FRAUD CHARGED AGAINST INDYMAC EXECS (via Foreclosureblues)

FRAUD CHARGED AGAINST INDYMAC EXECS FRAUD CHARGED AGAINST INDYMAC EXECS Today, February 12, 2011, 7 hours ago | Neil Garfield COMBO Title and Securitization Search, Report, Documents, Analysis & Commentary EDITOR’S COMMENT: The fraud has been obvious from the start. While this is a major case and hopefully a harbinger of things to come, it is directed at the fraud committed on shareholders of IndyMac. The fact is, if any of the banks had told the truth about what they were doin … Read More

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New Case Debunks MERS: In re Agard, New York Bankruptcy Court Well Reasoned Opinion (via Foreclosureblues)

New Case Debunks MERS: In re Agard, New York Bankruptcy Court Well Reasoned Opinion New Case Debunks MERS: In re Agard, New York Bankruptcy Court Well Reasoned Opinion Today, February 12, 2011, 5 hours ago | findsenlaw A great new case is out as of Feb. 10, 2011.  This judge analyzes all of the MERS arguments, incuding the Membership Rules, the Hultman and RK Arnold affidavits, and the agency and nominee arguments, and holds that MERS does not have the authority it claims.  Excerpts below.  Full case NY BK In re Agard Feb 2011.C … Read More

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Debt Collectors should follow the FDCPA Laws

see www.fairdebtcollectionpractices.org
The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) was shaped by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and passed by the Congress to ensure fair and lawful debt collections. This Act regulates debt collectors to ensure the rights of consumers for fair collection of debts.

The FDCPA requires the debt collectors to follow certain laws. These laws are about how to treat you and what attempts can be made to collect the debt from you. It is a known fact that if you owe you must pay but while attempting to collect the debt the debt collector should not over step the laws.

Over phone a debt collector should:

* Inform you his name and where he works

* Call you at a convenient time

* Not call you repeatedly

* Call you at office only if you or your employer approve

* Use decent and proper language

* Not threaten you with violence

* Not intimidate you with wage garnishment

* Speak truth

* Give right information about your debt

To collect the debt, a debt collector can:

* Inform you of the debt and request you to pay

* Request you for your convenient time and call only during that time

* Send you information by fax, or email

* Send information in enclosed envelope and not a post card

* Reach you in person if you have agreed to

* Contact third parties only once for information about you about your place of work or stay

* Call you at your workplace if you or your employer approve of it

* Contact your attorney only, if you have informed him about your attorney

A debt collector violates the FDCPA by

* Harassing you about the debt by calling repeatedly at unusual times

* Using improper language

* Threatening you with violence or legal action

* Not disclosing his name or place of work

* Calling himself a federal agent or an attorney

* Threatening you with arrest if you dint pay

* Contacting you even after you dispute the debt

It is imperative for a debt collector to adhere to the FDCPA laws. If he violates he can be sued under this Act. In case of violation of the Act you may engage an FDCPA attorney and pursue legal action.

Why Robo-Signatures Are Illegal in California and Other Non-Judicial Foreclosure States

With all of the press robo-signing has gotten, it is a bit surprising that everyone is having such a hard time concluding whether these practices effect California foreclosures. My assistant even said to me today, “but the banks say that it doesn’t matter because California is non judicial.”

Because the topic has not gotten the treatment it deserves, I will gladly do the job. The following are by no means a complete list, but are the most clear LEGAL reasons (setting aside pure moral questions and the U.S. Constitution) that the Robo-Signer Controversy will lead to massive litigation in California.

In short, Robo Signers are illegal in California because good title cannot be based on fraud, robo signed non judicial foreclosure sales are void as a matter of law, the documents are not able to be recorded in California if they are not notarized, which we know was often not done properly, and finally, because they robo signed forgeries ARE intended for judicial proceedings, including evictions and bankruptcy relief from stay motions.

1. Good Title Cannot Be Based on Fraud (Even as to a 3d Party).

In the case of a fraudulent transaction California law is settled. The Court in Trout v. Trout, (1934), 220 Cal. 652 at 656 made as much plain:

“Numerous authorities have established the rule that an instrument wholly void, such as an undelivered deed, a forged instrument, or a deed in blank, cannot be made the foundation of a good title, even under the equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase. Consequently, the fact that defendant Archer acted in good faith in dealing with persons who apparently held legal title, is not in itself sufficient basis for relief.” (Emphasis added, internal citations omitted).

This sentiment was clearly echoed in 6 Angels, Inc. v. Stuart-Wright Mortgage, Inc. (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1279 at 1286 where the Court stated:

“It is the general rule that courts have power to vacate a foreclosure sale where there has been fraud in the procurement of the foreclosure decree or where the sale has been improperly, unfairly or unlawfully conducted, or is tainted by fraud, or where there has been such a mistake that to allow it to stand would be inequitable to purchaser and parties.” (Emphasis added).

Hence, if forged Robo Signed signatures are used to obtain the foreclosure, it CERTAINLY makes a difference in California and other non-judicial foreclosure states.

2. Any apparent sale based on Robosigned documents is void – without any legal effect – like Monopoly Money.

In Bank of America v. LaJolla Group II, the California Court of Appeals held that if a trustee is not contractually empowered under the Deed of Trust to hold a sale, it is totally void. It has no legal effect whatsoever. Title does not transfer. No right to evict arises. The property is not sold.

In turn, California Civil COde 2934a requires that the beneficiary execute and notarize and record a substitution for a valid substitution of trustee to take effect. Thus, if the Assignment of Deed of Trust is robo-signed, the sale is void. If the substitution of trustee is robo-signed, the sale is void. If the Notice of Default is Robo-Signed, the sale is void.

3. These documents are not recordable without good notarization.

In California, the reason these documents are notarized in the first place is because otherwise they will not be accepted by the County recorder. Moreover, a notary who helps commit real estate fraud is liable for $25,000 per offense.

Once the document is recorded, however, it is entitled to a “presumption of validity”, which is what spurned the falsification trend in the first place. Civil Code section 2924.

Therefore, the notarization of a false signature not only constitutes fraud, but is every bit intended as part of a larger conspiracy to commit fraud on the court.

4. The documents are intended for court eviction proceedings.

A necessary purpose for these documents, AFTER the non judicial foreclosure, is the eviction of the rightful owners afterward. Even in California, eviction is a judicial process, albeit summary and often sloppily conducted by judges who don’t really believe they can say no to the pirates taking your house. However, as demonstrated below, once these documents make it into court, the bank officers and lawyers become guilty of FELONIES:

California Penal Code section 118 provides (a) Every person who, having taken an oath that he or she will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly before any competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any of the cases in which the oath may by law of the State of California be administered, willfully and contrary to the oath, states as true any material matter which he or she knows to be false, and every person who testifies, declares, deposes, or certifies under penalty of perjury in any of the cases in which the testimony, declarations, depositions, or certification is permitted by law of the State of California under penalty of perjury and willfully states as true any material matter which he or she knows to be false, is guilty of perjury. This subdivision is applicable whether the statement, or the testimony, declaration, deposition, or certification is made or subscribed within or without the State of California.

Penal Code section 132 provides: Every person who upon any trial, proceeding, inquiry, or investigation whatever, authorized or permitted by law, offers in evidence, as genuine or true, any book, paper, document, record, or other instrument in writing, knowing the same to have been forged or fraudulently altered or ante-dated, is guilty of felony.

The Doctrine of Unclean Hands provides: plaintiff’s “unclean hands” bar injunctive relief when the plaintiff’s misconduct arose from the transaction pleaded in the complaint. California Satellite Sys. v Nichols (1985) 170 CA3d 56, 216 CR 180. The unclean hands doctrine demands that a plaintiff act fairly in the matter for which he or she seeks a remedy. The plaintiff must come into
court with clean hands, and keep them clean, or he or she will be denied relief, regardless of the merits of the claim. Kendall-Jackson Winery Ltd. v Superior Court (1999) 76 CA4th 970, 978, 90 CR2d 743. Whether the doctrine applies is a question of fact. CrossTalk Prods., Inc. v Jacobson (1998) 65 CA4th 631, 639, 76 CR2d 615.

5. Robo Signed Documents Are Intended for Use in California Bankruptcy Court Matters.

One majorly overlooked facet of California is our extremely active bankrtupcy court proceedings, where, just as in judicial foreclosure states, the banks must prove “standing” to proceed with a foreclosure. All declarations submitted in support of standing to file a proof of claim, objections to a plan and most importantly perhaps Relief from Stays are fraud upon bankruptcy court if signed by robo-signers.

Conclusion

Verified eviction complaints, perjured motions for summary judgment, and all other eviction paperwork after robo signed non judicial foreclosures in California and other states are illegal and void. The paperwork itself is void. The sale is void. But the only way to clean up the hundreds of thousands of effected titles is through litigation, because even now the banks will simply not do the right thing. And that’s why robo signers count in non-judicial foreclosure states. Victims of robosigners in California may seek declaratory relief, damages under the Rosenthal Act; an injunction and attorneys fees for Unfair Business practices, as well as claims for slander of title; abuse of process, civil theft, and conversion.Timothy McCandless Esq. and Associates
Offices Statewide

(909)890-9192 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (909)890-9192 end_of_the_skype_highlighting

(925)957-9797 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting (925)957-9797 end_of_the_skype_highlighting

FAX (909) 382-9956
tim@Prodefenders.com

http://www.timothymccandless.com

Commercial property meltdown and Workout


Timothy McCandless Esq. and Associates
Offices Statewide

(909)890-9192
(925)957-9797
FAX (909) 382-9956
tim@Prodefenders.com

http://www.timothymccandless.com

Commercial Mortgage Modification: Modify Your Small Business Mortgage to Avoid Commercial Bankruptcy

Timothy McCandless Esq. and Associates
Offices Statewide

(909)890-9192
(925)957-9797
FAX (909) 382-9956
tim@Prodefenders.com

http://www.timothymccandless.com

Introduction

If you are a small business owner facing a large balloon payment you can not refinance or payments which are becoming increasingly less affordable, you may be considering closing your doors, filing bankruptcy, or just letting it all go. But there may be another alternative for you, which is being heavily encouraged by the government: Commercial Mortgage Modification. (A commercial mortgage modification is an alteration to your existing loan that would make the terms easier for you to afford.)

What is your best option?

It depends on several factors. They are: the cause of the problem, whether a modification will “work,” your long term goals, and the pros and cons of applying for a commercial mortgage modification.

1) What is the Cause of Your Cashflow Problem?

Commercial mortgage defaults fall into one of two categories: 1) debt service default and 2) balloon payment default. The latter of these categories is a bit easy to explain; i.e., after 3 years of payments on your commercial mortgage, you do not have a lump sum principal payment per the loan agreement and cannot refinance for one reason or another (these days, the economy has practically halted all lending so it should be no surprise). However, a debt service default arises from another problem: insufficient cash flow.

As a business owner and a commercial borrower interested in a commercial mortgage modification, it will serve you best to identify when your cash flow problem began, whether it was from a) drop in business, b) increased defaults on your own receivables, c) an increase in other recurring expenses, d) a single event, such as a lawsuit or partner’s bankruptcy, e) some combination of the above, or f) some other circumstance. Identifying the cause of the problem will help you and your lender to identify the most fitting solution.

2) Will mortgage modification work?

The importance of this second consideration to commercial mortgage modification cannot be overstated. It is neither in the lenders’ best interest, nor many times your own, to delay the inevitable: foreclosure. Some factors are:

a. Prospects for your business. Have you landed new contracts? Is business picking up? Is something set to happen in the industry that will help your business? Are you expanding into another more lucrative area? What are your prospects and how will they help to resolve the cause identified in your response to #1 above?

b. Debt Service Coverage Ratio after modification. Your “debt service coverage ratio” is a calculation of whether the money coming into your business is sufficient to cover the outflow, and by how much (or if not, by how much?) A DSCR of below 1 is desired, with a DSCR of over 1 indicating insufficient cash flow. The question the bank is most interested in is, if the loan is modified, will your coverage ratio be low enough to service your debt without default, and is the new proposed ratio sustainable based on your prospects (see 2.a. above)?

c. What is your exit plan? Finally, to determine whether the plan will work, you must be able to identify an exit strategy, or a plan for what happens at the end of the loan. If the term is only set out for a few more years, where will the next balloon payment come from? If the interest is reduced sufficiently to ix your current cash flow situation, what will happen if/when the interest rate goes back up, or when the balloon payment comes due? Your exit plan (and the bank’s) should never be overlooked when considering a commercial mortgage modification.

3) What are your long term goals?

For the business owner considering a commercial mortgage modification, an assessment of the company’s future, and the mortgage holder’s own goals can help in deciding whether a modification is the answer to your problems, or an exercise in futility. For some business owners, mortgage default and allowing the bank to exercise its interest in the security may be financially superior to the alternative of fighting to keep the business going. If your long terms goals do not sync with the mortgage modification plan, then even if you obtain a commercial mortgage modification, it is likely to fail sometime later down the road.

4) Consider the pros and cons of bankruptcy

The United States commercial bankruptcy statutes including Chapter 11 are specifically aimed to aid persons who are unable to pay business debt. The filing fee for a chapter 11 is $1000.00, and a debt management plan must accompany your filing. Keep in mind, Chapter 11 does not discharge business debt. Rather, the assets of the business will be used to repay its obligations over a specified period of time, commonly 3 years. Additionally, the attorney fees are high. So high that often the bankruptcy judge will order your firm liquidated to pay the fees.

Conclusion:

Commercial bankruptcy may be able to be avoided, if you still have some cash flow into the business and you can restructure your debts, including commercial mortgage modification, to improve your debt service coverage ratio (i.e., so you are back in the black every month). Commercial mortgage modification should be considered part of a long term, serious plan, and not a quick fix or a temporary way to stall an eventually unavoidable foreclosure. The cause of the problem, whether modification will work, your long term goals, and the pros and cons of bankruptcy should be among your major considerations.

Modifying a Land Loan

Timothy McCandless Esq. and Associates
Offices Statewide

(909)890-9192
(925)957-9797
FAX (909) 382-9956
tim@Prodefenders.com

http://www.timothymccandless.com

(Adapted from the October 30, 2009 Policy Statement on Prudent Commercial Real Estate Loan Workouts)

Introduction

In response to the residential mortgage crisis, and in anticipation of the looming commercial mortgage crisis of much greater potential magnitude, the federal banking regulators got together and issued a policy statement to encourage lenders to modify commercial mortgages and other loans secured by commercial real estate. Attachment 1 to the Policy Statement featured six example scenarios to help lenders to understand that the question isn’t whether you modify a loan, but rather how you modify a loan, that may result in regulatory penalization.

From the statement: “[t]he regulators have found that prudent CRE loan workouts are often in the best interest of the financial institution and the borrower. Examiners are expected to take a balanced approach in assessing the adequacy of an institution’s risk management practices for loan workout activity. Financial institutions that implement prudent CRE loan workout arrangements after performing a comprehensive review of a borrower’s financial condition will not be subject to criticism for engaging in these efforts even if the restructured loans have weaknesses that result in adverse credit classification. In addition, renewed or restructured loans to borrowers who have the ability to repay their debts according to reasonable modified terms will not be subject to adverse classification solely because the value of the underlying collateral has declined to an amount that is less than the loan balance. ”

What follows is the regulator’s example of modifying a Land Loan.

Note:

* The financial regulators consist of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), and the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) State Liaison Committee (collectively, the regulators).

BASE CASE: Three years ago, the lender originated a $3.25 million loan to a borrower for the purchase of raw land that the borrower was seeking to have zoned for residential use. The loan had a three-year term and required monthly interest-only payments at a market rate that the borrower has paid from existing financial resources. An appraisal obtained at origination reflected an “as is” market value of $5 million, which resulted in a 65 percent LTV. The borrower was successful in obtaining the zoning change and has been seeking construction financing for a townhouse development and to repay the land loan. At maturity, the borrower requested an extension to provide additional time to secure construction financing that would include repayment of the land loan.

SCENARIO 1: The borrower provided the lender with current financial information, demonstrating the ability to make principal and interest payments. Further, the borrower made a principal payment of $250,000 in exchange for an extension of the maturity date of the loan. The borrower also pledged additional unencumbered collateral, granting the lender a first lien on an office building with an “as stabilized” market value of $1 million. The financial information also demonstrates that cash flow from the borrower’s personal assets and the office building generate sufficient stable cash flow to amortize the land loan over a reasonable period of time. A recent appraisal of the raw land reflects an “as is” market value of $3 million, which results in a 75 percent LTV when combined with the additional collateral and the principal reduction. The lender restructured a $3 million loan with monthly principal and interest payments for another year at a market rate that provides for the incremental credit risk.

*
Classification: The lender internally graded the loan as pass due to the adequate cash flow to pay principal and interest from the borrower’s personal assets and the office building. Also the borrower provided a curtailment and additional collateral to maintain a reasonable LTV. The examiner agreed with the lender’s internal grade.
*
Nonaccrual Treatment: The lender maintained the loan on accrual status, as the borrower has sufficient funds to cover the debt service requirements for the next year. Full repayment of principal and interest is reasonably assured from the collateral and the borrower’s financial resources. The examiner concurred with the lender’s accrual treatment.
*
TDR Treatment: The lender concluded that while the borrower has been affected by declining economic conditions, the level of deterioration does not warrant TDR treatment. The borrower was not experiencing financial difficulties because the borrower has the ability to service the renewed loan, which was prudently underwritten and has a market rate of interest. The examiner concurred with the lender’s rationale and TDR treatment.

SCENARIO 2: The borrower provided the lender with current financial information that indicated the borrower is unable to continue to make interest-only payments. The borrower has been sporadically delinquent up to 60 days on payments. The borrower is still seeking a loan to finance construction of the townhouse development, but has not been able to obtain a takeout commitment. A recent appraisal of the property reflects an “as is” market value of $3 million, which results in a 108 percent LTV. The lender extended a $3.25 million loan at a market rate of interest for one year with principal and interest due at maturity.

*
Classification: The lender internally graded the loan as pass because the loan is currently not past due and at a market rate of interest. Also, the borrower is trying to obtain takeout construction financing. The examiner disagreed with the internal grade and adversely classified the loan. The examiner concluded that the loan was not restructured on reasonable repayment terms because the borrower does not have the capacity to service the debt and full repayment of principal and interest is not assured. The examiner classified $550,000 loss ($3.25 million loan balance less $2.7 million, based on the current appraisal of $3 million less estimated cost to sell of 10 percent or $300,000). The examiner classified the remaining $2.7 million balance substandard. This classification treatment recognizes the credit risk in the collateral dependent loan based on the property’s market value less costs to sell.
*
Nonaccrual Treatment: The lender maintained the loan on accrual status. The examiner did not concur with this treatment and advised the lender to place the loan on nonaccrual because the loan was not restructured on reasonable repayment terms, the borrower does not have the capacity to service the debt, and full repayment of principal and interest is not assured.
* TDR Treatment: The lender reported the restructured loan as a TDR. The borrower is experiencing financial difficulties as indicated by the inability to refinance this debt and the inability to repay the loan at maturity in a manner consistent with the original exit strategy. A concession was provided by renewing the loan with a deferral of principal and interest payments for an additional year when the borrower was unable to obtain takeout financing. The examiner concurred with the lender’s TDR treatment.

Modifying a Commercial Operating Line of Credit in Connection with Owner-Occupied Real Estate

Timothy McCandless Esq. and Associates
Offices Statewide

(909)890-9192
(925)957-9797
FAX (909) 382-9956
tim@Prodefenders.com

http://www.timothymccandless.com

(Adapted from the October 30, 2009 Policy Statement on Prudent Commercial Real Estate Loan Workouts)

Introduction

In response to the residential mortgage crisis, and in anticipation of the looming commercial mortgage crisis of much greater potential magnitude, the federal banking regulators got together and issued a policy statement to encourage lenders to modify commercial mortgages and other loans secured by commercial real estate. Attachment 1 to the Policy Statement featured six example scenarios to help lenders to understand that the question isn’t whether you modify a loan, but rather how you modify a loan, that may result in regulatory penalization.

From the statement: “[t]he regulators have found that prudent CRE loan workouts are often in the best interest of the financial institution and the borrower. Examiners are expected to take a balanced approach in assessing the adequacy of an institution’s risk management practices for loan workout activity. Financial institutions that implement prudent CRE loan workout arrangements after performing a comprehensive review of a borrower’s financial condition will not be subject to criticism for engaging in these efforts even if the restructured loans have weaknesses that result in adverse credit classification. In addition, renewed or restructured loans to borrowers who have the ability to repay their debts according to reasonable modified terms will not be subject to adverse classification solely because the value of the underlying collateral has declined to an amount that is less than the loan balance. ”

What follows is the regulator’s example of modifying a C.O.L.O.C.

Note:

* The financial regulators consist of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), and the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) State Liaison Committee (collectively, the regulators).

BASE CASE: Two years ago, the lender originated a CRE loan at a market rate to a borrower whose business occupies the property. The loan was based on a 20-year amortization period with a balloon payment due in three years. The LTV equaled 70 percent at origination. A year ago, the lender financed a $5 million interest-only operating line of credit for seasonal business operations at a market rate. The operating line of credit had a one-year maturity and was secured with a blanket lien on all the business assets. To better monitor the ongoing overall collateral position, the lender established a borrowing base reporting system, which included monthly accounts receivable aging reports. At maturity of the operating line of credit, the borrower’s accounts receivable aging report reflects a growing trend of delinquency, which is causing the borrower some temporary cash flow difficulties. The borrower has recently initiated more aggressive collection efforts.

SCENARIO 1: The lender renewed the $5 million operating line of credit for another year, requiring monthly interest payments at a market rate of interest. The borrower’s liquidity position has tightened but remains satisfactory, cash flow to service all debt is 1.2x, and both loans have been paid according to the contractual terms. The primary repayment source is from business operations, which remain satisfactory and an updated appraisal is not considered necessary.

Classification: The lender internally graded both loans as pass and is monitoring the credits. The examiner agreed with the lender’s analysis and the internal grades with the understanding that the lender is monitoring the trend in the accounts receivables aging report, and the borrower’s ongoing collection efforts.

Nonaccrual Treatment: The lender determined that both the real estate loan and the renewed operating line of credit may remain on accrual status as the borrower has demonstrated an ongoing ability to perform, has the financial capacity to pay a market rate of interest, and full repayment of principal and interest is reasonably assured. The examiner concurred with the lender’s accrual treatment.

TDR Treatment: The lender concluded that while the borrower has been affected by declining economic conditions, the renewal of the operating line of credit did not result in a TDR because the borrower is not experiencing financial difficulties and has the ability to repay both loans (which represent most of its outstanding obligations) at a market rate of interest. The lender expects full collection of principal and interest from the borrower’s operating income. The examiner concurred with the lender’s rationale and TDR treatment.

SCENARIO 2: The lender reduced the operating line of credit to $4 million and restructured the terms onto monthly interest-only payments at a below market rate. This action is expected to alleviate the business’ cash flow problem. The borrower’s company is still considered to be a going concern even though the borrower’s financial performance has continued to deteriorate and sales and profitability are declining. The trend in delinquencies in accounts receivable is worsening and has resulted in reduced liquidity for the borrower.

Cash flow problems have resulted in sporadic delinquencies on the operating line of credit. The borrower’s net operating income has declined, but reflects the capacity to generate a 1.08x debt service coverage ratio for both loans, based on the reduced rate of interest for the operating line of credit. The terms on the real estate loan remained unchanged. The lender internally updated the assumptions in the original appraisal and estimated the LTV on the real estate loan was 90 percent. The operating line of credit has an LTV of 80 percent with an overall LTV for the relationship of 85 percent for the relationship.

Classification: The lender internally graded both loans substandard due to deterioration in the borrower’s business operations and insufficient cash flow to repay all debt. The examiner agreed with the lender’s analysis and the internal grades with the understanding that the lender will monitor the trend in the business operations profitability and cash flow. The lender may need to order a new appraisal if the debt service coverage ratio continues to fall and the overall collateral margin further declines.

Nonaccrual Treatment: The lender reported both the restructured operating line of credit and the real estate loan on a nonaccrual basis. The operating line of credit was not renewed on market rate repayment terms, the borrower has an increasingly limited capacity to service the below market rate on an interest-only basis and there is insufficient support to demonstrate an ability to meet the new payment requirements. Since debt service for both loans is dependent on business operations, the borrower’s ability to continue to perform on the real estate loan is not assured. In addition, the collateral margin indicates that full repayment of all of the borrower’s indebtedness is questionable, particularly if the company fails to continue being a going concern. The examiner concurred with the lender’s nonaccrual treatment.

TDR Treatment: The lender reported the restructured operating line of credit as a TDR because (a) the borrower is experiencing financial difficulties (as evidenced by the borrower’s sporadic payment history, an increasing trend in accounts receivable delinquencies, and uncertain ability to repay the loans); and (b) the lender granted a concession on the line of credit through a below market interest rate. The lender concluded that the real estate loan should not be reported as TDR since that loan had not been restructured. The examiner concurred with the lender’s TDR treatment.

Modifying a Land Acquisition, Condominium Construction and Conversion Mortgage

Timothy McCandless Esq. and Associates
Offices Statewide

(909)890-9192
(925)957-9797
FAX (909) 382-9956
tim@Prodefenders.com

http://www.timothymccandless.com

(Adapted from the October 30, 2009 Policy Statement on Prudent Commercial Real Estate Loan Workouts)

Introduction

In response to the residential mortgage crisis, and in anticipation of the looming commercial mortgage crisis of much greater potential magnitude, the federal banking regulators got together and issued a policy statement to encourage lenders to modify commercial mortgages and other loans secured by commercial real estate. Attachment 1 to the Policy Statement featured six example scenarios to help lenders to understand that the question isn’t whether you modify a loan, but rather how you modify a loan, that may result in regulatory penalization.

From the statement: “[t]he regulators have found that prudent CRE loan workouts are often in the best interest of the financial institution and the borrower. Examiners are expected to take a balanced approach in assessing the adequacy of an institution’s risk management practices for loan workout activity. Financial institutions that implement prudent CRE loan workout arrangements after performing a comprehensive review of a borrower’s financial condition will not be subject to criticism for engaging in these efforts even if the restructured loans have weaknesses that result in adverse credit classification. In addition, renewed or restructured loans to borrowers who have the ability to repay their debts according to reasonable modified terms will not be subject to adverse classification solely because the value of the underlying collateral has declined to an amount that is less than the loan balance. ”

What follows is the regulator’s example of modifying a land acquisition, Condominium Construction and Conversion Mortgage.

Note:

* The financial regulators consist of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), and the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) State Liaison Committee (collectively, the regulators).

BASE CASE: The lender originally extended a $50 million loan for the purchase of vacant land and the construction of a condominium project. The loan was interest-only and included an interest reserve to cover the monthly payments. The developer bought the land and began construction after obtaining purchase commitments for about a third of the planned units. Many of these pending sales were with speculative buyers who committed to buy multiple units with minimal down payments. As the real estate market softened, most of the speculative buyers failed to perform on their purchase contracts and only a limited number of the other planned units have been pre-sold.

The developer subsequently determined it was in the best interest to halt construction with the property 80 percent complete. The loan balance was drawn to $44 million to pay construction costs (including cost overruns) and interest and the borrower estimates another $10 million is needed to complete construction. Current financial information reflects that the developer does not have sufficient cash flow to service the debt; and while the developer does have equity in other assets, there is a question about the borrower’s ability to complete the project.

SCENARIO 1: The borrower agrees to grant the lender a second lien on certain assets, which provides about $5 million in additional collateral support. In return, the lender advanced the borrower $10 million to finish construction and the condominium was completed. The lender also agreed to extend the $54 million loan for 12 months at a market rate of interest that provides for the incremental credit risk to give the borrower time to market the property. The borrower agreed to pay interest whenever a unit was sold with any outstanding balance due at maturity.

The lender obtained a recent appraisal on the condominium building that reported a prospective “as complete” market value of $65 million, reflecting a 24-month sell-out period and projected selling costs of 15 percent. The $65 million prospective “as complete” market value plus the $5 million in other collateral results in a LTV of 77 percent. The lender used the prospective “as complete” market value in its analysis and decision to fund the completion and sale of the units, and to maximize its recovery on the loan.

*
Classification: The lender internally graded the $54 million loan as substandard due to the project’s limited ability to service the debt despite the 1.3x gross collateral margin. The examiner agreed with the lender’s internal grade.
*
Nonaccrual Treatment: The lender maintained the loan on an accrual status due to the protection afforded by the collateral margin. The examiner did not concur with this treatment and determined the loan should be placed on nonaccrual due to the borrower’s questionable ability to sell the units and service the debt, raising concerns as to the full repayment of principal and interest.
*
TDR Treatment: The lender reported the restructured loan as a TDR because the borrower is experiencing financial difficulties, as demonstrated by the insufficient cash flow to service the debt, concerns about the project’s viability, and the borrower’s inability to obtain financing from other sources. In addition, the lender provided a concession by advancing additional funds to finish construction and deferring payments except from sold units until the maturity date when any remaining accrued interest plus principal are due. The examiner concurred with the lender’s TDR treatment.

SCENARIO 2: A recent appraisal of the property reflects that the highest and best use would be conversion to an apartment building. The appraisal reports a prospective “as complete” market value of $60 million upon conversion to an apartment building and a $67 million prospective “as stabilized” market value upon the property reaching stabilized occupancy. The borrower agrees to grant the lender a second lien on certain assets, which provides about $5 million in additional collateral support.

In return, the lender advanced the borrower $10 million, which is needed to convert the project to an apartment complex and finish construction. The lender also agreed to extend the $54 million loan for 12 months at a market rate of interest that provides for the incremental credit risk to give the borrower time to lease the apartments. The $60 million “as complete” market value plus the $5 million in other collateral results in a LTV of 83 percent. The prospective “as complete” market value is used because the loan is funding the construction of the apartment building. The lender may utilize the prospective “as stabilized” market value when funding is provided for the lease-up period.

*
Classification: The lender internally graded the $54 million loan as substandard due to the project’s limited ability to service the debt despite the 1.2x gross collateral margin. The examiner agreed with the lender’s internal grade.
*
Nonaccrual Treatment: The lender determined the loan should be placed on nonaccrual due to the borrower’s untested ability to lease the units and service the debt, raising concerns as to the full repayment of principal and interest. The examiner concurred with the lender’s nonaccrual treatment.
* TDR Treatment: The lender reported the restructured loan as a TDR because the borrower is experiencing financial difficulties, as demonstrated by the insufficient cash flow to service the debt, concerns about the project’s viability, and the borrower’s inability to obtain financing from other sources. In addition, the lender provided a concession by advancing additional funds to finish construction and deferring payments until the maturity date without a defined exit strategy. The examiner concurred with the lender’s TDR treatment.

Modifying A Construction Loan on a Single Family Residence

Timothy McCandless Esq. and Associates
Offices Statewide

(909)890-9192
(925)957-9797
FAX (909) 382-9956
tim@Prodefenders.com

http://www.timothymccandless.com

(Adapted from the October 30, 2009 Policy Statement on Prudent Commercial Real Estate Loan Workouts)

Introduction

In response to the residential mortgage crisis, and in anticipation of the looming commercial mortgage crisis of much greater potential magnitude, the federal banking regulators got together and issued a policy statement to encourage lenders to modify commercial mortgages and other loans secured by commercial real estate. Attachment 1 to the Policy Statement featured six example scenarios to help lenders to understand that the question isn’t whether you modify a loan, but rather how you modify a loan, that may result in regulatory penalization.

From the statement: “[t]he regulators have found that prudent CRE loan workouts are often in the best interest of the financial institution and the borrower. Examiners are expected to take a balanced approach in assessing the adequacy of an institution’s risk management practices for loan workout activity. Financial institutions that implement prudent CRE loan workout arrangements after performing a comprehensive review of a borrower’s financial condition will not be subject to criticism for engaging in these efforts even if the restructured loans have weaknesses that result in adverse credit classification. In addition, renewed or restructured loans to borrowers who have the ability to repay their debts according to reasonable modified terms will not be subject to adverse classification solely because the value of the underlying collateral has declined to an amount that is less than the loan balance. ”

What follows is the regulator’s example of modifying a construction loan on a single family residence.

Note:

* The financial regulators consist of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), and the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) State Liaison Committee (collectively, the regulators).

BASE CASE: The lender originated a $400,000 construction loan on a single family “spec” residence with a 15-month maturity to allow for completion and sale of the property. The loan required monthly interest-only payments at a market rate and was based on a LTV of 70 percent at origination. During the original loan construction phase, the borrower made all interest payments from personal funds. At maturity, the home had not sold and the borrower was unable to find another lender willing to finance this property under similar terms.

SCENARIO 1: At maturity, the lender restructured the loan for one year on an interest-only basis at a below market rate to give the borrower more time to sell the “spec” home. Current financial information indicates the borrower has limited ability to continue to pay interest from personal funds. If the residence does not sell by the revised maturity date, the borrower plans to rent the home. In this event, the lender will consider modifying the debt into an amortizing loan with a 20-year maturity, which would be consistent with this type of income-producing investment property. Any shortfall between the net rental income and loan payments would be paid by the borrower. Due to declining home values, the LTV at the renewal date was 90 percent.

*
Classification: The lender internally graded the loan substandard and is monitoring the credit. The examiner agreed with the lender’s treatment due to the borrower’s diminished ongoing ability to make payments and the reduced collateral position.
* Nonaccrual Treatment: The lender maintained the loan on an accrual basis because the borrower demonstrated an ability to make interest payments during the construction phase. The examiner did not concur with this treatment because the loan was not restructured on reasonable repayment terms, the borrower has limited capacity to service a below market rate on an interest-only basis, and the reduced collateral margin indicates that full repayment of principal and interest is questionable.
* TDR Treatment: The lender reported the restructured loan as a TDR. The borrower is experiencing financial difficulties as indicated by depleted cash reserves, inability to refinance this debt from other sources with similar terms, and the inability to repay the loan at maturity in a manner consistent with the original exit strategy. A concession was provided by renewing the loan with a deferral of principal payments, at a below market rate (compared to the rate charged on an investment property) for an additional year when the loan was no longer in the construction phase. The examiner concurred with the lender’s TDR treatment.

SCENARIO 2: At maturity of the original loan, the lender restructured the debt for one year on an interest-only basis at a below market rate to give the borrower more time to sell the “spec” home. Eight months later, the borrower rented the property. At that time, the borrower and the lender agreed to restructure the loan again with monthly payments that amortize the debt over 20 years at a market rate for a residential investment property. Since the date of the second restructuring, the borrower has made all payments for over six consecutive months.

*
Classification: The lender internally graded the restructured loan substandard. The examiner agreed with the lender’s initial substandard grade at the time of the restructuring, but now considered the loan as a pass due to the borrower’s demonstrated ability to make payments according to the modified terms for over six consecutive months.
*
Nonaccrual Treatment: The lender initially maintained the loan on nonaccrual, but returned it to an accruing status after the borrower made six consecutive monthly payments. The lender expects full repayment of principal and interest from the rental income. The examiner concurred with the lender’s accrual treatment.
*
TDR Treatment: The lender reported the first restructuring as a TDR. However, the second restructuring would not be reported as a TDR. The lender determined that the borrower is experiencing financial difficulties as indicated by depleted cash resources and a weak financial condition; however, the lender did not grant a concession on the second restructuring as the loan is at market rate and terms. The examiner concurred with the lender.

SCENARIO 3: The lender restructured the loan for one year on an interest-only basis at a below market rate to give the borrower more time to sell the “spec” home. The restructured loan has become 90+ days past due and the borrower has not been able to rent the property. Based on current financial information, the borrower does not have the capacity to service the debt. The lender considers repayment to be contingent upon the sale of the property. Current market data reflects few sales and similar new homes in this property’s neighborhood are selling within a range of $250,000 to $300,000 with selling costs equaling 10 percent, resulting in anticipated net sales proceeds between $225,000 and $270,000.

*
Classification: The lender graded $130,000 loss ($400,000 loan balance less estimated net sales proceeds of $270,000), $45,000 doubtful based on the range in the anticipated net sales proceeds, and the remaining balance of $225,000 substandard. The examiner agreed, as this classification treatment results in the recognition of the credit risk in the collateral dependent loan based on the property’s value less costs to sell. The examiner instructed management to obtain a current valuation on the property.
*
Nonaccrual Treatment: The lender placed the loan on nonaccrual when it became 60 days past due (reversing all accrued but unpaid interest) because the lender determined that full repayment of principal and interest was not reasonably assured. The examiner concurred with the lender’s nonaccrual treatment.
*
TDR Treatment: The lender plans to continue reporting this loan as a TDR until the lender forecloses on the property, and transfers the asset to the other real estate owned category. The lender determined that the borrower was continuing to experience financial difficulties as indicated by depleted cash resources, inability to refinance this debt from other sources with similar terms, and the inability to repay the loan at maturity in a manner consistent with the original exit strategy. In addition, the lender granted a concession by reducing the interest rate to a below market level. The examiner concurred with the lender’s TDR treatment.

SCENARIO 4: The lender committed an additional $16,000 for an interest reserve and extended the $400,000 loan for 12 months at a below market rate of interest with monthly interest-only payments. At the time of the examination, $6,000 of the interest reserve had been added to the loan balance. Current financial information that the lender obtained at examiner request reflects the borrower has no other repayment sources and has not been able to sell or rent the property. An updated appraisal supports an “as is” value of $317,650. Selling costs are estimated at 15 percent, resulting in anticipated net sales proceeds of $270,000.

*
Classification: The lender internally graded the loan as pass and is monitoring the credit. The examiner disagreed with the internal grade and instructed the lender to reverse the $6,000 interest capitalized out of the loan balance and interest income, and adversely classified the loan. The examiner concluded that the loan was not restructured on reasonable repayment terms because the borrower has limited capacity to service the debt and the reduced collateral margin indicated that full repayment of principal and interest is not assured. The examiner classified $130,000 loss based on the adjusted $400,000 loan balance less estimated net sales proceeds of $270,000, which was classified substandard. This classification treatment recognizes the credit risk in the collateral dependent loan based on the property’s market value less costs to sell. The examiner also criticized management for the inappropriate use of interest reserves. The remaining interest reserve of $10,000 is not subject to adverse classification because the loan should be placed on nonaccrual.
*
Nonaccrual Treatment: The lender maintained the loan on accrual status. The examiner did not concur with this treatment. The loan was not restructured on reasonable repayment terms, the borrower has limited capacity to service a below market rate on an interest-only basis, and the reduced collateral margin indicates that full repayment of principal and interest is not assured. The examiner advised the lender that the loan should be placed on nonaccrual. The lender’s decision to advance a $16,000 interest reserve was inappropriate given the borrower’s inability to repay it. The lender should reverse the capitalized interest in a manner consistent with regulatory reporting instructions and should not recognize any further interest income from the interest reserve.
* TDR Treatment: The lender reported the restructured loan as a TDR. The borrower is experiencing financial difficulties as indicated by depleted cash reserves, inability to refinance this debt from other sources with similar terms, and the inability to repay the loan at maturity in a manner consistent with the original exit strategy. A concession was provided by renewing the loan with a deferral of principal payments, at a below market rate (compared to investment property) for an additional year when the loan was no longer in the construction phase. The examiner concurred with the lender’s TDR treatment.

Modifying a Shopping Mall Mortgage

Timothy McCandless Esq. and Associates
Offices Statewide

(909)890-9192
(925)957-9797
FAX (909) 382-9956
tim@Prodefenders.com

http://www.timothymccandless.com

(Adapted from the October 30, 2009 Policy Statement on Prudent Commercial Real Estate Loan Workouts)

Introduction

In response to the residential mortgage crisis, and in anticipation of the looming commercial mortgage crisis of much greater potential magnitude, the federal banking regulators got together and issued a policy statement to encourage lenders to modify commercial mortgages and other loans secured by commercial real estate. Attachment 1 to the Policy Statement featured six example scenarios to help lenders to understand that the question isn’t whether you modify a loan, but rather how you modify a loan, that may result in regulatory penalization.

From the statement: “[t]he regulators have found that prudent CRE loan workouts are often in the best interest of the financial institution and the borrower. Examiners are expected to take a balanced approach in assessing the adequacy of an institution’s risk management practices for loan workout activity. Financial institutions that implement prudent CRE loan workout arrangements after performing a comprehensive review of a borrower’s financial condition will not be subject to criticism for engaging in these efforts even if the restructured loans have weaknesses that result in adverse credit classification. In addition, renewed or restructured loans to borrowers who have the ability to repay their debts according to reasonable modified terms will not be subject to adverse classification solely because the value of the underlying collateral has declined to an amount that is less than the loan balance. ”

What follows is the regulator’s example of modifying a shopping mall mortgage.

Note:

* The financial regulators consist of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), and the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) State Liaison Committee (collectively, the regulators).

BASE CASE: A lender originated a 36-month $10 million loan for the construction of a shopping mall to occur over 24 months with a 12-month lease-up period to allow the borrower time to achieve stabilized occupancy before obtaining permanent financing. The loan had an interest reserve to cover interest payments over the three-year term of the credit. At the end of the third year, there is $10 million outstanding on the loan, as the shopping mall has been built and the interest reserve, which has been covering interest payments, has been fully drawn.

At the time of origination, the appraisal reported an “as stabilized” market value of $13.5 million for the property. In addition, the borrower had a take-out commitment that would provide permanent financing at maturity. A condition of the take-out lender was that the shopping mall had to achieve a 75 percent occupancy level. Due to weak economic conditions, the property only reached a 55 percent occupancy level at the end of the12-month lease up period and the original takeout commitment became void. Mainly due to a tightening of credit for these types of loans, the borrower is unable to obtain permanent financing elsewhere when the loan matured in February (i.e., due to market factors and not due to the borrower’s financial condition).

SCENARIO 1: The lender renewed the loan for an additional year to allow for a higher lease-up rate and for the borrower to seek permanent financing. The extension is at a market rate that provides for the incremental credit risk and on an interest-only basis. While the property’s historical cash flow was insufficient at 0.92x debt service ratio, recent improvements in the occupancy level now provides adequate coverage. Recent improvements include the signing of several new leases with other leases currently being negotiated.

In addition, current financial statements reflect that the builder, who personally guarantees the debt, has sufficient cash on deposit at the lender plus other liquid assets. These assets provide sufficient cash flow to service the borrower’s global debt service requirements on a principal and interest basis, if necessary. The guarantor covered the initial cash flow shortfalls from the project and provided a good faith principal curtailment of $200,000 at renewal. A recent appraisal on the shopping mall reports an “as is” market value of $10 million and an “as stabilized” market value $11 million.

Classification: The lender internally graded the loan as a pass and is monitoring the credit. The examiner agreed with the lender’s internal loan grade. The examiner concluded that the project continues to progress and now cash flows the interest payments. The guarantor currently has the ability and demonstrated willingness to supplement the project’s cash flow and service the borrower’s global debt service requirements. The examiner concurred that the interest-only terms were reasonable because the renewal was short-term and the project and the guarantor have demonstrated repayment capacity. In addition, this type of loan structure is commonly used to allow a project to achieve stabilized occupancy, but any subsequent loan terms should likely have a principal amortization component. The examiner also agreed that the LTV should be based on the “as stabilized” market value as the lender is financing the project through the lease-up period.

Nonaccrual Treatment: The lender maintained the loan on accrual status as the guarantor has sufficient funds to cover the borrower’s global debt service requirements over the one-year period of the renewed loan. Full repayment of principal and interest is reasonably assured from the project’s and guarantor’s cash flow despite a decline in the collateral margin. The examiner concurred with the lender’s accrual treatment.

TDR Treatment: The lender concluded that while the borrower has been affected by declining economic conditions, the level of deterioration does not warrant TDR treatment. The borrower was not experiencing financial difficulties because the borrower and guarantor have the ability to service the renewed loan, which was prudently underwritten at a market rate of interest, plus the borrower’s other obligations on a timely basis, and the lender’s expectation to collect the full amount of principal and interest from the borrower’s or guarantor’s sources (i.e., not from interest reserves). The examiner concurred with the lender’s rationale and TDR treatment.

SCENARIO 2: The lender restructured the loan on an interest-only basis at a below market rate for one year to provide additional time to increase the occupancy level and thereby enable the borrower to arrange permanent financing. The level of lease-up remains relatively unchanged at 55 percent and the shopping mall projects a debt service coverage ratio of 1.02x based on the preferential loan terms. At the time of the restructuring, the lender inappropriately based the selection of the below market interest rate on outdated financial information, which resulted in a positive cash flow projection even though file documentation available at the time of the restructuring reflected that the borrower anticipates the shopping mall’s income stream will decline due to rent concessions, the loss of a tenant, and limited prospects for finding new tenants. Current financial statements indicate the builder, who personally guarantees the debt, is highly leveraged, has limited cash or liquid assets, and has other projects with delinquent payments. A recent appraisal on the shopping mall reports an “as is” market value of $9 million, which results in a LTV ratio of 111 percent.

Classification: The lender internally graded the loan as substandard. The examiner disagreed with the internal grade and classified the amount not protected by the collateral value, $1 million, as loss and required the lender to charge-off this amount. The examiner did not factor costs to sell into the loss classification analysis, as the source of repayment is not reliant on the sale of the collateral at this time. The examiner classified the remaining loan balance, based on the property’s “as is” market value of $9 million, as substandard given the borrower’s uncertain repayment capacity and weak financial support.

Nonaccrual Treatment: The lender determined the loan did not warrant being placed on nonaccrual status. The examiner did not concur with this treatment because the partial charge-off is indicative that full collection of principal is not anticipated and the lender has continued exposure to additional loss due to the project’s insufficient cash flow and reduced collateral margin, and the guarantor’s limited ability to provide further support.

TDR Treatment: The lender reported the restructured loan as a TDR because (a) the borrower is experiencing financial difficulties as evidenced by the high leverage, delinquent payments on other projects, and inability to meet the proposed exit strategy because of the inability to lease the property in a reasonable timeframe; and (b) the lender granted a concession as evidenced by the reduction in the interest rate to a below market rate. The examiner concurred with the lender’s TDR treatment.

SCENARIO 3: Current financial statements indicate the borrower and the guarantor have minimal other resources available to support this credit. The lender chose not to restructure the $10 million loan into a new single amortizing note of $10 million at a market rate of interest because the project’s projected cash flow would only provide a 0.88x debt service coverage ratio as the borrower has been unable to lease space. A recent appraisal on the shopping mall reported an “as is” market value of $9 million, which results in a LTV of 111 percent. Therefore, at the original loan’s maturity in February, the lender restructured the $10 million debt into two notes. The lender placed the first note of $7.2 million (i.e., the A note) on monthly payments that amortize the debt over 20 years at a market rate of interest that provides for the incremental credit risk. The project’s debt service coverage ratio equals 1.20x for the $7.2 million loan based on the shopping mall’s projected net operating income. The lender placed the second note of the remaining principal balance of $2.8 million (i.e., the B note) into a 2 percent interest-only loan that is scheduled to reset in five years to an amortizing payment. The lender then charged-off the $2.8 million note due to the project’s lack of repayment capacity and to provide reasonable collateral protection for the remaining on-book loan of $7.2 million. Since the restructuring, the borrower has made payments on both loans for more than six consecutive months.

Classification: The lender internally graded the on-book loan of $7.2 million as a pass credit due to the fact that the borrower has demonstrated the ability to perform under the modified terms. The examiner agreed with the lender’s grade as the lender restructured the original obligation into A and B notes, the lender charged off the B note, and the borrower has demonstrated the ability to repay the A note. Using this multiple note structure with the charge-off of the B note enables the lender to recognize interest income and limit the amount reported as a TDR in future periods. If the lender had restructured the loan into a single note, the credit classification and the nonaccrual and TDR treatments would have been different.

Nonaccrual Treatment: The lender restored the on-book loan of $7.2 million to accrual status as the borrower has the ability to repay the loan, has a record of performing at the revised terms for more than six months, and full repayment of principal and interest is expected. The examiner concurred with the lender’s accrual treatment. Interest payments received on the off-book loan have been recorded as recoveries because, in this case, full recovery of principal and interest on this loan was not reasonably assured.

TDR Treatment: The lender reported the restructured on-book loan of $7.2 million as a TDR. The lender determined that the on-book loan should be reported as a TDR, consistent with the regulatory reporting guidance because (a) the borrower is experiencing financial difficulties as evidenced by the borrower’s high leverage, delinquent payments on other projects, and failure to meet the proposed exit strategy because of the inability to lease the property in a reasonable timeframe and the unlikely collectibility of the charged-off loan; and (b) the lender granted a concession. The concessions included a below market interest rate and protracted payment requirements on the charged-off portion of the debt and extending the on-book loan beyond expected timeframes.

If the borrower continues to perform according to the modified terms of the restructured loan, the lender plans to stop reporting the on-book loan as a TDR after the regulatory reporting defined time period expires because it was restructured with a market rate of interest. For example, since the restructuring occurred in February, the $7.2 million on-book loan should be reported as a TDR on the lender’s March, June, September, and December regulatory reports. The TDR reporting could cease on the lender’s following March regulatory report if the borrower continues to perform according to the modified terms. The examiner concurred with this planned treatment.

SCENARIO 4: Current financial statements indicate the borrower and the guarantor have minimal other resources available to support this credit. The lender restructured the $10 million loan into a new single note of $10 million at a market rate of interest that provides for the incremental credit risk and is on an amortizing basis. The project’s projected cash flow reflects a 0.88x debt service coverage ratio as the borrower has been unable to lease space. A recent appraisal on the shopping mall reports an “as is” market value of $9 million, which results in a LTV of 111 percent. Based on the property’s current market value of $9 million, the lender charged-off $1 million immediately after the renewal.

Classification: The lender internally graded the remaining $9 million on-book portion of the loan as a pass credit because the lender’s analysis of the project’s cash flow indicated a 1.05x debt service coverage ratio when just considering the on-book balance. The examiner disagreed with the internal grade and classified the $9 million on-book balance as substandard due to the borrower’s marginal financial condition, lack of guarantor support, and uncertainty over the source of repayment.

Nonaccrual Treatment: The lender maintained the remaining $9 million on-book portion of the loan on accrual, as the borrower has the ability to repay the principal and interest on this balance. The examiner did not concur with this treatment. The examiner instructed the lender to place the loan on nonaccrual status. Because the lender restructured the debt into a single note and had charged-off a portion of the restructured loan, the repayment of the interest and principal contractually due on the entire debt is not reasonably assured.

The loan can be returned to accrual status if the lender can document that subsequent improvement in the borrower’s financial condition has enabled the loan to be brought fully current with respect to principal and interest and the lender expects the contractual balance of the loan (including the partial charge-off) will be fully collected. In addition, interest income may be recognized on a cash basis for the partially charged-off portion of the loan when the remaining recorded balance is considered fully collectible. However, the partial charge-off cannot be reversed.

TDR Treatment: The lender reported the restructured loan as a TDR according to the requirements of its regulatory reports because (a) the borrower is experiencing financial difficulties as evidenced by the high leverage, delinquent payments on other projects, and inability to meet the original exit strategy because the borrower was unable to lease the property in a reasonable timeframe; and (b) the lender granted a concession as evidenced by deferring payment beyond the repayment ability of the borrower. The charge-off indicates that the lender does not expect full repayment of principal and interest, yet the borrower remains obligated for the full amount of the debt and payments, which is at a level that is not consistent with the borrower’s repayment capacity. Because the borrower is not expected to be able to comply with the loan’s restructured terms, the lender would likely continue to report the loan as a TDR. The examiner concurs with reporting the renewed loan as a TDR.

Modifying a Commercial Office Building Mortgage

Timothy McCandless Esq. and Associates
Offices Statewide

(909)890-9192
(925)957-9797
FAX (909) 382-9956
tim@Prodefenders.com

http://www.timothymccandless.com

(Adapted from the October 30, 2009 Policy Statement on Prudent Commercial Real Estate Loan Workouts)

Introduction

In response to the residential mortgage crisis, and in anticipation of the looming commercial mortgage crisis of much greater potential magnitude, the federal banking regulators got together and issued a policy statement to encourage lenders to modify commercial mortgages and other loans secured by commercial real estate. Attachment 1 to the Policy Statement featured six example scenarios to help lenders to understand that the question isn’t whether you modify a loan, but rather how you modify a loan, that may result in regulatory penalization.

From the statement: “[t]he regulators have found that prudent CRE loan workouts are often in the best interest of the financial institution and the borrower. Examiners are expected to take a balanced approach in assessing the adequacy of an institution’s risk management practices for loan workout activity. Financial institutions that implement prudent CRE loan workout arrangements after performing a comprehensive review of a borrower’s financial condition will not be subject to criticism for engaging in these efforts even if the restructured loans have weaknesses that result in adverse credit classification. In addition, renewed or restructured loans to borrowers who have the ability to repay their debts according to reasonable modified terms will not be subject to adverse classification solely because the value of the underlying collateral has declined to an amount that is less than the loan balance. ”

What follows is the regulator’s example of modifying a mortgage on a commercial office building.

Note:

* The financial regulators consist of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), and the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) State Liaison Committee (collectively, the regulators).

BASE CASE: A lender originated a $15 million loan for the purchase of an office building with monthly payments based on an amortization of 20 years and a balloon payment of $13.6 million at the end of year three. At origination, the loan had a 75 percent loan-to-value (LTV) based on an appraisal reflecting a $20 million market value on an “as stabilized” basis, a debt service coverage ratio of 1.35x, and a market interest rate. The lender expected to renew the loan when the balloon payment became due at the end of year three. The project’s cash flow has declined, as the borrower granted rental concessions to existing tenants in order to retain the tenants and compete with other landlords in a weak economy.

SCENARIO 1: At maturity, the lender renewed the $13.6 million loan at a market rate of interest that provides for the incremental credit risk and amortized the principal over the remaining 17 years. The borrower had not been delinquent on prior payments and has sufficient cash flow to service the market rate terms at a debt service coverage ratio of 1.12x. A review of the leases reflects the majority of tenants are now stable occupants with long-term leases and sufficient cash flow to pay their rent. A recent appraisal reported an “as stabilized” market value of $13.1 million for the property, reflecting an increase in market capitalization rates, which results in a 104 percent LTV.

Classification: The lender internally graded the loan pass and is monitoring the credit. The examiner agreed, as the borrower has the ability to continue making payments on reasonable terms despite a decline in cash flow and in the market value of the collateral.

Nonaccrual Treatment: The lender maintained the loan on an accrual status. The borrower has demonstrated the ability to make the regularly scheduled payments and, even with the decline in the borrower’s creditworthiness, cash flow appears sufficient to make these payments and full repayment of principal and interest is expected. The examiner concurred with the lender’s accrual treatment.

TDR Treatment: The lender determined that the renewed loan should not be reported as a TDR. While the borrower is experiencing some financial deterioration, the borrower has sufficient cash flow to service the debt and has no record of payment default; therefore, the borrower is not experiencing financial difficulties. The examiner concurred with the lender’s TDR treatment.

SCENARIO 2: At maturity, the lender renewed the $13.6 million loan at a market rate of interest that provides for the incremental risk and amortized the principal over the remaining 17 years. The borrower had not been delinquent on prior payments. The building’s net operating income has decreased and current cash flow to service the new loan has declined, resulting in a debt service coverage ratio of 1.12x. Some of the leases are coming up for renewal and additional rental concessions may be necessary to keep the existing tenants in a weak economy. However, the project’s debt service coverage is not expected to drop below 1.05x. A current valuation has not been ordered. The lender estimates the property’s current “as stabilized” market value is $14.5 million, which results in a 94 percent LTV. In addition, the lender has not asked the borrower to provide current financial statements to assess the borrower’s ability to service the debt with cash from other sources.

Classification: The lender internally graded the loan pass and is monitoring the credit. The examiner disagreed with the internal grade and listed the credit as special mention. While the borrower has the ability to continue to make payments, there has been a declining trend in the property’s income stream, continued potential rental concessions, and a reduced collateral margin. In addition, the lender’s failure to request current financial information and to obtain an updated collateral valuation represents administrative deficiencies.

Nonaccrual Treatment: The lender maintained the loan on an accrual status. The borrower has demonstrated the ability to make regularly scheduled payments and, even with the decline in the borrower’s creditworthiness, cash flow is sufficient at this time to make payments and full repayment of principal and interest are expected. The examiner concurred with the lender’s accrual treatment.

TDR Treatment: The lender determined that the renewed loan should not be reported as a TDR. While the borrower is experiencing some financial deterioration, the borrower is not experiencing financial difficulties as the borrower has sufficient cash flow to service the debt, and there was no history of default. The examiner concurred with the lender’s TDR treatment.

SCENARIO 3: At maturity, the lender restructured the $13.6 million loan on a 12-month interest-only basis at a below market rate of interest. The borrower has been sporadically delinquent on prior payments and projects a debt service coverage ratio of 1.12x based on the preferential terms. A review of the leases, which were available to the lender at the time of the restructuring, reflects the majority of tenants have short-term leases and that some were behind on their rental payments to the borrower. According to the lender, this situation has not improved since the restructuring. A recent appraisal reported a $14.5 million “as stabilized” market value for the property, which results in a 94 percent LTV.

Classification: The lender internally graded the loan pass and is monitoring the credit. The examiner disagreed with the internal grade due to the borrower’s limited ability to service a below market rate loan on an interest-only basis, sporadic delinquencies, and the reduced collateral position, and classified the loan substandard.

Nonaccrual Treatment: The lender maintained the loan on accrual status due to the positive cash flow and collateral margin. The examiner did not concur with this treatment because the loan was not restructured with reasonable repayment terms, the borrower has limited capacity to service a below market rate on an interest-only basis, and the reduced estimate of cash flow from the property indicates that full repayment of principal and interest is not reasonably assured.

TDR Treatment: The lender reported the restructured loan as a TDR because the borrower is experiencing financial difficulties: the project’s ability to generate sufficient cash flows to service the debt is questionable, the lease income from the tenants is declining, loan payments have been sporadic, and collateral values have declined. In addition, the lender granted a concession (i.e., reduced the interest rate to a below market level and deferred principal payments). The examiner concurred with the lender’s TDR treatment.

Commercial Mortgage Modification: What They Are and How to Get One




Image Source:  © Copyright 2009  Roy Tennant
Introduction
This article will discuss, in basic terms, the process for obtaining a commercial mortgage modification.  For more detailed information, contact an attorney in your area competent in this specialized field of law. This article is not meant to be construed as legal advice, and is for educational and informative purposes only.
Definition of Commercial Mortgage Modification
First off, the term “Commercial Mortgage Modification” refers to a renegotiation in payment terms of a mortgage secured by real property that is not 1-4 unit residential real estate.  Commercial mortgages can be secured by hotels, golf courses, shopping malls, apartment complexes, office buildings, shipping warehouses, or any other type of commercial property (that is, not 1-4 unit residential).
The Best Circumstances for a Commercial Mortgage Modification
The circumstances under which commercial mortgage modification negotiations occur include any foreseeably pending default by the commercial mortgage borrower.  These circumstances will fall into one of two categories: debt service default, or balloon payment default.
“Debt service default” arises where a borrower does not have the monthly cash flow to continue to pay the monthly mortgage payment during the life of the loan (usually, 3, 5, or 7 years).  “Balloon Payment default,” on the other hand, occurs at the end of the life of the commercial mortgage, when the borrower must pay back the majority of the loan principal to the lender in a single lump sum (or, “balloon payment”).  Either debt service default or balloon payment default can lead to a borrower request for commercial mortgage modification.
The Process of Obtaining a Commercial Mortgage Modification
Obtaining a commercial mortgage modification from your lender is essentially a 3-step process that involves first a pre-negotiation agreement or letter your bank will send you upon your request to negotiate, a process of supplying information for your bank to review in consideration of your commercial mortgage modification request, and finally, negotiation of the terms of your commercial mortgage modification.
Pre-negotiation letter. The pre-negotiation agreement or letter which accompanies most negotiations for commercial mortgage modifications is usually an agreement about the negotiation process itself.  A pre-negotiation agreement will set the ground rules regarding whether each party reserves or waives certain legal rights during negotiation, such as the common law duty of good faith and fair dealing. It is very important to read, understand, and if necessary, negotiate the terms of the pre-negotiation agreement itself, so that you do not unwittingly waive potential rights or claims.
Informing your bank. The process of informing your bank will be similar to your original loan application.  You will provide your bank with tax and income information for consideration of whether you qualify for new terms.  Tax returns, profit and loss schedules, and proof of accounts receivable are common items the bank will want to see.  If you are a landlord, the bank may require you to provide information as to the nature of your leases and their respective payment histories.
Negotiating Terms. The final stage of the process, negotiating the terms of your commercial mortgage modification, involves the give-and-take process during which you set, for example, a new loan duration, interest rate, balloon amount, or other concessions for you to avoid defaulting on your mortgage and going into foreclosure.
Who to Call
You should always rely on a skilled professional whenever you are going to sign any legal documents, and so it is highly recommended that you contact an attorney in your area familiar with lending laws, banking regulations, and best practices in the field of commercial mortgage modification.  Conclusion
Commercial Mortgage Modification should be a consideration for anyone who owns a business and who is likely to default on a commercial mortgage obligation in the foreseeable future.  The process can be relatively simple, but involves highly complex legal documents for which a skilled professional should be sought.

Southern California (909)890-9192 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting              (909)890-9192      end_of_the_skype_highlighting      end_of_the_skype_highlighting in Northern California(925)957-9797

Mortgage Lawsuits

DUNN v. WELLS FARGO: Eight causes of action
LAWYERS’ FUND FOR CLIENT PROTECTION OF STATE v. JP MORGAN CHASE BANK
ACEVES v. U.S. BANK: Bank’s promise to work with her in reinstating and modifying the loan was enforceable
KESLING v. COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS: Countrywide has refused to exercise its rights to obtain repayment on the loan
BROWN v. BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON: Homeowners do not have a a private right of action under HAMP for denial of a loan modification
CALDERON v. AURORA LOAN SERVICES: Plaintiffs alleged that “at no time” was MERS a holder of the “Note” or “Deed of Trust”
MARSH v. WELLS FARGO BANK: Approved Plaintiffs’ application for a loan modification
DELEBREAU v. BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING: The Court is Alarmed by the Factual and Procedural Morass
TORRES v. LITTON LOAN SERVICING: Another solicitation from Defendant for a loan modification plan
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. v. YOUNG: Question of whether foreclosures are legal proceedings or equitable proceedings
BANK OF NEW YORK v. PARNELL: A notice of mortgage cancellation
BANK v HARP: JPMorgan improperly filed the foreclosure complaint
CATALAN v. GMAC MORTGAGE: Details of plaintiffs’ maddening troubles with their mortgage
Keller Rohrback L.L.P. Files Class Action Against EMC Mortgage Corp. and Bear Stearns
International Investors Join Forces in Lawsuit Against Fortis Over Massive Misrepresentation Ahead of 2008 Bank Collapse
Wells Fargo Comments on Massachusetts Supreme Court Ruling
U.S. Bank’s Statement on Massachusetts Court Ruling
Massachusetts Foreclosure Case Reveals Bad Practices Behind the Mortgage Scene
Prisco v. U.S. Bank: Defendant violated the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362.1
Brookstone Law Fights For Orange County Law Enforcement Professionals Loan Modification
KARL v. QUALITY LOAN SERVICE: Plaintiff alleges several defects in the NOD
SIFRE v. WELLS FARGO BANK: Defendant does not have standing to foreclose and fraudulently induced him into entering into the mortgage contract
U.S. v. RAMENTOL: Appeal that the government failed to introduce evidence sufficient for a jury to convict them of wire fraud
MORTENSEN v. MERS: Defendants treated Mortensen shabbily in connection with his efforts to negotiate a mortgage loan modification
U.S. v. NOVRIT: Appeal from a criminal conviction for multiple counts relating to a mortgage fraud conspiracy
Ally Financial Reaches Agreement with Fannie Mae on Mortgage Repurchase Exposure
HAMP: Public citizens are not intended third-party beneficiaries to government contracts
VIDA v. ONEWEST BANK: HAMP does not provide for a private right of action
Loan Officers File Overtime Case Against Republic Mortgage Home Loans
Mortgage Lawsuits Up 41%
Timothy McCandless Esq. and Associates
Offices Statewide

(909)890-9192
(925)957-9797
FAX (909) 382-9956
tim@Prodefenders.com

http://www.timothymccandless.com

Home Affordable Modification Plan – Checklist For Approval

Are you applying for HAMP Program which is also known as Home Affordable Modification Program? The program is federally subsidized and that would pay lenders over and above servicers to modify eligible loans using the consistent terms state with the Treasury Department. What are the advantages of this loan workout programs and what are the necessities to partake?

“Obama’s HAMP loan modification program is part of the $75 billion dollar housing stimulus program that is planned to help out around 4 million homeowners out of foreclosure.”

The advantages of Obama’s HAMP loan modification program include:

  • Trim down payments to equal 31% of monthly total earnings
  • Stopping foreclosure procedure
  • Let off late fees and penalties
  • Include past outstanding payments in new loan
  • Lower interest rate as low as 2%*
  • Lengthen loan term to forty years
  • Defer or forgive principal balance

Unfortunately, not everyone could get eligible for aid under this program, nevertheless if you can meet the necessary eligibility requirements you can submit a loan modification program request for consideration. Here’re the requirements to apply for a loan workout:

  • Individual should stay in the home as your primary residence
  • Loan amount should be less than $729,750
  • Present payment equals more than 31% of monthly total income
  • Facing financial hardship

Majority lenders as well as servicers are contributing in Obama’s home affordable modification program, and concerned homeowners are positive to start the application process. Only borrowers who can prove they meet the appropriate guidelines would be accepted for a lower mortgage payment. There is a standard formula that lenders make use of to decide who would get eligible for approval. Homeowners can use a software program that uses this very similar program to help out them to organizing an exact and suitable application. Just input income and expenses, and the debt ratio, new target payment with new interest rate, disposable income and additional calculations are done automatically. Save hours of frustration and pass up mistakes.

Act Now – To Apply For Bad Credit Mortgage Refinance Loan »

Mass. BK Judge Issues “Emergency Preliminary Injunction, Pending Loan Modification Request” CRUZ v. WELLS FARGO (via Foreclosureblues)

Mass. BK Judge Issues “Emergency Preliminary Injunction, Pending Loan Modification Request” CRUZ v. WELLS FARGO Mass. BK Judge Issues “Emergency Preliminary Injunction, Pending Loan Modification Request” CRUZ v. WELLS FARGO Today, February 06, 2011, 8 hours ago | dinsfla In re: JOSE D CRUZ, Chapter 13, Debtor. JOSE D CRUZ, Plaintiff, v. HACIENDA ASSOCIATES, LLC and WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Defendants. Case No. 10-43793-MSH, Adv. Pro. No. 11-04006. United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts, Central Division. January 26, 2011. MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON … Read More

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Arizona Homeowners: Strength in Numbers (via Foreclosureblues)

Arizona Homeowners: Strength in Numbers Arizona Homeowners: Strength in Numbers Today, February 06, 2011, 7 hours ago | findsenlaw Please take two minutes to email the Arizona Senate Banking and Insurance Committee members to show your support for SB 1259.  It should not be easier to steal a house than to steal a car. You might tell them: They should support the law because no honest foreclosing entity will fear certifying that they are authorized to foreclose by a clear chain of title … Read More

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MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES: LEGAL COUNTERFEITING (via Foreclosureblues)

MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES: LEGAL COUNTERFEITING MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES: LEGAL COUNTERFEITING Today, February 06, 2011, 11 hours ago | Neil Garfield COMBO Title and Securitization Search, Report, Documents, Analysis & Commentary EDITOR’S NOTE: If you want to get the FEEL of what just happened in our world of finance and the ensuing effects on our economy, you might be better off reading a book like “Moneymakers: The Wicked Lives and Surprising Adventures of Three Notorious Counterfeiter … Read More

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housing market news from patrick.net (via Foreclosureblues)

housing market news from patrick.net Real Estate Lobby Is Ready To Kill Reform (businessweek.com) U.S. housing reform at risk of stopping way short (blogs.reuters.com) Housing finance changes likely to mean lower taxpayer subsidies for debt (washingtonpost.com) Mortgage rule could improve housing prices, by lowering them (reuters.com) GOP Targets Transportation, Housing For the Deepest Cuts (dc.streetsblog.org) Rand Paul Wants To End Public Housi … Read More

via Foreclosureblues

Wisconsin Appeals Court: Affidavits Not Based On "Personal Knowledge" Sink Lender's Attempt To Score Summary Judgment In Foreclosure Action (via Livinglies's Weblog)

Wisconsin Appeals Court: Affidavits Not Based On "Personal Knowledge" Sink Lender's Attempt To Score Summary Judgment In Foreclosure Action A Wisconsin intermediate appeals court recently reached the relatively unremarkable, predictable, and certainly non-ground-breaking conclusion that affidavits filed by a foreclosing lender that are not based on the "personal knowledge" of the affiant are insufficient to establish a basis for summary judgment. … Read More

via Livinglies's Weblog

Take this APR and Shove It

— Illustration: Christoph Hitz

He’s been called a “credit terrorist,” but Steven Katz says you shouldn’t feel guilty about sticking it to Wall Street.

— By Kimberly Thorpe

READ ALSO: Steven Katz’s tips for driving creditors crazy.

At last count, Steven Katz owed $80,000 on his six credit cards, and he has no intention of paying any of it off. In fact, he’d like to show you how to be like him—a “credit terrorist” in open revolt against the banking system.

Katz is the founder of Debtorboards.com (“Sue Your Creditor and Win!”), a five-year-old online forum where he’s collected countless tricks and tactics for evading and repelling persistent creditors. He’s written how-tos on shielding your assets from seizure, luring collection agencies into expensive lawsuits, and frustrating private investigators looking for debtors on the run. He’s even infiltrated the bill collectors’ forums, where he’s been tagged a “credit jihadist” and his site’s been called a “credit terrorist training camp,” a label he embraces. “Debtorboards is one of the biggest and most successful temper tantrums ever,” the 59-year-old Katz boasts. The site has more than 10,000 members—double what it had in 2009.

Katz wants the millions of Americans buried in debt to stop feeling guilty about not honoring their obligations. “People are brainwashed to think that paying a credit card is more important than paying for the necessities of life,” he says. “Business and morality have nothing to do with each other, according to the bankers.” One of Katz’s mottos is “No one ever went to hell for not paying a debt.”

“No one ever went to hell for not paying a debt.”

He wasn’t always an unrepentant debtor. When he first spoke to me from his tax and accounting business in a strip mall in Tucson, Arizona, he recalled how his first job in the ’70s was tromping through Brooklyn making collections for a small loan company. He once threatened to take a woman’s kids to an orphanage if she didn’t pay her bills. He wasn’t serious, but it worked.

The tables were turned in 2003, when a collection agency came after Katz for a debt that had been written off when he declared bankruptcy a few years earlier. The collector wouldn’t relent, and Katz’s credit score tanked. Outraged, he turned to the internet, where he learned how to go after debt collectors for violating consumer protection laws. Eventually, the collector paid him $1,000 in damages. Katz framed the check with the caption “The Steven Katz school of bill collector education is now open for business.”

His tactics may be extreme, but Katz is not alone in his quest to evade the banking system. More Americans than ever are unable—or unwilling—to make good on their debts. Since 2008, banks have “charged off” a record $90 billion in credit card debt—taking it off their books as unlikely to ever be repaid. In the past two years, major banks charged off more than 10 percent of all consumer credit card accounts, on average—two times the pre-recession rate, and the highest in US history. The number of consumer lawsuits filed against collectors, like those Debtorboards encourages, has grown 122 percent since 2008. A backlash against the big banks is ballooning—from the California woman who made a popular YouTube video urging people to stop paying their credit card bills as part of a “debtors’ revolution” to the “Move Your Money” campaign, which encourages consumers to move their money to local banks or credit unions.

While it’s easy to hate the big banks and credit card companies, it can be hard to quit them cold turkey. Katz knows this well: After going bankrupt, he went back into debt to finance the growth of his tax business and renovate his home. By early 2010, he and his wife owed upwards of $40,000 on six credit cards. They diligently made their monthly payments. The 6 percent APR on his Wells Fargo Visa tripled; his other cards’ rates followed. (Banks surprised many customers with higher rates and new fees in response to 2009’s credit reform law, which limited rate hikes.) He called Wells Fargo to lower the rate; the bank refused. He says he started to pay down the balance, but then it looked like his wife was about to lose her job.

So Katz started planning his final escape. His wife found a job teaching English in Shijiazhuang, China, and he decided to join her. “I’d been fucked over by the banks,” he says. “I was treated like a deadbeat even though I wasn’t. And my attitude was, ‘If you’re going to treat me like a deadbeat, goddamn it, I might as well be one.'”

He stopped paying his bills and took out the largest cash advances possible, transferring $38,000 to an account in China, where it would be virtually out of reach from American banks. Of course, in the States he’d still be on the hook for his debts, and he could face fraud charges for taking the money with no intention of paying it back. But Katz says he has no plans to ever come back.

Last August, he began his new life as an “international deadbeat” by buying a first-class one-way ticket to China—with his credit card, of course. Talking on the phone from his new three-bedroom apartment, he recalls how his wife and son met him in Beijing, handing him two collection letters that had already arrived at his new address. He opened them on the spot. “In the middle of the airport, I’m laughing my head off, and I just take one of them and wipe my butt with it.”

 

The Financial Anarchist's Cookbook (via Foreclosureblues)

The Financial Anarchist's Cookbook The Financial Anarchist's Cookbook Today, February 07, 2011, 9 hours ago | Kimberly Thorpe READ ALSO: "Credit terrorist" Steven Katz says you shouldn't feel guilty about sticking it to Wall Street. TAPE EVERYTHING. Record your calls with collection agents (if it's legal in your state). When they say, "We can seize your car to repay a credit card bill," you've caught them in a violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Sue, and you could … Read More

via Foreclosureblues

US Housing Continues Freefall & Is Nowhere Near The Bottom (via Livinglies's Weblog)

US Housing Continues Freefall & Is Nowhere Near The Bottom The Frighteningly Obvious Truth That Most Deny – US Housing Continues Freefall & Is Nowhere Near The Bottom Posted on February 7, 2011 by Foreclosureblues Today, February 07, 2011, 4 hours ago | Reggie Middleton The residential real estate situation is still looking quite bleak. The downturn (actually, the continuation of the earlier downturn – they were not two separate events) that I forecast last year has come, and come with a vengeance. I … Read More

via Livinglies's Weblog

[NYSC] Judge Spinner “Plaintiff’s Papers Raises Disturbing Issues”, “Appears To Run Counter To New York’s Statute of Frauds” BENEFICIAL HOMEOWNER SERV. CORP v. STEELE (via Livinglies's Weblog)

[NYSC] Judge Spinner “Plaintiff’s Papers Raises Disturbing Issues”, “Appears To Run Counter To New York’s Statute of Frauds” BENEFICIAL HOMEOWNER SERV. CORP v. STEELE COMBO Title and Securitization Search, Report, Documents, Analysis & Commentary MORTGAGE DOCUMENTS MUST BE IN WRITING AND EXECUTED ACCORDING TO STATUTE OF FRAUDS EDITORS ANALYSIS: Every state has a statute of frauds — which in plain language means that there are certain types of transactions that won't be enforced by the court, or where parts of the transactions won't be enforced by the court without a written instrument executed in the for … Read More

via Livinglies's Weblog

Foreclosure fraud Bay News

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Lawler: How Many Folks Have “Lost Their Homes” to Foreclosure/Short Sales/DILs?


by CalculatedRisk on 2/02/2011 05:30:00 PM

CR: This is an interesting question and hard to answer … the following is from economist Tom Lawler …

How Many Folks Have “Lost Their Homes” to Foreclosure/ShortSales/DILs Over the Past Few Years?

According toHope Nowestimates, completed foreclosure sales (rounded) were about as follows over the past few years.

Year Completed Foreclosure
2007 514,000
2008 914,000
2009 949,000
2010 1,070,000

 

While these numbers are disturbingly high, they are not nearly as large as one would have expected given the surge in seriously delinquent loans and loans in the process of foreclosure. For the latter, here is a chart based on data from the MBA’s National Delinquency Survey, which covers “over 85%” of total 1-4 family first-lienmortgages.MBA Delinquency
On one side, the “completed foreclosure sales” understates the number of homes “lost,” given that many homeowners have “lost” their homes but been able to negotiate a short sale or (much less likely) done a deed in lieu of foreclosure. While there are no official estimates of either short sales or DILs, there is no doubt that the volume of short sales increased dramatically in 2009 and 2010.

Using CoreLogic’s estimates and grossing them up to reflect its incomplete geographic coverage, one would get short sales estimates of around 78,000 for 2007, 164,000 for 2008, 278,000 for 2009, and 331,000 for 2010. However, based on data reported by lenders on short sales in the OCC/OTS mortgage metricsreports, the CoreLogic estimates of short sales look way too high for 2007 and 2008 (the 2009 estimates look OK, but the 2010 estimates – which admittedly are not available for the full year – look a tad low). Using instead my own estimates for 2008 through 2010, here’s what completed foreclosure sales plus short sales might look like (I don’t have a DIL estimate, but it appears as if the volume of DILs was pretty low).

Year Completed Foreclosure Sales Short Sales Total
2008 914,000 95,000 1,009,000
2009 949,000 263,000 1,212,000
2010 1,070,000 375,000 1,445,000

 

On the other hand, the above numbers could well OVERSTATE significantly the number of homeowners who lost their primary home either to foreclosure or to a short sale. A “significant” % of completed foreclosure sales has been completed foreclosures on non-owner-occupied homes, though estimates vary as to what that % has been. In addition, not all short sales have involved homeowners “involuntarily” leaving their home, but who instead wanted to (for economic or other reasons) move and who were able to negotiate a short sale with their lender.So what is the right number for folks who lost their residence to foreclosure, a short sales, or a DIL? I don’t rightly know.

It is pretty clear, however, that overall foreclosure moratoria, foreclosure delays, modifications, and other workout activity continued to keep the number of homeowners who “lost” their homes to foreclosure massively lower than one would have expected given the delinquency/in foreclosure numbers.

Year Completed Foreclosure Sales plus Short Sales Loans in Foreclosure/90+ Delinquent at end of previous year
2008 1,009,000 1,664,760
2009 1,212,000 2,859,959
2010 1,445,000 4,296,018

 

Note: the loans in foreclosure/90+ delinquent are derived from the MBA National Delinquency Survey, which only covers somewhere around 85-87% of the total 1-4 family first-lien mortgage market. A crude estimate of the “total” market would “gross up” the above numbers by around 1.163 (or 1/0.86).CR Note: This was from housing economist Tom Lawler.

Deutsche Bank Financial Fraud On Wall Street & US Mortgage Scam Just The Tip of the Foreclosure Iceberg Linked To Stern Law Firm. (via Foreclosureblues)

Deutsche Bank Financial Fraud On Wall Street & US Mortgage Scam Just The Tip of the Foreclosure Iceberg Linked To Stern Law Firm. Deutsche Bank Financial Fraud On Wall Street & US Mortgage Scam Just The Tip of the Foreclosure Iceberg Linked To Stern Law Firm. Today, February 04, 2011, 18 minutes ago | pibillwarner Friday, February 04, 2011 Deutsche Bank and David J. Stern as DJSP Enterprises set up Wall Strert for a big fall, when do the Federal Indictments come down? According to Bloomberg financial writer and author, Michael Lewis, under  Josef Ackermann’s leadership … Read More

via Foreclosureblues

Dems: Obama Broke Pledge to Force Banks to Help Homeowners

Dems: Obama Broke Pledge to Force Banks to Help Homeowners

by Paul Kiel and Olga Pierce ProPublica, Feb. 4, 2011

Before he took office, President Obama repeatedly promised voters and Democrats in Congress that he’d fight for changes to bankruptcy laws to help homeowners—a tough approach that would force banks to modify mortgages.

“I will change our bankruptcy laws to make it easier for families to stay in their homes,” Obama told supporters at a Colorado rally on September 16, 2008, the same day as the bailout of AIG.

Bankruptcy judges have long been barred from lowering mortgage payments on primary residences, though they could do it with nearly all other types of debt, even mortgages on vacation homes. Obama promised to change that, describing it as exactly “the kind of out-of-touch Washington loophole that makes no sense.”

But when it came time to fight for the measure, he didn’t show up. Some Democrats now say his administration actually undermined it behind the scenes.

“Their behavior did not well serve the country,” said Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-CA), who led House negotiations to enact the change, known as “cramdown.” It was “extremely disappointing.”

Instead, the administration has relied on a voluntary program with few sticks, that simply offers banks incentives to modify mortgages. Known as Home Affordable Modification Program, or HAMP, the program was modeled after an industry plan. The administration also wrote it carefully to exclude millions of homeowners seen as undeserving.

The administration launched the program with a promise that it would help 3 million to 4 million homeowners avoid foreclosure, but it’s likely to fall far short of that goal. The Congressional Oversight Panel now estimates [1] fewer than 800,000 homeowners will ultimately get lasting mortgage modifications.

The number of modifications has remained dramatically low compared to the number of homeowners falling behind. (Source: LPS Applied Analytics and HOPE Now)

Over the past year, ProPublica has been exploring why the program has helped so few homeowners. Last week, we reported how the Treasury Department has allowed banks to break the program’s rules with few ramifications [2]. The series is based on newly released data, lobbying disclosures, and dozens of interviews with insiders, members of Congress and others.

As the foreclosure crisis grew through 2008, the large banks that handle most mortgages were slow to offer modifications to struggling homeowners. Homeowners were left to navigate an onerous process that usually did not actually lower their mortgage payment. More than half of modifications kept the homeowner’s payment the same or actually increased it.

Many in Congress and elsewhere thought that mortgage servicers, the largest of which are the four largest banks, would make modifications only if they were pressured to do so.

Servicers work as intermediaries, handling homeowners’ mortgage payments on behalf of investors who own the loans. Since servicers don’t own the vast majority of the loans they service, they don’t take the loss if a home goes to foreclosure, making them reluctant to make the investments necessary to fulfill their obligations to help homeowners.

To force those servicers to modify mortgages, advocates pushed for a change to bankruptcy law giving judges the power not just to change interest rates but to reduce the overall amount owed on the loan, something servicers are loath to do [3].

Congressional Democrats had long been pushing a bill to enact cramdown and were encouraged by the fact that Obama had supported it, both in the Senate and on the campaign trail.

They thought cramdowns would serve as a stick, pushing banks to make modifications on their own.

“That was always the thought,” said Rep. Brad Miller (D-NC), “that judicial modifications would make voluntary modifications work. There would be the consequence that if the lenders didn’t [modify the loan], it might be done to them.”

When Obama unveiled his proposal to stem foreclosures a month after taking office, cramdown was a part of the package [4]. But proponents say he’d already damaged cramdown’s chances of becoming law.

In the fall of 2008, Democrats saw a good opportunity to pass cramdown. The $700 billion TARP legislation was being considered, and lawmakers thought that with banks getting bailed out, the bill would be an ideal vehicle for also helping homeowners. But Obama, weeks away from his coming election, opposed that approach and instead pushed for a delay. He promised congressional Democrats that down the line he would “push hard to get cramdown into the law,” recalled Rep. Miller.

Four months later, the stimulus bill presented another potential vehicle for cramdown. But lawmakers say the White House again asked them to hold off, promising to push it later.

An attempt to include cramdown in a continuing resolution got the same response from the president.

“We would propose that this stuff be included and they kept punting,” said former Rep. Jim Marshall, a moderate Democrat from Georgia who had worked to sway other members of the moderate Blue Dog caucus [5] on the issue.

“We got the impression this was an issue [the White House] would not go to the mat for as they did with health care reform,” said Bill Hampel, chief economist for the Credit Union National Association, which opposed cramdown and participated in Senate negotiations on the issue.

Privately, administration officials were ambivalent about the idea. At a Democratic caucus meeting weeks before the House voted on a bill that included cramdown, Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner “was really dismissive as to the utility of it,” said Rep. Lofgren.

Larry Summers, then the president’s chief economic adviser, also expressed doubts in private meetings, she said. “He was not supportive of this.”

The White House and Summers did not respond to requests for comment.

Treasury staffers began conversations with congressional aides by saying the administration supported cramdown and would then “follow up with a whole bunch of reasons” why it wasn’t a good idea, said an aide to a senior Democratic senator.

Homeowners, Treasury staffers argued, would take advantage of bankruptcy to get help they didn’t need. Treasury also stressed the effects of cramdown on the nation’s biggest banks, which were still fragile. The banks’ books could take a beating if too many consumers lured into bankruptcy by cramdown also had their home equity loans and credit card debt written down.

While the Obama administration was silent, the banking industry had long been mobilizing massive opposition to the measure.

“Every now and again an issue comes along that we believe would so fundamentally undermine the nature of the financial system that we have to take major efforts to oppose, and this is one of them,” Floyd Stoner, the head lobbyist for the American Bankers Association, told an industry magazine.

With big banks hugely unpopular, the key opponents of cramdown were the nation’s community bankers, who argued that the law would force them to raise mortgage rates to cover the potential losses. Democratic leaders offered to exempt the politically popular smaller banks from the cramdown law, but no deal was reached.

“When you’re dealing with something like the bankruptcy issue, where all lenders stand pretty much in the same shoes, it shouldn’t be a surprise when the smaller and larger banks find common cause,” said Steve Verdier, a lobbyist for the Independent Community Bankers Association.

The lobbying by the community banks and credit unions proved fatal to the measure, lawmakers say. “The community banks went bonkers on this issue,” said former Sen. Chris Dodd (D-CT). With their opposition, he said, “you don’t win much.”

“It was a pitched battle to get it out of the House,” said Rep. Miller, with “all the effort coming from the Democratic leadership, not the Obama administration.”

The measure faced stark conservative opposition. It was opposed by Republicans in Congress and earlier by the Bush administration, who argued that government interference to change mortgage contracts would reduce the security of all kinds of future contracts.

“It undermines the foundation of the capitalist economy,” said Phillip Swagel, a Bush Treasury official. “What separates us from [Russian Prime Minister Vladimir] Putin is not retroactively changing contracts.”

After narrowly passing the House, cramdown was defeated when 12 Democrats joined Republicans [6] to vote against it.

Many Democrats in Congress said they saw this as the death knell for the modification program, which would now have to rely on the cooperation of banks and other mortgage servicers to help homeowners.

“I never thought that it would work on a voluntary basis,” said Rep. Lofgren.

At the time that the new administration was frustrating proponents of cramdown, the administration was putting its energies into creating a voluntary program, turning to a plan already endorsed by the banking industry. Crafted in late 2008, the industry plan gave banks almost complete freedom in deciding which mortgages to modify and how.

The proposal was drafted by the Hope Now Alliance, a group billed as a broad coalition of the players affected by the mortgage crisis, including consumer groups, housing counselors, and banks. In fact, the Hope Now Alliance was headquartered in the offices of the Financial Services Roundtable, a powerful banking industry trade group. Hope Now’s lobbying disclosures were filed jointly with the Roundtable, and they show efforts to defeat cramdown and other mortgage bills supported by consumer groups.

The Hope Now plan aimed to boost the number of modifications by streamlining the process for calculating the new homeowner payments. In practice, because it was voluntary, it permitted servicers to continue offering few or unaffordable modifications.

The plan was replaced by the administration’s program after just a few months, but it proved influential. “The groundwork was already laid,” said Christine Eldarrat, an executive adviser at the Federal Housing Finance Agency, which regulates Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. “Servicers were onboard, and we knew their feelings about certain guidelines.”

As an official Treasury Department account of its housing programs later put it, “The Obama Administration recognized the momentum in the private sector reflected in Hope Now’s efforts and sought to build upon it.” It makes no mention of cramdown as being needed to compel compliance.

Ultimately, HAMP kept the streamlined evaluation process of the Hope Now plan but made changes that would, in theory, push servicers to make more affordable modifications. If servicers chose to participate, they would receive incentive payments, up to $4,000, for each modification, and the private investors and lenders who owned the loans would also receive subsidies. In exchange, servicers would agree to follow rules for handling homeowner applications and make deeper cuts in mortgage payments. Servicers who chose not to participate could handle delinquent homeowners however they chose.

The program had to be voluntary, Treasury officials say, because the bailout bill did not contain the authority to compel banks to modify loans or follow any rules. A mandatory program requires congressional approval. The prospects for that were, and remain, dim, said Dodd. “Not even close.”

“The ideal would have been both [cramdown and HAMP],” said Rep. Barney Frank (D-MA), then the chairman of the House Financial Services Committee. But given the political constraints, HAMP on its own was “better than nothing.”

“We designed elegant programs that seemed to get all the incentives right to solve the problem,” said Karen Dynan, a former senior economist at the Federal Reserve. “What we learned is that the world is a really complicated place.”

The program was further limited by the administration’s concerns about using taxpayer dollars to help the wrong homeowners. The now-famous “rant” by a CNBC reporter [7], which fueled the creation of the Tea Party movement, was prompted by the idea that homeowners who had borrowed too much money might get help.

Candidate Obama had portrayed homeowners in a sympathetic light. But the president struck a cautious note when he unveiled the plan in February 2009 [8]. The program will “not rescue the unscrupulous or irresponsible by throwing good taxpayer money after bad loans,” said Obama. “It will not reward folks who bought homes they knew from the beginning they would never be able to afford.”

While the government had been relatively undiscriminating in its bank bailout [9], it would carefully vet homeowners seeking help. HAMP was written to exclude homeowners seen as undeserving, limiting the program’s reach to between 3 million and 4 million homes.

In order to prove their income was neither too high nor too low for the program, homeowners were asked to send in more documents than servicers had required previously, further taxing servicers’ limited capacity. As a result, some servicers say eligible homeowners have been kept out. According to one industry estimate [10], as many as 30 percent more homeowners would have received modifications without the additional demands for documentation.

A lot of the program is focused on “weeding out bad apples,” said Steven Horne, former Director of Servicing Risk Strategy at Fannie Mae. “Ninety percent is not focused on keeping more borrowers in their homes.”

~

Banks Keep Stealing – Why Keep Paying? (via Foreclosureblues)

Banks Keep Stealing – Why Keep Paying? Banks Keep Stealing – Why Keep Paying? Today, February 03, 2011, 36 minutes ago | Mark Stopa Below is an article written by MSNBC’s Dylan Ratigan, who makes a compelling argument for strategic default. The dire straits of the middle class of America has made it near impossible for our politicians to keep up the pretense that our current government truly works for the “people.” Between the multiple overt and secretive bailouts, the massive bonuses … Read More

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STOP! You Must Read The Florida Appeal Transcript of PINO v. BANK OF NEW YORK (via Foreclosureblues)

STOP! You Must Read The Florida Appeal Transcript of PINO v. BANK OF NEW YORK STOP! You Must Read The Florida Appeal Transcript of PINO v. BANK OF NEW YORK Yesterday, February 03, 2011, 11:01:44 PM | dinsfla courtesy of IceLegal excerpts: JUDGE POLEN: I’m afraid I’m not following that. David Stern’s client at the time was BNY Mellon Bank, right? MR. NIEVES: Yes. JUDGE POLEN: Okay. And that’s evidence of what, an assignment to a bank? MR. NIEVES: Basically, the law firm manufactured evidence for the client’s case. JUDGE POL … Read More

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The Pino Case- If The Court Considers Fraud on The Courts You’ll Create Chaos in The Courts. (via Foreclosureblues)

The Pino Case- If The Court Considers Fraud on The Courts You’ll Create Chaos in The Courts. The Pino Case- If The Court Considers Fraud on The Courts You’ll Create Chaos in The Courts. Yesterday, February 03, 2011, 8:51:53 PM | Matthew D. Weidner, Esq. The Pino Appeal is Florida’s Ibanez moment.  The Florida Supreme Court will soon decide just how serious Florida courts are going to take systematic, repetitive fraud on the Courts of the State of Florida.  The bottom line is this…. Will banks and foreclosure mills  be given a free pass o … Read More

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housing market news from patrick.net (via Foreclosureblues)

housing market news from patrick.net Wealthiest Americans Enrich Themselves At Taxpayer Expense (dailybail.com) JPMorgan was warned on Madoff, lawsuit says (money.cnn.com) Read unsealed complaint: JPMorgan Execs Warned About Madoff (stopforeclosurefraud.com) Merrill fired analyst who angered huge bank clients before financial crisis (finance.yahoo.com) When Irish Eyes Are Crying (vanityfair.com) Russia's Putin sees $20.5 bln housing investment (r … Read More

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The Great Global Debt Prison (via Foreclosureblues)

The Great Global Debt Prison The Great Global Debt Prison Today, February 04, 2011, 51 minutes ago | giordano By Giordano Bruno Neithercorp Press – 2/4/2011 Tense and terrible times inevitably summon an odd coupling of two very different and difficult human conditions; honesty, and brutality. Certain painful truths are revealed, and often, a palpable fury erupts. Being that times today are particularly tense, and on the verge of being spectacularly terrible, perhaps we shoul … Read More

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FREE HOUSE? MAN BEATS BANK – And Creates Mortgage Banking MERS Bomb (via Foreclosureblues)

FREE HOUSE? MAN BEATS BANK – And Creates Mortgage Banking MERS Bomb FREE HOUSE? MAN BEATS BANK – And Creates Mortgage Banking MERS Bomb Today, February 04, 2011, 4 hours ago | Neil Garfield COMBO Title and Securitization Search, Report, Documents, Analysis & Commentary EDITOR’S NOTE: If you don’t get your chain of title and claims of securitization of your loan analyzed after reading this article and watching these short videos, you are walking away from your own wealth. The “free house” that you are accused … Read More

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If they’re too big to fail, they’re too big

How did our economy come so close to collapse? How did we lose jobs, homes and retirement funds? Ordinary people are angry that they are suffering the grievous effects of the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression — and they want an explanation about how it happened.

“They aren’t getting answers from the big banks that created this mess, the ones that were bailed out with taxpayer dollars, and they aren’t getting it from the government officials who were supposed to be guarding against this very disaster that has befallen us,” MidSouth Bank President and CEO C.R. “Rusty” Cloutier writes on the book jacket in Big Bad Banks. “That’s why I decided to write Big Bad Banks.”

However, just weeks before Big Bad Banks hit bookstore shelves, former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan did an about face. Speaking before the Council of Foreign Relations in New York on Oct. 15, Greenspan actually suggested breaking up big banks:

“If they’re too big to fail, they’re too big,” Greenspan said, according to Bloomberg. “In 1911 we broke up Standard Oil — so what happened? The individual parts became more valuable than the whole. Maybe that’s what we need to do.”

But where has America’s “Economic Dictator,” as Cloutier refers to him in Big Bad Banks, been for the past two decades? “It was pretty obvious to me from the get-go that Alan Greenspan had never met a big-time banker who he didn’t like and had never met a small-time banker who he did like,” Cloutier writes in Big Bad Banks. “With his deregulatory mindset he went about the business of making it easier and easier for his beloved big bankers to expand their franchises and become even bigger while making it more and more difficult for small banks to thrive and prosper.”

Temporary injunction granted !

Attorney Lenore L. Albert in Huntington beach, CA, attorney for Plaintiffs and the Class Action has secured an order that is worth reading both from the standpoint of what you should be looking for as well as what should be in your pleadings. The Court has obviously been convinced that Deutsch, Aurora, Quality Loan Service et al are involved in an enterprise that if not criminal, does not meet the standards of due process or even just plain common sense and fairness.


J Selna is paving the way for a permanent injunction against them for much the same reasons as we have seen in the high Court decisions around the country including the recent Ibanez decision in Massachusetts, and the very recent New jersey decision. The Order is important not only for its content but because of its form which is why I want you to read it.

The Order 1st prohibits the Defendants from taking ANY action with respect to the properties, and second sets the stage for making that prohibition permanent. What is interesting to me about this order is the specificity of the order and the timing in which it takes effect. See if you don’t agree.

selna-ca-tro-deutsch-aurora-quality

The Scandal of Foreclosure Mill Law Firms Continues

It has been well known for some time that many of the foreclosure mill law firms are not truly law firms.  Rather, they are just paperwork processors for the massive banks masquerading as lawyers.  One aspect of this, while well known but unpunished, is the fact that these firms flaunt the rules prohibiting law firms from splitting legal fees with non-lawyers or having non-lawyer shareholders.  Why the state ethics boards that govern lawyers are not cracking down is beyond me.  One thing that might crack down on them is the marketplace.  In today’s New York Times, it is reported that a scheme to spin off the “backoffice” operations of one of the most notorious of these law firms, that of David J. Stern in Florida is a disaster for investors. It does not help these investors that Mr. Stern’s “law firm” has essentially been fired by all of its major clients since the robosigning scandal first came out.

Attacking the Sale or Defending Possession in Unlawful Detainer Proceedings

Generally, the purchaser at a trustee’s sale may institute an unlawful detainer action to obtain possession if the “property has been duly sold in accordance with Section 2924 of the Civil Code” and if “title under the sale has been duly perfected.” [Code of Civ. Proc. § 1161a(b) (3). ] A transferee of the purchaser also has standing to use the unlawful detainer process. [See Evans v. Superior Court (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 162, 169-70; 136 Cal.Rptr. 596.] The action may be brought after the failure to vacate following the service of a three-day notice to quit. [Code of Civ. Proc. § 116la(b).] However, unlawful detainer proceedings may be used against a tenant or subtenant only after the service of notice to quit at least as long as the periodic tenancy but not exceeding 30 days. [Code Civ. Pro. § 1161a(c).] The remedy is cumulative to common law actions such as ejectment which may be brought to obtain possession. [See Duckett v. Adolph Wexler Bldg. & Fin. Corp. (1935) 2 Cal.2d 263, 265-66; 40 P.2d 506; Mutual Bldo. & Loan Assn. v. Corum (1934) 3 Cal.App.2d 56, 58; 38 P.2d 793.] With very rare exceptions, the purchaser will invoke summary unlawful detainer proceedings rather than other proceedings to gain possession.
However, the purchaser is precluded from invoking unlawful detainer if a local ordinance, such as a rent control law, does not permit eviction after foreclosure. [See Gross v. Superior Court (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 265; 217 Cal.Rptr. 284.] The purchaser may also be bound to rent ceilings. [See People v. Little (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d Supp. 14; 192 Cal.Rptr. 619.]
The courts have charted inconsistent paths in determining what defenses may be raised in unlawful detainer proceedings and to what extent the trustor may be able to attack the purchaser’s title. In the early cases, the courts concluded that the purchaser had the burden of proving that the purchaser acquired the property in the manner expressed in the unlawful detainer statute; i.e., the property was duly sold and the purchaser duly perfected title. No other questions of title could be litigated. [See e.g., Nineteenth Realty Co. v. Diacrs (1933) 134 Cal.App. 278, 288-89; 25 P.2d 522; Hewitt v. Justice’s Court (1933) 131 Cal.App. 439, 443; 21 P.2d 641.]

This rule was adopted by the Supreme Court in Cheney v. Trauzettel (1937) 9 Cal.2d 158; 69 P.2d 832. The Supreme Court held that:
… in the summary proceeding in unlawful detainer the right to possession alone was involved, and the broad question of title could not be raised and litigated by cross-complaint or affirmative defense. [Citations omitted.] It is true that where the purchaser at a trustee’s sale proceeds under section 1161a of the Code of Civil Procedure he must prove his acquisition of title by purchase at the sale; but it is only to this limited extent, as provided by statute, that the title may be litigated in such a proceeding. [Citations omitted.] . . . the plaintiff need only prove a sale in compliance with the statute and deed of trust, followed by purchase at such sale, and the defendant may raise objections only on that phase of the issue of title. Matters affecting the validity of the trust deed or primary obligation itself, or other basic defects in the plaintiff’s title, are neither properly raised in this summary proceeding for possession, nor are they concluded by the judgment. (Id. at 159-60.)
Accordingly, in numerous cases trustors have been forbidden from defending against the unlawful detainer on grounds other than showing that the sale was not conducted pursuant to Civil Code § 2924. [See e.g., California Livestock Production Credit Assn. v. Sutfin, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d 136, 140 n.2; Evans v. Superior Court, supra, 67 Cal.App.3d 162, 170-71; MCA. Inc. v. Universal Diversified Enterprises Corp. (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 170, 176-77; 103 Cal.Rptr. 522; Cruce v. Stein, supra, 146 Cal.App.2d 688, 692; Abrahamer v. Parks, supra, 141 Cal.App.2d 82, 84; Hiaoins v. Covne (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 69, 72-73, 75; 170 P.2d 25; Delov v. Ono (1937) 22 Cal.App.2d 301, 303; 70 P.2d 960.]
Other courts, on the other hand, have considered defenses extrinsic to compliance with statutory foreclosure procedure in determining unlawful detainer matters. In Seidell v. Anglo-California Trust Co. (1942) 55 Cal.App.2d 913, 921; 132 P.2d 12, the Court of Appeal construed Cheney to prohibit only equitable but not legal defenses. Therefore, the Court thought that lack of consideration and other issues going to the validity of the note and the trust deed were proper defenses. (Id. at 922.) Other cases have permitted the unlawful detainer defenses whether or not the grounds were technically legal or equitable. [See e.g., Kartheiser v. Superior Court (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 617, 621; 345 P.2d 135 (beneficiary’s waiver of default); Freeze v. Salot, supra, 122 Cal.App.2d 561; (no default); Kessler v. Bridge (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d Supp. 837; 327 P.2d 241 (rescission, lack of delivery); Altman v. McCollum. supra, 107 Cal.App.2d Supp. 847; (estoppel to assert default).]
The issue of what defenses can or should be raised also significantly affects the application of the res judicata doctrine to any action by the trustor after the unlawful detainer to challenge the trustee’s sale. Cases, proceeding from Seidell, which hold that potential defenses are far ranging, have also held that issues which were, or might have been, determined in the unlawful detainer proceeding are barred by res judicata in subsequent proceedings. [See Freeze v. Salot. supra, 122 Cal.App.2d 561, 565-66; Bliss v. Security-First Nat. Bank (1947) 81 Cal.App.2d 50, 58; Seidell v. Analo-California Trust Co., supra, 55 Cal.App.2d 913.]
The Court of Appeal, however, ruled differently in Gonzales v. Gem Properties, Inc., supra, 37 Cal.App.3d 1029, 1036. The court recognized the extreme difficulty of conducting complicated defenses in the context of a summary proceeding; investigation and discovery procedures are limited, and the proceeding is too swift to afford sufficient time for preparation. Therefore, the court denied a res judicata effect to issues such as fraud.
The resolution of the problems raised by these cases appears in Vella v. Hudoins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251; 142 Cal.Rptr. 414 and Asuncion v. Superior Court (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 141; 166 Cal.Rptr.
306. In Vella, the Supreme Court held generally that only claims “bearing directly upon the right of immediate possession are permitted; consequently, a judgment in unlawful detainer usually has very limited res judicata effect and will not prevent one who is dispossessed from bringing a subsequent action to resolve questions of title [citations omitted], or to adjudicate other legal and equitable claims between the parties [citations omitted].” (20 Cal.3d at 255.) The purchaser, however, must show that the sale was regularly conducted and that the purchaser’s title was duly perfected. (Id.)
The court reaffirmed the holding in Cheney that claims dealing with the validity of the trust deed or the obligation or with other basic defects in the purchaser’s title should not be litigated in unlawful detainer proceedings, and that determination made regarding such claims should not be given res judicata effect. (Id. at 257.) Defenses which need not be raised may nonetheless be considered if there is no objection. [See Stephens, Partain & Cunningham v. Hollis, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d 948, 953.] Res judicata will apply only to defenses, including those ordinarily not cognizable but raised without objection, if there is a fair opportunity to litigate, rvella v. Hudgins, supra, 20 Cal.3d 251, 256-57.] Since complex claims, such as for fraud, can very rarely be fairly litigated in summary unlawful detainer proceedings, the trustor is not required to raise those issues as a defense. (Id.at 258.)
Although not required and ordinarily not allowed to litigate critical issues involving the obligation, the trust deed, and title, the homeowner-trustor is practically impelled to litigate these issues or be dispossessed since an unlawful detainer hearing will certainly precede a trial on a quiet title action. [See Code of Civ. Proc. § 1179a; Kartheiser v. Superior Court, supra, 174 Cal.App.2d 617, 621-23.] The California Supreme Court, citing Justice Douglas, aptly observed:
. . . the home, even though it be in the slums, is where man’s roots are. To put him into the street . . . deprives the tenant of a fundamental right without any real opportunity to defend. Then he loses the essence of the controversy, being given only empty promises that somehow, somewhere, someone may allow him to litigate the basic question in the case. S. P. Growers Assn. v. Rodriguez (1976) 17 Cal.3d 719, 730; 131 Cal.Rptr. 761.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeal held in Asuncion, supra, that “homeowners cannot be evicted, consistent with due process guaranties, without being permitted to raise the affirmative defenses which if proved would maintain their possession and ownership.” (108 Cal.App.3d at 146.) Nonetheless, the Court was mindful that an unlawful detainer action was “not a suitable vehicle to try complicated ownership issues. …” [Id. at 144; see Mehr v. Superior Court (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 1044, 1049; 189 Cal.Rptr. 138; Gonzales v. Gem Properties, Inc., supra, 37 Cal.App.3d 1029, 1036.] The Court thus prescribed the following procedure when the trustor had on file a superior court action contesting title: (a) the municipal court should transfer the unlawful detainer proceeding to the superior court because that action ultimately involves the issue of title which is beyond the municipal court’s jurisdiction; and (b) the superior court should stay the eviction action, subject to a bond if appropriate, until trial of the action dealing with title, or (c) the superior court should consolidate the actions. (Id. at 146-47.)
If the challenge to title is based on fraud in the acquisition of title, improper sales methods, or other improprieties that directly impeach the unlawful detainer plaintiff’s title or the procedures followed in the foreclosure sale, Asuncion and Mehr dictate that the unlawful detainer should be stayed. On the other hand, if the challenge to title is based on a claim unrelated to the specific property in question, such as a fraud not directly related to the obtaining of title to the property that is the subject of the unlawful detainer, the rule in Asuncion does not apply. [See Old National Financial Services, Inc. v. Seibert (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 460, 464-67.]

Asuncion should also be distinguished from Mobil Oil Corp. v. Superior Court (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 486; 145 Cal.Rptr. 17, which is frequently cited in opposition to the procedure authorized in Asuncion♦ In Mobil, the court ruled that statutory procedure accorded unlawful detainer proceedings precluded staying the unlawful detainer action until the tenant gas station operator could try his action alleging unfair practices in the termination of his franchise. (Id. at 494.) The Asuncion court noted some procedural distinctions: the commercial lessee did not seek a preliminary injunction and obtained a stay on apparently inadequate factual grounds, while the Asuncions had not yet had the opportunity to present facts on which a preliminary injunction might issue. (See 108 Cal.App.3d at 146 n. 1.)
In addition, the differences between the interests presented in commercial and residential transactions suggest that different considerations may apply to each. The courts have recognized a distinction between commercial and residential cases and have been more willing to allow affirmative defenses in residential cases. [See S. P. Growers Assn., supra, 17 Cal.3d 719, 730; 131 Cal.Rptr. 761; Custom Parking, Inc. v. Superior Court (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 90, 96-100; 187 Cal.Rptr. 674; Schulman v. Vera (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 552, 560-63; 166 Cal.Rptr. 620; Asuncion v. Superior Court, supra, 108 Cal.App.3d 141, 145, 146 n. 1; Mobil Oil Corp.v, Handlev (1976) 76 Cal.App.3d 956, 966;- 143 Cal.Rptr. 321; see generally, Union Oil Co. v. Chandler (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 716, 725; 84 Cal.Rptr. 756.]
The commercial lessee may be able to establish its rights in an action apart from the unlawful detainer. The trustor, however, will lose possession of the trustor’s home. While the lessee’s loss is likely compensable in money, the loss of the home and the attendant adverse impact on the psychological well being of the residents and the family structure will not as easily be amenable to compensation. Moreover, the family cast out onto the streets may be unable to maintain an action which may come to trial years later. [See S. P. Growers Assn. v. Rodriguez, supra, 17 Cal.3d 719, 730.] In addition, the affirmative defenses alleged in the recent commercial lease cases have presented substantial and complex issues [see e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 79 Cal.App.3d 486, 495 (unfair business practice charge involving all Mobil service station operators); Onion Oil Co. v. Chandler, supra, 4 Cal.App.3d 716, 725-26 (antitrust violations)] and would likely consume more trial time than most trustee’ s sale cases.
Moreover, the court’s decision on whether to recognize various affirmative defenses in unlawful detainer proceedings results from a balancing of the public policies furthered by protecting the tenant or property owner from eviction against the state’s interest in the expediency of a summary proceeding. [See e.g., Barela v. Superior Court (1981) 30 Cal.3d 244, 250; 178 Cal.Rptr. 618; S. P. Growers Assn. v. Rodriguez, supra, 17 Cal.3d 719, 729-30; Custom Parking, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 138 Cal.App.3d 90.] There is a strong public policy supporting homeownership and the conservation of neighborhoods from destabilizing influences. [See discussion in Chapter III B 1 “Propriety of Injunctive Relief”.] These interests when coupled with the due process concerns mentioned in Asuncion militate for the hearing of affirmative defenses in accord with the procedure set forth in Asuncion.
As an alternative to an Asuncion motion prior to the hearing of the unlawful detainer action, the homeowner’s counsel could file a superior court action to challenge title and to restrain the purchasers from initiating or prosecuting an unlawful detainer. If the homeowner has lost the unlawful detainer, the injunction could be aimed at restraining the purchasers from enforcing the writ of possession or from taking possession of the premises.
Counsel should not direct the injunction against the municipal court or the sheriff or marshall since the superior court has no jurisdiction to enjoin a judicial proceeding or a public officer’s discharge of regular duties. [See e.g., Code of Civ. Proc. § 526.]
The courts have not ruled on whether traditional landlord-tenant defenses could ever be invoked in unlawful detainer,proceedings between the purchaser at the foreclosure sale and the person in possession. However, these defenses do not apply if the person in possession has no independent right to possession after the foreclosure. [See California Livestock Production Credit Assn. v. Sutfin. supra, 165 Cal.App.3d 136, 143.] In Sutfin, for example, the court held that a trustor could not invoke a retaliatory eviction defense because the trustor had no lease agreement giving the trustor a right to possession and the trustor’s only claim to possession derived from his title to the property which was lost at a valid foreclosure sale. (Id.)

Violation Of the Bankruptcy Stay

Acts Taken in Violation of the Stay
If a party has received actual notice of the stay, violation of it is contempt, leading to fines, attorney’s fees and in some courts, damages, fin re Zartun (Bank. App. 9th Cir. 1983) 30 B.R. 543.] Under 362(h), an individual injured by a willful (knowing, but not necessarily malicious) violation of the stay can sue for damages, costs, and attorney’s fees. A violation which is initially innocent becomes willful if the violator proceeds or refuses to correct the situation after receiving notice of the filing of the petition.
The majority of the cases and the major commentators state that acts taken in violation of the automatic stay are void. [In re Posner (9th Cir. 1983) 700 F.2d 1243, cert, den. 464 U.S. 848.] The acts are void whether or not the violator had notice of the stay. Collier on Bankruptcy (15th Ed.) § 362.11 at 362-73.] However, in the Ninth Circuit the sale may only be “voidable” if the violation of the stay is a “technical” violation. in re Brooks (Bank. App. 9th Cir. 1987) 79 B.R. 479.] In Brooks, the defendant re-recorded a deed of trust to correct a mistake in the legal description without knowledge that one of the property owners had filed a petition under Chapter 7. When the other property owner attempted to void the lien in her later bankruptcy, the court held that the re-recording was only voidable at the discretion of the first debtor’s trustee and that the trustee had not opted to
IV-14

void the transaction.
This is critical in the foreclosure context because a void sale could be set aside even against a bona fide purchaser if made in violation of the stay. Section 549(c) creates an exception when a good faith purchaser without knowledge of the bankruptcy purchases the property for a fair equivalent value and the transfer has been perfected prior to the filing of notice of the bankruptcy petition in the county recorder’s office where the property is located.

How bankruptcy Stay Works

Effect of the Automatic Stay
Under section 362, the filing of a bankruptcy petition automatically invokes a stay of virtually all actions against the debtor or property of the estate to collect pre-petition claims. (There are exceptions – 11 U.S.C. 362(b) – not applicable here.) The stay preserves the debtor’s assets so that they can be reorganized or liquidated in a fashion that provides for equal
distribution to creditors. The stay is of critical importance in the foreclosure context as the filing of the stay stops a foreclosure sale.
Section 362(a)(l)-(8) species the acts stayed by the filing. Those of primary importance for nonjudicial foreclosure are (3), (4), and (5):
“(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under Section 301, 302, or 303 of this title … operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of …
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect or enforce any lien against property of the estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect or enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement of the case under the Code.
Under section 541, the filing of a petition creates an estate consisting of all legal and equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the date of filing. Obviously, this would include real property to which the debtor holds title, including the home being threatened with foreclosure. In Chapter 7, the debtor selects exemptions as described above from property of the estate, including a real property exemption. Once selected, and unless obligated to by the trustee or a creditor [Bankruptcy Rule 4003(b)], exempt property is no longer property of the estate and under section 362(c)(1) might be in jeopardy. However, section 362(a)(4) and (5) provide continued protection from the enforcement of liens – in this context – foreclosure. Section 362(a)(4) protects the property of the estate, that is, the deed of trust holder’s debt value. Section 362(a)(5) bars any act to enforce a lien against property of the debtor, that is, the debtor’s equity claimed exempt.
Under 11 U.S.C. section 1306(a), property of the estate in a Chapter 13 also includes all property the debtor acquires during the time the case is pending. Section 362(a)(4) would continue to protect property administered under the plan in this context as well.

The automatic stay continues in effect until one of the following events occurs:
(1) Property is no longer property of the estate,except when such property of the debtor is specifically protected under another subsection of 352.
(2) The case is closed.
(3) The case is dismissed.
(4) Discharge is granted, wherein the stay which terminates under section 362(c)(2) is replaced by a permanent injunction under section 524(a).
(5) Relief from the stay is granted under section 362(d)-(g).
In a Chapter 12 or Chapter 13 case, sections 1201 and 1301 respectively stay the collection of a consumer debt from a guarantor or other co-debtor (co-signer) once the petition is filed, to the extent that the plan calls for payment of the creditor. A consumer debt is defined in section 101(7) as a debt incurred primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. This stay terminates automatically twenty (20) days after a request by the creditor unless the debtor specifically and affirmatively objects to the termination. [11 U.S.C. 1201(a), 1301(d).]

Aceves ruling: Foreclosed homeowner has cause to sue bank for fraud (via Foreclosureblues)

Aceves ruling: Foreclosed homeowner has cause to sue bank for fraud Aceves ruling: Foreclosed homeowner has cause to sue bank for fraud Today, February 01, 2011, 1 hour ago | KERRY CURRY A California appeals court ruled that U.S. Bank reneged on its promise to negotiate a mortgage modification, which is sufficient cause for the homeowner to sue the bank for fraud in a scathing ruling alleging the bank never had any intention of working with the homeowner. However, the court also ruled that the homeowner, Claudia … Read More

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HIGH COURTS KNOCKING DOWN PRETENDER SHELL GAME

Posted on February 1, 2011 by Neil Garfield
ONE ON ONE WITH NEIL GARFIELD
COMBO ANALYSIS TITLE AND SECURITIZATION

SEE nj-game-over-standing-required-no-pretender-lenders-allowed-personal-knowledge-required-to-authenticate
SEE ibanez-huge-win-for-borrowers-in-massachusetts-non-judicial-state-high-court
Maybe the Game IS Over
Show me the law! That was the answer I was getting from skeptical lawyers and Judges three years, 2 years ago and even six months ago. Now there are high Courts and trial courts from Coast to Coast that are answering. It isn’t “new law” as the lawyers for the banks are suggesting, and it isn’t about a free house for borrowers.
In plain language this is about the application of law that has governed business conduct for centuries with the consequential effect of (a) preventing intervening parties from avoiding the requirements of due process and getting title issued to a house in which they never had any interest (a free house for pretender lenders) and (b) opening the door to the inner sanctum where the real parties in interest can interact in ways that will settle the mortgage mess (corruption of title and fraud) in a direct manner as best as possible under the circumstances.
Wall Street and those who protect Wall Street in government having nothing left but scare tactics — as if overturning millions of fraudulent transactions and foreclosures would somehow result in in the end of the world or weaken our nation. President Sarkozy answered that ridiculous assertion in sharp words to Jamie Dimon at the Davos conference when he pointed to the wild irresponsible schemes that others have less gently refereed to as criminal fraud. Sarkozy was speaking for the head of every government in the world and every central banker except perhaps a select few who were providing lubricant to Wall Street’s contrivances during the period of 2001-2009.

If our position in the world depends upon protecting those who commit fraud, if our credibility is seen as depending upon maintaining a status quo in which millions go starving and homeless, if the light we shine blinds the eyes of people who wish to see, then we have forsaken our heritage, and forever changed and corrupted the ideal that the United States of America is a nation of laws, in which here, better than anywhere else on Earth, here is where the people are free to pursue truth, justice and prosperity under the watchful eye of a protective government

The MERS Wave Function and Corporatism (Conclusion) (via Foreclosureblues)

The MERS Wave Function and Corporatism (Conclusion) The MERS Wave Function and Corporatism (Conclusion) Today, January 30, 2011, 3 hours ago | Russ   Parts one and two. So what’s the actual mechanism of this MERS wave, and how are the courts finding that this isn’t the metaphorical equivalent of a physics experiment, and MERS and the banks cannot just choose to collapse the wave of potentiality into particulate actuality at a time and place of their choosing? What does MERS claim to think it … Read More

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WASHINGTON STATE JOINS MOVEMENT FOR PUBLIC BANKING (via Foreclosureblues)

WASHINGTON STATE JOINS MOVEMENT FOR PUBLIC BANKING WASHINGTON STATE JOINS MOVEMENT FOR PUBLIC BANKING Today, January 30, 2011, 39 minutes ago | ilene Taking back control of their finances from the TBTF banks is a great idea for other states to pursue as well. – Ilene WASHINGTON STATE JOINS MOVEMENT FOR PUBLIC BANKING Courtesy of Ellen Brown at Web of Debt Bills were introduced on January 18 in both the House and Senate of the Washington State Legislature that add Washington to the growing number … Read More

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THE FTC AND MARS – ARE REAL ESTATE AGENTS INVOLVED? (via Foreclosureblues)

THE FTC AND MARS – ARE REAL ESTATE AGENTS INVOLVED? THE FTC AND MARS – ARE REAL ESTATE AGENTS INVOLVED? Today, January 30, 2011, 2 hours ago | Richard Zaretsky, Florida Real Estate Attorney (Richard P. Zaretsky P.A. – Bd Certified Real Estate Attorney) The Question – Are Real Estate Agents Furnishing MARS? The issue regarding real estate agents and the new FTC MARS Rule (as in Mortgage Assistance Relief Services) is that there is no clear cut rule.  The Commission states in footnote 126 of the Rul … Read More

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More Judges Pushing Back on Dubious Foreclosure Documents (via Foreclosureblues)

More Judges Pushing Back on Dubious Foreclosure Documents More Judges Pushing Back on Dubious Foreclosure Documents Today, January 31, 2011, 2 hours ago | Yves Smith Even though this example involves only three judges in Ohio, don’t underestimate its significance. The fact that judges of their own initiative have started insisting that all attorneys provide certifications of foreclosure-related documents, a standard now in effect in New York state, shows how much their credibility has fallen. From the C … Read More

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Adam Levitin: The Big Fail — SECURITIZATION NEVER OCCURRED (via Livinglies's Weblog)

NOTABLE QUOTES: This opinion could turn out to be incredibly important.  It provides a critical evidence for the argument that many securitization transactions simply failed to be effective because non-compliance with the terms of the transaction:  failure to properly transfer the mortgage meant that the mortgages were never actually securitized. The Big Fail posted by Adam Levitin Last week the US Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey … Read More

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NOMI PRINS…Foreclosure crisis far from over…THE UGLY TRUTH (via Foreclosureblues)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?source=patrick.net&v=noSKF9RRqn8#watch-headlineRead More

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WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., v. SANDRA A. FORD | NJ APPELLATE DIVISION Reverses Foreclosure Due to Lack of Standing

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., v. SANDRA A. FORD | NJ APPELLATE DIVISION Reverses Foreclosure Due to Lack of Standing
Today, January 30, 2011, 9 hours ago | Foreclosure FraudGo to full article

Below is a well thought out decision by the SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION.

The court decided that Wells Fargo lacked standing to foreclose.

Some excerpts from the opinion…
(Emphasis added by 4F)
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,
as Trustee,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
SANDRA A. FORD,
Defendant-Appellant.

This appeal presents significant issues regarding the evidence required to establish the standing of an alleged assignee of a mortgage and negotiable note to maintain a foreclosure action.

On March 6, 2005, defendant Sandra A. Ford executed a negotiable note to secure repayment of $403,750 she borrowed from Argent Mortgage Company (Argent) and a mortgage on her residence in Westwood. Defendant alleges that Argent engaged in various predatory and fraudulent acts in connection with this transaction.

Five days later, on March 11, 2005, Argent purportedly assigned the mortgage and note to plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo). Wells Fargo claims that it acquired the status of a holder in due course as a result of this assignment and therefore is not subject to any of the defenses defendant may have been able to assert against Argent.

Defendant allegedly stopped making payments on the note in the spring of 2006, and on July 14, 2006, Wells Fargo filed this mortgage foreclosure action. In an amended complaint, Wells Fargo asserted that Argent had assigned the mortgage and note to Wells Fargo but that the assignment had not yet been recorded.

Wells Fargo subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment. This motion was supported by a certification of Josh Baxley, who identified himself as “Supervisor of Fidelity National as an attorney in fact for HomEq Servicing Corporation as attorney in fact for [Wells Fargo].” Baxley’s certification stated: “I have knowledge of the amount due Plaintiff for principal, interest and/or other charges pursuant to the mortgage due upon the mortgage made by Sandra A. Ford dated March 6, 2005, given to Argent Mortgage Company, LLC, to secure the sum of $403,750.00.” . Baxley’s certification also alleged that Wells Fargo is “the holder and owner of the said Note/Bond and Mortgage” executed by defendant and that the exhibits.

Attached to his certification, which appear to be a mortgage and note signed by defendant, were “true copies.” Again, the source of this purported knowledge was not indicated. The exhibits attached to the Baxley certification did not include the purported assignment of the mortgage.

The trial court issued a brief oral opinion granting Wells Fargo’s motion for summary judgment. The court observed that defendant “has raised numerous serious disturbing allegations relating to the originator of this loan [Argent], which if true would be a substantial violation of law and substantial violation of her rights.” Nevertheless, the court concluded that those allegations did not provide a defense to Wells Fargo’s foreclosure action because Wells Fargo was a “holder in due course” of the mortgage and note. The court apparently based this conclusion in part on a document attached to Wells Fargo’s reply brief, entitled “Assignment of Mortgage,” which was not referred to in Baxley’s certification or authenticated in any other manner.

Defendant filed a notice of appeal from the judgment.

On appeal, defendant argues that (1) Wells Fargo failed to establish that it is the holder of the negotiable note she gave to Argent and therefore lacks standing to pursue this foreclosure action; (2) even if Wells Fargo is the holder of the note, it failed to establish that it is a holder in due course and therefore, the trial court erred in concluding that Wells Fargo is not subject to the defenses asserted by defendant based on Argent’s alleged predatory and fraudulent acts in connection with execution of the mortgage and note; and (3) even if Wells Fargo is a holder in due course, it still would be subject to certain defenses and statutory claims defendant asserted in her answer and counterclaim.

We conclude that Wells Fargo failed to establish its standing to pursue this foreclosure action. Therefore, the summary judgment in Wells Fargo’s favor must be reversed and the case remanded to the trial court.

The Baxley certification Wells Fargo submitted in support of its motion for summary judgment alleged that “[p]laintiff is still the holder and owner of the said Note/Bond and mortgage,” and a copy of the mortgage and note was attached to the certification. In addition, Wells Fargo submitted a document that purported to be an assignment of the mortgage, which stated that it was an assignment of “the described Mortgage, together with the certain note(s) described
therein with all interest, all liens, and any rights due or to become due thereon.”

If properly authenticated, these documents could be found sufficient to establish that Wells Fargo was a “nonholder in possession of the [note] who has the rights of a holder.”

Baxley’s certification does not allege that he has personal knowledge that Wells Fargo is the holder and owner of the note. In fact, the certification does not give any indication how Baxley obtained this alleged knowledge. The certification also does not indicate the source of Baxley’s alleged knowledge that the attached mortgage and note are “true copies.”

Furthermore, the purported assignment of the mortgage, which an assignee must produce to maintain a foreclosure action, see N.J.S.A. 46:9-9, was not authenticated in any manner; it was simply attached to a reply brief. The trial court should not have considered this document unless it was authenticated by an affidavit or certification based on personal knowledge.

For these reasons, the summary judgment granted to Wells Fargo must be reversed and the case remanded to the trial court because Wells Fargo did not establish its standing to pursue this foreclosure action by competent evidence. On the remand, defendant may conduct appropriate discovery, including taking the deposition of Baxley and the person who purported to assign the mortgage and note to Wells Fargo on behalf of Argent. Our conclusion that the summary judgment must be reversed because Wells Fargo failed to establish its standing to maintain this action makes it unnecessary to address defendant’s other arguments. However, for the guidance of the trial court in the event Wells Fargo is able to establish its standing on remand, we note that even though Wells Fargo could become a “holder” of the note under N.J.S.A. 12A:3-201(b) if Argent indorsed the note to Wells Fargo even at this late date, see UCC Comment 3 to N.J.S.A. 12A:3-203, Wells Fargo would not thereby become a “holder in due course” that could avoid whatever defenses defendant would have to a claim by Argent because Wells Fargo is now aware of those defenses.

Consequently, if Wells Fargo produces an indorsed copy of the note on the remand, the date of that indorsement would be a critical factual issue in determining whether Wells Fargo is a holder in due course. Accordingly, the summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.

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