the
meeting to occur within 14 days. The assessment of the borrower's
financial situation and discussion of options may occur during the
first contact, or at the subsequent meeting scheduled for that
purpose. In either case, the borrower shall be provided the toll-free
telephone number made available by the United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to find a HUD-certified housing
counseling agency. Any meeting may occur telephonically.
   (b) A notice of default filed pursuant to Section 2924 shall
include a declaration from the mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized
agent that it has contacted the borrower, tried with due diligence to
contact the borrower as required by this section, or the borrower
has surrendered the property to the mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary,
or authorized agent.
   (c) If a mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent had
already filed the notice of default prior to the enactment of this
section and did not subsequently file a notice of rescission, then
the mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall, as
part of the notice of sale filed pursuant to Section 2924f, include a
declaration that either:
   (1) States that the borrower was contacted to assess the borrower'
s financial situation and to explore options for the borrower to
avoid foreclosure.
   (2) Lists the efforts made, if any, to contact the borrower in the
event no contact was made.
   (d) A mortgagee's, beneficiary's, or authorized agent's loss
mitigation personnel may participate by telephone during any contact
required by this section.
   (e) For purposes of this section, a "borrower" shall include a
mortgagor or trustor.
   (f) A borrower may designate a HUD-certified housing counseling
agency, attorney, or other advisor to discuss with the mortgagee,
beneficiary, or authorized agent, on the borrower's behalf, options
for the borrower to avoid foreclosure. That contact made at the
direction of the borrower shall satisfy the contact requirements of
paragraph (2) of subdivision (a). Any loan modification or workout
plan offered at the meeting by the mortgagee, beneficiary, or
authorized agent is subject to approval by the borrower.
   (g) A notice of default may be filed pursuant to Section 2924 when
a mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent has not contacted a
borrower as required by paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) provided
that the failure to contact the borrower occurred despite the due
diligence of the mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent. For
purposes of this section, "due diligence" shall require and mean all
of the following:
   (1) A mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall first
attempt to contact a borrower by sending a first-class letter that
includes the toll-free telephone number made available by HUD to find
a HUD-certified housing counseling agency.
   (2) (A) After the letter has been sent, the mortgagee,
beneficiary, or authorized agent shall attempt to contact the
borrower by telephone at least three times at different hours and on
different days.  Telephone calls shall be made to the primary
telephone number on file.
   (B) A mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent may attempt to
contact a borrower using an automated system to dial borrowers,
provided that, if the telephone call is answered, the call is
connected to a live representative of the mortgagee, beneficiary, or
authorized agent.
   (C) A mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent satisfies the
telephone contact requirements of this paragraph if it determines,
after attempting contact pursuant to this paragraph, that the
borrower's primary telephone number and secondary telephone number or
numbers on file, if any, have been disconnected.
   (3) If the borrower does not respond within two weeks after the
telephone call requirements of paragraph (2) have been satisfied, the
mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall then send a
certified letter, with return receipt requested.
   (4) The mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall provide
a means for the borrower to contact it in a timely manner, including
a toll-free telephone number that will provide access to a live
representative during business hours.
   (5) The mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent has posted a
prominent link on the homepage of its Internet Web site, if any, to
the following information:
   (A) Options that may be available to borrowers who are unable to
afford their mortgage payments and who wish to avoid foreclosure, and
instructions to borrowers advising them on steps to take to explore
those options.
   (B) A list of financial documents borrowers should collect and be
prepared to present to the mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized
agent when discussing options for avoiding foreclosure.
   (C) A toll-free telephone number for borrowers who wish to discuss
options for avoiding foreclosure with their mortgagee, beneficiary,
or authorized agent.
   (D) The toll-free telephone number made available by HUD to find a
HUD-certified housing counseling agency.
   (h) Subdivisions (a), (c), and (g) shall not apply if any of the
following occurs:
   (1) The borrower has surrendered the property as evidenced by
either a letter confirming the surrender or delivery of the keys to
the property to the mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized
agent.
   (2) The borrower has contracted with an organization, person, or
entity whose primary business is advising people who have decided to
leave their homes on how to extend the foreclosure process and avoid
their contractual obligations to mortgagees or beneficiaries.
   (3) The borrower has filed for bankruptcy, and the proceedings
have not been finalized.
   (i) This section shall apply only to loans made from January 1,
2003, to December 31, 2007, inclusive, that are secured by
residential real property and are for owner-occupied residences. For
purposes of this subdivision, "owner-occupied" means that the
residence is the principal residence of the borrower.
  (j) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2013,
and as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted statute,
that is enacted before January 1, 2013, deletes or extends that da

United First Class Action

On Saturday March 7,2009 a meeting was held for 200 plus victims of the United First equity save your house scam. At that meeting it was determined that a class action should be filed to recover the funds lost by the victims of the unconscionable contract.

As a first step an involuntary Bankruptcy is being filed today March 9, 2009. To be considered as a creditor of said Bankruptcy please Fax the Joint Venture agreement and retainer agreement to 909-494-4214.
Additionally it is this attorneys opinion that said Bankruptcy will act as a “stay” for all averse actions being taken by lenders as against said victims. This opinion is based upon the fact that United First maintained an interest in the real property as a joint venture to 80% of the properties value(no matter how unconscionable this may be) this is an interest that can be protected by the Bankruptcy Stay 11 USC 362.

Banks Refusing To Take Back Foreclosed Properties

NPR ^
Posted on Saturday, March 07, 2009 11:56:28 PM by Chet 99
All Things Considered, March 3, 2009 • Let’s say you’re one of the millions of Americans facing foreclosure. You made mistakes, borrowed more than you should have — or maybe you lost your job — and now have to walk away from your house. In some parts of the country, simply walking away isn’t so simple — especially if the bank doesn’t want your house.
At 8:30 nearly every Monday morning, employees from the Cuyahoga County Sheriff’s Office stand in a windowless room in Cleveland’s Justice Center to auction off hundreds of foreclosed houses.
Hoping to buy are a few investors, bargain hunters and the rare person trying to save his or her house. Most often, it’s lawyers from local law firms representing global financial institutions who claim property here. Although these days, that’s starting to change.
When there’s no bid, the lender can either try to sell at another sheriff sale or do nothing. Doing nothing means the foreclosure is not complete. And Cleveland foreclosure attorney Larry Rothenberg says doing nothing is becoming more popular.
Lenders Not Bidding
“Lately, lenders are finding that the costs to purchase property at the sheriff sale and resell it, and the likelihood of finding a buyer weigh against a decision to buy the property. And so it’s become more likely than before that lenders are not entering bids at sheriff sales,” Rothenberg says.
That changes the foreclosure equation. Rick Sharga of RealtyTrac says employees at his online foreclosure sales company have heard of other cities where lenders are walking away from foreclosures, and he worries it could spread.
“There are some urban areas where you’ve had rapid price depreciation, where you also have extreme unemployment issues, and nobody’s buying the properties,” Sharga says. “All those conditions need to be in place before a lender is going to be motivated to do what you’re seeing happen now.”
And when lenders don’t complete a foreclosure action at a sheriff sale, the house stays in the homeowner’s name.
‘It’s Not My House’
Sharon Little says she was shocked to find out she was still listed as the owner of a rental property on a busy Cleveland street. She walked away from the house in 2006 when she declared bankruptcy. Since then, thieves have stripped the house of siding, copper plumbing, and even windows. She found out her name was still on the deed only when she got a summons last October to appear in housing court.
“Eventually, they’re going to tear this house down,” Little says. “Somebody’s going to have to foot the bill, and frankly I think it should be the bank because it’s their house. It’s not my house really, so …”
Begging For Foreclosure
But the city of Cleveland is writing tickets for housing code violations to whomever is listed on the deed.
Bus driver Curley Jackson has been on the phone with his loan servicers trying to persuade them to foreclose on property he can no longer afford.
“I surrendered these properties back to you all. I said, ‘You keep leaving them in my name, I’m getting these tickets.’ They don’t care. They’re not getting a ticket. They’re not getting threatened with jail,” Jackson says.
Cleveland Housing Court officials say they are now seeing homeowners take matters into their own hands. Little, for instance, wrote up a deed and gave her house to her lender.
“That’s because it was their house from the jump, so that’s what we do — give it right back to them. You can keep your house. I don’t want it,” Little says.
Untouchable Real Estate
Bankruptcy attorney Richard Nemeth has asked state lawmakers to propose a bill that would force lenders to completely follow through with foreclosure or forgive the homeowner’s debt.
“It’s a really sad set of affairs when people don’t want to touch a piece of real estate with a 10-foot pole,” Nemeth says.
County officials in Cleveland hope a new land bank will help solve this problem by giving lenders a place to dump unwanted property. In the meantime, the city is forced to use scarce tax dollars to maintain or demolish some of these unwanted foreclosed houses.

Lenders Fighting Mortgage Rewrite Measure Targets Bankrupt Homeowners

Sen. Richard J. Durbin’s bill would allow bankruptcy judges to alter the terms of first mortgages for primary residences.
Sen. Richard J. Durbin’s bill would allow bankruptcy judges to alter the terms of first mortgages for primary residences. (By Alex Wong — Associated Press)

By Jeffrey H. Birnbaum
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, February 22, 2008; Page D01

The nation’s largest lending institutions are lobbying hard to block a proposal in Congress that would give bankruptcy judges greater latitude to rewrite mortgages held by financially strapped homeowners.

The proposal, which could come to a vote in the Senate as early as next week, is being pushed by Democratic congressional leaders and a large coalition of groups that includes labor unions, consumer advocates, civil rights organizations and AARP, the powerful senior citizens’ lobby.

The legislation would allow bankruptcy judges for the first time to alter the terms of mortgages for primary residences. Under the proposal, borrowers could declare bankruptcy, and a judge would be able to reduce the amount they owe as part of resolving their debts.

Currently, bankruptcy judges cannot rewrite first mortgages for primary homes. This restriction was adopted in the 1970s to encourage banks to provide mortgages to new home buyers.

The Democrats and their allies see the plan as an antidote to the recent mortgage crisis, especially among low-income borrowers with subprime loans. The legislation would prevent as many as 600,000 homeowners from being thrown into foreclosure, its advocates say.

“We should be giving families every reasonable tool to ensure they can keep a roof over their heads,” said Sen. Richard J. Durbin (Ill.), the Senate’s second-ranking Democrat and author of a leading version of the legislation.

But the banks argue that any help the proposal might provide to troubled homeowners in the short run would be offset by the higher costs that borrowers would have to pay to get mortgages in the future. The reason, banks say, is that they would pass along the added risk to borrowers in the form of higher interest rates, larger down payments or increased closing costs.
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If banks were unable to pass on the entire cost, they could be forced to trim their profits.

“This provision is incredibly counterproductive,” said Edward L. Yingling, president of the America Bankers Association. “We will lobby very, very strongly against it.”

The Durbin measure is part of a larger housing assistance bill being pushed by Democrats in the Senate. A separate version of the measure was approved late last year, mostly along party lines, by the House Judiciary Committee. The Bush administration has said that it opposes both provisions as overly coercive and potentially detrimental to the already strained mortgage market.

Lobbyists for major banks have made the proposal’s defeat a top priority. They have been meeting at least weekly to coordinate their efforts and have fanned out on Capitol Hill to meet with lawmakers and their staffs.

At least a dozen industry associations have banded together to fight the proposed legislation. They include the American Bankers Association, the Financial Services Roundtable, the Consumer Bankers Association and the Mortgage Bankers Association. These groups and others have signed joint letters to lawmakers on the issue.

In one of their letters, sent to Senate leaders last week, the groups wrote that the legislation would “have a very negative impact in the financial markets, which are struggling in part because of difficulties in valuing the mortgages that underlay securities [and] would greatly increase the uncertainty that already exists.”

Bank lobbyists have also gone online to make their case. The mortgage bankers have set up a Web site, http://www.mortgagebankers.org/StopTheCramDown, that can calculate how much mortgage costs might increase by state and by county if the Durbin measure were to become law. “Cram down” is the industry term for a forced easing of mortgage terms.

Supporters of the measure are also sending letters and meeting with lawmakers. A letter urging a quick vote on the proposal was delivered to Senate Majority Leader Harry M. Reid (Nev.) last week. It was signed by 19 organizations, including the Consumer Federation of America, the AFL-CIO, the National Council of La Raza, the U.S. Conference of Mayors and AARP.

The letter said, “The court-supervised modification provision is a commonsense solution that will help families save their homes without any cost to the U.S. Treasury, while ensuring that lenders recover at least what they would in a foreclosure.”

The Center for Responsible Lending, a pro-consumer watchdog group that backs Durbin’s effort, is trying to instigate voter e-mails to lawmakers on the subject. The group’s Web site includes a page that allows people to send electronic notes supporting the measure to their elected representatives with just a few clicks of a mouse.

AARP spokesman Jim Dau said his group will also ramp up its efforts. It may soon ask its activists to urge lawmakers to back the mortgage-redrafting legislation. AARP, which is the nation’s largest lobby group, has a list of 1.5 million volunteers whom it says it can call upon to contact lawmakers on legislative matters.

Lawyers that get it Niel Garfield list

Lawyers that get it Niel Garfield list
lawyers-that-get-it-02092

$8.4 Billion Countrywide Settlement… and why they only lower the interest!

I have gotten a number of calls asking if the home ownership retention program announced by Bank of America is likely to have an impact on foreclosures in CA. This program is a settlement with the CA Attorney General, Jerry Brown, and other state attorney generals that were suing Countrywide / Bank of America for predatory lending practices. It is expected to provide up to $8.4 Billion to 400,000 borrowers nationwide, with $3.5 Billion to 125,000 borrowers in CA.

While $8.4 Billion is a huge number – roughly 7.75% of BAC’s market cap today – it is literally a laughable amount. Problem is that it equals only $28,000 per loan in California. I compared that number to the average amount a California homeowner is upside down at the time of foreclosure – the average total debt is $26,200 more than they originally borrowed.(all that negative amortization) So in the best case scenario this puts borrowers back where they started, in loans they fundamentally can’t afford.So really it is nothing. The best thing is that it is admission of fault that could be used in individual cases against the lender in an individual action.

Note that they clearly state that principal balance reduction will only be available on a limited basis to restore negative equity from pay option ARMs – which makes sense given that they really don’t have enough money to do much more. Instead the primary goal is to ensure “modifications are affordable”. Given that they simply don’t have the money to lower principal balances to affordable levels, that means more artificially low payments… the exact thing that got us into this problem in the first place.

So back to the original question, will it likely impact foreclosures? Sort of, but only temporarily. It could impact your foreclosure if you were to copy the complaint and file your own case against countrywide at least you would not get a demur to the complaint. I posted the text of the complaint on Dec 31, 2008 California and everybody else V Countrywidecountrywide-complaint-form

They have graciously committed to not pursue foreclosure until they have contacted the owner and made a decision on program eligibility. So it appears to impact foreclosures, except that the recently passed SB1137 re codified as civil code 2923.5 and 2923.6 required them to do that anyway – so this claim is little more than spin.

Since this completely fails to address the underlying problem of the original loan amounts often exceeding current market value by $100k or more I’d also say the impact will only be temporary. Though that may still be a long time. In one case I recently reviewed Countrywide had a loan balance of over $900k on a home worth $550k – they modified the payment to 2% interest only for 5 years. The homeowner can afford it for now, but what happens in 5 years? Your’e kidding yourself if you think values are going back to those levels that quickly. Do we really still want to be cleaning this mess up 5 years from now?

Bottom line, Jerry Brown and the other state’s attorney generals have given Bank of America a gift. The opportunity to avoid litigation while getting the state’s endorsement for a plan that will never work and buying them precious time to find a way out of their dire predicament. Like the bailouts it’s possible it may help save this financial institution, but it will only delay our return to a stable and healthy real estate market.