“MERS Helps Wall Street Steal Your Home”

“MERS Helps Wall Street Steal Your Home” From Great Leap Forward site(L. Randall Wray) April 10, 2013
Submitted by admin on Wed, 04/10/2013 – 01:53

This needs to be widely distributed.

This is a webinar put together to assist resistance to the bankster frauds in seizing properties, when they have no legal basis to do so due to the securitization process which includes MERS the Mortgage Electronic Records Service which violated contract law at the outset and then enabled the robo-signer scamming of the process.

Over the past couple of years, I’ve tried to explain how the financial sector created MERS to destroy property records so that it would be easier to steal homes. In the old days, property records were maintained at county recorder offices. But that was so old-school. It made it too easy to find out who owes whom and who owns what. Wall Street wanted to make this as complicated as possible so that no indebted homeowner would ever know who she/he owes. Wall Street took the mortgages and sliced and diced them, separating origination of mortgages from the ownership of the right to receive payment, and as well separated that ownership from the servicing of the mortgages. And then the bankers burned all the records.
In the old days, you had to keep all the documents together, in physical form. And when a mortgage was sold, you had to go back to the recorder’s office to change the record. With the creation of MERS, most of those documents were destroyed and the banksters never bothered to tell the recorders who owned what. The indebted households have no idea who owns their note and who services the mortgages. Even if they write that monthly check, the banks claim they never received it—the dog ate it, you know.

In truth, since they screwed up all the property records, even the banksters have no idea who owes who what. So they just start foreclosing on everything. Don’t owe a mortgage? Who cares, they foreclose anyway. You cannot prove you’ve got a right to the house you live in, since they shredded all the documents and “forgot” to tell MERS you paid off the note. No more “note burning parties” since they burned the notes as soon as they got them. See here: http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/10/countrywide-destroyed-required-reco… http://www.zerohedge.com/article/mortgage-lenders-seeking-court-permissi…
I just came across an excellent video—albeit wonky—that explains all this: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tlUCaq22oYo
It will take decades to sort out the mess that MERS has made of property records. Meanwhile, don’t believe ‘em. They have no proof they’ve got a right to take your home from you.

Predatory Lending and Predatory Servicing together at last Jan 1, 2013 Civil Code §2924.12(b)

Predatory Lending are abusive practices used in the mortgage industry that strip borrowers of home equity and threaten families with bankruptcy and foreclosure.

Predatory Lending can be broken down into three categories: Mortgage Origination, Mortgage Servicing; and Mortgage Collection and Foreclosure.

Mortgage Origination is the process by which you obtain your home loan from a mortgage broker or a bank.

Predatory lending practices in Mortgage Origination include:
# Excessive points;
# Charging fees not allowed or for services not delivered;
# Charging more than once for the same fee
# Providing a low teaser rate that adjusts to a rate you cannot afford;
# Successively refinancing your loan of “flipping;”
# “Steering” you into a loan that is more profitable to the Mortgage Originator;
# Changing the loan terms at closing or “bait & switch;”
# Closing in a location where you cannot adequately review the documents;
# Serving alcohol prior to closing;
# Coaching you to put minimum income or assets on you loan so that you will qualify for a certain amount;
# Securing an inflated appraisal;
# Receiving a kickback in money or favors from a particular escrow, title, appraiser or other service provider;
# Promising they will refinance your mortgage before your payment resets to a higher amount;
# Having you sign blank documents;
# Forging documents and signatures;
# Changing documents after you have signed them; and
# Loans with prepayment penalties or balloon payments.

Mortgage Servicing is the process of collecting loan payments and credit your loan.

Predatory lending practices in Mortgage Servicing include:
# Not applying payments on time;
# Applying payments to “Suspense;”
# “Jamming” illegal or improper fees;
# Creating an escrow or impounds account not allowed by the documents;
# Force placing insurance when you have adequate coverage;
# Improperly reporting negative credit history;
# Failing to provide you a detailed loan history; and
# Refusing to return your calls or letters.
#

Mortgage Collection & Foreclosure is the process Lenders use when you pay off your loan or when you house is repossessed for non-payment

Predatory lending practices in Mortgage Collection & Foreclosure include:
# Producing a payoff statement that includes improper charges & fees;
# Foreclosing in the name of an entity that is not the true owner of the mortgage;
# Failing to provide Default Loan Servicing required by all Fannie Mae mortgages;
# Failing to follow due process in foreclosure;
# Fraud on the court;
# Failing to provide copies of all documents and assignments; and
# Refusing to adequately communicate with you.

Abuses by Mortgage Service Companies

Although predatory lending has received far more attention than abusive servicing, a significant percentage of consumer complaints over loans involve servicing, not origination. For example, the director of the Nevada Fair Housing Center testified that of the hundreds of complaints of predatory lending issues her office received in 2002, about 42 percent involved servicing once the loan was transferred

Abusive Mortgage Servicing Defined:

Abusive servicing occurs when a servicer, either through action or inaction, obtains or attempts to obtain unwarranted fees or other costs from borrowers, engages in unfair collection practices, or through its own improper behavior or inaction causes borrowers to be more likely to go into default or have their homes foreclosed. Abusive practices should be distinguished from appropriate actions that may harm borrowers, such as a servicer merely collecting appropriate late fees or foreclosing on borrowers who do not make their payments despite proper loss mitigation efforts. Servicing can be abusive either intentionally, when there is intent to obtain unwarranted fees, or negligently, when, for example, a servicer’s records are so disorganized that borrowers are regularly charged late fees even when mortgage payments were made on time.

Abusive servicing often happens to debtors who have filed a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Plan and are in the process of making payments under the Plan. If you suspect that your mortgage servicer is abusing your relationship by charging unnecessary fees while you are paying off your Chapter 13 Plan, call us. We can help.

There is significant evidence that some Mortgage servicers have engaged in abusive behavior and that borrowers have frequently been the victims. Some servicers have engaged in practices that are not only detrimental to borrowers but also illegal Such abuse has been documented in court opinions and decisions, in the decisions and findings of ratings agencies, in litigation and settlements obtained by government agencies against prominent servicers, in congressional testimony, and in newspaper accounts of borrowers who claim to have been mistreated by servicers. The abusive servicing practices documented in these sources include improper foreclosure or attempted foreclosure, improper fees, improper forced-placed insurance, and improper use or oversight of escrow funds .

Civil Code §2924.12(b) Right to Sue Mortgage Servicers for Injunctive Relief, Damages, Treble Damages, and Right to Attorney’s Fees. : )

5 Dec

prohabition-images

H. Right to Sue Mortgage Servicers for Injunctive Relief, Damages, Treble Damages, and Right to Attorney’s Fees

2013 is going to be a good year

One of the most important provisions of the Act from a lender’s perspective is that it provides borrowers with the right to sue mortgage servicers for injunctive relief before the trustee’s deed upon sale has recorded, or if it has already recorded, to sue for actual economic damages, if the mortgage servicer has not corrected any “material” violation of certain enumerated portions of the Act before the trustee’s deed upon sale recorded. (Civil Code §2924.12(a).) In an area that will certainly open up a Pandora’s Box of litigation, the Act does not define what constitutes a “material” violation of the Act. If a court finds that the violation was intentional, reckless or willful, the court can award the borrower the greater of treble (triple) damages or $50,000. (Civil Code §2924.12(b).) Furthermore, a violation of the enumerated provisions of the Act is also deemed to be a violation of the licensing laws if committed by a person licensed as a consumer or commercial finance lender or broker, a residential mortgage lender or servicer, or a licensed real estate broker or salesman. (Civil Code §2924.12(d).) Lastly, in a one-sided attorney’s fee provision that only benefits borrowers, the court may award a borrower who obtains an injunction or receives an award of economic damages as a result of the violation of the Act their reasonable attorney’s fees and costs as the prevailing party. (Civil Code §2924.12(i).) This provides all the more reason for lenders and mortgage servicers to comply with the terms of the Act. This provision for the recovery by only the borrower of their reasonable attorney’s fees makes it more likely that borrowers will file litigation against mortgage lenders or servicers than they otherwise would. Compliance is the lender’s or mortgage servicer’s best defense to litigation under the Act.

Significantly for lenders, as long as the mortgage servicer remedies the material violation of the Act before the trustee’s deed upon sale has recorded, the Act specifically provides that the mortgage servicer shall not be liable under the Act for any violation or damages. (Civil Code §2924.12(b) & (c).) The Act also clarifies that signatories to the National Mortgage Settlement who are in compliance with the terms of that settlement, as they relate to the terms of the Act, will not face liability under the Act. (Civil Code §2924.12(g).

Improper foreclosure or attempted foreclosure

Because servicers can exact fees associated with foreclosures, such as attorneys’ fees, some servicers have attempted to foreclose on property even when borrowers are current on their payments or without giving borrowers enough time to repay or otherwise working with them on a repayment plan Furthermore, a speedy foreclosure may save servicers the cost of attempting other techniques that might have prevented the foreclosure.

Some servicers have been so brazen that they have regularly claimed to the courts that borrowers were in default so as to justify foreclosure, even though the borrowers were current on their payments. Other courts have also decried the frequent use of false statements to obtain relief from stay in order to foreclose on borrowers’ homes. For example, in Hart v. GMAC Mortgage Corporation, et al., 246 B.R. 709 (2000), even though the borrower had made the payments required of him by a forbearance agreement he had entered into with the servicer (GMAC Mortgage Corporation), it created a “negative suspense account” for moneys it had paid out, improperly charged the borrower an additional monthly sum to repay the negative suspense account, charged him late fees for failing to make the entire payment demanded, and began foreclosure proceedings.

Improper fees

Claiming that borrowers are in default when they are actually current allows servicers to charge unwarranted fees, either late fees or fees related to default and foreclosure. Servicers receive as a conventional fee a percentage of the total value of the loans they service, typically 25 basis points for prime loans and 50 basis points for subprime loans In addition, contracts typically provide that the servicer, not the trustee or investors, has the right to keep any and all late fees or fees associated with defaults. Servicers charge late fees not only because they act as a prod to coax borrowers into making payments on time, but also because borrowers who fail to make payments impose additional costs on servicers, which must then engage in loss mitigation to induce payment.

Such fees are a crucial part of servicers’ income. For example, one servicer’s CEO reportedly stated that extra fees, such as late fees, appeared to be paying for all of the operating costs of the company’s entire servicing department, leaving the conventional servicing fee almost completely profit The pressure to collect such fees appears to be higher on subprime servicers than on prime servicers:

Because borrowers typically cannot prove the exact date a payment was received, servicers can charge late fees even when they receive the payment on time Improper late fees may also be based on the loss of borrowers’ payments by servicers, their inability to track those payments accurately, or their failure to post payments in a timely fashion. In Ronemus v. FTB Mortgage Services, 201 B.R. 458 (1996), under a Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan, the borrowers had made all of their payments on time except for two; they received permission to pay these two late and paid late fees for the privilege. However, the servicer, FTB Mortgage Services, misapplied their payments, then began placing their payments into a suspense account and collecting unauthorized late fees. The servicer ignored several letters from the borrowers’ attorney attempting to clear up the matter, sent regular demands for late fees, and began harassing the borrowers with collection efforts. When the borrowers sued, the servicer submitted to the court an artificially inflated accounting of how much the borrowers owed.

Some servicers have sent out late notices even when they have received timely payments and even before the end of a borrower’s grace period Worse yet, a servicer might pocket the payment, such as an extra payment of principal, and never credit it to the borrower Late fees on timely payments are a common problem when borrowers are making mortgage payments through a bankruptcy plan

Moreover, some servicers have also added false fees and charges not authorized by law or contract to their monthly payment demands, relying on borrowers’ ignorance of the exact amount owed. They can collect such fees or other unwarranted claims by submitting inaccurate payoff demands when a borrower refinances or sells the house). Or they can place the borrowers’ monthly payments in a suspense account and then charge late fees even though they received the payment Worse yet, some servicers pyramid their late fees, applying a portion of the current payment to a previous late fee and then charging an additional late fee even though the borrower has made a timely and full payment for the new month Pyramiding late fees allows servicers to charge late fees month after month even though the borrower made only one late payment

Servicers can turn their fees into a profit center by sending inaccurate monthly payment demands, demanding unearned fees or charges not owed, or imposing fees higher than the expenses for a panoply of actions For example, some servicers take advantage of borrowers’ ignorance by charging fees, such as prepayment penalties, where the note does not provide for them Servicers have sometimes imposed a uniform set of fees over an entire pool of loans, disregarding the fact that some of the loan documents did not provide for those particular fees. Or they charge more for attorneys’, property inspection, or appraisal fees than were actually incurred. Some servicers may add a fee by conducting unnecessary property inspections, having an agent drive by even when the borrower is not in default, or conducting multiple inspections during a single period of default to charge the resulting multiple fees

The complexity of the terms of many loans makes it difficult for borrowers to discover whether they are being overcharged Moreover, servicers can frustrate any attempts to sort out which fees are genuine.

Improperly forced-placed insurance

Mortgage holders are entitled under the terms of the loan to require borrowers to carry homeowners’ insurance naming the holder as the payee in case of loss and to force-place insurance by buying policies for borrowers who fail to do so and charging them for the premiums However, some servicers have force-placed insurance even in cases where the borrower already had it and even provided evidence of it to the servicer Worse yet, servicers have charged for force-placed insurance without even purchasing it. Premiums for force-placed insurance are often inflated in that they provide protection in excess of what the loan.

Escrow Account Mismanagement

One of the benefits of servicing mortgages is controlling escrow accounts to pay for insurance, taxes, and the like and, in most states, keeping any interest earned on these accounts Borrowers have complained that servicers have failed to make tax or insurance payments when they were due or at all. The treasurer of the country’s second largest county estimated that this failure to make timely payments cost borrowers late fees of at least $2 million in that county over a two-year span, causing some to lose their homes. If servicers fail to make insurance payments and a policy lapses, borrowers may face much higher insurance costs even if they purchase their own, non-force-placed policy. Worse yet, borrowers may find themselves unable to buy insurance at all if they cannot find a new insurer willing to write them a policy

You can make a claim for mortgage service abuse, and often the court will award actual and punitive damages. If you think you have been a victim of mortgage service abuse, contact us. We can help you make a claim.

Many a client call me when its toooooo late however sometimes something can be done it would envolve an appeal and this application for a stay. Most likely you will have to pay the reasonable rental value till the case is decided. And … Yes we have had this motion granted. ex-parte-application-for-stay-of-judgment-or-unlawful-detainer3
When title to the property is still in dispute ie. the foreclosure was bad. They (the lender)did not comply with California civil code 2923.5 or 2923.6 or 2924. Or the didn’t possess the documents to foreclose ie. the original note. Or they did not possess a proper assignment 2932.5. at trial you will be ignored by the learned judge but if you file a Motion for Summary Judgmentevans sum ud
template notice of Motion for SJ
TEMPLATE Points and A for SJ Motion
templateDeclaration for SJ
TEMPLATEProposed Order on Motion for SJ
TEMPLATEStatement of Undisputed Facts
you can force the issue and if there is a case filed in the Unlimited jurisdiction Court the judge may be forced to consider title and or consolidate the case with the Unlimited Jurisdiction Case

BILL NUMBER: AB 278	CHAPTERED
	BILL TEXT

	CHAPTER  86
	FILED WITH SECRETARY OF STATE  JULY 11, 2012
	APPROVED BY GOVERNOR  JULY 11, 2012
	PASSED THE SENATE  JULY 2, 2012
	PASSED THE ASSEMBLY  JULY 2, 2012
	AMENDED IN SENATE  SEPTEMBER 1, 2011
	AMENDED IN SENATE  JUNE 23, 2011

INTRODUCED BY   Assembly Members Eng, Feuer, Mitchell, and John A.
Pérez
   (Principal coauthors: Assembly Members Davis, Carter, and Skinner)

   (Principal coauthors: Senators Leno, Evans, Calderon, Corbett,
DeSaulnier, Hancock, Pavley, and Steinberg)

                        FEBRUARY 8, 2011

   An act to amend and add Sections 2923.5 and 2923.6 of, to amend
and repeal Section 2924 of, to add Sections 2920.5, 2923.4, 2923.7,
2924.17, and 2924.20 to, to add and repeal Sections 2923.55, 2924.9,
2924.10, 2924.18, and 2924.19 of, and to add, repeal, and add
Sections 2924.11, 2924.12, and 2924.15 of, the Civil Code, relating
to mortgages.

	LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

   AB 278, Eng. Mortgages and deeds of trust: foreclosure.
   (1) Existing law, until January 1, 2013, requires a mortgagee,
trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent to contact the borrower
prior to filing a notice of default to explore options for the
borrower to avoid foreclosure, as specified. Existing law requires a
notice of default or, in certain circumstances, a notice of sale, to
include a declaration stating that the mortgagee, trustee,
beneficiary, or authorized agent has contacted the borrower, or has
tried with due diligence to contact the borrower, or that no contact
was required for a specified reason.
   This bill would add mortgage servicers, as defined, to these
provisions and would extend the operation of these provisions
indefinitely, except that it would delete the requirement with
respect to a notice of sale. The bill would, until January 1, 2018,
additionally require the borrower, as defined, to be provided with
specified information in writing prior to recordation of a notice of
default and, in certain circumstances, within 5 business days after
recordation. The bill would prohibit a mortgage servicer, mortgagee,
trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent from recording a notice of
default or, until January 1, 2018, recording a notice of sale or
conducting a trustee's sale while a complete first lien loan
modification application is pending, under specified conditions. The
bill would, until January 1, 2018, establish additional procedures to
be followed regarding a first lien loan modification application,
the denial of an application, and a borrower's right to appeal a
denial.
   (2) Existing law imposes various requirements that must be
satisfied prior to exercising a power of sale under a mortgage or
deed of trust, including, among other things, recording a notice of
default and a notice of sale.
   The bill would, until January 1, 2018, require a written notice to
the borrower after the postponement of a foreclosure sale in order
to advise the borrower of any new sale date and time, as specified.
The bill would provide that an entity shall not record a notice of
default or otherwise initiate the foreclosure process unless it is
the holder of the beneficial interest under the deed of trust, the
original or substituted trustee, or the designated agent of the
holder of the beneficial interest, as specified.
   The bill would prohibit recordation of a notice of default or a
notice of sale or the conduct of a trustee's sale if a foreclosure
prevention alternative has been approved and certain conditions exist
and would, until January 1, 2018, require recordation of a
rescission of those notices upon execution of a permanent foreclosure
prevention alternative. The bill would, until January 1, 2018,
prohibit the collection of application fees and the collection of
late fees while a foreclosure prevention alternative is being
considered, if certain criteria are met, and would require a
subsequent mortgage servicer to honor any previously approved
foreclosure prevention alternative.
   The bill would authorize a borrower to seek an injunction and
damages for violations of certain of the provisions described above,
except as specified. The bill would authorize the greater of treble
actual damages or $50,000 in statutory damages if a violation of
certain provisions is found to be intentional or reckless or resulted
from willful misconduct, as specified. The bill would authorize the
awarding of attorneys' fees for prevailing borrowers, as specified.
Violations of these provisions by licensees of the Department of
Corporations, the Department of Financial Institutions, and the
Department of Real Estate would also be violations of those
respective licensing laws. Because a violation of certain of those
licensing laws is a crime, the bill would impose a state-mandated
local program.
   The bill would provide that the requirements imposed on mortgage
servicers, and mortgagees, trustees, beneficiaries, and authorized
agents, described above are applicable only to mortgages or deeds of
trust secured by residential real property not exceeding 4 dwelling
units that is owner-occupied, as defined, and, until January 1, 2018,
only to those entities who conduct more than 175 foreclosure sales
per year or annual reporting period, except as specified.
   The bill would require, upon request from a borrower who requests
a foreclosure prevention alternative, a mortgage servicer who
conducts more than 175 foreclosure sales per year or annual reporting
period to establish a single point of contact and provide the
borrower with one or more direct means of communication with the
single point of contact. The bill would specify various
responsibilities of the single point of contact. The bill would
define single point of contact for these purposes.
   (3) Existing law prescribes documents that may be recorded or
filed in court.
   This bill would require that a specified declaration, notice of
default, notice of sale, deed of trust, assignment of a deed of
trust, substitution of trustee, or declaration or affidavit filed in
any court relative to a foreclosure proceeding or recorded by or on
behalf of a mortgage servicer shall be accurate and complete and
supported by competent and reliable evidence. The bill would require
that before recording or filing any of those documents, a mortgage
servicer shall ensure that it has reviewed competent and reliable
evidence to substantiate the borrower's default and the right to
foreclose, including the borrower's loan status and loan information.
The bill would, until January 1, 2018, provide that any mortgage
servicer that engages in multiple and repeated violations of these
requirements shall be liable for a civil penalty of up to $7,500 per
mortgage or deed of trust, in an action brought by specified state
and local government entities, and would also authorize
administrative enforcement against licensees of the Department of
Corporations, the Department of Financial Institutions, and the
Department of Real Estate.
   The bill would authorize the Department of Corporations, the
Department of Financial Institutions, and the Department of Real
Estate to adopt regulations applicable to persons and entities under
their respective jurisdictions for purposes of the provisions
described above. The bill would provide that a violation of those
regulations would be enforceable only by the regulating agency.
   (4) The bill would state findings and declarations of the
Legislature in relation to foreclosures in the state generally, and
would state the purposes of the bill.
   (5) The California Constitution requires the state to reimburse
local agencies and school districts for certain costs mandated by the
state. Statutory provisions establish procedures for making that
reimbursement.
   This bill would provide that no reimbursement is required by this
act for a specified reason.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:

  SECTION 1.  The Legislature finds and declares all of the
following:
   (a) California is still reeling from the economic impacts of a
wave of residential property foreclosures that began in 2007. From
2007 to 2011 alone, there were over 900,000 completed foreclosure
sales. In 2011, 38 of the top 100 hardest hit ZIP Codes in the nation
were in California, and the current wave of foreclosures continues
apace. All of this foreclosure activity has adversely affected
property values and resulted in less money for schools, public
safety, and other public services. In addition, according to the
Urban Institute, every foreclosure imposes significant costs on local
governments, including an estimated nineteen thousand two hundred
twenty-nine dollars ($19,229) in local government costs. And the
foreclosure crisis is not over; there remain more than two million
"underwater" mortgages in California.
   (b) It is essential to the economic health of this state to
mitigate the negative effects on the state and local economies and
the housing market that are the result of continued foreclosures by
modifying the foreclosure process to ensure that borrowers who may
qualify for a foreclosure alternative are considered for, and have a
meaningful opportunity to obtain, available loss mitigation options.
These changes to the state's foreclosure process are essential to
ensure that the current crisis is not worsened by unnecessarily
adding foreclosed properties to the market when an alternative to
foreclosure may be available. Avoiding foreclosure, where possible,
will help stabilize the state's housing market and avoid the
substantial, corresponding negative effects of foreclosures on
families, communities, and the state and local economy.
   (c) This act is necessary to provide stability to California's
statewide and regional economies and housing market by facilitating
opportunities for borrowers to pursue loss mitigation options.
  SEC. 2.  Section 2920.5 is added to the Civil Code, to read:
   2920.5.  For purposes of this article, the following definitions
apply:
   (a) "Mortgage servicer" means a person or entity who directly
services a loan, or who is responsible for interacting with the
borrower, managing the loan account on a daily basis including
collecting and crediting periodic loan payments, managing any escrow
account, or enforcing the note and security instrument, either as the
current owner of the promissory note or as the current owner's
authorized agent. "Mortgage servicer" also means a subservicing agent
to a master servicer by contract. "Mortgage servicer" shall not
include a trustee, or a trustee's authorized agent, acting under a
power of sale pursuant to a deed of trust.
   (b) "Foreclosure prevention alternative" means a first lien loan
modification or another available loss mitigation option.
   (c) (1) Unless otherwise provided and for purposes of Sections
2923.4, 2923.5, 2923.55, 2923.6, 2923.7, 2924.9, 2924.10, 2924.11,
2924.18, and 2924.19, "borrower" means any natural person who is a
mortgagor or trustor and who is potentially eligible for any federal,
state, or proprietary foreclosure prevention alternative program
offered by, or through, his or her mortgage servicer.
   (2) For purposes of the sections listed in paragraph (1),
"borrower" shall not include any of the following:
   (A) An individual who has surrendered the secured property as
evidenced by either a letter confirming the surrender or delivery of
the keys to the property to the mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or
authorized agent.
   (B) An individual who has contracted with an organization, person,
or entity whose primary business is advising people who have decided
to leave their homes on how to extend the foreclosure process and
avoid their contractual obligations to mortgagees or beneficiaries.
   (C) An individual who has filed a case under Chapter 7, 11, 12, or
13 of Title 11 of the United States Code and the bankruptcy court
has not entered an order closing or dismissing the bankruptcy case,
or granting relief from a stay of foreclosure.
   (d) "First lien" means the most senior mortgage or deed of trust
on the property that is the subject of the notice of default or
notice of sale.
  SEC. 3.  Section 2923.4 is added to the Civil Code, to read:
   2923.4.  (a) The purpose of the act that added this section is to
ensure that, as part of the nonjudicial foreclosure process,
borrowers are considered for, and have a meaningful opportunity to
obtain, available loss mitigation options, if any, offered by or
through the borrower's mortgage servicer, such as loan modifications
or other alternatives to foreclosure. Nothing in the act that added
this section, however, shall be interpreted to require a particular
result of that process.
   (b) Nothing in this article obviates or supersedes the obligations
of the signatories to the consent judgment entered in the case
entitled United States of America et al. v. Bank of America
Corporation et al., filed in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, case number 1:12-cv-00361 RMC.
  SEC. 4.  Section 2923.5 of the Civil Code is amended to read:
   2923.5.  (a) (1) A mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee,
beneficiary, or authorized agent may not record a notice of default
pursuant to Section 2924 until both of the following:
   (A) Either 30 days after initial contact is made as required by
paragraph (2) or 30 days after satisfying the due diligence
requirements as described in subdivision (e).
   (B) The mortgage servicer complies with paragraph (1) of
subdivision (a) of Section 2924.18, if the borrower has provided a
complete application as defined in subdivision (d) of Section
2924.18.
   (2) A mortgage servicer shall contact the borrower in person or by
telephone in order to assess the borrower's financial situation and
explore options for the borrower to avoid foreclosure. During the
initial contact, the mortgage servicer shall advise the borrower that
he or she has the right to request a subsequent meeting and, if
requested, the mortgage servicer shall schedule the meeting to occur
within 14 days. The assessment of the borrower's financial situation
and discussion of options may occur during the first contact, or at
the subsequent meeting scheduled for that purpose. In either case,
the borrower shall be provided the toll-free telephone number made
available by the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) to find a HUD-certified housing counseling agency.
Any meeting may occur telephonically.
   (b) A notice of default recorded pursuant to Section 2924 shall
include a declaration that the mortgage servicer has contacted the
borrower, has tried with due diligence to contact the borrower as
required by this section, or that no contact was required because the
individual did not meet the definition of "borrower" pursuant to
subdivision (c) of Section 2920.5.
   (c) A mortgage servicer's loss mitigation personnel may
participate by telephone during any contact required by this section.

    (d) A borrower may designate, with consent given in writing, a
HUD-certified housing counseling agency, attorney, or other adviser
to discuss with the mortgage servicer, on the borrower's behalf, the
borrower's financial situation and options for the borrower to avoid
foreclosure. That contact made at the direction of the borrower shall
satisfy the contact requirements of paragraph (2) of subdivision
(a). Any loan modification or workout plan offered at the meeting by
the mortgage servicer is subject to approval by the borrower.
    (e) A notice of default may be recorded pursuant to Section 2924
when a mortgage servicer has not contacted a borrower as required by
paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) provided that the failure to contact
the borrower occurred despite the due diligence of the mortgage
servicer. For purposes of this section, "due diligence" shall require
and mean all of the following:
   (1) A mortgage servicer shall first attempt to contact a borrower
by sending a first-class letter that includes the toll-free telephone
number made available by HUD to find a HUD-certified housing
counseling agency.
   (2) (A) After the letter has been sent, the mortgage servicer
shall attempt to contact the borrower by telephone at least three
times at different hours and on different days. Telephone calls shall
be made to the primary telephone number on file.
   (B) A mortgage servicer may attempt to contact a borrower using an
automated system to dial borrowers, provided that, if the telephone
call is answered, the call is connected to a live representative of
the mortgage servicer.
   (C) A mortgage servicer satisfies the telephone contact
requirements of this paragraph if it determines, after attempting
contact pursuant to this paragraph, that the borrower's primary
telephone number and secondary telephone number or numbers on file,
if any, have been disconnected.
   (3) If the borrower does not respond within two weeks after the
telephone call requirements of paragraph (2) have been satisfied, the
mortgage servicer shall then send a certified letter, with return
receipt requested.
   (4) The mortgage servicer shall provide a means for the borrower
to contact it in a timely manner, including a toll-free telephone
number that will provide access to a live representative during
business hours.
   (5) The mortgage servicer has posted a prominent link on the
homepage of its Internet Web site, if any, to the following
information:
   (A) Options that may be available to borrowers who are unable to
afford their mortgage payments and who wish to avoid foreclosure, and
instructions to borrowers advising them on steps to take to explore
those options.
   (B) A list of financial documents borrowers should collect and be
prepared to present to the mortgage servicer when discussing options
for avoiding foreclosure.
   (C) A toll-free telephone number for borrowers who wish to discuss
options for avoiding foreclosure with their mortgage servicer.
   (D) The toll-free telephone number made available by HUD to find a
HUD-certified housing counseling agency.
    (f) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust
described in Section 2924.15.
   (g) This section shall apply only to entities described in
subdivision (b) of Section 2924.18.
    (h) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1,
2018, and as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted
statute, that is enacted before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends
that date.
  SEC. 5.  Section 2923.5 is added to the Civil Code, to read:
   2923.5.  (a) (1) A mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee,
beneficiary, or authorized agent may not record a notice of default
pursuant to Section 2924 until both of the following:
   (A) Either 30 days after initial contact is made as required by
paragraph (2) or 30 days after satisfying the due diligence
requirements as described in subdivision (e).
   (B) The mortgage servicer complies with subdivision (a) of Section
2924.11, if the borrower has provided a complete application as
defined in subdivision (f) of Section 2924.11.
   (2) A mortgage servicer shall contact the borrower in person or by
telephone in order to assess the borrower's financial situation and
explore options for the borrower to avoid foreclosure. During the
initial contact, the mortgage servicer shall advise the borrower that
he or she has the right to request a subsequent meeting and, if
requested, the mortgage servicer shall schedule the meeting to occur
within 14 days. The assessment of the borrower's financial situation
and discussion of options may occur during the first contact, or at
the subsequent meeting scheduled for that purpose. In either case,
the borrower shall be provided the toll-free telephone number made
available by the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) to find a HUD-certified housing counseling agency.
Any meeting may occur telephonically.
   (b) A notice of default recorded pursuant to Section 2924 shall
include a declaration that the mortgage servicer has contacted the
borrower, has tried with due diligence to contact the borrower as
required by this section, or that no contact was required because the
individual did not meet the definition of "borrower" pursuant to
subdivision (c) of Section 2920.5.
   (c) A mortgage servicer's loss mitigation personnel may
participate by telephone during any contact required by this section.

   (d) A borrower may designate, with consent given in writing, a
HUD-certified housing counseling agency, attorney, or other adviser
to discuss with the mortgage servicer, on the borrower's behalf, the
borrower's financial situation and options for the borrower to avoid
foreclosure. That contact made at the direction of the borrower shall
satisfy the contact requirements of paragraph (2) of subdivision
(a). Any loan modification or workout plan offered at the meeting by
the mortgage servicer is subject to approval by the borrower.
   (e) A notice of default may be recorded pursuant to Section 2924
when a mortgage servicer has not contacted a borrower as required by
paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) provided that the failure to contact
the borrower occurred despite the due diligence of the mortgage
servicer. For purposes of this section, "due diligence" shall require
and mean all of the following:
   (1) A mortgage servicer shall first attempt to contact a borrower
by sending a first-class letter that includes the toll-free telephone
number made available by HUD to find a HUD-certified housing
counseling agency.
   (2) (A) After the letter has been sent, the mortgage servicer
shall attempt to contact the borrower by telephone at least three
times at different hours and on different days. Telephone calls shall
be made to the primary telephone number on file.
   (B) A mortgage servicer may attempt to contact a borrower using an
automated system to dial borrowers, provided that, if the telephone
call is answered, the call is connected to a live representative of
the mortgage servicer.
   (C) A mortgage servicer satisfies the telephone contact
requirements of this paragraph if it determines, after attempting
contact pursuant to this paragraph, that the borrower's primary
telephone number and secondary telephone number or numbers on file,
if any, have been disconnected.
   (3) If the borrower does not respond within two weeks after the
telephone call requirements of paragraph (2) have been satisfied, the
mortgage servicer shall then send a certified letter, with return
receipt requested.
   (4) The mortgage servicer shall provide a means for the borrower
to contact it in a timely manner, including a toll-free telephone
number that will provide access to a live representative during
business hours.
   (5) The mortgage servicer has posted a prominent link on the
homepage of its Internet Web site, if any, to the following
information:
   (A) Options that may be available to borrowers who are unable to
afford their mortgage payments and who wish to avoid foreclosure, and
instructions to borrowers advising them on steps to take to explore
those options.
   (B) A list of financial documents borrowers should collect and be
prepared to present to the mortgage servicer when discussing options
for avoiding foreclosure.
   (C) A toll-free telephone number for borrowers who wish to discuss
options for avoiding foreclosure with their mortgage servicer.
   (D) The toll-free telephone number made available by HUD to find a
HUD-certified housing counseling agency.
   (f) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust
described in Section 2924.15.
   (g) This section shall become operative on January 1, 2018.
  SEC. 6.  Section 2923.55 is added to the Civil Code, to read:
   2923.55.  (a) A mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee,
beneficiary, or authorized agent may not record a notice of default
pursuant to Section 2924 until all of the following:
    (1) The mortgage servicer has satisfied the requirements of
paragraph (1) of subdivision (b).
   (2) Either 30 days after initial contact is made as required by
paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) or 30 days after satisfying the due
diligence requirements as described in subdivision (f).
   (3) The mortgage servicer complies with subdivision (c) of Section
2923.6, if the borrower has provided a complete application as
defined in subdivision (h) of Section 2923.6.
   (b) (1) As specified in subdivision (a), a mortgage servicer shall
send the following information in writing to the borrower:
   (A) A statement that if the borrower is a servicemember or a
dependent of a servicemember, he or she may be entitled to certain
protections under the federal Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (50
U.S.C. Sec. 501 et seq.) regarding the servicemember's interest rate
and the risk of foreclosure, and counseling for covered
servicemembers that is available at agencies such as Military
OneSource and Armed Forces Legal Assistance.
   (B) A statement that the borrower may request the following:
   (i) A copy of the borrower's promissory note or other evidence of
indebtedness.
   (ii) A copy of the borrower's deed of trust or mortgage.
   (iii) A copy of any assignment, if applicable, of the borrower's
mortgage or deed of trust required to demonstrate the right of the
mortgage servicer to foreclose.
   (iv) A copy of the borrower's payment history since the borrower
was last less than 60 days past due.
   (2) A mortgage servicer shall contact the borrower in person or by
telephone in order to assess the borrower's financial situation and
explore options for the borrower to avoid foreclosure. During the
initial contact, the mortgage servicer shall advise the borrower that
he or she has the right to request a subsequent meeting and, if
requested, the mortgage servicer shall schedule the meeting to occur
within 14 days. The assessment of the borrower's financial situation
and discussion of options may occur during the first contact, or at
the subsequent meeting scheduled for that purpose. In either case,
the borrower shall be provided the toll-free telephone number made
available by the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) to find a HUD-certified housing counseling agency.
Any meeting may occur telephonically.
   (c) A notice of default recorded pursuant to Section 2924 shall
include a declaration that the mortgage servicer has contacted the
borrower, has tried with due diligence to contact the borrower as
required by this section, or that no contact was required because the
individual did not meet the definition of "borrower" pursuant to
subdivision (c) of Section 2920.5.
   (d) A mortgage servicer's loss mitigation personnel may
participate by telephone during any contact required by this section.

   (e) A borrower may designate, with consent given in writing, a
HUD-certified housing counseling agency, attorney, or other adviser
to discuss with the mortgage servicer, on the borrower's behalf, the
borrower's financial situation and options for the borrower to avoid
foreclosure. That contact made at the direction of the borrower shall
satisfy the contact requirements of paragraph (2) of subdivision
(b). Any foreclosure prevention alternative offered at the meeting by
the mortgage servicer is subject to approval by the borrower.
   (f) A notice of default may be recorded pursuant to Section 2924
when a mortgage servicer has not contacted a borrower as required by
paragraph (2) of subdivision (b), provided that the failure to
contact the borrower occurred despite the due diligence of the
mortgage servicer. For purposes of this section, "due diligence"
shall require and mean all of the following:
   (1) A mortgage servicer shall first attempt to contact a borrower
by sending a first-class letter that includes the toll-free telephone
number made available by HUD to find a HUD-certified housing
counseling agency.
   (2) (A) After the letter has been sent, the mortgage servicer
shall attempt to contact the borrower by telephone at least three
times at different hours and on different days. Telephone calls shall
be made to the primary telephone number on file.
   (B) A mortgage servicer may attempt to contact a borrower using an
automated system to dial borrowers, provided that, if the telephone
call is answered, the call is connected to a live representative of
the mortgage servicer.
   (C) A mortgage servicer satisfies the telephone contact
requirements of this paragraph if it determines, after attempting
contact pursuant to this paragraph, that the borrower's primary
telephone number and secondary telephone number or numbers on file,
if any, have been disconnected.
   (3) If the borrower does not respond within two weeks after the
telephone call requirements of paragraph (2) have been satisfied, the
mortgage servicer shall then send a certified letter, with return
receipt requested, that includes the toll-free telephone number made
available by HUD to find a HUD-certified housing counseling agency.
   (4) The mortgage servicer shall provide a means for the borrower
to contact it in a timely manner, including a toll-free telephone
number that will provide access to a live representative during
business hours.
   (5) The mortgage servicer has posted a prominent link on the
homepage of its Internet Web site, if any, to the following
information:
   (A) Options that may be available to borrowers who are unable to
afford their mortgage payments and who wish to avoid foreclosure, and
instructions to borrowers advising them on steps to take to explore
those options.
   (B) A list of financial documents borrowers should collect and be
prepared to present to the mortgage servicer when discussing options
for avoiding foreclosure.
   (C) A toll-free telephone number for borrowers who wish to discuss
options for avoiding foreclosure with their mortgage servicer.
   (D) The toll-free telephone number made available by HUD to find a
HUD-certified housing counseling agency.
   (g) This section shall not apply to entities described in
subdivision (b) of Section 2924.18.
   (h) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust
described in Section 2924.15.
   (i)  This section shall remain in effect only until January 1,
2018, and as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted
statute, that is enacted before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends
that date.
  SEC. 7.  Section 2923.6 of the Civil Code is amended to read:
   2923.6.  (a) The Legislature finds and declares that any duty that
mortgage servicers may have to maximize net present value under
their pooling and servicing agreements is owed to all parties in a
loan pool, or to all investors under a pooling and servicing
agreement, not to any particular party in the loan pool or investor
under a pooling and servicing agreement, and that a mortgage servicer
acts in the best interests of all parties to the loan pool or
investors in the pooling and servicing agreement if it agrees to or
implements a loan modification or workout plan for which both of the
following apply:
   (1) The loan is in payment default, or payment default is
reasonably foreseeable.
   (2) Anticipated recovery under the loan modification or workout
plan exceeds the anticipated recovery through foreclosure on a net
present value basis.
   (b) It is the intent of the Legislature that the mortgage servicer
offer the borrower a loan modification or workout plan if such a
modification or plan is consistent with its contractual or other
authority.
   (c) If a borrower submits a complete application for a first lien
loan modification offered by, or through, the borrower's mortgage
servicer, a mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or
authorized agent shall not record a notice of default or notice of
sale, or conduct a trustee's sale, while the complete first lien loan
modification application is pending. A mortgage servicer, mortgagee,
trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record a notice
of default or notice of sale or conduct a trustee's sale until any of
the following occurs:
   (1) The mortgage servicer makes a written determination that the
borrower is not eligible for a first lien loan modification, and any
appeal period pursuant to subdivision (d) has expired.
   (2) The borrower does not accept an offered first lien loan
modification within 14 days of the offer.
   (3) The borrower accepts a written first lien loan modification,
but defaults on, or otherwise breaches the borrower's obligations
under, the first lien loan modification.
   (d) If the borrower's application for a first lien loan
modification is denied, the borrower shall have at least 30 days from
the date of the written denial to appeal the denial and to provide
evidence that the mortgage servicer's determination was in error.
   (e) If the borrower's application for a first lien loan
modification is denied, the mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee,
beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record a notice of default
or, if a notice of default has already been recorded, record a
notice of sale or conduct a trustee's sale until the later of:
   (1) Thirty-one days after the borrower is notified in writing of
the denial.
   (2) If the borrower appeals the denial pursuant to subdivision
(d), the later of 15 days after the denial of the appeal or 14 days
after a first lien loan modification is offered after appeal but
declined by the borrower, or, if a first lien loan modification is
offered and accepted after appeal, the date on which the borrower
fails to timely submit the first payment or otherwise breaches the
terms of the offer.
   (f) Following the denial of a first lien loan modification
application, the mortgage servicer shall send a written notice to the
borrower identifying the reasons for denial, including the
following:
   (1) The amount of time from the date of the denial letter in which
the borrower may request an appeal of the denial of the first lien
loan modification and instructions regarding how to appeal the
denial.
   (2) If the denial was based on investor disallowance, the specific
reasons for the investor disallowance.
   (3) If the denial is the result of a net present value
calculation, the monthly gross income and property value used to
calculate the net present value and a statement that the borrower may
obtain all of the inputs used in the net present value calculation
upon written request to the mortgage servicer.
   (4) If applicable, a finding that the borrower was previously
offered a first lien loan modification and failed to successfully
make payments under the terms of the modified loan.

         (5) If applicable, a description of other foreclosure
prevention alternatives for which the borrower may be eligible, and a
list of the steps the borrower must take in order to be considered
for those options. If the mortgage servicer has already approved the
borrower for another foreclosure prevention alternative, information
necessary to complete the foreclosure prevention alternative.
   (g) In order to minimize the risk of borrowers submitting multiple
applications for first lien loan modifications for the purpose of
delay, the mortgage servicer shall not be obligated to evaluate
applications from borrowers who have already been evaluated or
afforded a fair opportunity to be evaluated for a first lien loan
modification prior to January 1, 2013, or who have been evaluated or
afforded a fair opportunity to be evaluated consistent with the
requirements of this section, unless there has been a material change
in the borrower's financial circumstances since the date of the
borrower's previous application and that change is documented by the
borrower and submitted to the mortgage servicer.
   (h) For purposes of this section, an application shall be deemed
"complete" when a borrower has supplied the mortgage servicer with
all documents required by the mortgage servicer within the reasonable
timeframes specified by the mortgage servicer.
   (i) Subdivisions (c) to (h), inclusive, shall not apply to
entities described in subdivision (b) of Section 2924.18.
   (j) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust
described in Section 2924.15.
    (k)  This section shall remain in effect only until January 1,
2018, and as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted
statute, that is enacted before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends
that date.
  SEC. 8.  Section 2923.6 is added to the Civil Code, to read:
   2923.6.  (a) The Legislature finds and declares that any duty
mortgage servicers may have to maximize net present value under their
pooling and servicing agreements is owed to all parties in a loan
pool, or to all investors under a pooling and servicing agreement,
not to any particular party in the loan pool or investor under a
pooling and servicing agreement, and that a mortgage servicer acts in
the best interests of all parties to the loan pool or investors in
the pooling and servicing agreement if it agrees to or implements a
loan modification or workout plan for which both of the following
apply:
   (1) The loan is in payment default, or payment default is
reasonably foreseeable.
   (2) Anticipated recovery under the loan modification or workout
plan exceeds the anticipated recovery through foreclosure on a net
present value basis.
   (b) It is the intent of the Legislature that the mortgage servicer
offer the borrower a loan modification or workout plan if such a
modification or plan is consistent with its contractual or other
authority.
   (c) This section shall become operative on January 1, 2018.
  SEC. 9.  Section 2923.7 is added to the Civil Code, to read:
   2923.7.  (a) Upon request from a borrower who requests a
foreclosure prevention alternative, the mortgage servicer shall
promptly establish a single point of contact and provide to the
borrower one or more direct means of communication with the single
point of contact.
   (b) The single point of contact shall be responsible for doing all
of the following:
   (1) Communicating the process by which a borrower may apply for an
available foreclosure prevention alternative and the deadline for
any required submissions to be considered for these options.
   (2) Coordinating receipt of all documents associated with
available foreclosure prevention alternatives and notifying the
borrower of any missing documents necessary to complete the
application.
   (3) Having access to current information and personnel sufficient
to timely, accurately, and adequately inform the borrower of the
current status of the foreclosure prevention alternative.
   (4) Ensuring that a borrower is considered for all foreclosure
prevention alternatives offered by, or through, the mortgage
servicer, if any.
   (5) Having access to individuals with the ability and authority to
stop foreclosure proceedings when necessary.
   (c) The single point of contact shall remain assigned to the
borrower's account until the mortgage servicer determines that all
loss mitigation options offered by, or through, the mortgage servicer
have been exhausted or the borrower's account becomes current.
   (d) The mortgage servicer shall ensure that a single point of
contact refers and transfers a borrower to an appropriate supervisor
upon request of the borrower, if the single point of contact has a
supervisor.
   (e) For purposes of this section, "single point of contact" means
an individual or team of personnel each of whom has the ability and
authority to perform the responsibilities described in subdivisions
(b) to (d), inclusive. The mortgage servicer shall ensure that each
member of the team is knowledgeable about the borrower's situation
and current status in the alternatives to foreclosure process.
   (f) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust
described in Section 2924.15.
   (g) (1) This section shall not apply to a depository institution
chartered under state or federal law, a person licensed pursuant to
Division 9 (commencing with Section 22000) or Division 20 (commencing
with Section 50000) of the Financial Code, or a person licensed
pursuant to Part 1 (commencing with Section 10000) of Division 4 of
the Business and Professions Code, that, during its immediately
preceding annual reporting period, as established with its primary
regulator, foreclosed on 175 or fewer residential real properties,
containing no more than four dwelling units, that are located in
California.
   (2) Within three months after the close of any calendar year or
annual reporting period as established with its primary regulator
during which an entity or person described in paragraph (1) exceeds
the threshold of 175 specified in paragraph (1), that entity shall
notify its primary regulator, in a manner acceptable to its primary
regulator, and any mortgagor or trustor who is delinquent on a
residential mortgage loan serviced by that entity of the date on
which that entity will be subject to this section, which date shall
be the first day of the first month that is six months after the
close of the calendar year or annual reporting period during which
that entity exceeded the threshold.
  SEC. 10.  Section 2924 of the Civil Code, as amended by Section 1
of Chapter 180 of the Statutes of 2010, is amended to read:
   2924.  (a) Every transfer of an interest in property, other than
in trust, made only as a security for the performance of another act,
is to be deemed a mortgage, except when in the case of personal
property it is accompanied by actual change of possession, in which
case it is to be deemed a pledge. Where, by a mortgage created after
July 27, 1917, of any estate in real property, other than an estate
at will or for years, less than two, or in any transfer in trust made
after July 27, 1917, of a like estate to secure the performance of
an obligation, a power of sale is conferred upon the mortgagee,
trustee, or any other person, to be exercised after a breach of the
obligation for which that mortgage or transfer is a security, the
power shall not be exercised except where the mortgage or transfer is
made pursuant to an order, judgment, or decree of a court of record,
or to secure the payment of bonds or other evidences of indebtedness
authorized or permitted to be issued by the Commissioner of
Corporations, or is made by a public utility subject to the
provisions of the Public Utilities Act, until all of the following
apply:
   (1) The trustee, mortgagee, or beneficiary, or any of their
authorized agents shall first file for record, in the office of the
recorder of each county wherein the mortgaged or trust property or
some part or parcel thereof is situated, a notice of default. That
notice of default shall include all of the following:
   (A) A statement identifying the mortgage or deed of trust by
stating the name or names of the trustor or trustors and giving the
book and page, or instrument number, if applicable, where the
mortgage or deed of trust is recorded or a description of the
mortgaged or trust property.
   (B) A statement that a breach of the obligation for which the
mortgage or transfer in trust is security has occurred.
   (C) A statement setting forth the nature of each breach actually
known to the beneficiary and of his or her election to sell or cause
to be sold the property to satisfy that obligation and any other
obligation secured by the deed of trust or mortgage that is in
default.
   (D) If the default is curable pursuant to Section 2924c, the
statement specified in paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of Section
2924c.
   (2) Not less than three months shall elapse from the filing of the
notice of default.
   (3) Except as provided in paragraph (4), after the lapse of the
three months described in paragraph (2), the mortgagee, trustee, or
other person authorized to take the sale shall give notice of sale,
stating the time and place thereof, in the manner and for a time not
less than that set forth in Section 2924f.
   (4) Notwithstanding paragraph (3), the mortgagee, trustee, or
other person authorized to take sale may record a notice of sale
pursuant to Section 2924f up to five days before the lapse of the
three-month period described in paragraph (2), provided that the date
of sale is no earlier than three months and 20 days after the
recording of the notice of default.
   (5) Until January 1, 2018, whenever a sale is postponed for a
period of at least 10 business days pursuant to Section 2924g, a
mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall provide written
notice to a borrower regarding the new sale date and time, within
five business days following the postponement. Information provided
pursuant to this paragraph shall not constitute the public
declaration required by subdivision (d) of Section 2924g. Failure to
comply with this paragraph shall not invalidate any sale that would
otherwise be valid under Section 2924f. This paragraph shall be
inoperative on January 1, 2018.
   (6) No entity shall record or cause a notice of default to be
recorded or otherwise initiate the foreclosure process unless it is
the holder of the beneficial interest under the mortgage or deed of
trust, the original trustee or the substituted trustee under the deed
of trust, or the designated agent of the holder of the beneficial
interest. No agent of the holder of the beneficial interest under the
mortgage or deed of trust, original trustee or substituted trustee
under the deed of trust may record a notice of default or otherwise
commence the foreclosure process except when acting within the scope
of authority designated by the holder of the beneficial interest.
   (b) In performing acts required by this article, the trustee shall
incur no liability for any good faith error resulting from reliance
on information provided in good faith by the beneficiary regarding
the nature and the amount of the default under the secured
obligation, deed of trust, or mortgage. In performing the acts
required by this article, a trustee shall not be subject to Title
1.6c (commencing with Section 1788) of Part 4.
   (c) A recital in the deed executed pursuant to the power of sale
of compliance with all requirements of law regarding the mailing of
copies of notices or the publication of a copy of the notice of
default or the personal delivery of the copy of the notice of default
or the posting of copies of the notice of sale or the publication of
a copy thereof shall constitute prima facie evidence of compliance
with these requirements and conclusive evidence thereof in favor of
bona fide purchasers and encumbrancers for value and without notice.
   (d) All of the following shall constitute privileged
communications pursuant to Section 47:
   (1) The mailing, publication, and delivery of notices as required
by this section.
   (2) Performance of the procedures set forth in this article.
   (3) Performance of the functions and procedures set forth in this
article if those functions and procedures are necessary to carry out
the duties described in Sections 729.040, 729.050, and 729.080 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
   (e) There is a rebuttable presumption that the beneficiary
actually knew of all unpaid loan payments on the obligation owed to
the beneficiary and secured by the deed of trust or mortgage subject
to the notice of default. However, the failure to include an actually
known default shall not invalidate the notice of sale and the
beneficiary shall not be precluded from asserting a claim to this
omitted default or defaults in a separate notice of default.
  SEC. 11.  Section 2924 of the Civil Code, as amended by Section 2
of Chapter 180 of the Statutes of 2010, is repealed.
  SEC. 12.  Section 2924.9 is added to the Civil Code, to read:
   2924.9.  (a) Unless a borrower has previously exhausted the first
lien loan modification process offered by, or through, his or her
mortgage servicer described in Section 2923.6, within five business
days after recording a notice of default pursuant to Section 2924, a
mortgage servicer that offers one or more foreclosure prevention
alternatives shall send a written communication to the borrower that
includes all of the following information:
   (1) That the borrower may be evaluated for a foreclosure
prevention alternative or, if applicable, foreclosure prevention
alternatives.
   (2) Whether an application is required to be submitted by the
borrower in order to be considered for a foreclosure prevention
alternative.
   (3) The means and process by which a borrower may obtain an
application for a foreclosure prevention alternative.
   (b) This section shall not apply to entities described in
subdivision (b) of Section 2924.18.
   (c) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust
described in Section 2924.15.
   (d)  This section shall remain in effect only until January 1,
2018, and as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted
statute, that is enacted before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends
that date.
  SEC. 13.  Section 2924.10 is added to the Civil Code, to read:
   2924.10.  (a) When a borrower submits a complete first lien
modification application or any document in connection with a first
lien modification application, the mortgage servicer shall provide
written acknowledgment of the receipt of the documentation within
five business days of receipt. In its initial acknowledgment of
receipt of the loan modification application, the mortgage servicer
shall include the following information:
   (1) A description of the loan modification process, including an
estimate of when a decision on the loan modification will be made
after a complete application has been submitted by the borrower and
the length of time the borrower will have to consider an offer of a
loan modification or other foreclosure prevention alternative.
   (2) Any deadlines, including deadlines to submit missing
documentation, that would affect the processing of a first lien loan
modification application.
   (3) Any expiration dates for submitted documents.
   (4) Any deficiency in the borrower's first lien loan modification
application.
   (b) For purposes of this section, a borrower's first lien loan
modification application shall be deemed to be "complete" when a
borrower has supplied the mortgage servicer with all documents
required by the mortgage servicer within the reasonable timeframes
specified by the mortgage servicer.
   (c) This section shall not apply to entities described in
subdivision (b) of Section 2924.18.
   (d) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust
described in Section 2924.15.
   (e)  This section shall remain in effect only until January 1,
2018, and as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted
statute, that is enacted before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends
that date.
  SEC. 14.  Section 2924.11 is added to the Civil Code, to read:
   2924.11.  (a) If a foreclosure prevention alternative is approved
in writing prior to the recordation of a notice of default, a
mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized
agent shall not record a notice of default under either of the
following circumstances:
   (1) The borrower is in compliance with the terms of a written
trial or permanent loan modification, forbearance, or repayment plan.

   (2) A foreclosure prevention alternative has been approved in
writing by all parties, including, for example, the first lien
investor, junior lienholder, and mortgage insurer, as applicable, and
proof of funds or financing has been provided to the servicer.
   (b) If a foreclosure prevention alternative is approved in writing
after the recordation of a notice of default, a mortgage servicer,
mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record
a notice of sale or conduct a trustee's sale under either of the
following circumstances:
   (1) The borrower is in compliance with the terms of a written
trial or permanent loan modification, forbearance, or repayment plan.

   (2) A foreclosure prevention alternative has been approved in
writing by all parties, including, for example, the first lien
investor, junior lienholder, and mortgage insurer, as applicable, and
proof of funds or financing has been provided to the servicer.
   (c) When a borrower accepts an offered first lien loan
modification or other foreclosure prevention alternative, the
mortgage servicer shall provide the borrower with a copy of the fully
executed loan modification agreement or agreement evidencing the
foreclosure prevention alternative following receipt of the executed
copy from the borrower.
   (d) A mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall record a
rescission of a notice of default or cancel a pending trustee's sale,
if applicable, upon the borrower executing a permanent foreclosure
prevention alternative. In the case of a short sale, the rescission
or cancellation of the pending trustee's sale shall occur when the
short sale has been approved by all parties and proof of funds or
financing has been provided to the mortgagee, beneficiary, or
authorized agent.
   (e) The mortgage servicer shall not charge any application,
processing, or other fee for a first lien loan modification or other
foreclosure prevention alternative.
   (f) The mortgage servicer shall not collect any late fees for
periods during which a complete first lien loan modification
application is under consideration or a denial is being appealed, the
borrower is making timely modification payments, or a foreclosure
prevention alternative is being evaluated or exercised.
   (g) If a borrower has been approved in writing for a first lien
loan modification or other foreclosure prevention alternative, and
the servicing of that borrower's loan is transferred or sold to
another mortgage servicer, the subsequent mortgage servicer shall
continue to honor any previously approved first lien loan
modification or other foreclosure prevention alternative, in
accordance with the provisions of the act that added this section.
   (h) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust
described in Section 2924.15.
   (i) This section shall not apply to entities described in
subdivision (b) of Section 2924.18.
   (j)  This section shall remain in effect only until January 1,
2018, and as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted
statute, that is enacted before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends
that date.
  SEC. 15.  Section 2924.11 is added to the Civil Code, to read:
   2924.11.  (a) If a borrower submits a complete application for a
foreclosure prevention alternative offered by, or through, the
borrower's mortgage servicer, a mortgage servicer, trustee,
mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record a notice
of sale or conduct a trustee's sale while the complete foreclosure
prevention alternative application is pending, and until the borrower
has been provided with a written determination by the mortgage
servicer regarding that borrower's eligibility for the requested
foreclosure prevention alternative.
   (b) Following the denial of a first lien loan modification
application, the mortgage servicer shall send a written notice to the
borrower identifying with specificity the reasons for the denial and
shall include a statement that the borrower may obtain additional
documentation supporting the denial decision upon written request to
the mortgage servicer.
   (c) If a foreclosure prevention alternative is approved in writing
prior to the recordation of a notice of default, a mortgage
servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall
not record a notice of default under either of the following
circumstances:
   (1) The borrower is in compliance with the terms of a written
trial or permanent loan modification, forbearance, or repayment plan.

   (2) A foreclosure prevention alternative has been approved in
writing by all parties, including, for example, the first lien
investor, junior lienholder, and mortgage insurer, as applicable, and
proof of funds or financing has been provided to the servicer.
   (d) If a foreclosure prevention alternative is approved in writing
after the recordation of a notice of default, a mortgage servicer,
mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record
a notice of sale or conduct a trustee's sale under either of the
following circumstances:
   (1) The borrower is in compliance with the terms of a written
trial or permanent loan modification, forbearance, or repayment plan.

   (2) A foreclosure prevention alternative has been approved in
writing by all parties, including, for example, the first lien
investor, junior lienholder, and mortgage insurer, as applicable, and
proof of funds or financing has been provided to the servicer.
   (e) This section applies only to mortgages or deeds of trust as
described in Section 2924.15.
   (f) For purposes of this section, an application shall be deemed
"complete" when a borrower has supplied the mortgage servicer with
all documents required by the mortgage servicer within the reasonable
timeframes specified by the mortgage servicer.
   (g) This section shall become operative on January 1, 2018.
  SEC. 16.  Section 2924.12 is added to the Civil Code, to read:
   2924.12.  (a) (1) If a trustee's deed upon sale has not been
recorded, a borrower may bring an action for injunctive relief to
enjoin a material violation of Section 2923.55, 2923.6, 2923.7,
2924.9, 2924.10, 2924.11, or 2924.17.
   (2) Any injunction shall remain in place and any trustee's sale
shall be enjoined until the court determines that the mortgage
servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent has
corrected and remedied the violation or violations giving rise to the
action for injunctive relief. An enjoined entity may move to
dissolve an injunction based on a showing that the material violation
has been corrected and remedied.
   (b) After a trustee's deed upon sale has been recorded, a mortgage
servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall
be liable to a borrower for actual economic damages pursuant to
Section 3281, resulting from a material violation of Section 2923.55,
2923.6, 2923.7, 2924.9, 2924.10, 2924.11, or 2924.17 by that
mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized
agent where the violation was not corrected and remedied prior to the
recordation of the trustee's deed upon sale. If the court finds that
the material violation was intentional or reckless, or resulted from
willful misconduct by a mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee,
beneficiary, or authorized agent, the court may award the borrower
the greater of treble actual damages or statutory damages of fifty
thousand dollars ($50,000).
   (c) A mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or
authorized agent shall not be liable for any violation that it has
corrected and remedied prior to the recordation of a trustee's deed
upon sale, or that has been corrected and remedied by third parties
working on its behalf prior to the recordation of a trustee's deed
upon sale.
   (d) A violation of Section 2923.55, 2923.6, 2923.7, 2924.9,
2924.10, 2924.11, or 2924.17 by a person licensed by the Department
of Corporations, Department of Financial Institutions, or Department
of Real Estate shall be deemed to be a violation of that person's
licensing law.
   (e) No violation of this article shall affect the validity of a
sale in favor of a bona fide purchaser and any of its encumbrancers
for value without notice.
   (f) A third-party encumbrancer shall not be relieved of liability
resulting from violations of Section 2923.55, 2923.6, 2923.7, 2924.9,
2924.10, 2924.11, or 2924.17 committed by that third-party
encumbrancer, that occurred prior to the sale of the subject property
to the bona fide purchaser.
   (g) A signatory to a consent judgment entered in the case entitled
United States of America et al. v. Bank of America Corporation et
al., filed in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, case number 1:12-cv-00361 RMC, that is in compliance with
the relevant terms of the Settlement Term Sheet of that consent
judgment with respect to the borrower who brought an action pursuant
to this section while the consent judgment is in effect shall have no
liability for a violation of Section 2923.55, 2923.6, 2923.7,
2924.9, 2924.10, 2924.11, or 2924.17.
   (h) The rights, remedies, and procedures provided by this section
are in addition to and independent of any other rights, remedies, or
procedures under any other law. Nothing in this section shall be
construed to alter, limit, or negate any other rights, remedies, or
procedures provided by law.
   (i) A court may award a prevailing borrower reasonable attorney's
fees and costs in an action brought pursuant to this section. A
borrower shall be deemed to have prevailed for purposes of this
subdivision if the borrower obtained injunctive relief or was awarded
damages pursuant to this section.
   (j) This section shall not apply to entities described in
subdivision (b) of Section 2924.18.
   (k)  This section shall remain in effect only until January 1,
2018, and as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted
statute, that is enacted before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends
that date.
  SEC. 17.  Section 2924.12 is added to the Civil Code, to read:
   2924.12.  (a) (1) If a trustee's deed upon sale has not been
recorded, a borrower may bring an action for injunctive relief to
enjoin a                                                 material
violation of Section 2923.5, 2923.7, 2924.11, or 2924.17.
   (2) Any injunction shall remain in place and any trustee's sale
shall be enjoined until the court determines that the mortgage
servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent has
corrected and remedied the violation or violations giving rise to the
action for injunctive relief. An enjoined entity may move to
dissolve an injunction based on a showing that the material violation
has been corrected and remedied.
   (b) After a trustee's deed upon sale has been recorded, a mortgage
servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall
be liable to a borrower for actual economic damages pursuant to
Section 3281, resulting from a material violation of Section 2923.5,
2923.7, 2924.11, or 2924.17 by that mortgage servicer, mortgagee,
trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent where the violation was not
corrected and remedied prior to the recordation of the trustee's
deed upon sale. If the court finds that the material violation was
intentional or reckless, or resulted from willful misconduct by a
mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized
agent, the court may award the borrower the greater of treble actual
damages or statutory damages of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000).
   (c) A mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or
authorized agent shall not be liable for any violation that it has
corrected and remedied prior to the recordation of the trustee's deed
upon sale, or that has been corrected and remedied by third parties
working on its behalf prior to the recordation of the trustee's deed
upon sale.
   (d) A violation of Section 2923.5, 2923.7, 2924.11, or 2924.17 by
a person licensed by the Department of Corporations, Department of
Financial Institutions, or Department of Real Estate shall be deemed
to be a violation of that person's licensing law.
   (e) No violation of this article shall affect the validity of a
sale in favor of a bona fide purchaser and any of its encumbrancers
for value without notice.
   (f) A third-party encumbrancer shall not be relieved of liability
resulting from violations of Section 2923.5, 2923.7, 2924.11, or
2924.17 committed by that third-party encumbrancer, that occurred
prior to the sale of the subject property to the bona fide purchaser.

   (g) The rights, remedies, and procedures provided by this section
are in addition to and independent of any other rights, remedies, or
procedures under any other law. Nothing in this section shall be
construed to alter, limit, or negate any other rights, remedies, or
procedures provided by law.
   (h) A court may award a prevailing borrower reasonable attorney's
fees and costs in an action brought pursuant to this section. A
borrower shall be deemed to have prevailed for purposes of this
subdivision if the borrower obtained injunctive relief or was awarded
damages pursuant to this section.
   (i) This section shall become operative on January 1, 2018.
  SEC. 18.  Section 2924.15 is added to the Civil Code, to read:
   2924.15.  (a) Unless otherwise provided, paragraph (5) of
subdivision (a) of Section 2924, and Sections 2923.5, 2923.55,
2923.6, 2923.7, 2924.9, 2924.10, 2924.11, and 2924.18 shall apply
only to first lien mortgages or deeds of trust that are secured by
owner-occupied residential real property containing no more than four
dwelling units. For these purposes, "owner-occupied" means that the
property is the principal residence of the borrower and is security
for a loan made for personal, family, or household purposes.
   (b)  This section shall remain in effect only until January 1,
2018, and as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted
statute, that is enacted before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends
that date.
  SEC. 19.  Section 2924.15 is added to the Civil Code, to read:
   2924.15.  (a) Unless otherwise provided, Sections 2923.5, 2923.7,
and 2924.11 shall apply only to first lien mortgages or deeds of
trust that are secured by owner-occupied residential real property
containing no more than four dwelling units. For these purposes,
"owner-occupied" means that the property is the principal residence
of the borrower and is security for a loan made for personal, family,
or household purposes.
   (b) This section shall become operative on January 1, 2018.
  SEC. 20.  Section 2924.17 is added to the Civil Code, to read:
   2924.17.  (a) A declaration recorded pursuant to Section 2923.5
or, until January 1, 2018, pursuant to Section 2923.55, a notice of
default, notice of sale, assignment of a deed of trust, or
substitution of trustee recorded by or on behalf of a mortgage
servicer in connection with a foreclosure subject to the requirements
of Section 2924, or a declaration or affidavit filed in any court
relative to a foreclosure proceeding shall be accurate and complete
and supported by competent and reliable evidence.
   (b) Before recording or filing any of the documents described in
subdivision (a), a mortgage servicer shall ensure that it has
reviewed competent and reliable evidence to substantiate the borrower'
s default and the right to foreclose, including the borrower's loan
status and loan information.
   (c) Until January 1, 2018, any mortgage servicer that engages in
multiple and repeated uncorrected violations of subdivision (b) in
recording documents or filing documents in any court relative to a
foreclosure proceeding shall be liable for a civil penalty of up to
seven thousand five hundred dollars ($7,500) per mortgage or deed of
trust in an action brought by a government entity identified in
Section 17204 of the Business and Professions Code, or in an
administrative proceeding brought by the Department of Corporations,
the Department of Real Estate, or the Department of Financial
Institutions against a respective licensee, in addition to any other
remedies available to these entities. This subdivision shall be
inoperative on January 1, 2018.
  SEC. 21.  Section 2924.18 is added to the Civil Code, to read:
   2924.18.  (a) (1) If a borrower submits a complete application for
a first lien loan modification offered by, or through, the borrower'
s mortgage servicer, a mortgage servicer, trustee, mortgagee,
beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record a notice of
default, notice of sale, or conduct a trustee's sale while the
complete first lien loan modification application is pending, and
until the borrower has been provided with a written determination by
the mortgage servicer regarding that borrower's eligibility for the
requested loan modification.
   (2) If a foreclosure prevention alternative has been approved in
writing prior to the recordation of a notice of default, a mortgage
servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall
not record a notice of default under either of the following
circumstances:
   (A) The borrower is in compliance with the terms of a written
trial or permanent loan modification, forbearance, or repayment plan.

   (B) A foreclosure prevention alternative has been approved in
writing by all parties, including, for example, the first lien
investor, junior lienholder, and mortgage insurer, as applicable, and
proof of funds or financing has been provided to the servicer.
   (3) If a foreclosure prevention alternative is approved in writing
after the recordation of a notice of default, a mortgage servicer,
mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record
a notice of sale or conduct a trustee's sale under either of the
following circumstances:
   (A) The borrower is in compliance with the terms of a written
trial or permanent loan modification, forbearance, or repayment plan.

   (B) A foreclosure prevention alternative has been approved in
writing by all parties, including, for example, the first lien
investor, junior lienholder, and mortgage insurer, as applicable, and
proof of funds or financing has been provided to the servicer.
   (b) This section shall apply only to a depository institution
chartered under state or federal law, a person licensed pursuant to
Division 9 (commencing with Section 22000) or Division 20 (commencing
with Section 50000) of the Financial Code, or a person licensed
pursuant to Part 1 (commencing with Section 10000) of Division 4 of
the Business and Professions Code, that, during its immediately
preceding annual reporting period, as established with its primary
regulator, foreclosed on 175 or fewer residential real properties,
containing no more than four dwelling units, that are located in
California.
   (c) Within three months after the close of any calendar year or
annual reporting period as established with its primary regulator
during which an entity or person described in subdivision (b) exceeds
the threshold of 175 specified in subdivision (b), that entity shall
notify its primary regulator, in a manner acceptable to its primary
regulator, and any mortgagor or trustor who is delinquent on a
residential mortgage loan serviced by that entity of the date on
which that entity will be subject to Sections 2923.55, 2923.6,
2923.7, 2924.9, 2924.10, 2924.11, and 2924.12, which date shall be
the first day of the first month that is six months after the close
of the calendar year or annual reporting period during which that
entity exceeded the threshold.
   (d) For purposes of this section, an application shall be deemed
"complete" when a borrower has supplied the mortgage servicer with
all documents required by the mortgage servicer within the reasonable
timeframes specified by the mortgage servicer.
   (e) If a borrower has been approved in writing for a first lien
loan modification or other foreclosure prevention alternative, and
the servicing of the borrower's loan is transferred or sold to
another mortgage servicer, the subsequent mortgage servicer shall
continue to honor any previously approved first lien loan
modification or other foreclosure prevention alternative, in
accordance with the provisions of the act that added this section.
   (f) This section shall apply only to mortgages or deeds of trust
described in Section 2924.15.
   (g)  This section shall remain in effect only until January 1,
2018, and as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted
statute, that is enacted before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends
that date.
  SEC. 22.  Section 2924.19 is added to the Civil Code, to read:
   2924.19.  (a) (1) If a trustee's deed upon sale has not been
recorded, a borrower may bring an action for injunctive relief to
enjoin a material violation of Section 2923.5, 2924.17, or 2924.18.
   (2) Any injunction shall remain in place and any trustee's sale
shall be enjoined until the court determines that the mortgage
servicer, mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent has corrected
and remedied the violation or violations giving rise to the action
for injunctive relief. An enjoined entity may move to dissolve an
injunction based on a showing that the material violation has been
corrected and remedied.
   (b) After a trustee's deed upon sale has been recorded, a mortgage
servicer, mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall be
liable to a borrower for actual economic damages pursuant to Section
3281, resulting from a material violation of Section 2923.5, 2924.17,
or 2924.18 by that mortgage servicer, mortgagee, beneficiary, or
authorized agent where the violation was not corrected and remedied
prior to the recordation of the trustee's deed upon sale. If the
court finds that the material violation was intentional or reckless,
or resulted from willful misconduct by a mortgage servicer,
mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized agent, the court may award the
borrower the greater of treble actual damages or statutory damages of
fifty thousand dollars ($50,000).
   (c) A mortgage servicer, mortgagee, beneficiary, or authorized
agent shall not be liable for any violation that it has corrected and
remedied prior to the recordation of the trustee's deed upon sale,
or that has been corrected and remedied by third parties working on
its behalf prior to the recordation of the trustee's deed upon sale.
   (d) A violation of Section 2923.5, 2924.17, or 2917.18 by a person
licensed by the Department of Corporations, the Department of
Financial Institutions, or the Department of Real Estate shall be
deemed to be a violation of that person's licensing law.
   (e) No violation of this article shall affect the validity of a
sale in favor of a bona fide purchaser and any of its encumbrancers
for value without notice.
   (f) A third-party encumbrancer shall not be relieved of liability
resulting from violations of Section 2923.5, 2924.17 or 2924.18,
committed by that third-party encumbrancer, that occurred prior to
the sale of the subject property to the bona fide purchaser.
   (g) The rights, remedies, and procedures provided by this section
are in addition to and independent of any other rights, remedies, or
procedures under any other law. Nothing in this section shall be
construed to alter, limit, or negate any other rights, remedies, or
procedures provided by law.
   (h) A court may award a prevailing borrower reasonable attorney's
fees and costs in an action brought pursuant to this section. A
borrower shall be deemed to have prevailed for purposes of this
subdivision if the borrower obtained injunctive relief or damages
pursuant to this section.
   (i) This section shall apply only to entities described in
subdivision (b) of Section 2924.18.
   (j)  This section shall remain in effect only until January 1,
2018, and as of that date is repealed, unless a later enacted
statute, that is enacted before January 1, 2018, deletes or extends
that date.
  SEC. 23.  Section 2924.20 is added to the Civil Code, to read:
   2924.20.  Consistent with their general regulatory authority, and
notwithstanding subdivisions (b) and (c) of Section 2924.18, the
Department of Corporations, the Department of Financial Institutions,
and the Department of Real Estate may adopt regulations applicable
to any entity or person under their respective jurisdictions that are
necessary to carry out the purposes of the act that added this
section. A violation of the regulations adopted pursuant to this
section shall only be enforceable by the regulatory agency.
  SEC. 24.  The provisions of this act are severable. If any
provision of this act or its application is held invalid, that
invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications that can
be given effect without the invalid provision or application.
  SEC. 25.   No reimbursement is required by this act pursuant to
Section 6 of Article XIII B of the California Constitution because
the only costs that may be incurred by a local agency or school
district will be incurred because this act creates a new crime or
infraction, eliminates a crime or infraction, or changes the penalty
for a crime or infraction, within the meaning of Section 17556 of the
Government Code, or changes the definition of a crime within the
meaning of Section 6 of Article XIII B of the California
Constitution.

Civil Code §2924.12(b) Right to Sue Mortgage Servicers for Injunctive Relief, Damages, Treble Damages, and Right to Attorney’s Fees. : )

prohabition-images

H. Right to Sue Mortgage Servicers for Injunctive Relief, Damages, Treble Damages, and Right to Attorney’s Fees

2013 is going to be a good year

One of the most important provisions of the Act from a lender’s perspective is that it provides borrowers with the right to sue mortgage servicers for injunctive relief before the trustee’s deed upon sale has recorded, or if it has already recorded, to sue for actual economic damages, if the mortgage servicer has not corrected any “material” violation of certain enumerated portions of the Act before the trustee’s deed upon sale recorded. (Civil Code §2924.12(a).) In an area that will certainly open up a Pandora’s Box of litigation, the Act does not define what constitutes a “material” violation of the Act. If a court finds that the violation was intentional, reckless or willful, the court can award the borrower the greater of treble (triple) damages or $50,000. (Civil Code §2924.12(b).) Furthermore, a violation of the enumerated provisions of the Act is also deemed to be a violation of the licensing laws if committed by a person licensed as a consumer or commercial finance lender or broker, a residential mortgage lender or servicer, or a licensed real estate broker or salesman. (Civil Code §2924.12(d).) Lastly, in a one-sided attorney’s fee provision that only benefits borrowers, the court may award a borrower who obtains an injunction or receives an award of economic damages as a result of the violation of the Act their reasonable attorney’s fees and costs as the prevailing party. (Civil Code §2924.12(i).) This provides all the more reason for lenders and mortgage servicers to comply with the terms of the Act. This provision for the recovery by only the borrower of their reasonable attorney’s fees makes it more likely that borrowers will file litigation against mortgage lenders or servicers than they otherwise would. Compliance is the lender’s or mortgage servicer’s best defense to litigation under the Act.

Significantly for lenders, as long as the mortgage servicer remedies the material violation of the Act before the trustee’s deed upon sale has recorded, the Act specifically provides that the mortgage servicer shall not be liable under the Act for any violation or damages. (Civil Code §2924.12(b) & (c).) The Act also clarifies that signatories to the National Mortgage Settlement who are in compliance with the terms of that settlement, as they relate to the terms of the Act, will not face liability under the Act. (Civil Code §2924.12(g).

 

Attorney General Kamala D. Harris Announces Final Components of California Homeowner Bill of Rights Signed into Law

From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Tuesday, September 25, 2012 4:21 PM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: Attorney General Kamala D. Harris Announces Final Components of California Homeowner Bill of Rights Signed into Law

State of California Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General Kamala D. Harris
News ReleaseSeptember 25, 2012

For Immediate Release
(415) 703-5837

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Print Version

Attorney General Kamala D. Harris Announces Final Components of California Homeowner Bill of Rights Signed into Law

SACRAMENTO — Attorney General Kamala D. Harris today announced that the final parts of the California Homeowner Bill of Rights have been signed into law by Governor Jerry Brown.

“California has been the epicenter of the foreclosure and mortgage crisis,” said Attorney General Harris. “The Homeowner Bill of Rights will provide basic fairness and transparency for homeowners, and improve the mortgage process for everyone.”

The Governor signed:

  • Senate Bill 1474 by Senator Loni Hancock, D-Berkeley, which gives the Attorney General’s office the ability to use a statewide grand jury to investigate and indict the perpetrators of financial crimes involving victims in multiple counties.
  • Assembly Bill 1950, by Assemblymember Mike Davis, D-Los Angeles, which extends the statute of limitations for prosecuting mortgage related crimes from one year to three years, giving the Department of Justice and local District Attorneys the time needed to investigate and prosecute complex mortgage fraud crimes.
  • Assembly Bill 2610 by Assemblymember Nancy Skinner, D-Berkeley, which requires purchasers of foreclosed homes to give tenants at least 90 days before starting eviction proceedings. If the tenant has a fixed-term lease, the new owner must honor the lease unless the owner demonstrates that certain exceptions intended to prevent fraudulent leases apply.

Previously signed into law were three other components of the Homeowner Bill of Rights. Assembly Bill 2314, by Assemblymember Wilmer Carter, D-Rialto, provides additional tools to local governments and receivers to fight blight caused by multiple vacant homes in neighborhoods.

Two additional bills, which came out of a two-house conference committee, provide protections for borrowers and struggling homeowners, including a restriction on dual-track foreclosures, where a lender forecloses on a borrower despite being in discussions over a loan modification to save the home. The bills also guarantee struggling homeowners a single point of contact at their lender with knowledge of their loan and direct access to decision makers.

All aspects of the California Homeowner Bill of Rights will take effect on January 1, 2013.

# # #You may view the full account of this posting, including possible attachments, in the News & Alerts section of our website at: http://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-kamala-d-harris-announces-final-components-california-homeown-0
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Fighting the eviction with forms and pleadings a recent case

Paragas tble contents mot lemine

Mot lemine exclude evidence in trial

Mot lemine 2 Peragas

Mot in lemine 3

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Peragas oppos settlement statement

Plaintff statement of case

Plaintiff witness list

Plaintiff witness list

Plaintiff jury trial brief

Plaintiff req for judicial notice

Mot in liemine to preclude Peragas

A. Peragas opp to mot to liminane

sepstatementparagas

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opposition to def’s MIL to preclude TDUS

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PARAGAS-RJN RE MOTION IN LIMINE

Peragas order deny MSJ

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Tell me not to make my payments could come back to bite the Bank. “Downey Savings could not take advantage of its own wrong. (Civ. Code, § 3517.)”

Ragland v. U.S. Bank N.A. (2012) , Cal.App.4th

[No. G045580. Fourth Dist., Div. Three. Sept. 11, 2012.]

PAM RAGLAND, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION et al., Defendants and Respondents.

(Superior Court of Orange County, No. 30-2008-00114411, Gregory H. Lewis, Judge.)

(Opinion by Fybel, J., with Aronson, Acting P.J., and Ikola, J., concurring.)

COUNSEL

Travis R. Jack for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, Karin Dougan Vogel, J. Barrett Marum and Mark G. Rackers for Defendants and Respondents. {SLIP OPN. PAGE 2}

OPINION

FYBEL, J.-

INTRODUCTION

After Pam Ragland lost her home through foreclosure, she sued defendants U.S. Bank National Association (U.S. Bank), the successor in interest to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as the receiver for Downey Savings and Loan Association (Downey Savings); DSL Service Company (DSL), the trustee under the deed of trust; and DSL’s agent, FCI Lender Services, Inc. (FCI). (We refer to U.S. Bank, DSL, and FCI collectively as Defendants.) She asserted causes of action for negligent misrepresentation, fraud, breach of oral contract, violation of Civil Code section 2924g, subdivision (d) (section 2924g(d)), intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and rescission of the foreclosure sale. Ragland appeals from the judgment entered after the trial court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and summary adjudication.

Applying basic contract and tort law, we reverse the judgment in favor of U.S. Bank on the causes of action for negligent misrepresentation, fraud, violation of section 2924g(d), and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Ragland produced evidence creating triable issues of fact as to whether Downey Savings induced her to miss a loan payment, thereby wrongfully placing her loan in foreclosure, and whether she suffered damages as a result. We affirm summary adjudication of the causes of action for breach of oral contract, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and rescission, and affirm the judgment in favor of DSL and FCI because Ragland is no longer pursuing claims against them.

The FDIC took control of Downey Savings in November 2008 and later assigned its assets, including Ragland’s loan, to U.S. Bank. For the sake of clarity, we continue to use the name “Downey Savings” up through December 17, 2008, the date of the foreclosure sale. {Slip Opn. Page 3}

FACTS

I. Ragland Refinances Her Loan. Her Signature Is Forged on Some Loan Documents.

In June 2002, Ragland refinanced her home mortgage through Downey Savings. She obtained the refinance loan through a mortgage broker. The loan was an adjustable rate mortgage with an initial yearly interest rate of 2.95 percent, and the initial monthly payment was $1,241.03.

Ragland thought that Downey Savings had offered her a fixed rate loan and claimed her mortgage broker forged her name on certain loan documents. In July 2002, she sent a letter to the escrow company, asserting her signature had been forged on the buyer’s estimated closing statement and on the lender’s escrow instructions, and, in September 2002, she notified Downey Savings of the claimed forgery. A handwriting expert opined that Ragland’s signature had been forged on those two documents, and on a statement of assets and liabilities, an addendum to the loan application, a provider of service schedule, and an itemization of charges. By August 2002, Ragland had consulted two attorneys about the forged documents, one of whom wanted to file a class action lawsuit on her behalf, and the other of whom advised her of her right to rescind the loan. Ragland signed, and did not dispute signing, the adjustable rate mortgage note, the deed of trust, and riders to both instruments.

II. Ragland Seeks a Loan Modification. She Is Told to Miss a Loan Payment to Qualify.

By April 2008, the yearly interest rate on Ragland’s loan had increased to 7.022 percent and her monthly payment had increased to over $2,600. On April 13, Ragland spoke with a Downey Savings representative named John about modifying her {Slip Opn. Page 4} loan. John told Ragland her loan was not “behind” but he would work with her to modify it. He told Ragland not to make the April 2008 loan payment because “the worst thing that’s going to happen is you are going to have a late fee, we will get this done for you.” When Ragland asked if there was a chance the loan modification would not “go through,” John replied, “usually not, you are pre-qualified.”

John told Ragland a $1,000 fee would be charged to modify the loan, and Downey Savings would not waive that fee. She replied that Downey Savings should waive the fee because her “loan was forged and nothing was done about it.” John said he would check with his supervisor about waiving the fee.

John did not call back, and on April 16, 2008, the last day to make a timely loan payment for April, Ragland, who was nervous about a late payment, called him. John told her nothing could be done about the loan, so she asked to speak to his supervisor. The supervisor told Ragland, “[i]f you have one document in your packet that’s forged, you may not be responsible for anything in your loan, at all, you may not have to even pay your loan.” When Ragland said she had 13 to 15 forged documents, the supervisor checked her record and told her, “I can see that you reported . . . this to us. We are going to have to put it in legal.” The supervisor told Ragland that Downey Savings could not collect from her while its legal department investigated the forgery. Ragland had planned to make her April 2008 loan payment but, based on what John and the supervisor told her, manually cancelled the automatic payment from her checking account.

In late April 2008, Downey Savings sent Ragland a notice that her loan payment was delinquent. On April 29, 2008, Ragland spoke with Downey Savings representatives named Joseph and Claudia and made notes on the delinquency notice of her conversations with them. Ragland noted that Claudia or Joseph told her: “Can’t do modi[fication] while investigat[e] [¶] . . . Collection activity ‘frozen.'” Claudia told Ragland that Downey Savings was initiating an investigation into her claim of forgery {Slip Opn. Page 5} and could not accept further loan payments from her during the investigation. Ragland noted that Joseph also told her, “collection activity frozen.”

No one from Downey Savings further discussed a loan modification with Ragland or requested financial information from her. Ragland testified in her deposition, “once it went into legal, that was it. It was like the legal black hole.”

In May 2008, a withdrawal was made from Ragland’s checking account and transmitted to Downey Savings as the May 2008 loan payment. Downey Savings refused to accept the payment.

On May 5, 2008, Downey Savings sent Ragland a letter entitled “Notice of Intent to Foreclose” (some capitalization omitted). According to the letter, the amount required to reinstate the loan was $5,487.80. On May 9, Ragland called Downey Savings in response to this letter. Her notes for this conversation indicate she spoke with “Reb,” who transferred her to “Jasmine,” who transferred her to “Lilia,” who said the loan was in Downey Savings’s legal department and “they[‘]ll C/B.”

III. Downey Savings Institutes Foreclosure Proceedings; Ragland Gets the Runaround.

Nobody from Downey Savings called Ragland back. In early July 2008, Ragland received a letter from Downey Savings’s collection department, informing her that foreclosure proceedings on her home had begun. On July 15, Ragland had a telephone conversation with each of three Downey Savings representatives, identified in her notes of the conversations as Eric, Gail, and Leanna. Ragland spoke first with Eric, who told her the account was in foreclosure and transferred her to the foreclosure department. Ragland next spoke with Gail, who said she could not speak to her because the account was in foreclosure. Gail transferred Ragland to Leanna. Leanna told Ragland that the legal department failed to put a red flag in the computer to indicate the loan was being investigated and that the loan should never have been placed in {Slip Opn. Page 6} foreclosure. Leanna told Ragland that Downey Savings was “waiting for legal,” and Ragland’s attorney needed to “write the letter to legal and ask them . . . for a status update on the investigation, and that we had time, because it had just been referred in June and the sale wasn’t set for quite a while.” Ragland’s notes from the conversation include, “[f]oreclosure on hold.”

IV. Downey Savings Institutes Foreclosure Proceedings; Ragland Attempts to Make Loan Payments.

On July 18, 2008, Downey Savings instructed DSL, the trustee under the deed of trust, to initiate foreclosure proceedings on Ragland’s home. DSL assigned its agent, FCI, to take the actions necessary to foreclose the deed of trust on Ragland’s home.

Ragland attempted to make payments on her loan in September, October, and November 2008 through transfers from her checking account. Downey Savings rejected the payments.

On October 30, 2008, FCI recorded a notice of trustee’s sale, stating the foreclosure sale of Ragland’s home would be held on November 20. Ragland filed this lawsuit against Downey Savings on November 7, 2008. Several days later, Ragland’s attorney, Dean R. Kitano, spoke with general counsel for Downey Savings, Richard Swinney, about Ragland’s allegations of fraud and forgery in connection with the origination of her loan. Swinney agreed to postpone the foreclosure sale until December 9, 2008.

By letter dated November 12, 2008, Swinney informed Kitano that until Downey Savings received certain documentation from Ragland, it would not consider modifying her loan. The letter stated that any loan modification would require that she bring the loan current and described as “not credible” Ragland’s contention that a Downey Savings representative told her to skip a monthly payment. The forgery issue, {Slip Opn. Page 7} according to the letter, “has no impact on this loan” because Ragland did not claim her signatures on the disclosure statement, note, or deed of trust were forged.

Later in November 2008, the Office of Thrift Supervision closed Downey Savings, and the FDIC was appointed as its receiver. U.S. Bank acquired the assets of Downey Savings from the FDIC. Ragland’s loan was among those assets acquired by U.S. Bank.

V. Ragland’s Home Is Sold at Foreclosure Sale on the Day After the Trial Court Denied Ragland’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction.

On November 12, 2008, Ragland filed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order to enjoin the foreclosure sale scheduled for December 9. The ex parte application was heard on November 26, on which date the trial court issued an order stating: “Plaintiff shall be entitled to a temporary restraining order enjoining the foreclosure sale on December 9, 2008; upon bringing the loan current by Dec[ember] 16. Current is as of Nov[ember] 26, 2008.” A hearing on Ragland’s motion for a preliminary injunction was scheduled for December 16, 2008.

Following the ex parte hearing, Downey Savings provided Ragland a statement showing the amount necessary to reinstate her loan was $24,804.57, of which about $4,074 was for late charges, interest on arrears, property inspection and foreclosure costs. Kitano sent Downey Savings a letter, dated December 2, 2008, stating that “[c]urrently, my client is unable to pay the arrearage to make the loan current” and proposing that (1) $12,000 of the reinstatement amount be “tacked onto the back end of the loan” and (2) Downey Savings forgive the remaining amount.

In advance of the hearing on Ragland’s motion for a preliminary injunction, the trial court issued a tentative decision that stated, in part: “The court’s order of November 26, 2008, conditions the TRO [(temporary restraining order)] on plaintiff’s {Slip Opn. Page 8} bringing her payments current as of November 26, 20[08] by no later than December 16, 2008. According to defendant, t[he] amount necessary to bring the loan current is $24,804.57. Plaintiff does not dispute that she owes regular monthly mortgag[e] payments on the loan, and therefore whether or not she is likely to prevail on the merits is not at issue insofar as her responsibilit[ies] to bring the loan payments current [are] concerned. If plaintiff fails to bring her payments current by the hearing date, there is no reason to issue a preliminary injunction, since the injunction would serve no purpose but to prolong the inevitable to no good purpose. . . . [¶] If plaintiff does bring her payments current by the hearing date, then there is no basis for a foreclosure sale because the arrears would have been cured. Hence there would seem to be no need for the issuance of a preliminary injunction under such circumstances.”

Ragland did not pay the amount demanded by Downey Savings to reinstate the loan by December 16, 2008. She had sufficient funds to make the back payments due under the note, but not to pay the additional fees.

On December 16, 2008, the trial court denied Ragland’s motion for a preliminary injunction, and the foreclosure sale was conducted the next day. Ragland’s home was sold at the sale for $375,000.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Ragland’s third amended complaint asserted causes of action against U.S. Bank for negligent misrepresentation, breach of oral contract, and fraud, and against Defendants for violations of section 2924g(d), intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and rescission of foreclosure sale.

In December 2010, Defendants moved for summary judgment and, in the alternative, for summary adjudication of each cause of action. In May 2011, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment on the ground Ragland could not pay the full amount demanded by Downey Savings to reinstate her loan. The trial court ruled: {Slip Opn. Page 9} “A valid and viable tender of payment of the indebtedness owing is essential to an action to cancel a voidable sale under a deed of trust . . . . [Citation.] [¶] This rule . . . is based upon the equitable maxim that a court of equity will not order a useless act performed . . . if plaintiffs could not have redeemed the property had the sale procedures been proper, any irregularities in the sale did not result in damages to the plaintiffs. [¶] [Citation.] [¶] The defendants have shown that all of plaintiff’s damages under each cause of action were suffered as a result of the foreclosure sale of her property. . . . Plaintiff alleges that the foreclosure sale occurred six days too early in violation of Civil Code §2924g. Even if this were true, plaintiff’s damages are not recoverable because plaintiff was incapable of reinstating her loan. . . . This was made clear by plaintiff’s counsel in his letter to Downey Savings’ counsel two weeks before the foreclosure sale (December 2, 2008). Plaintiff’s counsel stated that ‘. . . my client is unable to pay the arrearage to make the loan current[.’] . . . Plaintiff’s failure to reinstate the loan by the December 16, 2008 preliminary injunction hearing confirmed as much, and plaintiff also admitted this in her deposition.”

As to the contention that Ragland could have made the past due loan payments but not the added fees, the trial court ruled: “Plaintiff claims that she indicated in her deposition that she had the money to make up the back payments, but not enough money to also make up the fees. Plaintiff’s Separate Statement, page 6, lines 16-18. The referenced deposition testimony amounts to a claim that plaintiff had only part of the money necessary to reinstate the loan.” The court also rejected the contention that Ragland was prepared to file bankruptcy to delay the foreclosure sale, stating, “[t]his is a further admission that plaintiff was incapable of reinstating her loan even if the foreclosure sale had been delayed an additional six days.”

Ragland timely filed a notice of appeal from the judgment entered in Defendants’ favor. {Slip Opn. Page 10}

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE AND MOTION TO STRIKE

I. Ragland’s Request for Judicial Notice

Ragland requests that we take judicial notice of 18 discrete facts concerning the financial condition of Downey Savings from 2005 to the time of its acquisition by U.S. Bank, the nature of Downey Savings’s assets in that timeframe, the resale of Ragland’s home, and the condition of the Orange County housing market. She argues those 18 facts are relevant to show “when Downey Savings’ disastrous financial condition beg[a]n showing in late 2007, and bec[ame] clear by April, 2008, Downey’s desperate need for cash explains its unusual behavior.” She concedes, “[t]he matters concerning which judicial notice is requested were not presented to the trial court.” We deny the request for judicial notice.

Ragland requests we take judicial notice pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (h), which provides the court “may” take judicial notice of “[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” The Court of Appeal has the same power as the trial court to take judicial notice of matters properly subject to judicial notice. (Evid. Code, § 459.) “‘Matters that cannot be brought before the appellate court through the record on appeal (initially or by augmentation) may still be considered on appeal by judicial notice.'” (Fitz v. NCR Corp. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 702, 719, fn. 4.)

As evidentiary support for the request for judicial notice, Ragland offers 12 exhibits, consisting of an audit report of Downey Savings, prepared by the Office of the Inspector General of the United States Department of the Treasury (exhibit 1), printed pages from various Web sites and blogs (exhibits 2-6 and 8-12), and a recorded grant deed (exhibit 7). Ragland’s request for judicial notice requires us (with one exception) to take judicial notice of, and accept as true, the contents of those exhibits. While we may {Slip Opn. Page 11} take judicial notice of the existence of the audit report, Web sites, and blogs, we may not accept their contents as true. (Unruh-Haxton v. Regents of University of California (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 343, 364.) “When judicial notice is taken of a document, however, the truthfulness and proper interpretation of the document are disputable. [Citation.]” (StorMedia Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 449, 457, fn. 9.)

Although the audit report is a government document, we may not judicially notice the truth of its contents. In Mangini v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063, overruled on another ground in In re Tobacco Cases II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257, 1276, the plaintiff sought judicial notice of a report of the United States Surgeon General and a report to the California Department of Health Services. The California Supreme Court denied the request: “While courts may notice official acts and public records, ‘we do not take judicial notice of the truth of all matters stated therein.’ [Citations.] ‘[T]he taking of judicial notice of the official acts of a governmental entity does not in and of itself require acceptance of the truth of factual matters which might be deduced therefrom, since in many instances what is being noticed, and thereby established, is no more than the existence of such acts and not, without supporting evidence, what might factually be associated with or flow therefrom.'” (Mangini v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., supra, at pp. 1063-1064.)

Nor may we take judicial notice of the truth of the contents of the Web sites and blogs, including those of the Los Angeles Times and Orange County Register. (See Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1141, fn. 6 [“The truth of the content of the articles is not a proper matter for judicial notice”]; Unlimited Adjusting Group, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 883, 888, fn. 4 [statements of facts contained in press release not subject to judicial notice].) The contents of the Web sites and blogs are “plainly subject to interpretation and for that reason not subject to judicial notice.” (L.B. Research & Education Foundation v. UCLA Foundation (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 171, 180, fn. 2.) {Slip Opn. Page 12}

The exception is the grant deed. A recorded deed is an official act of the executive branch, of which this court may take judicial notice. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (c), 459, subd. (a); Evans v. California Trailer Court, Inc. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 540, 549; Cal-American Income Property Fund II v. County of Los Angeles (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 109, 112, fn. 2.) The grant deed purports to show that Ragland’s home was conveyed by the purchaser at the foreclosure sale to another party. While we may take judicial notice of the grant deed, we decline to do so because we conclude it is not relevant to any issue raised on appeal.

In addition, Ragland has not shown exceptional circumstances justifying judicial notice of facts that were not part of the record when the judgment was entered. (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3; Duronslet v. Kamps (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 717, 737.)

II. Defendants’ Motion to Strike Portions of Ragland’s Opening Brief

Defendants move to strike (1) six passages from Ragland’s opening brief that are supported by citations to the exhibits attached to the request for judicial notice or by citations to Web sites outside the record on appeal, and (2) three passages accusing Downey Savings of trying to swindle Ragland to generate cash.

California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) states an appellate brief must “[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears.” We may decline to consider passages of a brief that do not comply with this rule. (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 990.) As a reviewing court, we usually consider only matters that were part of the record when the judgment was entered. (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc., supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 444, fn. 3.) {Slip Opn. Page 13}

We have denied Ragland’s request for judicial notice; we therefore decline to consider those passages of the appellant’s opening brief, noted in the margin, which are supported solely by citations to exhibits attached to that request or to Web sites outside the appellate record. fn. 1 The three passages from the appellant’s opening brief accusing Downey Savings of trying to swindle Ragland also are not supported by record references, fn. 2 but we consider those three passages to be argument rather than factual assertions.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“A trial court properly grants summary judgment where no triable issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [Citation.] We review the trial court’s decision de novo, considering all of the evidence the parties offered in connection with the motion (except that which the court properly {Slip Opn. Page 14} excluded) and the uncontradicted inferences the evidence reasonably supports. [Citation.]” (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476.) We liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve all doubts about the evidence in that party’s favor. (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1039.)

DISCUSSION

I. Negligent Misrepresentation Cause of Action

In the first cause of action, for negligent misrepresentation, Ragland alleged: “On or about April 29, 2008, Downey [Savings] represented to Plaintiff that Downey [Savings] could modify Plaintiff’s current loan during the time that the legal department was investigating the fraud allegation on Plaintiff’s loan. However, in order to do a modification of Plaintiff’s loan, Plaintiff would have to be in arrears on her current loan. Downey[ Savings]’s representative then told Plaintiff not to pay April’s mortgage payment. Upon . . . Downey[ Savings]’s representations Plaintiff did not pay April’s mortgage payment. Thereafter, Downey [Savings] informed Plaintiff that Downey [Savings] could not accept any further mortgage payments from Plaintiff until the legal department investigated the alleged fraud on the initial mortgage.”

The elements of negligent misrepresentation are (1) a misrepresentation of a past or existing material fact, (2) made without reasonable ground for believing it to be true, (3) made with the intent to induce another’s reliance on the fact misrepresented, (4) justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation, and (5) resulting damage. (Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. FSI, Financial Solutions, Inc. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1573; National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Cambridge Integrated Services Group, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 35, 50.)

In opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Ragland presented evidence that John or his supervisor represented (1) her loan was not “behind” {Slip Opn. Page 15} but he would work with her to modify the loan; (2) she should not make the April 2008 loan payment because “the worst thing that’s going to happen is you are going to have a late fee, we will get this done for you”; and (3) her loan modification request likely would be approved because she was prequalified. Ragland also presented evidence that several days later, on the last day for her to make a timely loan payment for April, John’s supervisor told her the loan would be turned over to the legal department because Ragland had reported some of the loan documents were forged. The supervisor told Ragland that Downey Savings would not attempt to collect from her until the matter had been investigated by the legal department.

Ragland presented evidence that in reliance on the representations made by John or his supervisor, she did not make her April 2008 loan payment. Defendants assert Ragland was already in default when she first spoke with John on April 13, 2008, because she failed to make her payment due April 1, 2008. The note stated Ragland’s monthly payment was due on the first day of each month, but that the monthly payment would be deemed timely if paid by the end of the 15th day after the due date. In addition, Ragland presented evidence that John told her on April 13, 2008, she was not “behind” but he would work with her to modify the loan. The payments made by Ragland for September and October 2008, which were rejected by Downey Savings, were dated the 16th of the month, and the rejected payment for November 2008 was dated the 14th. At the very least, there is a triable issue of fact whether Ragland was in default when she spoke with John on April 13.

Defendants argue Ragland did not rely on the misrepresentations because she tried to make her loan payments in May, September, October, and November 2008. Ragland made her loan payment by automatic transfer from her checking account. She manually prevented or undid the automatic payments for April, June, July, and August 2008. As Ragland argues in her reply brief, an inference could be drawn that she inadvertently did not stop the May 2008 payment. We draw all reasonable inference in {Slip Opn. Page 16} favor of the party against whom the summary judgment motion was made. (Crouse v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1520.)

Defendants argue Ragland’s reliance was not justified because she was told her loan was in the foreclosure department and nobody at Downey Savings ever told her she could stop making loan payments. The evidence presented by Ragland created a triable issue of fact whether her reliance was justified. On April 29, 2008, Ragland spoke with Joseph and Claudia at Downey Savings, and they told her Downey Savings was initiating an investigation of her forgery claim; during the investigation, Downey Savings would not accept loan payments; and collection activity was frozen. In May 2008, on receiving a letter stating her loan was in foreclosure, Ragland called Downey Savings. Her call was transferred several times, until a person named Lilia told her the loan was in Downey Savings’s legal department, which would call her back. Nobody from the legal department called Ragland back. In July 2008, Ragland received a letter from Downey Savings, telling her foreclosure proceedings had begun. After receiving the letter, she called Downey Savings and spoke with three different representatives. The third, Leanna, told Ragland the legal department had failed to place a red flag on the loan and it should never have been placed in foreclosure. Ragland’s notes from the conversation include the statement, “[f]oreclosure on hold.”

The trial court granted summary judgment against Ragland on the ground she suffered no damages because, on the date of the foreclosure sale, she could not reinstate the loan by tendering $24,804.57–the amount Downey Savings claimed was due and owing. The evidence created at the very least a triable issue of fact on damages. Ragland testified in her deposition that as of the date of the foreclosure sale, “I could have covered the back payments but not the fees, not all the fees.” Those fees were tacked on because Ragland’s failure to make the April 2008 loan payment placed the loan in foreclosure. However, Ragland presented evidence that she did not make the April 2008 payment because she relied on misrepresentations made by Downey Savings. In {Slip Opn. Page 17} July 2008, Downey Savings told Ragland her loan should not have been placed in foreclosure and the foreclosure was “on hold.” If Downey Savings wrongfully placed Ragland’s loan in foreclosure, as Ragland alleges, then it had no right to demand payment of additional fees and interest to reinstate the loan. Downey Savings could not take advantage of its own wrong. (Civ. Code, § 3517.)

Defendants point to the December 2, 2008 letter from Ragland’s attorney as undermining her claim she could make the past due monthly loan payments. In that letter, the attorney stated that Ragland could not pay the full amount required to bring the loan current and proposed $12,000 of the reinstatement amount be “tacked onto the back end of the loan.” Defendants ask, if Ragland could have made all of the past due monthly loan payments, why did she not offer to pay them? The question is rhetorical: If she had offered to pay the past due monthly loan payments, Downey Savings certainly would have rejected the offer, just as now Defendants vigorously argue a tender must be unconditional and offer payment of additional fees.

Defendants argue Ragland’s declaration is inconsistent with her deposition testimony because, in her deposition, Ragland could not identify precisely the people from whom she asked to borrow money to make the past due monthly loan payments. Her declaration is consistent with her deposition testimony. Ragland testified, under oath, in her deposition that as of the date of the foreclosure sale, she “could have covered the back payments but not the fees.” The evidence established she was not behind on her monthly payments when she spoke with John at Downey Savings on April 13, 2008, and Downey Savings rejected her payments for May, September, October, and November 2008. A reasonable inference from this evidence, which we liberally construe in Ragland’s favor, is that Ragland would have been able to make the past due monthly payments by the time of the foreclosure sale. (Miller v. Department of Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446, 470 [“We stress that, because this is an appeal from a grant of {Slip Opn. Page 18} summary judgment in favor of defendants, a reviewing court must examine the evidence de novo and should draw reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party”].)

II. Breach of Oral Contract Cause of Action

In her second cause of action, for breach of oral contract, Ragland alleged Downey Savings breached its promise to investigate her allegations of forgery. On appeal, she does not attempt to support a claim of breach of oral contract and argues instead, “[t]he second cause of action for breach of oral promise to investigate should have been labeled as a cause of action for promissory estoppel.” While conceding the second cause of action does not include the required allegation of detrimental reliance (Kajima/Ray Wilson v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2000) 23 Cal.4th 305, 310), she argues a detrimental reliance allegation may be extrapolated from the fraud cause of action.

The second cause of action did not incorporate by reference the allegations of the fraud cause of action. Ragland argues we must ignore labels, but however labeled, the second cause of action does not allege promissory estoppel. On remand, Ragland may seek leave to amend her complaint to allege a promissory estoppel cause of action.

III. Fraud Cause of Action

In the third cause of action, for fraud, Ragland alleged Downey Savings “falsely and fraudulently” made the representations alleged in the negligent misrepresentation cause of action.

The elements of fraud are (1) the defendant made a false representation as to a past or existing material fact; (2) the defendant knew the representation was false at the time it was made; (3) in making the representation, the defendant intended to deceive {Slip Opn. Page 19} the plaintiff; (4) the plaintiff justifiably and reasonably relied on the representation; and (5) the plaintiff suffered resulting damages. (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.)

Defendants argue U.S. Bank was entitled to summary adjudication of the fraud cause of action because no evidence was presented of “a misrepresentation, reliance or damages.” As explained in part I. of the Discussion on negligent misrepresentation, Ragland presented evidence in opposition to the motion for summary judgment that was sufficient to create triable issues as to misrepresentation, reliance, and damages.

Defendants do not argue lack of evidence of elements two (knowledge of falsity) and three (intent to deceive) and did not seek summary adjudication of the fraud cause of action on the ground of lack of evidence of either of those elements. fn. 3 Since Ragland submitted evidence creating triable issues of misrepresentation, reliance, and damages, summary adjudication of the fraud cause of action is reversed.

IV. Violation of Section 2924g(d) Cause of Action

In the fourth cause of action, Ragland alleged Defendants violated section 2924g(d) by selling her home one day after the expiration of the temporary restraining order.

Section 2924g(d) reads, in relevant part: “The notice of each postponement and the reason therefor shall be given by public declaration by the trustee at the time and {Slip Opn. Page 20} place last appointed for sale. A public declaration of postponement shall also set forth the new date, time, and place of sale and the place of sale shall be the same place as originally fixed by the trustee for the sale. No other notice of postponement need be given. However, the sale shall be conducted no sooner than on the seventh day after the earlier of (1) dismissal of the action or (2) expiration or termination of the injunction, restraining order, or stay that required postponement of the sale, whether by entry of an order by a court of competent jurisdiction, operation of law, or otherwise, unless the injunction, restraining order, or subsequent order expressly directs the conduct of the sale within that seven-day period.” (Italics added.)

On November 26, 2008, the trial court issued an order stating: “Plaintiff shall be entitled to a temporary restraining order enjoining the foreclosure sale on December 9, 2008; upon bringing the loan current by Dec[ember] 16. Current is as of Nov[ember] 26, 2008.” The foreclosure sale was conducted on December 17, 2008.

A. Section 2924g(d) Creates a Private Right of Action and Is Not Preempted by Federal Law.

In their summary judgment motion, Defendants argued section 2924g(d) does not create a private right of action and is preempted by federal law. Although Defendants do not make those arguments on appeal, we address, due to their significance, the issues whether section 2924g(d) creates a private right of action and whether it is preempted by federal law. Following the reasoning of Mabry v. Superior Court (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 208 (Mabry), we conclude section 2924g(d) creates a private right of action and is not preempted.

In Mabry, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at page 214, our colleagues concluded Civil Code section 2923.5 may be enforced by private right of action. Section 2923.5 requires a lender to contact the borrower in person or by telephone before a notice of default may be filed to “‘assess'” the borrower’s financial situation and “‘explore'” options to prevent foreclosure. (Mabry, supra, at pp. 213-214.) Section 2923.5, though {Slip Opn. Page 21} not expressly creating a private right of action, impliedly created one because there was no administrative mechanism to enforce the statute, a private remedy furthered the purpose of the statute and was necessary for it to be effective, and California courts do not favor constructions of statutes that render them advisory only. (Mabry, supra, at p. 218.)

There is no administrative mechanism to enforce section 2924g(d), and a private remedy is necessary to make it effective. While the Attorney General might be responsible for collective enforcement of section 2924g(d), “the Attorney General’s office can hardly be expected to take up the cause of every individual borrower whose diverse circumstances show noncompliance with section [2924g(d)].” (Mabry, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 224.)

The Mabry court also concluded Civil Code section 2923.5 was not preempted by federal law because the statute was part of the foreclosure process, traditionally a matter of state law. Regulations promulgated by the Office of Thrift Supervision pursuant to the Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933 (12 U.S.C. § 1461 et seq.) preempted state law but dealt with loan servicing only. (Mabry, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at pp. 228-231.) “Given the traditional state control over mortgage foreclosure laws, it is logical to conclude that if the Office of Thrift Supervision wanted to include foreclosure as within the preempted category of loan servicing, it would have been explicit.” (Id. at p. 231.) Section 2924g(d), as section 2923.5, is part of the process of foreclosure and therefore is not subject to federal preemption.

B. The Foreclosure Sale Violated Section 2924g(d).

Defendants argue the foreclosure sale did not violate section 2924g(d) on the ground the trial court’s November 26, 2008 order was not a temporary restraining order because it conditioned injunctive relief on Ragland bringing her loan current by December 16, 2008. That condition was not met, and, therefore, Defendants argue, a temporary restraining order was never issued. {Slip Opn. Page 22}

We disagree with Defendants’ interpretation of the November 26 order. The foreclosure sale had been scheduled for December 9, 2008. The November 26 order was for all intents and purposes a temporary restraining order subject to section 2924g(d) because the effect of that order was to require postponement of the sale at least to December 16, 2008. The requirement that Ragland bring the loan current by that date was not a condition precedent to a temporary restraining order, which in effect had been issued, but a condition subsequent, the failure of which to satisfy would terminate injunctive relief. fn. 4

Defendants argue they were entitled nonetheless to summary adjudication of the fourth cause of action because Ragland could not have brought her loan current within seven days of December 16, 2008. Although Ragland submitted evidence that she could pay back amounts due, she did not present evidence she could bring the loan current, including payment of additional fees, as required by the trial court’s November 26 order.

The purpose of the seven-day waiting period under section 2924g(d) was not, however, to permit reinstatement of the loan, “but to ‘provide sufficient time for a trustor to find out when a foreclosure sale is going to occur following the expiration of a court order which required the sale’s postponement’ and ‘provide the trustor with the opportunity to attend the sale and to ensure that his or her interests are protected.’ [Citation].” (Hicks v. E.T. Legg & Associates (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 496, 505.) “The bill [amending section 2924g(d) to add the waiting period] was sponsored by the Western Center on Law and Poverty in response to an incident in which a foreclosure sale was held one day after a TRO was dissolved. The property was sold substantially below fair {Slip Opn. Page 23} market value. The trustor, who had obtained a purchaser for the property, did not learn of the new sale date and was unable to protect his interests at the sale.” (Ibid.)

Thus, in obtaining relief under section 2924g(d), the issue is not whether Ragland could have reinstated her loan within the seven-day waiting period but whether the failure of Downey Savings to comply with the statute impaired her ability to protect her interests at a foreclosure sale. Defendants did not raise that issue as ground for summary adjudication of the fourth cause of action.

V. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Cause of Action

In the fifth cause of action, Ragland alleged that in December 2008, Defendants intentionally caused her severe emotional distress by selling her home in a foreclosure sale.

Defendants argue Ragland cannot recover emotional distress damages–either intentionally or negligently inflicted–because she suffered property damage at most as result of their actions. (See Erlich v. Menezes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 543, 554 [“‘No California case has allowed recovery for emotional distress arising solely out of property damage'”].) Erlich v. Menezes and other cases disallowing emotional distress damages in cases of property damage involved negligent infliction of emotional distress. (Ibid. [negligent construction of home does not support emotional distress damages]; Butler-Rupp v. Lourdeaux (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1228-1229 [negligent breach of lease of storage space]; Camenisch v. Superior Court (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1689, 1693 [negligent infliction of emotional distress based on legal malpractice]; Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1040 [“mere negligence will not support a recovery for mental suffering where the defendant’s tortious conduct has resulted in only economic injury to the plaintiff”].) The rule does not apply to intentional infliction of emotional distress: “[R]ecovery for emotional distress caused by injury to property is permitted {Slip Opn. Page 24} only where there is a preexisting relationship between the parties or an intentional tort.” (Lubner v. City of Los Angeles (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 525, 532; see also Cooper v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 1008, 1012 [no recovery for emotional distress arising solely out of property damage “absent a threshold showing of some preexisting relationship or intentional tort”].)

The elements of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress are (1) the defendant engages in extreme and outrageous conduct with the intent to cause, or with reckless disregard for the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff suffers extreme or severe emotional distress; and (3) the defendant’s extreme and outrageous conduct was the actual and proximate cause of the plaintiff’s extreme or severe emotional distress. (Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 1001.) “Outrageous conduct” is conduct that is intentional or reckless and so extreme as to exceed all bounds of decency in a civilized community. (Ibid.) The defendant’s conduct must be directed to the plaintiff, but malicious or evil purpose is not essential to liability. (Ibid.) Whether conduct is outrageous is usually a question of fact. (Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1045 (Spinks).)

Ragland argues Downey Savings engaged in outrageous conduct by inducing her to skip the April loan payment, refusing later to accept loan payments, and selling her home at foreclosure. She likens this case to Spinks, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th 1004, in which the appellate court reversed summary adjudication in the defendants’ favor of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendants in Spinks were landlords of an apartment complex in which the plaintiff resided under a lease entered into by her employer. (Id. at p. 1015.) When the plaintiff’s employment was terminated following an industrial injury, the defendants, at the employer’s direction, changed the locks on the plaintiff’s apartment, causing her to leave her residence. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal rejected the contention the defendants’ conduct was not outrageous {Slip Opn. Page 25} as a matter of law: “First, as a general principle, changing the locks on someone’s dwelling without consent to force that person to leave is prohibited by statute. [Citation.] Though defendants’ agents were polite and sympathetic towards plaintiff, they nevertheless caused her to leave her home without benefit of judicial process. . . . ‘While in the present case no threats or abusive language were employed, and no violence existed, that is not essential to the cause of action. An eviction may, nevertheless, be unlawful even though not accompanied with threats, violence or abusive language. Here the eviction was deliberate and intentional. The conduct of defendants was outrageous.'” (Id. at pp. 1045-1046.) In addition, the defendants’ onsite property manager had expressed concern over the legality of changing the locks, and the plaintiff was particularly vulnerable at the time because she was recovering from surgery. (Id. at p. 1046.)

Defendants argue Spinks is inapposite because changing locks on an apartment to force the tenant to leave is unlawful, while, in contrast, Downey Savings proceeded with a lawful foreclosure after Ragland defaulted and had a legal right to protect its economic interests. (See Sierra-Bay Fed. Land Bank Assn. v. Superior Court (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 318, 334 [“It is simply not tortious for a commercial lender to lend money, take collateral, or to foreclose on collateral when a debt is not paid”]; Quinteros v. Aurora Loan Services (E.D.Cal. 2010) 740 F.Supp.2d 1163, 1172 [“The act of foreclosing on a home (absent other circumstances) is not the kind of extreme conduct that supports an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim”].)

This argument assumes Downey Savings had the right to foreclose, an issue at the heart of the case. Ragland created triable issues of fact on her causes of action for negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and violation of section 2924g(d). Defendants do not argue Downey Savings would have had the right to foreclose if any of those causes of action were meritorious. Ragland’s treatment by Downey Savings, if proven, was at least {Slip Opn. Page 26} as bad as the conduct of the defendants in Spinks and was so extreme as to exceed all bounds of decency in our society.

VI. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Cause of Action

In the sixth cause of action, Ragland alleged that in December 2008, Defendants negligently caused her severe emotional distress by selling her home in a foreclosure sale. As explained above, Ragland cannot recover under her cause of action for negligent infliction because Defendants’ conduct resulted only in injury to property. In addition, she cannot recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress because she cannot prove a relationship giving rise to a duty of care.

There is no independent tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress; rather, “[t]he tort is negligence, a cause of action in which a duty to the plaintiff is an essential element.” (Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 984.) “That duty may be imposed by law, be assumed by the defendant, or exist by virtue of a special relationship.” (Id. at p. 985.)

Ragland asserted a “direct victim” claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress rather than a “bystander” claim. “‘Direct victim’ cases are cases in which the plaintiff’s claim of emotional distress is not based upon witnessing an injury to someone else, but rather is based upon the violation of a duty owed directly to the plaintiff. ‘[T]he label “direct victim” arose to distinguish cases in which damages for serious emotional distress are sought as a result of a breach of duty owed the plaintiff that is “assumed by the defendant or imposed on the defendant as a matter of law, or that arises out of a relationship between the two.” [Citation.] In these cases, the limits [on bystander cases . . . ] have no direct application. [Citations.] Rather, well-settled principles of negligence are invoked to determine whether all elements of a cause of {Slip Opn. Page 27} action, including duty, are present in a given case.'” (Wooden v. Raveling (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1035, 1038.)

Ragland argues a relationship between her and Defendants, sufficient to create a duty of care, arose by virtue of (1) the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the loan documents and (2) financial advice rendered by John or Joseph during the telephone calls in April 2008.

The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a contractual relationship and does not give rise to an independent duty of care. Rather, “‘[t]he implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is limited to assuring compliance with the express terms of the contract, and cannot be extended to create obligations not contemplated by the contract.'” (Pasadena Live v. City of Pasadena (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1089, 1094.) Outside of the insured-insurer relationship and others with similar qualities, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not give rise to tort damages. (Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654, 692-693; see also Cates Construction, Inc. v. Talbot Partners (1999) 21 Cal.4th 28, 61 [no tort recovery for breach of implied covenant arising out of performance bond]; Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 503, 516 [“In the absence of an independent tort, punitive damages may not be awarded for breach of contract” even when the breach was willful, fraudulent, or malicious]; Mitsui Manufacturers Bank v. Superior Court (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 726, 730-732 [commercial borrower may not recover tort damages for lender’s breach of implied covenant in loan documents].)

No fiduciary duty exists between a borrower and lender in an arm’s length transaction. (Oaks Management Corporation v. Superior Court (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 453, 466; Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 573, 579; Price v. Wells Fargo Bank (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 465, 476.) “[A]s a general rule, a financial institution owes no duty of care to a borrower when the institution’s involvement in the loan transaction does not exceed the scope of its conventional role as a mere lender of {Slip Opn. Page 28} money.” (Nymark v. Heart Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1089, 1096.)

Relying on Barrett v. Bank of America (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 1362 (Barrett), Ragland argues Downey Savings exceeded the scope of its role as a lender of money because John and Joseph gave her what amounted to investment advice by telling her not to make her April 2008 loan payment. In Barrett, the plaintiffs executed personal guarantees to the defendant bank of two loans made to a corporation of which the plaintiffs were the principal shareholders. (Id. at p. 1365.) Soon after the loans funded, the plaintiffs were informed the corporation was in technical default because the corporation’s liability to asset ratios no longer met the bank’s requirements. (Ibid.) The bank’s loan officer assigned to the matter suggested three different ways to improve the corporation’s financial situation. As to the third suggestion, merger or acquisition, the loan officer told the plaintiffs a merging company would be responsible for the loans and the plaintiffs would be released from the guarantees. (Ibid.)

The plaintiffs followed the third suggestion, and their corporation merged with another one. The merging corporation soon could not make the payments on the loans. (Barrett, supra, 183 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1365-1366.) The assignee of the loans enforced them against the plaintiffs and instituted foreclosure proceedings against their home. (Id. at p. 1366.) The plaintiffs sued the bank for various causes of action, including constructive fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Ibid.) The jury returned a verdict in favor of the bank. (Id. at pp. 1366-1367.)

The issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on constructive fraud. (Barrett, supra, 183 Cal.App.3d at p. 1368.) The Court of Appeal, reversing, concluded substantial evidence supported a constructive fraud theory of recovery. (Id. at p. 1369.) Constructive fraud usually arises from a breach of duty in which a fiduciary relationship exists. (Ibid.) The court reasoned the bank acted as the plaintiffs’ fiduciary because one plaintiff perceived his relationship with the loan officer {Slip Opn. Page 29} as “very close,” relied on the loan officer’s financial advice, shared confidential financial information with the loan officer, and relied on the loan officer’s advice about mergers. (Ibid.) In addition, a consultant for the merging corporation testified the loan officer assured him the plaintiffs would not be released from their guarantees. (Ibid.)

The evidence presented in opposition to the motion for summary judgment did not create a triable issue of Ragland’s relationship with Downey Savings. In contrast with the extensive financial and legal advice given by the loan officer in Barrett, John or his supervisor at Downey Savings told Ragland not to make her April 2008 loan payment in order to be considered for a loan modification. This advice was directly related to the issue of loan modification and therefore fell within the scope of Downey Savings’s conventional role as a lender of money.

The undisputed facts established there was no relationship between Ragland and Downey Savings giving rise to a duty the breach of which would permit Ragland to recover emotional distress damages based on negligence. The trial court did not err by granting summary adjudication of the cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

VII. Rescission Cause of Action

Ragland concedes her seventh cause of action, for rescission, is no longer viable (“a dead letter”) because her home was resold after the foreclosure sale to a bona fide purchaser for value. For that reason too, she states she is no longer asserting claims against DSL and FCI.

VIII. Temporary Restraining Order

Ragland argues the trial court’s November 26, 2008 order violated her due process rights because it, in effect, required her to pay nearly $25,000 to bring her loan {Slip Opn. Page 30} current or face foreclosure of her home. There are two fundamental problems with Ragland’s challenge to the November 26 order. First, an order granting or dissolving an injunction, or refusing to grant or dissolve an injunction, is directly appealable. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(6).) Ragland did not file a notice of appeal from the November 26 order or from the later order denying her motion for a preliminary injunction. Second, even if Ragland properly had appealed, the sale of her home at foreclosure would have rendered the appeal moot. An appeal from an order denying a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction will not be entertained after the act sought to be enjoined has been performed. (Finnie v. Town of Tiburon (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1, 10.) “An appeal should be dismissed as moot when the occurrence of events renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant appellant any effective relief. [Citation.]” (Cucamongans United for Reasonable Expansion v. City of Rancho Cucamonga (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 473, 479.)

Ragland concedes her attempt to halt the foreclosure sale, like her rescission cause of action, is a “dead letter” and she is not seeking to set aside the November 26 order or the order denying a preliminary injunction. She argues, “the denial of due process at the application for temporary restraining order was a substantial factor in [the] trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of U.S. Bank.” We fail to see the connection. In any event, we are reversing the judgment as to U.S. Bank, and affirming summary adjudication only of the causes of action for breach of oral contract, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and rescission.

DISPOSITION

The judgment in favor of DSL and FCI, and summary adjudication of the causes of action for breach of oral contract, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and rescission are affirmed. Ragland may seek leave to amend in the trial court, as explained {Slip Opn. Page 31} in this opinion. In all other respects, the judgment is reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. Ragland shall recover costs incurred on appeal.

Aronson, Acting P.J., and Ikola, J., concurred.

­FN 1. 1. From page 4, the third full paragraph beginning “In October, 2007, Downeys’ publicly traded common stock,” through page 6, the citation following the first full paragraph and ending http://www.ocregister.com/articles/bank-16076-fremont-fdic.html).

2. On page 7, footnote 3 that continues from page 6, the second sentence beginning “Between April 2008” and ending “[$543,000 + 14% = $619,020].”

3. From page 7, in the third paragraph, the second sentence beginning “By that time, Downey’s” to page 8, the first line ending “(http:/www.bankaholic.com/ downey-savings/).”

4. On page 8, the second full paragraph beginning “In late July, 2008.”

5. From page 9, the third full paragraph beginning “On November 21, 2008” through the first full paragraph on page 10.

6. From page 31, the first full paragraph beginning “Going through a foreclosure can be so stressful” through page 32, the first full paragraph ending “(http://abcnews.go.com/Health/DepressionNews/story?id=5444573&page=1).”

­FN 2. The three passages are:

1. On page 16, the first full paragraph beginning “In the present case.”

2. On page 16, footnote 4.

3. On page 30, in the first full paragraph, the fourth sentence beginning “Downey Savings took Ms. Ragland’s home.”

­FN 3. In its notice of motion and separate statement of undisputed material facts, U.S. Bank moved for summary adjudication of two issues (issues 9 and 10) related to the fraud cause of action: “9. U.S. Bank is entitled to summary adjudication against Plaintiff on the third cause of action for Fraud because U.S. Bank did not make an actionable misrepresentation. [¶] 10. U.S. Bank is entitled to summary adjudication against Plaintiff on the third cause of action for Fraud because all of Plaintiff’s alleged damages arise from the foreclosure of her property and Plaintiff was incapable of reinstating the loan at the time of the foreclosure.”

­FN 4. The requirement that Ragland bring her loan current might also be viewed as a condition precedent to a preliminary injunction. But, as the trial court noted: “If plaintiff does bring her payments current by the hearing date, then there is no basis for a foreclosure sale because the arrears would have been cured. Hence there would seem to be no need for the issuance of a preliminary injunction under such circumstances.”

Here is what not to do Get an injunction, then not post the Bond, then file a frivilious appeal

Filed 4/16/12

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICTION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

JANE BROWN,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

WELLS FARGO BANK, NA,

Defendant and Respondent.

2d Civil No. B233679

(Super. Ct. No. 56-2010-00378817-CU-OR-VTA)

(Ventura County)

Some appeals are filed to delay the inevitable.  This is such an appeal.  It is frivolous and was ” ‘dead on arrival’ at the appellate courthouse.”  (Estate of Gilkison (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1449.)

Jane Brown was/is in default on a home mortgage.  Foreclosure proceedings were commenced and she filed suit to prevent the sale of her home.  She appeals from a June 8, 2011 order dissolving a preliminary injunction and allowing the sale to go forward.  This was attributable to her failing to deposit $1,700 a month into a trust account as ordered by the trial court.  The preliminary injunction required that the money be deposited in lieu of an injunction bond.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 529, subd. (a).)

In her opening brief appellant claims that the order dissolving the injunction is invalid because it issued “ex parte.”  After calendar notice was sent to him, trial and appellate counsel, Jason W. Estavillo, asked that we dismiss the appeal.  We will deny this request.  We will affirm the judgment and refer the matter to the California State Bar for consideration of discipline.

Facts and Procedural History

In 2010 appellant defaulted on her $480,000 World Savings Bank FSB loan secured by a deed of trust.[1]  Wachovia Mortgage, a division of Wells Fargo Bank NA (respondent) recorded a Notice of Trustee’s Sale on May 12, 2010.  The trustee’s sale was postponed to August 9, 2010.

Appellant sued for declaratory/injunctive relief on August 5, 2010.  The trial court granted a temporary restraining order to stop the trustee’s sale.  On September 7, 2010, the trial court granted a  preliminary injunction on condition that appellant deposit $1,700 a month in a client trust account in lieu of a bond.

On June 2, 2011, respondent filed an ex parte application to dissolve the preliminary injunction  because appellant had not made a single payment.  It argued that “we’re facing a deadline under the trustee sale date of next week.  And we have no reason to believe these payments . . . will be made.  She has not paid anything on her mortgage in over two years.  There is no reason to believe she’s going to make this payment.  It’s all been simply a delay tactic.”

Appellant, represented by Mr. Estavillo, appeared at the June 3, 2011 ex parte hearing and argued that the proposed order should not issue ex parte.  The trial court agreed, set a June 8, 2011 hearing date, and told appellant’s trial counsel “to scramble on this.  Find out from your client what she has done or hasn’t done.  And I should tell you that one of the myths that sometimes creeps into this [type of] case is that if the plaintiff is successful, they end up with a free house.  It doesn’t work that way.”  Counsel told the court that he would “make sure” the payments would “get made.”

On June 7, 2011, appellant filed opposition papers but failed to explain why the money was not deposited in lieu of a bond.  Respondent argued that appellant has “not complied with the preliminary injunction.  They have not made a payment.  There is nothing in there about their ability to make the payment . . . .  They have defied [the] court order since December and they continue to do so.”

The trial court dissolved the preliminary injunction and signed the proposed order.   The June 8, 2011 order provides:  “The foreclosure sale scheduled for June 10, 2011 may go forward as scheduled.”

On June 8, 2011, appellant filed a notice of appeal.  The filing of the notice of appeal works as a “stay” of the trial court’s order and stops the trustee’s sale.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 916, subd. (a); Royal Thrift & Loan Co. v. County Escrow, Inc. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 24, 35-36.)

Frivolous Appeal

In the opening brief appellant’s counsel feebly argues that respondent failed to make a good cause showing for ex parte relief and that her due process rights were violated.  She prays for reversal of the order allowing sale of her home.  But rather than granting ex parte relief, the trial court agreed to set the matter for hearing.  So, the premise to the sole contention on appeal, the ex parte nature of the order, is false.  Moreover, at the noticed hearing, appellant expressly waived any claim that the hearing was not properly noticed or was irregular.  (Eliceche v. Federal Land Bank Assn. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1349, 1375.)  Waiver aside, the trial court had good cause to “fast track” the hearing.  The Notice of Trustee’s Sale was about to expire and appellant had not deposited money in lieu of an injunction bond, as ordered.  Code of Civil Procedure section 529, subdivision (a) required that the preliminary injunction be dissolved.

Appellant makes no showing that the trial court abused its discretion in dissolving the preliminary injunction.  Nor does she even suggest that there has been a miscarriage of justice.  She complains that the order has the words “ex parte” in the caption.  This is “form over substance” argument.  (Civ. Code, § 3528.)  On appeal, the substance and effect of the order controls, not its label.  (Crtizer v. Enos (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1250; Viejo Bancorp, Inc. v. Wood (1989) 217 Cal.App.3d 200, 205.)

Conclusion

The appellate courts take a dim view of a frivolous appeal.  Here, with the misguided help of counsel, the trustee’s sale was delayed for over two years.  Use of the appellate process solely for delay is an abuse of the appellate  process.  (In re Marriage of Flaherty(1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 646; see also In re Marriage of Greenberg  (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1100.)   We give appellant the benefit of the doubt. But we have no doubt about appellate counsel’s decision to bring and maintain this appeal, and at the eleventh hour, seek a dismissal.  No viable issue is raised on appeal and it is frivolous as a matter of law.  (See e.g. In re Marriage of Greenberg, supra, 194 Cal.Ap.4th 1095.)  “[R]espondent is not the only person aggrieved by this frivolous appeal.  Those litigants who have nonfriviolous appeals are waiting in line while we process the instant appeal.”  (Estate of Gilkison, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 1451.)  Respondent has not asked for monetary sanctions.  We have not issued an order to show cause seeking sanctions payable to the court.  But we do not suffer lightly the abuse of the appellate process.

Appellant’s request to dismiss the appeal is denied.  The June 8, 2010 order dissolving the preliminary injunction is affirmed.  Respondent is awarded costs on appeal.  If there is a standard clause awarding attorney fees to the prevailing party in the note and/or deed of trust, respondent is also awarded reasonable attorney fees in an amount to be determined by the trial court on noticed motion.  The clerk of this court is ordered to send a copy of this opinion to the California State Bar for consideration of discipline.  We express no opinion on what discipline, if any, is to be imposed.  (In re Mariage of Greenberg, supra.)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

YEGAN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P.J.

PERREN, J.

Henry Walsh, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

                        Jason W. Estavillo, for Appellant

Robert A. Bailey; Anglin, Flewell, Rasmusen, Campbell & Trytten, for Respondent.


[1] After World Savings Bank FSB issued the loan in 2006, it changed its name to Wachovia Mortgage FSB.  Wachovia Mortgage merged into and became a division of Wells Fargo Bank NA.

What is a Wrongful Foreclosure Action?

The pretender lender does not have the loan and did not invest any of the servicers money. Yet these frauds are occurring every day. They did not loan you the money yet they are the ones foreclosing, taking the bail out money, the mortgage insurance, and then throwing it back on the investor for the loss. We could stop them if a few plaintiffs where awarded multi million dollar verdicts for wrongful foreclosure.
A wrongful foreclosure action typically occurs when the lender starts a non judicial foreclosure action when it simply has no legal cause. Wrongful foreclosure actions are also brought when the service providers accept partial payments after initiation of the wrongful foreclosure process, and then continue on with the foreclosure process. These predatory lending strategies, as well as other forms of misleading homeowners, are illegal.

The borrower is the one that files a wrongful disclosure action with the court against the service provider, the holder of the note and if it is a non-judicial foreclosure, against the trustee complaining that there was an illegal, fraudulent or willfully oppressive sale of property under a power of sale contained in a mortgage or deed or court judicial proceeding. The borrower can also allege emotional distress and ask for punitive damages in a wrongful foreclosure action.
Causes of Action

Wrongful foreclosure actions may allege that the amount stated in the notice of default as due and owing is incorrect because of the following reasons:

Incorrect interest rate adjustment
Incorrect tax impound accounts
Misapplied payments
forbearance agreement which was not adhered to by the servicer
Unnecessary forced place insurance,
Improper accounting for a confirmed chapter 11 or chapter 13 bankruptcy plan.
Breach of contract
Intentional infliction of emotional distress
Negligent infliction of emotional distress
Unfair Business Practices
Quiet title
Wrongful foreclosure

Injunction

Any time prior to the foreclosure sale, a borrower can apply for an injunction with the intent of stopping the foreclosure sale until issues in the lawsuit are resolved. The wrongful foreclosure lawsuit can take anywhere from ten to twenty-four months. Generally, an injunction will only be issued by the court if the court determines that: (1) the borrower is entitled to the injunction; and (2) that if the injunction is not granted, the borrower will be subject to irreparable harm.
Damages Available to Borrower

Damages available to a borrower in a wrongful foreclosure action include: compensation for the detriment caused, which are measured by the value of the property, emotional distress and punitive damages if there is evidence that the servicer or trustee committed fraud, oppression or malice in its wrongful conduct. If the borrower’s allegations are true and correct and the borrower wins the lawsuit, the servicer will have to undue or cancel the foreclosure sale, and pay the borrower’s legal bills.
Why Do Wrongful Foreclosures Occur?

Wrongful foreclosure cases occur usually because of a miscommunication between the lender and the borrower. This could be as a result of an incorrectly applied payment, an error in interest charges and completely inaccurate information communicated between the lender and borrower. Some borrowers make the situation worse by ignoring their monthly statements and not promptly responding in writing to the lender’s communications. Many borrowers just assume that the lender will correct any inaccuracies or errors. Any one of these actions can quickly turn into a foreclosure action. Once an action is instituted, then the borrower will have to prove that it is wrongful or unwarranted. This is done by the borrower filing a wrongful foreclosure action. Costs are expensive and the action can take time to litigate.
Impact

The wrongful foreclosure will appear on the borrower’s credit report as a foreclosure, thereby ruining the borrower’s credit rating. Inaccurate delinquencies may also accompany the foreclosure on the credit report. After the foreclosure is found to be wrongful, the borrower must then petition to get the delinquencies and foreclosure off the credit report. This can take a long time and is emotionally distressing.

Wrongful foreclosure may also lead to the borrower losing their home and other assets if the borrower does not act quickly. This can have a devastating affect on a family that has been displaced out of their home. However, once the borrower’s wrongful foreclosure action is successful in court, the borrower may be entitled to compensation for their attorney fees, court costs, pain, suffering and emotional distress caused by the action. Fortunately, these wrongful foreclosure incidences are rare. The majority of foreclosures occur as a result of the borrower defaulting on their mortgage payments.

Win the house back at the eviction on summary judgement

Here goes

Timothy L. McCandless, Esq., SBN 147715
LAW OFFICES OF TIMOTHY L. MCCANDLESS
820 Main Street, Suite #1
P.O. Box 149
Martinez, California 94553

Telephone: (925) 957-9797
Facsimile: (925) 957-9799
Email: legal@prodefenders.com

Attorney for Defendant(s):

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN MATEO

SOUTHERN BRANCH – HALL OF JUSTICE & RECORDS

FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE
CORPORATION, ITS ASSIGNEES
AND/OR SUCCESSORS,

Plaintiff(s),

VS.

; and DOES 1 -10, Inclusive,

Defendant(s)

CASE NO:

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY
DEFENDANT

[Filed concurrently with: Notice of Motion and
Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendant;
Declaration of Alexander B. Paragas in Support
of Motion for Summary Judgment by
Defendant; Defendant’s Separate Statement of
Undisputed Facts and Supporting Evidence on
Motion for Summary Judgment; [Proposed]
Order]

Hearing’s:
Date : September X, 2012
Time : X:XX a.m.
Dept. : Law and Motions
Reservation No.:

Defendant and Movant herein,  (“Defendant”), submits the
following Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of his Motion for Summary

Judgment against Plaintiff FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION, ITS
ASSIGNEES AND/OR SUCCESSORS,(hereinafter “FHLMC”)(“Plaintiff”).

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
I
FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THIS LITIGATION

On or about January 24, 2008, Defendant executed an “Adjustable Rate Note” promising to
pay INDYMAC BANK, F.S.B. (hereinafter “INDYMAC”)1, the sum of $417,000.00, by monthly
payment commencing February 1, 2008.
The Deed of Trust (“DOT”) and the Note are between Defendant, Defendant’s wife Mrs.
Paragas and INDYMAC, Plaintiff was never a signatory to this Note, or DOT. A true and correct
copy of DOT and Adjustable Rate Rider is attached to the Declaration of Alexander B. Paragas
and incorporated herein as Exhibit “1”.
The issue is does Plaintiff has a right as a stranger to the Note to foreclose on the Note and
DOT that was not in its name and for which Plaintiff was not party to the Note or financing
transaction nor a disclosed beneficiary by virtue of a recorded assignment.
Furthermore Defendant alleges that MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION
SYSTEMS INC., a/k/a MERSCORP, INC. (hereinafter “MERS”) was not listed anywhere on his
Note executed at the same time as DOT. Furthermore Defendant is informed and believes that
directly after INDYMAC caused MERS to go on title as the “Nominee Beneficiary” this is

1 Independent National Mortgage Corporation “INDYMAC” before its failure was the largest savings and loan association in the
Los Angeles area and the seventh largest mortgage originator in the United States. The failure of INDYMAC on July 11, 2008, was the
fourth largest bank failure in United States history, and the second largest failure of a regulated thrift.

The primary causes of INDYMAC’s failure were largely associated with its business strategy of originating and securitizing Alt-
A loans on a large scale. During 2006, INDYMAC originated over $90 billion of mortgages. INDYMAC’s aggressive growth strategy, use
of Alt-A and other nontraditional loan products, insufficient underwriting, credit concentrations in residential real estate in the California
and Florida markets, and heavy reliance on costly funds borrowed from the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) and from brokered deposits,
led to its demise when the mortgage market declined in 2007. As an Alt-A lender, INDYMAC’s business model was to offer loan products
to fit the borrower’s needs, using an extensive array of risky option-adjustable-rate-mortgages (option ARMs), subprime loans, 80/20 loans,
and other nontraditional products. Ultimately, loans were made to many borrowers who simply could not afford to make their payments.
The thrift remained profitable only as long as it was able to sell those loans in the secondary mortgage market.

When home prices declined in the latter half of 2007 and the secondary mortgage market collapsed, INDYMAC was forced to
hold $10.7 billion of loans it could not sell in the secondary market. Its reduced liquidity was further exacerbated in late June 2008 when
account holders withdrew $1.55 billion or about 7.5% of INDYMAC’s deposits. During this time INDYMAC’s financial situation was
unraveling at the seams, culminating on July 11, 2008 when INDYMAC was placed into conservatorship by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Company “FDIC” due to liquidity concerns. A bridge bank, INDYMAC FEDERAL BANK, F.S.B., Defendant in the instant action, was
established to assume control of INDYMAC’s assets and secured liabilities, and the bridge bank was put into conservatorship under the
control of the FDIC.

On March 19, 2009 the Acting Director of Office of Thrift Supervision “OTS” replaced the FDIC as conservator for INDYMAC
pursuant to Section 5(d)(2)(C) of the Home Owners’ Loan Act (HOLA), 12 U.S.C. 1464(d)(2)(C); and appointed the FDIC as the receiver
for INDYMAC pursuant to Section 5(d)(2) of HOLA, 12 U.S.C. 1464(d)(2) and Section 11(c)(5) of the FDIA, 12 U.S.C. 1821(c)(5).

As a result of the OTS Order, INDYMAC became an “inactive institution” on March 19, 2009, the very same day that the Order
was issued. In other words, INDYMAC, as a defunct corporation, was no longer in existence as of March 19, 2009.

routinely done in order to hide the true identity of the successive Beneficiaries when and as the
loan was sold.
Based upon published reports, including MERS’ web site, Defendant believes and hereon
allege, MERS does not: (1) take applications for, underwrite or negotiate mortgage loans; (2)
make or originate mortgage loans to consumers; (3) extend credit to consumers; (4) service
mortgage loans; or (5) invest in mortgage loans.
MERS is used by Plaintiff and foreclosing entities to facilitate the unlawful transfers or
mortgages, unlawful pooling of mortgages and the injection into the United States banking
industry of un-sourced (i.e. unknown) funds, including, without limitation, improper off-shore
funds. Defendant is informed and thereon believes and alleges that MERS has been listed as
beneficiary owner of more than half the mortgages in the United States. MERS is improperly
listed as beneficiary owner of Defendant’s mortgage.
Nationwide, there are courts requiring banks that claim to have transferred mortgages to MERS
to forfeit their claim to repayment of such mortgages.
MERS’ operations undermine and eviscerate long-standing principles of real property law,
such as the requirement that any person who seeks to foreclose upon a parcel of real property: (1)
be in possession of the original Note and mortgage; and (2) possess a written assignment giving it
rights to the payments due from borrower pursuant to the mortgage and Note.
The Plaintiff and its agents did not want to pay the fees associated with recording mortgages
and they did not wanted to bother with the trouble of keeping track of the originals. That is the
significance of the word ‘Electronic’ in Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. The
undermined long-established rights and sabotaged the judicial process, eliminating,
“troublesome” documentation requirements. While conversion to electronic loan documentation
may eventually be implemented, it will ultimately be brought about only through duly enacted
legislation which includes appropriate safeguards and counterchecks.
Upon information and belief:
a) MERS is not the original lender for Defendant’s loan;
b) MERS is not the creditor, beneficiary of the underlying debt or an assignee
under the terms of Defendant’s Promissory Note;
c) MERS does not hold the original Defendant’s Promissory Note, nor has it ever
held the originals of any such Promissory Note;

d) At all material times, MERS was unregistered and unlicensed to conduct
mortgage lending or any other type or real estate or loan business in the State of
California and has been and continues to knowingly and intentionally
improperly record mortgages and conduct business in California and elsewhere
on a systematic basis for the benefit of the Plaintiff and other lenders.
Defendant initiated loan modification negotiation efforts with ONEWEST BANK, F.S.B.,
(hereinafter “ONEWEST”) on or about November 2010, after experiencing unforeseen financial
hardship. Defendant believed that his loan servicer would be willing to avoid a foreclosure since
he and his wife Mrs. Paragas were willing to tender unconditionally but needed the monthly
payments restructured to reflect the downturn in their monthly gross income, and reflect the
current market conditions.
Despite Defendant’s efforts, ONEWEST has refused to work in any reasonable way to modify
the loan or avoid foreclosure sale. Furthermore ONEWEST is presently bound by a Consent
Order, WN-11-0112 , with the United States of America Department of the Office of Thrift
Supervision related to its initiation and handling of foreclosure proceedings. The Consent Order is
based in part on foreclosure affidavits that have been found to be false. ONEWEST presently
manages approximately 141 billion dollars in residential mortgage loans in which it has litigated
numerous wrongful foreclosure proceedings and initiated non-judicial foreclosure proceedings
without proper standing.
The challenged foreclosure process is based upon several Assignments of DOT.
a) First Assignment executed and effective January 3, 2011, a true and correct
copy of the Assignment of DOT is attached to the Declaration of Alexander B.
Paragas and incorporated herein as Exhibit “2”;
b) Second Assignment executed and effective May 24, 2011, a true and correct
copy of the Assignment of DOT is attached to the Declaration of Alexander B.
Paragas and incorporated herein as Exhibit “3”; and
c) Third Assignment executed and effective October 31, 2011, a true and correct
copy of the Assignment of DOT is attached to the Declaration of Alexander B.
Paragas and incorporated herein as Exhibit “4”.
There are no documents of which the Court can take judicial notice that establish that MERS

2 See: http://www.mortgagedaily.com/forms/OccConsentOrderOnewest041311.pdf

either held the Promissory Note or was given the authority by INDYMAC, the original lender, to
assign the Note.
Defendant further alleges and according the San Mateo County Recorder’s Office, that first
Assignment of DOT (See Exhibit “2”) was purportedly signed by Mr. BRIAN BURNETT as the
“Assistant Secretary” of MERS, Defendant believes and alleges that Mr. BRIAN BURNETT was
never, in any manner whatsoever, appointed as the “Assistant Secretary” by the Board of
Directors of MERS, as required by MERS’ corporate by-laws and an adopted corporate resolution
by the Board of Directors of MERS. For that reason, Mr. BRIAN BURNETT never had, nor has,
any corporate or legal authority from MERS, or the lender’s successors and assigns, to execute
the purported “Assignment.” Furthermore Mr. BRIAN BURNETT purports to be ONEWEST’s
“Assistant Vice President” according the Substitution of Trustee (“SOT”) executed and effective
January 13, 2011 a true and correct copy of the SOT is attached to the Declaration of Alexander
B. Paragas and incorporated herein as Exhibit “5”.
This is a shell game where Mr. BRIAN BURNETT purports to be “Assistant Secretary” and
“Assistant Vice President” for two different entities at the same time, in reality Mr. BRIAN
BURNETT is an employee for ONEWEST, so that he can manufacture the paperwork necessary
for ONEWEST to hijack the mortgage and then foreclose on the property. Furthermore this is
example of how MERS is being used by its members to perpetrate a fraud.
On or about October 31, 2011 another MERS’ employee Mrs. WENDY TRAXLER as
“Assistant Secretary” once again assigned same DOT to ONEWEST (See Exhibit “4”).
Defendant is left to wonder, which Assignment is valid, and how is possible that two
employees of same entity, in this case MERS’, Mr. BRIAN BURNETT and Mrs. WENDY
TRAXLER, both “Assistant Secretaries”, did not communicated as to the Defendant’s Note and
DOT before the execution of the Assignments, or it appears that MERS’ employees preparing and
signing off on foreclosures without reviewing them, as the law requires.
It has been widely reported in the media that mortgage servicers, lenders, and major banks
have suspended over a hundred thousand foreclosures because relevant documents may not have
been properly prepared by ROBO-SIGNERS. Typically, the ROBO-SIGNERS were given phony
titles such as “Vice President” and “Assistant Secretary” to make it appear that they were bank
officers. In reality, ROBO-SIGNERS were typically, teens, hair stylists, Wal-Mart workers,
students, and unemployed persons of varying backgrounds.

The ROBO-SIGNING of affidavits and Assignments of Mortgage and all other mortgage
foreclosure documents served to cover up the fact that loan servicers cannot demonstrate the facts
required to conduct a lawful foreclosure.
Here in this instant case Mr. BRIAN BURNETT assigned DOT from MERS to ONEWEST on
or about January 3, 2011 (See Exhibit “2”), on or about May 24, 2011 Mrs. MOLLIE
SCHIFFMAN an “Assistant Vice President” of ONEWEST assigned interest of Plaintiffs’ Note
and DOT to the Plaintiff (See Exhibit “3”), yet on or about October 31, 2011 Mrs. WENDY
TRAXLER once again assigns same Note and DOT from MERS to ONEWEST (See Exhibit
“4”), this fabricated Assignments of DOT is nothing more than an attempt of Plaintiff and its
agents to hijack the mortgage and then foreclose on the property, in violation of California Civil
Law.
Defendant further alleges that purported Assignments of his Note and DOT, is attempt to pave
the way for Plaintiff to be able to claim an estate or interest in the Property adverse to that of
Defendant.
Defendant alleges that, on information and belief, ONEWEST, QUALITY LOAN SERVICE
CORPORATION, (hereinafter “QUALITY”), Plaintiff and/or its agents have been fraudulently
enforcing a debt obligation, fraudulently foreclosed on Plaintiff’s Subject Property in which they
did not have pecuniary, equitable or legal interest. Thus, ONEWEST’s, QUALITY’s and/or
Plaintiff’s conduct was part of a fraudulent debt collection scheme.
Defendant further alleges that on or about January 26, 2011 QUALITY recorded Notice of
Default (“NOD”), a true and correct copy of the NOD is attached to the Declaration of Alexander
B. Paragas and incorporated herein as Exhibit “6”.
Defendant further alleges, on or about May 4, 2011, had received Notice of Trustee’s Sale
(“NTS”) a true and correct copy of the NTS is attached to the Declaration of Alexander B.
Paragas and incorporated herein as Exhibit “7”. The sale was scheduled for May 23, 2011 at 1:00
p.m., but postponed to several times, until April 23, 2012, when sale of the Subject Property was
executed.
On or about April 23, 2012 at 12:31 p.m., Defendant filed voluntary Chapter 13 bankruptcy
protection in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California, Case No.
12-31228 a true and correct copy of the filing is attached to the Declaration of Alexander B.
Paragas and incorporated herein as Exhibit “8”, along with Motion to Extend Automatic Stay

pursuant U.S.C. Section 362(c)(3)(B), Notice of Opportunity for Hearing on Motion to Extend
Automatic Stay pursuant U.S.C. Section 362(c)(3)(B), and Declaration in Support of Hearing on
Motion to Extend Automatic Stay pursuant U.S.C. Section 362(c)(3)(B) a true and correct copy of
the filing is attached to the Declaration of Alexander B. Paragas and incorporated herein as
Exhibit “9”.
Plaintiff and its agents have been notified of the filings, but failed to object and proceeded
with the sale of the Subject Property in violation of the 11 U.S.C. Section 362, and conveyed all
its right, tile and interest in and to the Plaintiffs’ property.
On or about May 4, 2012 QUALITY recorded Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale (“TDUS”) a true and
correct copy of the TDUS is attached to the Declaration of Alexander B. Paragas and incorporated
herein as Exhibit “10”, that operated to prefect the lenders/beneficiary interest in the property of
the Defendant during the pendency of the Chapter 13 proceeding.
On or about June 11, 2012 U.S. Bankruptcy Judge, Mr. THOMAS E. CARLSON granted
Motion to Extend Automatic Stay a true and correct copy of the Order is attached to the
Declaration of Alexander B. Paragas and incorporated herein as Exhibit “11”, stating that
Automatic Stay, under 11 U.S.C. Section 362(a), shall remain in force for the duration of
Defendant’s Chapter 13 proceeding, until is terminated under 11 U.S.C. Section 362(c)(1), or a
Motion for Relief from Stay is granted under 11 U.S.C. Section 362(d), no Motion for Relief has
been filed by any Creditor, including Plaintiff herein.
On or about May 16, 2012, Plaintiff filed this instant case. The Unlawful Detainer Complaint
states that the Plaintiff obtained the right to possession by a Trustee’s sale and that title was
perfected and recorded [UD Complaint, ¶11]. Title is “duly perfected” when all steps have been
taken to make it perfect, that is, to convey to purchaser that which he has purchased, valid and
good beyond all reasonable doubt, Kessler v. Bridge (1958, Cal App Dep’t Super Ct) 161 Cal
App 2d Supp 837, 327 P2d 241, 1958 Cal App LEXIS 1814.
In this instant case, the title has not been perfected in Plaintiff’s since the title to the Property
was not conveyed to Plaintiff under the power of sale contained in the DOT and/or was not
conveyed in compliance with California Civil Code Section 2924 et seq., and in violation of 11
U.S.C. Section 362.
///
///

FHLMC DOES NOT HAVE STANDING TO BRING THE INSTANT ACTION

FHLMC lacks standing to bring the instant action for possession of the subject property. (1)
FHLMC is not a proper party to this action, and as such the court is without jurisdiction to grant
possession of the subject property to Plaintiff. Further, (2) Plaintiff or Plaintiff’s predecessor
failed to perform (2) conditions precedent (i) mandated by the original DOT, Section (20) which
requires a separate Notice and opportunity to cure in addition to the procedure established by
California Civil Code Section 2924 thereby cancelling the performance of Defendant, and (ii)
they failed to record the assignment of the deed of Trust a condition precedent to conducting a
foreclosure sale, (3) Plaintiff cannot prove that the non-judicial foreclosure which occurred,
strictly complied with the tenets of California Civil Code Section 2924 in order to maintain an
action for possession pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1161.
1. Plaintiff failed to perform a condition precedent contained in the DOT prior to
bringing this action pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section
1161, which mandates that the trustee attempting in writing prior to the
institution of a non-judicial foreclosure to allow defendant to cure the default;
2. Plaintiff failed to record the assignment of the Note and DOT prior to initiating
the foreclosure therefore the foreclosure was invalid under Section 2924;
3. The original promissory note executed by Defendant and his wife Mrs. Paragas
is invalid due to the ineffective method of assignment utilized by the parties,
assignment of the promissory note was not contained on the body of the page of
the Note, but rather was effectuated on a different paper, notwithstanding the
fact that there was sufficient room to draft the assignment on the face of the
note;
4. At the time of making the Note and DOT, Plaintiff’s predecessor ONEWEST
was operating its business from Inside California; however, ONEWEST was not
lawfully registered with the Secretary of State to conduct business pursuant to
California Corporations Code Section 1502 et seq. invalidating the Note and
DOT; and
5. The Trustee that conducted the non-judicial foreclosure sale was not a holder in
due course of the Original Note, because the Note was rendered non-negotiable
by (i) the manner in which the assignment was attempted, and (ii) the failure of

FHLMC to record the assignment, invalidating the Note, and resulting TDUS,
which denies Plaintiff standing to seek possession under California Code of
Civil Procedure Section 1161a.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

In this matter before the Bench, it becomes pellucidly clear that several fatal errors occurred
throughout the assignment of the Defendant’s Note and DOT, and ineffective non-judicial
foreclosure sale, which when weighed together have the effect of denying Plaintiff the necessary
standing to seek possession.
1. Plaintiff failed to perform a condition precedent contained in the DOT
prior to bringing this action pursuant to California Code of Civil
Procedure Section 1161.
This party is charged with the duty to perform and condition precedent prior to bringing the
instant action and failed to do so. Paragraph (20) of the DOT provides in pertinent part:

Neither borrow or lender may commence, join, or be joined to any judicial action
(as either an individual litigant, or the member of a class, that arises from the other
party’s actions pursuant to this security instrument or alleges that the other party has
breached any provision of, or any duty by reason of, this Security Instrument, until
such borrower or lender has notified the other party (with such notice given in
compliance with the requirements of Section 15) of such alleged breach and
afforded the other party hereto a reasonable period after giving of such notice to
take corrective action. If applicable law provides a time period which must elapse
before certain action can be taken, that time period will be deemed to be reasonable for
the purposes of this paragraph. The notice of acceleration and notice to cure given to
borrower pursuant to Section 22 and the notice of acceleration given to borrower
pursuant to Section 18 shall be deemed to satisfy the notice and opportunity to take
corrective action provisions of this Section 20. (Emphasis added.)

When there is an agreement between the Beneficiary and Trustor, such as the Condition Precedent
expressed in Paragraph 20 of the DOT a Foreclosure cannot take place before the condition is
satisfied. If the Beneficiary fails to carry out its obligation a subsequent foreclosure is invalid.
Haywood Lumber & Investment Co. V. Corbett (1934) 138 CA 644, 650, 33 P2d 41;
The DOT was drafted solely by the original beneficiary, Defendant had no part in drafting this
document, only the execution thereof. Defendant contends that the aforementioned language
contained in the DOT creates a condition precedent prior to either Plaintiff or Defendant bringing
any action, without first giving written notice to perform a covenant.

By virtue of the fact that an Unlawful Detainer involves a forfeiture of the tenant’s right to
possession, the Courts strictly construe the statutory proceedings which regulate it. Kwok v.
Bergren, (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 596, 600,181 Cal.Rptr. 795. The failure of Plaintiff to perform a
condition precedent, to wit, failure to give Defendant notice and a reasonable period to cure a
breach of the terms and conditions, cancels the performance of Defendant, until the condition
precedent is performed according to the terms of the DOT.
In the absence of proof that Plaintiff timely performed the condition precedent giving
Defendant a chance to cure his breach of the terms and conditions of the DOT, Plaintiff cannot
proceed with the present action. The Plaintiff is a stranger who is not in privity with the
tenant/owner, and he must prove that he is authorized by the statute to prosecute an Unlawful
Detainer proceeding pursuant to a properly conducted foreclosure sale. Therefore, the tenant can
raise the limited defense that the foreclosure sale is invalid because it was not processed ,in
compliance, with the statutes regarding foreclosures, and the Plaintiff has the burden of proof that
the foreclosure statutes were satisfied by performance of all of the notices and procedures
required.
2. Plaintiff failed to record the assignment of the Note and DOT prior to
initiating the foreclosure therefore the foreclosure was invalid under
Section 2924.
There is also a condition precedent to enforcing the note by an assignee, see California Civil
Code Section 2932.5 which states:

2932.5. Where a power to sell real property is given to a mortgagee, or
other encumbrancer, in an instrument intended to secure the payment of
money, the power is part of the security and vests in any person who by
assignment becomes entitled to payment of the money secured by the
instrument. The power of sale may be exercised by the assignee if the
assignment is duly acknowledged and recorded. (emphasis added).

The assignment was not Recorded

The assignment was not recorded. Since FHLMC failed to record the assignment they were not
entitled to enforce the Note or to foreclose on this Property therefore the Title was not perfected
under Section 2924 by a foreclosure sale and was not duly carried out under Section 2924 and was
wholly defective and this Plaintiff has no standing in this Unlawful Detainer action.
In addition to recording the assignment, the Beneficiary must also deliver the Original Note to

the Trustee in order for the Trustee to conduct the foreclosure sale. Haskell V. Matranga (1979)
CA 3d. 471, 479-480, 160 CR 177;
In the Case of a Mortgage with a power of Sale an assignee can only enforce the power of sale
if the assignment is recorded, since the assignee’s authority to conduct the sale must appear in the
public records, New York Life Insurance Co. V. Doane, (1936) 13 CA 2d. 233, 235-237, 56 P2d.
984, 56 ALR 224;
3. Plaintiff is not a holder in due course of the original promissory Note
executed by the borrower, because the method of assignment utilized by the
parties to indorse the assignment rendered the note non-negotiable as a
matter of law.
The assignment of the original promissory Note was invalidated by the manner in which the
assignment was attempted. It has long been settled that the assignment of a Note must be reflected
on the body of the note, as long as there is room available. If room to draft the assignment is
available, but the party making the assignment drafts the assignment on a separate piece of paper,
the Note is no longer negotiable. The public policy is to avoid one party from making multiple
assignments of the same property, at the same time, and defrauding each assignee of their
consideration for the assignment. In Privus vs. Bush, (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 1003, the court held
that a promissory Note executed as security for a DOT was rendered non-negotiable because the
endorsement by the assignor was not contained on the face of the Note, notwithstanding the fact
that there was sufficient space on the Note to effectuate the assignment.
The Privus, supra., Court held at pages 106-107, in pertinent part: California Uniform
Commercial Code Section 3302, Subdivision (1) provides, “A holder in due course is a holder
who takes the instrument (a) For value; and (b) In good faith; and (c) without notice that it is
overdue or has been dishonored or of any defense against or claim to it on the part of any person.”
In the present case, the trial Court did not question Defendant’s status as a holder in due course
because of any failure to satisfy the value, good faith, or no notice requirements. Rather, the Court
concluded that Defendant is not a holder in due course because he is not a holder at all, an
essential prerequisite to qualifying as a holder in due course. A holder is “a person who is in
possession of … an instrument …, issued or indorsed to him ….” (Section 1201(20).) The trial
Court ruled that the Williams’ signature on the paper attached to the promissory Note did not
qualify as an endorsement because there was adequate space for the endorsement on the note

itself.” (emphasis added).
Section 3202(2) states, “An endorsement must be written by or on behalf of the holder and on
the instrument or on a paper so firmly affixed thereto as to become a part thereof.” Thus, the code
does not say whether or not such a paper, called an “allonge,” may be used when there is still
room for an endorsement on the instrument itself. Nor has any reported California case dealt with
this issue under the code. The code does, however, instruct us as to where to look for the law with
which to resolve the issue. Section 1103 states that, “(u)nless displaced by the particular
provisions of this code, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant … shall
supplement its provisions,” and that section’s Uniform Commercial Code comment Notes “the
continued applicability to commercial contracts of all supplemental bodies of law except insofar
as they are explicitly displaced by this Act.” Therefore, since the Commercial Code has not
addressed the issue, we decide the present case according to the rules on allonges of the law
merchant.” Privus vs. Bush, (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 1003,1007.
“Although the cases are not unanimous, the majority view is that the law merchant permits the
use of an allonge only when there is no longer room on the negotiable instrument itself to write an
indorsement. (See generally Annot., Indorsement of Negotiable Instrument By Writing Not On
Instrument Itself (1968) 19 A.L.R.3d 1297, 1301-1304; Annot., Indorsement of Bill or Note by
Writing Not On Instrument Itself (1928) 56 A.L.R. 921, 924-926.) Typical of the majority
position is Bishop v. Chase, (1900) 156 Mo. 158, 56 S.W. 1080. There it was held that the general
rule is that an instrument could be indorsed only by writing on the instrument itself, but that an
exception to the rule allows the use of an attached paper “when the back of the instrument is so
covered as to make it necessary.” (Id., 156 Mo. 158, 56 S.W. at p. 1083.) Thus, the Court
invalidated an attempted endorsement by allonge when “there was plenty of room upon the back
of the Note to have made the endorsement, and the only excuse for not doing so was that it was
more convenient to assign it on a separate paper.” (Id., 156 Mo. 158, 56 S.W. at p. 1084.)” Privus
vs. Bush, (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 1003, 1007.
Here, the original Note executed had sufficient space for an endorsement, however, the note
does not contain an endorsement, and Defendant has never seen a document which purports to
assign the note to a third party. As such, Plaintiff is not a holder in due course, nor was the trustee
who conducted the non-judicial foreclosure a holder in due course. Such failures on the part of the
trustee who conducted the non-judicial foreclosure clearly demonstrate that the sale was not

conducted pursuant to the strict mandates of California Civil Code Section 2924.
A non-judicial foreclosure sale under the power-of-sale in a DOT or Mortgage, on the other
hand, must be conducted in strict compliance with its provisions and applicable statutory law. A
trustee’s powers and rights are limited to those set forth in the DOT and laws applicable thereto.
(See, e.g., Fleisher v. Continental Auxiliary Co., (1963) 215 Cal.App.2d 136, 139, 30 Cal.Rptr.
137; Woodworth v. Redwood Empire Sav. & Loan Assn., (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 347, 366, 99
Cal.Rptr. 373). No Court order authorizing or approving the sale is involved. A sale under the
power of sale in a DOT or Mortgage is a “private sale.” Walker v. Community Bank, (1974) 10
Cal.3d at p. 736, 111 Cal.Rptr. 897. (emphasis added).
The statutory procedures governing the conduct of such sales are found in Civil Code Sections
2924, 2924a-2924h, which set forth the time periods in which to comply with certain
requirements, the persons authorized to conduct the sale, the requirements of Notice of Nefault
and Election to Sell and for cure of default and reinstatement, inter alia. The sale is concluded
when the trustee accepts the last and highest bid. (Civil Code Section 2924h, Subd. (c)). Coppola
vs. Superior Court, (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 848, 868.
Here, Plaintiff’s predecessor rendered the note non-negotiable by failing to list the assignment
on the fact of the Note, notwithstanding the fact that sufficient space existed. Thus, the Note could
not be the security interest utilized for execution of the non-judicial foreclosure pursuant to
California Civil Code Section 2924. Plaintiff cannot prove that the foreclosure strictly complied
with Section 2924 as mandated. Thus, the TDUS is invalid, and does not confer upon Plaintiff a
right to seek possession of the subject premises pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure
Section 1161a. Therefore, Plaintiff does not have standing to prosecute the instant action, and the
matter must be dismissed or in the alternative Defendant is entitled to Summary Judgment.
As a General Rule a Defendant in an Unlawful Detainer cannot test the strength or validity of
Plaintiff’s Title Vella v. Hudgins, (1977) 20 C3d 251, 255, 142 CR 414, 572 P2d 28; Old
National Financial Services, Inc. v. Seibert, (1987) 194 CA 3d 460, 465, 289 CR 728; However,
a different rule applies in an Unlawful Detainer which is brought by a purchaser after a
foreclosure sale. His right to obtain possession is based on the fact that the property has been
“Duly Sold” by foreclosure proceedings California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1161a, and
therefore it is necessary that the Plaintiff “Prove” that each of the statutory procedures have been
complied with as a condition for obtaining possession of the property Vella V. Hudgins Supra;

Stephens, Pertain and Cunningham V. Hollis (1987) 196 CA3d 948, 953, 242 CR 251.
In the first instance, it appears that Plaintiff is not even the real party in interest. Plaintiff has
the burden of proving that it is the proper Plaintiff and that the TDUS resulted from a properly
conducted non-judicial foreclosure sale.
Again as stated in Privus vs. Bush, (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 1003, the court held that a
promissory note executed as security for a DOT was rendered non-negotiable because the
endorsement by the assignor was not contained on the face of the Note, notwithstanding the fact
that there was sufficient space on the Note to effectuate the assignment and thus the Plaintiff was
not a holder in due course, notwithstanding their title as a “Holders”.
California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1161(3) mandates that in order to seek possession
after a sale pursuant to Civil Code Section 2924, the Plaintiff’s interest must be “duly perfected”.
California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1161 provides in pertinent part:

(b) In any of the following cases, a person who holds over and continues in possession
of a manufactured home, mobile home, floating home, or real property after a three-day
written notice to quit the property has been served upon the person, or if there is a
subtenant in actual occupation of the premises, also upon such subtenant, as prescribed
in Section 1162, may be removed there from as prescribed in this chapter:

(3) Where the property has been sold in accordance with Section 2924 of the Civil
Code, under a power of sale contained in a deed of trust executed by such person, or a
person under whom such person claims, and the title under the sale has been duly
perfected.

Here, it has been shown that Plaintiff, FHLMC did not perfect its interest because the original
assignment rendered the note non-negotiable, and secondarily they failed to record the assignment
prior to commencing the foreclosure, thus, the non-judicial foreclosure could not lawfully
proceed, and the trustee did not strictly comply with the mandates of Section 2924.
A non-judicial foreclosure sale under the power-of-sale in a DOT or Mortgage, on the other
hand, must be conducted in strict compliance with its provisions and applicable statutory law. A
trustee’s powers and rights are limited to those set forth in the deed of trust and laws applicable
thereto. (See, e.g., Fleisher v. Continental Auxiliary Co., (1963) 215 Cal.App.2d 136, 139, 30
Cal.Rptr. 137. Therefore, the Court would properly exercise its discretion pursuant to California
Code of Civil Procedure Section 631.8, by granting the Motion to Dismiss for lack of standing on
the part of Plaintiff or under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 437C and Granting
Summary Judgment in Favor of Defendant.

LEGAL STANDARD

The standard for granting summary judgment

Summary Judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show there is no triable issue of
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Code Civil
Procedure Section 437c(c). A Defendant is entitled to Summary Judgment if the record
establishes that none of the Plaintiff’s asserted causes of actions can prevail as a matter of law.
Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass’n, (1988) 46 CAl.3d 1092, 1107. A Defendant moving for Summary
Judgment must conclusively negate a necessary element of the Plaintiff’s case and show there is
no material issue of fact that requires a trial. Ibid.
The moving Defendant has the burden of introducing evidence that the Plaintiff’s action is
without merit on any legal theory. Hulett v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, (1992) 10 Cal.App.
4th 1051, 1064. Once the Defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the Plaintiff to show
that a triable issue of material fact exists. Code Civil Procedure Section 437c(o)(1). But if the
Defendant fails to meet that burden, the adverse party has no burden to demonstrate the claim’s
validity, and the court must deny the motion. Hulett, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at 1064.
Instead of introducing evidence that would negate the Plaintiff’s action, a moving Defendant
may introduce the Plaintiff’s own factually devoid discovery responses to demonstrate that it has
no case. Union Bank v. Superior Court, (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 573, 589-593. The burden of
proof would then be on the Plaintiff to introduce evidence that would show a triable issue of
material fact. Id., at 593. But the Defendant does not meet its burden merely by asserting that the
Plaintiff has no evidence. Hagen v. Hickenbottom, (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 168, 186. Instead, the
Defendant must submit discovery responses that would conclusively foreclose any cause of
action. Id. at 186-187.
When no or insufficient affidavits or other evidence is submitted to demonstrate the absence of
an issue of material fact, the Court may treat the motion as in legal effect one for Judgment on the
pleadings. White v. County of Orange, (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 566, 569. In that case, the motion
performs the same function as a general demurrer. Ibid. A general demurrer will not test whether
a complaint is ambiguous or uncertain or states essential facts only inferentially or conclusionary.
Johnson v. Mead, (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 156, 160. The Defendants’ failure to challenge those
defects by way of special demurrer waives them. Hooper v. Deukmejian, (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d

987, 994.

CONCLUSION

Defendant respectfully submits his Motion to Summary Judgment and requests that the court
grant the motion as framed herein.

Respectfully submitted;

DATED: August 24, 2012 LAW OFFICES OF TIMOTHY L. MCCANDLESS

_____________________________________
Timothy L. McCandless, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant(s): Alexander B. Paragas

Separation of Note and Deed of Trust

From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Wednesday, August 15, 2012 7:06 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: Separation of Note and Deed of Trust

From Attorney Dan Hanecak,

Today I was told by Judge Brown of the Sacramento County Superior Court that Civil Code 2936 does not apply to deeds of trust because the statute states mortgage. I was also told that Carpenter v. Longan did not apply to the statutory framework of Section 2924 and the nonjudicial foreclosure scheme. I pleaded that the security instrument follows the note and is unenforceable if it is separated to no avail.

I do like Judge Brown, so this is by no means an attack on him, but it took me only 10 minutes of research to prove that I was right.

Friggin newbies.

See attached research.

Regards,

Dan

Separation of note and DOT.doc

Cal. Cases…Separation of Note and Deed of Trust

From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Monday, August 06, 2012 3:50 PM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: Cal. Cases…Separation of Note and Deed of Trust

Just a FYI…found this case researching something else on Google Scholar…I left the links in in case you want to follow up or on…

Domarad v. Fisher & Burke, Inc., 270 Cal.App.2d 543 (1969)

[3-5] Consonant with the foregoing, we note the following established principles: that a deed of trust is a mere incident of the debt it secures and that an assignment of the debt “carries with it the security.” (Civ. Code, § 2936; Cockerell v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 42 Cal.2d 284, 291 [267 P.2d 16]; Lewis v. Booth, 3 Cal.2d 345, 349 [44 P.2d 560]; Union Supply Co. v. Morris, 220 Cal. 331, 338-339 [30 P.2d 394]; Savings & Loan Soc. v. McKoon, 120 Cal 177, 179 [52 P. 305]; Hyde v. Mangan, 88 Cal. 319, 327 [26 P. 180]); that a deed of trust is inseparable from the debt and always abides with the debt, and it has no market or ascertainable value, apart from the obligation it secures (Buck v. Superior Court, 232 Cal. App.2d 153, 158 [42 Cal. Rptr. 527, 11 A.L.R.3d 1064]; Nagle v. Macy, 9 Cal. 426, 428; Hyde v. Mangan, supra; Polhemus v. Trainer, 30 Cal. 685, 688); and that a deed of trust has no assignable quality independent of the debt, it may not be 554*554 assigned or transferred apart from the debt, and an attempt to assign the deed of trust without a transfer of the debt is without effect. (Adler v. Sargent, 109 Cal. 42, 48 [41 P. 799]; Polhemus v. Trainer, supra; Hyde v. Mangan, supra; Johnson v. Razy, 181 Cal. 342, 344 [184 P. 657]; Kelley v. Upshaw, 39 Cal.2d 179, 191-192 [246 P.2d 23].)[5]

California non-judicial foreclosure cases and ruling recent to date

California Cases – 2004 to Present
Including Federal cases interpreting California law
LISTED WITH MOST RECENT CASES FIRST
Go to cases 2000 – 2003

Cadlerock Joint Venture v. Lobel     Docket
Cal.App. 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G045936)  6/20/12TRUSTEE’S SALES / DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS: When a single lender contemporaneously makes two non-purchase money loans secured by two deeds of trust referencing a single parcel of real property and soon thereafter assigns the junior loan to a different entity, the assignee of the junior loan, who is subsequently “sold out” by the senior lienholder’s nonjudicial foreclosure sale, may pursue the borrower for a money judgment in the amount of the debt owed. The court pointed out that there was no suggestion in the record that the loan originator and assignees were affiliated in any way or that two loans were created, when one would have sufficed, as an artifice to evade C.C.P. Section 580d. (Section 580d prohibits a lender from obtaining a deficiency judgment after non-judicially foreclosing its deed of trust.)
Nickell v. Matlock     Docket
Cal.App. 2nd Dist. (B230321)  6/4/12QUIET TITLE: Normally, a defendant has no right to participate in the case after its default has been entered. But Code of Civil Procedure Section 764.010, pertaining to quiet title actions, provides that “[t]he court shall not enter judgment by default but shall in all cases require evidence of plaintiff’s title and hear such evidence as may be offered respecting the claims of any of the defendants . . .” The court held that, while default may be entered, Section 764.010 requires that before issuing a default judgment the trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing in open court, and that defendants were entitled to participate in the hearing even though their answers to the complaint had been stricken as a result of sanctions, and their defaults had been entered.
Cal Sierra Construction v. Comerica Bank     Docket
Cal.App. 3rd Dist. (C060707)  5/31/12MECHANICS LIENS: The court held that only owners, and not lenders, are entitled to bring a “Lambert” motion. This term refers to Lambert v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 383, which held that where a claimant has already filed suit to enforce a mechanics lien or stop notice, the owner may file a motion in the action to have the matter examined by the trial court. On such motion, the claimant bears the burden of establishing the “probable validity” of the claim underlying the lien or stop notice. If the claimant fails to meet that burden, the lien and stop notice may be released in whole or in part.
American Property Management Corporation v. Superior Court     Docket
Cal.App., 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D060868)  5/24/12INDIANS – SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: The court held that a California limited liability company (“the LLC”), which was wholly owned through a series of California limited liability companies by an Indian tribe, was not entitled to sovereign immunity. The LLC owned a hotel and the lawsuit involved a dispute with its property management company. The court stated that the dispositive fact was that the LLC was a California limited liability company. Nevertheless, it went through the weighing process prescribed by the US 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in Breakthrough Mgmt. Group, Inc. v. Chukchansi Gold Casino & Resort629 F.3d 1173, which concluded that a court needs to determine whether a tribe’s entities are an “arm of the tribe” by looking to a variety of factors when examining the relationship between the tribe and its entities, including but not limited to: (1) their method of creation; (2) their purpose; (3) their structure, ownership, and management, including the amount of control the tribe has over the entities; (4) whether the tribe intended for the entities to have tribal sovereign immunity; (5) the financial relationship between the tribe and the entities; and (6) whether the purposes of tribal sovereign immunity are served by granting immunity to the entities. The court concluded that the balance of these factors weighed heavily against sovereign immunity, and reiterated that the most significant fact was the LLC’s organization as a California limited liability company.The concurring opinion would not accord the same dispositive effect of formation under state law as a limited liability company that the majority did, but agreed that the factors set forth by the 10th Circuit weighed against sovereign immunity.

[Ed. note: The “weighing” process is impossible to do with any certainty at the time of contracting with an LLC (or other entity) in which an Indian tribe owns an interest. In spite of the favorable outcome of this state court appellate opinion, it seems that in order to be safe, you need to insist on a specific waiver of sovereign immunity from a tribe that has an interest in any entity you enter into a contract with.]

Shady Tree Farms v. Omni Financial     Docket
Cal.App. 5th Dist. (F062924)  5/22/12MECHANICS LIENS: Plaintiff contracted directly with the owner of a development to deliver trees, and recorded a mechanics lien after not being paid. The court held that plaintiff’s mechanics lien was invalid because it failed to provide defendant construction lender with a preliminary 20-day notice under Civil Code Section 3097(b). Section 3097(a), requiring a 20-day notice to the owner, original contractor and construction lender, did not apply because plaintiff was under direct contract with the owner, and the subsection contains an exception for such persons. However, Section 3097(b) requires a 20-day notice to the construction lender by anyone under direct contract with the owner, except “the contractor”. The court interpreted that term to refer only to the general contractor, so the exception did not apply to plaintiff.
Deutsche Bank v. McGurk     Docket
Cal.App. 2nd Dist. (B231591)  5/22/12QUIET TITLE: Defendant McGurk filed a previous quiet title action against a purchaser who had defrauded her, and recorded a lis pendens. She also named as a defendant the lender holding a deed of trust executed by the purchaser. McGurk dismissed the lender after the lender filed bankruptcy intending to pursue the lender in the bankruptcy action. The lender then assigned the note and deed of trust to plaintiff, after which McGurk took the default of the purchaser. Plaintiff brought this declaratory relief action seeking a determination of the validity of the deed of trust. The court held that 1) even though the assignment was recorded subsequent to the lis pendens, plaintiff stands in the shoes of the lender, whose deed of trust recorded prior to the lis pendens, 2) while plaintiff took the assignment subject to the risk that its assignor’s interest would be proven to have been invalid, that risk never came to fruition because the assignor was dismissed, 3) the case was remanded to the trial court to determine the validity of the deed of trust.
Herrera v. Federal National Mortgage Association     Docket
Cal.App. 4th Dist., Div. 2 (E052943)  5/17/12TRUSTEE’S SALES: MERS, as nominee beneficiary, has the power to assign its interest under a deed of trust. Even assuming plaintiffs can allege specific facts showing that MERS’ assignment of the deed of trust was void, a plaintiff in a suit for wrongful foreclosure is required to demonstrate the alleged imperfection in the foreclosure process was prejudicial to the plaintiff’s interests. Not only did plaintiffs fail to show prejudice, but if MERS lacked the authority to assign the deed of trust, the true victim would not be the plaintiffs, who were admittedly in default, but the lender whose deed of trust was improperly assigned. Finally, Civil Code Section 2932.5, requiring recordation of an assignment of a mortgage, applies only to mortgages that give a power of sale to the creditor, not to deeds of trust which grant a power of sale to the trustee.
Estates of Collins and Flowers (Flowers v. Dancy)     Docket
Cal.App. 3rd Dist. (C064815)FORGERY: The son of one of two property owners forged a deed after they both had died. The court held that the administrator of the estates of the property owners was precluded from attacking the admittedly forged deed due to the “unclean hands” doctrine. The administrator, prior to being appointed as such, wrongfully sought to control the house by filing a defective mechanics lien, filing a baseless quiet title action for his own benefit, and renting the property to tenants for his own benefit, without regard for the other heirs of the two deceased property owners. The court pointed out that a forged deed is a nullity, but a party’s conduct may estop him from asserting that the deed is forged, and that the unclean hands doctrine can prevent a party from attacking a forged deed.The court also addressed the fact that as the other heirs should not suffer as a result of the administrator’s wrongful conduct. However, the court found that there was no evidence that any heirs who had not aided, ratified, or acquiesced in the administrator’s actions actually exist in this case.
Sumner Hill Homeowners’ Association v. Rio Mesa Holdings     Docket
Cal.App. 5th Dist. (F058617)  5/2/12EASEMENTS: In the published portion of the opinion, the court held that a subdivision map failed to provide public access to a river as required by Government Code Section 66478.4 ifthe river is navigable, but that the challenge to the map was barred by the 90-day statute of limitations in Government Code Section 66499.37. The court did not reach the question of whether or not the river is navigable. The court also held that implied and equitable easement rights are sufficient “title” to support a slander of title action, and that defendant slandered plaintiffs’ title by recording a Notice of Permission to Use Land Under Civil Code Section 813 that purported to restrict plaintiffs use of the easement.The court also addressed Streets and Highways Code Section 8353, which provides that the vacation of a street or highway extinguishes all private easements claimed by reason of the purchase of a lot by reference to a map on which the street or highway is shown, unless within two years after the vacation, the claimant records a notice describing the private easement. The court held that this section does not apply to private easements that are based on other or additional grounds besides the fact that the purchase was by reference to a map depicting a street.
Haynes v. EMC Mortgage Corporation     Docket
Cal.App. 1st Dist. (A131023)  4/9/12TRUSTEE’S SALES: Civil Code Section 2932.5, which requires the assignee of a mortgagee to record the assignment before exercising a power to sell the real property, applies only to mortgages and not to deeds of trust. Section 2932.5 requires the assignment of a mortgage to be recorded so that a prospective purchaser knows that the mortgagee has the authority to exercise the power of sale. This is not necessary when a deed of trust is involved, since the trustee conducts the sale and transfers title. (Ed. note: The result was not affected by the fact that the assignee substituted a new trustee.)
Brown v. Wells Fargo Bank     Docket
Cal.App. 2nd Dist (B233679)     Case complete 6/20/12TRUSTEE’S SALES: Plaintiff filed suit and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent a trustee’s sale. The trial court granted the injunction on the condition that plaintiff deposit $1,700 a month into a client trust account. The trial court subsequently dissolved the injunction after plaintiff failed to make any payments. The appellate court affirmed, and further determined that the appeal was frivolous because no viable issue was raised on appeal. It directed the court clerk to send a copy of the opinion to the California State Bar for consideration of discipline of plaintiff’s attorney.
Connolly v. Trabue     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
Cal.App. 1st Dist. (A131984)  4/10/12     Petition for review and depublication request filed with Cal Supreme Ct. 5/21/12PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS: Plaintiffs brought an action to establish a prescriptive easement to a portion of defendant’s property they had fenced in 1998. Plaintiff and defendant’s predecessor intended to do a lot line adjustment that would transfer the disputed area to plaintiffs, but it was not accomplished because of an error in a deed. The trial court ruled that, even if such an easement had been acquired by Plaintiffs, their claim was barred by the doctrine of laches because they had delayed in asserting their claim in a timely manner. The appellate court reversed, holding that the doctrine of laches is inapplicable in an action involving a claim for a prescriptive easement because 1) once a prescriptive easement is established for the statutory period, the owner of the easement is under no obligation to take further action, rather, it is the record owner who must bring an action within 5 years after the prescriptive period commences, 2) this was an action at law, not equity, and laches applies only to equitable actions and 3) there was no evidence that plaintiffs were aware of the error in deed until shortly before they filed this action. [Ed. note: Plaintiff’s occupation of the disputed area was apparently exclusive, but the court did not discuss cases holding that a prescriptive easement cannot be established where the use is exclusive. For example, see Harrison v. Welch.]
Bank of America v. Mitchell     Docket
Cal.App. 2nd Dist. (B233924)  4/10/12     Case complete 6/11/12TRUSTEE’S SALES / DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS: The court acknowledged existing case law holding that a “sold out” junior holder of a deed of trust can obtain a deficiency judgment when the junior lien is wiped out by a trustee’s sale under a senior deed of trust. But the court held that a deficiency judgment was not available in this case where the same lender held both deeds of trust and assigned the junior deed of trust to plaintiff after the trustee’s sale. The court also held that this applies regardless of whether the lender purchases at its own trustee’s sale or where, as here, a 3rd party purchases at the sale.
Montgomery Sansome LP v. Rezai     Docket
Cal.App. 1st Dist. (A130272, A130694)  3/28/12     Case complete 5/29/12MECHANICS LIENS/CONTRACTOR LICENSING: Plaintiff’s certificate of limited partnership with the California Secretary of State was in the name of “Montgomery-Sansome, LP”. Its contractor’s license was in the name of Montgomery Sansome LTD. A fictitious business name statement named Montgomery Sansome LTD, L.P. and incorrectly stated that it was a general partnership. The contract entered into with defendant to perform certain repairs named plaintiff as Montgomery Sansome LTD, LP. The trial court granted a summary judgment in favor of defendant, holding that plaintiff could not recover because the entity that signed the contract was not licensed. The appellate court reversed, holding that there is a triable issue of fact regarding whether there is actually only a single entity. Plaintiff did not violate the licensing law if the entity that entered into the contract is actually the same as the entity that signed the contract. The court distinguished cases holding that the licensing law is violated where a corporation or partnership enters into a contract and the principal is licensed, but not the entity.
Debrunner v. Deutsche Bank     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
Cal.App. 6th Dist. (H036379)  3/16/12     Petition for review and depublication request DENIED by Cal Supreme Ct. 6/13/12TRUSTEE’S SALES: The court upheld the trial court’s grant of a demurrer in favor of the lender without leave to amend, holding:
1. Since each assignment of deed of trust provided for the assignment “together with the note or notes therein described”, it was not necessary to separately endorse the promissory note.
2. Physical possession of the note is not a precondition to nonjudicial foreclosure.
3. A notice of default does not need to be filed by the person holding the note. C.C. 2924(a)(1) permits a notice of default to be filed by the “trustee, mortgagee or beneficiary, or any of their authorized agents”.
4. A notice of default (NOD) is valid even though the substitution of the trustee identified in the NOD is not recorded until after the NOD records.
Walker v. Ticor Title Company of California     Docket
Cal.App. 1st Dist. (A126710)  3/15/12     Case complete 5/16/12ESCROW: Plaintiffs filed suit against Ticor and 12 other defendants alleging defendants conspired to fraudulently induce them to refinance real estate loans. The court upheld the judgment in favor of Ticor, holding as follows:
1. Even though Ticor gave the loan documents to the loan broker in order to have plaintiffs sign them at home, this did not violate a provision of the lender’s closing instructions prohibiting the release of loan documents without lender’s prior approval because the lender was fully aware that this was Ticor’s and the loan broker’s practice so, therefore, it impliedly consented to it.
2. It was reasonable for the jury to conclude that Ticor did not violate a provision of the lender’s closing instructions requiring the closing agent to “coordinate the settlement” because the loan broker’s activity of obtaining signatures was only part of the larger coordination of the settlement handled and supervised by Ticor.
3. It was permissible for the loan broker to provide copies of the “Notice of Right to Cancel” because nothing in the language of the instructions precluded Ticor from delegating this task, nor could plaintiffs have been damaged by such a delegation.
4. One of the plaintiffs notified Ticor after the loan closed that his wife had not signed the loan documents. This was insufficient to establish that Ticor aided and abetted the loan broker’s fraud because it did not show that Ticor had actual knowledge of the fraud.
5. It was improper for the trial court to reduce the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to Ticor based on plaintiff’s financial condition.
Kavin v. Frye     Docket
Cal.App. 2nd Dist. (B230076)  3/5/12     Case complete 5/7/12OPTION TO RENEW LEASE:
1. An option to renew a lease was not effective where it was exercised by only one of four tenants, and the other tenants did not authorize the first tenant to do so.
2. A lease provision stating that all lessees are jointly and severally liable for lease obligations is not an authorization for only one lessee to execute an option to extend the lease.
3. The option was executed late per the terms of the lease. Normally, a lessor can waive the time requirement for an option since the provision normally benefits only the lessor. Here, however, the lessor could not waive the provision on behave of two of the tenants who, since they signed the lease basically as guarantors, also stood to benefit by the expiration of the option period.
SCI California Funeral Services v. Five Bridges Foundation     Docket
Cal.App. 1st Dist. (A126053)  2/14/12     Case complete 4/17/12DAMAGES-DIMINUTION IN VALUE: In this non-title insurance case, plaintiff purchased property, including an easement that was determined, in another action, to be invalid. The court held that the buyer’s damages for loss of the easement included, in addition to diminution in value caused by loss of the easement, damages attributable to the fact that the easement had additional unique value to a neighbor, which plaintiff could have used as a “bargaining chip” to obtain a higher price when negotiating a sale of the easement to the neighbor.[Ed. Note: This case may not be applicable to title insurance because standard ALTA policies contain a provision limiting liability for damages to “the difference between the value of the Title as insured and the value of the Title subject to the risk insured against by this policy”. CLTA policies contain a similar provision. The ALTA/CLTA Homeowners Policy of Title Insurance contains a provision limiting damages to “your actual loss”.]
California Redevelopment Association v. Matosantos     Docket
53 Cal.4th 231 – Cal. Supreme Court (S194861)  12/29/11REDEVELOPMENT AGENCIES:
1. Assembly Bill 1X 26, which bars redevelopment agencies from engaging in new business and provides for their windup and dissolution, is constitutional.
2. Assembly Bill 1X 27, which offers redevelopment agencies the alternative to continue to operate if the cities and counties that created them agree to make payments into funds benefiting the state’s schools and special districts, is unconstitutional.
Stebley v. Litton Loan Servicing     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
202 Cal.App.4th 522 – 3rd Dist. (C066130)  11/30/11 (Pub. Order 12/29/11)    Petition for review and depublication request by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 3/14/12TRUSTEE’S SALES: The court upheld the trial court’s sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend in an action alleging that defendant violated Civil Code Section 2923.5, which requires that before a notice of default can be filed, a lender must attempt to contact the borrower and explore options to prevent foreclosure. The court held:
1. Section 2923.5 does not provide for damages or for setting aside a foreclosure sale. The only remedy available is to provide the borrower more time before a foreclosure sale occurs. After the sale, the statute provides no relief.
2. The statute does not require a lender to modify the loan.
3. While a tender of the loan amount is not necessary to delay a foreclosure sale, it is necessary in order to set aside a sale after it occurs.
4. Plaintiff’s cause of action for dependant adult abuse fails because plaintiff failed to allege that the property was taken wrongfully where an ordinary foreclosure sale occurred.
Portico Management Group v. Harrison     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
202 Cal.App.4th 464 – 3rd Dist. (C062060)  12/28/11     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 4/11/12TRUSTS: In the published portion of the opinion, the court held that an arbitration award and judgment against a trust, and not against the trustees in their capacity as trustees, were not valid because a trust is not an entity or person capable of owning title to property. A trust is, rather, a fiduciary relationship with respect to property. The court pointed out that if the judgment had been against the trustees in their representative capacities, it would have also bound successor trustees. Although the lawsuit properly named the trustees, for some reason plaintiff did not seek to correct or modify the arbitration award or judgment to indicate that it was properly against the trustees.
Gray1 CPB v. Kolokotronis     Docket
202 Cal.App.4th 480 – 3rd Dist (C064954)  12/2/11 (Pub. Order 12/28/11)     Case complete 2/28/12GUARANTY: The court rejected defendant’s contention that the guaranty he signed was actually a demand note, which would have meant that he could compel the lender to foreclose on the security first and that the waiver of his rights under various antideficiency statutes would be invalid. The court held that the following language in the guaranty did not turn the guaranty into a promissory note: “whether due or not due,” “on demand,” and “not contingent upon and are independent of the obligations of Borrower.”
Lona v. Citibank     Docket
202 Cal.App.4th 89 – 6th Dist (H036140)  12/21/11     Case complete 2/22/12TRUSTEE’S SALES: The court reversed a summary judgment in favor of defendants in an action seeking to set aside a trustee’s sale on the basis that the loan was unconscionable. The court held that summary judgment was improper for two reasons:
1. The homeowner presented sufficient evidence of triable issues of material fact regarding unconscionability. Plaintiff asserted that the loan broker ignored his inability to repay the loan (monthly loan payments were four times his monthly income) and, as a person with limited English fluency, little education, and modest income, he did not understand many of the details of the transaction which was conducted entirely in English.
2. Plaintiff did not tender payment of the debt, which is normally a condition precedent to an action by the borrower to set aside the trustee’s sale, but defendants’ motion for summary judgment did not address the exceptions to this rule that defendant relied upon.The case contains a good discussion of four exceptions to the tender requirement: 1. If the borrower’s action attacks the validity of the underlying debt, a tender is not required since it would constitute an affirmation of the debt. 2. A tender will not be required when the person who seeks to set aside the trustee’s sale has a counter-claim or set-off against the beneficiary. 3. A tender may not be required where it would be inequitable to impose such a condition on the party challenging the sale. 4. No tender will be required when the trustor is not required to rely on equity to attack the deed because the trustee’s deed is void on its face.
Pioneer Construction v. Global Investment Corp.     Modification Order     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
202 Cal.App.4th 161 – 2nd Dist. (B225685)  12/21/11     Request for depublication DENIED 3/28/12MECHANICS LIENS: The court held that:
1. A mechanics lien claimant who provided labor and materials prepetition to a debtor in bankruptcy can record a mechanics lien after the property owner files for bankruptcy without violating the automatic stay. (11 U.S.C. §362(b)(3).)
2. A mechanics lienor must, and defendant did, file a notice of lien in the debtor’s bankruptcy proceedings to inform the debtor and creditors of its intention to enforce the lien. (11 U.S.C. §546(b)(2)
3. The 90-day period to file an action after recording a mechanics lien is tolled during the pendency of the property owner’s bankruptcy. Accordingly, an action to enforce the lien was timely when filed 79 days after a trustee’s sale by a lender who obtained relief from the automatic stay. (The property ceased to be property of the estate upon completion of the trustee’s sale.)
Harbour Vista v. HSBC Mortgage Services     Docket
201 Cal.App.4th 1496 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G044357)  12/19/11     Case complete 2/21/12QUIET TITLE: Normally, a defendant has no right to participate in the case after its default has been entered. But Code of Civil Procedure Section 764.010, pertaining to quiet title actions, provides that “[t]he court shall not enter judgment by default but shall in all cases require evidence of plaintiff’s title and hear such evidence as may be offered respecting the claims of any of the defendants . . .” The court held that, while default may be entered, Section 764.010 requires that before issuing a default judgment the trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing in open court, and that a defendant is entitled to participate in the hearing even when it has not yet answered the complaint and is in default.
Park v. First American Title Insurance Company     Docket
201 Cal.App.4th 1418 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G044118)  11/23/11 (Pub. Order 12/16/11)     Case complete 2/15/12TRUSTEE’S SALES: A trustee’s sale was delayed due to defendant’s error in preparing the deed of trust. However, the court held that plaintiff could not establish damages because she could not prove that a potential buyer was ready, willing and able to purchase the property when the trustee’s sale was originally scheduled. Such proof would require showing that a prospective buyer made an offer, entered into a contract of sale, obtained a cashier’s check, or took any equivalent step that would have demonstrated she was ready, willing, and able to purchase plaintiff’s property. Also, plaintiff would need to show that the prospective buyer was financially able to purchase the property, such as by showing that the prospective buyer had obtained financing for the sale, preapproval for a loan or had sufficient funds to purchase the property with cash.
Bardasian v. Superior Court     Docket
201 Cal.App.4th 1371 – 3rd Dist. (C068488)  12/15/11TRUSTEE’S SALES: Civil Code Section 2923.5 requires that before a notice of default can be filed, a lender must attempt to contact the borrower and explore options to prevent foreclosure. Where the trial court ruled on the merits that a lender failed to comply with Section 2923.5, it was proper to enjoin the sale pending compliance with that section, but it was not proper to require plaintiff to post a bond and make rent payments. Also, discussions in connection with a loan modification three years previously did not constitute compliance with the code section.
Lang v. Roche     Docket
201 Cal.App.4th 254 – 2nd Dist. (B222885)  11/29/11     Case complete 2/3/12SHERIFF’S SALES: Plaintiff sought to set aside a Sheriff’s sale arising from the execution on a judgment rendered in another action. Defendant had obtained that judgment by default after service by publication even though plaintiff was defendant’s next door neighbor and could easily be found. The court set the sale aside, holding that even though C.C.P. 701.780 provides that an execution sale is absolute and cannot be set aside, that statute does not eliminate plaintiff’s right of equitable redemption where the judgment is void due to lack of personal jurisdiction.
Promenade at Playa Vista HOA v. Western Pacific Housing     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
200 Cal.App.4th 849 – 2nd Dist. (B225086)  11/8/11     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. GRANTED 1/25/12CC&R’S: In a construction defect action brought by a condominium homeowners association, the court held that a developer cannot compel binding arbitration of the litigation pursuant to an arbitration provision in the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. CC&R’s are not a contract between the developer and the homeowners association. Instead, the provisions in the CC&R’s are equitable servitudes and can be enforced only by the homeowners association or the owner of a condominium, not by a developer who has sold all the units.
Alpha and Omega Development v. Whillock Contracting     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
200 Cal.App.4th 656 – 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D058445)  11/2/11     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 2/15/12LIS PENDENS: This is a slander of title and malicious prosecution action brought after defendant’s unsuccessful action to foreclose a mechanics lien. Plaintiff’s slander of title allegation is based on defendant’s recordation of a lis pendens in the prior mechanics lien action. The appellate court upheld the trial court’s granting of defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion and striking the slander of title cause of action, because recording a lis pendens is privileged under Civil Code Section 47(b)(4).
Biancalana v. T.D. Service Company     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
200 Cal.App.4th 527 – 6th Dist. (H035400)  10/31/11     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. GRANTED 2/15/12TRUSTEE’S SALES: Inadequacy of the sale price is not a sufficient ground for setting aside a trustee’s sale of real property in the absence of any procedural errors. The unpaid balance of the loan secured by the subject deed of trust was $219,105. The trustee erroneously told the auctioneer to credit bid the delinquency amount ($21,894.17). Plaintiff was the successful bidder with a bid of $21,896. The court refused to set aside the sale because there were no procedural errors and the mistake was within the discretion and control of the trustee, who was acting as agent for the lender. The court distinguished Millennium Rock Mortgage, Inc. v. T.D. Service Co. because here the mistake was made by defendant in the course and scope of its duty as the beneficiary’s agent, not by the auctioneer as in Millennium Rock.The case also contains a discussion of the rule that once the trustee’s deed has been delivered, a rebuttable presumption arises that the foreclosure sale has been conducted regularly and properly. But where the deed has not been transferred, the sale may be challenged on the grounds of procedural irregularity.
First Bank v. East West Bank     Docket
199 Cal.App.4th 1309 – 2nd Dist. (B226061)  10/17/11     Case complete 12/19/11RECORDING: Where two deeds of trust secured by the same real property were simultaneously time-stamped for recording by the County Recorder’s Office but were indexed at different times, the lenders have equal priority. The recording laws protect subsequent purchasers and neither bank was a subsequent purchaser. The court acknowledged that a subsequent purchaser (or lender) who records his interest before the prior interest is indexed has priority, but this rule does not apply when both deeds of trust were recorded simultaneously.
Dollinger DeAnza Assoc. v. Chicago Title Insurance Company     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
199 Cal.App.4th 1132 – 6th Dist. (H035576)  9/9/11 (Pub. Order 10/6/11)     Request for depublication DENIED 1/4/12TITLE INSURANCE: Plaintiff’s title insurance policy, which was issued in 2004, insured property that originally consisted of seven parcels, but which had been merged into a single parcel pursuant to a Notice of Merger recorded by the City of Cupertino in 1984. The policy did not except the Notice of Merger from coverage. Plaintiff filed this action after Chicago Title denied its claim for damages alleged to result from the inability to sell one of the parcels separately. The court ruled in favor of Chicago, holding:
1. While the notice of merger may impact Plaintiff’s ability to market the separate parcel, it has no affect on Plaintiff’s title to that parcel, so it does not constitute a defect in title. It does not represent a third person’s claim to an interest in the property.
2. Chicago is not barred by principals of waiver or estoppel from denying plaintiff’s claim, after initially accepting the claim, because 1) waiver only applies to insurers that do not reserve rights when accepting a tender of defense and 2) plaintiff failed to show detrimental reliance, which is one of the elements of estoppel.
3. Plaintiff’s claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be maintained where benefits are not due under plaintiff’s insurance policy.
4. Since the court held that the Notice of Merger was not a defect in title, it did not need to consider Chicago’s contention that the Notice of Merger was void because the County Recorder indexed it under the name of the City, rather than the name of the property owner.
[Ed. note: This case must have dealt with an ALTA 1992 policy. The ALTA 2006 policy made changes to the Covered Risks.]
Sukut Construction v. Rimrock CA     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
199 Cal.App.4th 817 – 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D057774)  9/30/11     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 12/14/11MECHANICS LIENS: Plaintiff could not establish a mining lien under Civil Code Section 3060 for removing rocks from a quarry because a quarry is not a mine and the rocks were not minerals. The court did not address whether plaintiff could establish a regular mechanics lien because it held that plaintiff was judicially estopped from asserting that position after leading defendant to believe that it was asserting only a mining claim.
UNPUBLISHED: First American Title Insurance Company v. Ordin     Docket
Cal.App. 2nd Dist. (B226671)  9/14/11     Case complete 11/17/11TITLE INSURANCE: An arbitrator found that defendants did not lose coverage under their title policy when they conveyed title to their wholly owned corporation, then to themselves as trustees of their family trust and finally to a wholly owned limited liability company. This conflicts with the holding in Kwok v. Transnation Title Insurance Company and this could have been an interesting case, except that whether the ruling was right or wrong was not before the court. The court held only that the arbitrator’s award could not be overturned, even if the the law was applied incorrectly, because there was no misconduct by the arbitrator.
Calvo v. HSBC Bank     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
199 Cal.App.4th 118 – 2nd Dist. (B226494)  9/13/11     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 1/4/12TRUSTEE’S SALES: Notice of the assignment of a deed of trust appeared only in the substitution of trustee, which was recorded on the same date as the notice of trustee’s sale, and which stated that MERS, as nominee for the assignee lender, was the present beneficiary. Plaintiff sought to set aside the trustee’s sale for an alleged violation of Civil Code section 2932.5, which requires the assignee of a mortgagee to record an assignment before exercising a power to sell real property. The court held that the lender did not violate section 2932.5 because that statute does not apply when the power of sale is conferred in a deed of trust rather than a mortgage.
Robinson v. Countrywide Home Loans     Docket
199 Cal.App.4th 42 – 4th Dist., Div. 2 (E052011)  9/12/11     Case complete 11/15/11TRUSTEE’S SALES: The trial court properly sustained defendant lender’s demurrer without leave to amend because 1) the statutory scheme does not provide for a preemptive suit challenging MERS authority to initiate a foreclosure and 2) even if such a statutory claim were cognizable, the complaint did not allege facts sufficient to challenge the trustee’s authority to initiate a foreclosure.
Hacienda Ranch Homes v. Superior Court (Elissagaray)     Docket
198 Cal.App.4th 1122 – 3rd Dist. (C065978)  8/30/11     Case complete 11/1/11ADVERSE POSSESSION: Plaintiffs (real parties in interest) acquired a 24.5% interest in the subject property at a tax sale. The court rejected plaintiffs’ claim of adverse possession under both 1) “color of title” because the tax deed by which they acquired their interest clearly conveyed only a 24.5% interest instead of a 100% interest, and 2) “claim of right” because plaintiffs’ claims of posting for-sale signs and clearing weeds 2 or 3 times a year did not satisfy the requirement of protecting the property with a substantial enclosure or cultivating or improving the property, as required by Code of Civil Procedure Section 325. The court also pointed out that obtaining adverse possession against cotenants requires evidence much stronger than that which would be required against a stranger, and plaintiffs failed to establish such evidence in this case.
Gramercy Investment Trust v. Lakemont Homes Nevada, Inc.     Docket
198 Cal.App.4th 903 – 4th Dist., Div. 2 (E051384)  8/24/11     Case complete 10/27/11ANTIDEFICIENCY: After a judicial foreclosure, the lender obtained a deficiency judgment against a guarantor. The court held that the choice of law provision designating the law of New York was unenforceable because there were insufficient contacts with New York. California is where the contract was executed, the debt was created and guaranteed, the default occurred and the real property is located. Also, Nevada law does not apply, even though the guarantor was a Nevada corporation, because Nevada had no connection with the transaction. The court also held that the guarantor was not entitled to the protection of California’s antideficiency statutes because the guaranty specifically waived rights under those statutes in accordance with Civil Code Section 2856.
Hill v. San Jose Family Housing Partners     Docket
198 Cal.App.4th 764 – 6th Dist. (H034931)  8/23/11     Case complete 10/25/11EASEMENTS: Plaintiff, who had entered into an easement agreement with defendant’s predecessor to maintain a billboard on a portion of defendant’s property, filed an action to prevent defendant from constructing a multi-unit building that would allegedly block the view of the billboard. Defendant asserted that the easement was unenforceable because it violated city and county building codes. The court held:
1. The easement was enforceable because the property’s use for advertising purposes is not illegal in and of itself. Although the instrumentality of that use, i.e., the billboard, may be illegal, that is not a bar to the enforcement of the agreement.
2. The easement agreement did not specifically state that it included the right to view the billboard from the street, but the parties necessarily intended the easement to include that right since viewing the billboard by passing traffic is the purpose of the easement.
3. Nevertheless, the trial court improperly denied a motion for a retrial to re-determine damages based on new evidence that the city had instituted administrative proceedings to have the billboard removed. The award of damages was based on plaintiff’s expected revenue from the billboard until 2037, and such damages will be overstated if the city forces plaintiff to remove the billboard.
Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
198 Cal.App.4th 256 – 1st Dist. (A130478)  8/11/11     Depublication request DENIED 11/30/11FORECLOSURE / MERS: Plaintiff alleged a foreclosure was unlawful because MERS made an invalid assignment of an interest in the promissory note and because the lender had breached an agreement to forbear from foreclosure. The appellate court held that the trial court properly sustained a demurrer to the fourth amended complaint without leave to amend. The court held that MERS had a right to assign the note even though it was not the beneficiary of the deed of trust because in assigning the note it was acting on behalf of the beneficiary and not on its own behalf. Additionally, Plaintiff failed to allege that the note was not otherwise assigned by an unrecorded document. The court also held that plaintiff failed to properly allege that the lender breached a forbearance agreement because plaintiff did not attach to the complaint a copy of a letter (which the court held was part of the forbearance agreement) that purportedly modified the agreement. Normally, a copy of an agreement does not have to be attached to a complaint, but here the trial court granted a previous demurrer with leave to amend specifically on condition plaintiff attach a copy of the entire forbearance agreement to the amended pleading.
Boschma v. Home Loan Center     Docket
198 Cal.App.4th 230 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G043716)  8/10/11     Case complete 10/11/11LOAN DISCLOSURE: Borrowers stated a cause of action that survived a demurrer where they alleged fraud and a violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law (B&PC 17200, et seq.) based on disclosures indicating that borrowers’ Option ARM loan may result in negative amortization when, in fact, making the scheduled payments would definitely result in negative amortization. However, the court also pointed out that at trial in order to prove damages plaintiffs will have to present evidence that, because of the structure of the loans, they suffered actual damages beyond their loss of equity. For every dollar by which the loan balances increased, plaintiffs kept a dollar to save or spend as they pleased, so they will not be able to prove damages if their “only injury is the psychological revelation . . . that they were not receiving a free lunch from defendant”.
Thorstrom v. Thorstrom     Docket
196 Cal.App.4th 1406 – 1st Dist. (A127888)  6/29/11     Case complete 8/30/11EASEMENTS: Plaintiffs were not able to preclude defendants’ use of a well on plaintiffs’ property. The historic use of the well by the common owner (the mother of the current owners) indicated an intent for the well to serve both properties, and an implied easement was created in favor of defendants when the mother died and left one parcel to each of her two sons. However, the evidence did not establish that defendants were entitled to exclusive use of the well, so both properties are entitled to reasonable use of the well consistent with the volume of water available at any given time.
Herrera v. Deutsche Bank     Docket
196 Cal.App.4th 1366 – 3rd Dist. (C065630)  5/31/11 (Cert. for pub. 6/28/11)     Case complete 8/30/11TRUSTEE’S SALES: Plaintiffs sought to set aside a trustee’s sale, claiming that the Bank had not established that it was the assignee of the note, and that the trustee (“CRC”) had not established that it was properly substituted as trustee. To establish that the Bank was the beneficiary and CRC was the trustee, defendants requested that the trial court take judicial notice of the recorded Assignment of Deed of Trust and Substitution of Trustee, and filed a declaration by an employee of CRC referring to the recordation of the assignment and substitution, and stating that they “indicated” that the Bank was the assignee and CRC was the trustee. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment and the appellate court reversed. The Court acknowledged that California law does not require the original promissory note in order to foreclose. But while a court may take judicial notice of a recorded document, that does not mean it may take judicial notice of factual matters stated therein, so the recorded documents do not prove the truth of their contents. Accordingly, the Bank did not present direct evidence that it held the note.Ed. notes: 1. It seems that the Bank could have avoided this result if it had its own employee make a declaration directly stating that the Bank is the holder of the note and deed of trust, 2. In the unpublished portion of the opinion, the Court held that if the Bank is successful in asserting its claim to the Property, there is no recognizable legal theory that would require the Bank to pay plaintiffs monies they expended on the property for back taxes, insurance and deferred maintenance.
Tashakori v. Lakis     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
196 Cal.App.4th 1003 – 2nd Dist. (B220875)  6/21/11     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 9/21/11EASEMENTS: The court granted plaintiffs an “equitable easement” for driveway purposes. Apparently, plaintiffs did not have grounds to establish a prescriptive easement. But a court can award an equitable easement where the court applies the “relative hardship” test and determines, as the court did here, that 1) the use is innocent, which means it was not willful or negligent, 2) the user will suffer irreparable harm if relief is not granted and 3) there is little harm to the underlying property owner.
Conservatorship of Buchenau (Tornel v. Office of the Public Guardian)     Docket
196 Cal.App.4th 1031 – 2nd Dist. (B222941)  5/31/11 (Pub. order 6/21/11)     Case complete 8/24/11CONTRACTS: A purchaser of real property was held liable for damages for refusing to complete the purchase contract, even though the seller deposited the deed into escrow 19 days after the date set for close of escrow. The escrow instructions did not include a “time is of the essence” clause, so a reasonable time is allowed for performance. The purchaser presented no evidence that seller’s delay of 19 days was unreasonable following a two-month escrow.
Diamond Heights Village Assn. v. Financial Freedom Senior Funding Corp.     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
196 Cal.App.4th 290 – 1st Dist. (A126145)  6/7/11     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 9/21/11HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION LIENS:
1. A homeowner’s association recorded a notice of assessment lien, judicially foreclosed and obtained a judgment against the homeowners. However, it did not record an abstract of judgment, which would have created a judgment lien, nor did it record a writ of execution, which would have created an execution lien. The court held that a subsequently recorded deed of trust had priority because when an assessment lien is enforced through judicial action, the debt secured by the lien is merged into the judgment. The association’s previous rights were merged into the judgment, substituting in their place only such rights as attach to the judgment.
2. After defendant lender prevailed on summary judgment as to the single cause of action naming the lender, trial proceeded as to the owners of the property, including a cause of action for fraudulent conveyance of a 1/2 interest in the property pertaining to a transfer from the original owner to himself and his mother. The trial court ruled in favor of the Association on the fraudulent conveyance cause of action AND held that defendant lender’s deed of trust was set aside as to that 1/2 interest. The appellate court held that trial of those remaining claims was proper, including trial of the Association’s cause of action against the homeowners for fraudulent conveyance of their condominium unit. It was not proper, however, to void the lender’s security interest in the property (in whole or part) when the lender had not been joined as a party to the fraudulent conveyance cause of action, and final judgment had already been entered in its favor.
Hamilton v. Greenwich Investors XXVI      Modification     Docket
195 Cal.App.4th 1602 – 2nd Dist. (B224896)  6/1/11     Case complete 8/17/11TRUSTEE’S SALES:
1. Plaintiff/borrower’s failure to disclose, in earlier bankruptcy proceedings, the existence of his breach of contract and fraud claims against the lender bars the borrower from litigating those claims now. The court distinguished several cases that permitted a debtor in bankruptcy from subsequently pursuing a cause of action that was not disclosed in the bankruptcy pleadings on the basis that in those cases the defendant was not a creditor in the bankruptcy and because the schedules specifically asked the debtor to disclose any offsets against the debts that were listed. This action against the lender amounts to an offset against the loan, so by listing the loan and failing to list this claim, the borrower’s bankruptcy schedules were inaccurate.
2. The borrower’s causes of action for breach of contract and fraud fail in any event because the borrower did not allege the essential fact of payment of sums due from the borrower (i.e. performance by the borrower) or set forth an excuse for performance.
3. The borrower cannot state a cause of action for violations of Civil Code Section 2923.5, which requires lenders to contact borrowers to explore options to avoid foreclosure, because the only remedy for such violations is postponement of the foreclosure sale, and borrower’s house has been sold.
***DECERTIFIED***
Ferguson v. Avelo Mortgage     Modification     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
Cal.App. 2nd Dist. (B223447)  6/1/11     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED & DECERTIFIED 9/14/11FORECLOSURE / MERS:
1. A Notice of Default was defective because it was signed by a trustee before recordation of the substitution of trustee substituting it in place of the original trustee. But the Notice of Sale was properly given because it recorded at the same time as the substitution and included the statutorily required affidavit attesting to the mailing of a copy of the substitution to all persons to whom an NOD must be mailed. Since the NOS was valid, the court held that the sale was merely voidable and not void. Therefore, unlike a void sale (such as where a substitution of trustee is not recorded until after the trustee’s sale is completed), where the sale is merely voidable the plaintiff must tender full payment of the debt in order to bring an action setting aside the sale. The plaintiff did not make such a tender, so the trial court properly refused to set aside the sale.
2. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS), as nominee of the original lender had the authority to assign the note and deed of trust to defendant, even if MERS does not possess the original note.
Creative Ventures, LLC v. Jim Ward & Associates     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
195 Cal.App.4th 1430 – 6th Dist. (H034883)  5/31/11     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 8/10/11USURY:
1. The real estate broker arranged loan exception to the Usury Law does not apply were a corporation was not licensed as a broker, even though the officer who negotiated the loan was licensed, where the officer was acting on behalf of the corporation and not on his own behalf.
2. The payee of the note assigned the note to multiple investors. In order to take free of the borrower’s defenses against the original payee, the assignees would have had to be holders in due course. They were not holders in due course because a) the original payee did not endorse the note and transfer possession of the note to the assignees, both of which are requirements for holder in due course status, and b) each investor was assigned a partial interest and partial assignees cannot be holders in due course.
3. The individual investors did not receive usurious interest because the interest rate itself was not usurious. But since the overall interest was usurious when the payee’s brokerage fee was included, the investors must refund the illegal interest each received.
4. The fact that the investors did not intend to violate the Usury Law is irrelevant because the only intent required is the intent to receive payment of interest.
5. An award of treble damages is within the discretion of the trial court, and the trial court properly exercised its discretion not to award treble damages because the conduct of defendants was not intentional.
Ribeiro v. County of El Dorado     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
195 Cal.App.4th 354 – 3rd Dist. (C065505)  5/10/111     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 8/24/11TAX SALES: “Caveat emptor” applies to tax sales. Accordingly, plaintiff/tax sale purchaser could not rescind the tax sale and obtain his deposit back where he was unaware of the amount of 1915 Act bond arrearages and where the County did not mislead him.
The Main Street Plaza v. Cartwright & Main, LLC     Docket
194 Cal.App.4th 1044 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G043569)  4/27/11     Case complete 6/27/11EASEMENTS: Plaintiff sought to establish a prescriptive easement for parking and access. The trial court granted a motion for summary judgment against plaintiff because it had not paid taxes on the easement. The appellate court reversed because, while payment of property taxes is an element of a cause of action for adverse possession, payment of taxes is not necessary for an easement by prescription, unless the easement has been separately assessed. A railway easement over the same area was separately assessed, but that is irrelevant because the railway easement and the prescriptive easement were not coextensive in use.
Liberty National Enterprises v. Chicago Title Insurance Company     Docket
194 Cal.App.4th 839 – 2nd Dist. (B222455)  4/6/11 (pub. order 4/26/11)     Case complete 6/28/11NOTE: This case is not summarized because it deals with disqualification of a party’s attorney, and not with issues related to title insurance. It is included here only to point out that fact.
Barry v. OC Residential Properties     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
194 Cal.App.4th 861 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G043073)  4/26/11     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 7/13/11TRUSTEE’S SALES: Under C.C.P. 729.035 a trustee’s sale to enforce a homeowners association lien is subject to a right of redemption for 90 days after the sale, and under C.C.P. 729.060 the redemption price includes reasonable amounts paid for maintenance, upkeep and repair. Defendant purchased plaintiff’s interest in a common interest development at a foreclosure sale of a homeowners association lien. Plaintiff sought to redeem the property and defendant included certain repair costs in the redemption amount. Plaintiff asserted that the costs were not for reasonable maintenance, upkeep and repair. The court held that the costs were properly included because the person seeking to redeem has the burden of proof, and plaintiff failed to carry that burden in this case. Plaintiff also asserted that she should not have to pay the repair costs because the work was performed by an unlicensed contractor. The court held that the cost of the repair work was properly included because plaintiff would receive a windfall if she did not have to reimburse those costs and because this is not an action in which a contractor is seeking compensation.
McMackin v. Ehrheart     Docket
194 Cal.App.4th 128 – 2nd Dist. (B224723)  4/8/11     Case complete 6/9/11CONTRACTS / PROBATE: This case involves a “Marvin” agreement, which is an express or implied contract between nonmarital partners. Plaintiff sought to enforce an alleged oral agreement with a decedent to leave plaintiff a life estate in real property. The court held that since the agreement was for distribution from an estate, it is governed by C.C.P. Section 366.3, which requires the action to be commenced within one year after the date of death. But the court further concluded that, depending on the circumstances of each case, the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied to preclude a party from asserting the statute of limitations set forth in section 366.3 as a defense to an untimely action where the party’s wrongdoing has induced another to forbear filing suit.
Ferwerda v. Bordon     Docket
193 Cal. App. 4th 1178 – 3rd Dist. (C062389)  3/25/11     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 6/8/11CC&R’s
In the published portion of the opinion, the court held:
1. The following language in the CC&R’s gave the Homeowners Association the authority to adopt new design standards pertaining to development of lots in the subdivision: “in the event of a conflict between the standards required by [the Planning] Committee and those contained herein, the standards of said Committee shall govern”; and
2. The Planning Committee could not adopt a rule that allowed for attorney’s fees to be awarded to the prevailing party in a lawsuit because such a provision was not contained in the CC&R’s. Adopting the rule was an attempt by the committee to insert a new provision that binds homeowners without their approval.In the unpublished portion of the opinion, the court held that the Planning Committee acted properly in denying the plaintiff’s building plans. (The details are not summarized here because that part of the opinion is not certified for publication.)
Capon v. Monopoly Game LLC     Docket
193 Cal. App. 4th 344 – 1st Dist. (A124964)  3/4/11     Case complete 5/5/11HOME EQUITY SALES CONTRACT ACT: In the published portion of the opinion, the court held that plaintiff was entitled to damages under the Home Equity Sales Contract Act because the purchaser was subject to the Act and the purchase contract did not comply with it. There is an exception in the Act for a purchaser who intends to live in the property. The principal member of the LLC purchase asserted that he intended to live in the property, but the court held the exception does not apply because the purchaser was the LLC rather than the member, so his intent was irrelevant.
Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans     Docket     Cal. Sup.Ct. Docket     U.S. Supreme Ct. Docket
192 Cal. App. 4th 1149 – 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D057005)  2/18/11     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 5/18/11, Petition for a writ of certiorari DENIED 10/11/11FORECLOSURE / MERS: A borrower brought an action to restrain a foreclosure of a deed of trust held by MERS as nominee for the original lender. A Notice of Default had been recorded by the trustee, which identified itself as an agent for MERS. The court held that 1) There is no legal basis to bring an action in order to determine whether the person electing to sell the property is duly authorized to do so by the lender, unless the plaintiff can specify a specific factual basis for alleging that the foreclosure was not initiated by the correct party; and 2) MERS has a right to foreclose because the deed of trust specifically provided that MERS as nominee has the right to foreclose.
Schuman v. Ignatin     Docket
191 Cal. App. 4th 255 – 2nd Dist. (B215059)  12/23/10     Case complete 2/23/11CC&R’s: The applicable CC&R’s would have expired, but an amendment was recorded extending them. Plaintiff filed this action alleging that defendant’s proposed house violated the CC&R’s. The trial court held that the amendment was invalid because it was not signed by all of the lot owners in the subdivision. Since the CC&R’s had expired, it did not determine whether the proposed construction would have violated them. The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that the defect in the amendment rendered it voidable, not void, and it could no longer be challenged because the four-year statute of limitations contained in C.C.P. 343 had run.
Schelb v. Stein     Docket
190 Cal. App. 4th 1440 – 2nd Dist. (B213929)  12/17/10     Case complete 2/16/11MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT: In a previous divorce action, in order to equalize a division of community property, the husband was ordered to give the wife a note secured by a deed of trust on property awarded to the husband. In this case (many years later), the court held that under the Marketable Record Title Act, the deed of trust had expired. (Civil Code Section 882.020.) However, under Family Code Section 291, the underlying family law judgment does not expire until paid, so it is enforceable as an unsecured judgment.
Vuki v. Superior Court     Docket
189 Cal. App. 4th 791 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G043544)  10/29/10     Case complete 1/3/11TRUSTEE’S SALES: Unlike section 2923.5 as construed by this court in Mabry v. Superior Court (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 208, neither Section 2923.52 or Section 2923.53 provides any private right of action, even a very limited one as this court found in Mabry. Civil Code section 2923.52 imposes a 90-day delay in the normal foreclosure process. But Civil Code section 2923.53 allows for an exemption to that delay if lenders have loan modification programs that meet certain criteria. The only enforcement mechanism is that a violation is deemed to be a violation of lenders license laws. Section 2923.54 provides that a violation of Sections 2923.52 or 2923.53 does not invalidate a trustee’s sale, and plaintiff also argued that a lender is not entitled to a bona fide purchaser protection. The court rejected that argument because any noncompliance is entirely a regulatory matter, and cannot be remedied in a private action.
Abers v. Rounsavell     Mod Opinion     Docket
189 Cal. App. 4th 348 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G040486)  10/18/10     Case complete 12/20/10LEASES: Leases of residential condominium units required a re-calculation of rent after 30 years based on a percentage of the appraised value of the “leased land”. The term “leased land” was defined to consist of the condominium unit and an undivided interest in the common area of Parcel 1, and did not include the recreational area (Parcel 2), which was leased to the Homeowners Association. The Court held that the language of the leases was clear. The appraisals were to be based only on the value of the lessees’ interest in Parcel 1 and not on the value of the recreational parcel.
UNPUBLISHED: Residential Mortgage Capital v. Chicago Title Ins. Company     Docket
Cal.App. 1st Dist. (A125695)  9/20/10     Case complete 11/23/10ESCROW: An escrow holder released loan documents to a mortgage broker at the broker’s request in order to have the borrowers sign the documents at home. They were improperly backdated and the broker failed to provide duplicate copies of the notice of right to rescind. Due these discrepancies, the lender complied with the borrower’s demand for a rescission of the loan, and filed this action against the escrow holder for amounts reimbursed to the borrower for finance charges and attorney’s fees. The Court held that the escrow holder did not breach a duty to the lender because it properly followed the escrow instructions, and it is common for escrow to release documents to persons associated with the transaction in order for them to be signed elsewhere.
Starr v. Starr     Docket
189 Cal. App. 4th 277 – 2nd Dist. (B219539)  9/30/10     Case complete 12/16/10COMMUNITY PROPERTY: In a divorce action the Court ordered the husband to convey title to himself and his former wife. Title had been taken in the husband’s name and the wife executed a quitclaim deed. But Family Code Section 721 creates a presumption that a transaction that benefits one spouse was the result of undue influence. The husband failed to overcome this presumption where the evidence showed that the wife executed the deed in reliance on the husband’s representation that he would subsequently add her to title. The husband was, nevertheless, entitled to reimbursement for his separate property contribution in purchasing the property.
Malkoskie v. Option One Mortgage Corp.     Docket
188 Cal. App. 4th 968 – 2nd Dist. (B221470)  9/23/10     Case complete 11/23/10TRUSTEE’S SALES: After plaintiff stipulated to a judgment in an unlawful detainer action, she could not challenge the validity of the trustee’s sale in a subsequent action because the subsequent action is barred by collateral estoppel. Because the action was barred, the court did not reach the question of the validity of the trustee’s sale based on the substitution of trustee being recorded after trustee’s sale proceedings had commenced and based on assignments of the deed of trust into the foreclosing beneficiary being recorded after the trustee’s deed.
Lee v. Fidelity National Title Ins. Co.     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
188 Cal. App. 4th 583 – 1st Dist. (A124730)  9/16/10     Petition for review and depublication by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 12/1/10TITLE INSURANCE:
1. The insureds could have reasonably expected that they were buying a title insurance policy on APN 22, and not just APN 9, where both the preliminary report and policy included a reference to APN 22, listed exclusions from coverage that were specific to APN 22, and attached an assessor’s parcel map with an arrow pointing to both APN 9 and 22.
2. A preliminary report is merely an offer to issue a title policy, but an insured has the right to expect that the policy will be consistent with the terms of the offer.
3. There was a triable issue of fact as to whether a neighbor’s construction of improvements on APN 22 was sufficient to commence the running of the statute of limitations, where the insureds testified that they did not know the precise location of APN 22 and assumed that the neighbors constructed the improvements on their own property.
4. There was a triable issue of fact as to whether Fidelity National Title Insurance Company acted as escrow holder or whether the escrow was conducted by its affiliate, Fidelity National Title Company (only the insurance company was named as a defendant).
Chicago Title Insurance Company v. AMZ Insurance Services     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
188 Cal. App. 4th 401 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G041188)  9/9/10     Petition for review and depublication by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 12/15/10ESCROW: A document entitled “Evidence of Property Insurance” (“EOI”) constitutes a binder under Insurance Code Section 382.5(a). In this case an EOI was effective to obligate the insurer to issue a homeowner’s policy even though the escrow failed to send the premium check. In order to cancel the EOI the insured has to be given notice pursuant to Insurance Code Section 481.1, which the insurer did not do. The escrow holder paid the insured’s loss and obtained an assignment of rights. The court held that the escrow holder did not act as a volunteer in paying the amount of the loss, and is entitled to be reimbursed by the insurance company under the doctrine of equitable subrogation.
Vanderkous v. Conley     Docket
188 Cal. App. 4th 111 – 1st Dist (A125352)  9/2/10     Case complete 11/3/10QUIET TITLE: 1) In a quiet title action the court has equitable powers to award compensation as necessary to do complete justice, even though neither party’s pleadings specifically requested compensation. 2) Realizing that the court was going to require plaintiff to compensate defendant in exchange for quieting title in plaintiff’s favor, plaintiff dismissed the lawsuit. However, the dismissal was invalid because it was filed following trial after the case had been submitted to the court.
Purdum v. Holmes     Docket
187 Cal. App. 4th 916 – 2nd Dist. (B216493)  7/29/10     Case complete 10/22/10NOTARIES: A notary was sued for notarizing a forged deed. He admitted that he knew the grantor had not signed the deed, but the lawsuit was filed more than six years after the deed was signed and notarized. The court held that the action was barred by the six-year limitation period in C.C.P. 338(f)(3) even though plaintiff did not discover the wrongful conduct until well within the six year period.
Perlas v. GMAC Mortgage     Docket
187 Cal. App. 4th 429 – 1st Dist. (A125212)  8/11/10     Case complete 10/10/10DEEDS OF TRUST: Borrowers filed an action against a lender to set aside a deed of trust, setting forth numerous causes of action. Borrowers’ loan application (apparently prepared by a loan broker) falsely inflated the borrowers’ income. In the published portion of the opinion. The court held in favor of the lender, explaining that a lender is not in a fiduciary relationship with borrowers and owes them no duty of care in approving their loan. A lender’s determination that the borrowers qualified for the loan is not a representation that they could afford the loan. One interesting issue in the unpublished portion of the opinion was the court’s rejection of the borrowers’ argument that naming MERS as nominee invalidated the deed of trust because, as borrower argued, the deed of trust was a contract with MERS and the note was a separate contract with the lender.
Soifer v. Chicago Title Company     Modification     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
187 Cal. App. 4th 365 – 2nd Dist. (B217956)  8/10/10     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 10/27/10TITLE INSURANCE: A person cannot recover for errors in a title company’s informal communications regarding the condition of title to property in the absence of a policy of title insurance or the purchase of an abstract of title. There are two ways in which an interested party can obtain title information upon which reliance may be placed: an abstract of title or a policy of title insurance. Having purchased neither, plaintiff cannot recover for title company’s incorrect statement that a deed of trust in foreclosure was a first lien.
In re: Hastie (Weinkauf v. Florez)     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
186 Cal. App. 4th 1285 – 1st Dist. (A127069)  7/22/10     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. filed late and DENIED 9/21/10DEEDS: An administrator of decedent’s estate sought to set aside two deeds on the basis that the grantees were the grandson and granddaughter of decedent’s caregiver. Defendant did not dispute that the transfers violated Probate Code Section 21350, which prohibits conveyances to a fiduciary, including a caregiver, or the fiduciary’s relatives, unless specified conditions are met. Instead, defendant asserted only that the 3-year statute of limitations had expired. The court held that the action was timely because there was no evidence indicating that the heirs had or should have had knowledge of the transfer, which would have commenced the running of the statute of limitations.
Bank of America v. Stonehaven Manor, LLC     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
186 Cal. App. 4th 719 – 3rd Dist. (C060089)  7/12/10     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 10/20/10ATTACHMENT: The property of a guarantor of a debt–a debt which is secured by the real property of the principal debtor and also that of a joint and several co-guarantor–is subject to attachment where the guarantor has contractually waived the benefit of that security (i.e. waived the benefit of Civil Code Section 2849).
Jackson v. County of Amador     Docket
186 Cal. App. 4th 514 – 3rd Dist. (C060845)  7/7/10     Depublication request DENIED 9/15/10RECORDING LAW: An owner of two rental houses sued the county recorder for recording a durable power of attorney and two quitclaim deeds that were fraudulently executed by the owner’s brother. The superior court sustained the recorder’s demurrer without leave to amend. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the legal insufficiency of the power of attorney did not provide a basis for the recorder to refuse to record the power of attorney under Government Code Section 27201(a) and the recorder did not owe the owner a duty to determine whether the instruments were fraudulently executed because the instruments were notarized.
Luna v. Brownell     Docket
185 Cal. App. 4th 668 – 2nd Dist. (B212757)  6/11/10     Case complete 8/17/10DEEDS: A deed transferring property to the trustee of a trust is not void as between the grantor and grantee merely because the trust had not been created at the time the deed was executed, if (1) the deed was executed in anticipation of the creation of the trust and (2) the trust is in fact created thereafter. The deed was deemed legally delivered when the Trust was established.
Mabry v. Superior Court     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
185 Cal. App. 4th 208 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G042911)  6/2/10     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 8/18/10TRUSTEE’S SALES: The court answered, and provided thorough explanations for, a laundry list of questions regarding Civil Code Section 2923.5, which requires a lender to explore options for modifying a loan with a borrower prior to commencing foreclosure proceedings.
1. May section 2923.5 be enforced by a private right of action?  Yes.
2. Must a borrower tender the full amount of the mortgage indebtedness due as a prerequisite to bringing an action under section 2923.5?  No.
3. Is section 2923.5 preempted by federal law?  No.
4. What is the extent of a private right of action under section 2923.5?  It is limited to obtaining a postponement of a foreclosure to permit the lender to comply with section 2923.5.
5. Must the declaration required of the lender by section 2923.5, subdivision (b) be under penalty of perjury?  No.
6. Does a declaration in a notice of default that tracks the language of section 2923.5(b) comply with the statute, even though such language does not on its face delineate precisely which one of three categories applies to the particular case at hand?  Yes.
7. If a lender forecloses without complying with section 2923.5, does that noncompliance affect the title acquired by a third party purchaser at the foreclosure sale?  No.
8. Did the lender comply with section 2923.5?  Remanded to the trial court to determine which of the two sides is telling the truth.
9. Can section 2923.5 be enforced in a class action in this case?  Not under these facts, which are highly fact-specific.
10. Does section 2923.5 require a lender to rewrite or modify the loan? No.
612 South LLC v. Laconic Limited Partnership     Docket
184 Cal. App. 4th 1270 – Cal.App. 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D056646)  5/25/10     Case complete 7/26/10ASSESSMENT BOND FORECLOSURE:
1. Recordation of a Notice of Assessment under the Improvement Act of 1911 imparted constructive notice even though the notice did not name the owner of the subject property and was not indexed under the owner’s name. There is no statutory requirement that the notice of assessment be indexed under the name of the property owner.
2. A Preliminary Report also gave constructive notice where it stated: “The lien of special tax for the following municipal improvement bond, which tax is collected with the county taxes. . .”
3. A property owner is not liable for a deficiency judgment after a bond foreclosure because a property owner does not have personal liability for either delinquent amounts due on the bond or for attorney fees incurred in prosecuting the action.
Tarlesson v. Broadway Foreclosure Investments     Docket
184 Cal. App. 4th 931 – 1st Dist. (A125445)  5/17/10     Case complete 7/20/10HOMESTEADS: A judgment debtor is entitled to a homestead exemption where she continuously resided in property, even though at one point she conveyed title to her cousin in order to obtain financing and the cousin subsequently conveyed title back to the debtor. The amount of the exemption was $150,000 (later statutorily changed to $175,000) based on debtor’s declaration that she was over 55 years old and earned less than $15,000 per year, because there was no conflicting evidence in the record.
UNPUBLISHED: MBK Celamonte v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
Cal.App. 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G041605)  4/28/10     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 7/21/10TITLE INSURANCE / ENCUMBRANCES: A recorded authorization for a Mello Roos Assessment constitutes an “encumbrance” covered by a title policy, even where actual assessments are conditioned on the future development of the property.
Plaza Home Mortgage v. North American Title Company     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
184 Cal. App. 4th 130 – 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D054685)  4/27/10     Depublication request DENIED 8/11/10ESCROW / LOAN FRAUD: The buyer obtained 100% financing and managed to walk away with cash ($54,000) at close of escrow. (Actually, the buyer’s attorney-in-fact received the money.) The lender sued the title company that acted as escrow holder, asserting that it should have notified the lender when it received the instruction to send the payment to the buyer’s attorney-in-fact after escrow had closed. The court reversed a grant of a motion for summary judgment in favor of the escrow, pointing out that its decision is narrow, and holding only that the trial court erred when it determined the escrow did not breach the closing instructions contract merely because escrow had closed. The case was remanded in order to determine whether the escrow breached the closing instructions contract and if so, whether that breach proximately caused the lender’s damages.
Garcia v. World Savings     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
183 Cal. App. 4th 1031 – 2nd (B214822)  4/9/10     Petition for review and depublication by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 6/23/10TRUSTEE’S SALES: A lender told plaintiffs/owners that it would postpone a trustee’s sale by a week to give plaintiffs time to obtain another loan secured by other property in order to bring the subject loan current. Plaintiffs obtained a loan the following week, but the lender had conducted the trustee’s sale on the scheduled date and the property was sold to a third party bidder. Plaintiffs dismissed causes of action pertaining to setting aside the sale and pursued causes of action for breach of contract, wrongful foreclosure and promissory estoppel. The court held that there was no consideration that would support the breach of contract claim because plaintiffs promised nothing more than was due under the original agreement. Plaintiffs also could not prove a cause of action for wrongful foreclosure because that cause of action requires that the borrower tender funds to pay off the loan prior to the trustee’s sale. However, plaintiffs could recover based on promissory estoppel because procuring a high cost, high interest loan by using other property as security is sufficient to constitute detrimental reliance.
LEG Investments v. Boxler     Docket
183 Cal. App. 4th 484 – 3rd Dist. (C058743)  4/1/10     Certified for Partial Publication     Case complete 6/2/10PARTITION: A right of first refusal in a tenancy in common agreement does not absolutely waive the right of partition. Instead, the right of first refusal merely modifies the right of partition to require the selling cotenant to first offer to sell to the nonselling cotenant before seeking partition. [Ed. note: I expect that the result would have been different if the right of partition had been specifically waived in the tenancy in common agreement.]
Steiner v. Thexton     Docket
48 Cal. 4th 411 – Cal. Supreme Court (S164928)  3/18/10OPTIONS: A contract to sell real property where the buyer’s performance was entirely conditioned on the buyer obtaining regulatory approval to subdivide the property is an option. Although plaintiffs’ promise was initially illusory because no consideration was given at the outset, plaintiffs’ part performance of their bargained-for promise to seek a parcel split cured the initially illusory nature of the promise and thereby constituted sufficient consideration to render the option irrevocable.
Grotenhuis v. County of Santa Barbara     Docket
182 Cal. App. 4th 1158 – 2nd Dist. (B212264)  3/15/10     Case complete 5/18/10PROPERTY TAXES: Subject to certain conditions, a homeowner over the age of 55 may sell a principle residence, purchase a replacement dwelling of equal or lesser value in the same county, and transfer the property tax basis of the principal residence to the replacement dwelling. The court held that this favorable tax treatment is not available where title to both properties was held by an individual’s wholly owned corporation. The court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the corporation was their alter ego because that concept is used to pierce the corporate veil of an opponent, and not to enable a person “to weave in and out of corporate status when it suits the business objective of the day.”
Clear Lake Riviera Community Assn. v. Cramer     Docket
182 Cal.App. 4th 459 – 1st Dist. (A122205)  2/26/10     Case complete 4/29/10HOMEOWNER’S ASSOCIATIONS: Defendant homeowners were ordered to bring their newly built house into compliance with the homeowners association’s guidelines where the house exceed the guidelines’ height restriction by nine feet. Even though the cost to the defendants will be great, they built the house with knowledge of the restriction and their hardship will not be grossly disproportionate to the loss the neighbors would suffer if the violation were not abated, caused by loss in property values and loss of enjoyment of their properties caused by blocked views. The height restriction was contained in the associations guidelines and not in the CC&R’s, and the association did not have records proving the official adoption of the guidelines. Nevertheless, the court held that proper adoption was inferred from the circumstantial evidence of long enforcement of the guidelines by the association.
Forsgren Associates v. Pacific Golf Community Development     Docket     Sup. Ct. Docket
182 Cal.App. 4th 135 – 4th Dist., Div. 2 (E045940)  2/23/10     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 6/17/10MECHANIC’S LIENS: 1. Owners of land are subject to mechanic’s liens where they were aware of the work being done by the lien claimant and where they failed to record a notice of non-responsibility.
2. Civil Code Section 3128 provides that a mechanic’s lien attaches to land on which the improvement is situated “together with a convenient space about the same or so much as may be required for the convenient use and occupation thereof”. Accordingly, defendant’s land adjacent to a golf course on which the lien claimant performed work is subject to a mechanic’s lien, but only as to the limited portions where a tee box was located and where an irrigation system was installed.
3. The fact that adjacent property incidentally benefits from being adjacent to a golf course does not support extending a mechanic’s lien to that property.
4. The owners of the adjacent property were liable for interest, but only as to their proportionate share of the amount of the entire mechanic’s lien.
Steinhart v. County of Los Angeles      Docket
47 Cal.4th 1298 – Cal. Supreme Court (S158007)  2/4/10PROPERTY TAXES: A “change in ownership”, requiring a property tax reassessment, occurs upon the death of a trust settlor who transferred property to a revocable trust, and which became irrevocable upon the settlor’s death. The fact that one trust beneficiary was entitled to live in the property for her life, and the remaining beneficiaries received the property upon her death, did not alter the fact that a change in ownership of the entire title had occurred.
Kuish v. Smith     Docket
181 Cal.App.4th 1419 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G040743)  2/3/10     Case complete 4/12/10CONTRACTS: 1. Defendants’ retention of a $600,000 deposit designated as “non-refundable” constituted an invalid forfeiture because a) the contract did not contain a valid liquidated damages clause, and b) plaintiff re-sold the property for a higher price, so there were no out-of-pocket damages. 2. The deposit did not constitute additional consideration for extending the escrow because it was labeled “non-refundable” in the original contract.
Kendall v. Walker (Modification attached)     Docket
181 Cal.App.4th 584 – 1st Dist. (A105981)  12/30/09     Case complete 3/29/10WATER RIGHTS: An owner of land adjoining a navigable waterway has rights in the foreshore adjacent to his property separate from that of the general public. The court held that the boundary in the waterway between adjacent parcels of land is not fixed by extending the boundary lines into the water in the direction of the last course ending at the shore line. Instead, it is fixed by a line drawn into the water perpendicular to the shore line. Accordingly, the court enjoined defendants from allowing their houseboat from being moored in a manner that crossed onto plaintiffs’ side of that perpendicular boundary line.
Junkin v. Golden West Foreclosure Service     Docket
180 Cal.App.4th 1150 – 1st Dist. (A124374)  1/5/10     Case complete 3/12/10USURY: The joint venture exception to the Usury Law, which has been developed by case law, provides that where the relationship between the parties is a bona fide joint venture or partnership, an advance by a joint venturer is an investment and not a loan, making the Usury Law inapplicable. The court applied the exception to a loan by one partner to the other because instead of looking at the loan in isolation, it looked at the entire transaction which it determined to be a joint venture. The case contains a good discussion of the various factors that should be weighed in determining whether the transaction is a bona fide joint venture. The presence or absence of any one factor is not, alone, determinative. The factors include whether or not: 1) there is an absolute obligation of repayment, 2) the investor may suffer a loss, 3) the investor has a right to participate in management, 4) the subject property was purchased from a third party and 5) the parties considered themselves to be partners.
Banc of America Leasing & Capital v. 3 Arch Trustee Services     Docket
180 Cal.App.4th 1090 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G041480)  12/11/09     Case complete 3/8/10TRUSTEE’S SALES: A judgment lien creditor is not entitled to receive a notice of default, notice of trustee’s sale or notice of surplus sale proceeds unless the creditor records a statutory request for notice. The trustee is required to disburse surplus proceeds only to persons who have provided the trustee with a proof of claim. The burden rests with the judgment creditor to keep a careful watch over the debtor, make requests for notice of default and sales, and to submit claims in the event of surplus sale proceeds.
Park 100 Investment Group v. Ryan     Docket
180 Cal.App.4th 795 – 2nd Dist. (B208189)  12/23/09     Case complete 2/26/10LIS PENDENS: 1. A lis pendens may be filed against a dominant tenement when the litigation involves an easement dispute. Although title to the dominant tenement would not be directly affected if an easement right was shown to exist, the owner’s right to possession clearly is affected2.A recorded lis pendens is a privileged publication only if it identifies an action previously filed with a court of competent jurisdiction which affects the title or right of possession of real property. If the complaint does not allege a real property claim, or the alleged claim lacks evidentiary merit, the lis pendens, in addition to being subject to expungement, is not privileged.
Millennium Rock Mortgage v. T.D. Service Company     Modification     Docket
179 Cal.App.4th 804 – 3rd Dist. (C059875)  11/24/09     Case complete 1/26/10TRUSTEE’S SALES: A trustee’s sale auctioneer erroneously read from a script for a different foreclosure, although the correct street address was used. The auctioneer opened the bidding with the credit bid from the other foreclosure that was substantially less than the correct credit bid. The errors were discovered after the close of bidding but prior to the issuance of a trustee’s deed. The court held that the errors constituted an “irregularity” sufficient to give the trustee the right to rescind the sale.The court distinguished 6 Angels v. Stuart-Wright Mortgage, in which the court held that a beneficiary’s negligent miscalculation of the amount of its credit bid was not sufficient to rescind the sale. In 6 Angels the error was totally extrinsic to the proper conduct of the sale itself. Here there was inherent inconsistency in the auctioneer’s description of the property being offered for sale, creating a fatal ambiguity in determining which property was being auctioned.
Fidelity National Title Insurance Company v. Schroeder     Docket
179 Cal.App.4th 834 – 5th Dist. (F056339)  11/24/09     Case complete 1/25/10JUDGMENTS: A judgment debtor transferred his 1/2 interest in real property to the other cotenant prior to the judgment creditor recording an abstract of judgment. The court held that if the trial court on remand finds that the transfer was intended to shield the debtor’s property from creditors, then the transferee holds the debtor’s 1/2 interest as a resulting trust for the benefit of the debtor, and the creditor’s judgment lien will attach to that interest. The court also held that the transfer cannot be set aside under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act because no recoverable value remained in the real property after deducting existing encumbrances and Gordon’s homestead exemption.The case contains a good explanation of the difference between a resulting (“intention enforcing”) and constructive (“fraud-rectifying”) trust. A resulting trust carries out the inferred intent of the parties; a constructive trust defeats or prevents the wrongful act of one of them.
Zhang v. Superior Court     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
Cal.App. 4th Dist., Div. 2 (E047207) 10/29/09     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. GRANTED 2/10/10INSURANCE / BAD FAITH: Fraudulent conduct by an insurer does not give rise to a private right of action under the Unfair Insurance Practices Act (Insurance Code section 790.03 et seq.), but it can give rise to a private cause of action under the Unfair Competition Law (Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq.).
Presta v. Tepper     Docket
179 Cal.App.4th 909 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G040427)  10/28/09     Case complete 1/25/10TRUSTS: An ordinary express trust is not an entity separate from its trustee, like a corporation is. Instead, a trust is merely a relationship by which one person or entity holds property for the benefit of some other person or entity. Consequently, where two men entered into partnership agreements as trustees of their trusts, the provision of the partnership agreement, which required that upon the death of a partner the partnership shall purchase his interest in the partnership, was triggered by the death of one of the two men.
Wells Fargo Bank v. Neilsen      Modification     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
178 Cal.App.4th 602 – 1st Dist. (A122626)  10/22/09 (Mod. filed 11/10/09)     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 2/10/10CIRCUITY OF PRIORITY: The Court follows the rule in Bratcher v. Buckner, even though Bratcherinvolved a judgment lien and two deeds of trust and this case involves three deeds of trust. The situation is that A, B & C have liens on the subject property, and A then subordinates his lien to C’s lien. The problem with this is that C appears to be senior to A, which is senior to B, which is senior to C, so that each lien is senior and junior to one of the other liens.The Court held that the lien holders have the following priority: (1) C is paid up to the amount of A’s lien, (2) if the amount of A’s lien exceeds C’s lien, A is paid the amount of his lien, less the amount paid so far to C, (3) B is then paid in full, (4) C is then paid any balance still owing to C, (5) A is then paid any balance still owing to A.

This is entirely fair because A loses priority as to the amount of C’s lien, which conforms to the intent of the subordination agreement. B remains in the same position he would be in without the subordination agreement since his lien remains junior only to the amount of A’s lien. C steps into A’s shoes only up to the amount of A’s lien.

NOTE: The odd thing about circuity of priority cases is that they result in surplus proceeds after a foreclosure sale being paid to senior lienholders. Normally, only junior lienholders and the foreclosed out owner are entitled to share in surplus proceeds, and the purchaser takes title subject to the senior liens.

Schmidli v. Pearce     Docket
178 Cal.App.4th 305 – 3rd Dist. (C058270)  10/13/09      Case complete 12/15/09MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT: This case was decided under the pre-2007 version of Civil Code Section 882.020, which provided that a deed of trust expires after 10 years if the maturity date is “ascertainable from the record”. The court held that this provision was not triggered by a Notice of Default, which set forth the maturity date and which was recorded prior to expiration of the 10-year period. NOTE: In 2007, C.C. Section 882.020 was amended to make it clear that the 10-year period applies only where the maturity date is shown in the deed of trust itself.
Nielsen v. Gibson     Docket
178 Cal.App.4th 318 – 3rd Dist. (C059291)  10/13/09     Case complete 12/15/09ADVERSE POSSESSION: 1. The “open and notorious” element of adverse possession was satisfied where plaintiff possessed the subject property by actual possession under such circumstances as to constitute reasonable notice to the owner. Defendant was charged with constructive knowledge of plaintiff’s possession, even though defendant was out of the country the entire time and did not have actual knowledge.2. The 5-year adverse possession period is tolled under C.C.P. Section 328 for up to 20 years if the defendant is “under the age of majority or insane”. In the unpublished portion of the opinion the court held that although the defendant had been ruled incompetent by a court in Ireland, there was insufficient evidence that defendant’s condition met the legal definition of “insane”.
Ricketts v. McCormack     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
177 Cal.App.4th 1324 – 2nd Dist. (B210123)  9/27/09     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 12/17/09RECORDING LAW: Civil Code Section 2941(c) provides in part, “Within two business days from the day of receipt, if received in recordable form together with all required fees, the county recorder shall stamp and record the full reconveyance or certificate of discharge.” In this class action lawsuit against the County recorder, the court held that indexing is a distinct function, separate from recording a document, and is not part of section 2941(c)’s stamp-and-record requirement.The court distinguished indexing, stamping and recording:
Stamping: The “stamping” requirement of Section 2941(c) is satisfied when the Recorder endorses on a reconveyance the order of receipt, the day and time of receipt and the amount of fees paid.
Recording: The reconveyance is “recorded” once the Recorder has confirmed the document meets all recording requirements, created an entry for the document in the “Enterprise Recording Archive” system, calculated the required fees and confirmed payment of the correct amount and, finally, generated a lead sheet containing, among other things, a bar code, a permanent recording number and the words “Recorded/Filed in Official Records.”
Indexing: Government Code Section 27324 requires all instruments “presented for recordation” to “have a title or titles indicating the kind or kinds of documents contained therein,” and the recorder is “required to index only that title or titles captioned on the first page of a document.
Starlight Ridge South Homeowner’s Assn. v. Hunter-Bloor     Docket
177 Cal.App.4th 440 – 4th Dist., Div. 2 (E046457)  8/14/09 (Pub. Order 9/3/09)     Case complete 10/19/09CC&R’s: Under Code Civ. Proc. Section 1859, where two provisions appear to cover the same matter, and are inconsistent, the more specific provision controls over the general provision. Here the provision of CC&R’s requiring each homeowner to maintain a drainage ditch where it crossed the homeowners’ properties was a specific provision that controlled over a general provision requiring the homeowner’s association to maintain landscape maintenance areas.
First American Title Insurance Co. v. XWarehouse Lending Corp.     Docket
177 Cal.App.4th 106 – 1st Dist. (A119931)  8/28/09      Case complete 10/30/09TITLE INSURANCE: A loan policy provides that “the owner of the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage” becomes an insured under the loan policy. Normally, this means that an assignee becomes an insured. However, where the insured lender failed to disburse loan proceeds for the benefit of the named borrower, an indebtedness never existed, and the warehouse lender/assignee who disbursed money to the lender did not become an insured. The court pointed out that the policy insures against defects in the mortgage itself, but not against problems related to the underlying debt.NOTE: In Footnote 8 the court distinguishes cases upholding the right of a named insured or its assignee to recover from a title insurer for a loss due to a forged note or forged mortgage because in those cases, and unlike this case, moneys had been actually disbursed or credited to the named borrower by either the lender or its assignee.
Wells Fargo v. D & M Cabinets     Docket
177 Cal.App.4th 59 – 3rd Dist. (C058486)  8/28/09     Case complete 10/28/09JUDGMENTS: A judgment creditor, seeking to sell an occupied dwelling to collect on a money judgment, may not bypass the stringent requirements of C.C.P. Section 704.740 et seq. when the sale is conducted by a receiver appointed under C.C.P Section 708.620. The judgment creditor must comply with Section 704.740, regardless of whether the property is to be sold by a sheriff or a receiver.
Sequoia Park Associates v. County of Sonoma     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
176 Cal.App.4th 1270 – 1st Dist. (A120049)  8/21/09     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 12/2/09PREEMPTION: A County ordinance professing to implement the state mobilehome conversion statutes was preempted for the following reasons: (1) Gov. Code Section 66427.5 expressly preempts the power of local authorities to inject other factors when considering an application to convert an existing mobilehome park from a rental to a resident-owner basis, (2) the ordinance is impliedly preempted because the Legislature has established a dominant role for the state in regulating mobilehomes, and has indicated its intent to forestall local intrusion into the particular terrain of mobilehome conversions and (3) the County’s ordinance duplicates several features of state law, a redundancy that is an established litmus test for preemption.
Citizens for Planning Responsibly v. County of San Luis Obispo     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
176 Cal.App.4th 357 – 2nd Dist (B206957)  8/4/09     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 10/14/09PREEMPTION: The court held that the State Aeronautics Act, which regulates the development and expansion of airports, did not preempt an initiative measure adopted by the voters because none of the following three factors necessary to establish preemption was present: (1) The Legislature may so completely occupy the field in a matter of statewide concern that all, or conflicting, local legislation is precluded, (2) the Legislature may delegate exclusive authority to a city council or board of supervisors to exercise a particular power over matters of statewide concern, or (3) the exercise of the initiative power would impermissibly interfere with an essential governmental function.
Delgado v. Interinsurance Exchange of the Auto Club of So. Cal.     Docket
47 Cal.4th 302 – Cal. Supreme Court (S155129)  8/3/09INSURANCE / BAD FAITH: The case is not as relevant to title insurance as the lower court case, which held that an insurance company acted in bad faith as a matter of law where a potential for coverage was apparent from the face of the complaint. The Supreme Court reversed, basing its decision on the meaning of “accident” in a homeowner’s policy, and holding that an insured’s unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense does not turn the resulting intentional act of assault and battery into “an accident” within the policy’s coverage clause. Therefore, the insurance company had no duty to defend its insured in the lawsuit brought against him by the injured party.
1538 Cahuenga Partners v. Turmeko Properties     Docket
176 Cal.App.4th 139 – 2nd Dist. (B209548)  7/31/09     Case complete 10/7/09RECONVEYANCE: [This is actually a civil procedure case that it not of much interest to title insurance business, but it is included here because the underlying action sought to cancel a reconveyance.] The court ordered that a reconveyance of a deed of trust be cancelled pursuant to a settlement agreement. The main holding was that a trial court may enforce a settlement agreement against a party to the settlement that has interest in the subject matter of the action even if the party is not named in the action, where the non-party appears in court and consents to the settlement.
Lee v. Lee     Docket
175 Cal.App.4th 1553 – 5th Dist. (F056107)  7/29/09     Case complete 9/28/09DEEDS / STATUTE OF FRAUDS:
1. The Statute of Frauds does not apply to an executed contract, and a deed that is executed by the grantor and delivered to the grantee is an executed contract. The court rejected defendants’ argument that the deed did not reflect the terms of sale under a verbal agreement.
2. While the alteration of an undelivered deed renders the conveyance void, the alteration of a deed after it has been delivered to the grantee does not invalidate the instrument as to the grantee. The deed is void only as to the individuals who were added as grantees after delivery.
White v. Cridlebaugh     Docket
178 Cal.App.4th 506 – 5th Dist. (F053843)  7/29/09  (Mod. 10/20/09)     Case complete 12/21/09MECHANIC’S LIENS: Under Business and Professions Code Section 7031, a property owner may recover all compensation paid to an unlicensed contractor, in addition to not being liable for unpaid amounts. Furthermore, this recovery may not be offset or reduced by the unlicensed contractor’s claim for materials or other services.
Linthicum v. Butterfield     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
175 Cal.App.4th 259 – 2nd Dist. (B199645)  6/24/09     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 9/9/09NOTE: This is a new opinion following a rehearing. The only significant changes from the original opinion filed 4/2/09 (modified 4/8/09) involve the issue of a C.C.P. 998 offer, which is not a significant title insurance or escrow issue.
EASEMENTS: The court quieted title to an easement for access based on the doctrine of “balancing conveniences ” or “relative hardship”. Prohibiting the continued use of the roadway would cause catastrophic loss to the defendants and insignificant loss to the plaintiffs. However, the court remanded the case for the trial court to determine the width of the easement, which should be the minimal width necessary. The court reversed the judgment insofar as it awarded a utility easement to the defendants because they did not seek to quiet title to an easement for utilities, even though they denied the material allegations of that cause of action.
United Rentals Northwest v. United Lumber Products     Docket
174 Cal.App.4th 1479 – 5th Dist. (F055855)  6/18/09     Case complete 8/18/09MECHANIC’S LIENS: Under Civil Code Section 3106, a “work of improvement” includes the demolition and/or removal of buildings. The court held that lumber drying kilns are “buildings” so the contractor who dismantled and removed them was entitled to a mechanic’s lien.
People v. Shetty     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
174 Cal.App.4th 1488 – 2nd Dist. (B205061)  6/18/09     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 9/30/09HOME EQUITY SALES CONTRACT ACT: This case is not significant from a title insurance standpoint, but it is interesting because it is an example of a successful prosecution under the Home Equity Sales Contract Act (Civil Code Section 1695 et seq.).
Strauss v. Horton     Modification     Docket
46 Cal.4th 364 – Cal. Supreme Court (S168047)  5/26/09SAME SEX MARRIAGE: The California Supreme Court upheld Proposition 8, which amended the California State Constitution to provide that: “Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.” Proposition 8 thereby overrode portions of the ruling of In re Marriage Cases, which allowed same-sex marriages. But the Court upheld the marriages that were performed in the brief time same-sex marriage was legal from 5:00pm on June 16, 2008 (when In re Marriage Cases was final) through November 4, 2008 (the day before Proposition 8 became effective restricting the definition of marriage to a man and a woman).
In re Marriage of Lund     Docket
174 Cal.App.4th 40 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G040863)  5/21/09     Case complete 7/27/09COMMUNITY PROPERTY: An agreement accomplished a transmutation of separate property to community property even though it stated that the transfer was “for estate planning purposes”. A transmutation either occurs for all purposes or it doesn’t occur at all.
St. Marie v. Riverside County Regional Park, etc.     Docket
46 Cal.4th 282 – Cal. Supreme Court (S159319)  5/14/09OPEN SPACE DEDICATION: Property granted to a Regional Park District is not “actually dedicated” under Public Resources Code Section 5540 for open space purposes until the district’s Board of Directors adopts a resolution dedicating the property for park or open space purposes. Therefore, until the Board of Directors adopts such a resolution, the property may be sold by the District without voter or legislative approval.
Manhattan Loft v. Mercury Liquors     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
173 Cal.App.4th 1040 – 2nd Dist. (B211070)  5/6/09     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 8/12/09LIS PENDENS: An arbitration proceeding is not an “action” that supports the recordation of a notice of pendency of action. The proper procedure is for a party to an arbitration agreement to file an action in court to support the recording of a lis pendens, and simultaneously file an application to stay the litigation pending arbitration.
Murphy v. Burch     Docket
46 Cal.4th 157 – Cal. Supreme Court (S159489)  4/27/09EASEMENT BY NECESSITY: This case contains a good discussion of the law of easements by necessity, which the court held did not apply in this case to provide access to plaintiff’s property. This means plaintiff’s property is completely landlocked because the parties had already stipulated that a prescriptive easement could not be established.An easement by necessity arises by operation of law when 1) there is a strict necessity as when a property is landlocked and 2) the dominant and servient tenements were under the same ownership at the time of the conveyance giving rise to the necessity. The second requirement, while not categorically barred when the federal government is the common grantor, requires a high burden of proof to show 1) the intent of Congress to establish the easement under federal statutes authorizing the patent and 2) the government’s lack of power to condemn the easement. Normally, a reservation of an easement in favor of the government would not be necessary because the government can obtain the easement by condemnation.

The court pointed out that there is a distinction between an implied grant and implied reservation, and favorably quotes a treatise that observes: “an easement of necessity may be created against the government, but the government agency cannot establish an easement by necessity over land it has conveyed because its power of eminent domain removes the strict necessity required for the creation of an easement by necessity.”

Abernathy Valley, Inc. v. County of Solano     Docket
173 Cal.App.4th 42 – 1st Dist. (A121817)  4/17/09     Case complete 6/22/09SUBDIVISION MAP ACT: This case contains a very good history of California’s Subdivision Map Act statutes. The court held that parcels shown on a 1909 map recorded pursuant to the 1907 subdivision map law are not entitled to recognition under the Subdivision Map Act’s grandfather clause (Government Code Section 66499.30) because the 1907 act did not regulate the “design and improvement of subdivisions”. The court also held that a local agency may deny an application for a certificate of compliance that seeks a determination that a particular subdivision lot complies with the Act, where the effect of issuing a certificate would be to effectively subdivide the property without complying with the Act.
Linthicum v. Butterfield     Modification     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
172 Cal.App.4th 1112 – 2nd Dist. (B199645)  4/2/09
SEE NEW OPINION FILED 6/24/09
EASEMENTS: The court quieted title to an easement for access based on the doctrine of “balancing conveniences ” or “relative hardship”. Prohibiting the continued use of the roadway would cause catastrophic loss to the defendants and insignificant loss to the plaintiffs. However, the court remanded the case for the trial court to determine the width of the easement, which should be the minimal width necessary. The court reversed the judgment insofar as it awarded a utility easement to the defendants because they did not seek to quiet title to an easement for utilities, even though they denied the material allegations of that cause of action.
McAvoy v. Hilbert     Docket
172 Cal.App.4th 707 – 4th Dist., Div 1 (D052802)  3/24/09     Case complete 5/27/09ARBITRATION: C.C.P. Section 1298 requires that an arbitration provision in a real estate contract be accompanied by a statutory notice and that the parties indicate their assent by placing their initials on an adjacent space or line. The court held that a listing agreement that is part of a larger transaction for the sale of both a business and real estate is still subject to Section 1298, and refused to enforce an arbitration clause that did not comply with that statute.
Peak-Las Positas Partners v. Bollag     Modification     Docket
172 Cal.App.4th 101 – 2nd Dist. (B205091)  3/16/09     Case complete 5/27/09ESCROW: Amended escrow instructions provided for extending the escrow upon mutual consent which “shall not be unreasonably withheld or delayed”. The court held that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s determination that the seller’s refusal to extend escrow was unreasonable. The court pointed out the rule that equity abhors a forfeiture and that plaintiff had paid a non-refundable deposit of $465,000 and spent $5 million in project costs to obtain a lot line adjustment that was necessary in order for the property to be sold.
Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn     Modification     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
171 Cal.App.4th 1356 6th Dist. (H031127)  2/19/09     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 5/13/09CC&R’s: The court upheld the validity of recorded CC&R’s containing an affordable housing restriction that required property to remain affordable to buyers with low to moderate income. The court reached several conclusions:
1. Constructive notice of recorded CC&R’s is imparted even if they are not referenced in a subsequent deed,
2. CC&R’s may describe an entire tract, and do not need to describe individual lots in the tract,
3. An affordable housing restriction is a reasonable restraint on alienation even if it is of indefinite duration,
4. Defendants had a duty as sellers to disclose the existence of the CC&R’s. Such disclosure was made if plaintiffs were given, prior to close of escrow, preliminary reports that disclosed the CC&R’s.
5. The fact that a victim had constructive notice of a matter from public records is no defense to fraud. The existence of such public records may be relevant to whether the victim’s reliance was justifiable, but it is not, by itself, conclusive.
6. In the absence of a claim that defendants somehow prevented plaintiffs from reading the preliminary reports or deeds, or misled them about their contents, plaintiffs cannot blame defendants for their own neglect in reading the reports or deeds. Therefore, the date of discovery of alleged fraud for failing to disclose the affordable housing restriction would be the date plaintiffs received their preliminary reports or if they did not receive a preliminary report, the date they received their deeds.
Kwok v. Transnation Title Insurance Company     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
170 Cal.App.4th 1562 – 2nd Dist. (B207421)  2/10/09     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 4/29/09TITLE INSURANCE: Plaintiffs did not succeed as insureds “by operation of law” under the terms of the title insurance policy after transfer of the property from a wholly owned limited liability company, of which appellants were the only members, to appellants as trustees of a revocable family trust. This case highlights the importance of obtaining a 107.9 endorsement, which adds the grantee as an additional insured under the policy.
Pro Value Properties v. Quality Loan Service Corp.     Docket
170 Cal.App.4th 579 – 2nd Dist. (B204853)  1/23/09     Case complete 3/27/09TRUSTEE’S SALES: A Trustee’s Deed was void because the trustee failed to record a substitution of trustee. The purchaser at the sale was entitled to a return of the money paid plus interest. The interest rate is the prejudgment interest rate of seven percent set forth in Cal. Const., Art. XV, Section 1. A trustee’s obligations to a purchaser are based on statute and not on a contract. Therefore, Civil Code Section 3289 does not apply, since it only applies to a breach of a contract that does not stipulate an interest rate.
Sixells v. Cannery Business Park     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
170 Cal.App.4th 648 – 3rd Dist. (C056267)  12/29/08     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 3/25/09CONTRACTS: The Subdivision Map Act (Gov. Code, Section 66410 et seq.) prohibits the sale of a parcel of real property until a final subdivision map or parcel map has been filed unless the contract to sell the property is “expressly conditioned” upon the approval and filing of a final map (66499.30(e)). Here, the contract satisfied neither requirement because it allowed the purchaser to complete the purchase if, at its election, the subject property was made into a legal parcel by recording a final map or if the purchaser “waived” the recording of a final map. Therefore the contract was void.
Patel v. Liebermensch     Docket
45 Cal.4th 344 – Cal. Supreme Court (S156797)  12/22/08SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE: The material factors required for a  written contract are the seller, the buyer, the price to be paid, the time and manner of payment, and the property to be transferred, describing it so it may be identified. Here, specific performance of an option was granted even though it was not precise as to the time and manner of payment because where a contract for the sale of real property specifies no time of payment, a reasonable time is allowed. The manner of payment is also a term that may be supplied by implication.
In re Marriage of Brooks and Robinson     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
169 Cal.App.4th 176 – 4th Dist., Div. 2 (E043770)  12/16/08     Request for review and depublication by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 3/25/09COMMUNITY PROPERTY: The act of taking title to property in the name of one spouse during marriage with the consent of the other spouse effectively removes that property from the general presumption that the property is community property. Instead, there is a presumption that the parties intended title to be held as stated in the deed. This presumption can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence of a contrary agreement, and not solely by tracing the funds used to purchase the property or by testimony of an intention not disclosed at the time of the execution of the conveyance. Because the court found that there was no agreement to hold title other than as the separate property of the spouse who acquired title in her own name, it did not reach the issue of whether a purchaser from that spouse was a BFP or would be charged with knowledge of that the seller’s spouse had a community property interest in the property.
The Formula, Inc. v. Superior Court     Docket
168 Cal.App.4th 1455 – 3rd Dist. (C058894)  12/10/09     Case complete 2/10/09LIS PENDENS: A notice of litigation filed in another state is not authorized for recording under California’s lis pendens statutes. An improperly filed notice of an action in another state is subject to expungement by a California court, but not under the authority of C.C.P. Section 405.30, and an order of expungement is given effect by being recorded in the chain of title to overcome the effect of the earlier filing.
Ekstrom v. Marquesa at Monarch Beach HOA     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
168 Cal.App.4th 1111 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G038537)  12/1/08     Depublication request DENIED 3/11/09CC&R’s: A provision in CC&R’s requiring all trees on a lot to be trimmed so as to not exceed the roof of the house on the lot, unless the tree does not obstruct views from other lots, applies to palm trees even though topping a palm tree will kill it. All trees means “all trees”, so palm trees are not exempt from the requirement that offending trees be trimmed, topped, or removed.
Spencer v. Marshall     Docket
168 Cal.App.4th 783 – 1st Dist. (A119437)  11/24/08     Case complete 1/26/09HOME EQUITY SALES: The Home Equity Sales Contract Act applies even where the seller is in bankruptcy and even where the seller’s Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Plan allows the seller to sell or refinance the subject property without further order of the court.
Kachlon v. Markowitz     Docket
168 Cal.App.4th 316 – 2nd Dist. (B182816)  11/17/08     Case complete 1/27/09TRUSTEE’S SALES:
1. The statutorily required mailing, publication, and delivery of notices in nonjudicial foreclosure, and the performance of statutory nonjudicial foreclosure procedures, are privileged communications under the qualified, common-interest privilege, which means that the privilege applies as long as there is no malice. The absolute privilege for communications made in a judicial proceeding (the “litigation privilege”) does not apply.
2. Actions seeking to enjoin nonjudicial foreclosure and clear title based on the provisions of a deed of trust are actions on a contract, so an award of attorney fees under Civil Code Section 1717 and provisions in the deed of trust is proper.
3. An owner is entitled to attorney fees against the trustee who conducted trustee’s sale proceedings where the trustee did not merely act as a neutral stakeholder but rather aligned itself with the lender by denying that the trustor was entitled to relief.
Hines v. Lukes     Docket
167 Cal.App.4th 1174 – 2nd Dist. (B199971)  10/27/08     Case complete 12/31/08EASEMENTS: [Not significant from a title insurance standpoint]. The underlying dispute concerns an easement but the case involves only civil procedure issues pertaining to the enforcement of a settlement agreement.
Satchmed Plaza Owners Association v. UWMC Hospital Corp.     Docket
167 Cal.App.4th 1034 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G038119)  10/23/08     Case complete 12/23/08RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL: [Not significant from a title insurance standpoint]. The underlying dispute concerns a right of first refusal but the case involves only civil procedure issues pertaining to a party’s waiver of its right to appeal where it has accepted the benefits of the favorable portion of judgment.
Gray v. McCormick     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
167 Cal.App.4th 1019 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G039738)  10/23/08     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 1/14/09EASEMENTS: Exclusive easements are permitted under California law, but the use by the owner of the dominant tenement is limited to the purposes specified in the grant of easement, not all conceivable uses of the property.
In re Estate of Felder     Docket
167 Cal.App.4th 518 – 2nd Dist.   (B205027)  10/9/08     Case complete 12/11/08CONTRACTS: [Not significant from a title insurance standpoint]. The case held that an estate had the right to retain the entire deposit upon a purchaser’s breach of a sales contract even though the estate had only a 1/2 interest in the subject property.
Secrest v. Security National Mortgage Loan Trust     Order Modifying Opinion     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
167 Cal.App.4th 544 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G039065)  10/9/08, Modified 11/3/08     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 12/17/08LOAN MODIFICATION: Because a note and deed of trust come within the statute of frauds, a Forbearance Agreement also comes within the statute of frauds pursuant to Civil Code section 1698. Making the downpayment required by the Forbearance Agreement was not sufficient part performance to estop Defendants from asserting the statute of frauds because payment of money alone is not enough as a matter of law to take an agreement out of the statute, and the Plaintiffs have legal means to recover the downpayment if they are entitled to its return. In addition to part performance, the party seeking to enforce the contract must have changed position in reliance on the oral contract to such an extent that application of the statute of frauds would result in an unjust or unconscionable loss, amounting in effect to a fraud.
FDIC v. Dintino     Docket
167 Cal.App.4th 333 – 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D051447)  9/9/08 (Pub. Order 10/2/08)     Case complete 12/2/08TRUST DEEDS: A lender who mistakenly reconveyed a deed of trust could not sue under the note because it would violate the one action rule. However, the lender prevailed on its unjust enrichment cause of action. The applicable statute of limitations was the 3-year statute for actions based on fraud or mistake, and not the 4-year statute for actions based on contract. Nevertheless, the action was timely because the statute did not begin to run until the lender reasonably discovered its mistake, and not from the date of recordation of the reconveyance. Finally, the court awarded defendant attorney’s fees attributable to defending the contract cause of action because defendant prevailed on that particular cause of action even though he lost the lawsuit.
California Coastal Commission v. Allen     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
167 Cal.App.4th 322 – 2nd Dist. (B197974)  10/1/08     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 1/14/09HOMESTEADS:
1. The assignees of a judgment properly established their rights as assignees by filing with the clerk of the court an acknowledgement of assignment of judgment.
2. The subject property was not subject to a homestead exemption because the debtor transferred the property to a corporation of which he was the sole shareholder. The homestead exemption only applies to the interest of a natural person in a dwelling.
3. The debtor could not claim that he was only temporarily absent from a dwelling in order to establish it as his homestead where he leased it for two years. This is true even though the debtor retained the right to occupy a single car section of the garage and the attic.
In re Marriage of Holtemann     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
162 Cal.App.4th 1175 – 2nd Dist. (B203089)  9/15/08     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 12/10/08COMMUNITY PROPERTY: Transmutation of separate property to community property requires language which expressly states that the characterization or ownership of the property is being changed. Here, an effective transmutation occurred because the transmutation agreement clearly specified that a transmutation was occurring and was not negated by arguably confusing language in a trust regarding the parties’ rights to terminate the trust. The court also stated that it was not aware of any authority for the proposition that a transmutation can be conditional or temporary. However, while questioning whether a transmutation can be conditional or temporary, the court did not specifically make that holding because the language used by the parties was not conditional.
Mission Shores Association v. Pheil     Docket
166 Cal.App.4th 789 – 4th Dist., Div. 2 (E043932)  9/5/08     Case complete 11/7/08CC&R’s: Civil Code Section 1356 allows a court to reduce a super-majority voting requirement to amend CC&R’s where the court finds that the amendment is reasonable. Here the court reduced the 2/3 majority requirement to a simple majority for an amendment to limit rentals of homes to 30 days or more.
Zanelli v. McGrath     Docket
166 Cal.App.4th 615 – 1st Dist. (A117111)  9/2/08     Case complete 11/4/08EASEMENTS:
1. The doctrine of merger codified in Civil Code Sections 805 and 811 applies when “the right to the servitude,” and “the right to the servient tenement” are not vested in a single individual, but in the same persons;2. The doctrine of merger applies regardless of whether the owners held title as joint tenants or tenants in common. Also, the fact that one owner held his interest in one of the properties as trustee for his inter vivos revocable trust does not preclude merger because California law recognizes that when property is held in this type of trust the settlor has the equivalent of full ownership of the property. (If he had held title only in a representative capacity as a trustee for other beneficiaries under the terms of an irrevocable trust, then his ownership might not result in extinguishment by merger because he would only hold the legal title for the benefit of others.) The court cites Galdjie v. Darwish (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1331, stating that a revocable inter vivos trust is recognized as simply a probate avoidance device, but does not prevent creditors of the settlers from reaching trust property.

(3) After being extinguished by merger, an easement is not revived upon severance of the formerly dominant and servient parcels unless it is validly created once again.

Ritter & Ritter v. The Churchill Condominium Assn.     Docket
166 Cal.App.4th 103 – 2nd Dist. (B187840) 7/22/08  (pub. order 8/21/08)     Case complete 10/21/08HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATIONS: A member of a condominium homeowners’ association can recover damages from the association which result from a dangerous condition negligently maintained by the association in the common area. However, the court found in favor of the individual directors because a greater degree of fault is necessary to hold unpaid individual board members liable, and such greater degree of fault was not present here.
Kempton v. City of Los Angeles     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
165 Cal.App.4th 1344 – 2nd Dist. (B201128) 8/13/08     Request for Depublication by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 11/12/08NUISANCE: A private individual may bring an action against a municipality to abate a public nuisance when the individual suffers harm that is specially injurious to himself, or where the nuisance is a public nuisance per se, such as blocking a public sidewalk or road. The court held that plaintiff’s assertions that neighbors’ fences were erected upon city property, prevent access to plaintiff’s sidewalk area, and block the sightlines upon entering and exiting their garage were sufficient to support both a public nuisance per se and specific injury.
Claudino v. Pereira     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
165 Cal.App.4th 1282 – 3rd Dist. (C054808) 8/12/08     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 11/12//08SURVEYS: Determining the location of a boundary line shown on a plat recorded pursuant to the 1867 Townsite Acts requires an examination of both the plat and the surveyor’s field notes. Here, the plat showed the boundary as a straight line, but the court held that the boundary followed the center line of a gulch because the field notes stated that the boundary was “down said gulch”.
Zack’s, Inc. v. City of Sausalito     Docket
165 Cal.App.4th 1163 – 1st Dist. (A118244) 8/11/08     Case complete 10/14/08TIDELANDS / PUBLIC STREETS: A statute authorizing the City’s lease of tidelands does not supersede other state laws establishing procedures for the abandonment of public streets. Because the City failed to follow the normal procedure for abandonment of the portion of the street upon which it granted a lease, the leasehold was not authorized and can therefore be deemed a nuisance.
Gehr v. Baker Hughes Oil Field Operations     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
165 Cal.App.4th 660 – 2nd Dist. (B201195) 7/30/08     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 10/16/08NUISANCE: Plaintiff purchased from Defendant real property that was contaminated, and Defendant had begun the remediation process. The 3-year statute of limitations for suing under a permanent nuisance theory had expired. So Plaintiff sued for nuisance damages under a continuing nuisance theory, seeking interest rate differential damages based on the difference in the interest rate between an existing loan and a loan that plaintiff could have obtained if not for the contamination.The court held that plaintiff’s claim for interest rate differential damages is actually a claim for diminution in value, which may not be recovered under a continuing nuisance theory. Damages for diminution in value may only be recovered for permanent, not continuing, nuisances. When suing for a continuing nuisance, future or prospective damages are not allowed, such as damages for diminution in the value of the subject property. A nuisance can only be considered “continuing” if it can be abated, and therefore a plaintiff suing under this theory may only recover the costs of abating the nuisance.

If the nuisance has inflicted a permanent injury on the land, the plaintiff generally must bring a single lawsuit for all past, present, and future damages within three years of the creation of the nuisance. But if the nuisance is one which may be discontinued at any time, it is considered continuing in character and persons harmed by it may bring successive actions for damages until the nuisance is abated. Recovery is limited, however, to actual injury suffered prior to commencement of each action.

Witt Home Ranch v. County of Sonoma     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
165 Cal.App.4th 543 – 1st Dist. (A118911) 7/29/08     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 5/28/08SUBDIVISION MAP ACT: This case contains a good history of California’s Subdivision Map Act statutes. The court held that the laws governing subdivision maps in 1915 did not regulate the “design and improvement of subdivisions,” as required by the grandfather clause of Government Code Section 66499.30. The subdivision map in this case was recorded in 1915 and no lots were subsequently conveyed, so the map does not create a valid subdivision.
T.O. IX v. Superior Court     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
165 Cal.App.4th 140 – 2nd Dist. (B203794) 7/24/08     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 9/10/08MECHANIC’S LIENS: A mechanic’s lien claimant recorded a mechanic’s lien against each of the nine parcels in a project, each lien for the full amount due under the contract. The court held that defendant could record a single release bond under Civil Code Section 3143 to release all of the liens.
Kassir v. Zahabi     Docket
164 Cal.App.4th 1352 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G038449) 3/5/08 (Pub. Order 4/3/08, Received 7/16/08)     Case complete 5/9/08SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE: The trial court ordered Defendant to specifically perform his contract to sell real property to Plaintiff, and further issued a judgment ordering Defendant to pay Plaintiff for rents accruing during the time Defendant was able to perform the agreement but refused to do so. The court held that because the property was overencumbered, Defendant would have received nothing under the agreement and no offset was required.The court explained that because execution of the judgment in a specific performance action will occur later than the date of performance provided by the contract, financial adjustments must be made to relate their performance back to the contract date, namely: 1) when a buyer is deprived of possession of the property pending resolution of the dispute and the seller receives rents and profits, the buyer is entitled to a credit against the purchase price for the rents and profits from the time the property should have been conveyed to him, 2) a seller also must be treated as if he had performed in a timely fashion and is entitled to receive the value of his lost use of the purchase money during the period performance was delayed, 3) if any part of the purchase price has been set aside by the buyer with notice to the seller, the seller may not receive credit for his lost use of those funds and 4) any award to the seller representing the value of his lost use of the purchase money cannot exceed the rents and profits awarded to the buyer, for otherwise the breaching seller would profit from his wrong.
Grant v. Ratliff     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
164 Cal.App.4th 1304 – 2nd Dist. (B194368) 7/16/08     Request for depublication by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 10/1/08PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS: The plaintiff/owner of Parcel A sought to establish a prescriptive easement to a road over Parcel B. In order to establish the requisite 5-year period of open and notorious possession, the plaintiff needed to include the time that the son of the owner of Parcel B spent living in a mobile home on Parcel A. The court held that the son’s use of Parcel A was not adverse but was instead a matter of “family accommodation” and, therefore, a prescriptive easement was not established. The court also discussed: 1) a party seeking to establish a prescriptive easement has the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence and 2) once the owner of the dominant tenement shows that use of an easement has been continuous over a long period of time, the burden shifts to the owner of the servient tenement to show that the use was permissive, but the servient tenement owner’s burden is a burden of producing evidence, and not a burden of proof.
SBAM Partners v. Wang     Docket
164 Cal.App.4th 903 – 2nd Dist. (B204191) 7/9/08     Case complete 9/10/08HOMESTEADS: Under C.C.P. Section 704.710, a homestead exemption is not allowed on property acquired by the debtor after the judgment has been recorded unless it was purchased with exempt proceeds from the sale, damage or destruction of a homestead within the six-month safe harbor period.
Christian v. Flora     Docket
164 Cal.App.4th 539 – 3rd Dist. (C054523) 6/30/08     Case complete 9/2/08EASEMENTS: Where parcels in a subdivision are resubdivided by a subsequent parcel map, the new parcel map amends the provisions of any previously recorded parcel map made in compliance with the Map Act. Here, although the deeds to plaintiffs referred to the original parcel map, since the intent of the parties was that the easement shown on the amended parcel map would be conveyed, the grantees acquired title to the easement shown on the amended map.
Lange v. Schilling     Docket
163 Cal.App.4th 1412 – 3rd Dist. (C055471) 5/28/08; pub. order 6/16/08     Case Complete 8/18/08REAL ESTATE AGENTS: The clear language of the standard California real estate purchase agreement precludes an award of attorney’s fees if a party does not attempt mediation before commencing litigation. Because plaintiff filed his lawsuit before offering mediation, there was no basis to award attorney’s fees.
Talbott v. Hustwit     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
164 Cal.App.4th 148 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G037424) 6/20/08     Petition for review and depublication DENIED by Cal Supreme Ct. 9/24/08GUARANTEES:
1. C.C.P. 580a, which requires an appraisal of the real property security before the court may issue a deficiency judgment, does not apply to an action against a guarantor.
2. A lender cannot recover under a guaranty where there the debtor and guarantor already have identical liability, such as with general partners or trustees of a revocable trust in which the debtor is the settlor, trustee and primary beneficiary. Here, however, a  guarantee signed by the trustees of the debtors’ trust is enforceable as a “true guarantee” because, although the debtors were the settlors, they were a) secondary, not primary, beneficiaries and b) were not the trustees.
Mayer v. L & B Real Estate     Sup.Ct. Docket
43 Cal.4th 1231 – Cal. Supreme Court (S142211) 6/16/08TAX SALES: The one-year statute of limitations for attacking a tax sale does not begin to run against a property owner who is in “undisturbed possession” of the subject property until that owner has actual notice of the tax sale. Ordinarily, a property owner who has failed to pay property taxes has sufficient knowledge to put him on notice that a tax sale might result. However, in this case the property owners did not have notice because they purchased a single piece of commercial property and received a single yearly tax bill. They had no reason to suspect that due to errors committed by the tax assessor, a small portion of their property was being assessed separately and the tax bills were being sent to a previous owner.NOTE: This creates a hazard for title companies insuring after a tax sale in reliance on the one-year statute of limitations in Revenue and Taxation Code Section 3725.
California Golf v. Cooper     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
163 Cal.App.4th 1053 – 2nd Dist. (B195211) 6/9/08     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 9/17/08TRUSTEE’S SALES:
1. A bidder at a trustee’s sale may not challenge the sale on the basis that the lender previously obtained a decree of judicial foreclosure because the doctrine of election of remedies benefits only the trustor or debtor.
2. A lender’s remedies against a bidder who causes a bank to stop payment on cashier’s checks based on a false affidavit asserting that the checks were lost is not limited to the remedies set forth in CC Section 2924h, and may pursue a cause of  action for fraud against the bidder.
(The case contains a good discussion (at pp. 25 – 26) of the procedure for stopping payment on a cashier’s check by submitting an affidavit to the issuing bank.)
Biagini v. Beckham     Docket
163 Cal.App.4th 1000 – 3rd Dist. (C054915) 6/9/08     Case complete 8/11/08DEDICATION:
1. Acceptance of a dedication may be actual or implied. It is actual when formal acceptance is made by the proper authorities, and implied when a use has been made of the property by the public 1) of an  intensity that is reasonable for the nature of the road and 2) for such a length of time as will evidence an intention to accept the dedication. BUT the use in this case was not sufficient because the use was by neighbors whose use did not exceed what was permitted pursuant to a private easement over the same area.
2. A statutory offer of dedication can be revoked as to the public at large by use of the area that is inconsistent with the dedication, but the offer remains open for formal acceptance by the public entity to which the offer was made.
Steiner v. Thexton     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
Cal.App. 3rd Dist. (C054605) 5/28/08     REVERSED by Cal. Supreme Ct.OPTIONS: A contract to sell real property where the buyer’s performance was entirely conditioned on the buyer obtaining regulatory approval to subdivide the property is an option. An option must be supported by consideration, but was not here, where the buyer could back out at any time. Buyer’s promise to deliver to seller copies “of all information, reports, tests, studies and other documentation” was not sufficient consideration to support the option.
In re Marriage Cases     Docket
43 Cal.4th 757 – Cal. Supreme Court (S147999) 5/15/08MARRIAGE: The language of Family Code Section 300 limiting the designation of marriage to a union “between a man and a woman” is unconstitutional and must be stricken from the statute, and the remaining statutory language must be understood as making the designation of marriage available both to opposite-sex and same-sex couples.
Harvey v. The Landing Homeowners Association     Docket
162 Cal.App.4th 809 – 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D050263) 4/4/08 (Cert. for Pub. 4/30/08)     Case complete 6/30/08HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATIONS: The Board of Directors of an HOA has the authority to allow owners to exclusively use common area accessible only to those owners where the following provision of the CC&R’s applied: “The Board shall have the right to allow an Owner to exclusively use portions of the otherwise nonexclusive Common Area, provided that such portions . . . are nominal in area and adjacent to the Owner’s Exclusive Use Area(s) or Living Unit, and, provided further, that such use does not unreasonably interfere with any other Owner’s use . . .” Also, this is allowed under Civil Code Section 1363.07(a)(3)(E).
Salma v. Capon     Docket
161 Cal.App.4th 1275 – 1st Dist. (A115057) 4/9/08     Case complete 6/11/08HOME EQUITY SALES: A seller claimed he sold his house for far less than it was worth “due to the duress of an impending trustee’s sale and the deceit of the purchasers”. The case involves procedural issues that are not relevant to this web site. However, it is included here because it demonstrates the kind of mess that can occur when you are dealing with property that is in foreclosure. Be careful, folks.
Aviel v. Ng     Docket
161 Cal.App.4th 809 – 1st Dist. (A114930) 2/28/08; pub. order 4/1/08     Case complete 5/6/08LEASES / SUBORDINATION: A lease provision subordinating the lease to “mortgages” also applied to deeds of trust because the two instruments are functionally and legally the same. Therefore a foreclosure of a deed of trust wiped out the lease.
People v. Martinez     Docket
161 Cal.App.4th 754 – 4th Dist., Div. 2 (E042427) 4/1/08     Case complete 6/2/08FORGERY: This criminal case involves a conviction for forgery of a deed of trust. [NOTE: The crime of forgery can occur even if the owner actually signed the deed of trust. The court pointed out that “forgery is committed when a defendant, by fraud or trickery, causes another to execute a document where the signer is unaware, by reason of such trickery, that he is executing a document of that nature.”
Pacific Hills Homeowners Association v. Prun     Docket
160 Cal.App.4th 1557 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G038244) 3/20/08     Case complete 5/27/08CC&R’s: Defendants built a gate and fence within the setback required by the CC&R’s. 1) The court held that the 5-year statute of limitations of C.C.P. 336(b) applies to unrecorded as well as recorded restrictions, so that the shorter 4-year statute of limitations of C.C.P. 337 is inapplicable. 2) The court upheld the trial court’s equitable remedy of requiring the HOA to pay 2/3 of the cost of relocation defendant’s gate based upon the HOA’s sloppiness in not pursuing its case more promptly.
Nicoll v. Rudnick     Docket
160 Cal.App.4th 550 – 5th Dist. (F052948) 2/27/08     Case complete 4/28/08WATER RIGHTS: An appropriative water right established in a 1902 judgment applied to the entire 300 acre parcel so that when part of the parcel was foreclosed and subsequently re-sold, the water rights must be apportioned according to the acreage of each parcel, not according to the prior actual water usage attributable to each parcel. NOTE: This case contains a good explanation of California water rights law.
Real Estate Analytics v. Vallas     Docket
160 Cal.App.4th 463 – 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D049161) 2/26/08     Case complete 5/29/08SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE: Specific performance is appropriate even where the buyer’s sole purpose and entire intent in buying the property was to earn money for its investors and turn a profit as quickly as possible. The fact that plaintiff was motivated solely to make a profit from the purchase of the property does not overcome the strong statutory presumption that all land is unique and therefore damages were inadequate to make plaintiff whole for the defendant’s breach.
Fourth La Costa Condominium Owners Assn. v. Seith     Docket
159 Cal.App.4th 563 – 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D049276) 1/30/08     Case complete 4/1/08CC&R’s/HOMEOWNER’S ASSOCIATIONS: The court applied CC 1356(c)(2) and Corp. Code 7515, which allow a court to reduce the supermajority vote requirement for amending CC&R’s and bylaw because the amendments were reasonable and the balloting requirements of the statutes were met.
02 Development, LLC v. 607 South Park, LLC     Docket
159 Cal.App.4th 609 – 2nd Dist. (B200226) 1/30/08     Case complete 4/3/08SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE: 1) An assignment of a purchaser’s rights under a purchase agreement prior to creation of the assignee as an LLC is valid because an organization can enforce pre-organization contracts if the organization adopts or ratifies them. 2) A purchaser does not need to prove that it already had the necessary funds, or already had binding commitments from third parties to provide the funds, when the other party anticipatorily repudiates the contract. All that plaintiff needed to prove was that it would have been able to obtain the necessary funding (or funding commitments) in order to close the transaction on time.
Richeson v. Helal     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
158 Cal.App.4th 268 – 2nd Dist. (B187273) 11/29/07; Pub. & mod. order 12/21/07 (see end of opinion)     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 2/20/08CC&R’s / MUNICIPALITIES: An Agreement Imposing Restrictions (“AIR”) and CC&R’s did not properly lend themselves to an interpretation that would prohibit the City from changing the permitted use or zoning and, were they so construed, the AIR and CC&R’s would be invalid as an attempt by the City to surrender its future right to exercise its police power respecting the property. Here, the AIR and CC&R’s did not prohibit the City from issuing a new conditional use permit allowing the continued use of the subject property as a neighborhood market.
Bill Signs Trucking v. Signs Family Ltd. Partnership     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
157 Cal.App.4th 1515 – 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D047861) 12/18/07     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 4/9/08LEASES / RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL: A tenant’s right of first refusal under a commercial lease is not triggered by the conveyance of an interest in the property between co-partners in a family limited partnership that owns the property and is the landlord.
Schweitzer v. Westminster Investments     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
157 Cal.App.4th 1195 – 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D049589) 12/13/07     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 3/26/08EQUITY PURCHASERS:
1) The bonding requirement of the Home Equity Sales Contracts Act (Civil Code Section 1695.17) is void for vagueness under the due process clause and may not be enforced. Section 1695.17 is vague because it provides no guidance on the amount, the obligee, the beneficiaries, the terms or conditions of the bond, the delivery and acceptance requirements, or the enforcement mechanisms of the required bond.
2) Although the bond requirement may not be enforced, the remainder of the statutory scheme remains valid because the bond provisions are severable from the balance of the enactment.
3) The court refused to set aside the deed in favor of the equity purchaser because, first, the notice requirements of Civil Code Section 1695.5 appear to have been met and, second, the seller’s right to rescind applies before the deed is recorded but the statute “does not specify that a violation of section 1695.5 provides grounds for rescinding a transaction after recordation of the deed”.
Crestmar Owners Association v. Stapakis     Docket
157 Cal.App.4th 1223 – 2nd Dist. (B191049) 12/13/07     Case complete 2/15/07CC&R’s: Where a developer failed to convey title to two parking spaces as required by the CC&R’s, the homeowner’s association was able to quiet title even though more than 20 years had passed since the parking spaces should have been conveyed. The statute of limitations does not run against someone, such as the homeowner’s association here, who is in exclusive and undisputed possession of the property.
Washington Mutual Bank v. Blechman     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
157 Cal.App.4th 662 – 2nd Dist. (B191125) 12/4/07     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 3/19/08TRUSTEE’S SALES: The foreclosing lender and trustee are indispensable parties to a lawsuit which seeks to set aside a trustee’s sale. Therefore, a default judgment against only the purchaser at the trustee’s sale is subject to collateral attack.
Garretson v. Post     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
156 Cal.App.4th 1508 – 4th Dist., Div.2 (E041858) 11/20/07     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 2/27/08TRUSTEE’S SALES: A cause of action for wrongful foreclosure does not fall within the protection of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, commonly referred to as the anti-SLAPP statute (strategic lawsuit against public participation).
Murphy v. Burch     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
Cal.App. 1st Dist. (A117051) 11/19/07
AFFIRMED by Cal Supreme Ct. 4/27/09EASEMENT BY NECESSITY: An easement by necessity arises by operation of law when 1) there is a strict necessity as when a property is landlocked and 2) the dominant and servient tenements were under the same ownership at the time of the conveyance giving rise to the necessity. However, the second requirement is not met when the properties were owned by the federal government because the Government has the power of eminent domain, rendering it unnecessary to resort to the easement by necessity doctrine in order to acquire easements.The court attempts to distinguish Kellogg v. Garcia, 102 Cal.App.4th 796, by pointing out that in that case the issue of eminent domain did not arise because the dominant tenement was owned by a private party and the servient tenements by the federal government. [Ed. Note: the court does not adequately address the fact that the government does not always have the power of eminent domain. It only has that power if a public purpose is involved. Also, I do not think the court adequately distinguishes Kellogg, which seems to hold that common ownership by the federal government satisfies the requirement of common ownership.]
Elias Real Estate v. Tseng     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
156 Cal.App.4th 425 – 2nd Dist. (B192857) 10/25/07     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 2/13/08SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE: Acts of a partner falling within Corp. Code 16301(1) (acts in ordinary course of business) are not subject to the statute of frauds. Acts of a partner falling within Corp. Code 16301(2) (acts not in the ordinary course of business) are subject to the statute of frauds. In this case, a sale of the partnership’s real property was not in the ordinary course of business, so it fell within Corp. Code 16301(2) and plaintiff could not enforce a contract of sale signed by only one partner.
Strong v. State Board of Equalization     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
155 Cal.App.4th 1182 – 3rd Dist. (C052818) 10/2/07     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 1/3/08CHANGE OF OWNERSHIP: The statute that excludes transfers between domestic partners from property tax reassessment is constitutional.
County of Solano v. Handlery     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
155 Cal.App.4th 566 – 1st Dist. (A114120) 9/21/07     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 12/12/07DEEDS: The County brought an action against grantors’ heirs to invalidate restrictions in a deed limiting the subject property to use as a county fair or similar public purposes. The court refused to apply the Marketable Record Title Act to eliminate the power of termination in favor of the grantors because the restrictions are enforceable under the public trust doctrine.
Baccouche v. Blankenship     Docket
154 Cal.App.4th 1551 – 2nd Dist (B192291) 9/11/07     Case complete 11/16/07EASEMENTS: An easement that permits a use that is prohibited by a zoning ordinance is not void. It is a valid easement, but cannot be enforced unless the dominant owner obtains a variance. As is true with virtually all land use, whether a grantee can actually use the property for the purposes stated in the easement is subject to compliance with any applicable laws and ordinances, including zoning restrictions.
WRI Opportunity Loans II LLC v. Cooper     Docket
154 Cal.App.4th 525 – 2nd Dist. (B191590) 8/23/07     Case complete 10/26/07USURY: The trial court improperly granted a motion for summary judgment on the basis that the loan was exempt from the usury law.1. The common law exception to the usury law known as the “interest contingency rule” provides that interest that exceeds the legal maximum is not usurious when its payment is subject to a contingency so that the lender’s profit is wholly or partially put in hazard. The hazard in question must be something over and above the risk which exists with all loans – that the borrower will be unable to pay.
2. The court held that the interest contingency rule did not apply to additional interest based on a percentage of the sale price of completed condominium units because the lender was guaranteed additional interest regardless of whether the project generated rents or profits.
3. The loan did not qualify as a shared appreciation loan, permitted under Civil Code Sections 1917-1917.006, because the note guaranteed the additional interest regardless of whether the property appreciated in value or whether the project generated profits.
4. The usury defense may not be waived by guarantor of a loan. (No other published case has addressed this issue.)
Archdale v. American International Specialty Lines Ins. Co.     Docket
154 Cal.App.4th 449 – 2nd Dist. (B188432) 8/22/07     Case complete 10/26/07INSURANCE: The case contains good discussions of 1) an insurer’s liability for a judgment in excess of policy limits where it fails to accept a reasonable settlement offer within policy limits and 2) the applicable statutes of limitation.
REVERSED by Cal. Supreme Court 12/22/08
Patel v. Liebermensch
     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
154 Cal.App.4th 373 – 4th, Div. 1 (D048582) 8/21/07REVERSED: SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE: Specific performance of an option was denied where the parties never reached agreement on the amount of  the deposit, the length of time of the escrow or payment of escrow expenses if there were a delay. One judge dissented on the basis that the option contract was sufficiently clear to be specifically enforced and the court should insert reasonable terms in place of the uncertain terms.
In Re Marriage of Ruelas     Docket
154 Cal.App.4th 339 – 2nd Dist. (B191655) 8/20/07     Case complete 10/26/07RESULTING TRUST: A resulting trust was created where a daughter acquired property in her own name and the evidence showed that she was acquiring the property for her parents who had poor credit.
Stoneridge Parkway Partners v. MW Housing Partners     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
153 Cal.App.4th 1373 – 3rd Dist. (C052082) 8/3/07     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 11/14/07USURY: The exemption to the usury law for loans made or arranged by real estate brokers applies to a loan in which the broker who negotiated the loan was an employee of an affiliate of the lender, but nevertheless acted as a third party intermediary in negotiating the loan.
Kinney v. Overton     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
153 Cal.App.4th 482 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G037146) 7/18/07     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 10/10/07EASEMENTS: Former Civil Code Section 812 provided that

“[t]he vacation . . . of streets and highways shall extinguish all private easements therein claimed by reason of the purchase of any lot by reference to a map or plat upon which such streets or highways are shown, other than a private easement necessary for the purpose of ingress and egress to any such lot from or to a public street or highway, except as to any person claiming such easement who, within two years from the effective date of such vacation or abandonment . . . shall have recorded in the office of the recorder of the county in which such vacated or abandoned streets or highways are located a verified notice of his claim to such easement . . .” [Emphasis added.]

The court held that cross-complainant could not maintain an action against the person occupying the disputed abandoned parcel because it was not necessary for access and he did not record the notice required by C.C. Section 812. The court specifically did not address the state of title to the disputed parcel or what interest, if any, cross-defendant may have in the parcel.

Hartzheim v. Valley Land & Cattle Company     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
153 Cal.App.4th 383 – 6th Dist. (H030053) 7/17/07     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 10/10/07LEASES / RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL: A right of first refusal in a lease was not triggered by a partnership’s conveyance of property to the children and grandchildren of its partners for tax and estate planning purposes because it did not constitute a bona fide offer from any third party. The court considered three factors: 1) the contract terms must be reviewed closely to determine the conditions necessary to invoke the right, 2) where a right of first refusal is conditioned upon receipt of a bona fide third party offer to purchase the property, the right is not triggered by the mere conveyance of that property to a third party and 3) the formalities of the transaction must be reviewed to determine its true nature.
Berryman v. Merit Property Mgmt.     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
152 Cal.App.4th 1544 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G037156) 5/31/07     Petition for review by Cal Supreme DENIED 10/10/07HOMEOWNER’S ASSOCIATIONS: Fees charged by a homeowner’s association upon a transfer of title by a homeowner are limited by Civil Code Section 1368 to the association’s actual costs. The court held that this limitation does not apply to fees charged by a management company hired by the association.
Cal-Western Reconveyance Corp. v. Reed     Docket
152 Cal.App.4th 1308 – 2nd Dist. (B193014) 6/29/07     Case complete 8/29/07TRUSTEE’S SALES: After a trustee’s sale, the trustee deposited the surplus proceeds into court under CC 2924j in order to determine who was entitled to the excess proceeds. The court held that:
(1) The distribution of surplus proceeds to satisfy child and spousal support arrearages was proper because the County had properly recorded an abstract of support judgment,
(2) The trial court erred in distributing proceeds to the debtor’s former wife to satisfy her claims for a community property equalization payment and for attorney fees ordered in the dissolution proceeding, because no recorded lien or encumbrance secured those claims, which in any event were discharged in the debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding (because child and spousal support obligations are not dischargeable, but property settlement payments are dischargeable), and
(3) The trial court erred in distributing proceeds to the debtor’s former lawyer, who was retained to assist the debtor in the collection of proceeds from the trustee’s sale, because an attorney’s lien on the prospective recovery of a client must be enforced in a separate action.
(4) The debtor failed to produce sufficient evidence to support his claim that he was entitled to the $150,000 homestead exemption applicable when a debtor is physically disabled and unable to engage in substantial gainful employment (so he was entitled to only the standard $50,000 homestead exemption).
Poseidon Development v. Woodland Lane Estates     Order Modifying Opinion     Docket
152 Cal.App.4th 1106 – 3rd Dist. (C052573) 6/28/07     Case complete 8/31/07PROMISSORY NOTES: A penalty that applied to late payments of installments did not apply to a late payment of the final balloon payment of principal. The penalty was 10% of the amount due, which made sense for regular installments, but bore no reasonable relationship to actual damages if applied to the balloon payment.
Carr v. Kamins     Docket
151 Cal.App.4th 929 – 2nd Dist. (B191247) 5/31/07     Case complete 8/1/07QUIET TITLE: A quiet title judgment was set aside by defendant’s heir four years after being entered because the heir was not named and served. The plaintiff believed the defendant to be deceased, but made no effort to locate and serve the defendant’s heirs. [Even though this case contains some unique facts, the fact that a default judgment can be set aside four years after being entered demonstrates the danger of relying on default judgments and the need to closely examine the court file and surrounding circumstances before doing so.]
Estate of Yool     Docket
151 Cal.App.4th 867 – 1st Dist. (A114787) 5/31/07     Case complete 7/31/07RESULTING TRUST: A decedent held title with her daughter for the purpose of facilitating financing and did not intend to acquire beneficial title. A probate court properly ordered the Special Administrator to convey title to the daughter based on the Resulting Trust Doctrine. It held that the four-year statute of limitations under C.C.P. 343 applied and not C.C.P. 366.2, which limits actions to collect on debts of the decedent to one year after the date of death.
Kalway v. City of Berkeley     Docket
151 Cal.App.4th 827 – 1st Dist. (A112569) 5/31/07     Case complete 8/1/07SUBDIVISION MAP ACT: Plaintiff husband transferred title of a parcel to his wife in order to avoid merger under the Subdivision Map Act of a substandard parcel into their adjoining lot. The court held that plaintiffs could not evade the Map Act in this manner. It also held that the City had no authority to obtain an order canceling the deed, but that the wife also had no right to further transfer title to the substandard lot except back to her husband.
Delgado v. Interinsurance Exchange of the Auto Club of So. Cal.     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
Cal.App. 2nd Dist. (B191272) 6/25/07
REVERSED BY CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURTBAD FAITH: An insurance company acted in bad faith as a matter of law where a potential for coverage was apparent from the face of the complaint. The insured allegedly assaulted plaintiff and there was a potential for coverage because the insured may have acted in self defense. The case contains a thorough analysis of the duties of defense and indemnity.
Blackmore v. Powell     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
150 Cal.App.4th 1593 – 2nd Dist. (B185326) 5/22/07     Request for depublication DENIED 8/29/07EASEMENTS: An easement “for parking and garage purposes” includes the exclusive right to build and use a garage. Granting an exclusive easement may constitute a violation under the Subdivision Map act, but here there is no violation because the exclusive use of the garage covers only a small portion of the easement and is restricted to the uses described in the easement deed.
Amalgamated Bank v. Superior Court     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
149 Cal.App.4th 1003 – 3rd Dist. (C052156, C052395) 4/16/07     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 8/8/07LIS PENDENS:
1. In deciding a writ petition from an order granting or denying a motion to expunge a lis pendens after judgment and pending appeal, an appellate court must assess whether the underlying real property claim has “probable validity”. This is the same test that is used before judgment. “Probable validity” post-judgment means that it is more likely than not the real property claim will prevail at the end of the appellate process.
2. A judicial foreclosure sale to a third party is absolute, subject only to the right of redemption, and may not be set aside, except that under C.C.P. Section 701.680(c)(1) the judgment debtor may commence an action to set aside the sale within 90 days only if the purchaser at the sale was the judgment creditor. Here, a potential bidder who was stuck in traffic and arrived too late to the sale could not set it aside because only the judgment debtor can do that and because a third party purchased at the sale.
L&B Real Estate v. Housing Authority of Los Angeles     Docket
149 Cal.App.4th 950 – 2nd Dist. (B189740) 4/13/07     Case complete 6/13/07TAX DEEDS: Because public property is exempt from taxation, tax deeds purporting to convey such property for nonpayment of taxes are void. Two parcels were inadvertently not included in a deed to the State (subsequently conveyed to the Housing Authority of Los Angeles). Accordingly, the tax collector thought that those parcels were still owned by the seller and sold them at a tax sale after real estate taxes were not paid on them. The court also points out that plaintiff was not a good faith purchaser because it had constructive and actual knowledge of the fact that the Housing Authority’s low income housing was partially located on the two parcels sold at the tax sale.
Ulloa v. McMillin Real Estate     Docket
149 Cal.App.4th 333 – 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D048066) 3/7/07 (Cert. for pub. 4/4/07)     Case complete 6/4/07STATUTE OF FRAUDS: The Statute of Frauds requires the authority of an agent who signs a sales agreement to be in writing if the agent signs on behalf of the party to be charged. However, a plaintiff purchaser whose agent signed her name with only verbal authorization is not precluded by the Statute of Frauds from bringing the action because the defendant is the party to be charged.
Jordan v. Allstate Insurance Company     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
148 Cal.App.4th 1062 – 2nd Dist. (B187706) 3/22/07      Petition for review and depublication DENIED 6/27/07BAD FAITH: Where there is a genuine issue as to the insurer’s liability under the policy, there can be no bad faith liability imposed on the insurer for advancing its side of that dispute. However, there can be bad faith liability where an insurer denies coverage but a reasonable investigation would have disclosed facts showing the claim was covered under other provisions of the policy. The court clarified that an insurer’s failure to investigate can result in bad faith liability only if there is coverage. If there is no coverage, then any failure to properly investigate cannot cause the insured any damage.
Shah v. McMcMahon     Docket
148 Cal.App.4th 526 – 2nd Dist. (B188972) 3/12/07     Case complete 5/16/07LIS PENDENS: Plaintiffs could not appeal an order for attorney’s fees awarded in a hearing of a motion to expunge a lis pendens. The only remedy is to challenge the award by way of a petition for writ of mandate.
Sterling v. Taylor     Docket
40 Cal.4th 757 – Cal. Supreme Court (S121676) 3/1/07STATUTE OF FRAUDS: If a memorandum signed by the seller includes the essential terms of the parties’ agreement (i.e. the buyer, seller, price, property and the time and manner of payment), but the meaning of those terms is unclear, the memorandum is sufficient under the statute of frauds if extrinsic evidence clarifies the terms with reasonable certainty. Because the memorandum itself must include the essential contractual terms, extrinsic evidence cannot supply those required terms, however, it can be used to explain essential terms that were understood by the parties but would otherwise be unintelligible to others. In this case, the memorandum did not set forth the price with sufficient clarity because it was uncertain whether it was to be determined by a multiplier applied to the actual rent role or whether the price specified was the agreed price even though it was based on the parties’ incorrect estimate of the rent role.
Jet Source Charter v. Doherty     Docket
148 Cal.App.4th 1 – 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D044779) 1/30/07     (Pub. order and modification filed 2/28/07 – see end of opinion) Case complete 5/1/07PUNITIVE DAMAGES: Parts I, II, III and IV NOT certified for publication: Where the defendant’s conduct only involves economic damage to a single plaintiff who is not particularly vulnerable, an award which exceeds the compensatory damages awarded is not consistent with due process.
Dyer v. Martinez     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
147 Cal.App.4th 1240 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G037423) 2/23/07     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 6/13/07RECORDING: A lis pendens that was recorded but not indexed does not impart constructive notice, so a bona fide purchaser for value takes free of the lis pendens. The party seeking recordation must ensure that all the statutory requirements are met and the recorder is deemed to be an agent of the recording party for this purpose.
Behniwal v. Mix     Docket
147 Cal.App.4th 621 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G037200) 2/7/07     Case complete 4/13/07SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE: In a specific performance action, a judgment for plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees cannot be offset against the purchase price that the successful plaintiff must pay defendant for the property. A judgment for attorneys’ fees is not an incidental cost that can be included as part of the specific performance judgment, and it is not a lien that relates back to the filing of the lis pendens. Instead, it is an ordinary money judgment that does not relate back to the lis pendens. So, while plaintiff’s title will be superior to defendant’s liens that recorded subsequent to the lis pendens, those liens are nevertheless entitled to be paid to the extent of available proceeds from the full purchase price.
Castillo v. Express Escrow     Docket
146 Cal.App.4th 1301 – 2nd Dist. (B186306) 1/18/07     Case complete 3/20/07MOBILEHOME ESCROWS:
1) Health and Safety Code Section 18035(f) requires the escrow agent for a mobile home sale to hold funds in escrow upon receiving written notice of a dispute between the parties, even though the statute specifically states “unless otherwise specified in the escrow instructions” and even though the escrow instructions provided that escrow was to close unless “a written demand shall have been made upon you not to complete it”.
2) Section 18035(f) does not require the written notice of dispute to cite the code section, or to be in any particular form, or that the notice be addressed directly to the escrow holder, or that the notice contain an express request not to close escrow. The subdivision requires nothing more than that the escrow agent receive notice in writing of a dispute between the parties. So receiving a copy of the buyer’s attorney’s letter to the seller was sufficient to notify the escrow agent that a dispute existed.
Rappaport-Scott v. Interinsurance Exchange     Docket
146 Cal.App.4th 831 – 2nd Dist (B184917) 1/11/07     Case complete 3/14/07INSURANCE: An insurer’s duty to accept reasonable settlement offers within policy limits applies only to third party actions and not to settlement offers from an insured. An insurer has a duty not to unreasonable withhold payments due under a policy. But withholding benefits under a policy is not unreasonable if there is a genuine dispute between the insurer and the insured as to coverage or the amount of payment due, which is what occurred in this case.
In re: Rabin
BAP 9th Circuit 12/8/06BANKRUPTCY/HOMESTEADS: Under California law, the homestead exemption rights of registered domestic partners are identical to those of people who are married. Therefore, domestic partners are limited to a single combined exemption, in the same manner as people who are married. In the absence of a domestic partnership or marriage, each cotenant is entitled to the full homestead exemption.
Wachovia Bank v. Lifetime Industries     Docket
145 Cal.App.4th 1039 – 4th Dist., Div. 2 (E037560) 12/15/06     Case complete 2/16/07OPTIONS:
1. When the holder of an option to purchase real property exercises the option and thereby obtains title to the property, the optionee’s title relates back to the date the option was given, as long as the optionee has the right to compel specific performance of the option. But where the optionee acquires title in a transaction unconnected with the option, such as where there has been a breach of the option agreement so that the optionee did not have the right to specific performance, the optionee takes subject to intervening interests just like any other purchaser.
2. Civil Code Section 2906 provides a safe harbor for a lender to avoid the rule against “clogging” the equity of redemption as long as the option is not dependent on the borrower’s default. But even if the lender falls outside the safe harbor because the exercise of the option is dependent upon borrower’s default, it does not automatically follow that the option is void. Instead, the court will analyze the circumstances surrounding the transaction and the intent of the parties to determine whether the option is either void or a disguised mortgage. Also, even if the transaction is a disguised mortgage the optionee (now mortgagee) has a right to judicially foreclose, which will wipe out intervening interests.
Wright v. City of Morro Bay     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
144 Cal.App.4th 767, 145 Cal.App.4th 309a – 2nd Dist (B176929) 11/7/06     Modification of Opinion 12/6/06     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 2/21/07DEDICATION/ABANDONMENT: C.C.P. 771.010, which provides for termination of an offer of dedication if not accepted within 25 years, did not apply because 1) the statute cannot be applied retroactively to the City’s acceptance occurring more than 25 years after the offer of dedication and 2) the area covered by the dedicated road has never been used by anyone, so the requirement that the property be “used as if free of the dedication” was not met.
State Farm General Insurance Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank     Docket
143 Cal.App.4th 1098 – 1st Dist. (A111643) 10/10/06     Case complete 12/11/06The “superior equities rule” prevents an insurer, who is subrogated to the rights of the insured after paying a claim, from recovering against a party whose equities are equal or superior to those of the insurer. Thus, an insurer may not recover from an alleged tortfeasor where the tortfeasor’s alleged negligence did not directly cause the insured’s loss. The court questioned the continued vitality of the superior equities rule in California, but felt compelled to follow a 1938 Supreme Court case that applied the rule. The court suggests that the Supreme Court should re-address the issue in light of modern day fault principles.
Corona Fruits & Veggies v. Frozsun Foods     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
143 Cal.App.4th 319 – 2nd Dist. (B184507) 9/25/06     Petition for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 12/20/06UCC: A UCC-1 financing statement filed in the name of Armando Munoz is not effective where the debtor’s true name was Armando Munoz Juarez.
Warren v. Merrill     Docket
143 Cal.App.4th 96 – 2nd Dist. (B186698) 9/21/06     Case complete 11/21/06QUIET TITLE: The Court quieted title in plaintiff where title was taken in the real estate agent’s daughter’s name as part of a fraudulent scheme perpetrated by the agent. This is not a significant title insurance case, but I posted it for reference since it involves quiet title.
McKell v. Washington Mutual     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
142 Cal.App.4th 1457 – 2nd Dist. (B176377) 9/18/06     Request for depublication DENIED 1/17/07RESPA: Washington Mutual (i) charged hundreds of dollars in “underwriting fees” when the underwriting fee charged by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to WAMU was only $20 and (ii) marked up the charges for real estate tax verifications and wire transfer fees. The court followed Kruse v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (2d Cir. 2004) 383 F.3d 49, holding that marking up costs, for which no additional services are performed, is a violation of RESPA. Such a violation of federal law constitutes an unlawful business practice under California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) and a breach of contract. Plaintiffs also stated a cause of action for an unfair business practice under the UCL based on the allegation that WAMU led them to believe they were being charged the actual cost of third-party services.
Reilly v. City and County of San Francisco     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
142 Cal.App.4th 480 – 1st Dist. (A109062) 8/29/06     Request for depublication DENIED 12/13/06PROPERTY TAX: A change in ownership of real property held by a testamentary trust occurs when an income beneficiary of the trust dies and is succeeded by another income beneficiary. Also, for purposes of determining change in ownership, a life estate either in income from the property or in the property itself is an interest equivalent in value to the fee interest.
Markowitz v. Fidelity     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
142 Cal.App.4th 508 – 2nd Dist. (B179923) 5/31/06     Publication ordered by Cal. Supreme Court 8/30/06ESCROW: Civil Code Section 2941, which permits a title insurance company to record a release of a deed of trust if the lender fails to do so, does not impose an obligation on an escrow holder/title company to record the reconveyance on behalf of the trustee. Citing other authority, the Court states that an escrow holder has no general duty to police the affairs of its depositors; rather, an escrow holder’s obligations are limited to faithful compliance with the parties’ instructions, and absent clear evidence of fraud, an escrow holder’s obligations are limited to compliance with the parties’ instructions. The fact that the borrower had an interest in the loan escrow does not mean that he was a party to the escrow, or to the escrow instructions.
Cebular v. Cooper Arms Homeowners Association     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
142 Cal.App.4th 106 – 2nd Dist. (B182555) 8/21/06     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 11/15/06; Request to publish Part III, Sec. B filed 10/24/06COVENANTS, CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS: It is not unreasonable for CC&R’s to allocate dues obligations differently for each unit, along with the same allocation of voting rights, even though each unit uses the common areas equally. Although the allocation does not make much sense, courts are disinclined to question the wisdom of agreed-to restrictions.
Bernard v. Foley     Docket
39 Cal.4th 794 – Cal. Supreme Court (S136070) (8/21/06)TESTAMENTARY TRANSFERS: Under Probate Code Section 21350, “care custodians” are presumptively disqualified from receiving testamentary transfers from dependent adults to whom they provide personal care, including health services. The Court held that the term “care custodian” includes unrelated persons, even where the service relationship arises out of a preexisting personal friendship rather than a professional or occupational connection. Accordingly, the Court set aside amendments to decedent’s will that were made shortly before decedent’s death, which would have given most of the estate to the care providers.
Regency Outdoor Advertising v. City of Los Angeles     Docket
39 Cal.4th 507 – Cal. Supreme Court (S132619) 8/7/06     Modification of Opinion 10/11/06ABUTTER’S RIGHTS: There is no right to be seen from a public way, so the city is not liable for damages resulting from the view of plaintiff’s billboard caused by planting trees along a city street. The court pointed out that a private party who blocks the view of someone’s property by obstructing a public way would be liable to someone in plaintiff’s position.
Kleveland v. Chicago Title Insurance Company     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
141 Cal.App.4th 761 – 2nd Dist. (B187427) 7/24/06     Case complete 10/5/06     Request for depublication DENIED 10/25/06TITLE INSURANCE: An arbitration clause in a title policy is not enforceable where the preliminary report did not contain an arbitration clause and did not incorporate by reference the arbitration clause in the CLTA policy actually issued. (The preliminary report incorporated by reference the provisions of a Homeowner’s Policy of Title Insurance with a somewhat different arbitration clause, but a CLTA policy was actually issued.)
Essex Insurance Company v. Five Star Dye House     Docket
38 Cal.4th 1252 – Cal. Supreme Court (S131992) 7/6/06INSURANCE: When an insured assigns a claim for bad faith against the insurer, the assignee may recover Brandt (attorney) fees. Although purely personal causes of action are not assignable, such as claims for emotional distress or punitive damages, Brandt fees constitute an economic loss and are not personal in nature.
Peak Investments v. South Peak Homeowners Association     Docket
140 Cal.App.4th 1363 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G035851) 6/28/06     Case complete 8/31/06HOMEOWNER’S ASSOCIATIONS: Where CC&R’s require approval by more than 50 percent of owners in order to amend the Declaration, Civil Code Section 1356(a) allows a court, if certain conditions are met, to reduce the percentage of votes required, if it was approved by “owners having more than 50 percent of the votes in the association”. The Court held that the quoted phrase means a majority of the total votes in the HOA, not merely a majority of those votes that are cast.
CTC Real Estate Services v. Lepe     Docket
140 Cal.App.4th 856 – 2nd Dist. (B185320) 6/21/06     Case complete 8/23/06TRUSTEE’S SALES: The victim of an identity theft, whose name was used to obtain a loan secured by a purchase money deed of trust to acquire real property, may, as the only claimant, recover undistributed surplus proceeds that remained after a trustee sale of the property and the satisfaction of creditors. The Court pointed out that a victim of theft is entitled to recover the assets stolen or anything acquired with the stolen assets, even if the value of those assets exceeds the value of that which was stolen.
Slintak v. Buckeye Retirement Co.     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
139 Cal.App.4th 575 – 2nd Dist. (B182875) 5/16/06     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 9/13/06MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT
1) Under Civil Code Section 882.020(a)(1), a deed of trust expires after 10 years where “the final maturity date or the last date fixed for payment of the debt or performance of the obligation is ascertainable from the record”. Here, the October 1992 Notice of Default was recorded and contained the due date of the subject note; thus, the due date is “ascertainable from the record” and the 10-year limitations period of section 882.020(a)(1) applies.2) Under C.C. Section 880.260, if an action is commenced and a lis pendens filed by the owner to quiet or clear title, the running of the 10-year limitations period is reset and a new 10-year limitations period commences on the date of the recording of the lis pendens. After the expiration of the recommenced 10-year period, the power of sale in the trust deed expires.
Preciado v. Wilde     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
139 Cal.App.4th 321 – 2nd Dist. (B182257) 5/9/06     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 8/16/06ADVERSE POSSESSION: Plaintiffs failed to establish adverse possession against defendant, with whom they held title as tenants in common. Before title may be acquired by adverse possession as between cotenants, the occupying tenant must impart notice to the tenant out of possession, by acts of ownership of the most open, notorious and unequivocal character, that he intends to oust the latter of his interest in the common property. Such evidence must be stronger than that which would be required to establish title by adverse possession in a stranger.
UNPUBLISHED Harbor Pipe v. Stevens
Cal.App. 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G035530) 4/4/06     Case complete 6/6/06JUDGMENTS: A judgment lien against the settlor of a revocable trust attached to trust property where the identity of the settlor is reflected in the chain of title, so a purchaser takes subject to the judgment lien. NOTE: In other words, title companies need to check the names of the settlors in the General Index when title is held in trust.
Aaron v. Dunham     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
137 Cal.App.4th 1244 – 1st Dist. (A109488) 3/15/06     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 6/21/06PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS: 1) Permission granted to an owner does not constitute permission to a successor. 2) Under Civil Code Section 1008, signs preventing prescriptive rights must be posted by an owner or his agent, so signs posted by a lessee without the knowledge of the owner, do not qualify.
***DECERTIFIED***
Newmyer v. Parklands Ranch     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
Cal.App. 2nd Dist. (B180461) 3/23/06     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED; CA opinion DECERTIFIED 6/14/06EASEMENTS: The owner of the dominant tenement possessing over the servient tenement an access easement that includes the right to grant other easements for “like purposes” may convey to an owner of property adjoining the dominant tenement an enforceable easement for access over the servient tenement.
Marion Drive LLC v. Saladino     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
136 Cal.App.4th 1432 – 2nd Dist. (B182727) 2/27/06     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 5/24/06ASSESSMENT LIEN: After a tax sale, the holder of a bond secured by a 1911 Act assessment lien has priority as to surplus tax sale proceeds over a subsequently recorded deed of trust. This is true even though the bond holder purchased the property from the tax sale purchaser. The Court rejected defendant’s argument that fee title had merged with the assessment lien.
Barnes v. Hussa     Docket
136 Cal.App.4th 1358 – 3rd Dist. (C049163) 2/24/06     Case complete 4/26/06LICENSES / WATER RIGHTS: The Plaintiff did not overburden a license to run water in a pipeline across defendant’s property where he extended the pipeline to other property he owned because there was no increase in the burden on the servient tenement and no harm to defendants. A couple of interesting things pointed out by the Court are: 1) A person entitled to use water may use it elsewhere as long as others are not injured by the change, and 2) “An irrevocable license . . . is for all intents and purposes the equivalent of an easement.”
***REVERSED***
Mayer v. L & B Real Estate
     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
Cal.App. 2nd Dist. (B180540) 2/14/06     REVERSED by Cal Supreme Ct. 6/16/08TAX SALES: The one-year statute of limitations for attacking a tax sale applies to preclude an action by a property owner who had actual notice of the tax sale, even where the tax collector’s conduct was egregious. The Court did not reach the question of whether the tax collector satisfied its due process obligations, but refers to a Supreme Court case which held that the limitations period is enforceable even if the defect is constitutional in nature. That case recognized a limited exception where an owner is in “undisturbed possession” such that the owner lacked any reasonable means of alerting himself to the tax sale proceedings.
Wright Construction Co. v. BBIC Investors     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
136 Cal.App.4th 228 – 1st Dist. (A109876) 1/31/06     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 4/26/06MECHANICS’ LIENS: A mechanic’s lien is premature and invalid under Civil Code Section 3115 if it is recorded before the contractor “completes his contract”. A contract is complete for purposes of commencing the recordation period under section 3115 when all work under the contract has been performed, excused, or otherwise discharged. Here, because of the tenant’s anticipatory breach of the contract, plaintiff had “complete[d] [its] contract” within the meaning of section 3115 the day before the claim of lien was recorded, so the claim of lien was not premature. In a previous writ proceeding, the Court held that the landlord’s notice of nonresponsibility was invalid under the “participating owner doctrine” because the landlord caused the work of improvement to be performed by requiring the lessee to make improvements.
Torres v. Torres     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
135 Cal.App.4th 870 – 2nd Dist. (B179146) 1/17/06     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 4/12/06POWER OF ATTORNEY: 1) A statutory form power of attorney is not properly completed where the principal marks the lines specifying the powers with an “X” instead of initials, as required by the form. However, the form is not the exclusive means of creating a power of attorney, so even though it is not valid as a statutory form, it is valid as regular power of attorney. 2) Under Probate Code Section 4264, an attorney in fact may not make a gift of the principal’s property unless specifically authorized to do so in the power of attorney. Here, the principal quitclaimed the property to himself, the other attorney in fact and the principal as joint tenants. However, the court refused to invalidate the conveyance because the plaintiff failed to produce any evidence that the conveyance was not supported by consideration.
Ung v. Koehler     Order Modifying Opinion     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
135 Cal.App.4th 186 – 1st Dist. (A109532) 12/28/05     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 4/12/06TRUSTEE’S SALES:
1. Expiration of the underlying obligation does not preclude enforcement of the power of sale under a deed of trust.
2. A power of sale expires after 60 years or, if the last date fixed for payment of the debt is ascertainable from the record, 10 years after that date.
3. In order to avoid a statutory absurdity, a notice of default that is recorded more than 10 years after “the last date fixed for payment of the debt” does not constitute a part of the “record” for purposes of Civil Code Section 882.020(a).
Trust One Mortgage v. Invest America Mortgage     Docket
134 Cal.App.4th 1302 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G035111) 12/15/05     Case complete 2/21/06TRUSTEE’S SALES/ANTI-DEFICIENCY: An indemnification agreement is enforceable after a non-judicial foreclosure where the indemnitor is not the same person as the obligor. If the indemnitor and obligor were the same, the indemnity would be void as an attempt to circumvent antideficiency protections.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Citifinancial Mortgage Company v. Missionary Foundation     Docket
Cal.App. 2nd (B178664) 12/14/05     Case complete 2/16/06MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT: (UNPUBLISHED OPINION) Under Civil Code Section 882.020(a)(1), a deed of trust becomes unenforceable 10 years after the final maturity date, or the last date fixed for payment of the debt or performance of the obligation, if that date is ascertainable from the record. Here, the record showed via an Order Confirming Sale of Real Property that the obligation was due five years after close of escrow. The Court held that since “close of escrow” is an event, and not a date certain, Section 882.020(a)(1) did not apply in spite of the fact that escrow must have closed in order for the deed of trust to have been recorded.
McElroy v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp.     Docket
134 Cal.App. 4th 388 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G034588) 11/1/05     Case complete 2/1/06TRUSTEE’S SALES: The Court refused to set aside a trustee’s sale where the lender foreclosed after the trustors tendered payment in the form of a “Bonded Bill of Exchange Order”. The Court determined that “the Bill is a worthless piece of paper, consisting of nothing more than a string of words that sound as though they belong in a legal document, but which, in reality, are incomprehensible, signifying nothing.”
***DECERTIFIED***
The Santa Anita Companies v. Westfield Corporation     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
134 Cal.App.4th 77 – 2nd Dist. (B175820) 11/17/05     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED and DECERTIFIED 01/25/06DEEDS: The 3-year statute of limitations under C.C.P. 338(d) to seek relief on the ground of mistake does not begin to run until discovery of the mistake or receiving facts that would put a reasonable person on notice of the mistake. The fact that carefully reading the deed would have revealed the mistake is not sufficient to charge the plaintiff with notice, so the statute of limitations did not begin to run until plaintiff actually became aware of the error, and this action was therefore timely.
Big Valley Band of Pomo Indians v. Superior Court     Docket
133 Cal.App.4th 1185 – 1st Dist. (A108615) 11/1/05     Case complete 1/4/06INDIANS: An employment agreement with an Indian tribe contained the following clause: “Any claim or controversy arising out of or relating to any provisions of this Agreement, or breach thereof, shall . . . be resolved by arbitration under the rules of the American Arbitration Association in San Francisco, California, and judgment on any award by the arbitrators may be entered in any court having such jurisdiction”. The court held that the effect of the arbitration clause as limited to a consent to arbitrate and enforce any award in state court. But this clause was insufficient to waive the tribe’s immunity from a breach of contract action brought in state court. So plaintiffs are apparently free to bring the same breach of contract claims in an arbitration proceeding.
Behniwal v. Mix     Docket
133 Cal.App.4th 1027 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G034074) 9/30/05     Case complete 1/3/06STATUTE OF FRAUDS: A sales contract signed on the sellers’ behalf by their real estate agent did not satisfy the Statute of Frauds because the agent did not have written authority to sign for the sellers. However, a contract which must be in writing can be ratified if the ratification is also in writing. Here the sellers ratified the contract by a sufficient written ratification where they subsequently signed disclosure documents that specifically referred to the contract signed by the real estate agent.
Behniwal v. Superior Court     Docket
133 Cal.App.4th 1048 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G035299) 9/30/05     Case complete 1/3/06LIS PENDENS: (Related to Mix v. Superior Court, several cases below.) Having determined that the plaintiffs have at least a “probably valid” real property claim, the Court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the Superior Court to vacate its order expunging the lis pendens. The lis pendens will therefore protect plaintiff’s claim until the time for appeal to the Supreme Court expires or unless the Supreme Court issues its own writ directing that the lis pendens be expunged.
Zipperer v. County of Santa Clara     Docket
133 Cal.App.4th 1013 – 6th Dist. (H028455) 9/30/05 (Mod. 10/28/05)     Case complete 12/28/05EASEMENTS:
PUBLISHED PORTION: The Solar Shade Control Act provides that “. . . no person owning, or in control of a property shall allow a tree or shrub to be placed, or, if placed, to grow on such property, subsequent to the installation of a solar collector on the property of another so as to cast a shadow greater than 10 percent of the collector absorption area”. The County is exempt from the Act because it adopted an ordinance pursuant to a statute allowing cities and counties to exempt themselves from the Act. The Court did not address the issue of whether the act applies where a tree is not “placed” by a property owner.UNPUBLISHED PORTION: A common law easement for light and air generally may be created only by express written instrument. A statutory “solar easement” under Civil Code Section 801.5 may be created only by an instrument containing specified terms. The Court held that the County did not have an obligation to trim trees to avoid shading plaintiff’s solar panels, rejecting several theories asserted by plaintiff.
Fishback v. County of Ventura     Docket
133 Cal.App.4th 896 – 2nd Dist. (B177462) 10/26/05     Case complete 1/9/06SUBDIVISION MAP ACT: Under the 1937 and 1943 Subdivision Map Acts, “subdivision” was defined as “any land or portion thereof shown on the last preceding tax roll as a unit or as contiguous units which is divided for the purpose of sale . . . into five or more parcels within any one year period.” The Court makes numerous points interpreting those statutes, some of the most significant being: 1) Once the fifth parcel is created within a one-year period, all the parcels created within that year constitute a subdivision; 2) Even though a unit of land is defined as a unit as shown on the last tax roll preceding the division, that does not mean the unit shown on the last preceding tax roll is a legal parcel, and legal parcels cannot be created by dividing that illegal parcel; and 3) If land is divided for the purpose of sale, it is irrelevant that the retained parcel is not held for the purpose of sale. Thus, for example, if the owner of a unit of land divides it in half, the unit is divided for the purpose of sale even if the owner intends to sell only one half and keep the other.
Attorney General Opinion No. 04-1105
10/3/05ASSESSOR’S RECORDS: County Assessors maintain parcel boundary map data, which is detailed geographic information used to describe and define the precise geographic boundaries of assessor’s parcels. When maintained in electronic format, Assessors must make copies in electronic format available to the public. The fee charged for producing the copy is limited to the direct cost of producing the copy in electronic format, and may not include expenses associated with the county’s initial gathering of the information, with initial conversion of the information into electronic format, or with maintaining the information.
Villacreses v. Molinari     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
132 Cal.App.4th 1223 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G034719) 9/26/05     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 12/14/05ARBITRATION: Section 1298 requires that an arbitration provision in a real estate contract be accompanied by a statutory notice and that the parties indicate their assent by placing their initials on an adjacent space or line. The arbitration notice, standing alone, does not constitute an arbitration provision. So the Defendants could not compel arbitration where the contract contained only the notice, but did not contain a separate arbitration provision.The Court has a good sense of humor. The opinion contains the following memorable quotes:

1. “If the first rule of medicine is ‘Do no harm,’ the first rule of contracting should be ‘Read the documents’.”

2. “. . . to paraphrase the immortal words of a former President of the United States, the applicability of this purported arbitration agreement to the instant dispute ‘depends upon what the meaning of the word “it” is.'”

Campbell v. Superior Court (La Barrie)     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
132 Cal.App.4th 904 – 4th Dist., Div. 1 (D046064) 9/14/05     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 12/14/05LIS PENDENS: A cause of action for a constructive trust or an equitable lien does not support a lis pendens where it is merely for the purpose of securing a judgment for money damages. [Ed. Note: The Court in this and similar cases make the absolute statement that “an equitable lien does not support a lis pendens”, and explain that the lien is sought merely to secure a money judgment. But it is unclear whether the Court would reach the same conclusion in a pure equitable lien case. For example, where a loan is paid off with the proceeds of a new loan, but the new mortgage accidentally fails to be recorded, an action to impose an equitable lien seeks more than a mere money judgment. It seeks to allow the new lender to step into the shoes of the old lender and, in my opinion, a lis pendens should be allowed.]
Fripp v. Walters Docket     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
132 Cal.App.4th 656 – 3rd Dist. (C046733) 9/7/05 (ONLY PART I CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION)     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 11/16/05BOUNDARIES / SURVEYS: A conveyance referring to a parcel map cannot convey more property than the creator of the parcel map owned. The Court rejected Defendant’s claim that the recorded parcel map was a “government sanctioned survey” which precludes a showing that the boundaries established by the parcel map are erroneous. The court explained that the rule cited by Defendants applies only to official survey maps that create boundaries. Boundary lines cannot be questioned after the conveyance of public land to a private party, even if they are inaccurate.
Title Trust Deed Service Co. v. Pearson     Docket
132 Cal.App.4th 168 – 2nd Dist (B175067) 8/25/05     Case complete 10/28/05HOMESTEADS: A declared homestead exemption applies to surplus proceeds from a trustee’s sale. [Comment: Applying the declared homestead exemption to trustee’s sales is fine. But the Court also seems to want to pay surplus proceeds to the debtor up to the amount of the exemption before paying the holder of a junior trust deed. This should be wrong since the homestead exemption does not apply to voluntary liens. I think the Court does not adequately address what appears to me to be a circuity of priority problem: The homestead exemption is senior to the judgment lien, which in this case happens to be senior to a junior TD, which is senior to the homestead exemption.]
In re Marriage of Benson     Docket
36 Cal.4th 1096 – Cal. Supreme Court (S122254) 8/11/05COMMUNITY PROPERTY: The doctrine of partial performance, which is an exception to the Statute of Frauds, is not an exception to the requirement of Family Code Section 852 that an agreement to transmute property be in writing. The concurring opinion points out that the Court does not decide what statutory or equitable remedy would be available to make whole a spouse who has been disadvantaged by an illusory oral promise to transmute property, or what sanction may be employed against a spouse who has used section 852(a) as a means of breaching his or her fiduciary duty and gaining unjust enrichment.
First Federal Bank v. Fegen     Docket
131 Cal.App.4th 798 – 2nd Dist. (B174252) 7/29/05     Case complete 9/29/05JUDGMENTS: The Court dismissed an appeal as being moot where the debtor did not post a bond after a sheriff’s sale of real property. C.C.P. Section 917.4 provides that an appeal of an order directing the sale of real property does not stay enforcement of the order. A sheriff’s sale is final, except that the debtor can commence an action within 90 days to set aside the sale if the judgment creditor is the successful bidder. Here, the debtor failed to file an action within 90 days so the sale is final.
Bear Creek Master Association v. Edwards     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
130 Cal.App.4th 1470 – 4th Dist. Div. 2 (E034859) 7/13/05     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 10/19/05CONDOMINIUMS: The definition of “condominium” in Civil Code Section 1351(f) does not require that an actual structure has been built; rather it only requires that it be described in a recorded condominium plan. (Note, however, that under CC 1352 the condominium does not come into existence until a condominium unit has been conveyed.) The case also contains an extensive discussion of the procedural requirements for foreclosing on an assessment lien recorded by the homeowner’s association.
Woodridge Escondido Property Owners Assn. v. Nielsen     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
130 Cal.App.4th 559 – 4th Dist. Div. 1 (D044294) 5/25/05 (pub. order 6/16/05)     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 8/31/05CC&R’s: A provision in CC&R’s that prohibited construction of a permanent structure in an easement area applied to a deck because it was attached to the house and had supporting posts that were buried in the ground, such that it was designed to continue indefinitely without change and was constructed to last or endure.
Beyer v. Tahoe Sands Resort     Docket
129 Cal.App.4th 1458 – 3rd Dist. (C045691) 6/8/05     Case complete 8/8/05EASEMENTS: California Civil Code Section 805 provides that a servitude cannot be held by the owner of the servient tenement. The Court held that the term “owner” under Section 805 means the owner of the full fee title, both legal and equitable, such that a property owner who owns less than full title may validly create easements in his own favor on his land. Here, the Court held that the grantor could reserve an easement over property conveyed to a time-share trustee where the grantor held all beneficial interest in the trust and the grantee held just bare legal title.
Bank of America v. La Jolla Group     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
129 Cal.App.4th 706 – 5th Dist. (F045318) 5/19/05     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 9/7/05TRUSTEE’S SALES: A trustee’s sale, which was accidentally held after the owner and lender agreed to reinstate the loan, is invalid. The conclusive presumptions in Civil Code Section 2924 pertain only to notice requirements, not to every defect or inadequacy. The Court points out that the advantages of being a bona fide purchaser are not limited to the presumptions set forth in Section 2924, but does not discuss it further because the defendant did not argue that its bona fide purchaser status supports its position in any way other than the statutory presumptions.
Zabrucky v. McAdams     Docket
129 Cal.App.4th 618 – 2nd Dist. (B167590) 5/18/05     Case complete 7/20/05COVENANTS, CONDITIONS & RESTRICTIONS: The Court interpreted a provision in CC&R’s to prohibit an addition to a house which would unreasonably obstruct a neighbor’s view. The Court painstakingly nit-picked through the provisions of the CC&R’s and compared the provisions and the facts to other cases where courts have done the same. The main conclusion I draw is that these cases are each unique and it is very difficult to determine in advance what a court will do. In fact, one judge dissented in this case. This means it can be very dangerous to issue endorsements such as CLTA Endorsement No. 100.6 or 100.28, insuring against this kind of provision in CC&R’s.
Anolik v. EMC Mortgage Corp.     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
Cal.App. 3rd Dist. (C044201) 4/29/05 (Mod. 5/26/05)     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED and DECERTIFIED 8/10/05***DECERTIFIED***
TRUSTEE’S SALES:
1. To be valid, a notice of default must contain at least one correct statement of a breach, and it must be substantial enough to authorize use of the drastic remedy of nonjudicial foreclosure.
2. An assertion in a notice of default of one or more breaches qualified with the words “if any” does not satisfy the requirements of section 2924 because it indicates that the lender has no clue as to the truth or falsity of the assertion.
3. It is not proper to declare a payment in default when the time for imposing a late fee on that payment has not expired because the default is not sufficiently substantial at that point.
4. Under Civil Code Section 2954, a lender cannot force impound payments for property taxes until the borrower has failed to pay two consecutive tax installments.
Kangarlou v. Progressive Title Company     Docket
128 Cal.App.4th 1174 – 2nd Dist. (B177400) 4/28/05     Case complete 6/29/05ESCROW: 1. Under Civil Code Section 1717, plaintiff can recover attorney’s fees after prevailing in an action against the escrow holder, even though the escrow instructions limited attorney’s fees to actions to collect escrow fees.
2. Under Business and Professions Code Section 10138, an escrow holder has a duty to obtain evidence that a real estate broker was regularly licensed before delivering compensation.
Paul v. Schoellkopf     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
128 Cal.App.4th 147 – 2nd Dist. (B170379) 4/5/05     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 6/15/05ESCROW: A provision for attorneys’ fees in escrow instructions limited to fees incurred by the escrow company in collecting for escrow services does not apply to other disputes between the buyer and seller.
Knight v. Superior Court     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
128 Cal.App.4th 14 – 3rd Dist. (C048378) 4/4/05     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 6/29/05DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS: Family Code Section 308.5, enacted by Proposition 22, 3/7/00, states: “Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.” This statute did not prohibit the legislature from enacting California’s Domestic Partnership Law, Family Code Section 297, et seq., because Section 308.5 pertains only to marriages, not to other relationships.
Estate of Seifert     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
128 Cal.App.4th 64 – 3rd Dist. (C046456) 4/4/05     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 6/22/05ADVERSE POSSESSION: A fiduciary, including an executor, may not acquire title by adverse possession against the heirs. Once the executor was appointed, the statutory period for his adverse possession of the subject property ceased to run.
Melendrez v. D & I Investment     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
127 Cal.App.4th 1238 – 6th Dist. (H027098) 3/29/05     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 6/22/05 TRUSTEE’S SALES: A trustee’s sale cannot be set aside where the purchaser at the sale is a bona fide purchaser (“BFP”). The elements of being a BFP are that the buyer 1) purchase the property in good faith for value, and 2) have no knowledge or notice of the asserted rights of another. The value paid may be substantially below fair market value. Also, the buyer’s sophistication and experience in purchasing at trustee’s sales does not disqualify him from being a BFP, although in evaluating whether the buyer is a BFP, the buyer’s foreclosure sale experience may be considered in making the factual determination of whether he had knowledge or notice of the conflicting claim.
Radian Guaranty v. Garamendi     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
127 Cal.App.4th 1280 – 1st Dist. (A105789) 3/29/05     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 7/20/05TITLE INSURANCE: Radian’s Lien Protection Policy constitutes title insurance pursuant to Insurance Code Section 12340.1. Because Radian does not possess a certificate of authority to transact title insurance, it is not authorized to sell the policy in California or anywhere else in the United States, pursuant to California’s monoline statutes: Ins. Code Section 12360 (title insurance) and Ins. Code Section 12640.10 (mortgage guaranty insurance).
Gardenhire v. Superior Court     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
128 Cal.App.4th 426a – 6th Dist. (H026601) 3/22/05     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 6/8/05TRUSTS: A trust can be revoked by a will where the trust provided for revocation by “any writing” and the will expressed a present intent to revoke the trust. The Court pointed out that a will, which is inoperative during the testator’s life, can nevertheless have a present and immediate effect upon delivery, such as notice of intent to revoke.
Jones v. Union Bank of California     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
127 Cal.App.4th 542 – 2nd Dist. (B173302) 3/11/05     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 6/8/05When a lender successfully defends an action to set aside or enjoin a foreclosure sale, the antideficiency provisions of C.C.P. Section 580d do not prohibit an award of attorney fees. In addition, Civil Code sections 2924c and 2924d do not limit the amount of fees the court may award.
O’Toole Company v. Kingsbury Court HOA     Docket
126 Cal.App.4th 549 – 2nd Dist. (B172607) 2/3/05     Case complete 4/8/05HOMEOWNER’S ASSOCIATIONS: In a suit to enforce a judgment, the trial court properly appointed a receiver and levied a special emergency assessment when defendant-homeowners association failed to pay. The Court pointed out that regular assessments are exempt from execution, but not special assessments.
State of California ex rel. Bowen v. Bank of America     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
126 Cal.App.4th 225 – 2nd Dist. (B172190) 1/31/05     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 5/18/05ESCHEAT: This is a qui tam action filed on behalf of the State Controller. The court held that unused reconveyance fees do not need to be escheated because the obligation to return a specific sum of money is neither certain nor liquidated under Civil Code Section 2941 or under the provisions of the deeds of trust. This case was against lenders and I believe it would not apply in the context of escrow and title insurance.
Van Klompenburg v. Berghold     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
126 Cal.App.4th 345 – 3rd Dist. (C045417) 1/31/05     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 5/11/05EASEMENTS: Where the grant of easement states that the right of way shall be “kept open” and “wholly unobstructed”, the normal rule does not apply, which would otherwise allow the owner of the servient estate to erect a locked gate as long as the owner of the dominant estate is given a key and the gate does not unreasonably interfere with the use of the easement.
State of California v. Old Republic Title Company     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
125 Cal.App.4th 1219 – 1st Dist. (A095918) 1/20/05     NOTE: request for order directing republication of court of appeal opinion DENIED 8/16/06.
Overruled in part on issue not significant to title insurance – SEE BELOW.
TITLE INSURANCE: Old Republic was found liable for 1) failing to escheat unclaimed funds in escrow accounts, 2) failing to return fees collected for reconveyances which were not used and 3) failing to pay interest collected on escrow funds to the depositing party.Of particular interest, the Court stated:
“Insurance Code Section 12413.5 provides that interest on escrow funds must be paid to the depositing party ‘unless the escrow is otherwise instructed by the depositing party . . . .’ Any title company is free to draft escrow instructions that, with full disclosure to and agreement from the depositing party, direct that the arbitrage interest differential be paid to the company. It is a matter of disclosing the pertinent costs and benefits to the customer.”

State of California v. PriceWaterhouseCoopers
39 Cal.4th 1220 – Cal. Supreme Court (S131807) 8/31/06

FALSE CLAIMS ACT: A political subdivision may not bring an action under Government Code section 12652, subdivision (c), to recover funds on behalf of the state or another political subdivision.

Frei v. Davey     Docket
124 Cal.App.4th 1506 – 4th Dist., Div. 3 (G033682) 12/17/04     Case complete 2/22/05CONTRACTS: Under the most recent version of the CAR purchase contract, the prevailing party is barred from recovering attorney fees if he refused a request to mediate.
Mix v. Superior Court     Docket      Sup.Ct. Docket
124 Cal.App.4th 987 – 4th Dist., Div. 3  12/7/04  (G033875)     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 2/16/05LIS PENDENS: (Related to Behniwal v. Superior Court, several cases above.) After the claimant loses at trial, the trial court must expunge a lis pendens pending appeal unless claimant can establish by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the real property claim. Claimants will rarely be able to do this because it requires a trial court to determine that its own decision will probably be reversed on appeal. The court points out that this strict result is tempered by claimant’s ability to petition the appellate court for a writ of mandate, so that the appellate court can make its own determination of the probability of the trial court’s decision being reversed on appeal.
D’Orsay International Partners v. Superior Court     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
123 Cal.App.4th 836 – 2nd Dist. 10/29/04 (B174411)     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 1/26/05MECHANIC’S LIENS: The court ordered the release of a mechanic’s lien because there was no actual visible work on the land or the delivery of construction materials. The criteria applicable to a design professional’s lien do not apply where the claimant filed a mechanic’s lien. The court specifically did not address the question of whether a contractor performing design services or employing design professionals may assert a design professionals’ lien.
Gibbo v. Berger     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
123 Cal.App.4th 396 – 4th Dist., Div. 2 10/22/04 (E035201)     Case complete 12/27/04    Req. for Depublication by Cal. Supreme Ct. DENIED 2/16/05USURY: The usury exemption for loans arranged by real estate brokers does not apply where the broker functioned as an escrow whose involvement was limited to preparing loan documents on the terms provided by the parties, ordering title insurance, and dispersing funds, all in accordance with the parties’ instructions. In order to “arrange a loan” the broker must act as a third party intermediary who causes a loan to be obtained or procured. Such conduct includes structuring the loan as the agent for the lender, setting the interest rate and points to be paid, drafting the terms of the loan, reviewing the loan documents, or conducting a title search.
Knapp v. Doherty     Docket
123 Cal.App.4th 76 – 6th Dist. 9/20/04 (H026670)     Case complete 12/21/04TRUSTEE’S SALES:
1. Civil Code Section 2924 requires the trustee to give notice of sale only “after the lapse of the three months” following recordation of the notice of default. The Notice of Sale technically violated this requirement because it was served by mail on the property owner several days prior to the end of three months. However, this did not invalidate the sale because the owner did not suffer prejudice from the early notice.
2. Incorrectly stating the date of the default in the Notice of Default did not invalidate the sale because the discrepancy was not material.
Royal Thrift and Loan v. County Escrow     Docket
123 Cal.App.4th 24 – 2nd Dist. 10/15/04 (B165006)     Case complete 12/16/04TRUSTEE’S SALES:
1. Postponements of a trustee’s sale during an appeal were reasonable, so they do not count toward the 3-postponement limit of Civil Code Section 2924g(c)(1). The postponements fall under the “stayed by operation of law” exception. However, the Court recognized that the better course would have been to re-notice the trustee’s sale after the appeal.
2. The court indicated that an appeal from an action to quiet title against a deed of trust should stay the trustee’s sale proceedings under Code of Civil Procedure Section 916 pending the appeal. However, the court did not formally make that holding because the owner did not appeal and the issues involving the appellants (escrow holder and bonding company) did not require a holding on that issue.
Tesco Controls v. Monterey Mechanical Co.     Docket
124 Cal.App.4th 780 – 3rd Dist. 12/6/04 (C042184) (Opinion on rehearing)     Case complete 2/7/05MECHANIC’S LIENS: A mechanic’s lien release that waives lien rights up to the date stated in the release is effective to waive lien rights up to that date, even if the progress payments did not fully compensate the lien claimant.
Gale v. Superior Court     Docket
122 Cal.App.4th 1388 – 4th Dist., Div. 3  10/6/04 (G033968) (Mod. 10/22/04)     Rehearing Denied 10/22/04; Case Complete 12/10/04LIS PENDENS / DIVORCE
1. The automatic stay contained in a divorce summons does not apply to the sale by the husband, as managing member of a family-owned management company, of real property vested in the management company.
2. A petition for dissolution of marriage which does not allege a community interest in specific real property does not support the filing of a lis pendens.
Nwosu v. Uba     Docket
122 Cal.App.4th 1229 – 6th Dist. 10/1/04 (H026182)     Case complete 12/01/04The court held that a transaction was a bona fide sale and not an equitable mortgage. The complicated facts provide little of interest to the title insurance business, other than to note the fact that a deed can be held to be a mortgage if the deed was given to secure a debt. The case contains a good discussion of the distinction between legal claims, for which there is a right to a jury trial, and equitable claims, for which there is no right to a jury trial.
Moores v. County of Mendocino     Docket
122 Cal.App.4th 883 – 1st Dist. 9/24/04 (A105446)     Case complete 11/24/04SUBDIVISION MAP ACT: The enactment of an ordinance requiring the County to record notices of merger did not result in the unmerger of parcels that had previously merged under the County’s previous automatic merger ordinance. The County properly sent a subsequent notice under Gov. Code Section 66451.302 notifying property owners of the possibility of a merger. Accordingly, plaintiff’s parcels remain merged.
Larsson v. Grabach     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
121 Cal.App.4th 1147 – 5th Dist. 8/25/04 (F042675)     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 12/15/04EASEMENTS: An easement by implication can be created when an owner of real property dies intestate and the property is then divided and distributed to the intestate’s heirs by court decree.
Felgenhauer v. Soni     Docket
121 Cal.App.4th 445 – 2nd Dist. 8/5/04 (B157490)     Case complete 10/8/04PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS: To establish a claim of right, which is one of the elements necessary to establish a prescriptive easement, the claimant does not need to believe he is entitled to use of the easement. The phrase “claim of right” has caused confusion because it suggests the need for an intent or state of mind. But it does not require a belief that the use is legally justified; it simply means that the property was used without permission of the owner of the land.
Jonathan Neil & Assoc. v. Jones     Docket
33 Cal.4th 917 – Cal. Supreme Court (S107855) 8/5/04 (Mod. 10/20/04)INSURANCE: A tort action for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing exists only in regard to the issues of bad faith payment of claims and unreasonable failure to settle. It does not pertain to the general administration of an insurance policy or to other contract settings. In this case, a tort cause of action does not lie for the insurer’s bad faith conduct in setting an unfairly high insurance premium.
Bello v. ABA Energy Corporation     Docket
121 Cal.App.4th 301 – 1st Dist. 8/2/04 (A102287)     Case complete 10/6/04RIGHTS OF WAY: A grant of a public right of way includes uses made possible by future development or technology, which are not in existence at the time of the grant. Here, the Court held that a right of way included the right to install a pipeline to transport natural gas.
California National Bank v. Havis     Docket
120 Cal.App.4th 1122 – 2nd Dist. 7/23/04 (B167152)     Case complete 9/22/04DEEDS OF TRUST: A bank holding a deed of trust holder was paid outside of escrow with a check. The bank sent a letter to escrow stating that it had “received payoff funds . . . it is our policy to issue the Full Reconveyance 10 days after receipt of the payoff check. Therefore, a Full Reconveyance will be sent to the County Recorder on or about August 5, 2002”. The escrow relied on the letter and closed escrow without paying off the lender. The check bounced and the lender began foreclosure.The Court reversed a summary judgment in favor of defendants, holding that the letter did not constitute a payoff demand statement binding on the bank under CC 2943. The Court determined that there was a triable issue of fact as to whether the parties could reasonably have relied on the letter. [Ed. note: The Court exhibited a scary lack of understanding of real estate transactions, and could not come to grips with the fact that reconveyances from institutional lenders never record at close of escrow.]
Kirkeby v. Sup. Ct. (Fascenelli)     Docket
33 Cal.4th 642 – Cal. Supreme Court 7/22/04 (S117640)LIS PENDENS: An action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance supports the recording of a lis pendens. The court stated that “[b]y definition, the voiding of a transfer of real property will affect title to or possession of real property”. (Ed. note: Several appellate court decisions have held that actions to impose equitable liens and constructive trusts do not support a lis pendens. The Supreme Court did not deal with those issues but it seems that, using the court’s language, it could similarly be said that “by definition imposing an equitable lien or constructive trust will affect title to or possession of real property.”)
Tom v. City and County of San Francisco     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
120 Cal.App.4th 674 – 1st Dist. 6/22/04 (A101950)     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 10/13/04TENANCY IN COMMON AGREEMENTS: In order to evade burdensome regulations for converting apartments to condominiums, it has become a common practice in San Francisco for a group of people to acquire a multi-unit residential building and enter into a tenancy in common agreement establishing an exclusive right of occupancy for each dwelling unit. Seeking to end this practice, the People’s Republic of San Francisco enacted an ordinance prohibiting exclusive right of occupancy agreements. The Court held that the ordinance is unconstitutional because it violates the right of privacy set forth in Article I, section I of the California Constitution.
California Attorney General Opinion No. 03-1108
6/9/04RECORDING: A memorandum of lease is a recordable instrument.
Yeung v. Soos     Docket
119 Cal.App.4th 576 – 2nd Dist. 6/16/04 (B165939) (Mod. 7/2/04)     Case complete 9/10/04QUIET TITLE: A default judgment after service by publication is permissible in a quiet title action. However, the judgment may not be entered by the normal default prove-up methods; the court must require evidence of the plaintiff’s title, including live witnesses and complete authentication of the underlying real property records. Nevertheless, the judgment is not rendered void because the default prove-up method was used rather than an evidentiary hearing.
Villa de Las Palmas HOA v. Terifaj     Docket
33 Cal.4th 73 – Cal. Supreme Court 6/14/04 (S109123)RESTRICTIONS: Use restrictions in amended declarations are binding on owners who purchased prior to recordation of the amendment. They are also subject to the same presumption of validity as the original declaration.
In re Marriage of Gioia     Docket
119 Cal.App.4th 272 – 2nd Dist. 6/9/04 (B166803)     Case complete 8/11/04BANKRUPTCY: A bankruptcy trustee’s notice of abandonment of property was effective even though it was ambiguous because it did not specifically state that the trustee will be deemed to have abandoned the property 15 days from the date of mailing of the notice. The court also states that an abandonment is irrevocable even if the property later becomes more valuable.
Dieckmeyer v. Redevelopment Agency of Huntington Beach     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
127 Cal.App.4th 248 – 4th Dist., Div. 3  2/28/05 (G031869) (2nd Opinion)     Case complete 5/5/05DEEDS OF TRUST: Where a deed of trust secures both payment of a promissory note and performance of contractual obligations (CC&R’s in this case), the trustor is not entitled to reconveyance of the deed of trust after the note is paid off, but before the contractual obligations are satisfied.
Textron Financial v. National Union Fire Insurance Co.     Docket      Sup.Ct. Docket
118 Cal.App.4th 1061 – 4th Dist., Div. 3  5/20/04 (G020323) (Mod. 6/18/04)     Req. for rev. and depub. by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 9/15/04INSURANCE / PUNITIVE DAMAGES:
1. The amount of attorney’s fees incurred by an insured in obtaining policy benefits and recoverable under Brandt v. Sup. Ct. are limited to the fees under the contingency fee agreement between the insured and its counsel, and not a higher figure based on the reasonable value of the attorney’s services.
2. Punitive damages must be based on compensatory damages awarded for tortious conduct, including breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, excluding the sum recovered on the breach of contract claim.
3. When compensatory damages are neither exceptionally high nor low, and the defendant’s conduct is neither exceptionally extreme nor trivial, the outer constitutional limit on the amount of punitive damages is approximately four times the amount of compensatory damages.
4. The wealth of a defendant cannot justify an otherwise unconstitutional punitive damages award.
Blackburn v. Charnley     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
117 Cal.App.4th 758 – 2nd Dist. 4/8/04 (B166080)     Request for review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 7/21/04SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE: Specific performance is available even though the contract referred to lots which had not yet been subdivided. This violation of the Subdivision Map Act made the contract voidable at the option of the buyer, who chose to enforce the contract instead. The requirement in the standard CAR contract to mediate in order to collect attorney’s fees does not apply where an action is filed in order to record a lis pendens and where mediation was conducted pursuant to the court’s own practices.
Hedges v. Carrigan     Docket
117 Cal.App.4th 578 – 2nd Dist. 4/6/04 (B166248)     Case complete 6/11/04ARBITRATION: The Federal Arbitration Act preempts C.C.P. Section 1298, which requires that an arbitration clause in a real estate contract contain a specified notice and be in a specified type size. Preemption requires that the transaction affect interstate commerce, which the court found existed because the anticipated financing involved an FHA loan, and the purchase agreement was on a copyrighted form that stated it could only be used by members of the National Association of Realtors. [Ed. note: the form does not say that!] However, in the unpublished portion of the opinion, the court held that the arbitration clause could not be enforced because it required that the parties initial it in order to acknowledge their agreement to arbitration, and they did not all do so. [Ed. note: the concurring opinion makes much more sense than the majority opinion!]
Kapner v. Meadowlark Ranch Assn.     Docket
116 Cal.App.4th 1182 – 2nd Dist. 3/17/04 (B163525)     Case complete 5/25/04ADVERSE POSSESSION / PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS: A prescriptive easement cannot be established where the encroacher’s use is exclusive. The Court affirmed the trial court’s order requiring the property owner to sign an encroachment agreement or remove the encroachment.
Harrison v. Welch     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
116 Cal.App.4th 1084 – 3rd Dist. 3/12/04 (C044320)     Request for depublication DENIED 6/23/04ADVERSE POSSESSION / PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENTS:
1) In the uncertified Part I of the opinion, the court rejected Defendant’s claim of adverse possession because real property taxes were not paid on any area outside of Defendant’s lot. The court rejected defendant’s creative argument that real property taxes were paid on all land within the setback area where defendant’s house was 3-1/2 feet from the property line, and a zoning ordinance required a 5-foot setback.
2) A prescriptive easement cannot be established where the encroacher’s use is exclusive. The opinion contains an excellent discussion of the case law on this issue.
3) The 5-year statute of limitations in C.C.P. Sections 318 and 321, within which a plaintiff must bring an action to recover real property, does not commence until the encroacher’s use of the property has ripened into adverse possession.
Brizuela v. CalFarm Insurance Company     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
116 Cal.App.4th 578 – 2nd Dist. 3/3/04 (B160875)     Review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 6/9/04INSURANCE: Where an insurance policy requires an insured who has filed a claim to submit to an examination under oath, that obligation is a condition precedent to obtaining benefits under the policy. The insurer is entitled to deny the claim without showing it was prejudiced by the insured’s refusal.
Hanshaw v. Long Valley Road Assn.     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
116 Cal.App.4th 471 – 3rd Dist. 3/2/04 (C041796)     Review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 5/19/04PUBLIC STREETS: An offer of dedication of a public street that is not formally accepted may, nevertheless, be accepted by subsequent public use. This is known as common law dedication. However, counties have a duty to maintain only those roads that are “county roads”, and a public road does not become a county road unless specifically accepted as such by the appropriate resolution of the Board of Supervisors.
Miner v. Tustin Avenue Investors     Docket
116 Cal.App.4th 264 – 4th Dist., Div.3  2/27/04 (G031703)     Case complete 5/4/04LEASES / ESTOPPEL CERTIFICATES: A lease contained an option to renew for 5 years, but the tenant signed an estoppel certificate stating that the lease was in full force and effect, and that the tenant had no options except the following: (blank lines that followed were left blank). The Court held that the tenant was not bound by the estoppel certificate because it was ambiguous as to whether it referred only to options outside of the lease or whether the tenant had somehow given up his option rights.
Tremper v. Quinones     Docket
115 Cal.App.4th 944 – 2nd Dist. 2/17/04 (B165218)     Case complete 5/3/04GOOD FAITH IMPROVER: Attorney’s fees and costs may be included in the calculation of damages awarded against a person bringing an action as a good faith improver under C.C.P. Section 871.3, regardless of whether the costs and fees were incurred in prosecuting a complaint or defending against a cross complaint, and even where the good faith improver issues are part of a quiet title action which would not ordinarily support an award of attorney’s fees and costs.
Kertesz v. Ostrovsky     Docket
115 Cal.App.4th 369 – 4th Dist., Div.3  1/28/04 (G030640)     Case complete 4/2/04JUDGMENTS / BANKRUPTCY: The time for renewing a judgment was 10 years from entry of the judgment, plus the amount of time between the debtor’s filing of a bankruptcy petition and the date of the Bankruptcy Court’s order of nondischargeability, plus an additional 30 days under Bankruptcy Code Section 108(c). The court reached this conclusion even though the judgment was entered before the bankruptcy petition was filed, and the 10-year period for renewing the judgment expired long after the bankruptcy was closed.NOTE: I believe the judge misunderstood the automatic stay and Bankruptcy Code Section 108(c). I do not believe the automatic stay applies when a period of time for taking an action commences prior to bankruptcy, and expires after the bankruptcy case is closed.
Rancho Santa Fe Association v. Dolan-King     Docket     Sup.Ct. Docket
115 Cal.App.4th 28 – 4th Dist., Div.1  1/7/04 (D040637/D041486)     Pet. for Review by Cal Supreme Ct. DENIED 4/28/04HOMEOWNER’S ASSOCIATIONS: Regulations adopted and interpreted by a Homeowner’s Association must be reasonable from the perspective of the entire development, not by determining on a case-by-case basis the effect on individual homeowners.
Gray Cary Ware & Freidenrich v. Vigilant Insurance Co.     Docket
114 Cal.App.4th 1185 – 4th Dist., Div.1  1/12/04 (D041811)     Case complete 3/15/04INSURANCE: Civil Code Section 2860(c) provides for the arbitration of disputes over the amount of legal fees or the hourly billing rate of Cumis counsel, but does not apply to other defense expenses.

Predatory lending revisited FINANCIAL CODE § 4970

Loans
Image by jferzoco via Flickr

A. INTRODUCTION

Predatory lending has become an insidious financial problem in recent years for thousands of Californians. In any real estate loan, the loan terms and consequences must be adequately disclosed and, more importantly, financially feasible for the borrower. Through “flipping” and “packing,” predatory lenders avoid these two requirements, reaping massive benefits while causing financial ruination for the consumer.

Fortunately for consumers, the California Legislature has recognized the growing problem of predatory lending by adding Division 1.6 to the Financial Code, effective July 1, 2002. This law specifies what constitutes predatory lending and expressly prohibits certain acts. In discussing predatory lending practices in California, this article will demonstrate the potential impact of the new law, and what remedies are now available to those affected by these practices. .

B. DEFINING PREDATORY LENDING

Predatory lending encompasses a variety of practices. The most prevalent of these practices, however, is predatory lending in connection with home mortgage loans. These loans are targeted at homeowners who may be living on fixed or lower incomes, and those who have checkered credit histories.

Unlike most prime loans, subprime mortgage loans are generally based on the equity in a borrower’s house instead of his or her ability to make the scheduled payments. Therefore, problems meeting scheduled payments frequently arise due to the borrower’s lack of liquidity, a problem obviously foreseeable, yet ignored, by the lender. When this occurs, the predatory lender encourages the borrower to refinance the loan into another unaffordable loan, thus increasing the loan amount owed, primarily due to new finance fees. This “refinancing” severely decreases the borrower’s equity in his or her home and is a common practice referred to as “loan flipping.”

Another practice utilized by predatory lenders is “packing.” This is the practice of surreptitiously placing lender-protective credit insurance or other goods and services into consumer loans. For example, a predatory lender will state a fixed monthly payment to the borrower. Upon closure, however, the loan papers will include numerous single premium payment insurance policies which need to be added to the quoted monthly payment. These insurance policies are not mentioned during the loan negotiations as an additional cost. The lender ultimately hopes the borrower will not notice the added charges at all; if, however, the borrower is lucky enough to recognize the hidden costs, predatory lenders are equipped with numerous tactics to force the loan through despite the borrower’s misgivings. The most prevalent tactic is to threaten the closing of the loan by stating that deletion of the challenged costs will either cause delay, or effect the borrower’s loan eligibility. Given the financial situations of most of these borrowers, the threat of not receiving the loan, or even just a delay in the closing of the loan, can be enough to make the borrower forget about the added charges

Although many borrowers become aware of these hidden charges when they receive their first statement, other hidden terms and penalties are included that become apparent only when the borrower decides to get out of the loan.

One of the most potent tools used by predatory lenders to keep borrowers defenseless is the prepayment penalty. According to Standard & Poor’s, subprime loans contain prepayment penalties 80% of the time, while prime loans only 2% of the time. Since it is lower income individuals who are targeted by predatory lenders, the threat of thousands of dollars in prepayment penalties obviates the lenders fear of the borrower prepaying the balance through a more affordable prime loan. The prepayment penalties trap the individual in a long-term unaffordable loan that can only be refinanced by the lender who misrepresented the loan terms in the first place.

Predatory loans can be financially devastating. A borrower owing up to three times as much as he or she has borrowed is not an uncommon occurrence with a sub-prime predatory home mortgage loan.

C. PREDATORY LENDING IN CALIFORNIA

The California Reinvestment Committee (CRC) is currently conducting a study weighing the effect predatory lending has had on Californians. The preliminary findings suggest predatory lending is a very common practice in California:

  • 73% of all borrowers saw key loan terms (e.g. interest rate, fixed versus adjustable mortgage, prepayment penalty) change for the worse at the closing of the loan as compared to what was represented to them;
  • 61% of all borrowers had loans containing prepayment penalty provisions which lock borrowers into bad loans by assessing a fee of several thousand dollars if borrowers pay off their subprime loans early;
  • 64% of borrowers reported refinancing their home loans from two to six times, suggesting widespread “loan flipping” and “equity stripping” by lenders;
  • 39% of borrowers reported that the idea to take out a loan secured by their home came from the marketing of subprime lenders. Aggressive marketing through telephone calls, mailers and broker solicitations, was experienced by most study participants.

Although the study is still in its infancy, the preliminary numbers leave no room for doubt that predatory lending has become a tremendous problem in California and is robbing Californians of millions of dollars. The discrepancies in prime loan interest rates and those offered by the subprime lenders has steadily increased.

Subprime lenders state that they serve a very important function, mainly providing credit to borrowers with imperfect credit histories. However, it is this exact premise, the supposed benevolence of subprime lending, on which predatory lenders rely to justify their practices, thereby blending financially feasible subprime lending into predatory lending. Financial Code § 4970 is California’s remedy to this problem.

D. BASIC PROVISIONS OF FINANCIAL CODE § 4970

California Financial Code § 4970 et seq. became effective on July 1, 2002. This law recognizes the need for more stringent regulations on consumer loans secured by specified real property, defined as “covered loans.” The effect of the bill was best summed up by the Legislative Counsel’s digest, which states:

The law prohibits various acts in making covered loans, including the following:

  • Failing to consider the financial ability of a borrower to repay the loan
  • Financing specified types of credit insurance into a consumer loan transaction
  • Recommending or encouraging a consumer to default on an existing consumer loan in order to solicit or make a covered loan that refinances the consumer loan
  • Making a covered loan without providing the consumer specified disclosure

Moreover, this law expressly defines the relationship between the broker and the borrower as a fiduciary relationship, thereby placing a legal duty on the broker to act in the borrower’s best interest.Furthermore, the newly enacted provisions clearly lay out strong incentives for attorneys to vigorously prosecute predatory lending. Under California Financial Code § 4978, these incentives include mandatory attorney fees, the award of punitive damages, and the greater of either actual damages or statutorily prescribed damages when the violation is “willful and knowing.”

(a) A person who fails to comply with the provisions of this division is civilly liable to the consumer in an amount equal to actual damages suffered by the consumer, plus attorney’s fees and costs. For a willful and knowing violation of this division, the person shall be liable to the consumer in the amount of $15,000.00 or the consumer’s actual damages, whichever is greater, plus attorneys’ fees and costs…..

(b)(2). A court may, in addition to any other remedy, award punitive damages to the consumer upon a finding that such damages are warranted pursuant to Section 3294 of the Civil Code.

Accordingly, if either an express violation of this section or abuse of the fiduciary relationship between broker and borrower is established, private attorneys and their clients are now equipped with statutory power to obtain redress.

Although California Financial Code § 4970 paints with a broad stroke, with its specificity, predatory lenders will undoubtedly find loopholes in the regulations. Fortunately for California consumers, actions for predatory lending can also be brought under the very expansive state consumer protection statutes, such as Business and Professions Code §17200.

E. WAYS TO AVOID PREDATORY LENDING

In addition to discussing remedial measures for predatory lending, it is important to also discuss ways in which individuals can avoid receiving a predatory loan.

The first way to avoid predatory lending is to comparison shop different lenders to find the best deal. As predatory lenders would have them believe, borrowers with credit problems think that only by paying exorbitant interest rates can they qualify for a loan. However, the truth is that up to 50% of those people who receive predatory loans would actually qualify for a prime loan. The most practical way to remedy this problem is for a borrower to obtain a credit history report and have it analyzed by a disinterested third party. By doing this, the borrower will know when a predatory lender is being untruthful about the type of loan for which he or she will qualify due to credit problems.

Second, when applying for a loan, keep an eye out for common misrepresentations that are indicative of predatory loans. For example, the lender states that the loan has the flexibility of an open line of credit, or the lender requires credit insurance, claiming it is the only way the borrower will qualify for the loan. Next, the consumer should ask to see the lender’s published rates on fees and points.

Finally, the consumer should look for terms and conditions that will trap him or her into the loan. As discussed above, prepayment clauses are indicative of a predatory loan. The reasoning behind prepayment clauses is to keep borrowers from refinancing into a prime loan once they learn the financial reality of their current loan. Furthermore, when a borrower is offered a loan that is “asset based”(10), he or she should demand to be told what affect such a loan could have on the asset’s equity.

CONCLUSION

It is important for attorneys to utilize all available tools at their discretion to curb harm resulting from predatory lending. California Finance Code § 4970 is a powerful new tool for litigators. Equipped with this new tool and California Business & Professions Code 17200, California attorneys should be eager to assist the victims of predatory lending.

In addition, it is important for the consumer to learn ways to spot predatory lending terms and conditions. By seeking the advice of counsel when applying for a loan, one may be able to avoid financial pitfalls down the road.

Max Gardner’s Top 65 Tips for Spotting Fake Documents

From: Charles Cox [mailto:charles@bayliving.com]
Sent: Tuesday, January 10, 2012 8:12 AM
To: Charles Cox
Subject: Max Gardner’s Top 65 Tips for Spotting Fake Documents

I think I sent this out about a month ago but doesn’t hurt to review:

Max Gardner’s Top 65 Tips for Spotting Fake Documents

Posted on January 10, 2012 by Neil Garfield

The Trustee sale can be set aside

Bank of America, N.A. v. La Jolla Group II, 129 Cal. App. 4th 706, 15 710,717 (5th Dist. 2005) (void foreclosure sale required rescission of trustee’s deed returning title to the status quo prior to the foreclosure sale); Dimock v. Emerald Properties, 81 Cal. App. 4th 868, 874 (4th Dist. 2000) (sale under deed of trust by former trustee void, and tender of the amount due is unnecessary).

THE COURT MUST STRICTLY ENFORCE

THE TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A FORECLOSURE.

The harshness of non-judicial foreclosure has been recognized. “The exercise of the power of sale is a harsh method of foreclosing the rights of the grantor.” Anderson v. Heart Federal Savings (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 202, 6 215, citing to System Inv. Corporation v. Union Bank (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 137, 153.  The statutory requirements are intended to protect the trustor from a wrongful or unfair loss of his property Moeller v. Lien (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 822, 830; accord, Hicks v. E.T. Legg & Associates (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 496, 503; Lo Nguyen v. Calhoun (6th District 2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 428, 440, and a valid foreclosure by the private power of sale requires strict compliance with the requirements of the statute. Miller & Starr, California Real Estate (3d ed.), Deeds of Trust and Mortgages, Chapter 10 §10.179; Anderson v. Heart Federal Sav. & Loan Assn., 208 Cal. App. 3d 202, 211 (3d Dist. 1989), reh’g denied and opinion modified, (Mar. 28, 1989); Miller v. Cote (4th Dist. 1982) 127 Cal. App. 3d 888, 894; System Inv. Corp. v. Union Bank (2d Dist. 1971) 21 Cal. App. 3d 137, 152-153; Bisno v. Sax (2d Dist. 1959) 175 Cal. App. 2d 714, 720.

It has been a cornerstone of foreclosure law that the statutory requirements, intending to protect the Trustor and or Grantor from a wrongful or unfair loss of the property, must be complied with strictly. Miller & Starr, California Real Estate (3d ed.), Deeds of Trust and Mortgages, Chapter 10 §10.182.   “Close” compliance does not count. As a result, any trustee’s sale based on a statutorily deficient Notice of Default is invalid (emphasis added). Miller & Starr, California Real Estate (3d ed.), Deeds of Trust and Mortgages, Chapter 10 §10.182; Anderson v. Heart Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. (3dDist. 1989) 208 Cal. App. 3d 202, 211, reh’g denied and opinion modified, (Mar. 28, 1989); Miller v. Cote (4th Dist. 1982) 127 Cal. App. 3d 888, 894; System Inv. Corp. v. Union Bank (2d Dist. 1971) 21 Cal. App. 3d 137, 152-153; Saterstrom v. Glick Bros. Sash, Door & Mill Co.(3d Dist. 1931) 118 Cal. App. 379.

Additionally, any Trustee’s Sale based on a statutorily deficient Notice of Trustee Sale is invalid.  Anderson v. Heart Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. (3d Dist. 1989) 11 208 Cal.App. 3d 202, 211, reh’g denied and opinion modified, (Mar. 28, 1989). The California Sixth District Court of Appeal observed, “Pursuing that policy [of judicial interpretation], the courts have fashioned rules to protect the debtor, one of them being that the notice of default will be strictly construed and must correctly set forth the amounts required to cure the default.” Sweatt v. The Foreclosure Co., Inc. (1985 – 6th District) 166 Cal.App.3d 273 at 278, citing to Miller v. Cote (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 888, 894 and SystemInv. Corp. v. Union Bank (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 137, 152-153.

The same reasoning applies even to a Notice of Trustee’s Sale.  Courts will set aside a foreclosure sale when there has been fraud, when the sale has been improperly, unfairly, or unlawfully conducted, or when there has been such a mistake that it would be inequitable to let it stand. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass’n v. Reidy (1940) 15 Cal. 2d 243, 248; Whitman v. Transtate Title Co.(4th Dist. 1985) 165 Cal. App. 3d 312, 322-323; In re Worcester (9th Cir. 1987) 811 F.2d 1224, 1228.  See also Smith v. Williams (1961) 55 Cal. 2d 617, 621; Stirton v. Pastor (4th Dist. 1960) 177 Cal. App. 2d 232, 234; Brown v. Busch (3d Dist. 1957) 152 Cal.App. 2d 200, 203-204.

English: Foreclosure auction 2007
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MARK J. DEMUCHA AND CHERYL M. DEMUCHA, a Reply Brief that worked

No. F059476

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                                                                                                                           

Wells Fargo in Laredo, Texas
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Appellants and Plaintiffs

v.

WELLS FARGO HOME MORTGAGE, INC.; WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION a.k.a. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.; FIRST AMERICAN LOANSTAR TRUSTEE SERVICES; FIRST AMERICAN CORPORATION; AND DOES 1 TO 45

Respondents and Defendants

                                                                                                                                                           

Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Kern

Case No.  S-1500-CV-267074

Honorable SIDNEY P. CHAPIN, Judge

Department 4

Tele: 661.868.7205

                                                                                                                                                           

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS MARK J. DEMUCHA AND CHERYL M. DEMUCHA

                                                                                                                                                           

Michael D. Finley, Esq.

Law Offices of Michael D. Finley

25375 Orchard Village Road, Suite 106

Valencia, CA 91355-3000

661.964.0444

Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants,

MARK J. DEMUCHA and CHERYL M. DEMUCHA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES                                                                                                        ii

INTRODUCTION                                                                                                                         1

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS                                                                                                  2

PROCEDURAL HISTORY                                                                                                          4

STANDARD OF REVIEW                                                                                                          4

ARGUMENT                                                                                                                                5

A.   THE DEMURRER WAS NOT PROPERLY SUSTAINED                                    5

B.   THE COMPLAINT VERY PLAINLY CONTAINS A
TENDER, EVEN THOUGH IT IS NOT REQUIRED FOR
A QUIET TITLE ACTION                                                                                        5

C.   SUSTAINING OF THE DEMURRER WAS REVERSIBLE
ERROR BECAUSE CALIFORNIA LAW REQUIRES
WELLS FARGO TO POSSESS THE NOTE IN ORDER TO
ENFORCE THE LOAN                                                                                             7

D.   THE DEFENDANTS’/RESPONDENTS’ ARGUMENTS
REGARDING THE PROPRIETY OF SUSTAINING THE
DEMURRER ON THE CLAIMS TO QUIET TITLE AND
REMOVE CLOUD ARE BASED UPON THE DELIBERATE MISREPRESENTATION OF THE NATURE OF THE
DEMUCHAS’ COMPLAINT                                                                                   8

E.    THE DEFENDANTS’/RESPONDENTS’ ARGUMENTS
REGARDING THE PROPRIETY OF SUSTAINING THE
DEMURRER ON THE CLAIM FOR FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION ARE BASED UPON THE
DELIBERATE MISREPRESENTATION OF THE CONTENT
OF THE DEMUCHAS’ COMPLAINT                                                                    9

F.    THE DEFENDANTS’/RESPONDENTS’ ARGUMENTS
REGARDING THE PROPRIETY OF SUSTAINING THE
DEMURRER ON THE CLAIM FOR INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ARE BASED UPON THE
DELIBERATE MISREPRESENTATION OF THE CONTENT
OF THE DEMUCHAS’ COMPLAINT                                                                    9

G.   THE DEFENDANTS’/RESPONDENTS’ ARGUMENTS
REGARDING THE PROPRIETY OF SUSTAINING THE
DEMURRER ON THE CLAIM FOR SLANDER OF
CREDIT ARE BASED UPON THE DELIBERATE MISREPRESENTATION OF THE CONTENT OF THE
DEMUCHAS’ COMPLAINT                                                                                  10

H.   THE DEFENDANTS’/RESPONDENTS’ ARGUMENTS
REGARDING THE PROPRIETY OF SUSTAINING THE
DEMURRER ON THE CLAIM FOR INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ARE BASED UPON THE
DELIBERATE MISREPRESENTATION OF THE
CONTENT OF THE DEMUCHAS’ COMPLAINT                                               10

CONCLUSION                                                                                                                            10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

                                                                                                                                                     Page

Caporale v. Saxon Mortgage, Bankr. North Dist. Cal., San Jose Case No. 07-54109.                  8

In re Foreclosure Cases, 2007 WL 3232430 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007).                                        8

Staff Mortgage v. Wilke (1980) 625 F.2d 281                                                                               8

Starr v. Bruce Farley Corp. (9th Cir. 1980), 612 F.2d 1197.                                                           8

Whitman v. Transtate Title Co. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 312, 322-323.                              6

STATUTES

Commercial Code § 3301.                                                                                                     7, 8, 9,

INTRODUCTION

            Defendants/Respondents continue to mischaracterize the Plaintiffs’/Appellants’ complaint very deliberately, apparently because they realize that the Plaintiff’s complaint as actually plead is beyond their ability to oppose it. Calling the Plaintiffs’ Complaint “inartfully drafted” because it does not state that it is a challenge to a non-judicial foreclosure is wishful thinking. The complaint is very artfully drafted as a Quiet Title action. The plaintiffs are not seeking to “stave off foreclosure of a mortgage,” but seeking to remove a false claim against their title to the property. No non-judicial foreclosure has taken place. No foreclosure sale has occurred, so there is no foreclosure sale to challenge or undo, but the Defendants/Respondents insist on arguing the case at the demurrer level and on this appeal as a complaint to challenge or set aside a non-judicial foreclosure and keep trying to apply those inapplicable pleading requirements to the complaint. The plaintiffs did seek a preliminary injunction against the foreclosure and obtained it because the Defendants/Respondents did not comply with the laws regarding non-judicial foreclosure. However, that does not make their complaint a “central defense” to non-judicial foreclosure as Defendants/Respondents argue throughout their brief. The mischaracterization of the case was a key element of the lower court’s error and continues to be a key element of the Defendants’/Respondents’ false arguments.

Further, Plaintiffs/Appellants never argued that producing the note was a preliminary requirement to non-judicial foreclosure, but Plaintiffs/Appellants have plead very specifically throughout the complaint that possessing the note is a requirement for the Defendants/Respondents to have any right to enforce the note whatsoever, which has been established California law (and in every state that has adopted the Uniform Commercial Code) for a very long time. The references to producing the note were merely offered as evidence demonstrating that the Defendants/Respondents do no possess the note because they repeatedly fail and refuse to produce it. In fact, it is important to note that the Defendants/Respondents have never yet argued that the note is in their possession as required by law.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

A.        THE SUBJECT TRANSACTION.

The Defendants’/Respondents’ Statement of Facts has a very subtle attempt at subterfuge and misdirection in that it places a statement made about their finances during litigation after Plaintiffs/Appellants incurred legal fees in a different context as though the statement were made prior to litigation during the time that the prior (and possibly current) note holder CTX Mortgage had the loan and prior to the recording of the notice of default. Defendants/Respondents have gone to great lengths to take this statement out of context and have argued extensively that this constitutes proof that the Plaintiffs/Appellants were unable to tender payment. However, this requires the assumption that only one conclusion may be drawn from the statement rather than a range of possibilities, including the fact that the Plaintiffs/Appellants had incurred attorney’s fees by that time.

B.        THE DEMUCHAS’ CONTENTIONS.

As in the underlying Demurrer, the Defendants/Respondents continue to falsely argue that there was no allegation of Tender in the Complaint. However, as demonstrated in the Appellants’ Opening Brief, there is no requirement of tender to plead Quiet Title. Even so, the Defendants/Respondents quote the allegation of tender that is in the Complaint even while arguing that there is no allegation of tender. This demonstrates the Defendants’/Respondents’ motive in deliberately mischaracterizing the complaint: they wish to apply a non-applicable standard to the complaint. Then when the non-applicable standard has been complied with anyway, they attempt to mislead the court by arguing that a plain allegation of tender is not an allegation of tender. However, as will be shown, the Defendants/Respondents have cited a case that states that tender can be offered in the complaint, and need not have been offered prior to filing the complaint.

C.        DEFENDANTS’/RESPONDENTS’ ASSERTION OF NO ALLEGATION OF TENDER OF ALL AMOUNTS DUE IS BLATANTLY FALSE.

As stated above, Plaintiffs/Appellants have already demonstrated that tendering payment is not a required element of a Quiet Title action, but that they have pleaded tender anyway. The Defendants’/Respondents’ arguments that payments must be tendered “when due” misstates the law, even for cases challenging non-judicial foreclosures, which this case is not. As will be shown below, the Defendants/Respondents cited a case that indicates very clearly that even in non-judicial foreclosure cases, a tender may be made in the complaint and need not have been made prior to filing the complaint.

D.        THE FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS AND THE DEMUCHAS’ ATTEMPTS TO DELAY OR HALT THEM.

The Defendants/Respondents’ focus on these extra proceedings within the case is a red herring to distract the court’s focus from the demurrer. The appeal is not about the ex-parte application for a preliminary injunction that was granted due to the fact that the Defendants/Respondents did not comply with California law requiring a specific declaration to be signed under penalty of perjury that was not. The Defendants/Respondents are going well outside the Complaint’s four corners to abuse the details of the ex-parte application that was not about the Complaint nor the Demurrer that are the subjects of this appeal. And once again, they are trying to argue the issue of the Plaintiffs’/Appellants’ financial situation as stated during the ex-parte proceedings after they had already incurred attorney’s fees for the false proposition that the Plaintiffs/Appellants were allegedly incapable of tendering payment prior to incurring the additional attorney’s fees of litigation when that is not the only conclusion that can be drawn from the separate ex-parte pleadings. Finally, they continue to shout endlessly about the issue of tender when it is not a required part of pleading the elements of Quiet Title and when pleading tender is required, an offer made in the complaint itself is deemed sufficient, as will be shown below.

E.        THE ARGUMENTS ABOUT FAILURE TO “PRODUCE THE NOTE” ARE A RED HERRING TO DISTRACT THE COURT FROM THE LEGAL REQUIREMENT THAT THE DEFENDANTS “POSSESS THE NOTE.”

The Defendants/Respondents continue to make a big deal about the fact that in a few places, the Complaint mentions that the defendants have failed to produce the original note. However, their own arguments on this point mention that the complaint further alleges their failure to hold or possess the original note, which is the more key portion of the pleadings.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

            The parties’ explanations of the case’s procedural history are close enough that no further discussion is necessary.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

            Some of the arguments contained in the Defendants’/Respondents’ Standard of Review section of their brief are specious, especially in the final paragraph arguing the subjects of tender and producing the note. The Defendants/Respondents have never demonstrated that California law requires an allegation of tender for a Quiet Title action, but have only cited as authority for this position cases that are focused on undoing a foreclosure sale after it has been completed. However, even those cases state that tender does not have to be made before filing the complaint, but the tender itself can be made within the complaint, and there cannot be any question that an offer of tender is made within the complaint. The Plaintiffs’/Appellants’ current attorney helped prepare pleadings for them in the trial court case and even made special, limited scope appearances for them, even though they were officially in pro per, so they incurred considerable legal fees during the litigation, which certainly had an effect on their financial situation at the time that they filed their ex parte application for a preliminary injunction, so the Defendants’/Respondents’ argument that the ex parte papers demonstrate that the Plaintiffs/Appellants could not tender payment is false. Further, the Defendants’/Respondents’ argument that “the central premise of each cause of action of the DeMuchas’ First Amendent Complaint [is] that a lender must ‘produce the note’ while conducting a non-judicial foreclosure” is a blatant misstatement of the Complaint’s content. The Complaint is not about non-judicial foreclosure, it is about quieting title. And the central premise is that a lender must possess the note in order to have a right to enforce the note, which is the law in California and every other state that has adopted the Uniform Commercial Code. No non-judicial foreclosure has yet taken place regarding the subject property.

ARGUMENT

A.        THE DEMURRER WAS NOT PROPERLY SUSTAINED.

Defendants/Respondents are demonstrating to this court the same misdirection and deliberate mischaracterization of the pleadings that misled the trial court into committing reversible error by improperly sustaining a demurrer to a valid complaint. The Defendants/Respondents have never demonstrated that tender is a requirement for a Quiet Title action. They have mischaracterized the case as a case to undo a non-judicial foreclosure when no non-judicial foreclosure has ever been completed regarding the subject property. The cases that they cited to the trial court and to this court regarding the requirements of a tender allegation were cases in which the subject property had been sold at a non-judicial foreclosure sale, which was being challenged after the fact. They have mischaracterized the Complaint’s allegations as though they state that “producing the note” is a requirement for non-judicial foreclosure, which is a blatant misstatement. The complaint states the true fact that the defendants have failed and refused to produce the note only as evidence of the fact that they do not possess the note and therefore have no right to enforce the note under California law. It is worth noting that the Defendants’/Respondents’ 34-page Appellate Brief never claims that they are the holders of the note as required by law.

B.        THE COMPLAINT VERY PLAINLY CONTAINS A TENDER, EVEN THOUGH IT IS NOT REQUIRED FOR A QUIET TITLE ACTION.

Defendants/Respondents continue their same improper tactic used with the trial court of citing irrelevant cases seeking to undo a foreclosure sale after the fact. Since no foreclosure sale has yet taken place regarding the subject property and this is a Quiet Title action, those cases are all irrelevant and inapplicable to the First Amended Complaint that is the subject of the Demurrer and this appeal. However, even under the Defendants’/Respondents’ inapplicable cases, the Defendants/Respondents have swerved into something that destroys their arguments completely: Citing Whitman v. Transtate Title Co. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 312, 322-323, the Defendants/Respondents correctly stated on page 11 of their brief, “therefore as a condition precedent to any action challenging a foreclosure, a plaintiff must pay or offer to pay the secured debt before an action is commenced or in the complaint.” (Emphasis added).  This is not an action challenging a foreclosure, but even if those standards were inappropriately applied to this action, the tender or offer to pay can be made “in the complaint.” The Verified First Amended Complaint (“VFAC”) states, “Plaintiff offers to pay and mortgage payments on the property to the individual or entity that is the valid holder of the original note as required by California Commercial Code § 3301, et seq. and all property taxes to the appropriate government agency.” (VFAC page 3, line 28 through page 4, line 7). This is a very clear tender, made “in the complaint,” even though it is not required in a Quiet Title Action.

Since tender is not a statutory element of a Quiet Title action, the Defendants’/Respondents’ arguments regarding the difficult financial times mentioned in the Plaintiffs’/Appellants’ ex-parte application for a preliminary injunction are moot. However, it should be noted that by the time the Plaintiffs/Appellants filed their ex-parte application, they had the additional financial burden of paying for attorney’s fees to have the same attorney who now represents them on appeal prepare pleadings for them and make special, limited scope appearances for them on the trial court level, so the conclusion that the Defendants/Respondents are asking the court to make are inaccurate.

Even the Defendants’/Respondents’ arguments regarding “implicit integration” of foreclosure issues are irrelevant, because the cases that they cited specifically involved a non-judicial foreclosure in which the sale had been completed, but no non-judicial foreclosure sale has taken place regarding the subject property. The defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs’/Appellants’ have failed to cite any authority for the fact that no allegation of tender is required is another false statement. Plaintiffs have directly quoted Code of Civil Procedure § 761.020, which fully sets forth the elements of a Quiet Title Action, and there is no requirement of tender. However, even if the court somehow found that a tender allegation was required, the tender allegation has been made in the Complaint in accordance with the Defedants’/Appellants’ own citations as set forth above. Further, the Defendants’/Respondents’ arguments that “a court of equity will not order a useless act performed” (FPCI Re-Hab 01, etc. v. E&G Investments, Ltd. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1018, 1022, and “equity will not interpose its remedial power in the accomplishment of what seemingly would be nothing but an idly and expensively futile act” (Leonard v. Bank of America Ass’n (1936) 16 Cal. App. 2d 341, 344) could and should just as easily be applied to the futile and useless acts that Defendants’/Respondents’ are requesting to be required and plead when they do not possess the original note and therefore have no right to expect payments, seek payments, nor threaten foreclosure because they did not receive payments that they had no right to receive in the first place, pursuant to Commercial Code § 3301. It can and should also be used to destroy their argument that plaintiff must be subjected to the requirements of case law regarding actions seeking to undo foreclosure irregularities before the foreclosure has even been completed, as though plaintiff should be able to foresee every foreclosure irregularity with a crystal ball before the process is even completed!

C.        SUSTAINING OF THE DEMURRER WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR BECAUSE CALIFORNIA LAW REQUIRES WELLS FARGO TO POSSESS THE NOTE IN ORDER TO ENFORCE THE LOAN.

Plaintiffs/Appellants have cited a fully binding California Statute, Commercial Code § 3301, which specifically states that in order to be a “person entitled to enforce an instrument,” the Defendants/Respondents must have been the holder of the instrument, with very limited exceptions. In opposition, the Defendants/Respondents continue their same bad habit engaged in during the trial court proceedings of citing and relying upon federal trial court cases, which are not binding authority in any way, without disclosing to the court that they are citing non-binding authority. In addition, many of their citations do not even contain the full reference, so that it is difficult or impossible to locate and read the case. As for the federal trial court cases, all that they have demonstrated is that there is a need for a California appellate court to clear up the confusion that clearly exists regarding California’s law, and especially Commercial Code § 3301. Further, their statement that every court that has considered the issue has ruled that possessing the note is not necessary for a foreclosure is false. For example, in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California in San Jose, a federal trial court judge stopped a foreclosure because the bank could not produce the note in the case of Caporale v. Saxon Mortgage, Case No. 07-54109. Like the Defendants’/Respondents’ authorities, this case is only persuasive authority, not binding, but it was reported on by ABC News, and a copy of the news video is available to be viewed online at http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=news/7_on_your_side&id=6839404. If the court is going to consider the non-binding federal trial court decisions offered by the Defendants/Respondents, the court should also consider the non-binding persuasive authority of In re Foreclosure Cases, 2007 WL 3232430 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007), wherein U.S. Bankruptcy Court Judge Christopher Boyko dismissed without prejudice fourteen judicial foreclosure actions filed by the trustees of securitized trusts against borrowers who had defaulted on their residential mortgages that had been sold into securitized trusts, based upon the application of Uniform Commercial Code § 3-301 to the mortgages in question.

As for their claim that the commercial code does not apply to a mortgage or a note secured by deed of trust, the Defendants/Respondents are willfully ignoring Staff Mortgage v. Wilke (1980) 625 F.2d 281, 6 Bankr.Ct.Dec. 1385, 29 UCC Rep.Serv. 639, cited in Plaintiffs’/Appellants’ Opening Brief, which clearly states that “notes secured by deeds of trust…were ‘instruments’ under the California Commercial Code.” This holding is repeated in Starr v. Bruce Farley Corp. (9th Cir. 1980), 612 F.2d 1197. The Defendants/Respondents have offered nothing other than their own opinion for the proposition that the note secured by deed of trust in question is not a “negotiable instrument” within the meaning of Commercial Code § 3301, even though they claim to have purchased the note, which by definition makes it negotiable.

D.        THE DEFENDANTS’/RESPONDENTS’ ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE PROPRIETY OF SUSTAINING THE DEMURRER ON THE CLAIMS TO QUIET TITLE AND REMOVE CLOUD ARE BASED UPON THE DELIBERATE MISREPRESENTATION OF THE NATURE OF THE DEMUCHAS’ COMPLAINT.

As always, the Defendants/Respondents insist upon misrepresenting the nature of the First Amended Complaint. Every element of each of these causes of action was specifically plead, as has been demonstrated. Pursuant to Commercial Code § 3301, the Defendants/Respondents have no right to enforce the note unless they possess the note. Plaintiffs/Appellants rely upon the appellate court to read the First Amended Complaint and comprehend it independently of the Defendants’/Respondents’ misrepresentations.

E.        THE DEFENDANTS’/RESPONDENTS’ ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE PROPRIETY OF SUSTAINING THE DEMURRER ON THE CLAIM FOR FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION ARE BASED UPON THE DELIBERATE MISREPRESENTATION OF THE CONTENT OF THE DEMUCHAS’ COMPLAINT.

The content of the First Amended Complaint speaks for itself. The Defendants/Respondents continue to look right at the paragraphs of the document that contain the elements required by law for each cause of action and to falsely state that the required allegations are not there. Plaintiffs/Appellants rely upon the appellate court to read the First Amended Complaint and comprehend it independently of the Defendants’/Respondents’ misrepresentations.

F.         THE DEFENDANTS’/RESPONDENTS’ ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE PROPRIETY OF SUSTAINING THE DEMURRER ON THE CLAIM FOR INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ARE BASED UPON THE DELIBERATE MISREPRESENTATION OF THE CONTENT OF THE DEMUCHAS’ COMPLAINT.

The content of the First Amended Complaint speaks for itself. The Defendants/Respondents continue to look right at the paragraphs of the document that contain the elements required by law for each cause of action and to falsely state that the required allegations are not there. Plaintiffs/Appellants rely upon the appellate court to read the First Amended Complaint and comprehend it independently of the Defendants’/Respondents’ misrepresentations.

G.        THE DEFENDANTS’/RESPONDENTS’ ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE PROPRIETY OF SUSTAINING THE DEMURRER ON THE CLAIM FOR SLANDER OF CREDIT ARE BASED UPON THE DELIBERATE MISREPRESENTATION OF THE CONTENT OF THE DEMUCHAS’ COMPLAINT.

The content of the First Amended Complaint speaks for itself. The Defendants/Respondents continue to look right at the paragraphs of the document that contain the elements required by law for each cause of action and to falsely state that the required allegations are not there. Plaintiffs/Appellants rely upon the appellate court to read the First Amended Complaint and comprehend it independently of the Defendants’/Respondents’ misrepresentations.

H.        THE DEFENDANTS’/RESPONDENTS’ ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE PROPRIETY OF SUSTAINING THE DEMURRER ON THE CLAIM FOR INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ARE BASED UPON THE DELIBERATE MISREPRESENTATION OF THE CONTENT OF THE DEMUCHAS’ COMPLAINT.

The content of the First Amended Complaint speaks for itself. The Defendants/Respondents continue to look right at the paragraphs of the document that contain the elements required by law for each cause of action and to falsely state that the required allegations are not there. Plaintiffs/Appellants rely upon the appellate court to read the First Amended Complaint and comprehend it independently of the Defendants’/Respondents’ misrepresentations.

CONCLUSION

            The trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend and entering a judgment of dismissal. The rules of a non-judicial foreclosure proceeding and litigation to set aside a non-judicial foreclosure do not apply to a quiet title action that is filed prior to a foreclosure sale. The Commercial Code’s requirements that the entity enforcing a note must possess the original note (with limited exceptions) applies to a Note Secured by Deed of Trust. Even in the context of a non-judicial foreclosure, there is no “breach” unless the entity that did not receive the mortgage payments had a right to receive the mortgage payments through possession of the original note or compliance with another recognized exception under the Commercial Code. Any other result would cause an unnecessary conflict of laws and allow fraudulent “lenders” to engage in non-judicial foreclosures and sales of property so long as they complied with the technical requirements of a non-judicial foreclosure. All of the causes of action of the Verified First Amended Complaint are properly plead, with the exception that “punitive damages” is not technically a cause of action, but that can be resolved by striking the label “Sixth Cause of Action” and just allowing the heading “Punitive Damages” to stand.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

            Dated: 23 December 2010                                                                                                                  

Michael D. Finley, Esq.

Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants

Mark J. DeMucha & Cheryl M. DeMucha

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Pursuant to rule 8.204(c) of the California Rules of Court, I hereby certify that this brief contains 3,914 words, including footnotes. In making this certification, I have relied on the word count of the computer program used to prepare the brief.

Dated: 23 December 2010                                                                                                                  

Michael D. Finley, Esq.

Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants

Mark J. DeMucha & Cheryl M. DeMucha

 PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action; my business address is: 25375 Orchard Village Road, Suite 106, Valencia, CA 91355-3000.

On 23 December 2010 I served the foregoing document described as: Appellant’s Opening Brief on the interested parties in this action by placing a true copy thereof in sealed envelopes addressed as follows:

(Attorneys for Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. & Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.): Kutak Rock LLP, 18201 Von Karman, Suite 1100, Irvine, CA 92612

(Attorneys for First American Loanstar Trustee Services & First American Corporation): Wright, Finlay & Zak, LLP, 4665 MacArthur Court, Suite 280, Newport Beach, CA 92660

Judge Sidney P. Chapin, Kern County Superior Court, Metropolitan Division, 1415 Truxtun Ave., Bakersfield, CA 93301

BY MAIL: I deposited such envelopes in the mail at Valencia, California. The envelopes were mailed with first class postage thereon fully prepaid.

ALSO, BY ELECTRONIC FILING WITH THE SUPREME COURT: In addition, I filed an electronic copy of the Appellant’s Opening Brief with the Supreme Court of California on 23 December 2010, through the Supreme Court’s website.

Dated: 23 December 2010                                                                                                                  

Michael D. Finley, Esq.

Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants

Mark J. DeMucha & Cheryl M. DeMucha

Delaware suing MERS Video

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26315908//vp/45070527#45070527

Delaware suing MERS video

KISS: KEEP IT SIMPLE STUPID from Garfield

Finality versus good and evil. In the battlefield it isn’t about good and evil. It is about winner and losers. In military battles around the world many battles have been one by the worst tyrants imaginable.

Just because you are right, just because the banks did bad things, just because they have no right to do what they are doing, doesn’t mean you will win. You might if you do it right, but you are up against a superior army with a dubious judge looking on thinking that this deadbeat borrower wants to get out of paying.

The court system is there to mediate disputes and bring them to a conclusion. Once a matter is decided they don’t want it to be easy to reopen a bankruptcy or issues that have already been litigated. The court presumably wants justice to prevail, but it also wants to end the dispute for better or for worse.

Otherwise NOTHING would end. Everyone who lost would come in with some excuse to have another trial. So you need to show fundamental error, gross injustice or an error that causes more problems that it solves.

These are the same issues BEFORE the matter is decided in court. Foreclosures are viewed as a clerical act or ministerial act. The outcome is generally viewed as inevitable.

And where the homeowner already admits the loan exists (a mistake), that the lien is exists and was properly filed and executed (a mistake) and admits that he didn’t make payments — he is admitting something he doesn’t even know is true — that there were payments due and he didn’t make them, which by definition puts him in default.

It’s not true that the homeowner would even know if the payment is due because the banks refuse to provide any accounting on the third party payments from bailout, insurance CDS, and credit enhancement.

That’s why you need reports on title, securitization, forensic reviews for TILA compliance and loan level accounting. If the Judges stuck to the law, they would require the proof first from the banks, but they don’t. They put the burden on the borrowers —who are the only ones who have the least information and the least access to information — to essentially make the case for the banks and then disprove it. The borrowers are litigating against themselves.

In the battlefield it isn’t about good and evil, it is about winners and losers. Name calling and vague accusations won’t cut it.

Sure you want to use the words surrogate signing, robo-signing, forgery, fabrication and misrepresentation. You also want to show that the court’s action would or did cloud title in a way that cannot be repaired without a decision on the question of whether the lien was perfected and whether the banks should be able to say they transferred bad loans to investors who don’t want them — just so they can foreclose.

But you need some proffers of real evidence — reports, exhibits and opinions from experts that will show that there is a real problem here and that this case has not been heard on the merits because of an unfair presumption: the presumption is that just because a bank’s lawyer says it in court, it must be true.

Check with the notary licensing boards, and see if the notaries on their documents have been disciplined and if not, file a grievance if you have grounds. Once you have that, maybe you have a grievance against the lawyers. After that maybe you have a lawsuit against the banks and their lawyers.

But the primary way to control the narrative or at least trip up the narrative of the banks is to object on the basis that counsel for the bank is referring to things not in the record. That is simple and the judge can understand that.

Don’t rely on name-calling, rely on the simplest legal requirements that you can find that have been violated. Was the lien perfected?

If the record shows that others were involved in the original transaction with the borrowers at the inception of the deal, then you might be able to show that there were only nominees instead of real parties in interest named on the note and mortgage.

Without disclosure of the principal, the lien is not perfected because the world doesn’t know who to go to for a satisfaction of that lien. If you know the other parties involved were part of a securitization scheme, you should say that — these parties can only be claiming an interest by virtue of a pooling and servicing agreement. And then make the point that they are only now trying to transfer what they are calling a bad loan into the pool that the investors bought — which is expressly prohibited for multiple reasons in the PSA.

This is impersonation of the investor because the investors don’t want to come forward and get countersued for the bad and illegal lending practices that were used in getting the borrower’s signature.

Point out that the auction of the property was improperly conducted where you can show that to be the case. Nearly all of the 5 million foreclosures were allowed to be conducted with a single bid from a non-creditor.

If you are not a creditor you must bid cash, put up a portion before you bid, and then pay the balance usually within 24-72 hours.

But instead they pretended to be the creditor when their own documents show they were supposed to be representing the investors who were not part of the lawsuit nor the judgment.

SO they didn’t pay cash and they didn’t tender the note. THEY PAID NOTHING. In Florida the original note must actually be filed with the court to make sure that the matter is actually concluded.

There is a whole ripe area of inquiry of inspecting the so-called original notes and bringing to the attention the fraud upon the court in submitting a false original. It invalidates the sale, by operation of law.

Gomes and the U.S. Supreme court some body had better help these attorneys argue and brief the case

Wednesday, August 17th, 2011, 2:49 pm

A controversial case challenging the ability of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems to foreclose on a California man was filed with the Supreme Court Monday, making it the first major MERS case to reach the nation’s highest court.

If the Supreme Court agrees to hear Gomes v. Countrywide, Gomes’ attorney, Ehud Gersten, says the court will have to decide whether a lower court stripped his client, Jose Gomes, of due process by allowing MERS to foreclose without ensuring the registry had the noteholder’s authority to foreclose.

“I believe this to be the first case in the country to take MERS to our Supreme Court,” Gersten told HousingWire. His claim could not be immediately verified.

“Ultimately, what this case is saying is if you are going to be taking someone’s home away from them, do you have the proof or the right to do so?” Gersten said. “If the Supreme Court starts to question MERS, and its business structure, it is going to have an effect on every MERS case in the country.”

MERS, the electronic registry at the center of the foreclosure crisis, has been under fire nationwide as foreclosure attorneys purport the firm, and its parent company Merscorp Inc., illegally foreclosed on properties.

Gersten, meanwhile, said MERS has a brief period of time to respond before the Supreme Court decides whether it will accept the case (click here for the filing).

Attorneys familiar with the Gomes case are not optimistic about its chances of being heard by the Supreme Court.

“While recent statistics show that the Supreme Court takes on average less than 3% of cases on certiorari, it takes even a smaller percentage of those advanced by private litigants, as opposed to the government,” said Patton Boggs attorney Anthony Laura. “Also it takes fewer cases out of the state court system than it does out of the federal Courts of Appeals.”

“So, the likelihood that this case will be taken is slim indeed,” Laura adds. “I believe those slim odds are even slimmer because the argument Gomes is making to the U.S. Supreme Court is one he did not previously raise.”

Laura said that, as a premise for invoking the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, Gomes claims that the court below abridged his 14th Amendment rights.

“My recollection is that Gomes never made a Constitutional argument below, neither in the California Court of Appeals nor in the petition for review to the California Supreme Court,” he said. “In my view, the U.S. Supreme Court will look skeptically on his just raising that argument now.”

The original plaintiff, Jose Gomes, appealed to the nation’s highest court after California’s Supreme Court decided not to review the 4th Appellate District Court of California’s decision in favor of MERS.

Gomes’ petition says he’s challenging the foreclosure because MERS “did not have the current noteholder’s authority to foreclose.”

Gersten argues his client “was entitled to proof that the loan servicer, trustee or an entity such as MERS, either named in the deed of trust or acting through assignments of interest, had legal authority on behalf of the promissory note’s current holder to foreclose.”

The 4th Appellate District Court’s decision, which Gomes wants overturned, held MERS had the authority to initiate a foreclosure on Gomes because the deed of trust “explicitly provided MERS with the authority to do so,” according to court records.

The state appellate court also ruled in favor of MERS after finding the deed of trust contained no language to suggest the “lender or its successors and assigns must provide Gomes with an assurance that MERS is authorized to proceed with a foreclosure,” according to court records.

MERS chose not to comment on the case, but a spokeswoman said the company is aware of the filing with the Supreme Court.

SAY NO TO LENDERS FRAUD!

Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com

Dear Homeowner,

It’s been widely reported around the country, via internet, blogs and newspapers, how the lenders used the foreclosure mills and other legal ways, to fabricate fraudulent documents to record in the county recorder offices and pretend they have legal standing to initiate the foreclosure procedure.

Neil Garfield in his blog http://www.livinglies.com, The Huffington Post, The New York Times, Steve Vondran in his website http://www.foreclosuredefenseresourcecenter.com, Tim McCandless in his blog https://timothymccandless.wordpress.com and many others have been advocating for the homeowners trying to raise awareness in the courts so that justice can be served.Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com

A few years ago, when the Mortgage Debacle started, these lenders went after the Mortgage Brokers after they found themselves in trouble for the many defaulted loans. They filed civil and criminal lawsuits convicting these brokers for fabricating documents and forging signatures to fund the loans. The legal system, judges and General Attorneys were prompt to convict “these so called criminals”.Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com

Today the tables have turned 180 degrees and we have discovered how these entities have been widely practicing what they accused others of. Today the lenders are fabricating documents, forging signatures and filing fraudulent documents with the government agencies to weasel their way into owning the homeowners’ properties.Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com

The fact that judges preceding the Unlawful Detainer hearings are not educated enough about the matter and don’t want to take the time to hear the attorneys defending the homeowners, does not help to make this wrong right. Securitization is a very complicated subject that cannot be taught in an Unlawful Detainer hearing or even in a Wrongful Foreclosure hearing. The way judges have been manipulating the information provided by the homeowners in their lawsuits to rule in favor of the lenders is despicable!Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com

That’s why it’s so important to have all your property recorded documents used to foreclose on your home, been researched and analyzed by an expert that can identify all the issues that can be used in a Court of Law to fight for your home.

When you go in front of a Judge with enough evidence to prove that fraud was committed by the lender when the lender fabricated documents used to foreclose, you have a good chance to get the Judge’s attention. Fraud is a subject they know, it’s a crime and they can rule in your favor. It would be very difficult for a Judge to justify this fraudulent behavior on the part of the lender.

Later on, once you have successfully received an injunction, you can bring the securitization argument in your complaint and make the lender prove their innocence.Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com

The documents used to initiate the foreclosure of your home have been fraudulently fabricated by either the Trustee or the Lender.

Some attorneys who have explored this cause of action in their civil lawsuits, have been able to get relief for the homeowners by getting the in Temporary Restraining Order and the Injunction granted.

Below please find proof of a very common practice within these entities when they fabricate documents. They use the name of one person who becomes an officer of many entities and the signature is very different in different documents. This has happened in your case too.

This is a portion of our report after thoroughly performing research and discovery for one of our clients: (testimonial letters can be provided upon request after signing a confidentiality agreement).

SIGNED BY: LINDA GREEN AS VICE PRESIDENT FOR AMERICAN HOME MORTGAGE SERVICING, INC. AS SUCCESOR IN INTEREST TO OPTION ONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION

TOO MANY JOBS

For this report, over 500 mortgage assignments were examined.

Each Assignment was filed by Docx, a mortgage servicing company in Alpharetta, GA; each was notarized in Fulton County, GA.

Many of these Assignments have been used in foreclosure actions to prove that the lender has the legal right to file the foreclosure actions.

The name of Linda Green, frequently appears on Docx documents. The following list summarizes some of the many job titles used by Green.Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com

JOB TITLES HELD BY LINDA GREEN

11-11-2004 & 06-22-2006

Vice President, Loan Documentation, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., successor by merger to Wells Fargo

Home Mortgage, Inc.

08-11-2008 & 08-14-2008

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc

08-27-2008

Vice President, American Home Mortgage Servicing as successor-in-interest to Option One Mortgage Corporation

09-19-2008

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Brokers Conduit

09-30-2008

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc

09-30-2008

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Brokers Conduit

10-08-2009

Vice President & Asst. Secretary, American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc., as servicer for Ameriquest Mortgage Corporation

10-16-2008

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc

10-17-2008, 11-20-2008

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Brokers Conduit

11-20-2008

Vice President, Option One Mortgage Corporation

12-08-2008

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Brokers Conduit

12-15-2008

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for HLB Mortgage

12-24-2008

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc

12-26-2008

Vice President, American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc

01-13-2009

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for Family Lending Services, Inc

01-15-2009

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., acting solely as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc

02-03-2009

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Broker Conduit

02-24-2009

Vice President, American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc. as successor-in-interest to Option One Mortgage Corporation

02-25-2009

Vice President, Bank of America, N A

02-27-2009

Vice President, American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc., as successor-in-interest to Option One Mortgage Corporation

03-02-2009

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., acting solely as nominee for American Home Mortgage

03-04-2009

Vice President, Argent Mortgage Company, LLC by Citi Residential Lending Inc., attorney-in-fact

03-06-2009 & 03-20-2009

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc

04-15-2009, 04-17-2009, 04-20-2009

Vice President, Bank of America, N.A.

05-11-2009, 07-06-2009

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc

07-14-2009

Vice President, Bank of America, N.A.

07-30-2009

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc

08-12-2009

Vice President, Sand Canyon Corporation f/k/a Option One Mortgage Corporation

08-28-2009

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc.

09-03-2009

Asst. Vice President, Sand Canyon Corporation formerly known as Option One Mortgage Corporation

09-03-2009

Asst. Secretary, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., acting solely as nominee for American Home Mortgage

09-04-2009

Asst. Secretary, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., acting solely as nominee for American Home Mortgage

09-08-2009

Vice President, Bank of America, N.A.

09-21-2009 & 09-22-2009

Vice President, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., as nominee for American Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc

ATTACHED TO THIS DOCUMENT OTHER DOCUMENTS SIGNED BY LINDA GREEN THAT SHOW THE VARIATIONS OF HER SIGNATURE

IT APPEARS AS IF THE SIGNATURE OF MS. GREEN COULD BE A FORGERY.Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com

A forgery is a writing which falsely purports to be writing for another and is executed with the intent to defraud. Ordinarily a forged instrument cannot carry title.

THE SIGNATURE BELOW IS THE SIGNATURE IN THIS ASSIGNMENT OF DEED OF TRUST:Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com

THE FOLLOWING SIGNATURES ARE FROM DIFFERENT DOCUMENTS RECORDEDIN DIFFERENT COUNTIES:

THIS WHOLE SYSTEM IS A FARCE. A BROKEN DOWN, FRAUDULENT, SHAKY, DISHONEST AND TERRIFYINGLY CORRUPT SYSTEM.

The press and the general public is starting to pick up on these major systemic issues that judges, attorneys and other insiders have known about for some time…when the whole system collapses we’ve all got a real mess on our hands.

As we all struggle to unravel this monstrous mess, breaking down capacity will be a key focus in the problem. We’re all going to be searching around to determine who to sue and where to sue them, but because the courts failed to enforce the most basic pleading requirement….i.e. specifically identify who the parties to the lawsuit are, this is going to be most difficult.

One of the persistent and most pervasive problems in the whole foreclosure crisis is the inability of any party to get reliable or credible information about what is owed on a mortgage, who that phantom amount is owed to and what negotiated amount a lender, servicer or other party involved in the transaction might accept to modify or short sale the underlying loan.

A very concerning issue is the publication on the MERS website of information that identifies who the servicer on a loan is and who the investor in that loan is. But, neither the servicer or investor matches up to the information in many cases.

When you combine all this information with the depositions of Robo signers that are posted on many website, you’ll understand that in a large number of cases, the only connection between the plaintiff foreclosing and the mortgage being foreclosed is a sloppy and hastily executed Assignment signed by an officer that has no corporate authority and has no personal knowledge of the information contained on those documents.

It’s simply not okay to use the “robosigning” practice in the non judicial foreclosure states because these foreclosure cases don’t have to go to court.

The following are some of the most clear legal reasons why the Robo-Signer Controversy should entitle hundreds of thousands of homeowners wrongfully foreclosed and evicted to sue in non judicial foreclosure states. Robo Signers are illegal because fraud cannot be the basis of clear title, trustee’s deeds following Robo Signed sales should be void as a matter of law, notarization is a recording requirement for many of the documents, which was often botched, and most importantly because robo signed falsifications are meant for use in court, including unlawful detainers and bankruptcy matters.Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com

CALIFORNIA

1. Clear Title May Not Derive from a Fraud (including a bona fide purchaser for value).

In the case of a fraudulent transaction California law is settled. The Court in Trout v. Trout, (1934), 220 Cal. 652 at 656 stated:

“Numerous authorities have established the rule that an instrument wholly void, such as an undelivered deed, a forged instrument, or a deed in blank, cannot be made the foundation of a good title, even under the equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase. Consequently, the fact that defendant Archer acted in good faith in dealing with persons who apparently held legal title, is not in itself sufficient basis for relief.” (Emphasis added, internal citations omitted).

This sentiment was clearly echoed in 6 Angels, Inc. v. Stuart-Wright Mortgage, Inc. (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1279 at 1286 where the Court stated:

“It is the general rule that courts have power to vacate a foreclosure sale where there has been fraud in the procurement of the foreclosure decree or where the sale has been improperly, unfairly or unlawfully conducted, or is tainted by fraud, or where there has been such a mistake that to allow it to stand would be inequitable to purchaser and parties.” (Emphasis added).

If forged signatures are used to obtain the foreclosure it makes a difference!

2. Any apparent sale based on Robosigned documents or forged signatures should be void and without any legal effect.

In Bank of America v. LaJolla Group II, the California Court of Appeals held that if a trustee is not contractually empowered under the Deed of Trust to hold a sale, it is totally void. Voidness, as opposed to voidability, means that it is without legal effect. Title does not transfer. No right to evict arises. The property is not sold.

In turn, California Civil Code 2934a requires that the beneficiary execute, notarize and record a substitution for a valid Substitution of Trustee to take effect. Thus, if the Assignment of Deed of Trust, the Substitution of Trustee or the Notice of Default are Robo-Signed, the sale should be void.Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com

3. These documents are not recordable without good notarization.

In California, the reason these documents are notarized in the first place is because otherwise they will not be accepted by the County recorder. Moreover, a notary who helps commit real estate fraud is liable for $25,000 per offense.

Once the document is recorded, however, it is entitled to a “presumption of validity”, which is what spurned the falsification trend in the first place. California Civil Code Section 2924. Therefore, the notarization of a false signature not only constitutes fraud, but is every bit intended as part of a larger conspiracy to commit fraud on the court.

4. The documents are intended for court eviction proceedings.

A necessary purpose for these documents, after the non judicial foreclosure, is the eviction of the rightful owners afterward. Even in California, eviction is a judicial process, albeit summary and often sloppily conducted by judges who don’t really believe they can say no to the pirates taking your house. However, as demonstrated below, once these documents make it into court, the bank officers and lawyers become guilty of felonies:

California Penal Code section 118 provides (a) Every person who, having taken an oath that he or she will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly before any competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any of the cases in which the oath may by law of the State of California be administered, willfully and contrary to the oath, states as true any material matter which he or she knows to be false, and every person who testifies, declares, deposes, or certifies under penalty of perjury in any of the cases in which the testimony, declarations, depositions, or certification is permitted by law of the State of California under penalty of perjury and willfully states as true any material matter which he or she knows to be false, is guilty of perjury.Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com

This subdivision is applicable whether the statement, or the testimony, declaration, deposition, or certification is made or subscribed within or without the State of California.

Penal Code section 132 provides: Every person who upon any trial, proceeding, inquiry, or investigation whatever, authorized or permitted by law, offers in evidence, as genuine or true, any book, paper, document, record, or other instrument in writing, knowing the same to have been forged or fraudulently altered or ante-dated, is guilty of felony.

The Doctrine of Unclean Hands provides: plaintiff’s misconduct in the matter before the court makes his hands “unclean” and he may not hold with them the pristine remedy of injunctive relief. California Satellite Sys. v Nichols (1985) 170 CA3d 56, 216 CR 180. California’s unclean hands rule requires that the Plaintiff don’t cheat, and behave fairly. The plaintiff must come into court with clean hands, and keep them clean, or he or she will be denied relief, regardless of the merits of the claim. Kendall-Jackson Winery Ltd. v Superior Court (1999) 76 CA4th 970, 978, 90 CR2d 743. Whether the doctrine applies is a question of fact. CrossTalk Prods., Inc. v Jacobson (1998) 65 CA4th 631, 639, 76 CR2d 615.

5. Robo Signed Documents Are Intended for Use in California Bankruptcy Court Matters. One majorly overlooked facet of California is our extremely active bankrtupcy court proceedings, where, just as in judicial foreclosure states, the banks must prove “standing” to proceed with a foreclosure. If they are not signed by persons with the requisite knowledge, affidavits submitted in bankruptcy court proceedings such as objections to a plan and Relief from Stays are perjured.

The documents in support are often falsified evidence.

CONCLUSION

Verified eviction complaints, perjured motions for summary judgment, and all other eviction paperwork after robo signed non judicial foreclosures in California and other states are illegal and void. The paperwork itself is void. The sale is void. But the only way to clean up the hundreds of thousands of effected titles is through litigation, because even now the banks will simply not do the right thing. And that’s why robo signers count in non-judicial foreclosure states. Victims of robosigners in California may seek declaratory relief, damages under the Rosenthal Act; an injunction and attorneys fees for Unfair Business practices, as well as claims for slander of title; abuse of process, civil theft, and conversion.Contact Us: MortgageReductionLaw.com

MERS in California

From LivingLies:
I think that everyone is missing the #1 problem MERS has in CA.
MERS is a Non-Authorized Agent and cannot legally assign the Promissory Note, making any foreclosure by other than the original lender wrongful, for the following reasons.
1) Under established and binding Ca law, a Nominee can’t assign the Note. Born V. Koop 1962 200 C. A. 2d 519[200 CalApp2d Page 527, 528
2) On most Notes, the term Nominee is not included and MERS never takes ownership, making it unenforceable and unassignable by MERS.
Ott v. Home Savings & Loan Association, 265 F. 2d 643 [647,648
3) Ca Civil Code §2924, et seq. is exhaustive and a Nominee is never included as an acceptable form of “authorized agent” in a judicial or non-judicial foreclosure.
Finally, GOMES V. COUNTRYYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC., 192 Cal.App.4th 1149, IS FLAWED!
a) The Gomes case simply failed to address and apply the established and binding definition of a nominee.
b) The first thing the Deed of Trust does is (i) take away MERS right to payments and (ii) take away the right to enforce the Note.
c) REGARDLESS WHAT A BORROWER AGREES TO, a borrower cannot legally grant MERS the right to assign the note or any of the rights of the note owner.
________________________________________
MERS Fatal Flaws
MERS cannot legally assign a Promissory Note because, MERS is a Non-Authorized Agent under Established and Binding California Real Property Law and the borrower can’t provide that power to MERS.
First, a Nominee is someone who is nominated potentially for a future position. Much like being nominated for President, yet a Presidential Nominee doesn’t receive any powers until the person actually becomes President.
Second, in the Deed of Trust MERS is identified “Solely as a Nominee” and as the Beneficiary. Which is logically and legally impossible, because a party can only be either the nominated Beneficiary or the Beneficiary. You can’t “not be” and “be” the beneficiary at the same time.
Third, Ca Civil Code §2924, et seq. is exhaustive and a Nominee is never included as an acceptable form of “authorized agent” in a judicial or non-judicial foreclosure.
Fourth, MERS acts “Solely as a Nominee” for lenders, and under Established California Law a “Nominee” is a “Non-Authorized” form of agent, which fails to comply with California Civil Code §§ 2924 through 2924k, as a nominee inherently lacks the right to enforce or assign, the Note or real property ownership rights, per the following case.
“In Cisco v. Van Lew, 60 Cal.App.2d 575, 583-584, 141 P.2d 433, 438., Cisco could not enforce the land sale contract because he was not a party to it, the court, at pages 583-584, said: “The word ‘nominee’ in its commonly accepted meaning connotes the delegation of authority to the nominee in a representative or nominal capacity only, and does not connote the transfer or assignment to the nominee of any property in or ownership of the rights of the person nominating him.”
Born V. Koop 1962 200 C. A. 2d 519[200 CalApp2d Page 527, 528], see file below
Fifth, in addition to MERS’ inherit lack of authority, MERS is not a party to the Note and the Note fails to use the words, for example “ Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB or Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB Nominee”.
“The purpose of the document in question here was to offer an obligation to Harold L. Shaw alone and not to his nominee or any other person whomsoever.”
Ott v. Home Savings & Loan Association, 265 F. 2d 643 [647,648], see file below
Finally, GOMES V. COUNTRYYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC., 192 Cal.App.4th 1149, IS FLAWED!
a) The Gomes case simply failed to address and apply the established and binding definition of a nominee.
b) The first thing the Deed of Trust does is (i) take away MERS right to payments and (ii) take away the right to enforce the Note.
c) REGARDLESS WHAT A BORROWER AGREES TO, a “Borrower” cannot legally grant MERS the right to assign the note or any of the rights of the note owner.
“It is no defense to deceit that false statement was made pursuant to some statutory scheme such as statutory procedures for trustee’s sale (§ 2924 et seq.).” Block v. Tobin (App. 1 Dist. 1975) 119 Cal.Rptr. 288, 45 Cal.App.3d 214.

“It is true, as Defendants repeatedly assert, that California Civil Code § 2924, et seq. authorizes non-judicial foreclosure in this state. It is not the case, however, that the availability of a non-judicial foreclosure process somehow exempts lenders, trustees, beneficiaries, servicers, and the numerous other (sometimes ephemeral) entities involved in dealing with Plaintiffs from following the law.” Sacchi vs. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. US Central District Court of California CV 11-1658 AHM (CWx), June 24, 2011
Therefore, without an endorsement on the Note and an assignment directly from the original lender, assignments by MERS; the substitution of the Trustee; and trustee sale are unlawful and void.

“The assignment of the lien without a transfer of the debt was a nullity in law.” (Polhemus v. Trainer, 30 Cal. 685; Peters v. Jamestown Box Co., 5 Cal. 334; Hyde v. Mangan, 88 Cal. 319;
Jones on Pledges, secs. 418, 419; Van Ewan v. Stanchfield, 13 Minn. 75.)
“A lien is not assignable unless by the express language of the statute.”
(Jones on Liens, sec. 982; Wingard v. Banning, 39 Cal. 343; Ruggles v. Walker, 34 Vt. 468; Wing v. Griffin, 1 Smith, E.D. 162; Holly v. Hungerford, 8 Pick. 73; Daubigny v. Duval, 5 Tenn. 604.)
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT, DAVIS, BELAU & CO. V. NATIONAL SUR. CO., 139 CAL 223, 224 (1903)

“The note and mortgage are inseparable; the former as essential, the latter as an incident. An assignment of the note carries the mortgage with it, while an assignment of the latter alone is a nullity.”
CARPENTER V. LONGAN, 83 U. S. 271 (1872), U.S. Supreme Court
“California courts have repeatedly allowed parties to pursue additional remedies for misconduct arising out of a nonjudicial foreclosure sale when not inconsistent with the policies behind the statutes”
California Golf, L.L.C. v. Cooper (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1053,1070
“(2) Whenever a court becomes aware that a contract is illegal, it has a duty to refrain from entertaining an action to enforce the contract. (3) Furthermore the court will not permit the parties to maintain an action to settle or compromise a claim based on an illegal contract”
Bovard v. American Horse Enterprises, Inc., 201 Cal.App.3d 832 (1988)

On April 11th, 2011,
The Honorable Judge Margaret M. Mann made very clear the following,
based upon California Supreme Court and U.S. Supreme court cases:
• Assignments must be recorded before the foreclosure sale
• Recorded assignments are necessary despite MERS’ role
• MERS’s system is not an alternative to statutory foreclosure law
Bankruptcy No: 10-17456-MM13 re: Eleazar Salazar,

see attached below Mann_order_salazar.pdf

2) Nothing under California Civil Code §§ 2924 through 2924k applies, unless there is a legal chain of title for the Deed of Trust with the Note from the original lender to MERS, and then to the foreclosing party.

The First Fatal Flaw – MERS never takes ownership of the underlying Note, Voiding the “Original” Deed of Trust.
Under California Law, the named Beneficiary on the Deed of Trust must have ownership of the underlying Note. MERS consistently claims to be only “Holding the Note” as a Nominee for the original lender, never “Owning the Note”.

Why MERS doesn’t have ownership of the Note:
1. There is no assignment or indorsement of the Note from the original lender to MERS.
2. The Deed of Trust is not a substitute for an Assignment or legal transfer of the Note from the Original lender to MERS.
“It is well established law in the Ninth Circuit that the assignment of a trust deed does not assign the underlying promissory note and right to be paid, and that the security interest is incident of the debt.” Rickie Walker case, see attached
3. MERS is a mortgage exchange not unlike a stock exchange. It allows banks to buy and sell home mortgages much like stock. Stock exchanges don’t own the stock on their exchange, only the investors do.
4. A Nominee in California cannot own the Note,
“The word “nominee” in its commonly accepted meaning, connotes the delegation of authority to the nominee in a representative or nominal capacity only, and does not connote the transfer or assignment to the nominee of any property in or ownership of the rights of the person nominating him.”
Cisco v. Van Lew, 60 Cal.App.2d 575, 583-584, 141 P.2d 433, 438.
5. In California, a Note payable to the original lender is not a bearer instrument, the original lender must indorse or assign the Note to MERS.
See Cal Com. Code §§3109,3201,3203,3204. and Rickie Walker case Order, and P&A pg6 attached below
6. MERS requires that the owner of the Note never claim MERS as a “Note-Owner”
MERS Membership Rule 8 Foreclosure, Section 2(a)(i), page 25, 26, see attached below
7. MERS consistently argues in court that it does not own the promissory notes,
MERS v. NEBRASKA DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE No. S-04-786, see attached below
8. Finally, Moeller v. Lien and CCC § 2924 DOES NOT “EXPRESSLY” EXCLUDE
OR SUPERCEDE CA Comercial Code § 3301, OR ANY OTHER CA LAWS!
In the case of California Golf, L.L.C. v. Cooper, 163 Cal. App. 4th 1053, 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 153, 2008 Cal. App. LEXIS 850 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2008), the Appellate Court held that the remedies of 2924h were not exclusive.
9. U.S. Supreme Court decision, Carpenter v. Longan (Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. 271, 21 L.Ed. 313 [1873])):
“The note and mortgage are inseparable; the former as essential, the latter as an incident. An assignment of the note carries the mortgage with it, while an assignment of the latter alone is a nullity. Case law in virtually every state follows Carpenter.”

Deed of Trust is also void, without a recorded assignment of the Deed of Trust for each transfer of the Note:
1. MERS Involvement in the loan effectively stripped the deed of trust lien from the land and a foreclosure is not legally possible, Bellistri v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 284 S.W.3d 619 (Mo.App. E.D.,2009), attached below
2. Any assignment of the Deed of Trust & Note from MERS to a successor is void and fraudulent.
RICKIE WALKER CASE, see attached below
Therefore, MERS definition of “Holding the Note” is not the legal equivalent of “Owning the Note”;
California Civil Code section 2924 for foreclosure only applies if MERS owned the note.

The Second Fatal Flaw – MERS tracking system is not a legal chain of title and the debt may be uncollectible.
When a Note is sold, it has to be indorsed the same way you basically sign a check for deposit or cashing.

Under California Law the Note is not a bearer instrument, but an instrument payable only to a specifically identified person, per California Commercial Code §3109; any transfer of the Note requires a legal Negotiation, Endorsement and a physical delivery of the note to the transferee to perfect the transfer, per California Commercial Codes §§3201, 3203, 3204.
see attached Rickie Walker Order.

“MERS Basics “Registration vs. Recording. (PPT Slide)
o MERS is not a system of legal record nor a replacement for the public land records.
o Mortgages must be recorded in the county land records.
o MERS is a tracking system. No interests are transferred on the MERS® System, only tracked.”,
MERS Southeast Legal Seminar – MERS Basics slide 7,
see attached below. or http://www.mersinc.org/files/filedownload.aspx?id=63&table=DownloadFile

“A mortgage note holder can sell a mortgage note to another in what has become a gigantic secondary market. . . . For these servicing companies to perform their duties satisfactorily, the note and mortgage were bifurcated.”
MERSCORP President and CEO, R.K. Arnold, Yes, There is Life on MERS, Prob.& Prop., Aug. 1997, at p.16, see attached below

Clear Title May Not Derive From A Fraud (including a bona fide purchaser for value).
In the case of a fraudulent transaction California law is settled. The Court in Trout v. Taylor, (1934), 220 Cal. 652 at 656 made as much plain:
“Numerous authorities have established the rule that an instrument wholly void, such as an undelivered deed, a forged instrument, or a deed in blank, cannot be made the foundation of a good title, even under the equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase. Consequently, the fact that defendant Archer acted in good faith in dealing with persons who apparently held legal title, is not in itself sufficient basis for relief.” (Emphasis added, internal citations omitted).

This sentiment was clearly echoed in 6 Angels, Inc. v. Stuart-Wright Mortgage, Inc. (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1279 at 1286 where the Court stated:
“It is the general rule that courts have power to vacate a foreclosure sale where there has been fraud in the procurement of the foreclosure decree or where the sale has been improperly, unfairly or unlawfully conducted, or is tainted by fraud, or where there has been such a mistake that to allow it to stand would be inequitable to purchaser and parties.” (Emphasis added).

In Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal. 4th 1226, 1231 [44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 352, 900 P.2d 601], the California Supreme Court concluded that:
“ ‘the antideficiency laws were not intended to immunize wrongdoers from the consequences of their fraudulent acts’ ” and that, if the court applies a proper measure of damages, “ ‘fraud suits do not frustrate the antideficiency policies because there should be no double recovery for the beneficiary.’ ” (Id. at p. 1238.)
Great Article source: http://www.exclusiveforeclosures.net/real-estate-foreclosures/doan-on-%E2%80%9Cproduce-the-note%E2%80%9D/

Therefore, any attempt to collect by other than the original lender may be impossible without a legal chain of title, because MERS tracking system is not a legal chain of title.

Source: https://sites.google.com/site/mersfatalflawsincalifornia/

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MERS Defense Flaw
Legal Disclaimer: All information contained on this website is alleged and general in nature, and should not be construed as legal advice or a substitute for legal advice. It was not written by an attorney and should only be reviewed by an attorney.

MERS alleged status as of November 18th, 2010

PROTECTION FROM VOIDABILITY IS ONLY PROVIDED FOR THE YEARS TAXES ARE PAID.

On July 21, 2010 MERS registered with the California Secretary of State.
MERS registration was necessary, and not retroactive for the following reasons:
1. MERS needed to register with the State of California, because MERS is Not a Foreign Lending Institution nor claims to be, therefore California Corporate Code § 191(d) does not exempt MERS from California Corporate Code §2105.
“the court cannot conclude that MERS falls within any of the five enumerated examples of “foreign lending institutions,” and the court declines to address sua sponte whether MERS otherwise satisfies subsection (d).”. . . “the enforcement of any loans by trustee’s sale, judicial process or deed in lieu of foreclosure or otherwise. . .” “Accordingly, section 191(c)(7) does not exempt MERS’s activity.”
CHAMPLAIE v. BAC, No. 2:09-cv-01316-LKK-DAD (E.D.Cal. 10-22-2009) pg23,24, attached below
As a result of MERS intentional failure from obtaining a certificate of qualification from the California Secretary of State as a “Beneficiary”, including filing returns and paying taxes, MERS is not allowed the right to defend a lawsuit when named as or defending its actions in a “Beneficiary” capacity, pursuant to California Revenue & Taxation Code Section §§ 23301, 23301.6, 23304.1.
“A suspended corporation is not allowed to exercise the powers and privileges of a corporation in good standing, including the right to sue or defend a lawsuit while its taxes remain unpaid”
PERFORMANCE PLASTERING v. RICHMOND AM. HOMES, 153 Cal.App.4th 659 (2007) 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 537
2. MERS must first produce a Certificate of Relief from Voidability for the time prior to July 21, 2010, California Revenue & Tax Code 23305.1 and file with this Superior Court Clerk receipt of payment to the California Secretary of State for taxes and penalties, California Corporations Code §2203(c).
“UMML qualified to transact intrastate business, but failed to pay the necessary fees, penalties and taxes.
The trial court correctly dismissed the complaint without prejudice.”
United Medical Management Ltd. v. Gatto, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1732 – Cal: Court of Appeals, 2nd Appellate
“we will dismiss a nonqualified foreign corporation’s appeal if we determine the nonqualified foreign corporation transacted
intrastate business in California.9 (Corp. Code, §§ 2105, 2203.) We believe this approach advances the policies of preventing tax evasion through the even-handed administration of the tax laws, while encouraging qualification of foreign corporations by prohibiting a delinquent corporation from enjoying the privileges of a going concern.”

“9 Pursuant to Corporations Code § 2203, subdivision (c), and as recognized in United Medical, supra, and Mediterranean Exports, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, a nonqualified foreign corporation is prohibited from maintaining an action in state court only until it complies with Corporations Code section 2105, pays to the Secretary of State a penalty of $250 and the fees for filing the required statement, and files with the court clerk receipts substantiating payment of such fees and franchise taxes and any other business taxes. Since the tax liability will be the issue presented to us, we will allow a nonqualified foreign corporation to maintain an action before us if it presents evidence substantiating it has qualified with the Secretary of State and paid the $250 penalty pursuant to Corporations Code section 2203, subdivision (c).”
In the Matter of the Appeal of Reitman Atlantic Corporation, 2001-SBE-002-A, See attached below

3. MERS will very likely cite one of these two cases:
United Medical Management Ltd. v. Gatto 49 Cal.App.4th 1732 (1996),
or Perlas v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Systems, Inc., 2010 WL 3079262 * 7, an unpublished case as of 10/18/2010
Both of which are based upon this case:
“A nonqualified corporation subject to a misdemeanor prosecution and on conviction to a heavy fine for doing business without complying with the law, is permitted to qualify, be restored to full legal competency and have its prior transactions given full effect.” (Tucker v. Cave Springs Min. Corp. (1934) 139 Cal. App. 213, 217 [33 P.2d 871].
So demand MERS filing of receipts and that Certificate of Relief from Voidability!
191 CHAMPLAIE_v_BAC_HOME_LOANS_SERVICING_LP_E_D_Cal_10-22-2009
atto, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1732 – Cal_ Court of Appeals, 2nd Appellate Dist., 5th Div. 1996 – Google Scholar
bellistri-v-ocwen

Joseph Born v. Koop
mann-order_salazar
MERS RULES(June2009)
MERS Southeast Legal Seminar (11.10.04) final

MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS INC v. NEBRASKA DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE – NE Supreme Court

Ott v. Home Savings & Loan Association
Perlas v. MERS
R.K. Arnold, MERS Admits Bifurcation
Reitman Atlantic Corporation BOE
Reitman Atlantic Corporation BOE
Rickie_Walker_P_and_A
RickieWalkerOrder

David and Goliath as court overturns case dissmissal

A Bakersfield homeowner is taking on a bank, in a battle that could have sweeping implications for people facing foreclosure.

Mark Demucha wants Wells Fargo to prove it owns his home loan. And, if his lawsuit is successful, it could set a legal precedent that slows or even stops foreclosures across the state.

“Filled out the same paperwork over and over again.”

Mark Demucha says all he wanted was to keep his house. “Sent it to them over and over again. I couldn’t give you the exact time frame, but it’s ridiculous,” he said.

But, after a year of trying to get a loan modification from Wells Fargo… “I had to do something to protect my family. to protect my home.”

He felt all washed up. “Not yes, not no, not anything. They didn’t respond.”

Demucha turned to family friend Michael Finley who happens to be a lawyer.

“A company that does not have a legal right to collect mortgage payments should not have the right to foreclose,” said Finley.

Now, in a case that could have far-reaching implications, Demucha and Finley say they have one simple request. “If they are going to take my house, I should be able to see they have a legal right to take it from me,” said Demucha. “They come to me and want me to have every single piece of paper I was ever supposed to have. But, when I say ‘hey where is my promissory note?’ they look at me like I’m a thief.”

That’s because Wells Fargo didn’t loan Demucha the money to buy his house. Another company called CTX Mortgage, did.

Banks, at the time, seemed like they were almost using the housing market as a roulette wheel or a craps table. They were shoving debt around like it was a card game.

Like so many millions of homeowners, Demucha’s loan was sold to another lender, a common practice because it’s profitable to the banks.

In the old days, any time ownership of a property and its loan changed hands, it would be recorded at the Hall of Records at a cost of $18. For the mortgage industry, that took too long and on a large scale cost too much money. So they privatized it by creating the mortgage electronic registration system, a company headquartered in Reston, Virginia.

The sole purpose of MERS was to cut out the county clerk, allowing one mortgage company to quickly and electronically transfer a loan to another mortgage company.

On Tuesday, a spokeswoman told 17 News, MERS holds title to about 60% of the country’s home mortgages or about 32 million loans. MERS is basically an electronic handshake between banks, saying we have a deal.

But, MERS has turned into a headache for some lenders as homeowners across the country have successfully challenged the company’s legal standing in court. Others like Demucha are demanding their lender produce loan documents which may have been lost or even destroyed in the MERS shuffle.

“Why should the bank not still be required to possess a single piece of paper that they are the right place to home the consumer should make the payments?”

Earlier this month, a state appellate court agreed, overturning a Kern County judge’s ruling that Wells Fargo could foreclose on the home.

The case is headed back to our county where the same judge will have to decide if Wells Fargo can prove it legitimately holds title to the Demucha’s home.

“I wish I were David and they were Goliath. This would have been an easier fight. They are like an army of Goliaths and I’m like David with his hands tied behind his back,” said Demucha.

Wells Fargo spokesman Tom Goyda couldn’t comment on the specifics of this case but acknowledged the appellate court had sent the case back to the Kern County trial court to rule on several issues. Goyda noted the appeals court did not actually rule on the case and that Wells Fargo would continue to try the case in court.

A spokeswoman for MERS said her company said she couldn’t comment because they are not part of this lawsuit. Demucha and his attorney are basically asking for Wells Fargo to go away and to restore the couple’s credit.

“Wells Fargo essentially ignored them until the fifth district appellate court said Wells Fargo you can’t ignore Mark and Sherry Demucha any more,” said Finley.

The appellate court ruling has arrived back here in Kern County but a hearing has not yet been scheduled.

MERS and invalid assignments

Brand New, Hot Off The Presses MERS Policy Bulletin

July 24th, 2011 | Author:

After years of claiming that assignments don’t matter and the date of assignment certainly doesn’t matter, the MERS Monster has finally changed its tune, effective July 21, 2011:

The Certifying Officer must execute the assignment of the Security Instrument from MERS before initiating foreclosure proceedings or filing Legal Proceedings and promptly send the assignment of the Security Instrument for recording in the applicable public land records

Well, harumph says I…what of all those damn post filing assignments?  What about all them specious arguments made in courtrooms all across this country that said the date of assignment didn’t matter?  What about the absurd argument that an “equitable assignment” had already occurred? (despite the fact that neither the pooling and servicing a agreement nor law permit such assignments)  For foreclosure cases already adjudged this is problematic and for all those hundreds of thousands still pending, this change in policy is exhibit #1 in the argument that a post filing assignment cannot confer standing.

This certainly ain’t “Ding Dong The Witch Is Dead”, it’s just another stanza in “Humpty Dumpty Sat on A Wall”

And all the kings horses and all the kings men couldn’t put Humpty Dumpty back together again.

Humpty Dumpty is our real property recording system that was developed over hundreds of years in this country.  A key read is Hernando Desoto’s “The Mystery of Capital” for a long explanation that our country’s success is tied largely to our real property record system that has been completely obliterated in just a few short years by all this mortgage madness.  What is most astonishing (and the biggest indictment of the whole MERS madness) is the fact that no law, legislation or court decision was ever rendered to justify the MERS system prior to its widespread implementation.  It was merely spread all across this country like a virulent virus that was transmitted and lay dormant in the property records impacting millions of homes all across America.

MERS Policy Bulletin

Ask for a 402 hearing and then dissmiss the eviction !!!

If the court follows the rules of evidence (and they do) if proper objections are filed. No eviction of a secuitized loan should ever prevail on an eviction; they cannot produce the foundation to authenticate the Trustees Deed it is based upon preliminary facts that they are unable and unwilling to bring to court. The Assignments Civil code 2932.5 , The Servicer, The Accounting, The Trustee, MERS, The Robo signer, The person that purportedly contacted the Borrower Trustor, The compliance documents with Civil Code 2924, all these are preliminary facts upon which the admission of the Trustees Deed depend Evidence code 400,401,402,403. Check out this motion !!

Timothy L. McCandless, Esq.  (SBN 147715)

LAW OFFICES OF TIMOTHY L. MCCANDLESS

Attorney for Defendant,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SOLANO

SOLANO COURT/ LIMITED JURISDICTION

FANNIE MAE et al,

Plaintiff,

v.

Defendant.

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)Case No.:

 

DEFENDANT’S IN LIMINE MOTION TO EXCLUDE ALL EVIDENCE (RE:FACIALLY INVALID DEED OF TRUST)

TRIAL DATE:  Tues., June 15, 2010 ) 

To the Court, to Plaintiff FANNIE MAE, and its attorney of record:

            PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, on Tuesday, June 15, 2010, at 8:30 AM, or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard, Defendant, MICHELLE CABESAS, will in limine judicii move the court, and hereby does move, for an order excluding from trial all evidence proffered by Plaintiff FANNIE MAE.

          The motion will be heard in Department  26, at 1:30 p.m. in front of the Honorable Judge Davis  of the Solano Court of the above-captioned court.

The motion will be brought pursuant to Evidence Code sections 353 and 400 et seq., Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10(b), and related decisional law.

The ground of the motion will be that the Unlawful Detainer Complaint, together with the publicly-filed “Deed of Trust” that is necessarily incorporated into it, is facially invalid because the  Beneficiary did not have the power of sale. Such irregularities should constitute sufficient grounds to set aside the entire non-judicial foreclosure process. Therefore, the Trustee’s Deed After Sale should not be admitted as no lawful basis exists for its execution. Additionally, the Notice of Default, and Notice of Default Declaration should be excluded.

The failure of Plaintiff and/or Plaintiff’s agent to perform a condition precedent pursuant to Civil Code Section 2923.5 is fatal. The Notice of Default Declaration fails is several regards, (1) the language of the Notice does not comply with the statute because it does not set forth facts of how the statute was performed; (2) the Declaration is not sworn under penalty of perjury; (3) the only date of the Declaration is the date of execution which is one day prior to the Notice of Default which was recorded only five days later, thus, thirty days did not pass from the date of execution of the Declaration and the date of recordation. As such, under Section 2923.5, the Notice of Default Declaration is void and could not support the recordation of the Notice of Default.  Because the non-judicial foreclosure process is subject to strict scrutiny, and given the material failure of a condition precedent by Plaintiff and/or Plaintiff’s agent, the entire non-judicial foreclosure process is invalid.  Therefore, the Trustee’s Deed After Sale cannot be admitted into evidence, as no lawful foundation can be laid.

//

DATED:  June 14, 2010.                  ________________________________________

LAW OFFICES OF TIMOTHY L. MCCANDLESS

By: Timothy P. McCandless, Esq.

Attorney for Defendant,

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The court’s records for this case will show that Plaintiff FANNIE MAE filed its Complaint on or about  August 4, 2009.   The apparent foreclosing beneficiary was plaintiff, FANNIE MAE.  [See attachment to Unlawful Detainer Complaint entitled “Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale.”]

This motion ensued in its present form, because sufficient time did not remain before trial, in order to permit Defendant CABESAS to bring a regularly-noticed general demurrer or “motion for judgment on the pleadings”.

II.

THE COURT HAS POWER TO EXCLUDE ALL EVIDENCE FROM TRIAL, ON GROUNDS ANALOGOUS TO A GENERAL DEMURRER.

            The court has power to consider and grant an objection to all evidence under Evidence Code sections 353 and 400 et seq.  If no cause of action or defense is stated by the respective pleading, then no “factual issue” any longer exists, and therefore no evidence may be admitted on grounds of “relevance” under Evidence Code sections 400 et seq.

It is well established that a party may bring an in limine objection in order to exclude all evidence, as a sort of general demurrer or “motion for judgment on the pleadings”.  “Although not in form a motion, this method of attacking the pleading is identical in purpose to a general demurrer and motion for judgment on the pleadings and is governed by the same rules.  [Citations.]”  5 WITKIN, Cal.Proc.3rd page 386, “Pleading” at §953.  See also 6 WITKIN, Cal.Proc.3rd pages 571-573, “Proceedings Without Trial” at §§272-273.

According to 5 WITKIN, Cal.Proc.3rd page 340, “Pleading” at §899, a “general” demurrer concerns only the defense that the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action or defense.  That is precisely what defendant contends here: the Unlawful Detainer Complaint fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted.

III.

THE COURT MUST STRICTLY ENFORCE

THE TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A FORECLOSURE.

            The harshness of non-judicial foreclosure has been recognized. “The exercise of the power of sale is a harsh method of foreclosing the rights of the grantor.” Anderson v. Heart Federal Savings (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 202, 6 215, citing to System Inv. Corporation v. Union Bank (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 137, 153.  The statutory requirements are intended to protect the trustor from a wrongful or unfair loss of his property Moeller v. Lien (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 822, 830; accord, Hicks v. E.T. Legg & Associates (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 496, 503; Lo Nguyen v. Calhoun (6th District 2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 428, 440, and a valid foreclosure by the private power of sale requires strict compliance with the requirements of the statute. Miller & Starr, California Real Estate (3d ed.), Deeds of Trust and Mortgages, Chapter 10 §10.179; Anderson v. Heart Federal Sav. & Loan Assn., 208 Cal. App. 3d 202, 211 (3d Dist. 1989), reh’g denied and opinion modified, (Mar. 28, 1989); Miller v. Cote (4th Dist. 1982) 127 Cal. App. 3d 888, 894; System Inv. Corp. v. Union Bank (2d Dist. 1971) 21 Cal. App. 3d 137, 152-153; Bisno v. Sax (2d Dist. 1959) 175 Cal. App. 2d 714, 720.

It has been a cornerstone of foreclosure law that the statutory requirements, intending to protect the trustor from a wrongful or unfair loss of the property, must be complied with strictly. Miller & Starr, California Real Estate (3d ed.), Deeds of Trust and Mortgages, Chapter 10 §10.182.   “Close” compliance does not count. As a result, any trustee’s sale based on a statutorily deficient Notice of Default is invalid (emphasis added). Miller & Starr, California Real Estate (3d ed.), Deeds of Trust and Mortgages, Chapter 10 §10.182; Anderson v. Heart Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. (3dDist. 1989) 208 Cal. App. 3d 202, 211, reh’g denied and opinion modified, (Mar. 28, 1989); Miller v. Cote (4th Dist. 1982) 127 Cal. App. 3d 888, 894; System Inv. Corp. v. Union Bank (2d Dist. 1971) 21 Cal. App. 3d 137, 152-153; Saterstrom v. Glick Bros. Sash, Door & Mill Co.(3d Dist. 1931) 118 Cal. App. 379.

Additionally, any trustee’s sale based on a statutorily deficient Notice of Trustee Sale is invalid.  Anderson v. Heart Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. (3d Dist. 1989) 11 208 Cal.App. 3d 202, 211, reh’g denied and opinion modified, (Mar. 28, 1989). The California Sixth District Court of Appeal observed, “Pursuing that policy [of judicial interpretation], the courts have fashioned rules to protect the debtor, one of them being that the notice of default will be strictly construed and must correctly set forth the amounts required to cure the default.” Sweatt v. The Foreclosure Co., Inc. (1985 – 6th District) 166 Cal.App.3d 273 at 278, citing to Miller v. Cote (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 888, 894 and SystemInv. Corp. v. Union Bank (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 137, 152-153.

The same reasoning applies even to a notice of a trustee’s sale.  Courts will set aside a foreclosure sale when there has been fraud, when the  sale has been improperly, unfairly, or unlawfully conducted, or when there has  been such a mistake that it would be inequitable to let it stand. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass’n v. Reidy (1940) 15 Cal. 2d 243, 248; Whitman v. Transtate Title Co.(4th Dist. 1985) 165 Cal. App. 3d 312, 322-323; In re Worcester (9th Cir. 1987) 811 F.2d 1224, 1228.  See also Smith v. Williams (1961) 55 Cal. 2d 617, 621; Stirton v. Pastor (4th Dist. 1960) 177 Cal. App. 2d 232, 234; Brown v. Busch (3d Dist. 1957) 152 Cal.App. 2d 200, 203-204.

If somehow these foreclosing predecessor-in-interest can establish this standing, or right, to extrajudicially foreclose, still it should be prevented from pursuing this eviction action, because such an action, if successful, would result in a wrongful foreclosure, due to the predecessor-in-interest’s exercise of a non-existent extrajudicial power.

IV.

PLAINTIFF, OR PLAINTIFF’S PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST,

DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO EXTRAJUDICIALLY FORECLOSE

The foreclosing predecessor-in-interest simply did not have the right to foreclose under the subject trust deed, because the notice of default  facially invalid.

The reason why the security instrument is not valid, is because it is facially void        !  A copy of the subject trust deed – a public record!! — is attached hereto.  Further, the trueness of the copy is readily verifiable, since it is a publicly-recorded document.  Clear as daylight, contact with the trustor 30 days prior to the notice was imjpossible. The was no lender MERS is not a lender Plaintiff  did not get the assignment  till 7/8/2009  . The notice of default was recorded 7/31/2009 only 23 days after the assignment.

A trust deed adds a third party, of sorts, namely the beneficiary.  It has been observed that a trust deed naming a purely fictitious person as beneficiary may be void.  Woodward v. McAdam (1894), 101 Cal. 438.  It has been held that a trust deed might be void for uncertainty, where the deed of trust does not name or describe any of the beneficiaries, but only classified them by reference to a common attribute.  Watkins v. Bryant (1891), 91 Cal. 492.  There seems to be no common-sense reason why the same principle should not apply to the designation of the grantee/ trustee, even were the law of deeds not generally applicable to trust deeds.

Beneficiary did not have the power of sale. Such irregularities should constitute sufficient grounds to set aside the entire non-judicial foreclosure process. Therefore, the Trustee’s Deed After Sale should not be admitted as no lawful basis exists for its execution. Additionally, the Notice of Default, and Notice of Default Declaration should be excluded.

The failure of Plaintiff and/or Plaintiff’s agent to perform a condition precedent pursuant to Civil Code Section 2923.5 is fatal. The Notice of Default Declaration fails is several regards, (1) the language of the Notice does not comply with the statute because it does not set forth facts of how the statute was performed; (2) the Declaration is not sworn under penalty of perjury; (3) the only date of the Declaration is the date of execution which is one day prior to the Notice of Default which was recorded only five days later, thus, thirty days did not pass from the date of execution of the Declaration and the date of recordation. As such, under Section 2923.5, the Notice of Default Declaration is void and could not support the recordation of the Notice of Default.  Because the non-judicial foreclosure process is subject to strict scrutiny, and given the material failure of a condition precedent by Plaintiff and/or Plaintiff’s agent, the entire non-judicial foreclosure process is invalid.  Therefore, the Trustee’s Deed After Sale cannot be admitted into evidence, as no lawful foundation can be laid.

CONCLUSION

          The Plaintiff’s entire case rests upon the “facial” or “on the public record” legitimacy of the extrajudicial foreclosure by its predecessor-in-interest.  The foreclosure was facially void.  The case should be dismissed, upon the court’s determination that no factual “issue” remains.

Respectfully submitted,

DATED:  June 14, 2010             _______________________________________

LAW OFFICES OF TIMOTHY L. MCCANDLESS

By: Timothy P. McCandless

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

SERS not MERS!

If you have been a reader of The Hallmark Abstract Sentinel then by now you are aware of MERS and the controversy that surrounds it. The Mortgage Electronic Recording System has been at the heart of questionable foreclosures due to standing issues, as well as for having aided in the avoidance of untold millions in recording fees not paid to counties.

It was only a matter of time before someone came up with a way to digitize marriage recordings in a system known as SERS, the Spouse Electronic Recording System (H/T 4closure Fraud).

SERS | SPOUSE ELECTRONIC RECORDING SYSTEM

Mike, on February 21, 2011 at 7:01 am said:

I have finally come to one conclusion: if you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em!

My proposal is quite simple–a paperless marriage recording system, called SERS, (Spouse Electronic Recording System) for the electronic recording of marriages. To avoid the high costs of (not to mention the hassle of) the filing of marriage certificates, a SERS member would be able to simply record himself or herself as a “nominee” for A marriage to A spouse. The SERS system will record that A marriage has taken place, but the person to whom the SERS member becomes married does not have to be specified until just prior to the termination of the marriage–via divorce or death.

In this manner, one is able to “leave one’s options open.” It is a perfect system for those who would like the stability of the institution of marriage, yet, at the same time, yearn for the flexibility of non-commitment. It announces to the world, “I’m married–I’m just not saying to whom it is that I am married.”

Mind you–the flexibility provided by SERS would have its limits. For example, a SERS marriage could only be assigned to a SERS member, and the marriage would have to be “officiated” by a SERS authorized officer. Nevertheless, virtually anyone with a pulse, $25 for an official SERS certifying officer stamp, an ink jet printer, and access to a SERS terminal could become a certifying officer of SERS. (And then there is Provision K, the “Kunkle Provision,” which provides for dead certifying officers, as well.)

At the “consecration” of the relationship–which is technically an “agency relationship,” the marriage will be given a SIN number, or Spouse Identification Number. In this manner, through the SIN number, any married person can track who their actual spouse is–except in the case of most situations–where the SERS member prefers to keep that information private. Rest assured, however, if you die or if you cause a divorce, a spouse will be assigned to you at least 30 days prior to such death or divorce, except in the case of most situations, where the spousal nominator doesn’t know what the heck is going on—wherein an assignment will be backdated to reflect that the spousal assignment transpired 30 days prior to said death or divorce.

Due to the high-tech nature of the proprietary data tracking software used by SERS, only one employee of SERSCORP will be necessary, and the cost of her salary and generous bonus structure will be virtually unnoticeable as it is skimmed off one marriage transaction fee at a time as SERS marital swaps are traded seamlessly Over The Counter through Cayman Island accounts. Due to the swapping functionality enabled by their individual (original) SINs, SERS marriages will facilitate the marital churning process without the pain, humiliation, or cost of conventional marital swapping. The cost of SERS transaction fees will be recouped in the sheer volume of marital business as marriage certificates are securitized into MBS (Marriage-Backed Securities.)

Keep in mind that many marital swaps can be transacted over the life of a SERS marriage, and the nominee spouse will be unaware of such arrangements. However, therein lies the genuine excitement that only fraud-ridden obfuscation could ever bring to a marriage. (Will my nominee spouse be long? Will my nominee spouse be short? Will my nominee spouse be naked? Will my nominee spouse purchase enhancements? Will my nominee spouse be synthetic? Will my nominee spouse be square?)

At SERSCORP…we’ll put the SERS in Sersprise!

This is of course a fiction…For now!

Agard MERS a nominee is not an agent

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
—————————————————————–x
In re:
Case No. 810-77338-reg
FERREL L. AGARD,
Chapter 7
Debtor.
—————————————————————–x
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Before the Court is a motion (the “Motion”) seeking relief from the automatic stay
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) and (2), to foreclose on a secured interest in the Debtor’s real
property located in Westbury, New York (the “Property”). The movant is Select Portfolio
Servicing, Inc. (“Select Portfolio” or “Movant”), as servicer for U.S. Bank National Association,
as Trustee for First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-FF12, Mortgage Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2006-FF12 (“U.S. Bank”). The Debtor filed limited opposition to the Motion
contesting the Movant’s standing to seek relief from stay. The Debtor argues that the only
interest U.S. Bank holds in the underlying mortgage was received by way of an assignment from
the Mortgage Electronic Registration System a/k/a MERS, as a “nominee” for the original
lender. The Debtor’s argument raises a fundamental question as to whether MERS had the legal
authority to assign a valid and enforceable interest in the subject mortgage. Because U.S. Bank’s
rights can be no greater than the rights as transferred by its assignor – MERS – the Debtor argues
that the Movant, acting on behalf of U.S. Bank, has failed to establish that it holds an
enforceable
Case 8-10-77338-reg Doc 41 Filed 02/10/11 Entered 02/10/11 14:13:10
right against the Property.1 The Movant’s initial response to the Debtor’s opposition was that
MERS’s authority to assign the mortgage to U.S. Bank is derived from the mortgage itself which
allegedly grants to MERS its status as both “nominee” of the mortgagee and “mortgagee of
record.” The Movant later supplemented its papers taking the position that U.S. Bank is a
creditor with standing to seek relief from stay by virtue of a judgment of foreclosure and sale
entered in its favor by the state court prior to the filing of the bankruptcy. The Movant argues
that the judgment of foreclosure is a final adjudication as to U.S. Bank’s status as a secured
creditor and therefore the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits this Court from looking behind the
judgment and questioning whether U.S. Bank has proper standing before this Court by virtue of a
valid assignment of the mortgage from MERS.
The Court received extensive briefing and oral argument from MERS, as an intervenor in
these proceedings which go beyond the arguments presented by the Movant. In addition to the
rights created by the mortgage documents themselves, MERS argues that the terms of its
membership agreement with the original lender and its successors in interest, as well as New
York state agency laws, give MERS the authority to assign the mortgage. MERS argues that it
holds legal title to mortgages for its member/lenders as both “nominee” and “mortgagee of
1 The Debtor also questions whether Select Portfolio has the authority and the standing to
seek relief from the automatic stay. The Movant argues that Select Portfolio has standing
to bring the Motion based upon its status as “servicer” of the Mortgage, and attaches an
affidavit of a vice president of Select Portfolio attesting to that servicing relationship.
Caselaw has established that a mortgage servicer has standing to seek relief from the
automatic stay as a party in interest. See, e.g., Greer v. O’Dell, 305 F.3d 1297
(11th Cir. 2002); In re Woodberry, 383 B.R. 373 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2008). This presumes,
however, that the lender for whom the servicer acts validly holds the subject note and
mortgage. Thus, this Decision will focus on whether U.S. Bank validly holds the subject
note and mortgage.
Page 2 of 37
Case 8-10-77338-reg Doc 41 Filed 02/10/11 Entered 02/10/11 14:13:10
record.” As such, it argues that any member/lender which holds a note secured by real property,
that assigns that note to another member by way of entry into the MERS database, need not also
assign the mortgage because legal title to the mortgage remains in the name of MERS, as agent
for any member/lender which holds the corresponding note. MERS’s position is that if a MERS
member directs it to provide a written assignment of the mortgage, MERS has the legal
authority, as an agent for each of its members, to assign mortgages to the member/lender
currently holding the note as reflected in the MERS database.
For the reasons that follow, the Debtor’s objection to the Motion is overruled and the
Motion is granted. The Debtor’s objection is overruled by application of either the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine, or res judicata. Under those doctrines, this Court must accept the state court
judgment of foreclosure as evidence of U.S. Bank’s status as a creditor secured by the Property.
Such status is sufficient to establish the Movant’s standing to seek relief from the automatic stay.
The Motion is granted on the merits because the Movant has shown, and the Debtor has not
disputed, sufficient basis to lift the stay under Section 362(d).
Although the Court is constrained in this case to give full force and effect to the state
court judgment of foreclosure, there are numerous other cases before this Court which present
identical issues with respect to MERS and in which there have been no prior dispositive state
court decisions. This Court has deferred rulings on dozens of other motions for relief from stay
pending the resolution of the issue of whether an entity which acquires its interests in a mortgage
by way of assignment from MERS, as nominee, is a valid secured creditor with standing to seek
relief from the automatic stay. It is for this reason that the Court’s decision in this matter will
address the issue of whether the Movant has established standing in this case notwithstanding the
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existence of the foreclosure judgment. The Court believes this analysis is necessary for the
precedential effect it will have on other cases pending before this Court.
The Court recognizes that an adverse ruling regarding MERS’s authority to assign
mortgages or act on behalf of its member/lenders could have a significant impact on MERS and
upon the lenders which do business with MERS throughout the United States. However, the
Court must resolve the instant matter by applying the laws as they exist today. It is up to the
legislative branch, if it chooses, to amend the current statutes to confer upon MERS the requisite
authority to assign mortgages under its current business practices. MERS and its partners made
the decision to create and operate under a business model that was designed in large part to avoid
the requirements of the traditional mortgage recording process. This Court does not accept the
argument that because MERS may be involved with 50% of all residential mortgages in the
country, that is reason enough for this Court to turn a blind eye to the fact that this process does
not comply with the law.
Facts
Procedural Background
On September 20, 2010, the Debtor filed for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy
Code. In Schedule A to the petition, the Debtor lists a joint ownership interest in the Property
described as follows:
A “[s]ingle family home owned with son, deed in son’s name since 2007; used as
primary residence . . .. Debtor was on original deed and is liable on the mortgage,
therefore has equitable title. Debtor is in default of the mortgage with a principal
balance of over $450,000.00. The house is worth approximately $350,000. A
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foreclosure sale was scheduled 9/21/10.”
According to Schedule D, the Property is valued at $350,000 and is encumbered by a mortgage
in the amount of $536,920.67 held by “SPS Select Portfolio Servicing.”
On October 14, 2010, the Movant filed the Motion seeking relief from the automatic stay
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §362(d) to foreclose on the Property. The Motion does not state that a
foreclosure proceeding had been commenced or that a judgment of foreclosure was granted prior
to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Nor does it mention that the Debtor holds only equitable
title and does not hold legal title to the Property. Instead, Movant alleges that U.S. Bank is the
“holder” of the Mortgage; that the last mortgage payment it received from the Debtor was
applied to the July, 2008 payment; and that the Debtor has failed to make any post-petition
payments to the Movant. Movant also asserts that as of September 24, 2010, the total
indebtedness on the Note and Mortgage was $542,902.33 and the Debtor lists the value of the
Property at $350,000 in its schedules. On that basis, Movant seeks entry of an order vacating the
stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) and (d)(2).
Annexed to the Motion are copies of the following documents:
• Adjustable Rate Note, dated June 9, 2006, executed by the Debtor as borrower and listing
First Franklin a Division of Na. City Bank of In. (“First Franklin”) as the lender
(“Note”);
• Balloon Note Addendum to the Note, dated June 9, 2006;
• Mortgage, dated June 9, 2006 executed by the Debtor and listing First Franklin as lender,
and MERS as nominee for First Franklin and First Franklin’s successors and assigns
(“Mortgage”);
• Adjustable Rate and Balloon Rider, dated June 9, 2006;
• Addendum to Promissory Note and Security Agreement executed by the Debtor; and
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• Assignment of Mortgage, dated February 1, 2008, listing MERS as nominee for First
Franklin as assignor, and the Movant, U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee for
First Franklin Mortgage Loan Trust 2006- FF12, Mortgage Pass-through Certificates,
Series 2006-FF12, as assignee (“Assignment of Mortgage”).
The Arguments of the Parties
On October 27, 2010, the Debtor filed “limited opposition” to the Motion, alleging that
the Movant lacks standing to seek the relief requested because MERS, the purported assignor to
the Movant, did not have authority to assign the Mortgage and therefore the Movant cannot
establish that it is a bona fide holder of a valid secured interest in the Property.
The Movant responded to the Debtor’s limited opposition regarding MERS’s authority to
assign by referring to the provisions of the Mortgage which purport to create a “nominee”
relationship between MERS and First Franklin. In conclusory fashion, the Movant states that it
therefore follows that MERS’s standing to assign is based upon its nominee status.
On November 15, 2010, a hearing was held and the Court gave both the Debtor and
Movant the opportunity to file supplemental briefs on the issues raised by the Debtor’s limited
opposition.
On December 8, 2010, the Movant filed a memorandum of law in support of the Motion
arguing that this Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue of whether MERS had authority
to assign the Mortgage, and even assuming the Court did have jurisdiction to decide this issue,
under New York law the MERS assignment was valid. In support of its jurisdictional argument,
the Movant advises the Court (for the first time) that a Judgement of Foreclosure and Sale
(“Judgment of Foreclosure”) was entered by the state court in favor of the Movant on November
24, 2008, and any judicial review of the Judgment of Foreclosure is barred by the doctrines of
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res judicata, Rooker-Feldman, and judicial estoppel.2 The Movant argues that the Debtor had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate these issues in state court, but chose to default, and cannot
now challenge the state court’s adjudication as to the Movant’s status as a secured creditor or
holder of the Note and Mortgage, or its standing to seek relief from the automatic stay in this
Court. The Movant also notes that the Debtor admits in her petition and schedules that she is
liable on the Mortgage, that it was in default and the subject of a foreclosure sale, and thus
judicial estoppel bars her arguments to the contrary.
In addition to its preclusion arguments, on the underlying merits of its position the
Movant cites to caselaw holding that MERS assignments similar to the assignment in this case,
are valid and enforceable. See U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Flynn, 897 N.Y.S. 2d 855, 858 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2010); Kiah v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121252, at *1 (D. Mass. Nov.
16, 2010); Perry v. Nat’l Default Servicing Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92907, at *1 (Dist.
N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2010). It is the Movant’s position that the provisions of the Mortgage grant
to MERS the right to assign the Mortgage as “nominee,” or agent, on behalf of the lender, First
Franklin. Specifically, Movant relies on the recitations of the Mortgage pursuant to which the
“Borrower” acknowledges that MERS holds bare legal title to the Mortgage, but has the right
“(A) to exercise any or all those rights, including, but not limited to, the right to foreclose and
2
The Judgment of Foreclosure names the Debtor and an individual, Shelly English, as
defendants. Shelly English is the Debtor’s daughter-in-law. At a hearing held on
December 13, 2010, the Debtor’s counsel stated that he “believed” the Debtor transferred
title to the Property to her son, Leroy English, in 2007. This is consistent with
information provided by the Debtor in her petition and schedules. Leroy English,
however, was not named in the foreclosure action. No one in this case has addressed the
issue of whether the proper parties were named in the foreclosure action. However,
absent an argument to the contrary, this Court can only presume that the Judgment of
Foreclosure is a binding final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction.
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sell the Property; and (B) to take any action required of Lender including, but not limited to,
releasing and canceling [the Mortgage].” In addition, the Movant argues that MERS’s status as a
“mortgagee” and thus its authority to assign the Mortgage is supported by the New York Real
Property Actions and Proceedings Law (“RPAPL”) and New York Real Property Law (“RPL”).
Movant cites to RPAPL § 1921-a which allows a “mortgagee” to execute and deliver partial
releases of lien, and argues that MERS falls within the definition of “mortgagee” which includes
the “current holder of the mortgage of record . . . or . . . their . . . agents, successors or assigns.”
N.Y. Real Prop. Acts. Law § 1921(9)(a) (McKinney 2011). Although the definition of
“mortgagee” cited to by the Movant only applies to RPAPL § 1921, Movant argues that it is a
“mortgagee” vested with the authority to execute and deliver a loan payoff statement; execute
and deliver a discharge of mortgage and assign a mortgage pursuant to RPL §§ 274 and 275.
In addition to its status as “mortgagee,” Movant also argues that the assignment is valid
because MERS is an “agent” of each of its member banks under the general laws of agency in
New York, see N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-1501(1) (McKinney 2011),3 and public policy requires
the liberal interpretation and judicial recognition of the principal-agent relationship. See Arens v.
Shainswitt, 37 A.D.2d 274 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971), aff’d 29 N.Y.2d 663 (1971). In the instant
case, Movant argues, the Mortgage appoints MERS as “nominee,” read “agent,” for the original
3 Movant cites to New York General Obligations Law for the proposition that “an agency
agreement may take any form ‘desired by the parties concerned.’” The direct quote
“desired by the parties concerned” seems to be attributed to the General Obligations Law
citation, however, the Court could find no such language in the current version of § 5-
1501(1). That provision, rather, defines an agent as “a person granted authority to act as
attorney-in-fact for the principal under a power of attorney, and includes the original
agent and any co-agent or successor agent. Unless the context indicates otherwise, an
‘agent’ designated in a power of attorney shall mean ‘attorney-in-fact’ for the purposes of
this title. An agent acting under a power of attorney has a fiduciary relationship with the
principal.” N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-1501(1) (McKinney 2011) (emphasis added).
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lender and the original lender’s successors and assigns. As nominee/agent for the lender, and as
mortgagee of record, Movant argues MERS had the authority to assign the Mortgage to the
Movant, U.S. Bank, “in accordance with the principal’s instruction to its nominee MERS, to
assign the mortgage lien to U.S. Bank . . . .”
Finally, Movant argues that even absent a legally enforceable assignment of the
Mortgage, it is entitled to enforce the lien because U.S. Bank holds the Note. The Movant
argues that if it can establish that U.S. Bank is the legal holder the Note, the Mortgage by
operation of law passes to the Movant because the Note and the Mortgage are deemed to be
inseparable. See In re Conde-Dedonato, 391 B.R. 247 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2008). The Movant
represents, but has not proven, that U.S. Bank is the rightful holder of the Note, and further
argues that the assignment of the Note has to this point not been contested in this proceeding.
MERS moved to intervene in this matter pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7024 because:
12. The Court’s determination of the MERS Issue directly affects the
business model of MERS. Additionally, approximately 50% of all consumer
mortgages in the United States are held in the name of MERS, as the mortgagee
of record.
13. The Court’s determination of the MERS Issue will have a
significant impact on MERS as well as the mortgage industry in New York and
the United States.
14. MERS has a direct financial stake in the outcome of this contested
matter, and any determination of the MERS Issue has a direct impact on MERS.
(Motion to Intervene, ¶¶12-14).
Permission to intervene was granted at a hearing held on December 13, 2010.
In addition to adopting the arguments asserted by the Movant, MERS strenuously
defends its authority to act as mortgagee pursuant to the procedures for processing this and other
mortgages under the MERS “system.” First, MERS points out that the Mortgage itself
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designates MERS as the “nominee” for the original lender, First Franklin, and its successors and
assigns. In addition, the lender designates, and the Debtor agrees to recognize, MERS “as the
mortgagee of record and as nominee for ‘Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns’” and as
such the Debtor “expressly agreed without qualification that MERS had the right to foreclose
upon the premises as well as exercise any and all rights as nominee for the Lender.” (MERS
Memorandum of Law at 7). These designations as “nominee,” and “mortgagee of record,” and
the Debtor’s recognition thereof, it argues, leads to the conclusion that MERS was authorized as
a matter of law to assign the Mortgage to U.S. Bank.
Although MERS believes that the mortgage documents alone provide it with authority to
effectuate the assignment at issue, they also urge the Court to broaden its analysis and read the
documents in the context of the overall “MERS System.” According to MERS, each
participating bank/lender agrees to be bound by the terms of a membership agreement pursuant
to which the member appoints MERS to act as its authorized agent with authority to, among
other things, hold legal title to mortgages and as a result, MERS is empowered to execute
assignments of mortgage on behalf of all its member banks. In this particular case, MERS
maintains that as a member of MERS and pursuant to the MERS membership agreement, the
loan originator in this case, First Franklin, appointed MERS “to act as its agent to hold the
Mortgage as nominee on First Franklin’s behalf, and on behalf of First Franklin’s successors and
assigns.” MERS explains that subsequent to the mortgage’s inception, First Franklin assigned
the Note to Aurora Bank FSB f/k/a Lehman Brothers Bank (“Aurora”), another MERS member.
According to MERS, note assignments among MERS members are tracked via self-effectuated
and self-monitored computer entries into the MERS database. As a MERS member, by
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operation of the MERS membership rules, Aurora is deemed to have appointed MERS to act as
its agent to hold the Mortgage as nominee. Aurora subsequently assigned the Note to U.S. Bank,
also a MERS member. By operation of the MERS membership agreement, U.S. Bank is deemed
to have appointed MERS to act as its agent to hold the Mortgage as nominee. Then, according to
MERS, “U.S. Bank, as the holder of the note, under the MERS Membership Rules, chose to
instruct MERS to assign the Mortgage to U.S. Bank prior to commencing the foreclosure
proceedings by U.S. Bank.” (Affirmation of William C. Hultman, ¶12).
MERS argues that the express terms of the mortgage coupled with the provisions of the
MERS membership agreement, is “more than sufficient to create an agency relationship between
MERS and lender and the lender’s successors in interest” under New York law and as a result
establish MERS’s authority to assign the Mortgage. (MERS Memorandum of Law at 7).
On December 20, 2010, the Debtor filed supplemental opposition to the Motion. The
Debtor argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine should not preclude judicial review in this case
because the Debtor’s objection to the Motion raises issues that could not have been raised in the
state court foreclosure action, namely the validity of the assignment and standing to lift the stay.
The Debtor also argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply because the Judgment
of Foreclosure was entered by default. Finally, she also argues that the bankruptcy court can
review matters “which are void or fraudulent on its face.” See In re Ward, 423 B.R. 22 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 2010). The Debtor says that she is “alleging questionable, even possibly fraudulent
conduct by MERS in regards to transferring notes and lifting the stay.” (Debtor’s Supplemental
Opposition at 3).
The Movant filed supplemental papers on December 23, 2010 arguing that the Motion is
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moot because the Property is no longer an asset of the estate as a result of the Chapter 7
Trustee’s “report of no distribution,” and as such, the Section 362(a) automatic stay was
dissolved upon the entry of a discharge on December 14, 2010. See Brooks v. Bank of New York
Mellon, No. DKC 09-1408, 2009 WL 3379928, at *2 (D. Md. Oct. 16, 2009); Riggs Nat’l Bank
of Washington, D.C. v. Perry, 729 F.2d 982, 986 (4th Cir. 1984).
The Movant also maintains that Rooker-Feldman does apply to default judgments
because that doctrine does not require that the prior judgment be a judgment “on the merits.”
Charchenko v. City of Stillwater, 47 F.3d 981, 983 n.1 (8th Cir. 1995); see also Kafele v. Lerner,
Sampson & Rothfuss, L.P.A., No. 04-3659, 2005 WL 3528921, at *2-3 (6th Cir. Dec. 22, 2005);
In re Dahlgren, No. 09-18982, 2010 WL 5287400, at *1 (D.N.J. Dec. 17, 2010). The Movant
points out that the Debtor seems to be confusing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine with issue and
claim preclusion and that the Debtor has misapplied Chief Judge Craig’s ruling in In re Ward.
Discussion
As a threshold matter, this Court will address the Movant’s argument that this Motion has
been mooted by the entry of the discharge order.
Effect of the Chapter 7 discharge on the automatic stay
Section 362(c) provides that:
Except as provided in subsections (d), (e), (f), and (h) of this section–
(1) the stay of an act against property of the estate under subsection (a) of this
section continues until such property is no longer property of the estate;
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(2) the stay of any other act under subsection (a) of this section continues until the
earliest of–
(A) the time the case is closed;
(B) the time the case is dismissed; or
(C) if the case is a case under chapter 7 of this title concerning an individual or a case
under chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13 of this title, the time a discharge is granted or denied;
11 U.S.C. § 362(c) (emphasis added).
Pursuant to Section 362(c)(1), the automatic stay which protects “property of the estate,”
as opposed to property of the debtor, continues until the property is no longer property of the
estate regardless of the entry of the discharge. The provision of the statute relied upon by the
Movant for the proposition that the automatic stay terminates upon the entry of a discharge,
relates only to the stay of “any other act under subsection(a),”, i.e., an act against property that is
not property of the estate, i.e., is property “of the debtor.” The relationship between property of
the estate and property of the debtor is succinctly stated as follows:
Property of the estate consists of all property of the debtor as of the date of the
filing of the petition. 11 U.S.C. § 541. It remains property of the estate until it has
been exempted by the debtor under § 522, abandoned by the trustee under §
554(a), or sold by the trustee under § 363. If property of the estate is not claimed
exempt, sold, or abandoned by the trustee, it is abandoned to the debtor at the
time the case is closed if the property was scheduled under § 521(1). If the
property is not scheduled by the debtor and is not otherwise administered, it
remains property of the estate even after the case has been closed.
If the property in question is property of the estate, it remains subject to the
automatic stay until it becomes property of the debtor and until the earlier of the
time the case was closed, the case is dismissed, or a discharge is granted or denied
in a chapter 7 case.
In re Pullman, 319 B.R. 443, 445 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2004).
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Movant’s position seems to be that the Chapter 7 Trustee’s filing of a “report of no
distribution,” otherwise known as a “no asset report,” effectuated an abandonment of the real
property at issue in this case, and therefore the Property has reverted back to the Debtor.
However, Movant fails to cite the relevant statute. Section 554(c) provides that “[u]nless the
court orders otherwise, any property scheduled under section 521(1) of this title not otherwise
administered at the time of the closing of a case is abandoned to the debtor and administered for
purposes of section 350 of this title.” 11 U.S.C. § 554(c) (emphasis added); Fed. R. Bankr. P.
6007. Cases interpreting Section 554(c) hold that the filing of a report of no distribution does
not effectuate an abandonment of estate property. See, e.g., In re Israel, 112 B.R. 481, 482 n.3
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1990) (“The filing of a no-asset report does not close a case and therefore does
not constitute an abandonment of property of the estate.”) (citing e.g., Zlogar v. Internal Revenue
Serv. (In re Zlogar), 101 B.R. 1, 3 n.3 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989); Schwaber v. Reed (In re Reed), 89
B.R. 100, 104 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988); 11 U.S.C. § 554(c)).
Because the real property at issue in this case has not been abandoned it remains property
of the estate subject to Section 362(a) unless and until relief is granted under Section 362(d).
Rooker-Feldman and res judicata4
The Movant argues that U.S. Bank’s status as a secured creditor, which is the basis for its
standing in this case, already has been determined by the state court and that determination
cannot be revisited here. The Movant relies on both the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and res
4 Because the Debtor’s objection is overruled under Rooker-Feldman and res judicata, the
Court will not address the merits of the Movant’s judicial estoppel arguments.
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judicata principles to support this position.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is derived from two Supreme Court cases, Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462
(1983), which together stand for the proposition that lower federal courts lack subject matter
jurisdiction to sit in direct appellate review of state court judgments. The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine is a narrow jurisdictional doctrine which is distinct from federal preclusion doctrines.
See McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 96-97 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi
Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005), and Hoblock v. Albany County Board of Elections,
422 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2005)). In essence, the doctrine bars “cases brought by state-court
losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.
Rooker-Feldman does not otherwise override or supplant preclusion doctrine or augment the
circumscribed doctrines that allow federal courts to stay or dismiss proceedings in deference to
state-court actions.” Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 283.
The Second Circuit has delineated four elements that must be satisfied in order for
Rooker-Feldman to apply:
First, the federal-court plaintiff must have lost in state court. Second, the plaintiff
must “complain [ ] of injuries caused by [a] state-court judgment[.]” Third, the
plaintiff must “invit[e] district court review and rejection of [that] judgment [ ].”
Fourth, the state-court judgment must have been “rendered before the district
court proceedings commenced”-i.e., Rooker-Feldman has no application to
federal-court suits proceeding in parallel with ongoing state-court litigation. The
first and fourth of these requirements may be loosely termed procedural; the
second and third may be termed substantive.
McKithen, 481 F.3d at 97 (internal citation omitted and alteration in original) (quoting Hoblock,
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422 F.3d at 85).
In a case with facts similar to the instant case, Chief Judge Craig applied the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine to overrule a debtor’s objection to a motion for relief from the automatic stay.
See In re Ward, 423 B.R. 22 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2010). In In re Ward, a foreclosure sale was
conducted prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. When the successful purchaser sought
relief from stay in the bankruptcy case to proceed to evict the debtor, the debtor opposed the
motion. The debtor argued that the foreclosure judgment was flawed because “no original note
was produced”, “the mortgage was rescinded”, “the plaintiff in the action doesn’t exist” or “was
not a proper party to the foreclosure action”, and that “everything was done irregularly and
underneath [the] table.” In re Ward, 423 B.R. at 27. Chief Judge Craig overruled the debtor’s
opposition and found that each of the elements of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine were satisfied:
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies in this case because the Debtor lost in the
state court foreclosure action, the Foreclosure Judgment was rendered before the
Debtor commenced this case, and the Debtor seeks this Court’s review of the
Foreclosure Judgment in the context of her opposition to the Purchaser’s motion
for relief from the automatic stay. The injury complained of, i.e., the foreclosure
sale to the Purchaser, was “caused by” the Foreclosure Judgment because “the
foreclosure [sale] would not have occurred but-for” the Foreclosure Judgment.
Accordingly, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not permit this Court to
disregard the Foreclosure Judgment.
In re Ward, 423 B.R. at 28 (citations omitted and alteration in original).
In the instant case, the Debtor argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply
because the Judgment of Foreclosure was entered on default, not on the merits. She also argues
that Rooker-Feldman should not apply because she is alleging that the Judgment of Foreclosure
was procured by fraud in that the MERS system of mortgage assignments was fraudulent in
nature or void. However, this Court is not aware of any exception to the Rooker-Feldman
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doctrine for default judgments, or judgments procured by fraud and the Court will not read those
exceptions into the rule. See Salem v. Paroli, 260 B.R. 246, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (applying
Rooker-Feldman to preclude review of state court default judgment); see also Lombard v.
Lombard, No. 00-CIV-6703 (SAS), 2001 WL 548725, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2001)
(applying Rooker-Feldman to preclude review of stipulation of settlement executed in
connection with state court proceeding even though applicant argued that the stipulation should
be declared null and void because he was under duress at the time it was executed).
The Debtor also argues that Rooker-Feldman does not apply in this case because she is
not asking this Court to set aside the Judgment of Foreclosure, but rather is asking this Court to
make a determination as to the Movant’s standing to seek relief from stay. The Debtor argues
that notwithstanding the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the bankruptcy court must have the ability to
determine the standing of the parties before it.
Although the Debtor says she is not seeking affirmative relief from this Court, the net
effect of upholding the Debtor’s jurisdictional objection in this case would be to deny U.S. Bank
rights that were lawfully granted to U.S. Bank by the state court. This would be tantamount to a
reversal which is prohibited by Rooker-Feldman.
Even if Rooker-Feldman were found not to apply to this determination, the Court still
would find that the Debtor is precluded from questioning U.S. Bank’s standing as a secured
creditor under the doctrine of res judicata. The state court already has determined that U.S.
Bank is a secured creditor with standing to foreclose and this Court cannot alter that
determination in order to deny U.S. Bank standing to seek relief from the automatic stay.
The doctrine of res judicata is grounded in the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United
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States Constitution. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. It prevents a party from re-litigating any issue or
defense that was decided by a court of competent jurisdiction and which could have been raised
or decided in the prior action. See Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 789 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying
New York preclusion rules); Swiatkowski v. Citibank, No. 10-CV-114, 2010 WL 3951212, at
*14 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2010) (citing Waldman v. Vill. of Kiryas Joel, 39 F.Supp.2d 370, 377
(S.D.N.Y. 1999)). Res judicata applies to judgments that were obtained by default, see Kelleran
v. Andrijevic, 825 F.2d 692, 694-95 (2d Cir. 1987), but it may not apply if the judgment was
obtained by extrinsic fraud or collusion. “Extrinsic fraud involves the parties’ ‘opportunity to
have a full and fair hearing,’ while intrinsic fraud, on the other hand, involves the ‘underlying
issue in the original lawsuit.’” In re Ward, 423 B.R. at 29. The Debtor’s assertions that the
MERS system of assignments may have been fraudulent is more appropriately deemed an
intrinsic fraud argument. The Debtor has not alleged any extrinsic fraud in the procurement of
the Judgment of Foreclosure which prevented a full and fair hearing before the state court.
As a result, the Court finds that the Judgment of Foreclosure alone is sufficient evidence
of the Movant’s status as a secured creditor and therefore its standing to seek relief from the
automatic stay. On that basis, and because the Movant has established grounds for relief from
stay under Section 362(d), the Motion will be granted.
MERS
Because of the broad applicability of the issues raised in this case the Court believes that
it is appropriate to set forth its analysis on the issue of whether the Movant, absent the Judgment
of Foreclosure, would have standing to bring the instant motion. Specifically MERS’s role in
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the ownership and transfer of real property notes and mortgages is at issue in dozens of cases
before this Court. As a result, the Court has deferred ruling on motions for relief from stay
where the movants’ standing may be affected by MERS’s participation in the transfer of the real
property notes and mortgages. In the instant case, the issues were resolved under the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine and the application of res judicata. Most, if not all, of the remainder of the
“MERS cases” before the Court cannot be resolved on the same basis. For that reason, and
because MERS has intervened in this proceeding arguing that the validity of MERS assignments
directly affects its business model and will have a significant impact on the national mortgage
industry, this Court will give a reasoned opinion as to the Movant’s standing to seek relief from
the stay and how that standing is affected by the fact that U.S. Bank acquired its rights in the
Mortgage by way of assignment from MERS.
Standing to seek relief from the automatic stay
The Debtor has challenged the Movant’s standing to seek relief from the automatic stay.
Standing is a threshold issue for a court to resolve. Section 362(d) states that relief from stay
may be granted “[o]n request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing.” 11 U.S.C. §
362(d). The term “party in interest” is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, however the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit has stated that “[g]enerally the ‘real party in interest’ is the
one who, under the applicable substantive law, has the legal right which is sought to be enforced
or is the party entitled to bring suit.” See Roslyn Savings Bank v. Comcoach (In re Comcoach),
698 F.2d 571, 573 (2d Cir. 1983). The legislative history of Section 362 “suggests that,
notwithstanding the use of the term ‘party in interest’, it is only creditors who may obtain relief
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from the automatic stay.” Id. at 573-74. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 175,
reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 5787, 6136); see also Greg Restaurant Equip.
And Supplies v. Toar Train P’ship (In re Toar Train P’ship), 15 B.R. 401, 402 (Bankr. D.
Vt.1981) (finding that a judgment creditor of the debtor was not a “party in interest” because the
judgment creditor was not itself a direct creditor of the bankrupt).
Using the standard established by the Second Circuit, this Court must determine whether
the Movant is the “one who, under applicable substantive law, has the legal right” to enforce the
subject Note and Mortgage, and is therefore a “creditor” of this Debtor. See In re Toar, 15 B.R.
at 402; see also In re Mims, 438 B.R. 52, 55 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010). The Bankruptcy Code
defines a “creditor” as an “entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or
before the order for relief . . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 101(10). “Claim” is defined as the “right to
payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed,
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured . . .
.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). In the context of a lift stay motion where the movant is seeking to
commence or continue with an action to foreclose a mortgage against real property, the movant
must show that it is a “party in interest” by showing that it is a creditor with a security interest in
the subject real property. See Mims, 438 B.R. at 57 (finding that as movant “failed to prove it
owns the Note, it has failed to establish that it has standing to pursue its state law remedies with
regard to the Mortgage and Property”). Cf. Brown Bark I L.P. v. Ebersole (In re Ebersole), 440
B.R. 690, 694 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2010) (finding that movant seeking relief from stay must prove
that it is the holder of the subject note in order to establish a ‘colorable claim’ which would
establish standing to seek relief from stay).
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Noteholder status
In the Motion, the Movant asserts U.S. Bank’s status as the “holder” of the Mortgage.
However, in order to have standing to seek relief from stay, Movant, which acts as the
representative of U.S. Bank, must show that U.S. Bank holds both the Mortgage and the Note.
Mims, 438 B.R. at 56. Although the Motion does not explicitly state that U.S. Bank is the holder
of the Note, it is implicit in the Motion and the arguments presented by the Movant at the
hearing. However, the record demonstrates that the Movant has produced no evidence,
documentary or otherwise, that U.S. Bank is the rightful holder of the Note. Movant’s reliance
on the fact that U.S. Bank’s noteholder status has not been challenged thus far does not alter or
diminish the Movant’s burden to show that it is the holder of the Note as well as the Mortgage.
Under New York law, Movant can prove that U.S. Bank is the holder of the Note by
providing the Court with proof of a written assignment of the Note, or by demonstrating that
U.S. Bank has physical possession of the Note endorsed over to it. See, eg., LaSalle Bank N.A. v.
Lamy, 824 N.Y.S.2d 769, 2006 WL 2251721, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 7, 2006). The only
written assignment presented to the Court is not an assignment of the Note but rather an
“Assignment of Mortgage” which contains a vague reference to the Note. Tagged to the end of
the provisions which purport to assign the Mortgage, there is language in the Assignment stating
“To Have and to Hold the said Mortgage and Note, and also the said property until the said
Assignee forever, subject to the terms contained in said Mortgage and Note.” (Assignment of
Mortgage (emphasis added)). Not only is the language vague and insufficient to prove an intent
to assign the Note, but MERS is not a party to the Note and the record is barren of any
representation that MERS, the purported assignee, had any authority to take any action with
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respect to the Note. Therefore, the Court finds that the Assignment of Mortgage is not sufficient
to establish an effective assignment of the Note.
By MERS’s own account, it took no part in the assignment of the Note in this case, but
merely provided a database which allowed its members to electronically self-report transfers of
the Note. MERS does not confirm that the Note was properly transferred or in fact whether
anyone including agents of MERS had or have physical possession of the Note. What remains
undisputed is that MERS did not have any rights with respect to the Note and other than as
described above, MERS played no role in the transfer of the Note.
Absent a showing of a valid assignment of the Note, Movant can demonstrate that U.S.
Bank is the holder of the Note if it can show that U.S. Bank has physical possession of the Note
endorsed to its name. See In re Mims, 423 B.R. at 56-57. According to the evidence presented
in this matter the manner in which the MERS system is structured provides that, “[w]hen the
beneficial interest in a loan is sold, the promissory note is [] transferred by an endorsement and
delivery from the buyer to the seller [sic], but MERS Members are obligated to update the
MERS® System to reflect the change in ownership of the promissory note. . . .” (MERS
Supplemental Memorandum of Law at 6). However, there is nothing in the record to prove that
the Note in this case was transferred according to the processes described above other than
MERS’s representation that its computer database reflects that the Note was transferred to U.S.
Bank. The Court has no evidentiary basis to find that the Note was endorsed to U.S. Bank or
that U.S. Bank has physical possession of the Note. Therefore, the Court finds that Movant has
not satisfied its burden of showing that U.S. Bank, the party on whose behalf Movant seeks relief
from stay, is the holder of the Note.
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Mortgagee status
The Movant’s failure to show that U.S. Bank holds the Note should be fatal to the
Movant’s standing. However, even if the Movant could show that U.S. Bank is the holder of the
Note, it still would have to establish that it holds the Mortgage in order to prove that it is a
secured creditor with standing to bring this Motion before this Court. The Movant urges the
Court to adhere to the adage that a mortgage necessarily follows the same path as the note for
which it stands as collateral. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Perry, 875 N.Y.S.2d 853, 856 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2009). In simple terms the Movant relies on the argument that a note and mortgage are
inseparable. See Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. 271, 274 (1872). While it is generally true that a
mortgage travels a parallel path with its corresponding debt obligation, the parties in this case
have adopted a process which by its very terms alters this practice where mortgages are held by
MERS as “mortgagee of record.” By MERS’s own account, the Note in this case was
transferred among its members, while the Mortgage remained in MERS’s name. MERS admits
that the very foundation of its business model as described herein requires that the Note and
Mortgage travel on divergent paths. Because the Note and Mortgage did not travel together,
Movant must prove not only that it is acting on behalf of a valid assignee of the Note, but also
that it is acting on behalf of the valid assignee of the Mortgage.5
5 MERS argues that notes and mortgages processed through the MERS System are never
“separated” because beneficial ownership of the notes and mortgages are always held by
the same entity. The Court will not address that issue in this Decision, but leaves open
the issue as to whether mortgages processed through the MERS system are properly
perfected and valid liens. See Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. at 274 (finding that an
assignment of the mortgage without the note is a nullity); Landmark Nat’l Bank v. Kesler,
216 P.3d 158, 166-67 (Kan. 2009) (“[I]n the event that a mortgage loan somehow
separates interests of the note and the deed of trust, with the deed of trust lying with some
independent entity, the mortgage may become unenforceable”).
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MERS asserts that its right to assign the Mortgage to U.S. Bank in this case, and in what
it estimates to be literally millions of other cases, stems from three sources: the Mortgage
documents; the MERS membership agreement; and state law. In order to provide some context
to this discussion, the Court will begin its analysis with an overview of mortgage and loan
processing within the MERS network of lenders as set forth in the record of this case.
In the most common residential lending scenario, there are two parties to a real property
mortgage – a mortgagee, i.e., a lender, and a mortgagor, i.e., a borrower. With some nuances
and allowances for the needs of modern finance this model has been followed for hundreds of
years. The MERS business plan, as envisioned and implemented by lenders and others involved
in what has become known as the mortgage finance industry, is based in large part on amending
this traditional model and introducing a third party into the equation. MERS is, in fact, neither a
borrower nor a lender, but rather purports to be both “mortgagee of record” and a “nominee” for
the mortgagee. MERS was created to alleviate problems created by, what was determined by the
financial community to be, slow and burdensome recording processes adopted by virtually every
state and locality. In effect the MERS system was designed to circumvent these procedures.
MERS, as envisioned by its originators, operates as a replacement for our traditional system of
public recordation of mortgages.
Caselaw and commentary addressing MERS’s role in the mortgage recording and
foreclosure process abound. See Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage
Lending, and the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 78 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1359 (2010). In a
2006 published opinion, the New York Court of Appeals described MERS system as follows:
In 1993, the MERS system was created by several large participants in the real
estate mortgage industry to track ownership interests in residential mortgages.
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Mortgage lenders and other entities, known as MERS members, subscribe to the
MERS system and pay annual fees for the electronic processing and tracking of
ownership and transfers of mortgages. Members contractually agree to appoint
MERS to act as their common agent on all mortgages they register in the MERS
system.
The initial MERS mortgage is recorded in the County Clerk’s office with
‘Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.’ named as the lender’s nominee
or mortgagee of record on the instrument. During the lifetime of the mortgage,
the beneficial ownership interest or servicing rights may be transferred among
MERS members (MERS assignments), but these assignments are not publicly
recorded; instead they are tracked electronically in MERS’s private system. In the
MERS system, the mortgagor is notified of transfers of servicing rights pursuant
to the Truth in Lending Act, but not necessarily of assignments of the beneficial
interest in the mortgage.
Merscorp, Inc., v. Romaine, 8 N.Y.3d 90 (N.Y. 2006) (footnotes omitted).
In the words of MERS’s legal counsel, “[t]he essence of MERS’ business is to hold legal
title to beneficial interests under mortgages and deeds of trust in the land records. The MERS®
System is designed to allow its members, which include originators, lenders, servicers, and
investors, to accurately and efficiently track transfers of servicing rights and beneficial
ownership.” (MERS Memorandum of Law at 5). The MERS® System “. . . eliminate[s] the
need for frequent, recorded assignments of subsequent transfers.” (MERS Supplemental
Memorandum of Law at 4). “Prior to MERS, every time a loan secured by a mortgage was sold,
the assignee would need to record the assignment to protect the security interest. If a servicing
company serviced the loan and the servicing rights were sold, – an event that could occur
multiple times during the life of a single mortgage loan – multiple assignments were recorded to
ensure that the proper servicer appeared in the land records in the County Clerk’s office.”
(MERS Supplemental Memorandum of Law at 4-5).
“When the beneficial interest in a loan is sold, the promissory note is still transferred by
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an endorsement and delivery from the buyer to the seller, but MERS Members are obligated to
update the MERS® System to reflect the change in ownership of the promissory note. . . . So
long as the sale of the note involves a MERS Member, MERS remains the named mortgagee of
record, and continues to act as the mortgagee, as the nominee for the new beneficial owner of the
note (and MERS’ Member). The seller of the note does not and need not assign the mortgage
because under the terms of that security instrument, MERS remains the holder of title to the
mortgage, that is, the mortgagee, as the nominee for the purchaser of the note, who is then the
lender’s successor and/or assign.” (MERS Supplemental Memorandum of Law at 6). “At all
times during this process, the original mortgage or an assignment of the mortgage to MERS
remains of record in the public land records where the security real estate is located, providing
notice of MERS’s disclosed role as the agent for the MERS Member lender and the lender’s
successors and assigns.” (Declaration of William C. Hultman, ¶9).
MERS asserts that it has authority to act as agent for each and every MERS member
which claims ownership of a note and mortgage registered in its system. This authority is based
not in the statutes or caselaw, but rather derives from the terms and conditions of a MERS
membership agreement. Those terms and conditions provide that “MERS shall serve as
mortgagee of record with respect to all such mortgage loans solely as a nominee, in an
administrative capacity, for the beneficial owner or owners thereof from time to time.”
(Declaration of William C. Hultman, ¶5). MERS “holds the legal title to the mortgage and acts
as the agent or nominee for the MERS Member lender, or owner of the mortgage loan.”
(Declaration of William C. Hultman, ¶6). According to MERS, it is the “intent of the parties . . .
for MERS to serve as the common nominee or agent for MERS Member lenders and their
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successors and assigns.” (MERS Supplemental Memorandum of Law at 19) (emphasis added by
the Court). “Because MERS holds the mortgage lien for the lender who may freely transfer its
interest in the note, without the need for a recorded assignment document in the land records,
MERS holds the mortgage lien for any intended transferee of the note.” (MERS Supplemental
Memorandum of Law at 15) (emphasis added by the Court). If a MERS member subsequently
assigns the note to a non-MERS member, or if the MERS member which holds the note decides
to foreclose, only then is an assignment of the mortgage from MERS to the noteholder
documented and recorded in the public land records where the property is located. (Declaration
of William C. Hultman, ¶12).
Before commenting on the legal effect of the MERS membership rules or the alleged
“common agency” agreement created among MERS members, the Court will review the relevant
portions of the documents presented in this case to evaluate whether the documentation, on its
face, is sufficient to prove a valid assignment of the Mortgage to U.S. Bank.
The Mortgage
First Franklin is the “Lender” named in the Mortgage. With reference to MERS’s role in
the transaction, the Mortgage states:
MERS is a separate corporation that is acting solely as a nominee for Lender and
Lender’s successors and assigns. MERS is organized and existing under the laws
of Delaware, and has an address and telephone number of P.O. Box 2026, Flint,
MI 48501-2026, tel. (888) 679 MERS. FOR PURPOSES OF RECORDING
THIS MORTGAGE, MERS IS THE MORTGAGEE OF RECORD.
(Mortgage at 1 (emphasis added by the Court)).
The Mortgage also purports to contain a transfer to MERS of the Borrower’s (i.e., the
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Debtor’s) rights in the subject Property as follows:
BORROWER’S TRANSFER TO LENDER OF RIGHTS IN THE PROPERTY
[The Borrower] mortgage[s], grant[s] and convey[s] the Property to MERS
(solely as nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors in interest) and its
successors in interest subject to the terms of this Security Instrument. This means
that, by signing this Security Instrument, [the Borrower is] giving Lender those
rights that are stated in this Security Instrument and also those rights that
Applicable Law gives to lenders who hold mortgage on real property. [The
Borrower is] giving Lender these rights to protect Lender from possible losses
that might result if [the Borrower] fail[s] to [comply with certain obligations
under the Security Instrument and accompanying Note.]
[The Borrower] understand[s] and agree[s] that MERS holds only legal title to the
rights granted by [the Borrower] in this Security Instrument, but, if necessary to
comply with law or custom, MERS (as nominee for Lender and Lenders’s
successors and assigns) has the right: (A) to exercise any or all those rights,
including, but not limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the Property; and (B)
to take any action required of Lender including, but not limited to, releasing and
canceling this Security Instrument.
[The Borrower gives] MERS (solely as nominee for Lender and Lender’s
successors in interest), rights in the Property . . .
(Mortgage at 3) (emphasis added).
The Assignment of Mortgage references the Mortgage and defines the “Assignor” as
“‘Mers’ Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 2150 North First Street, San Jose,
California 95131, as nominee for First Franklin, a division of National City Bank of IN, 2150
North First Street San Jose, California 95153.” (Emphasis added by the Court). The “Assignee”
is U.S. Bank.
Premised on the foregoing documentation, MERS argues that it had full authority to
validly execute the Assignment of Mortgage to U.S. Bank on February 1, 2008, and that as of the
date the foreclosure proceeding was commenced U.S. Bank held both the Note and the
Mortgage. However, without more, this Court finds that MERS’s “nominee” status and the
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rights bestowed upon MERS within the Mortgage itself, are insufficient to empower MERS to
effectuate a valid assignment of mortgage.
There are several published New York state trial level decisions holding that the status of
“nominee” or “mortgagee of record” bestowed upon MERS in the mortgage documents, by
itself, does not empower MERS to effectuate an assignment of the mortgage. These cases hold
that MERS may not validly assign a mortgage based on its nominee status, absent some evidence
of specific authority to assign the mortgage. See Bank of New York v. Mulligan, No. 29399/07,
2010 WL 3339452, at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 25, 2010); One West Bank, F.S.B. v. Drayton, 910
N.Y.S.2d 857, 871 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010); Bank of New York v. Alderazi, 900 N.Y.S.2d 821, 824
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (the “party who claims to be the agent of another bears the burden of
proving the agency relationship by a preponderance of the evidence”); HSBC Bank USA v.
Yeasmin, No. 34142/07, 2010 WL 2089273, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 2010); HSBC Bank
USA v. Vasquez, No. 37410/07, 2009 WL 2581672, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 21, 2010); LaSalle
Bank N.A. v. Lamy, 824 N.Y.S.2d 769, 2006 WL 2251721, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 7, 2006)
(“A nominee of the owner of a note and mortgage may not effectively assign the note and
mortgage to another for want of an ownership interest in said note and mortgage by the
nominee.”). See also MERS v. Saunders, 2 A.3d 289, 295 (Me. 2010) (“MERS’s only right is to
record the mortgage. Its designation as the ‘mortgagee of record’ in the document does not
change or expand that right…”). But see US Bank, N.A. v. Flynn, 897 N.Y.S.2d 855 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2010) (finding that MERS’s “nominee” status and the mortgage documents give MERS
authority to assign); Crum v. LaSalle Bank, N.A., No. 2080110, 2009 WL 2986655, at *3 (Ala.
Civ. App., Sept. 18, 2009) (finding MERS validly assigned its and the lender’s rights to
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assignee); Blau v. America’s Servicing Company, et al., No. CV-08-773-PHX-MHM, 2009 WL
3174823, at *8 (D. Ariz. Sept. 29, 2009) (finding that assignee of MERS had standing to
foreclose).
In LaSalle Bank, N.A. v. Bouloute, No. 41583/07, 2010 WL 3359552, at *2 (N.Y. Sup.
Aug. 26, 2010), the court analyzed the relationship between MERS and the original lender and
concluded that a nominee possesses few or no legally enforceable rights beyond those of a
principal whom the nominee serves. The court stated:
MERS . . . recorded the subject mortgage as “nominee” for FFFC. The word
“nominee” is defined as “[a] person designated to act in place of another, usu. in a
very limited way” or “[a] party who holds bare legal title for the benefit of
others.” (Black’s Law Dictionary 1076 [8th ed 2004] ). “This definition suggests
that a nominee possesses few or no legally enforceable rights beyond those of a
principal whom the nominee serves.” (Landmark National Bank v. Kesler, 289
Kan 528, 538 [2009] ). The Supreme Court of Kansas, in Landmark National
Bank, 289 Kan at 539, observed that:
The legal status of a nominee, then, depends on the context of the
relationship of the nominee to its principal. Various courts have
interpreted the relationship of MERS and the lender as an agency
relationship. See In re Sheridan, 2009 WL631355, at *4 (Bankr. D. Idaho,
March 12, 2009) (MERS “acts not on its own account. Its capacity is
representative.”); Mortgage Elec. Registrations Systems, Inc. v. Southwest,
2009 Ark. 152 —-, 301 SW3d 1, 2009 WL 723182 (March 19, 2009)
(“MERS, by the terms of the deed of trust, and its own stated purposes,
was the lender’s agent”); La Salle Nat. Bank v. Lamy, 12 Misc.3d 1191[A],
at *2 [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 2006] ) … (“A nominee of the owner of a
note and mortgage may not effectively assign the note and mortgage to
another for want of an ownership interest in said note and mortgage by the
nominee.”).
LaSalle Bank, N.A. v. Bouloute, No. 41583/07, 2010 WL 3359552, at *2; see also Bank of New
York v. Alderazi, 900 N.Y.S.2d 821, 823 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (nominee is “‘[a] person
designated to act in place of another, usually in a very limited way.’”) (quoting Black’s Law
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Dictionary)).
In LaSalle Bank, N.A. v. Bouloute the court concluded that MERS must have some
evidence of authority to assign the mortgage in order for an assignment of a mortgage by MERS
to be effective. Evidence of MERS’s authority to assign could be by way of a power of attorney
or some other document executed by the original lender. See Bouloute, 2010 WL 3359552, at
*1; Alderazi, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 823 (“‘To have a proper assignment of a mortgage by an
authorized agent, a power of attorney is necessary to demonstrate how the agent is vested with
the authority to assign the mortgage.’”) (quoting HSBC Bank USA, NA v. Yeasmin, 866 N.Y.S.2d
92 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008)).
Other than naming MERS as “nominee”, the Mortgage also provides that the Borrower
transfers legal title to the subject property to MERS, as the Lender’s nominee, and acknowledges
MERS’s rights to exercise certain of the Lender’s rights under state law. This too, is insufficient
to bestow any authority upon MERS to assign the mortgage. In Bank of New York v. Alderazi,
the court found “[t]he fact that the borrower acknowledged and consented to MERS acting as
nominee of the lender has no bearing on what specific powers and authority the lender granted
MERS.” Alderazi, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 824. Even if it did bestow some authority upon MERS, the
court in Alderazi found that the mortgage did not convey the specific right to assign the
mortgage.
The Court agrees with the reasoning and the analysis in Bouloute and Alderazi, and the
other cases cited herein and finds that the Mortgage, by naming MERS a “nominee,” and/or
“mortgagee of record” did not bestow authority upon MERS to assign the Mortgage.
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The MERS membership rules
According to MERS, in addition to the alleged authority granted to it in the Mortgage
itself, the documentation of the Assignment of Mortgage comports with all the legal
requirements of agency when read in conjunction with the overall MERS System. MERS’s
argument requires that this Court disregard the specific words of the Assignment of Mortgage or,
at the very least, interpret the Assignment in light of the overall MERS System of tracking the
beneficial interests in mortgage securities. MERS urges the Court to look beyond the four
corners of the Mortgage and take into consideration the agency relationship created by the
agreements entered into by the lenders participating in the MERS System, including their
agreement to be bound by the terms and conditions of membership.
MERS has asserted that each of its member/lenders agrees to appoint MERS to act as its
agent. In this particular case, the Treasurer of MERS, William C. Hultman, declared under
penalty of perjury that “pursuant to the MERS’s Rules of Membership, Rule 2, Section 5. . . First
Franklin appointed MERS to act as its agent to hold the Mortgage as nominee on First Franklin’s
behalf, and on behalf of First Franklin’s successors and assigns.” (Affirmation of William C.
Hultman, ¶7). However, Section 5 of Rule 2, which was attached to the Hultman Affirmation as
an exhibit, contains no explicit reference to the creation of an agency or nominee relationship.
Consistent with this failure to explicitly refer to the creation of an agency agreement, the rules of
membership do not grant any clear authority to MERS to take any action with respect to the
mortgages held by MERS members, including but not limited to executing assignments. The
rules of membership do require that MERS members name MERS as “mortgagee of record” and
that MERS appears in the public land records as such. Section 6 of Rule 2 states that “MERS
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shall at all times comply with the instructions of the holder of mortgage loan promissory notes,”
but this does not confer any specific power or authority to MERS.
State law
Under New York agency laws, an agency relationship can be created by a “manifestation
of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his
control, and the consent by the other to act.” Meisel v. Grunberg, 651 F.Supp.2d 98, 110
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing N.Y. Marine & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Tradeline, L.L.C., 266 F.3d 112, 122 (2d
Cir.2001)).
‘Such authority to act for a principal may be actual or apparent.’ . . . Actual
authority arises from a direct manifestation of consent from the principal to the
agent. . . . . The existence of actual authority ‘depends upon the actual interaction
between the putative principal and agent, not on any perception a third party may
have of the relationship.’
Meisel v. Grunberg, 651 F.Supp.2d at 110 (citations omitted).
Because MERS’s members, the beneficial noteholders, purported to bestow upon MERS
interests in real property sufficient to authorize the assignments of mortgage, the alleged agency
relationship must be committed to writing by application of the statute of frauds. Section 5-
703(2) of the New York General Obligations Law states that:
An estate or interest in real property, other than a lease for a term not exceeding
one year, or any trust or power, over or concerning real property, or in any
manner relating thereto, cannot be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or
declared, unless by act or operation of law, or by a deed or conveyance in writing,
subscribed by the person creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring
the same, or by his lawful agent, thereunto authorized by writing.
See N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-703(1) (McKinney 2011); Republic of Benin v. Mezei, No. 06 Civ.
870 (JGK), 2010 WL 3564270, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2010); Urgo v. Patel, 746 N.Y.S.2d 733
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(N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (finding that unwritten apparent authority is insufficient to satisfy the
statute of frauds) (citing Diocese of Buffalo v. McCarthy, 91 A.D.2d 1210 (4th Dept. 1983)); see
also N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-1501 (McKinney 2011) (“‘agent’ means a person granted
authority to act as attorney-in-fact for the principal under a power of attorney. . .”). MERS asks
this Court to liberally interpret the laws of agency and find that an agency agreement may take
any form “desired by the parties concerned.” However, this does not free MERS from the
constraints of applicable agency laws.
The Court finds that the record of this case is insufficient to prove that an agency
relationship exists under the laws of the state of New York between MERS and its members.
According to MERS, the principal/agent relationship among itself and its members is created by
the MERS rules of membership and terms and conditions, as well as the Mortgage itself.
However, none of the documents expressly creates an agency relationship or even mentions the
word “agency.” MERS would have this Court cobble together the documents and draw
inferences from the words contained in those documents. For example, MERS argues that its
agent status can be found in the Mortgage which states that MERS is a “nominee” and a
“mortgagee of record.” However, the fact that MERS is named “nominee” in the Mortgage is
not dispositive of the existence of an agency relationship and does not, in and of itself, give
MERS any “authority to act.” See Steinbeck v. Steinbeck Heritage Foundation, No. 09-18360cv,
2010 WL 3995982, at *2 (2d Cir. Oct. 13, 2010) (finding that use of the words “attorney in fact”
in documents can constitute evidence of agency but finding that such labels are not dispositive);
MERS v. Saunders, 2 A.3d 289, 295 (Me. 2010) (designation as the ‘mortgagee of record’ does
not qualify MERS as a “mortgagee”). MERS also relies on its rules of membership as evidence
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of the agency relationship. However, the rules lack any specific mention of an agency
relationship, and do not bestow upon MERS any authority to act. Rather, the rules are
ambiguous as to MERS’s authority to take affirmative actions with respect to mortgages
registered on its system.
In addition to casting itself as nominee/agent, MERS seems to argue that its role as
“mortgagee of record” gives it the rights of a mortgagee in its own right. MERS relies on the
definition of “mortgagee” in the New York Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law Section
1921 which states that a “mortgagee” when used in the context of Section 1921, means the
“current holder of the mortgage of record . . . or their agents, successors or assigns.” N.Y. Real
Prop. Acts. L. § 1921 (McKinney 2011). The provisions of Section 1921 relate solely to the
discharge of mortgages and the Court will not apply that definition beyond the provisions of that
section in order to find that MERS is a “mortgagee” with full authority to perform the duties of
mortgagee in its own right. Aside from the inappropriate reliance upon the statutory definition
of “mortgagee,” MERS’s position that it can be both the mortgagee and an agent of the
mortgagee is absurd, at best.
Adding to this absurdity, it is notable in this case that the Assignment of Mortgage was
by MERS, as nominee for First Franklin, the original lender. By the Movant’s and MERS’s
own admission, at the time the assignment was effectuated, First Franklin no longer held any
interest in the Note. Both the Movant and MERS have represented to the Court that subsequent
to the origination of the loan, the Note was assigned, through the MERS tracking system, from
First Franklin to Aurora, and then from Aurora to U.S. Bank. Accordingly, at the time that
MERS, as nominee of First Franklin, assigned the interest in the Mortgage to U.S. Bank, U.S.
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Bank allegedly already held the Note and it was at U.S. Bank’s direction, not First Franklin’s,
that the Mortgage was assigned to U.S. Bank. Said another way, when MERS assigned the
Mortgage to U.S. Bank on First Franklin’s behalf, it took its direction from U.S. Bank, not First
Franklin, to provide documentation of an assignment from an entity that no longer had any rights
to the Note or the Mortgage. The documentation provided to the Court in this case (and the
Court has no reason to believe that any further documentation exists), is stunningly inconsistent
with what the parties define as the facts of this case.
However, even if MERS had assigned the Mortgage acting on behalf of the entity which
held the Note at the time of the assignment, this Court finds that MERS did not have authority,
as “nominee” or agent, to assign the Mortgage absent a showing that it was given specific
written directions by its principal.
This Court finds that MERS’s theory that it can act as a “common agent” for undisclosed
principals is not support by the law. The relationship between MERS and its lenders and its
distortion of its alleged “nominee” status was appropriately described by the Supreme Court of
Kansas as follows: “The parties appear to have defined the word [nominee] in much the same
way that the blind men of Indian legend described an elephant – their description depended on
which part they were touching at any given time.” Landmark Nat’l Bank v. Kesler, 216 P.3d
158, 166-67 (Kan. 2010).
Conclusion
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the Motion in this case should be
granted. However, in all future cases which involve MERS, the moving party must show that it
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validly holds both the mortgage and the underlying note in order to prove standing before this
Court.
Dated: Central Islip, New York
February 10, 2011 /s/ Robert E. Grossman
Hon. Robert E. Grossman
United States Bankruptcy Judge
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bad day for the MERS argument in California

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
NANCY G. JIMENEZ,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
D056325
(Super. Ct. No. 37-2009-00088881-CU-OR-CTL)
APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of San Diego County, William R. Nevitt, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
Plaintiff Nancy Jimenez appeals from judgments of dismissal in favor of defendants Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) and California Reconveyance Company (CRC) on her complaint in which she alleged, inter alia, MERS, CRC and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., (Chase) lacked authority to conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure on a deed of trust for her property, which identified MERS as the “nominee” for the lender and its successors and assigns as well as the beneficiary of the deed.
2
Taking judicial notice of the “legal effect of” certain recorded documents, the trial court sustained the defendants’ demurrers to all but one cause of action and thereafter entered judgments of dismissal as to MERS and CRC. On appeal, Jimenez contends CRC lacked authority to foreclose on her property due to the void nature of the purported assignment of the deed by MERS; that as a result, CRC was not acting in the interest of the true holder of Jimenez’s note. She further contends the court erred by judicially noticing the legal effect of the documents submitted by defendants with their papers. Though we agree with Jimenez’s latter contention, we nevertheless affirm the judgments.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In November 2006, Jimenez executed a promissory note in The Mortgage Store’s favor for a $232,000 loan secured by real property on Florida Street in San Diego, California. The deed of trust securing the note defines the lender as The Mortgage Store and the trustee as First American Title Company. The deed of trust identifies MERS as a “separate corporation that is acting solely as a nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns” and provides that MERS “is the beneficiary under this Security Instrument.”
After CRC recorded a notice of trustee’s sale notifying Jimenez of her default under the deed of trust and the possible sale of her property, Jimenez sued MERS, CRC and Chase for “wrongful initiation of foreclosure,” declaratory relief and quiet title. In
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her complaint, she also alleged a cause of action against Chase and CRC for violation of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Rosenthal Act or Act, Civ. Code,1
§ 1788 et seq.), and causes of action against Chase alone for violations of section 2943 and the Unfair Competition Law (UCL; Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.).
Jimenez alleges on information and belief that at all times relevant, “MERS has existed only to maintain a database of mortgages registered by its member lenders and to serve as nominee beneficiary under their deeds of trust, sparing the true beneficiaries the trouble and expense of recording assignments of mortgages from the original lender to assigns as the notes are sold in the secondary mortgage market.” She alleges, “MERS does not own the promissory notes secured by the mortgages and has no right to payments made on the notes, nor does MERS service mortgage loans or make any decisions regarding them. MERS merely attempts to immobilize the mortgage lien while transfers of the promissory notes and servicing rights continue to occur.” According to Jimenez, The Mortgage Store acquired the note for resale and resold it into the secondary mortgage market, where it was sold and resold until it landed in a pool of mortgages that constituted the assets of a “special purpose entity” administered by a trustee, who held legal title to the assets. Jimenez alleges that at all times relevant, the “secondary mortgage market was marked by endemic failures to validly assign and properly document the assignments of mortgages, including mortgages in which MERS was the
1 All statutory references are to the Civil Code unless otherwise indicated.
4
nominal beneficiary, so that the actual ownership of beneficial interests in many mortgages became, and remains, difficult or impossible to determine.”
Jimenez further alleges that in January 2009, she sought documents concerning her loan from Chase via Washington Mutual,2 including a copy of the note; documents reflecting the note’s sale, transfer or assignment; and a beneficiary statement and payoff demand statement under section 2943. Two days later, CRC recorded a notice of default and election to sell under Jimenez’s trust deed, stating she was in default and it could exercise the power of sale in the trust deed without further notice. Thereafter Jimenez sent several additional requests for the same documents to Chase but did not obtain all of them. Jimenez alleges she “does not know the identity of the Note’s beneficial owner, that is, the ‘beneficiary’ as that term is used in . . . the California Civil Code relating to mortgages and deeds of trust . . . .” but she is “informed and believes that a person purporting to be the rightful current beneficiary by virtue of a purported assignment from MERS authorized an agent to cause the above-mentioned Notices to be recorded.” Jimenez alleges that The Mortgage Store did not assign the note to MERS and did not authorize MERS or any other person to assign the note to anyone on its behalf; that “the person or entity who directed the initiation of the foreclosure process was not the rightful
2 Jimenez alleged that defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. “does business in California as Chase and as of September 28, 2008, also as Washington Mutual . . . .”
5
owner of the Note and was acting without the rightful owner’s authority.”3 Jimenez sought a judicial declaration concerning the interpretation of section 2924 as well as a determination that her interest in the property was free of the lien of the deed of trust.
As to Chase and CRC, Jimenez alleges Chase identified itself to her as a debt collector in a March 2009 letter and that letter, together with CRC’s notice of default, constituted attempts to collect a debt in violation of the Rosenthal Act. As to Chase, Jimenez alleges it violated section 2943 by intentionally failing to respond to her requests for documents.
MERS generally demurred on grounds Jimenez’s complaint failed to state a cause of action. In part, MERS argued it was a duly appointed beneficiary under the trust deed and as a result had authority to assign the deed of trust in January 2007 to another entity,
3 Defendants criticize Jimenez’s allegations made on information and belief as “conclusory suppositions” and an “unarticulated guise” for pleading facts. But it is permissible for a pleader to allege on information and belief facts not within his or
her actual or presumed personal knowledge. (See Dey v. Continental Cent. Credit
(2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 721, 725, fn. 1; North v. Cecil B. DeMille Productions, Inc. (1934) 2 Cal.2d 55, 58; 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Pleading, §§ 398, 399, pp. 537-539.) We will, however, disregard as argument, contention or legal conclusions Jimenez’s allegations that MERS “spar[es] the true beneficiaries the trouble and expense of recording assignments of mortgages from the original lender to assigns . . . “; MERS “has no right to payments made on the notes”; the “secondary mortgage market was marked by endemic failures to validly assign and properly document the assignments of mortgages . . . so that the actual ownership of beneficial interests in many mortgages became, and remains, difficult or impossible to determine”; and MERS “was not the rightful owner of the Note and was acting without the rightful owner’s authority.” (E.g., Foerst v. Hobro (1932) 125 Cal.App. 476, 478; Spaulding v. Wesson (1890) 84 Cal. 141, 142; Metzenbaum v. Metzenbaum (1948) 86 Cal.App.2d 750, 754; 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, § 384, pp. 521-522.)
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La Salle Bank,4 which in turn recorded a substitution of trustee naming CRC as the new trustee. It asked the court to take judicial notice of the grant deed, deed of trust, notice of default, and a January 27, 2009 assignment providing that MERS “grants, assigns and transfers . . . all beneficial interest under” the deed of trust to La Salle Bank “together with the note or notes therein described and secured thereby . . . .” It also asked the court to judicially notice a substitution of trustee recorded on January 27, 2009, in which La Salle Bank, identified as the trust deed’s beneficiary, purported to substitute CRC as the trustee. It argued foreclosure was lawfully initiated under sections 2924 to 2924i, permitting the “trustee, mortgagee or beneficiary or any of their authorized agents” to conduct the foreclosure process and allowing a substituted trustee or its agent to record the notice of default and notice of sale. MERS argued Jimenez’s quiet title cause of action failed for the absence of a verified complaint and the fact its allegations were contradicted by the judicially noticeable documents.
CRC and Chase generally demurred on the same grounds as MERS and requested that the court take judicial notice of the same documents. They additionally argued Jimenez’s Rosenthal Act cause of action failed because Chase, as the trust deed’s beneficiary, had the authority to instruct the foreclosure trustee to commence foreclosure and when the beneficial interest was assigned to CRC, CRC possessed the same authority.
4 The entity is alleged to be La Salle Bank, N.A., as trustee for Washington Mutual Mortgage Pass Through Certificates WMALT Series 2007-OC1Trust. We shall refer to that entity as La Salle Bank.
7
In opposition to the demurrers, Jimenez argued her case centered on the validity and effect of the assignment and substitution of trustee that were the subject of defendants’ requests for judicial notice. She maintained a key factual dispute was whether CRC in fact held a beneficial interest in the promissory note secured by the deed of trust, and the documents were not judicially noticeable official records or findings, but merely documents created by the defendants. She argued the court could not take judicial notice of the documents’ contents and absent anything to contradict her pleadings it was required to overrule the demurrers to all but the quiet title and section 2943 causes of action. Jimenez sought leave to amend to cure the lack of verification and to “add any such allegations as may be appropriate, if the court sustains the demurrer.”
Granting judicial notice “as to the legal effect of the recorded documents,” the court tentatively sustained the defendants’ demurrers to all but the UCL cause of action without leave to amend. As to those causes of action, it ruled the documents contradicted essential allegations of Jimenez’s complaint and Jimenez did not show she could cure the defects by further amendment. It granted Jimenez leave to amend her UCL cause of action. The court thereafter entered judgments of dismissal in favor of MERS and CRC. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
The applicable appellate review standards are settled: ” ‘A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a complaint as a matter of law.’ [Citation.] In reviewing the propriety of the sustaining of a demurrer, the ‘court gives the complaint a reasonable interpretation,
8
and treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded. [Citations.] The court does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. [Citation.] The judgment must be affirmed “if any one of the several grounds of demurrer is well taken. [Citations.]” [Citation.] However, it is error for a trial court to sustain a demurrer when the plaintiff has stated a cause of action under any possible legal theory. [Citation.] And it is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if the plaintiff shows there is a reasonable possibility any defect identified by the defendant can be cured by amendment.’ ” (Dey v. Continental Cent. Credit, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at pp. 725-726.) Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving a reasonable possibility any defects can be cured by amendment. (Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1126.) The reviewing court independently examines the complaint under this standard. (McCall v. PacificCare of California, Inc. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 412, 415; Dey, at p. 726.)
If judicially noticeable facts render an otherwise facially valid complaint defective, the complaint is subject to demurrer. (See Evans v. City of Berkeley (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1, 6.) This rule discourages plaintiffs from filing sham pleadings: “Under the doctrine of truthful pleading, the courts ‘will not close their eyes to situations where a complaint contains allegations of fact inconsistent with attached documents, or allegations contrary to facts that are judicially noticed.’ [Citation.] ‘False allegations of fact, inconsistent with annexed documentary exhibits [citation] or contrary to facts judicially noticed [citation], may be disregarded . . . .’ ” (Hoffman v. Smithwoods RV Park, LLC (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 390, 400; accord, C.R. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp.
9
(2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1102 [allegations contrary to the law or to a fact of which judicial notice may be taken will be treated as a nullity].) However, our review should reflect no concern for whether Jimenez can prove the facts alleged in her complaint. (California Golf, LLC v. Cooper (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1053, 1064.) ” ‘The hearing on demurrer may not be turned into a contested evidentiary hearing through the guise of having the court take judicial notice of documents whose truthfulness or proper interpretation are disputable.’ ” (See Silguero v. Creteguard, Inc. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 60, 64.)
Jimenez makes lengthy arguments as to MERS’s role in non-judicial foreclosures without citation to the record. These arguments are unhelpful on our review of the sufficiency of her complaint, given our focus on Jimenez’s properly pleaded material facts and exhibits attached to her complaint. (Zelig v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1126; Barnett v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 500, 505.).
II. Propriety of Taking Judicial Notice of the “Effect” of the Recorded Documents
We begin with Jimenez’s challenge to the propriety of taking judicial notice of the “effect” of MERS’s recorded assignment to La Salle Bank and La Salle Bank’s substitution of CRC as trustee. Defendants sought judicial notice under Evidence Code section 451, subdivision (f), mandating notice of “[f]acts and propositions of generalized knowledge that are so universally known that they cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute,” and subdivisions of Evidence Code section 452 permitting judicial notice of court records (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)), facts and propositions of such common knowledge that they cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute (Evid. Code, § 452,
10
subd. (g)), and facts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination “by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (h).)
” ‘ “Judicial notice is the recognition and acceptance by the court, for use by the trier of fact or by the court, of the existence of a matter of law or fact that is relevant to an issue in the action without requiring formal proof of the matter.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]
‘ “Judicial notice may not be taken of any matter unless authorized or required by law.” (Evid. Code, § 450.) . . . A matter ordinarily is subject to judicial notice only if the matter is reasonably beyond dispute. [Citation.] Although the existence of a document may be judicially noticeable, the truth of statements contained in the document and its proper interpretation are not subject to judicial notice if those matters are reasonably disputable.’ ” (Unruh-Hazton v. Regents of University of California (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 343, 364-365; accord, StorMedia Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 449, 457, fn. 9 [“When judicial notice is taken of a document . . . the truthfulness and proper interpretation of the document are disputable”]; C.R. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1103-1104.)
Jimenez argues the statutes cited by defendants do not permit judicial notice of the assignment and trust deed; that none of the statutory grounds were present. We agree. The recorded documents are not court records (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)), and the contents of the documents, purporting to evidence particular transactions, neither constitute nor include “facts and propositions” that would be the subject of Evidence Code sections 451, subdivision (f), and 452, subdivisions (g) or (h). (Compare with In re
11
Marriage of Tammen (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 927, 931 [taking judicial notice, as a matter of common knowledge, of the proposition that deeds of trust are bought and sold in the course of ordinary business].)
Accordingly, we reject defendants’ assertion that judicial notice lies under section 452, subdivision (h), which involves facts that are “widely accepted as established by experts and specialists in the natural, physical, and social sciences which can be verified by reference to treatises, encyclopedias, almanacs and the like. . . . .” (Gould v. Maryland Sound Industries, Inc. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1145.) Defendants argue the assignment from MERS to La Salle Bank and La Salle Bank’s substitution of trustee demonstrate facts that are not reasonably subject to dispute and capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy, so as to contradict allegations of Jimenez’s complaint, including her allegation that “as of April 30, 2009, no assignment of the Note and no Substitution of Trustee had been recorded and . . . none has been recorded since that time.” Defendants point also to Jimenez’s allegation that “CRC has not been duly appointed or duly substituted as trustee by the true beneficiary of the Deed of Trust and therefore has no authority to conduct a sale of the property.” They argue the recording of the documents accomplished that substitution, and the “facts may be considered as business records and an exception to the hearsay rule” that fall within the scope of the sort of facts and propositions included in Evidence Code section 452, subdivision h. Defendants cite no authority for the latter proposition.
12
Jimenez concedes the propriety of taking judicial notice of the fact of recording. She maintains the court cannot, however, take judicial notice of the key issue here: whether the documents reflect a valid assignment of the promissory note from the original lender (The Mortgage Store) to any of the defendants, a claim that involves the truth of the documents’ contents. She argues recordation is not a substitute for evidentiary proof of the truth of the facts asserted in a recorded document. Specifically, she points to her allegation that there is no assignment of the promissory note from the original lender (The Mortgage Store) to any of the defendants, and to the fact that none of the recorded documents show any such assignment. Jimenez further argues the trial court’s taking of judicial notice was not harmless error, as these documents were the sole support for its ruling dismissing her causes of action. She emphasizes that our review in any event is de novo, and we are not bound by the trial court’s reasoning.
There is authority for the proposition that a court may take judicial notice of “recorded deeds.” (Evans v. California Trailer Court, Inc. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 540, 549, citing Maryland Casualty Co. v. Reeder (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 961, 977 (Maryland Casualty) & Cal-American Income Property Fund II v. County of Los Angeles (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 109, 112, fn. 2; Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106 (Poseidon).) In Evans, the plaintiffs did not object to the request and further conceded the truth of the matters evidenced by the deed, and under those circumstances the appellate court upheld the trial court’s evidentiary ruling taking judicial notice of a trustee’s deed. (Evans, at p. 549.) In Maryland Casualty, this court, reviewing a summary judgment on an insurance company’s declaratory relief complaint,
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asked the parties to identify evidence of ownership and took judicial notice of recorded deeds purporting to establish a chain of title so as to decide whether certain entities held interests in property and were subject to an exclusion against insurance coverage. (Maryland Casualty, 221 Cal.App.3d at pp. 976-977.) There is no indication in that case that any party objected to the request or disputed the validity of the deeds. Maryland Casualty in turn relied on B & P Development Corp. v. City of Saratoga (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 949, in which the appellate court took judicial notice under Evidence Code sections 459 and 452, subdivisions (g) and (h) only of the fact that the plaintiff had filed and recorded its final subdivision map. (Id. at p. 960.) The Court of Appeal in Cal-American Income Property Fund II granted the request to judicially notice the Los Angeles County Recorder’s recordation of trust deeds as official acts of the executive department under Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (c), a provision not relied upon by defendants here. (Cal-American Income Property Fund II, at p. 112, fn. 2.) The appellate court in Cal-American did so in view of the fact that the plaintiff, who opposed the request on grounds the documents were not introduced in the lower court, did not question the authenticity of the documents and the parties made reference to the trust deeds and foreclosure proceedings in the proceedings below. (Ibid.)
In Poseidon, the appellate court observed that under Maryland Casualty, judicial notice may be taken of recorded deeds, but cautioned that “the fact a court may take judicial notice of a recorded deed, or similar document, does not mean it may take judicial notice of factual matters stated therein. [Citation.] For example, the First Substitution [a substitution of trustee document recorded on July 16, 2004] recites that
14
Shanley ‘is the present holder of beneficial interest under said Deed of Trust.’ By taking judicial notice of the First Substitution, the court does not take judicial notice of this fact, because it is hearsay and it cannot be considered not reasonably subject to dispute.” (Poseidon, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 1117.) Poseidon involved plaintiff Poseidon Development, Inc.’s complaint for breach of a promissory note in which Poseidon sought to recover, inter alia, expenses associated with its initiation of a nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding. (Id. at p. 1109.) The trial court sustained the defendant’s demurrers without leave to amend, finding that certain documents, including assignments of the trust deed and note from Poseidon to another mortgage company, showed Poseidon was not entitled to recover fees incurred for the foreclosure because it had assigned the deed of trust and had no right to initiate foreclosure proceedings. (Id. at p. 1116.) On appeal, Poseidon challenged the trial court’s taking of judicial notice of the fact that the document transferred beneficial interest in the note and trust deed and argued that matter remained subject to dispute. (Id. at p. 1117.) The Court of Appeal rejected that argument, noting that the assignment contradicted Poseidon’s allegations that it ” ‘remained the true and rightful owner of the note with the power to foreclose on the deed of trust . . . .’ ” (Id. at p. 1118.) It held the “legal effect [of the assignment] could not be clearer” in that it was “not reasonably subject to dispute that, whatever else occurred, Poseidon gave up and no longer held the beneficial interest under the deed of trust” and thus no longer had the power to substitute the trustee of the deed of trust. (Ibid.) Importantly, the Court of Appeal observed that on appeal, Poseidon did not dispute the validity of the assignment, only its effect. (Ibid.) We take from Poseidon that had the plaintiff disputed the validity
15
of the assignment, judicial notice as to whether Poseidon retained the beneficial interest would be a contested factual matter not subject to judicial notice.
Here, we may judicially notice the fact that on January 27, 2009, MERS recorded an assignment of the deed of trust and note to La Salle, which in turn recorded a substitution of trustee document stating it was substituting CRC as the trustee. This would contradict Jimenez’s allegation that no assignment of the deed of trust or substitution of trustee had been recorded as of April 30, 2009. However, unlike the plaintiff in Poseidon, the gravamen of Jimenez’s complaint — reasonably and liberally construing its allegations — challenges the validity of the assignments and substitutions. In opposition to the demurrer, she questioned whether CRC in fact held a beneficial interest in the deed of trust and pointed out her complaint challenged the validity of MERS’s purported assignment of the note based on factual allegations — which we must accept as true — that The Mortgage Store did not assign the note to MERS or authorize MERS to assign the note to anyone on its behalf, and that MERS is not the note’s holder. Because Jimenez disputes MERS’s status and its ability to assign the note and also CRC’s status as the legitimate trustee, we conclude it is not proper to judicially notice the validity or legal effect of the assignment to La Salle Bank and substitution of trustee to CRC. (Poseidon, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 1117.)
III. The Complaint Fails to State a Cause of Action Even Assuming the Truth of Jimenez’s Allegation That MERS Does Not Hold the Promissory Note
Though we disregard the truth of the contents of the assignment and substitution of trustee submitted by defendants in support of their demurrer, we nevertheless conclude
16
Jimenez cannot state causes of action for “wrongful initiation” of foreclosure, declaratory relief, and violations of the Rosenthal Act. Our conclusion mainly turns on the recitals in the deed of trust executed by Jimenez and attached to her complaint, which give precedence to any contrary factual allegations. (Qualcomm, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters At Lloyd’s, London (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 184, 191; Performance Plastering v. Richmond American Homes of California (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 659, 665; Dodd v. Citizen’s Bank of Costa Mesa (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1624, 1627.)
A. Wrongful Initiation of Foreclosure
We have found no California state authority, and Jimenez cites none, identifying or describing the elements of a purported cause of action for “wrongful initiation” of foreclosure.5 Her allegations charge in a conclusory fashion that she does not know the note’s “beneficial owner”; that the person who directed initiation of the foreclosure is not the “rightful” owner of the note, that CRC is without authority to foreclose, and she has suffered damage “[a]s a result of defendant’s wrongful actions . . . .” Jimenez admits that the essence of her complaint is that under California law, “only the holder of a beneficial interest in a note can foreclose on the security for that note.”
We could reject Jimenez’s attempted cause of action merely by disregarding her conclusory pleading. But Jimenez’s assertions about the note are unavailing in any event.
5 Jimenez does not allege that her property was in fact sold at a foreclosure sale, and her cause of action does not seek to set aside such a sale. In Hulse v. Ocwen Federal Bank, FSB (D.Or. 2002) 195 F.Supp.2d 1188, the court suggested that without an actual foreclosure sale, the plaintiff in that case might have no remedy for an alleged initiation of the foreclosure process by the wrong entity. (Id. at p. 1204, fn. 5.)
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In California, the regulation of nonjudicial foreclosures pursuant to a power of sale is governed by the ” ‘comprehensive framework’ ” of sections 2924 through 2924k. (Melendrez v. D&I Investment, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1238, quoting Moeller v. Lien (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 822, 830; see also Ung v. Koehler (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 186, 202 [exercise of power of sale in a deed of trust ” ‘is carefully circumscribed by statute’ “]; Knapp v. Doherty (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 76, 86.) The statutory scheme is intended to be “exhaustive” and courts will not incorporate unrelated provisions into statutory nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. (See Moeller, at p. 834.) Under the scheme, a “trustee, mortgagee or beneficiary or any of their authorized agents” may record the notice of default — the document that initiates the non-judicial foreclosure process. (§§ 2924, subd. (a)(1); see also 2924b(b)(4) [“A ‘person authorized to record the notice of default or notice of sale’ shall include an agent for the mortgagee or beneficiary, an agent of the named trustee, any person designated in an executed substitution of trustee, or an agent of that substituted trustee”].) There is abundant federal authority in accord. (Morgera v. Countrywide Home Loans (E.D.Cal. 2010) 2010 WL 160348, *7 [citing cases]; Linkhart v. US. Bank Nat. Assn. (S.D.Cal. 2010) 2010 WL 1996895; Perlas v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Systems, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 2010) 2010 WL 3079262 [“There is no requirement in California that the foreclosure be initiated by the lender itself”].) Jimenez points to nothing in the framework requiring that the person initiating non-judicial foreclosure proceedings possess a beneficial interest in the note, or be the lender or original note holder.
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Jimenez attacks MERS’s ability to validly assign the note on grounds it is a nominal beneficiary only of the deed of trust, and is not the holder of the note.6 But that allegation is contradicted by the recorded deed of trust attached to her complaint, executed by Jimenez, in which Jimenez agreed that MERS, the designated beneficiary, was also broadly granted the right as the lender’s nominee to “exercise any or all of [the lender’s] interests, including, but not limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the Property; and to take any action required of Lender . . . .”7 (Italics added.) This language empowers MERS to take any actions within the lender’s authority, including making assignments of the note (as well as the trust deed), contrary to Jimenez’s allegations. Because Jimenez’s cause of action is premised on MERS’s asserted lack of power or authority to assign the promissory note, it fails on grounds her assertion is
6 It is true, as Jimenez emphasizes, that a valid assignment requires more than just assignment of the deed; the note must also be assigned. (See Carpenter v. Longan (1872) 83 U.S. 271, 274 [“[t]he note and mortgage are inseparable; the former as essential, the latter as an incident”; “[a]n assignment of the note carries the mortgage with it, while an assignment of the latter alone is a nullity”]; Kelley v. Upshaw (1952) 39 Cal.2d 179, 192 [assignment of only the deed without a transfer of the promissory note is completely ineffective]; see also Restatement (3d) of Property (Mortgages) § 5.4 [“[a] mortgage may be enforced only by, or in behalf of, a person who is entitled to enforce the obligation that the mortgage secures,” italics added].) Here, the face of MERS’s assignment to La Salle Bank shows MERS identified not just the deed of trust, but also the promissory note.
7 More fully, the deed of trust provides: “Borrower understands and agrees that MERS holds only legal title to the interests granted by Borrower in this Security Instrument but, if necessary to comply with law or custom, MERS (as nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns) has the right: to exercise any or all of those interests, including, but not limited to, the right to foreclose and sell the Property; and to take any action required of Lender including, but not limited to, releasing and canceling this Security Instrument.”
19
belied by the recitals in the deed of trust, which take precedence over the contrary factual allegations.
B. Declaratory Relief
Jimenez seeks a judicial declaration as to whether, “by necessary implication, [section] 2924[, subdivision] (a) allows a borrower, before his or her property is sold, to bring a civil action in order to test whether the person electing to sell the property is, or is duly authorized to do so by, the owner of a beneficial interest in it.” She specifically points to section 2924, subdivision (a)(1)(C), which requires, as part of a notice of default, “[a] statement setting forth the nature of each breach actually known to the beneficiary and of his or her election to sell or cause to be sold the property to satisfy that obligation and any other obligation secured by the deed of trust or mortgage that is in default.”
But this statute merely governs the contents of the notice of default for purposes of allowing a default to be cured and obtain reinstatement. (See Ung v. Koehler, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th 186, 202.) There are no ” ‘ “clear, understandable, unmistakable terms” ‘ ” within the statute that evidences legislative intent to create a private cause of action as Jimenez suggests. (See Lu v. Hawaiian Gardens Casino, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 592, 597.) We conclude Jimenez has not alleged an actual controversy to maintain a cause of action for her requested declaratory relief.
C. Violation of Rosenthal Act Cause of Action (as to CRC)
The Rosenthal Act protects consumers from unfair or deceptive debt collection acts and practices for “consumer debts,” created through transactions in which “property,
20
services or money is acquired on credit . . . primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” (§§ 1788.1, 1788.2 subds. (e)-(f).) Under the Act, a “debt collector” is defined as “any person who, in the ordinary course of business, regularly, on behalf of himself or herself or others, engages in debt collection.” (§ 1788.2, subd. (c).)
In support of her Rosenthal Act cause of action, Jimenez alleges CRC and Chase are “debt collectors within the meaning of the [Act]” and that Chase’s March 31, 2009 letter and CRC’s Notice of Default were attempts to collect a debt in violation of section 1788.10, subdivision (e)8 “in that they constitute an implied threat to sell the property, which is not permitted by law because, on information and belief, defendants were not authorized by the Note’s rightful owner to foreclose on the property.” Jimenez alleges the violations were willful and knowing. In its demurrer, CRC argued Jimenez failed to allege any harassing or threatening conduct, obscenity, misleading or false communications or any communications to third parties such as employers. It argued Jimenez’s allegations as to the absence of CRC’s authority to foreclose were contrary to the documents it sought to judicially notice.
On appeal, Jimenez apparently rests her argument on the impropriety of taking judicial notice of CRC’s status as the beneficial holder of the promissory note. She does not otherwise describe the Rosenthal Act’s elements or explain how her allegations state a
8 Section 1788.10, subdivision (e) prohibits any debt collector from collecting or attempting to collect a consumer debt by means of the following conduct: “The threat to any person that nonpayment of the consumer debt may result in the arrest of the debtor or the seizure, garnishment, attachment or sale of any property or the garnishment or attachment of wages of the debtor, unless such action is in fact contemplated by the debt collector and permitted by law . . . .” (§ 1788.10, subd. (e).)
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cause of action under the Act. For its part, CRC responds for the first time on appeal that foreclosure of a loan is not “debt collection” under the Act. It cites federal cases involving the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FFDCPA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692).
Jimenez’s Rosenthal Act claim falls on the premise alleged in her complaint that MERS had no authority to assign the promissory note, which assertedly invalidated CRC’s beneficial interest and ability to initiate foreclosure proceedings. As we have held, that premise is contradicted by the deed of trust granting MERS broad powers. Because the absence of MERS’s authority is the underlying basis for her cause of action under the Act, we conclude she cannot state a cause of action under the Act as a matter of law.
DISPOSITION
The judgments are affirmed.
O’ROURKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
BENKE, Acting P. J.
AARON, J.

MERS MEANS QUIET TITLE IN SALT LAKE CITY

Posted on January 17, 2011 by Foreclosureblues

How accurate are property records?
By Tom Harvey
The Salt Lake Tribune
Published: January 16, 2011 04:41PM
Updated: January 16, 2011 01:01AM

Chris Detrick | The Salt Lake Tribune

Walter Keane poses for a portrait at his office Friday January 7, 2011. Keane has filed lawsuit that resulted in homeowners getting title to their property even if they owed someone money because of flaws introduced into the nation’s property recording system by an entity created by the Mortgage Bankers Association.
A Utah court case in which the owner of a Draper townhouse got clear title to the property, even though he still owed $132,000 on it, raises new legal and financial questions about a property-records database created by mortgage bankers.
The award of a title free of liens means that whoever owns the promissory note on the Draper property — likely a group of faraway investors — no longer has the right to foreclose to collect on a delinquent loan. Indeed, the townhouse owner has sold the property and kept the money. Those who own the promissory note probably don’t even know what occurred.
Decisions such as the one 3rd District Judge Glen Iwasaki handed down in the Draper case could have a big impact as the state wends its way through hundreds of lawsuits involving foreclosures, loans on properties for more than they’re worth and predatory lending practices that led Utahns to lose their homes as the real-estate bubble burst.

Quiet title • Last year, the owner of the Draper property contacted attorney Walter T. Keane to help him deal with lenders, though Keane won’t say what the problem was and the owner declined an interview request.
Keane filed what’s called a “quiet title action,” a lawsuit in which the owner seeks clear title to a property free of liens by lenders or others.
In Utah, when you take out a mortgage loan to buy a home, you sign a promissory note held by the lender and a deed of trust that is recorded at the county recorder’s office. The promissory note gives the holder the right to collect payments on the loan. The recording of the deed of trust gives the lender the right to foreclose on the property if you default on the loan.
A trustee appointed by the lender also is recorded with the county and actually holds legal title to your property subject to the conditions of the trust deed.
The lawsuit over the title to the townhouse named Garbett Mortgage and Citibank FSB as the holders of promissory notes as recorded on trust deeds filed with the recorder’s office. Integrated Title Services was listed as trustee of the Garbett Mortgage trust deed, while First American Title was the trustee of the CitiBank trust deed.

Trust deed tag-along • But there also was another entity listed on the trust deeds called the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS). The Mortgage Bankers Association, the Washington, D.C.-based trade group that represents major mortgage lenders, created MERS in the mid-1990s.
MERS is a database where promissory note owners are recorded, with MERS itself then listed on trust deeds at county recorder offices as the “beneficiary” of the note instead of the real lenders or note owners.
The new arrangement greased the way for mortgages to be packaged together and sold to investors who were relieved of the need under the traditional system to record the true owner of the promissory notes and to pay the county recording fees, which average around $35. Attorneys charge MERS is largely an instrument to avoid paying fees every time a promissory note is sold and resold and eventually packaged with others and owned by group of investors.
During the latter part of the real-estate boom, hundreds of thousands of subprime loans were packaged and sold using the MERS system. MERS has registered about 31 million loans, the company’s chief executive said in congressional testimony in November. CEO R.K. Arnold also said in a 2009 deposition that the system had saved its members an estimated $2.4 billion that would have gone to county governments.

Who’s the beneficiary? • Under the state’s quiet title laws, Keane said he did not have to name MERS or serve it legal papers in the lawsuit because it was not the legal owner of title to the property. Those were title companies. In addition, attorneys contend, MERS cannot be the “beneficiary” or holder of the promissory note because it readily has admitted it has no financial interest in any notes or mortgages.
Normally, a trustee named in a trust deed has a legal duty in Utah to the entity that holds the promissory note and for fair dealing with the homeowner. But in the townhouse case, First American Title filed a response to the quiet title action saying that it had no idea who had the right to collect payments on the promissory note, nor did it admit to knowing any other basic information about the property.
“The fact of the matter is First American Title doesn’t know who the beneficiary of the trust deed is and basically they disavow any interest in it,” Keane said. “It’s an acknowledgement [the recording system on this property is] a fiction, that they don’t have any real interest in it.”
Garbett Mortgage also told the court it no longer held an interest in the property. Integrated Title never filed a response to the lawsuit but did withdraw as a trustee with the Salt Lake County Recorder’s Office.
“Considering the owner of the property [the title companies who were trustees] failed to dispute the matter, and further considering that the original lender claims no further interest, the court nullified the trust deeds prior to setting any type of trial date,” Keane said.
So in the four months that the process took, the owner was able to gain title and deny the owners of his loan the ability to foreclose on the property for nonpayment. That means the promissory note owned by investors may be worth far less than they paid for it because it is no longer backed by an asset.

Record reliability • MERS spokeswoman Karmelo Lejarde said MERS actually added reliability to the system of county recording offices.
“Prior to the creation of MERS [when servicers routinely held the mortgage lien for the note owner], the information in the public land records was not accurate due to delays in recording assignments or missing assignments that never got recorded,” she said in e-mail that appears to be a boilerplate response to questions about MERS’ role in the nation’s property registration system.
“With the MERS System, mortgage data is more accurate and title information more reliable. The MERS process creates accountability and transparency, helps keep costs low, reduces the risk of errors in record keeping and makes it easier to keep track of the lien if a loan is sold to other banks and investors.”
Gary Ott, the elected Salt Lake County recorder for the past 10 years, disagrees. He characterizes his office as a neutral party that permanently safeguards records, all of which are available for public inspection. In the past, parties were able to record each transaction or lien involving a property so a clear picture emerges of the title history of a property, Ott said, adding that with computerization, the recording is now nearly instantaneous once documents are received by his office.
“You can trust what you see at the recorder’s office because it’s up to this date, everything is in order,” said Ott, “and you can’t see at MERS if it’s in order at all. That’s the scary part, and people’s homes are something you shouldn’t mess with.”

Default judgment • Keane said he’s been able to obtain quiet title in the same manner in two other cases. Another attorney, Abraham Bates, said he recently also won a quiet title action in a similar case in Salt Lake County.
In Bates’ case, a couple who owed $417,000 on a house whose value had dropped way below that also sued for quiet title.
He named the original lender and a title company listed as trustee on the trust deed. Because neither responded to the lawsuit as legally required, the judge granted the couple a default judgment that still must be verified in court, Bates said.
Bates said under Utah laws, it was not necessary to serve MERS legal papers, as it was not in the Draper townhouse case.
“MERS is not the beneficiary of the trust deed,” Bates said. “MERS did not make the mortgage loan.”

New questions • While these decisions stripped the owners of the promissory notes of the ability to foreclose on the property to recoup missed payments, it does not preclude them from suing the people who signed the notes to try to recover lost monies.
But that action would open up a new line of questions about the MERS method of property recording, said Christopher Peterson, a University of Utah law professor who has made a national name for himself recently by questioning the legal foundations of MERS’ appearance in property-recording records and its role in foreclosures.
Under laws adopted by all 50 states, the owner of a “negotiable instrument” such as a promissory note must be in physical possession of the document, said Peterson. Otherwise it would be like someone trying to cash a photocopy of a check instead of the actual check.
“One cannot be a holder of a note unless one is in physical possession of that note,” he said.
But Peterson said evidence is coming out in courts that shows the actual promissory notes or mortgages signed by buyers were not transferred as the notes made their way into the mortgage-backed securities investment pools.
That could mean in these cases that no one is in a position to try to collect because the actual notes are lost or destroyed, potentially making some promissory notes investors think they hold worthless.

Right to foreclose • Bates said he has more than 100 lawsuits pending over MERS-related questions and has hired more attorneys for his firm to handle the increasing load.
State courts have been more favorable than federal courts to homeowners seeking to halt foreclosure proceedings based on questions about MERS’ legal standing under state and federal laws, the attorneys say.
Rulings have gone different ways in different courts. But Bates said he and Peterson are teaming up to appeal a recent ruling by U.S. District Judge Tena Campbell that dismissed a lawsuit claiming MERS did not have the legal right to initiate foreclosure proceedings.
The attorneys are appealing Campell’s ruling as it relates to Utah law to the Utah Supreme Court. A decision will help sort out the issues with MERS over whether it actually can initiate foreclosures even if it does not have any financial interest in the promissory note, Bates said.
A ruling favorable to the homeowner “would be an absolute tsunami in terms of foreclosure in the state of Utah,” he said.
If MERS is not able to start a foreclosure action, “then there will be a brick wall put up over all nonjudicial foreclosures prosecuted in this state,” Bates said.
tharvey@sltrib.com

What is MERS?
The Mortgage Bankers Association created the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, or MERS, in the mid-1990s. It is a database that holds the names of the entities that have a financial interest in a particular mortgage, such as investment funds that bought bundles of mortgages called mortgage-backed securities. MERS is recorded on many property deeds of trust in Utah as the “beneficiary” of a loan taken out on a property even if that loan is sold and resold many times. MERS allows the actual loan owners to avoid paying fees every time a loan is sold.

MERS CEO R.K. Arnold Leaving Company go figure!

Who knows, maybe his resignation has something to do with this article where he admits that they have bifuricated the note from the mortgage and have been doing so for many years with the servicers,

As investors bought more and more loans in the secondary market, many of them began to contract with servicing
companies to handle loan servicing obligations. A servicer is a company that a mortgage loan investor hires to handle
payment processing, tax and insurance escrows, foreclosure and other matters related to the loan or the property. Often, the servicer is the same lender that originated the loan, sold the beneficial ownership in the secondary market and agreed to continue servicing the loan for the new beneficial owner.

For these servicing companies to perform their duties satisfactorily, the note and mortgage were bifurcated. The
investor or its designee held the note and named the servicing company as mortgagee, a structure that became standard. Some servicing companies have grown quite large, and a very active secondary market in servicing contracts has developed as well. Now more than $ 400 billion in servicing contracts trade annually.

A servicing contract is not an interest in real estate. Unlike a mortgage, it has nothing to do with legal title to the
property and is personal property under UCC § 9-106. Even before MERS, servicers had no reason to appear in the
public land records, except to receive the legal process they need to service loans properly.

The bifurcated structure worked fine for a long time, but the sheer volume of transfers between servicing
companies and the resulting need to record assignments caused a heavy drag on the secondary market. The burden
affected lenders, title companies, consumers and even local recorders. Assignment processing for the sale of a relatively modest loan portfolio can take up to six months to complete. Error rates as high as 33% are common. With the active secondary market in servicing contracts, more than four million loans are affected annually. Loan servicing can trade several times before even the first assignment in a chain is recorded, leaving the public land records clogged with unnecessary assignments. Sometimes these assignments are recorded in the wrong sequence, clouding title to the property.

see full article “There is Life on MERS”
MERS CEO R.K. Arnold Leaving Company

Submitted by Tyler Durden on 01/21/2011 14:23 -0500
Is the biggest fraud in the history of the US housing market about to come unglued? If so, take our prediction of a $100 billion total in future BofA rep and warranty reserves and triple it.
From the WSJ:
The chief executive of the privately-held Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, or MERS, is planning to leave the company and an announcement could come within days, according to people familiar with the matter.

The company has been under fire by Congress and state officials for its role in the mortgage-document crisis. The firm’s board of directors has met in recent days to address the fate of the company and its chief executive, R.K. Arnold, the people said.

Arnold and other MERS executives didn’t respond to requests for comment. A MERS spokeswoman Friday declined comment. Arnold, a former U.S. Army Ranger, has served as the CEO and president of Merscorp Inc., the parent company of MERS, since 1998 and has been with the company since its inception 15 years ago, according to a corporate biography.

MERS was built by Fannie Mae (FNMA), Freddie Mac (FMCC), and several large U.S. banks in 1996 as an electronic registry of land records. That created a parallel database to facilitate the packaging of loans into securities that could be sold and re-sold without being recorded in local county courthouses, reducing costs for banks. The company’s name is listed as the agent for mortgage lenders on more than 65 million home loans.

But the company’s practices have begun to receive heavy scrutiny from state prosecutors and federal regulators, particularly in light of foreclosure-document problems that surfaced last fall. State and federal lawmakers have begun to consider bills that would make it harder for banks to use or foreclose on properties through MERS.

MERS’s legal standing also has been challenged by legal experts because it doesn’t own the underlying debt. Previously, the mortgage and the promissory note weren’t split between different parties.

Critics of the company have raised concerns over whether notes were properly assigned or tracked within the electronic system. Judges have also begun to question the company’s practices of “deputizing” hundreds of bank executives to handle foreclosures by naming them “vice presidents” of MERS.

insider mers memo foreclosure procedures all states

State-by-State
MERS Recommended
Foreclosure Procedures
Updated 2002
Corporate Offices
1818 Library Street, Suite 300
Reston, VA 20190
tel (800) 646-6377
fax (703) 748-0183
http://www.mersinc.org
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION__________________________________________________________3
RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURES:
Alabama___________________________________________________________________________8
Alaska____________________________________________________________________________10
Arizona___________________________________________________________________________12
Arkansas__________________________________________________________________________14
California__________________________________________________________________________16
Colorado__________________________________________________________________________18
Connecticut________________________________________________________________________20
Delaware__________________________________________________________________________22
District of Columbia_________________________________________________________________24
Florida____________________________________________________________________________26
Georgia___________________________________________________________________________28
Hawaii____________________________________________________________________________30
Idaho_____________________________________________________________________________32
Illinois____________________________________________________________________________34
Indiana____________________________________________________________________________36
Iowa______________________________________________________________________________38
Kansas____________________________________________________________________________40
Kentucky__________________________________________________________________________42
Louisiana__________________________________________________________________________44
Maine_____________________________________________________________________________46
Maryland__________________________________________________________________________48
Massachusetts______________________________________________________________________50
Michigan__________________________________________________________________________52
Minnesota_________________________________________________________________________54
Mississippi_________________________________________________________________________56
Missouri___________________________________________________________________________58
Montana___________________________________________________________________________60
Nebraska__________________________________________________________________________62
Nevada___________________________________________________________________________64
New Hampshire_____________________________________________________________________66
New Jersey________________________________________________________________________68
New Mexico_______________________________________________________________________70
New York_________________________________________________________________________72
North Carolina______________________________________________________________________74
North Dakota_______________________________________________________________________76
Ohio______________________________________________________________________________78
Oklahoma_________________________________________________________________________80
Oregon____________________________________________________________________________83
Pennsylvania_______________________________________________________________________85
Rhode Island_______________________________________________________________________87
South Carolina______________________________________________________________________89
South Dakota_______________________________________________________________________91
Tennessee_________________________________________________________________________93
Texas_____________________________________________________________________________95
Utah______________________________________________________________________________97
Vermont___________________________________________________________________________99
Virginia__________________________________________________________________________102
Washington_______________________________________________________________________104
West Virginia_____________________________________________________________________106
Wisconsin________________________________________________________________________108
Wyoming_________________________________________________________________________110
Introduction
MERS has put together this Foreclosure Manual to provide a state by state guideline for our Members to follow when foreclosing a mortgage loan in the name of MERS. Each state’s procedure was developed jointly with local counsel in that respective state. There may be future versions of this Manual if needed. If you have any questions about this Foreclosure Manual, please contact MERS.
Sharon McGann Horstkamp
Corporate Counsel
3
What is MERS?
MERS serves two purposes. First, it is a national electronic registry for tracking servicing rights and beneficial ownership interests in mortgage loans. Second, MERS acts as nominee (a form of agent) for the servicer and beneficial owner of a mortgage loan in the public land records. MERS is designed to operate within the existing legal framework in all U.S. jurisdictions and did not require any changes to existing laws.
How is this made possible? Its members appoint MERS as the mortgagee of record on all loans that they register on the MERS System. This appointment eliminates the need for any future assignments when servicing rights are sold from one MERS Member to another. Instead of preparing a paper assignment to track the change in the county land records, all subsequent transfers are tracked electronically on the MERS System.
MERS does not create or transfer beneficial interests in mortgage loans or create electronic assignments of the mortgage. What MERS does do is eliminate the need for subsequent recorded assignments altogether. The transfer process of the beneficial ownership of mortgage loans does not change with the arrival of MERS. Promissory notes still require an endorsement and delivery from the current owner to the next owner in order to change the beneficial ownership of a mortgage loan.
MERS is a Delaware corporation with a broad base of ownership from the mortgage industry. American Land Title Association is among our owners and has a seat on the MERS Board of Directors. Other owners with substantial investments in MERS include the Mortgage Bankers Association of America (MBA), Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac. These parties, along with Ginnie Mae, decided several years ago that MERS would be a major benefit to the mortgage industry and worked together to create the MERS of today.
How does MERS become the Mortgagee of Record?
MERS is put in this position in one of two ways: the first is by an assignment from a lender or servicer to MERS. This method is usually associated with bulk transfers of servicing. The second way is with the lender naming MERS as the mortgagee of record as nominee for itself (and its successors and assigns) in the original security instrument at the time the loan is closed. We call this second option “MOM”, which stands for MERS as Original Mortgagee.
4
“MOM” was a significant milestone for MERS and the mortgage industry. Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae have each approved the use of MERS as original mortgagee as nominee for a lender on the security instrument for loans sold to them and registered on the MERS System.
In order to make MOM work, changes were made by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to their uniform security instruments allowing MERS to be named as the mortgagee in a nominee capacity for the lender. First, to reflect the interrelationship of the promissory note and mortgage and to ensure these two instruments are tied together properly, the recital paragraph names MERS, solely as nominee for Lender, as beneficiary. Second, it is made clear that the originating lender rather than MERS is defined as the “Lender”. This change was made so that everyone understands that MERS is not involved in the loan administration process. Third, as mortgagee of record, MERS needs to have the authority to release the lien of security instrument, or if necessary, foreclose on the collateral on behalf of the lender. Such authority is provided by adding a paragraph to the security instrument informing the borrower that MERS holds only legal title to the interests granted by the borrower. It also informs the borrower that, if necessary to comply with law or custom, MERS may exercise the right to foreclose and sell the property and may take any action required of the Lender to release or cancel the security instrument.
Once MERS is named in the original security instrument or by way of an assignment, the document is then recorded in the appropriate public land records. From this point on, no subsequent assignments of the mortgage to a MERS member needs to be recorded. MERS remains in the land records, as mortgagee, throughout the life of the loan so long as servicing is not sold to a non-MERS member. All subsequent transfers of ownership in mortgage loans and servicing rights for that loan are tracked electronically between MERS members through the MERS System. This process eliminates the opportunity for a break in the chain of title.
Moreover, unless a MERS member transfers servicing rights to a loan registered on the MERS System to a non-MERS member, the loan stays on the system until it is paid off. The process to transfer servicing rights between MERS members requires an electronic confirmation from the buyer. It begins with the seller entering loan transfer information into the system, including the Mortgage Identification Number (explained below), the new servicer organizational identification number, the sale date, and the transfer effective date. The buyer then must submit a confirmation acknowledgment to the system. The old servicer and the new servicer are still required to notify the homeowner in writing when loan servicing is traded as required under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. A loan is de-registered from the system only if its servicing rights to a loan are transferred to a non-MERS member.
With every new loan that is registered on the MERS System, it becomes more likely that you will come in contact with a mortgage loan having MERS as the mortgage holder in the chain of title. MERS is put in this position in one of two ways: the first is by an assignment from a lender or servicer to MERS. This method is usually associated with bulk transfers of servicing. The second way is with the lender naming MERS as the mortgagee of record as
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nominee for itself (and its successors and assigns) in the original security instrument at the time the loan is closed. We call this second option “MOM”, which stands for MERS as Original Mortgagee.
“MOM” was a significant milestone for MERS and the mortgage industry. Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae have each approved the use of MERS as original mortgagee as nominee for a lender on the security instrument for loans sold to them and registered on the MERS System.
In order to make MOM work, changes were made by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to their uniform security instruments allowing MERS to be named as the mortgagee in a nominee capacity for the lender. First, to reflect the interrelationship of the promissory note and mortgage and to ensure these two instruments are tied together properly, the recital paragraph names MERS, solely as nominee for Lender, as beneficiary. Second, it is made clear that the originating lender rather than MERS is defined as the “Lender”. This change was made so that everyone understands that MERS is not involved in the loan administration process. Third, as mortgagee of record, MERS needs to have the authority to release the lien of security instrument, or if necessary, foreclose on the collateral on behalf of the lender. Such authority is provided by adding a paragraph to the security instrument informing the borrower that MERS holds only legal title to the interests granted by the borrower. It also informs the borrower that, if necessary to comply with law or custom, MERS may exercise the right to foreclose and sell the property and may take any action required of the Lender to release or cancel the security instrument.
Once MERS is named in the original security instrument or by way of an assignment, the document is then recorded in the appropriate public land records. From this point on, no subsequent assignments of the mortgage to a MERS member needs to be recorded. MERS remains in the land records, as mortgagee, throughout the life of the loan so long as servicing is not sold to a non-MERS member. All subsequent transfers of ownership in mortgage loans and servicing rights for that loan are tracked electronically between MERS members through the MERS System. This process eliminates the opportunity for a break in the chain of title.
Moreover, unless a MERS member transfers servicing rights to a loan registered on the MERS System to a non-MERS member, the loan stays on the system until it is paid off. The process to transfer servicing rights between MERS members requires an electronic confirmation from the buyer. It begins with the seller entering loan transfer information into the system, including the Mortgage Identification Number (explained below), the new servicer organizational identification number, the sale date, and the transfer effective date. The buyer then must submit a confirmation acknowledgment to the system. The old servicer and the new servicer are still required to notify the homeowner in writing when loan servicing is traded as required under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. A loan is de-registered from the system only if its servicing rights to a loan are transferred to a non-MERS member.
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Why Foreclose in the Name of MERS
The mortgage establishes the remedy to foreclose and sell the property if the borrower does not pay back the amount loaned to the borrower according to schedule. Typically, the loan servicer, as the mortgagee of record, is the party that initiates the foreclosure proceedings on behalf of the investor. When MERS is the mortgagee of record, the foreclosure can be commenced in the name of MERS in place of the loan servicer. For another entity to foreclose, an assignment is required from MERS to the other entity.
Establishing MERS as mortgagee of record will not cause any significant changes to current foreclosure practices in any state when the beneficial owner wants to proceed with foreclosures in the name of MERS. Just take a look at the recommended procedures.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR ALABAMA
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is through the mortgage or deed of trust that MERS is given the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Mortgages are foreclosed non-judicially under power of sale. Local counsel advises that a foreclosure can be brought in the name of MERS. Notice of the foreclosure sale is published with Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) named as the foreclosing entity instead of the servicer.
Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents for the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require the promissory note be endorsed in blank when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS. However, we have been advised that sometimes there is an endorsement of the promissory note to the servicer prior to foreclosure. We recommend that the agencies’ policies be followed.
At the foreclosure sale, the certifying officer will instruct the foreclosing attorney regarding the bid to be entered on behalf of MERS. If the bid is the highest bid, then the auctioneer will be instructed to deed the property directly to the investor. We have been advised that this is the same procedure followed when foreclosing in the name of the servicer. Because the MERS recommended procedure follows the same procedure that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name, no additional taxes are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS.
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Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity. If it is an FHA-insured loan and an eviction is necessary, then the auctioneer deed can be issued to the servicer. This way, the eviction can be brought in the name of the servicer. Once the eviction is completed, then the servicer can issue a deed to HUD. Again, you should follow the same procedures you follow when foreclosing in the name of the servicer.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR ALASKA
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is through the mortgage or deed of trust that MERS is given the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Deeds of Trust are typically used and are foreclosed non-judicially by the power of sale contained therein. MERS local counsel advises that a foreclosure can be done in the name of MERS. Local counsel confirmed with First American Title Insurance Company that with a few minor caveats, foreclosing in the name of MERS should not present any problems.
Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents, such as the substitution of trustee, as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents for the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
The agencies’ policy is that the promissory note is endorsed in blank when the seller/servicer sells the loan to them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS. We have been advised that sometimes the Note is endorsed to the servicer prior to the foreclosure, but unless it is legally required, the Note should remain endorsed in blank. MERS stands in the same shoes as the servicer to the extent that it is not the beneficial owner of the promissory note. An investor, typically a secondary market investor, will still be the ultimate owner of the promissory note.
The trustee, who is typically a title company, commences the foreclosure by executing and recording the Notice of Default. The Notice of Default is filed and published the same way with the same required information except that Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) will be named as the foreclosing
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entity. At the foreclosure sale, an “offset bid” is entered on behalf of MERS who is acting in the capacity as “agent” for the servicer. Local counsel advises that the Beneficiary’s Declaration of Default can be modified to describe the relationship of MERS and the Servicer. This should enable the servicer, instead of MERS, to be the named grantee of the Trustee’s Deed. The servicer can then issue a deed to the investor. This procedure is consistent with the current two-deed foreclosure practice.
While initially there may be some hesitation to accept an “offset bid” by the servicer, MERS local counsel states that usually a title company is willing to recognize the substance of who actually owns the loan rather than the form of the record ownership.1 In that instance, if the servicer is successful at the foreclosure sale, the trustee’s deed will be issued directly to the servicer.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity. If it is an FHA-insured loan and an eviction is necessary, then the servicer, by being the grantee of the trustee’s deed, is able to commence the eviction. This way, the servicer will proceed with the eviction the same way it would if the foreclosure were filed in its own name.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
1 If the “offset bid” is not accepted, then the trustee’s deed may need to be granted to MERS. If MERS takes title to the property, a subsequent deed should be executed to the investor as soon as possible.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR ARIZONA
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is the deed of trust that gives the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Deeds of Trust are used and are generally foreclosed non-judicially under a power of sale in the security instrument. Local counsel advises that a foreclosure can be brought in the name of MERS. The Notice of Trustee’s Sale is filed and published the same way it is when foreclosing in the name of the servicer except that Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) will be named as the foreclosing entity. It is important to note that the same procedures and state requirements that are required when foreclosing in the servicer’s name still must be followed when foreclosing in the name of MERS.
Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents, such as the Substitution of Trustee, as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents for the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS. The substituted trustee is typically the foreclosing attorney.
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mae and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells the loan to them. The note is to remain endorsed in the blank when a servicer commences foreclosure. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS.
At the trustee sale, the certifying officer will instruct the trustee regarding the bid to be entered on behalf of MERS for the investor. This is the same process that is used today when foreclosing in the servicer’s name. We have been advised that the
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current foreclosure procedure is a one-deed process with the investor directly taking title from the Trustee’s Deed. Therefore, the MERS recommended procedure is the same as when foreclosing in the name of the servicer. The bid is made on behalf of the investor so that the Trustee’s deed will be issued directly to the investor. Because the MERS recommended procedure follows the same procedure that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name, no additional recording or taxes are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity. If it is an FHA-insured loan, then the trustee’s deed is not recorded to the investor until after the eviction is completed. The eviction is conducted the same way it would be conducted if the servicer foreclosures.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR ARKANSAS
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like a servicer , will be the record mortgage holder. It is the mortgage or deed of trust that gives MERS the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Deeds of Trust are used and are generally foreclosed non-judicially under a power of sale in the security instrument. Local counsel advises that a foreclosure can be brought in the name of MERS. The Notice of Default is filed and published the same way it is when foreclosing in the name of the servicer except that Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) will be named as the foreclosing entity.
Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents, such as the Substitution of Trustee, as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents for the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS. The substituted trustee is typically the foreclosing attorney.
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS.
At the trustee sale, the certifying officer will instruct the trustee regarding the bid to be entered on behalf of MERS. The Trustee’s deed will be issued directly to the assignee of the bid. We have been advised that the current foreclosure procedure is a two-deed process with the servicer taking title and then executing a subsequent deed to the investor. Therefore, the MERS recommended procedure is the same as the current practice of assigning the bid to the servicer. Because the MERS recommended procedure follows the same procedure that is used when the servicer
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forecloses in its name, no additional taxes are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity. If it is an FHA-insured loan and an eviction is necessary, then the servicer, by being the grantee of the trustee’s deed, can commence the eviction. This way, the servicer will proceed with the eviction the same way it would if the foreclosure were filed in its own name.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR CALIFORNIA
A deed of trust in which the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) is named as beneficiary requires special non-judicial foreclosure procedures. MERS was created to avoid the cost and delays caused by assignments of mortgages and deeds of trust. To avoid the need to prepare and record an assignment with the County Recorder’s office, MERS holds title as nominee for the true mortgagee/beneficiary of the mortgage/deed of trust and as transfers occur, they are recorded on the MERS computer in a book entry systems similar to the transfer of stocks.
The MERS procedure for tracking the ownership of mortgages has a direct effect on the foreclosure process. On MERS loans, MERS is shown as the record beneficiary and therefore a MERS foreclosure is brought in the name of MERS. However, at the time of sale the true beneficiary is determined by MERS and the Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale is recorded in the name of that true beneficiary. There are no assignments, additional taxes or costs when foreclosing under the MERS’ foreclosure procedures.
To achieve this result, the following non-judicial foreclosure guidelines are recommended:
On MERS loans, MERS will show as the beneficiary of record. Foreclosures should be commenced in the name of MERS. To effectuate this process, MERS has allowed each servicer to choose a select number of its own employees to act as officers for MERS. Through this process, appropriate documents may be executed at the servicer’s site on behalf of MERS by the same servicing employee that signs foreclosure documents for non-MERS loans.
Until the time of sale, the foreclosure is handled in same manner as non-MERS foreclosures. At the time of sale, if the property reverts, the Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale will follow a different procedure. Since MERS acts as nominee for the true beneficiary, it is important that the Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale be made in the name of the true beneficiary and not MERS. Your title company or MERS officer can easily determine the true beneficiary. Title companies have indicated that they will insure subsequent title when these procedures are followed.
Normally, where the name of the grantee under the Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale is different than the name of the foreclosing entity, the Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale states that the “Grantee was not the foreclosing beneficiary.” This designation triggers the imposition of transfer taxes on the sale. It is important to note that in a MERS foreclosure sale, even where the property reverts, the name of the grantee will be different than the name of the entity foreclosing. Nonetheless, the Trustee’s
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Deed Upon Sale should state that “The Grantee was the foreclosing beneficiary.” This is because MERS merely holds title as nominee for the true beneficiary; it is the true beneficiary that has actually foreclosed and acquired title.
Finally, should a bankruptcy be filed, servicers should use the same procedures they use for other investor loans. Motions for Relief from Stay should be brought by the real party in interest, namely “Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as record holder and nominee for the true beneficiary _________.” On Proofs of Claim, both the servicer and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. should be jointly named. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR COLORADO
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.
(MERS) has been around since 1998. The reason why it works is because when the role
of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to
foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It
is the Deed of Trust that gives MERS the authority to foreclose. However, because
Colorado differs from other states in that the Promissory Note controls, and MERS is not
the beneficial note holder, we recommend foreclosing in the servicer’s name by
endorsing the Note to the servicer.
We are amending our prior recommended Procedure to foreclose in MERS name due to
recent changes in the Colorado Foreclosure Statute. This revision was developed in
conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel. The goal of the recommended
procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions.
The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Deeds of Trust are used and are generally foreclosed non-judicially pursuant to a power
of sale. In Colorado, the deed of trust names a Colorado public trustee rather than a
private trustee. Local counsel advises that a foreclosure can be brought in the name of
MERS. However, because the endorsement on the Note controls, and MERS holds the
mortgage lien on behalf of the Note Holder, it is a better practice to foreclose in the Note
Holder’s name. That may be the servicer of the loan.. This does not impact MERS
position as the mortgagee and no assignment from MERS to the servicer is necessary to initiate the foreclosure and the mortgage loan should remain registered on the MERS® System.
Keep in mind that the agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a
blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage
loan to them. However, in Colorado, the requirement is that the promissory note
needs to be endorsed to the foreclosing entity, which is usually the servicer. Therefore, the note should be endorsed to servicer.
This switch in our recommendation is also predicated on the change in the Colorado Foreclosure Statute that now allows for a copy of the Note rather than the original
Note to be produced together with a Certificate that can be filed by certain entities of which MERS does not fit into in its current corporate structure. The certificate states
that the foreclosing entity is the owner of the Note/debt and is a qualified entity
under the Statute to use a copy of the Note. Please consult with your own counselon
how this change impacts your current foreclose procedure.
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If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the
name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of
MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all
trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief
from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the
servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
MERS Local Counsel:
Caren Castle, Esq.
Castle & Castle, P.C.
Denver Place Plaza Tower
1099 18th Street, Suite 2300
Denver, CO 80202
Tel: (303) 299-1800
Fax: (303) 299-1808
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR CONNECTICUT
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. When the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is through the mortgage or deed of trust that the authority is given to MERS to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Mortgages are typically used and are foreclosed judicially either by strict foreclosure or by a power of sale. MERS local counsel advises that a loan can be foreclosed in the name of MERS. It up to the judge to decide which method will be used. The caption of the complaint should state Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as the plaintiff.
The body of the complaint should be the same as when foreclosing in the name of the servicer. MERS stands in the same shoes as the servicer to the extent that it is not the beneficial owner of the promissory note. An investor, typically a secondary market investor, will still be the ultimate owner of the promissory note.
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS unless it is legally required to be endorsed to the foreclosing entity, and not just the preferred method.3 If it is required to endorse the promissory note to the foreclosing entity, then the note may need to be endorsed to MERS.
Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the
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3 Local Counsel advises us that certain judges take the position that the note and mortgage must be held by the same entity. This is typically considered to be the servicer because if the promissory note is endorsed in blank and the servicer has physical custody of the note, the servicer will technically be the note holder as well as the record mortgage holder. By virtue of having the servicer’s employees be certifying officers of MERS, there can be an in-house transfer of possession of the note so that MERS is considered the note holder for purposes of foreclosing the loan.
same individual that signs the documents today for the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
In a strict foreclosure, once the Judgement of Strict Foreclosure is entered, and the applicable redemption period has expired, a certificate of Foreclosure is filed on the land records that will reflect MERS as the property owner. MERS should remain in the land records for as short a time as possible. A subsequent deed should be prepared from MERS to the investor.4 Alternatively, at the time of the entering of the judgment, if an assignment of judgment is executed by MERS, judgment could automatically be entered into the investor’s name.
In a foreclosure by sale, a motion should be submitted to the judge requesting the judge that the servicer be allowed to bid at the auction. If it is the highest bid, then after approval of the sale by the Court, a closing will be scheduled whereby title should vest in the servicer.5
Because the MERS recommended procedure follows the same procedure that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name for the investor, no additional taxes or recording fees are incurred.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and the title holder. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the name of the title holder. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
4 Some Connecticut Revenue Officers have taken the position that a state conveyance tax is due on the subsequent deed from the servicer to the investor. MERS local counsel is currently appealing this issue.
5 If a judge will not allow the servicer to “credit” bid, then a bid may be entered on behalf of MERS. Title will then vest with MERS momentarily until the deed to the investor is executed and recorded.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR DELAWARE
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is the mortgage that gives MERS the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Mortgages are typically used and are foreclosed judicially. MERS local counsel advises that a loan can be foreclosed in the name of MERS. The same procedures and requirements that are followed when foreclosing in the name of the servicer are still followed when foreclosing in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. The major difference is that the caption of the complaint should state Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as the plaintiff.
The body of the complaint should be the same as when foreclosing in the name of the servicer. MERS stands in the same shoes as the servicer to the extent that it is not the beneficial owner of the promissory note. An investor, typically a secondary market investor, will still be the ultimate owner of the promissory note.6
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS unless it is legally required to be endorsed to the foreclosing entity and not just the preferred method.7
6 Even though the servicer has physical custody of the note, custom in the mortgage industry is that the investor (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae or a private investor) owns the beneficial rights to the promissory note.
7 If the promissory note is endorsed in blank and the servicer has physical custody of the note, the servicer will technically be the note holder as well as the record mortgage holder. By virtue of having the servicer’s employees be certifying officers of MERS, there can be an in-house transfer of possession of the note so that MERS is considered the note holder for purposes of foreclosing the loan.
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Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents for the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
After a judgment to MERS is entered, a sheriff’s sale is held. The certifying officer will instruct the foreclosing attorney regarding the bid to be entered on behalf of MERS. If it is the successful bid, the sheriff will be instructed to execute a deed directly to the investor. This is the same method that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name. The sheriff then issues a sheriff’s deed directly to the investor. Because the MERS recommended procedure follows the same procedure that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name, no additional recording or taxes are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity. If it is an FHA-insured loan and an eviction is necessary, then the bid assignment is given to the servicer instead of to HUD. This way, the servicer will proceed with the eviction the same way it would if the foreclosure were filed in its own name.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is the deed of trust that gives MERS the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Deeds of Trust are foreclosed non-judicially. Local counsel advises that a foreclosure can be brought in the name of MERS. The Notice of Sale is sent, filed and published the same way it is when foreclosing in the name of the servicer with the same required information except that Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) will be named as the foreclosing entity.
Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents, such as Substitution of Trustee, as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS. This is the same requirement when foreclosing a loan in the name of the servicer. We have found that it is not legally required to have the note endorsed to MERS prior to the foreclosure.
At the trustee sale, the certifying officer will instruct the trustee regarding the bid to be entered on behalf of MERS. If the bid is the highest bid, then an unrecorded assignment of the deed of trust to the investor is given to the trustee prior to the sale. This assignment allows the Trustee’s Deed to be issued directly to the investor. We have been advised that this is the procedure used when foreclosing in the name of the servicer. Because the MERS recommended procedure follows the same Version 1.1
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procedure that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name, no additional taxes are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity. If it is an FHA-insured loan and an eviction is necessary, then the eviction can be brought in the name of MERS. At this point, MERS holds only equitable title. Once the eviction is completed, then the investor can be substituted in as the party to receive the Trustee’s Deed. Again, the same procedures should be followed as you do when foreclosing in the name of the servicer.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR FLORIDA
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the mortgagee of record. It is the mortgage that gives MERS the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Mortgages are typically used and are foreclosed judicially. MERS local counsel advises that a loan can be foreclosed in the name of MERS. When MERS has been assigned the mortgage, the caption of the complaint should state Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as the plaintiff. However, this changes slightly if MERS is the original mortgagee of record, meaning that MERS is named on the mortgage in a nominee capacity for the originating lender. The caption should then state Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as nominee for [insert name of the current servicer]. The key is how MERS is named as the mortgagee of record.
The body of the complaint should be the same as when foreclosing in the name of the servicer. MERS stands in the same shoes as the servicer to the extent that it is not the beneficial owner of the promissory note. An investor, typically a secondary market investor, will be the ultimate owner of the note.8
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced unless it is legally required to be endorsed to the foreclosing entity and not just the preferred method. If it is required to endorse the promissory note to the foreclosing entity, then the note may need to be endorsed to MERS. However, we have not found it a requirement in Florida that the Note needs to be endorsed to the foreclosing entity.9
8 Even though the servicer has physical custody of the note, custom in the mortgage industry is that the investor (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae or a private investor) owns the beneficial rights to the promissory note.
9 If the promissory note is endorsed in blank and the servicer has physical custody of the note, the servicer will technically be the note holder as well as the record mortgage holder. By virtue of Version 1.1
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Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution from MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents for the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
After a foreclosure judgment to MERS is entered, a public sale is held. The Plaintiff (MERS) has the option of assigning the foreclosure bid either prior to the foreclosure sale or in the ten (10) day period between the sale and the issuance of the Certificate of Title. The assignment is done with a motion filed with the court, and a court order is entered. If the bid is assigned, the certificate of title is issued directly to the assignee. This is the same method that is used when the servicer forecloses in its own name. Because the MERS recommended procedure follows the same procedure that is used when the servicer foreclosures in its name, no additional recording or transfer taxes are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity. If it is an FHA-insured loan and an eviction is necessary, then the bid assignment is given to the servicer instead of to HUD. This way, the servicer will proceed with the eviction the same way it would if the foreclosure were filed in its own name.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, then proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
having the servicer’s employees be certifying officers of MERS, there can be an in-house transfer of possession of the note so that MERS is considered the note holder for purposes of foreclosing the loan.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR GEORGIA
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is through the mortgage or deed of trust that MERS is given the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Security Deeds are used and are generally foreclosed non-judicially pursuant to a power of sale. Local counsel advises that a foreclosure can be brought in the name of MERS. It is important to note that the same procedures and state requirements that are required to be followed when foreclosing in the servicer’s name still must be followed when foreclosing in the name of MERS. The foreclosure proceeding is commenced by advertising the foreclosure in the official county newspaper once a week for four consecutive weeks prior to the date of the foreclosure sale. A notice is mailed to the debtor’s residence at least 15 days prior to the sale date. You will continue to do everything that you normally do when foreclosing a mortgage in the servicer’s name. The only difference is that the foreclosing entity is Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.
Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution from MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents today for the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS.
At the sale, the certifying officer will instruct the foreclosing attorney to enter a bid on behalf of the servicer. This is the same process that is used today when
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foreclosing in the servicer’s name. If it is the successful bid, then the attorney will be instructed to execute the deed under power directly to the servicer. We have been advised that the current foreclosure procedure is a two-deed process with the servicer taking title and then executing a special warranty deed to the investor. Therefore, the MERS recommended procedure would conform to the current practice. Because the MERS recommended procedure follows the same procedure that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name, no additional recording or transfer taxes are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity. The servicer is issued the deed under power and therefore commences the eviction in the servicer’s name.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR HAWAII
Foreclosing a loan in the name of MERS is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is through the mortgage or deed of trust that MERS is given the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Mortgages are typically used and are foreclosed judicially10. MERS local counsel advises that a loan can be foreclosed in the name of MERS. The same procedures and state requirements that are followed when foreclosing in the name of the servicer are still followed when foreclosing in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. The major difference is that the caption of the complaint will state Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. in place of the servicer’s name.
The body of the complaint should be the same as when foreclosing in the name of the servicer. MERS stands in the same shoes as the servicer to the extent that it is not the beneficial owner of the promissory note. A secondary market investor will still be the ultimate owner of the promissory note.
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS.
Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution from MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents for the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
10 Freddie Mac has initiated a non-judicial program in Hawaii effective January 1, 1998.
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After a foreclosure judgment to MERS is entered, a public auction is held. A bid is entered on behalf of MERS, and if the successful bid, then the Commissioner will be instructed that MERS has selected a nominee to be the ultimate purchaser of the property. (The nominee can be the servicer or the investor).
After the hearing to confirm the sale and the confirmation order, a deed is executed directly to the nominee. This is the same method that is used today when the servicer forecloses in its name. Because the MERS recommended procedure follows the same procedure that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name, no additional recording fees or taxes are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS. A conveyance tax and recording fee is paid on the transfer of the property from the commissioner to the nominee of MERS.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity. If it is an FHA-insured loan and an eviction is necessary, then the bid assignment is given to the servicer instead of to HUD. This way, the servicer will proceed with the eviction the same way it would if the foreclosure had been filed in its own name.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of MERS and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR IDAHO
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is through the deed of trust that MERS is given the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Trust Deeds are used and are generally foreclosed non-judicially pursuant to a power of sale. Local counsel advises that a foreclosure can be brought in the name of MERS. It is important to note that the same procedures and requirements that are followed when foreclosing in the servicer’s name must still be followed when foreclosing in the name of MERS. The Trustee must still file and record the Notice of Default and provide the grantor with a Notice of Sale. The Notice of Sale is published the same way is it when foreclosing in the name of the servicer except that Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) will be named as the foreclosing entity.
Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents, such as the Substitution of Trustee, as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents for the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. The note should remain endorsed in blank when the servicer commences foreclosure. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS. We have not found that it is legally required that the note be endorsed to the foreclosing entity.
At the trustee sale, the certifying officer will instruct the trustee regarding the bid to be entered on behalf of MERS. If it is the highest bid, then the trustee will be instructed by an instruction letter to execute the Trustee’s Deed directly to the
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investor. We have been advised that the current foreclosure procedure is a one-deed process with the trustee executing the Trustee’s Deed directly to the investor. The MERS recommended procedure is the same procedure followed when foreclosing in the name of the servicer. Therefore, no additional recording or transfer taxes are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity. If it is an FHA-insured loan, then the Trustee’s Deed may be issued to the servicer in order for the servicer to commence the eviction. Another option may be that the trustee’s deed is not recorded to the investor until after the eviction is completed. The eviction should be conducted the same way it would be conducted if the servicer commenced the foreclosure.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR ILLINOIS
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is through the mortgage or deed of trust that MERS is given the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Mortgages are typically used and are foreclosed judicially. MERS local counsel advises that a loan can be foreclosed in the name of MERS. The caption of the complaint should state Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as the plaintiff. The body of the complaint should be the same as when foreclosing in the name of the servicer.
MERS stands in the same shoes as the servicer to the extent that it is not the beneficial owner of the promissory note. An investor, typically a secondary market investor, will still be the ultimate owner of the promissory note.11
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS unless it is legally required to be endorsed to the foreclosing entity and not just the preferred method. We have been advised that sometimes there is an endorsement of the note to the servicer prior to foreclosure. However, we recommend the agencies’ policies be followed.
Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents as an officer of MERS. The certifying
11 If the promissory note is endorsed in blank and the servicer has physical custody of the note, the servicer will technically be the note holder as well as the record mortgage holder. By virtue of having its employees become certifying officers of MERS, there can be an in-house transfer of possession of the note so that MERS is considered the note holder for purposes of foreclosing the loan.
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officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents for the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
After a judgment to MERS is entered and the applicable redemption period expires, a foreclosure sale is held. A bid is entered on behalf of MERS, and if the successful bid, then the Certificate of Sale would be assigned to the investor. This assignment is not normally recorded. A confirmation hearing will be held confirming the sale. This is the same method that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name for the investor. After the entry of the Order of Confirmation, the holder of the Certificate of Sale is entitled to a deed. Because the MERS recommended procedure follows the same procedure that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name, no additional taxes are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity. If it is an FHA-insured loan and an eviction is necessary, then the deed is not recorded until after the eviction is completed. This way, the servicer will proceed with the eviction the same way it would if the foreclosure were filed in its own name.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of MERS and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR INDIANA
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is the mortgage or deed of trust that gives MERS the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Mortgages are typically used and are foreclosed judicially. MERS local counsel advises that a loan can be foreclosed in the name of MERS. When MERS has been assigned the mortgage, the caption of the complaint should state Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as the plaintiff. However, this changes slightly if MERS is the original mortgagee of record, meaning that MERS is named on the mortgage in a nominee capacity for the originating lender. The caption should then state Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as nominee for [insert name of the current servicer]. The key is how MERS is named as the mortgagee of record.
The body of the complaint should be the same as when foreclosing in the name of the servicer. MERS stands in the same shoes as the servicer to the extent that it is not the beneficial owner of the promissory note.12 An investor, typically a secondary market investor, will still be the ultimate owner of the promissory note.
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS. We have been advised that sometimes there is an endorsement of the note to the servicer prior to foreclosure. However, we recommend that the agencies’ policies be followed.
12 If the promissory note is endorsed in blank and the servicer has physical custody of the note, the servicer will technically be the note holder as well as the record mortgage holder. By virtue of having its employees become certifying officers of MERS, there can be an in-house transfer of possession of the note so that MERS is considered the note holder for purposes of foreclosing the loan.
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Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution from MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents for the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
After a foreclosure judgment to MERS is entered, MERS will assign the judgment and the right to bid to the servicer. This assignment of the judgment is filed with the Clerk of the Court in which the judgment is pending. A sheriff’s sale is scheduled as a result of the filing of a praecipe for sale. The servicer will enter a bid as the bid assignee and if the highest bidder, the Return of Sale will reflect this. The assignment of the judgment allows the servicer to bid so that title can be taken directly by the servicer. The servicer can then convey a subsequent deed to the investor. Because the MERS recommended procedure closely follows the same procedure that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name, no additional transfer taxes are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity. Because the foreclosure judgment is assigned to the servicer, the eviction can be brought in the name of the servicer.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of MERS and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR IOWA
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is the mortgage or deed of trust that gives MERS the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Generally, mortgages are used and are foreclosed judicially. MERS local counsel advises that a loan can be foreclosed in the name of MERS. The caption of the petition of foreclosure should name Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as the plaintiff. The body of the complaint should be the same as when foreclosing in the name of the servicer. MERS stands in the same shoes as the servicer to the extent that it is not the beneficial owner of the promissory note. An investor, typically a secondary market investor, will still be the ultimate owner of the promissory note.
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement when a seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS. We have been advised that sometimes there is an endorsement of the note to the servicer prior to foreclosure. However, we recommend that the agencies’ policies be followed.
Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents, such as the substitution of trustee, as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents for the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
After the foreclosure judgment to MERS is entered, there is a sheriff’s foreclosure sale. At the sale, a bid would be entered on behalf of MERS, and if the bid is successful, MERS will receive a certificate of purchase which it will assign to the
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servicer or the investor.13 The sheriff’s deed is then issued directly to the servicer or investor. Because the MERS recommended procedure follows the procedures used when foreclosing in the name of the servicer, no additional transfer taxes are incurred.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity. If it is an FHA-insured loan and an eviction is necessary, then the servicer will proceed with the eviction the same way it would if the foreclosure were filed in its own name.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
13 On a foreclosure without the right of redemption, there is no Certificate of Purchase issued. Instead, the foreclosure judgment should be assigned to the servicer or investor. To whom the judgment is issued will depend upon the instructions given from the servicer or investor. If the judgment is not assigned from MERS, this may cause title to be issued directly to MERS if a bid is entered on the behalf of MERS at the sheriff’s sale. If title is then subsequently passed to a private investor, revenue stamps may be incurred.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR KANSAS
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is through the deed of trust that MERS is given the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Mortgages are typically used and are foreclosed judicially. MERS local counsel advises that a loan can be foreclosed in the name of MERS. The caption of the complaint should state Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as the plaintiff. The body of the complaint should be the same as when foreclosing in the name of the servicer. MERS stands in the same shoes as the servicer to the extent that it is not the beneficial owner of the promissory note. An investor, typically a secondary market investor, will still be the ultimate owner of the promissory note.
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require that the promissory note be endorsed in blank when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS unless it is legally required to be endorsed to the foreclosing entity and not just the preferred method. We have been advised that sometimes there is an endorsement of the note to the servicer prior to the foreclosure. However, we recommend that the agencies’ requirements be followed.
Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents for the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
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If the successful bid, the sheriff will issue a certificate of purchase to MERS. This certificate will then be assigned from MERS to the investor. This is the same method that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name. After the applicable redemption period, a deed will be issued directly to the investor. Because the MERS recommended procedure follows the same procedure that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name, no additional taxes are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity. If it is an FHA-insured loan and an eviction is necessary, then the bid assignment is given to the servicer instead of to HUD. This way, the servicer will proceed with the eviction the same way it would if the foreclosure were filed in its own name.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR KENTUCKY
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is through the mortgage or deed of trust that MERS is given the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Mortgages are typically used and are foreclosed judicially. MERS local counsel advises that a loan can be foreclosed in the name of MERS. The caption of the complaint should state Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as the plaintiff. The body of the complaint should be the same as when foreclosing in the name of the servicer. MERS stands in the same shoes as the servicer to the extent that it is not the beneficial owner of the promissory note. An investor, typically a secondary market investor, will still be the ultimate owner of the promissory note.
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS. We have been advised that sometimes there is an endorsement of the note to the servicer prior to foreclosure. However, we recommend that the agencies’ policies be followed.
Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents for the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
After a judgment to MERS is entered, a foreclosure sale is held. The certifying officer will instruct the foreclosing attorney regarding the bid to be entered on behalf of MERS. If it is the successful bid, it will be assigned to the investor by simple documentation that is signed by the foreclosing attorney. The bid assignment does
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not need to be recorded. This is the same method that is used today when the servicer forecloses in its name.
The Motion to Confirm the sale is filed, and after the sale is confirmed, a deed will be prepared by the Master Commissioner to the investor. Because the MERS recommended procedure follows the same procedure that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name, no additional recording fees or transfer taxes are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity. If it is an FHA-insured loan and an eviction is necessary, then the bid assignment is given to the servicer instead of to HUD. This way, the servicer will proceed with the eviction the same way it would if the foreclosure were filed in its own name.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR LOUISIANA
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is through the mortgage or deed of trust that MERS is given the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Mortgages are employed in Louisiana in real estate transactions and must be foreclosed judicially, usually by a proceeding known as “Executory Process.” MERS local counsel advises that Louisiana law does not prohibit a loan from being foreclosed in the name of MERS.14 When MERS has been assigned the mortgage, the caption of the complaint should state Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as the plaintiff. However, this changes slightly if MERS is the original mortgagee of record, meaning that MERS is named on the mortgage in a nominee capacity for the originating lender, its successors and assigns. The caption should then state Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as nominee for [insert name of the current servicer]. The key is how MERS becomes the mortgage holder.
The body of the complaint should be the same as when foreclosing in the name of the servicer. MERS stands in the same shoes as the servicer to the extent that it is not the beneficial owner of the promissory note. An investor, typically a secondary market investor, will still be the ultimate owner of the promissory note.15
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them.16 Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS. However, it seems to be the standard practice that the blank endorsement is cancelled and the note is endorsed to the servicer to
14 Please Note: Fannie Mae’s foreclosure regulations require an assignment from MERS to Fannie Mae in the Parish of Orleans. This means that Fannie Mae will be the foreclosing entity. This is the same requirement that exists when the servicer is the record mortgage holder.
15 Even though the servicer has physical custody of the note, custom in the mortgage industry is that the investor (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae or a private investor) owns the beneficial rights to the promissory note.
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possession of the note so that MERS is considered the note holder for purposes of foreclosing the loan.
foreclose. If it is required to endorse the promissory note to the foreclosing entity, then the note may need to be endorsed to MERS.
Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents for the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
After the Petition is filed and the judge signs an order of executory process, the writ of seizure and sale is issued by the clerk and is served by the sheriff upon the mortgagor. After the foreclosure is published for the required amount of time, a sheriff’s sale is held. The certifying officer will instruct the foreclosing attorney as to the bid to be entered on behalf of MERS. If it is the successful bid, then the sheriff will issue a deed to MERS. MERS will then issue a subsequent deed to the investor.17 This is the same method that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name. Because the MERS recommended procedure follows the same procedure that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name, no additional taxes are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
17 If the promissory note is endorsed in blank and the servicer has physical custody of the note, the servicer will technically be the note holder as well as the record mortgage holder. By virtue of having the servicer’s employees be certifying officers of MERS, there can be an in-house transfer of
17 MERS should remain as the titleholder for as short of time as possible.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR MAINE
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is through the mortgage or deed of trust that MERS is given the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Mortgages are typically used and are foreclosed judicially. MERS local counsel advises that a loan can be foreclosed in the name of MERS.18 The caption of the complaint should state Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as the plaintiff.
The body of the complaint should be the same as when foreclosing in the name of the servicer. MERS stands in the same shoes as the servicer to the extent that it is not the beneficial owner of the promissory note. An investor, typically a secondary market investor, will still be the ultimate owner of the promissory note.19
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS. We have been advised that sometimes there is an endorsement of the note to the servicer prior to the foreclosure. However, we recommend adhering to the agencies’ policies.
18 We have been advised that the named plaintiff in the foreclosure action should be both the record holder of the mortgage and the holder of the promissory note. This is typically considered to be the servicer because if the promissory note is endorsed in blank and the servicer has physical custody of the note, the servicer will technically be the note holder as well as the record mortgage holder. By virtue of having the servicer’s employees be certifying officers of MERS, there can be an in-house transfer of possession of the note so that MERS is considered the note holder for purposes of foreclosing the loan.
19 Even though the servicer has physical custody of the note, custom in the mortgage industry is that the investor (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae or a private investor) owns the beneficial rights to the promissory note.
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Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents for the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
After a judgment to MERS is entered and the redemption period has expired, a public auction is held. The certifying officer will instruct the foreclosing attorney as to the bid to be entered on behalf of MERS. If the successful bid, then MERS will assign its bid and any deficiency judgment to the investor. This is the same method that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name. The foreclosure deed will issue directly to the investor. Because the MERS recommended procedure follows the same procedure that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name, no additional taxes are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity. If it is an FHA-insured loan and an eviction is necessary, then the bid assignment is given to the servicer instead of to HUD. This way, the servicer will proceed with the eviction the same way it would if the foreclosure were filed in its own name.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR MARYLAND
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the mortgagee of record. It is through the deed of trust that MERS is given the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Deeds of Trust are foreclosed non-judicially. Local counsel advises that a foreclosure can be brought in the name of MERS. The foreclosure is filed and placed on the docket of the applicable circuit court with the same required information except that Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) will be the named as the foreclosing entity instead of the servicer.
Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents, such as the Substitution of Trustee, as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents for the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS. However, we have been advised that there is sometimes an endorsement to the servicer in order to foreclose. We have not found this to be a legal requirement, and therefore, the agencies’ policies should be followed.
At the trustee sale, the certifying officer will instruct the trustee regarding the bid to be entered on behalf of MERS. If the bid is the highest bid, then before ratification, a motion to substitute interests will be filed so that the deed is issued directly to the investor. We have been advised that this is the procedure used when foreclosing in the name of the servicer. Because the MERS recommended procedure follows the
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same procedure that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name, no additional taxes are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity. If it is an FHA-insured loan and an eviction is necessary, then the servicer can be substituted as the interested party. This way, the eviction can be brought in the name of the servicer. Once the eviction is completed, then the servicer can issue a deed to HUD. Again, you should follow the same procedures you follow when foreclosing in the name of the servicer.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR MASSACHUSETTS
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is the mortgage or deed of trust that gives MERS the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Mortgages are used and are foreclosed using the mortgage power of sale together with a Land Court Judgment. MERS local counsel advises that a loan can be foreclosed in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents on behalf of the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS. We have been advised that sometimes the Note is endorsed to the servicer prior to the foreclosure. However, we recommend that the agencies’ policies be followed.
MERS stands in the same position as the servicer to the extent that it is not the beneficial owner of the promissory note. An investor, typically a secondary market investor, will still be the ultimate owner of the promissory note.20
At the foreclosure auction, MERS can waive the requirement of a deposit as to the investor. This way, the servicer can enter a bid on behalf of the investor without the
20 Even though the servicer has physical custody of the note, custom in the mortgage industry is that the investor (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae or a private investor) owns the beneficial rights of the promissory note.
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investor needing to produce any funds. If it is the highest bid, the foreclosure deed can be issued directly to the investor. We have been advised that this procedure is the same procedure used when Freddie Mac or Ginnie Mae are the investors. Because the MERS recommended procedure follows the same procedure that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name, no additional taxes are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR MICHIGAN
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is through the mortgage that MERS is given the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Mortgages are foreclosed non-judicially usually by a power of sale contained in the mortgage. Local counsel advises that a foreclosure can be brought in the name of MERS. The foreclosure is advertised by publishing the notice for four (4) consecutive weeks. The attorney should follow the same procedure followed when foreclosing in the name of the servicer except that the foreclosing entity is Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS).
Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents for the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. The endorsement is to remain in blank even if the servicer commences foreclosure. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS. However, we have been advised that sometimes there is an endorsement of the promissory notes to the servicer to foreclose. However, we recommend that the agencies’ policies be followed. We have not found an endorsement to the foreclosure entity to be a legal requirement, and therefore, the note should not be endorsed to MERS prior to the foreclosure.
At the auction, the certifying officer will instruct the foreclosing attorney regarding the bid to be entered on behalf of MERS. If the bid is the highest bid, then a deed may be issued to MERS. However, when the role of MERS, the servicer and the
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investor is explained and understood, the servicer may be allowed to bid on its own behalf without having to produce any funds at the sale. This would be the preferred method to use if at all possible. This way, the deed is executed directly to the servicer. If this is not possible, and MERS must take title, then title should be held by MERS for as short of time as possible. A subsequent deed from MERS to the investor should be executed immediately so that MERS remains in the chain of title only for an instant. We have been advised that the current practice used when foreclosing in the name of the servicer, is for the servicer to take title and then execute a subsequent deed to the investor. Because the MERS recommended procedure follows the same procedure that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name, no additional taxes are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR MINNESOTA
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is the mortgage or deed of trust that gives MERS the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Mortgages are used and are typically foreclosed non-judicially. MERS local counsel advises that a loan can be foreclosed in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents, such as the power of attorney to foreclose the mortgage, as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the same individual that currently sign the documents for the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS. We have been advised that sometimes there is an endorsement of the note to the servicer prior to foreclosure. However, we recommend that the agencies’ policies be followed.
At the foreclosure sale, the certifying officer will instruct the foreclosing attorney to enter a bid on behalf of MERS. A sheriff’s certificate is issued to the highest bidder. If MERS is the highest bidder, then the Sheriff’s certificate will be issued to MERS. The sheriff’s certificate operates as the conveyance of title. The certificate is executed and recorded during the redemption period. At the end of the redemption period, a deed will be issued from MERS to the investor.21 However, not every
21 During the redemption period, MERS will be considered to be titleholder. However, at the end of the redemption period, a deed to the investor should be executed as soon as possible so that MERS remains in the chain of title for as short a time as possible.
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foreclosure counsel follows this procedure currently when foreclosing mortgage loans in the name of the servicer. If your current practice is to assign the sheriff’s certificate to the investor, then this is also an acceptable option.22
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity. If it is an FHA-insured loan and an eviction is necessary, then the eviction can be brought in the name of MERS if MERS is the sheriff’s certificate holder. However, if you use the option of assigning the sheriff’s certificate, then the certificate is assigned to the servicer instead of to HUD. This way, the servicer will proceed with the eviction the same way it would if the foreclosure were filed in its own name.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
22 The difference between the two options is that some counsels prefer a one-deed process implementing an assignment of the sheriff’s certificate to the investor. Other counsels use a two-deed process with the servicer first taking title, and then executing a subsequent deed to the investor. Counsel should continue to follow the instructions given to them by the servicer of the mortgage loan.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR MISSISSIPPI
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is through the mortgage or deed of trust that MERS is given the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Deeds of Trust are foreclosed non-judicially. Local counsel advises that a foreclosure can be brought in the name of MERS. The foreclosure is advertised with the same required information except that Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) will be named as the foreclosing entity instead of the servicer.
Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents, such as the Deed of Appointment substituting Trustees, as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents on behalf of the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS. We have been advised that sometimes there is a blank note endorsement to the servicer prior to foreclosure. We have not found this to be a legal requirement, and therefore, the note should not be endorsed to MERS prior to the foreclosure.
At the trustee sale, the certifying officer will instruct the trustee regarding the bid to be entered on behalf of MERS. If the bid is the highest bid, then MERS can assign the bid to the investor. This assignment is simply a paragraph incorporated in the substitution of trustee document authorizing the substituted trustee to convey the property directly to the investor in the Substituted Trustee’s Deed. We have been
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advised that this procedure is the same procedure used when foreclosing in the name of the servicer. Because the MERS recommended procedure follows the same procedure that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name, no additional taxes are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity. If it is an FHA-insured loan and an eviction is necessary, then the servicer can be assigned the bid. This way, the eviction can be brought in the name of the servicer. Once the eviction is completed, then the servicer can issue a deed to HUD. Again, you should follow the same procedures you follow when foreclosing in the name of the servicer.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of MERS and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR MISSOURI
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is through the deed of trust that MERS is given the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Deeds of Trust are foreclosed non-judicially under a power of sale. Local counsel advises that a foreclosure can be brought in the name of MERS. A notice of sale is published and the borrower is notified along with all parties entitled to notice under state laws. A sale is then held. The same requirements continue to be followed except that Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) will be named as the foreclosing entity instead of the servicer.
Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents, such as the Substitution of Trustee, as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents for the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require that the promissory note be endorsed in blank when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced. We have been advised that sometimes there is an endorsement of the note to the servicer prior to the foreclosure. However, we recommend that the agencies’ requirements be followed.
At the trustee sale, the certifying officer will instruct the trustee by a written bid letter that the bid is being assigned to the investor and that title should vest with the investor. We have been advised that this procedure is the same procedure used when foreclosing in the name of the servicer. Therefore, no additional fees are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS.
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Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity. If it is an FHA-insured loan and an eviction is necessary, then the servicer can be the assignee of the bid. This way, the eviction can be brought in the name of the servicer. Once the eviction is completed, then the servicer can issue a deed to HUD. Again, you should follow the same procedures you follow when foreclosing in the name of the servicer.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR MONTANA
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is through the mortgage or deed of trust that MERS is given the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Deeds of Trust are foreclosed non-judicially. Local counsel advises that a foreclosure can be brought in the name of MERS. The Notice of Sale includes the same required information as when foreclosing in the name of the servicer except that Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) will be named as the foreclosing entity instead of the servicer. The Notice of Sale is recorded in the county where the property is located and is published in a newspaper of general circulation.
Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents, such as the Substitution of Trustee, as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents on behalf of the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells the loan to them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS.
At the trustee sale, the certifying officer will instruct the trustee regarding the bid to be entered on behalf of MERS. If the bid is the highest bid, then a trustee’s deed will be issued to MERS. Title should only remain with MERS for as short of time as possible. A certifying officer of MERS will subsequently execute a Grant Deed to the investor. We have been advised that this procedure is the same procedure used when foreclosing in the name of the servicer. Because the MERS recommended
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procedure follows the same procedure that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name, no additional taxes are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR NEBRASKA
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is through the mortgage or deed of trust that MERS is given the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
If a mortgage is used, it is foreclosed judicially. If a deed of trust is used, it can be foreclosed non-judicially under power of sale. Regardless of the type of security instrument used, MERS local counsel advises that a loan can be foreclosed in the name of MERS.
In a judicial foreclosure, when MERS has been assigned the mortgage, the caption of the complaint should state Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as the plaintiff. However, this changes slightly if MERS is the original mortgagee of record, meaning that MERS is named on the mortgage in a nominee capacity for the originating lender. The caption should then state Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as nominee for [insert name of the current servicer].23 The key is how MERS is named as the mortgagee of record.
The body of the complaint should be the same as when foreclosing in the name of the servicer. However, it is advised that a paragraph be inserted that explains that the servicer is the entity that is servicing the loan. MERS stands in the same shoes as the servicer to the extent that it is not the beneficial owner of the promissory note. An investor, typically a secondary market investor, will still be the ultimate owner of the promissory note.
In a non-judicial foreclosure, a notice of default is filed and recorded with the register of deeds in the county in which the property is located. The same procedures that are followed when foreclosing in the name of the servicer should continue to be followed except that Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. will be named as the foreclosing entity.
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23 We have been advised that the named plaintiff in the foreclosure action should be both the record holder of the mortgage and the owner and holder of the promissory note. This is typically considered to be the servicer because if the promissory note is endorsed in blank and the servicer has physical custody of the note, the servicer will technically be the note holder as well as the record mortgage holder. By virtue of having its employees become certifying officers of MERS, there can be an in-house transfer of possession of the note so that MERS is considered the note holder for purposes of foreclosing the loan. Therefore, MERS is both the mortgage holder and the note holder as nominee for the current servicer.
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS unless it is legally required to be endorsed to the foreclosing entity and not just the preferred method.24
Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents today on behalf of the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
After a judgment to MERS is entered in a judicial foreclosure, a foreclosure sale is held. The certifying officer enters a bid on behalf of MERS. If it is the successful bid, then the bid will be assigned to the investor. The sheriff’s deed will be issued directly to the investor. This is the same method that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name. Because the MERS recommended procedure is the same as when the servicer forecloses in its name, no additional taxes are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commenced the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity. If it is an FHA-insured loan and an eviction is necessary, then the bid assignment is given to the servicer instead of to HUD. This way, the servicer will proceed with the eviction the same way it would if the foreclosure were filed in its own name.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of MERS and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship between MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
24 Even though the servicer has physical custody of the note, custom in the mortgage industry is that the investor (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae or a private investor) owns the beneficial rights to the promissory note.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR NEVADA
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is the deed of trust that gives MERS the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Deeds of Trust are used and are generally foreclosed non-judicially pursuant to a power of sale. Local counsel advises that a foreclosure can be brought in the name of MERS. It is important to note that the same procedures and state requirements that are required to be followed when foreclosing in the servicer’s name must still be followed when foreclosing in the name of MERS. The Trustee must still record the Notice of Default and Election to Sell the Property. After the expiration of the three-month period, the Notice of Trustee’s Sale is filed and published the same way it is when foreclosing in the name of the servicer except that Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) will be named as the foreclosing entity.
Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents, such as the Substitution of Trustee, as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents for the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS. The substituted trustee is typically the foreclosing attorney.
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. The note should remain endorsed in blank when the servicer commences the foreclosure. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS.
At the trustee sale, the certifying officer will instruct the trustee regarding the bid to be entered on behalf of MERS for the investor. This is the same process that is used
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when foreclosing in the servicer’s name. If it is the successful bid, then the trustee will be instructed to execute the Trustee’s Deed directly to the investor. Therefore, the MERS recommended procedure is the same as the current practice of bidding on behalf of the investor so that the Trustee’s Deed is issued directly to the investor. Because the MERS recommended procedure follows the same procedure that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name, no additional recording or transfer taxes are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS. Furthermore, there will not be a transfer tax when the trustee’s deed is issued directly to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, VA or HUD.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity. If it is an FHA-insured loan, then the deed is not recorded to the investor until after the eviction is completed. The eviction is conducted the same way it is conducted when the foreclosure is brought in the name of the servicer.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR NEW HAMPSHIRE
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be record mortgage holder. It is the mortgage or deed of trust that gives MERS the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Mortgages are used and are generally foreclosed non-judicially under a power of sale in the security instrument. Local counsel advises that a foreclosure can be brought in the name of MERS.25 The Notice of Sales must be published with all required information except that Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) will be named as the foreclosing entity instead of the servicer.
Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents for the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
The agencies’ (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS.
At the foreclosure auction, the certifying officer will instruct the foreclosing attorney regarding the bid to be entered on behalf of MERS. If the bid is the highest bid, MERS will assign the bid to the investor so that the foreclosure deed is issued directly to the investor. We have been advised that the current foreclosure procedure is a one-deed process with the investor taking title. Therefore, the MERS
25 Please Note: Fannie Mae’s foreclosure regulations require an assignment from MERS to Fannie Mae in New Hampshire. This means that Fannie Mae will be the foreclosing entity. This is the same requirement that exists when the servicer is the record mortgage holder.
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recommended procedure is same the as the current practice with an assignment of the bid to the investor. Therefore, no additional taxes are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS in place of the servicer.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity. If it is an FHA-insured loan and an eviction is necessary, then the servicer may be assigned the bid so that the servicer is the grantee of the foreclosure deed. This way, the servicer is able to commence the eviction. The servicer will proceed with the eviction the same way it would if the foreclosure were filed in its own name. After the eviction is completed, the servicer will then issue a deed to HUD.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR NEW JERSEY
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is through the mortgage or deed of trust that MERS is given the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Mortgages are typically used and are foreclosed judicially. MERS local counsel advises that a loan can be foreclosed in the name of MERS. When MERS has been assigned the mortgage, the caption of the complaint should state Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as the plaintiff. However, this changes slightly if MERS is the original mortgagee of record, meaning that MERS is named on the mortgage in a nominee capacity for the originating lender. The caption should then state Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as nominee for [insert name of the current servicer]. The key is how MERS become the mortgage holder.
The body of the complaint should be the same as when foreclosing in the name of the servicer. MERS stands in the same shoes as the servicer to the extent that it is not the beneficial owner of the promissory note. An investor, typically a secondary market investor, will still be the ultimate owner of the promissory note.26
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS. We have been advised that sometimes there is an endorsement of the note to the servicer prior to the foreclosure. However, we recommend following the agencies’ policies.
26 If the promissory note is endorsed in blank and the servicer has physical custody of the note, the servicer will technically be the note holder as well as the record mortgage holder. By virtue of having the servicer’s employees be certifying officers of MERS, there can be an in-house transfer of possession of the note so that MERS is considered the note holder for purposes of foreclosing the loan.
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Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents for the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
After a judgment to MERS is entered, a sheriff’s sale is held. The certifying officer will instruct the foreclosing attorney as to the bid to be entered on behalf of MERS. If it is the highest bid, then the sheriff would be instructed that MERS has assigned its bid to the investor. This is the same method that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name. The sheriff would issue a sheriff’s deed directly to the investor. Local counsel advises that only VA and HUD are exempt from transfer taxes on the sheriff’s deed. Because the MERS recommended procedure follows the same procedure that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name, no additional taxes are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity. If it is an FHA-insured loan and an eviction is necessary, then the bid assignment is given to the servicer instead of to HUD. This way, the servicer will proceed with the eviction the same way it would if the foreclosure were filed in its own name.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR NEW MEXICO
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is the mortgage or deed of trust that gives MERS the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Mortgages are typically used and are foreclosed judicially. MERS local counsel advises that a loan can be foreclosed in the name of MERS. When MERS has been assigned the mortgage, the caption of the complaint should state Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as the plaintiff. However, this changes slightly if MERS is the original mortgagee of record, meaning that MERS is named on the mortgage in a nominee capacity for the originating lender. The caption should then state Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as nominee for [insert name of the current servicer]. The key is how MERS is named as the mortgagee of record.
The body of the complaint should be the same as when foreclosing in the name of the servicer. MERS stands in the same position as the servicer to the extent that it is not the beneficial owner of the promissory note. An investor, typically a secondary market investor, will still be the ultimate owner of the promissory note.27
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS.28 We have not found it to be a requirement in New Mexico that the Note be endorsed to the foreclosing entity.
27 Even though the servicer has physical custody of the note, custom in the mortgage industry is that the investor (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae or a private investor) owns the beneficial rights of the promissory note.
28 If the promissory note is endorsed in blank and the servicer has physical custody of the note, the servicer will technically be the note holder as well as the record mortgage holder. By virtue of having the servicer’s employees be certifying officers of MERS, there can be an in-house transfer of possession of the note so that MERS is considered the note holder for purposes of foreclosing the loan.
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Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution from MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents for the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
After a foreclosure judgment to MERS is entered, a Notice of Sale is published. The certifying officer will instruct the attorney regarding the bid to be entered on behalf of MERS. After the sale, a Report of Special Master is filed and an Order approving Sale and Special Master’s Report is filed. If MERS bid is the highest bid, then the Special Master’s Deed is recorded conveying the title to MERS. The title should only be held by MERS momentarily. A second deed should be prepared as soon as possible conveying the property from MERS to the investor. This is the same method that is used when the servicer forecloses in its own name. Because the MERS recommended procedure follows the same procedure that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name, no additional recording or transfer taxes are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of MERS and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR NEW YORK
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is the mortgage or deed of trust that gives MERS the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Mortgages are typically used and are foreclosed judicially. When MERS has been assigned the mortgage, the caption of the complaint should state Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as the plaintiff. However, this changes slightly if MERS is the original mortgagee of record, meaning that MERS is named on the mortgage in a nominee capacity for the originating lender, its successors and assigns. In that case, the caption should then state Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as nominee for [insert name of the current servicer]. The key is how did MERS become the mortgagee of record.
The body of the complaint should be the same as when foreclosing in the name of the servicer. MERS stands in the same shoes as the servicer to the extent that it is not the beneficial owner of the promissory note. An investor, typically a secondary market investor, will still be the ultimate owner of the promissory note.
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS. We have been advised that sometimes there is an endorsement of the note to the servicer prior to foreclosure. However, we recommend that the agencies’ policies be followed.
Employees of the servicer will be authorized to sign any necessary documents as a certifying officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. This typically will be the same individual that signs the documents for the servicer, but now will be signing as an officer of MERS.
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A foreclosure judgment to MERS would be entered. At the foreclosure sale the certifying officer will instruct the foreclosing attorney regarding the bid to be entered on behalf of MERS. If it is the successful bid, MERS will assign the bid to the investor. The assignment of the bid is a simple one-sentence reference that is submitted to the referee that states MERS assigns the bid to investor. The referee’s deed would be directly issued to the investor. This is the same method that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name. Because the MERS recommended procedure follows the same procedure that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name, no additional taxes are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity. If it is an FHA-insured loan and an eviction is necessary, then the bid assignment is given to the servicer instead of to HUD. This way, the servicer will proceed with the eviction the same way it would if the foreclosure were filed in its own name.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is for the servicer so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR NORTH CAROLINA
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is through the deed of trust that MERS is given the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Deeds of Trust are foreclosed non-judicially under power of sale. Local counsel advises that a foreclosure can be brought in the name of MERS. Notices are sent to all interested parties, and a hearing is scheduled with the Clerk of Superior Court. The same process followed when foreclosing in the name of the servicer continues to be followed except that Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) will be named as the foreclosing entity instead of the servicer.
Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents, such as the Substitution of Trustee, as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents on behalf of the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS. However, we have been advised that sometimes there is an endorsement of the note to the servicer prior to the commencement of the foreclosure. We have not found this to be a legal requirement, and therefore, the agencies’ requirements should be followed.
At the trustee sale, the certifying officer will instruct the trustee regarding the bid to be entered on behalf of MERS. If the bid is the highest bid, then MERS will assign its bid to the investor. We have been advised that this procedure is the same Version 1.1
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procedure followed when foreclosing in the name of the servicer. Because it is the same procedure, no additional taxes are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity. If it is an FHA-insured loan and an eviction is necessary, then the bid can be assigned to the servicer. This way, the eviction can be brought in the name of the servicer. Once the eviction is completed, then the servicer can issue a deed to HUD. Again, you should follow the same procedures you follow when foreclosing in the name of the servicer.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship between MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR NORTH DAKOTA
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is through this instrument that the authority is given to MERS to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Mortgages are typically used and are foreclosed judicially. MERS local counsel advises that a loan can be foreclosed in the name of MERS.29 When MERS has been assigned the mortgage, the caption of the complaint should state Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as the plaintiff. However, this changes slightly if MERS is the original mortgagee of record, meaning that MERS is named on the mortgage in a nominee capacity for the originating lender. The caption should then state Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as nominee for [insert name of the current servicer]. The key is how MERS is named as the mortgagee of record.
The body of the complaint should be the same as when foreclosing in the name of the servicer. However, it is advised that a paragraph be inserted that explains that the servicer is the entity that is servicing the loan. MERS stands in the same shoes as the servicer to the extent that it is not the beneficial owner of the promissory note. An investor, typically a secondary market investor, will still be the ultimate owner of the promissory note.30
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to
29 We have been advised that the named plaintiff in the foreclosure action should be both the record holder of the mortgage and the holder of the promissory note. This is typically considered to be the servicer because if the promissory note is endorsed in blank and the servicer has physical custody of the note, the servicer will technically be the note holder as well as the record mortgage holder. By virtue of having the servicer’s employees be certifying officers of MERS, there can be an in-house transfer of possession of the note so that MERS is considered the note holder for purposes of foreclosing the loan.
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30 Even though the servicer has physical custody of the note, custom in the mortgage industry is that the investor (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae or a private investor) owns the beneficial rights to the promissory note.
them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS unless it is legally required to be endorsed to the foreclosing entity and not just the preferred method. If it is required to endorse the promissory note to the foreclosing entity, then the note may need to be endorsed to MERS. However, we have not found it a requirement in North Dakota that the Note be endorsed to the foreclosing entity.
Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents today on behalf of the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
After a judgment to MERS is entered, a sheriff’s sale is held. A bid is entered on behalf of MERS, and if the successful bid, then the certificate of sale can be issued to MERS. At the sale, only the party who conducted the foreclosure is entitled to “credit.” At this point, one of two options can be followed. One is to assign the certificate of sale to the servicer or the investor. This way, the sheriff’s deed will be issued directly to the assignee. The other is the sheriff’s deed can be issued to MERS, and a Grant Deed will be subsequently issued to the investor. The latter option is the same method that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name. Because the MERS recommended procedure follows the same procedure that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name, no additional taxes are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is for the servicer so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR OHIO
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is through the mortgage or deed of trust that MERS is given the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Mortgages are used and are foreclosed judicially. MERS local counsel advises that a loan can be foreclosed in the name of MERS. The caption should state Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as the plaintiff. The body of the complaint should be the same as when foreclosing in the name of the servicer. MERS stands in the same shoes as the servicer to the extent that it is not the beneficial owner of the promissory note. An investor, typically a secondary market investor, will still be the ultimate owner of the promissory note.
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS. We have been advised that sometimes there is an endorsement of the note to the servicer prior to foreclosure. However, we recommend that the agencies’ policies be followed.
Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents for the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
After a judgment to MERS is entered, a sheriff’s sale is held. The certifying officer will instruct the foreclosing attorney as to the bid to be entered on behalf of MERS. If it is the successful bid, then MERS will assign its bid to the investor. The deed will then be issued directly to the investor. This is the same method that is used
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when the servicer forecloses in its name. Because the MERS recommended procedure follows the same procedure that is used when the servicer foreclosures in its name, no additional taxes are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity. If it is an FHA-insured loan and an eviction is necessary, then the bid assignment is given to the servicer instead of to HUD. This way, the servicer will proceed with the eviction the same way it would if the foreclosure were filed in its own name.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR OKLAHOMA
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is through the mortgage or deed of trust that MERS is given the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Mortgages are typically used and are foreclosed judicially. MERS local counsel advises that a loan can be foreclosed in the name of MERS, so long as MERS is the record mortgage holder and the holder of the promissory note (even if not the beneficial owner of the promissory note). The caption should reflect Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as the plaintiff. The body of the complaint should be the same as when foreclosing in the name of the servicer. MERS stands in the same shoes as the servicer to the extent that it is not the beneficial owner of the promissory note.31 An investor, typically a secondary market investor, will still be the beneficial owner of the promissory note.
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them.32 Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS. However, we have been advised that sometimes there is an endorsement of the note to the servicer prior to foreclosure. However, we recommend that the agencies’ policies be followed.
31 Even though the servicer has physical custody of the note, custom in the mortgage industry is that the investor (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae or a private investor) owns the beneficial rights to the promissory note.
32 If the promissory note is endorsed in blank and the servicer has physical custody of the note, the servicer will technically be the note holder as well as the record mortgage holder. By virtue of having the servicer’s employees be certifying officers of MERS, there can be an in-house transfer of possession of the note so that MERS is considered the note holder for purposes of foreclosing the loan.
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Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents for the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
After a judgment to MERS is entered, a Special Execution and Order of Sale is issued. The party instituting a foreclosure action must send a notice of the sheriff’s sale date to the borrower and all other persons that have a recorded interest or other known interest in the property that will be extinguished by the sale. This would include any junior lienholders, current owners or tenants and the holders of any other encumbrances on the property. The notice must be executed by the county sheriff and must contain a legal description of the property, as well as the date, time and place of sale. This notice must be sent at least 10 days prior to the date of sale. The attorney for the foreclosing party must execute and file an affidavit of compliance with these notice rules.
In addition, the party instituting a foreclosure action must publish notice of public sale for two successive weeks in the newspaper of the county in which the property is situated. The notice must also be executed by the sheriff and must state the names of persons having an interest in the property that will be extinguished by the sale. If the county does not have a newspaper, then a notice must be published on the court house, in 5 other public places in the county, as well as in any general circulation paper distributed in the county. If the county has a population of 110,000 as of the latest federal census, then the notice of sale must be published in a newspaper in the city or township in which the property is situated, or if no such paper exists, then the notice must be published in some newspaper published in the county. Okla. Stat. Tit. 12, section 764 (1995).
The sale is conducted by the county sheriff and must be held not less than 30 days after the date of the first publication or posting of the sale notice. Okla. Stat. Tit. 12, section 764 (1995). The sale is conducted through a public auction and the property is awarded to the highest bidder.
The certifying officer will instruct the foreclosing attorney to enter a bid on behalf of MERS. If it is the highest bid, then in the motion to confirm sale, MERS will request that the sheriff’s deed be issued to the investor. Upon the entering of the order confirming sale, the sheriff’s deed will be executed in favor of the investor. The MERS recommended procedures do not cause any additional taxes to be incurred.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of MERS and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to
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disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR OREGON
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is the mortgage or deed of trust that gives MERS the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Deeds of Trust are used and are foreclosed non-judicially by conferring a power of sale on the trustee in the event of default by the borrower. MERS local counsel advises that a loan can be foreclosed in the name of MERS.
Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents, such as the substitution of trustee, as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents for the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
The only change to the foreclosure procedure is to name Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. in the foreclosure notices as the beneficiary instead of to name the servicer. At the trustee’s sale, a bid will be entered on behalf of MERS. The bid is entered the same way it is entered for the servicer when foreclosing in the servicer’s name. If the bid is the highest bid, then the trustee’s deed can be issued directly to the investor. The Trustee’s deed will identify the investor as the grantee under the trustee’s deed and will recite that MERS, as nominee, successfully bid for the property at the trustee’s sale. Because the MERS recommended procedure follows the same procedure that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name, no additional taxes are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS.
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS.
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Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity. If it is an FHA-insured loan and an eviction is necessary, then the bid assignment is given to the servicer instead of to HUD. This way, the servicer will proceed with the eviction the same way it would if the foreclosure were filed in its own name.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR PENNSYLVANIA
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS will be the record mortgage holder. It is through the mortgage that MERS is given the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer or the investor to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Mortgages are typically used and are foreclosed judicially. The caption of the complaint should state Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as the plaintiff. The body of the complaint should be the same as when foreclosing in the name of the servicer or investor. A paragraph should be added that MERS, is or will be, the owner of legal title to the mortgage that is the subject of this action, and nominee for the [insert name of investor, or name of current servicer, if investor is Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac], which is the owner of the entire beneficial interest in the mortgage.
Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents for the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS. We have been advised that sometimes there is an endorsement of the note to the servicer prior to foreclosure. However, we recommend that the agencies’ policies be followed.
After the foreclosure judgment is entered in favor of MERS, the sheriff’s sale is scheduled. The servicer provides bidding instructions to the foreclosure attorney. After the sale, assuming that the foreclosure attorney was the successful bidder, the
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attorney instructs the sheriff, in writing, to assign the bid to the investor and to name the investor as grantee on the sheriff’s deed.33
The name of MERS must not appear on any post-sale documents, including sheriff’s deeds and complaints in ejectment. For FHA-insured loans that require evictions, the attorney must instruct the sheriff, in writing, to assign the bid to the investor, instead of to HUD, and to name the investor as grantee on the sheriff’s deed. The servicer, on behalf of the investor, proceeds with the eviction and deeds the property to HUD once the eviction is completed.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of MERS and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
33 MERS local counsel has contacted and received a letter from the Department of Revenue of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania that indicates the investor can use the foreclosing mortgagee transfer tax exemption by showing that MERS participated in the sheriff’s sale merely as an agent of the investor.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR RHODE ISLAND
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is the mortgage or deed of trust that gives MERS the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Mortgages are used and are foreclosed non-judicially. MERS local counsel advises a loan can be foreclosed in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.34 The foreclosure is advertised with Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as the named foreclosing entity.
Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents on behalf of the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS. We have been advised that sometimes there is an endorsement of the Note to the servicer prior to foreclosure. However, we recommend that the agencies’ policies be followed.
34 Please Note: Fannie Mae’s foreclosure regulations require an assignment from MERS to Fannie Mae in Rhode Island. This means that Fannie Mae will be the foreclosing entity. This is the same requirement that exists when the servicer is the record mortgage holder.
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MERS stands in the same shoes as the servicer to the extent that it is not the beneficial owner of the promissory note. An investor, typically a secondary market investor, will still be the ultimate owner of the promissory note.35
At the foreclosure auction, MERS can waive the requirement of a deposit as to the investor. This way, the servicer can enter a bid on behalf of the investor without the investor needing to produce any funds. If it is the highest bid, the foreclosure deed can be issued directly to the investor. We have been advised that this procedure is the same procedure used when Freddie Mac or Ginnie Mae are the investors. Because the MERS recommended procedure follows the same procedure that is used when the servicer foreclosures in its name, no additional taxes are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
35 Even though the servicer has physical custody of the note, custom in the mortgage industry is that the investor (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae or a private investor) owns the beneficial right to the promissory note.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR SOUTH CAROLINA
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is through the mortgage that MERS is given the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Mortgages are typically used and are foreclosed judicially. MERS local counsel advises that a loan can be foreclosed in the name of MERS.36 When MERS has been assigned the mortgage, the caption of the complaint should state Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as the plaintiff. However, this changes slightly if MERS is the original mortgagee of record, meaning that MERS is named on the mortgage in a nominee capacity for the originating lender, its successors and assigns. The caption should then state Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as nominee for [insert name of the current servicer]. The key is how MERS is named as the mortgagee of record.
The body of the complaint should be the same as when foreclosing in the name of the servicer. However, it is advised that a paragraph be inserted that explains that the servicer is the entity that is servicing the loan. MERS stands in the same shoes as the servicer to the extent that it is not the beneficial owner of the promissory note. An investor, typically a secondary market investor, will still be the ultimate owner of the promissory note. 37
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require that the promissory note be endorsed in blank when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure
36 We have been advised that the named plaintiff in the foreclosure action should be both the record holder of the mortgage and the holder of the promissory note. This is typically considered to be the servicer because if the promissory note is endorsed in blank and the servicer has physical custody of the note, the servicer will technically be the note holder as well as the record mortgage holder. By virtue of having the servicer’s employees be certifying officers of MERS, there can be an in-house transfer of possession of the note so that MERS is considered the note holder for purposes of foreclosing the loan.
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37 Even though the servicer has physical custody of the note, custom in the mortgage industry is that the investor (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae or a private investor) owns the beneficial rights to the promissory note.
is commenced in the name of MERS unless it is legally required to be endorsed to the foreclosing entity and not just the preferred method. We have been advised that sometimes there is an endorsement of the note to the servicer prior to the foreclosure. However, we recommend that the agencies’ requirements be followed.
Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents for the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
After a judgment to MERS is entered, a foreclosure sale is held. A bid is entered on behalf of MERS, and if the successful bid, then the bid will be assigned to the investor by using a one-page form instructing the sheriff of the assignment of bid. This is the same method that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name. The master in equity or the special referee would issue a deed directly to the investor. Local counsel advises that Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, VA and HUD are exempt from transfer taxes on the sheriff’s deed. Because the MERS recommended procedure follows the same procedure that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name, no additional taxes are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity. If it is an FHA-insured loan and an eviction is necessary, then the bid assignment is given to the servicer instead of to HUD. This way, the servicer will proceed with the eviction the same way it would if the foreclosure were filed in its own name.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR SOUTH DAKOTA
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is through the mortgage or deed of trust that MERS is given the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Mortgages are typically used and are foreclosed judicially. MERS local counsel advises that a loan can be foreclosed in the name of MERS. When MERS has been assigned the mortgage, the caption of the complaint should state Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as the plaintiff. However, this changes slightly if MERS is the original mortgagee of record, meaning that MERS is named on the mortgage in a nominee capacity for the originating lender. The caption should then state Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as nominee for [insert name of the current servicer]. The key is how MERS become the mortgage holder.
The body of the complaint should be the same as when foreclosing in the name of the servicer. MERS stands in the same shoes as the servicer in relation to not being the beneficial owner of the promissory note. An investor, typically a secondary market investor, will still be the ultimate owner of the promissory note.38
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS.
Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the
38 Even though the servicer has physical custody of the note, custom in the mortgage industry is that the investor (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae or a private investor) owns the beneficial right to the promissory note.
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same individual that signs the documents for the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
After a judgment to MERS is entered, a sheriff’s sale is held. The certifying officer will instruct the foreclosing attorney as to the bid to be entered on behalf of MERS. If it is the successful bid, then one of two options can be followed39. The first is that the Certificate of Sale may be assigned from MERS to the investor. This way, upon expiration of the redemption period, the sheriff’s deed will issue directly to the investor. There is a recording cost for the Certificate of Sale. The second option is that upon the expiration of the redemption period, MERS is issued the sheriff’s deed by virtue of being the holder of the Certificate of Sale. If this option is followed, MERS should only remain in the chain of title for as short of time as possible. A subsequent deed will then be executed from MERS to the investor. We have been advised that this latter option is the method that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name. Typically the servicer is issued the sheriff’s deed, and then issues a subsequent deed to the investor. Because the MERS recommended procedure follows the same procedure that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name, no additional taxes are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
39 MERS prefers to not take title to the property, so the Certificate of Sale should be assigned if possible. However, either option is acceptable.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR TENNESSEE
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, in place of the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is the mortgage or deed of trust that gives MERS the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Deeds of Trust are used and are generally foreclosed non-judicially under a power of sale in the security instrument. Local counsel advises that a foreclosure can be brought in the name of MERS. The Notice of Default is filed and published the same way it is when foreclosing in the name of the servicer except that Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) will be named as the foreclosing entity.
Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents, such as the Appointment of Substitution of Trustee, as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents for the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS.
At the trustee sale, the certifying officer will instruct the trustee regarding the bid to be entered on behalf of MERS. In the Trustee’s Deed, the bid will be assigned to the investor, unless the certifying officer instructs the trustee to assign the bid to the servicer. We have been advised that the current foreclosure procedure is a one-deed process with the investor directly taking title upon the conclusion of the trustee’s sale. Therefore, the MERS recommended procedure is the same as the current practice of assigning the bid to the investor. Because the MERS recommended
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procedure follows the same procedure that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name, no additional taxes are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity. If it is an FHA-insured loan, the eviction may need to be brought in the name of MERS. Therefore, MERS may need to be the grantee of the trustee’s deed. After the eviction is completed, MERS will then issue a deed to HUD.40
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of MERS and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
40 MERS should only be in the chain of title for as short of a time as possible. As soon as the eviction is completed, the deed to HUD should be recorded.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR TEXAS
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the mortgagee or beneficiary of record in the chain of title. It is through the power of sale in the deed of trust that MERS is given the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Deeds of Trust are foreclosed non-judicially. Local counsel advises that a foreclosure can be brought in the name of MERS. The foreclosure is commenced the same way as if it were being brought in the servicer’s name except that Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) will be named the foreclosing entity as the mortgagee or beneficiary of record as the nominee for the current servicer.
Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents, such as the Appointment of Substitution of Trustee, as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents for the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS.
At the trustee sale, the certifying officer will instruct the trustee regarding the bid to be entered on behalf of MERS as the mortgagee of record. If the bid is the highest bid, then the trustee’s deed is issued to MERS as the mortgagee of record and as the nominee for the current servicer. The servicer, as a duly appointed officer of MERS, can then convey the property by deed to the investor which is the same as the current practice that is used when foreclosing in the name of the servicer as mortgagee or
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beneficiary of record. Because the MERS recommended procedure follows the same procedure that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name, no additional taxes are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of MERS and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR UTAH
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is through the mortgage or deed of trust that MERS is given the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Deeds of Trust are foreclosed non-judicially. Local counsel advises that a foreclosure can be brought in the name of MERS. The Notice of Default and Election to Sell is filed with the county recorder. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) will be named as the foreclosing entity instead of the servicer.
Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents, such as the Substitution of Trustee, as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents for the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS.
After the reinstatement period expires, the Notice of Sale is published for the required length of time. Once this is completed, the foreclosure sale is held. The certifying officer will instruct the trustee regarding the bid to be entered on behalf of MERS. If the bid is the highest bid, the certifying officer will instruct the trustee to deed the property directly to the investor. We have been advised that this procedure is the same procedure used when foreclosing in the name of the servicer. Therefore, no additional taxes are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS in place of the servicer.
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Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity. If it is an FHA-insured loan and an eviction is necessary, then the servicer can be substituted as the interested party.41 This way, the eviction can be brought in the name of the servicer. Once the eviction is completed, then the servicer can issue a deed to HUD. Again, you should follow the same procedures you follow when foreclosing in the name of the servicer.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
41 MERS local counsel advises that an eviction is brought in the name of the party that takes title to the property following the foreclosure sale.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR VERMONT
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. When the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is through the mortgage that MERS is given the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Mortgages are typically used and are foreclosed judicially. MERS local counsel advises that a loan can be foreclosed in the name of MERS. Over 90% of the foreclosures are by strict foreclosures. When MERS has been assigned the mortgage, the caption of the complaint should state Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as the plaintiff. However, this changes slightly if MERS is the original mortgagee of record, meaning that MERS is named on the mortgage in a nominee capacity for the originating lender, its successors and assigns. The caption should then state Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as nominee for [insert name of the current servicer]. The key is how MERS is named as the mortgagee of record.
The body of the complaint should be the same as when foreclosing in the name of the servicer. MERS stands in the same shoes as the servicer to the extent that it is not the beneficial owner of the promissory note. An investor, typically a secondary market investor, will still be the ultimate owner of the promissory note.42
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS unless it is legally required to be endorsed to the
42 The servicer usually has physical custody of the note at the time of the foreclosure with a blank endorsement. This makes the servicer the noteholder for the purposes of foreclosing. However, custom in the mortgage industry is that the investor (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae or a private investor) owns the beneficial rights to the promissory note.
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foreclosing entity. If it is required to endorse the promissory note to the foreclosing entity, then the note may need to be endorsed to MERS. Local counsel has advised that it is essential that the Promissory Note be held in the name of the mortgage holder.43
Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents for the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
Because the majority of the foreclosures are by strict foreclosure, title will vest in MERS momentarily.44 The certifying officer will submit an affidavit of amounts due to the Clerk of Court, after which a default or summary judgment will be issued by the Court. The Clerk will prepare an accounting. Once the accounting is received, a judgment is prepared and served. The judgment is then signed by the Court. After the redemption period expires, a Certificate of Non-Redemption and Writ of Possession will be issued by the Court to MERS. The property will then be deeded from MERS to the investor. This is the same process that occurs when the servicer of the mortgage loan forecloses in its name. Because the MERS recommended procedure follows the same procedure that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name, no additional taxes are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS.
An alternative option is to file a Motion for Substitution of Parties after the judgment to MERS is entered. At this time, an unrecorded assignment of the mortgage needs to be shown to the judge. It should be noted that certain courts are not staffed with full time judges and there may be a slight increase in time before this Motion can be decided. It is recommended that this Motion be filed as soon as possible after the judgment is entered so that it is completed prior to the expiration of the redemption period. At the end of the redemption period, a Certificate of Non-Redemption is recorded which transfers the title. Prior to the Certificate being issued, the assignment of the mortgage is recorded.
Local counsel advises that Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, VA and HUD are exempt from transfer taxes on the sheriff’s deed.
43 We have been advised that the named plaintiff in the foreclosure action should be both the record holder of the mortgage and the holder of the promissory note. This is typically considered to be the servicer because if the promissory note is endorsed in blank and the servicer has physical custody of the note, the servicer will technically be the note holder as well as the record mortgage holder. By virtue of having the servicer’s employees be certifying officers of MERS, there can be an in-house transfer of possession of the note so that MERS is considered the note holder for purposes of foreclosing the loan.
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Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR VIRGINIA
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is through the mortgage or deed of trust that MERS is given the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Deeds of Trust are foreclosed non-judicially by a power of sale given to the Trustee upon default. Local counsel advises that a foreclosure can be brought in the name of MERS.45 The same procedure that is followed when foreclosing in the name of the servicer is followed when foreclosing in the name of MERS except that Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) will be named as the foreclosing entity.
Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents, such as the Substitution of Trustee, as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents for the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. Because the original note is required to be shown to the Commissioner at the time of the final accounting, the note is usually endorsed to the servicer when foreclosing in the name of the servicer. Therefore, local counsel advises that the note may need to be endorsed to MERS as the foreclosing entity. The endorsement of the note to the servicer is the same procedure that is followed when foreclosing in the name of the servicer.
45 Local Counsel advises that the promissory note is endorsed to the servicer prior to commencing a foreclosure so that the servicer becomes the noteholder. In order for a foreclosure to be brought in the name of MERS, the note should be endorsed to MERS so that MERS is the noteholder.
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At the trustee sale, the certifying officer will instruct the trustee regarding the bid to be entered on behalf of MERS. If the bid is the highest bid, then the trustee will be instructed to deed the property directly to the investor. We have been advised that this procedure is the same used when foreclosing in the name of the servicer. Therefore, no additional taxes are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity. If it is an FHA-insured loan and an eviction is necessary, then the servicer can be deeded the property so that the eviction can be brought in the name of the servicer. Once the eviction is completed, then the servicer can issue a deed to HUD. Again, you should follow the same procedures you follow when foreclosing in the name of the servicer.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR WASHINGTON
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is through the mortgage or deed of trust that MERS is given the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Deeds of Trust are used and are foreclosed non-judicially by conferring a power of sale on the trustee in the event of default by the borrower. MERS local counsel advises that a loan can be foreclosed in the name of MERS.
Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents, such as the substitution of trustee, as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents for the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS.
The only change to the foreclosure procedure is to name Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as the foreclosing entity. The Notice of Default and Notice of Trustee’s Sale is still required to be sent and published and all requirements related to these Notices must be followed. At the trustee’s sale, a bid will be entered on behalf of MERS. The bid is entered the same way it is entered for the servicer when foreclosing in the servicer’s name. If the bid is the highest bid, then the trustee’s deed can be issued directly to the investor. This is the same procedure that is followed when commencing a foreclosure in the name of the servicer. The Trustee’s deed will identify the investor as the grantee under the trustee’s deed and will recite that MERS, as nominee, successfully bid for the
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property at the trustee’s sale. Because the MERS recommended procedure follows the same procedure that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name, no additional recording or transfer taxes are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity. If it is an FHA-insured loan and an eviction is necessary, then the bid assignment is given to the servicer instead of to HUD. This way, the servicer will proceed with the eviction the same way it would if the foreclosure were filed in its own name.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR WEST VIRGINIA
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is through the mortgage or deed of trust that MERS is given the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Deeds of Trust are foreclosed non-judicially. Local counsel advises that a foreclosure can be brought in the name of MERS. The notice of sale is served on the grantor of the Deed of Trust by certified mail. The foreclosure sale is published according to the same requirements followed when foreclosing in the name of the servicer. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) will be named as the foreclosing entity instead of the servicer.
Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents, such as the Substitution of Trustee, as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents for the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS.
At the trustee auction, the certifying officer will instruct the trustee regarding the bid to be entered on behalf of MERS. If the bid is the highest bid, then the certifying officer will instruct the trustee on how to deed the property. A three-party deed can be used with the trustee transferring the property to the investor. MERS simply signs the deed and states that it has assigned its right in its bid to the investor. We have been advised that this procedure is the same procedure used when foreclosing
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in the name of the servicer. Therefore, no additional taxes are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity. If it is an FHA-insured loan and an eviction is necessary, then the property can be deeded to the servicer. This way, the eviction can be brought in the name of the servicer. Once the eviction is completed, the servicer can issue a deed to HUD. Again, you should follow the same procedures you follow when foreclosing in the name of the servicer.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR WISCONSIN
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like a servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is through the mortgage or deed of trust that MERS is given the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed in conjunction with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Mortgages are typically used and are foreclosed judicially. The caption of the complaint should name Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as the plaintiff. The body of the complaint should be the same as when foreclosing in the name of the servicer. MERS stands in the same shoes as the servicer to the extent that it is not the beneficial owner of the promissory note. A secondary market investor will still be the owner of the promissory note. A paragraph can be added to the complaint to explain the role of MERS as being the mortgagee of record with the authority to foreclose.
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when a seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS.
Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents for the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
After a foreclosure judgment in favor of MERS is entered and after expiration of the redemption period, a foreclosure sale is held. The certifying officer will provide local counsel with bid instructions. A bid will be entered on behalf of MERS, and if it is the highest bid, MERS will assign its bid to the investor and the investor can appear as the grantee on the Sheriff’s Deed. The Sheriff’s deed is then issued
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directly to the investor. The assignment of the bid is the method that is being used when the servicer forecloses in its name. The sheriff’s deed is exempt from transfer tax as are sheriff’s deeds following an assignment of bid. Certain other transfers, as between “principal and agent for no consideration may also be exempt from transfer tax. Because the MERS recommended procedure follows the procedure used when foreclosing in the servicer’s name, no additional taxes are incurred.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity. If it is an FHA-insured loan and an eviction is necessary, then the bid assignment is given to the servicer instead of to the investor (HUD). This way, the servicer will proceed with the eviction the same way it would if the foreclosure were filed in its own name.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
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MERS RECOMMENDED FORECLOSURE PROCEDURE
FOR WYOMING
Foreclosing a loan in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. is something new in the foreclosure arena. However, when the role of MERS is examined, it becomes clear that MERS stands in the same position to foreclose as the servicer. MERS, like the servicer, will be the record mortgage holder. It is through the mortgage or deed of trust that MERS is given the authority to foreclose.
To help make a smooth transition from foreclosing loans in the name of the servicer to foreclosing loans in the name of MERS, we have developed state by state recommended guidelines to follow. These guidelines were developed with experienced foreclosure counsel in your state. We have been able to keep the MERS recommended procedures consistent with the existing foreclosure procedures. The goal of the recommended procedures is to avoid adding any extra steps or incurring any additional taxes or costs by foreclosing in the name of MERS instead of the servicer.
MERS will continually review the guidelines and, if necessary, will issue revisions. The recommended guidelines to follow in your state are as follows:
Mortgages are foreclosed non-judicially by a power of sale contained in the mortgage. Local counsel advises that a foreclosure can be brought in the name of MERS. Notice of the sale is recorded in the real estate records and mailed by certified mail to all interested parties. The same procedures followed when foreclosing a mortgage loan in the name of the servicer is followed when foreclosing in the name of MERS except that Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) will be named as the foreclosing entity instead of the servicer. Publication of the sale occurs ten (10) days after the recording and mailing of the Notice.
Employees of the servicer will be certifying officers of MERS. This means they are authorized to sign any necessary documents as an officer of MERS. The certifying officer is granted this power by a corporate resolution of MERS. In other words, the same individual that signs the documents for the servicer will continue to sign the documents, but now as an officer of MERS.
The agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae) require a blank endorsement of the promissory note when the seller/servicer sells a mortgage loan to them. Therefore, the note should remain endorsed in blank when the foreclosure is commenced in the name of MERS.
At the sheriff’s sale, the certifying officer will instruct the sheriff regarding the bid to be entered on behalf of MERS. If the bid is the highest bid, then MERS will be issued a Certificate of Purchase. The Certificate of Purchase will be assigned to the investor. We have been advised that this is the same procedure used when foreclosing in the name of the servicer. Because the MERS recommended procedure
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follows the same procedure that is used when the servicer forecloses in its name, no additional recording costs are incurred by foreclosing in the name of MERS. Wyoming does not have transfer taxes.
Evictions are handled the same way they are handled when the servicer commences the foreclosure as the foreclosing entity. If it is an FHA-insured loan and an eviction is necessary, then the servicer can be assigned the Certificate. This way, the eviction can be brought in the name of the servicer. Once the eviction is completed, then the servicer can issue a deed to HUD. Again, you should follow the same procedures you follow when foreclosing in the name of the servicer.
If the debtor declares bankruptcy, the proof of claim should be filed jointly in the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and the servicer. It is advised to file in both names in order to disclose to the court the relationship of MERS and the servicer. The address to be used is the servicer’s address so that all trustee payments go directly to the servicer, not to MERS. The Motion for Relief from Stay may be filed either solely in the name of MERS or jointly with the servicer. If MERS is the foreclosing entity, then it is MERS that needs the relief from the bankruptcy.
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MERS to big to punish

The issue before the court boils down to whether MERS qualifies for certain exemptions from corporate tax registration required under section 23305 of the California Revenue and Tax Code. If it does not qualify for exemption, then MERS’ contracts are voidable under White Dragon Productions, Inc. vs. Performance Guarantees, Inc. (1987)
196 Cal.App.3d 163, and MERS may not appear to defend itself in this matter. (While Defendant presents a contrary 9th circuit decision on the issue of voidability of contract, the doctrine of stare decisis prevents the court from choosing to elect to follow that advisory opinion over California’s own precedent. Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 450 (1962). In Auto Equity Sales, the Court explained:
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, all tribunals exercising inferior jurisdiction are required to follow decisions of courts exercising superior jurisdiction. Otherwise, the doctrine of stare decisis makes no sense. The decisions of this court are binding upon and must be followed by all the state courts of California. Decisions of every division of the District Courts of Appeal are binding upon all the justice and municipal courts and upon all the superior courts of this state, and this is so whether or not the superior court is acting as a trial or appellate court. Courts exercising inferior jurisdiction must accept the law declared by courts of superior jurisdiction. It is not their function to attempt to overrule decisions of a higher court.” Therefore, White Dragon controls.)

With regard to the matter instantly before the court, MERS’ claimed exemptions are laid out at Corporations Code sections 191(c)(7) and 191(d)(3). Each of these statutory provisions provides narrow grounds for a foreign corporation to gain exemption from registration with our Secretary of State and payment of taxes so long as that corporation meets certain requirements and only conducts certain limited activities.
To rule on the question of MERS’ exemption under Corp. Code section 191(c)(7), the court must make three determinations: first, the court must make a legal determination as to the meaning of the language “creating evidences” in the statute; second and third, the court must make factual determinations to what activities MERS has been alleged in the FAC to have been conducting, and whether those activities are “creating evidences” and thereby exempted.
To answer the question of MERS’ exemption under Corp. Code section 191(d)(3), the court need make only two factual determinations, which are: is MERS a foreign lending institution, and if so, does it own the instant note, or any note in any of the thousands of MERS foreclosures in this state?
Finally, the court must decide whether, under either section, the operation of a database, selling memberships, and providing access to a database constitute exempted activities, and whether the acting as an agent of an exempt institution extends the exemption to MERS?

II. ARGUMENT
A. MERS DOES NOT QUALIFY FOR EXEMPTION UNDER CORPORATIONS
CODE SECTION 191(c)(7) BECAUSE 1) THE RULES OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION FORBID RENDERING SUBSECTION (d)(3) TO BE DEAD
LETTER; 2) ALL OF MERS’ ACTIVITIES GO BEYOND THE PLAIN MEANING
OF THE TERM, AND 3) NONE OF MERS’ ACTIVITIES COMPRISE THE PLAIN
MEANING OF THE TERM.
1. A Finding That MERS’ Foreclosure Activities Constitute Merely “Creating Evidences” Of Mortgages Would Render Subsection (d)(3) Dead Letter.

California Corporations Code section 191 (c)(7) provides an exemption to tax registration for foreign corporations engaged in “[c]reating evidences of debt or mortgages, liens or security interests on real or personal property.” Id. The statute does not expressly define “creating evidences,” and so the court is called upon to apply the rules of statutory construction to interpret the code prior to applying it. This is a matter of first impression, as there is no California precedent on this issue. (However, both parties have submitted federal court opinions on both sides of the issue).

California courts do not favor constructions of statutes that render them advisory only, or a dead letter. Petropoulos v. Department of Real Estate (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 554, 567; People v. Stringham (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 184, 197. Because Corp Code section 191(d)(7) expressly reserves the activities of assigning mortgages, conducting foreclosures, and substituting trustees for foreign lending institutions, these activities must, by definition, go beyond what is intended by “creating evidences” of transactions, or else, the gateway consideration of being a foreign lending institution required at section 191(d) would be dead letter, because such activities would already apply to ALL foreign corporations, who are exempted at (c)(7) for “creating evidences.” If the legislature included these foreclosurerelated activities in a new subsection expressly reserved for a certain type of foreign entity, then it clearly did not intend for them to be included by the term “creating evidences” which is provided to all foreign corporations.

2. All of MERS’ Activities Go Beyond The Plain Meaning Of The Term “Creating Evidences.”
Because there is no express definition of “creating evidences” provided in the Corporations Code, this phrase should be given its common meaning. “Creation” is defined by Mirriam Webster’s Dictionary as “the act of making, inventing or producing.”
“Evidence” is defined by the California Code of Evidence as “testimony, writings, material objects, or other things presented to the senses that are offered to prove the existence or nonexistence of a fact.” Evidence Code 140.
The evidences referred to in Corp. Code section 191(c)(7) are “of debt or mortgages, liens or security interest on real or personal property.”

Hence, when the words are taken together, the statute exempts: “making, inventing, or producing testimony, writings, material objects, or other things presented to the senses that are offered to prove the existence or nonexistence of debt or mortgages, liens or security interest on real or personal property.”

MERS’s California activities go far beyond these activities. In contrast to MERS, a foreign corporation who might qualify for exemption for “making, inventing, or producing testimony, writings, material objects, or other things presented to the senses that are offered to prove the existence or nonexistence of debt, mortgages, liens or security interest on real or personal property” is Socrates Legal Media, LLC, 227 West Monroe Suite 500 Chicago, IL 60606.

The business of Socrates Legal Media includes selling pre-packaged contract forms at Office Depot for people who conduct routine real estate transactions, such as taking liens on real property to secure debts. If a dispute arose between two parties to such an agreement within our state, and Socrates was brought in by the Plaintiff and alleged as being an unregistered foreign corporation who does not to have capacity to defend, Socrates could point out that it merely CREATES EVIDENCES of transactions, and seek exemption from the registration requirement to defend itself in the case. MERS, on the other hand, does not merely provide forms for agreements, or “create evidences” of them; MERS participates in California transactions.

Therefore, MERS’ activities go beyond what “creating evidences” could possibly mean. However, the trouble with MERS’s argument does not end with that.

3. None of MERS’ Activities Meet The Definition of “Creating Evidences.”

The real trouble with MERS’ argument is that it clearly did not even create these evidences to begin with, nor does it claim to. To wit, the evidences of debt, liens on property, or mortgages at issue in this case – the Note and the Deed of Trust – are “made, invented, and produced” respectively by the Lender and by federal government bodies known as “Fannie Mae” (short for the Federal National Mortgage Agency) and “Freddie Mac” (short for the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation).

The court may take judicial notice of the fact that these uniform instruments, used more commonly than any other to evidence the fact of a real estate mortgage transaction in our state, may be downloaded at http://www.freddiemac.com/uniform/. The mortgages at issue in this and every other MERS related case are not MERS’ forms. MERS did not “create” these “evidences.”

Rather, MERS’ involvement in the transaction was wholly participatory. MERS was named beneficiary on the deeds of trust. MERS participated in the foreclosure activities, though it was never entitled to collect a single penny under the notes. Characteristically, MERS only participated in the transaction for the sole purpose of avoiding paying California taxes. See: MERS’ admission in MERS v. Nebraska, that its purpose for being a phantom beneficiary on these deeds of trust is to avoid state real property transfer taxes at Plaintiff’s RJN in Support of Supplemental Briefing Exh. A (For the Nebraska Supreme Court’s finding that ” Mortgage lenders hire MERS to act as their nominee for mortgages, which allows the lenders to trade the mortgage note and servicing rights on the market without recording subsequent trades with the various register of deeds throughout Nebraska.”). See also: the admission of Bill Hultman at Plaintiffs RJN in Support of Supplemental Briefing Exh. B at Paragraph 8 (for MERS’ admission that “MERS is not a party to or obligee under the terms of the Promissory Note, and MERS does not appear on the Promissory Note.”).

Nor was the execution of the documents at closing MERS’ doing; that was conducted at a title company or by mobile notary. MERS does not claim that any person from MERS was present at a single mortgage closing in this state. Nor does MERS claim that any agent or representative of MERS even so much as signed the Fannie/Freddie uniform instruments.

The record in this case clearly establishes that only the Plaintiffs signed the Deed of Trust. Therefore, MERS’ activities do not render it exempt from tax registration under Corp Code 191(c)(7) because its activities go beyond “creating evidences” and do not include “creating evidences” in the first instance.

B. MERS DOES NOT QUALIFY UNDER SECTION 191(d)(3) BECAUSE IT IS NOT
A FOREIGN LENDING INSTITUTION AND BECAUSE IT DOES NOT OWN THE
NOTE.

1. As a Gateway Consideration, The Court Must Find That MERS Is A Foreign Lending Institution (Or Wholly Owned By One) to Qualify for ANY of the Exemptions at Corp. Code Section 191(d).

Under Corporations Code Section 191(d)(3), MERS must both 1) be the right type of entity (the gateway consideration to the exemptions), and 2) own the note to qualify for exemption.

Corporations Code Section 191(d) provides exemption solely for any:
“…foreign lending institution, including, but not limited to: any foreign banking corporation, any foreign corporation all of the capital stock of which is owned by one or more foreign banking corporations, any foreign savings and loan association, any foreign insurance company or any foreign corporation or association authorized by its charter to invest in loans secured by real and personal property, whether organized under the laws of the United States or of any other state, district or territory of the United States, shall not be considered to be doing, transacting or engaging in business in this state solely by reason of engaging in any or all of the following activities either on its own behalf or as a trustee of a pension plan, employee profit sharing or retirement plan, testamentary or inter vivos trust, or in any other fiduciary capacity…”

Firstly, MERS does not argue that it is a foreign lending institution in this case. In its Demurrer, Reply, oral argument, or anywhere on this record, there is NO factual averment that MERS is a foreign lending institution or wholly owned by one, or is an investor in mortgage notes.

Secondly, MERS has not submitted any evidence which would support such a finding.

Thirdly, in MERS v. Nebraska, MERS judicially admitted to the Supreme Court of Nebraska that it has never lent a dollar in any state, and is also not the holder of the note on any of its Deeds of Trust. Plaintiff’s Supplemental RJN Exh. A. In that case, MERS appealed a finding of the trial court that MERS was a foreign banking institution and therefore had to register as one in Nebraska. While the legal issue in the instant case is distinguishable, the factual problem before the court is identical to that case: is MERS a bank?.
Whereas there, MERS did everything it could to prove it was NOT a foreign lending institution, here MERS attempts the opposite. Where in Nebraska, MERS sought to avoid registration as a financial institution by swearing to God that it does not ever own the note, here MERS seeks to avail itself of an exemption reserved for foreign lending institutions, asserting the bald-faced conclusion that it should not have to register as a foreign corporation and pay California state taxes under a statute which clearly requires both status as a financial institution, AND ownership of the note, which it also disclaims.

B. MERS DOES NOT OWN THE NOTES AS REQUIRED BY 191(d)(3).

At Corporations Code Section 191(d)(3) the legislature expressly states MERS’claimed exemption:

“The ownership of any loans and the enforcement of any loans by trustee’s sale, judicial process or deed in lieu of foreclosure or otherwise.” Id. [Emphasis Added].

Corp. Code section 191(d)(3) is written in the conjunctive: “own and enforce.” MERS’ averments to its ability to participate in trustee sales without registration by way of this statute is therefore patently unfounded.

There is no averment in this case that MERS owns the note. In fact, by judicial admission, there is the opposite: MERS submits in its own joint Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Demurrer, an Assignment of the Deed of Trust to Wells Fargo. Consistent with MERS’ practice of hiding the true noteholder from the borrower to facilitate foreclosure fraud, the transfer to Wells Fargo suggests that it was Wells Fargo who had been the holder of the note entitled to enforce the Deed of Trust all along, never MERS.

C. MERS ACTIVITIES GO BEYOND THE SCOPE OF BOTH STATUTES; EVEN
IF MERS WERE EXEMPT UNDER EITHER STATUTE, ITS ACTIVITIES
INCLUDING OPERATING A MEMBERSHIP DATABASE GO BEYOND THE
SCOPE OF ANY OF THE ACTIVITIES INCLUDED IN EITHER EXEMPTION.

1. MERS’ Foreclosure Agent Activities Are Not Exempt Under Either Statute at Issue.

In reality, MERS operates as more of an agent than as a beneficiary on any given Deed of Trust (using the dubious title “nominee”). In support, MERS claims that Civil Code section 2924 allows “agents” to begin the non-judicial foreclosure process in California, and therefore, its agency activities should enjoy exemption from taxation. This is a non-sequitur.

The statutory exemption provided at Corp. Code section 191(d)(3) does not extend to companies in the business of “acting as foreclosure agents,” nor is any such interpretation of the statute even possible. While the Civil Code does allow agents to perform certain foreclosure functions, such allowance has no impact on the operation of the Tax Code.

MERS’ exemption argument leaps from one unfounded conclusion to the next. Nowhere in either statute does it aver that agents of the true noteholders are subject to the same exemptions simply by reason of agents being allowed to act on behalf of the noteholder.

Finally, and perhaps most telling, if you “follow the money” the distinction is clear: MERS profits by posing as the beneficiary to the deed of trust and generating foreclosure paperwork; a foreign lending institution profits by lending, and, when that doesn’t work out, by selling its security to collect on an unpaid debt. The business activities, or “profit generating activities”, of MERS are quite distinct from those of its principals, and there is no indication in any of the statutes that the legislature intended for the two to be interchangeable.

2. MERS’ Database Maintenance and Subscription Activities Are Not Exempt.

In their FAC, the Plaintiffs allege a set of activities which is neither included nor discussed above or by MERS at all in any of its arguments in favor of exemption: MERS operates a subscription-based information database for profit within the state of California.
MERS sells memberships to the database, provides access to records, and charges its customers accordingly. Similar to Westlaw, LexisNexis, or any other database provider, this activity is no more “creation of” the information contained therein, than is Westlaw the Creator of judicial opinion in any jurisdiction in this state or country.

Thus, regardless of the applicability to either claimed exemption to MERS’ other activities, MERS’ subscription-based activities exceed what the legislature intended a foreign corporation to do in this state without paying taxes to support the courts, schools, infrastructure, and other benefits of which it avails itself.

Therefore, MERS does not qualify for exemption from Revenue and Tax Code 23305 by way of either Corporations Code section 191(c)(7) or section 191(d)(3).

D. PUBLIC POLICY WEIGHS IN FAVOR OF MAKING MERS PAY ITS TAXES.

There is an argument that because MERS has embroiled itself in so many California mortgages, that it would be detrimental to industry to enforce our laws against it. However, because of the fact that the potential detriment to MERS pales in comparison to the impact MERS has had on this state, and will continue to have if allowed to be above our law, it would not be sound judicial policy to disregard the laws of California solely because of the sheer volume in which the defendant has violated them. It should be the opposite.

To enforce compliance with California’s tax code against MERS would not be any detriment to the mortgage industry, because the mortgage industry has already profited far beyond what was legal or fair in the first place due to these unlawful activities, as has MERS. To now disregard that those monies were ill-gotten based on the idea that it was just so much money that we’ll hurt the industry, truly, is to incentivize wholesale violation of California laws, as long as the issue stays under the radar long enough for the wrongful
conduct to become “too big to punish.”

Indeed, the mortgage industry has already received $700 billion in TARP funds, which came from taxpayer dollars, MERS itself as saved hundreds of millions of tax dollars by refusing to register in this state, and MERS’ customers have saved hundreds of millions by abusing the recording system and the unsupervised nonjudicial foreclosure statute.

It should be noted that secondary market mortgage holders have a remedy to all this: judicial foreclosure. The California codes are not set up without some recourse for those who are RIGHTFULLY owed a debt and RIGHTFULLY entitled to collect on it. Indeed, judicial foreclosure is the due process right of every California citizen whose mortgagee is not entitled to foreclose under Civil Code section 2924. (While Civil Code 2924 was not found to be a violation of due process by the California Supreme Court, a judicial seal of approval on abuse of that statute by those without any right title or interest most certainly is.)

On the flip side of this coin is the already felt crushing impact of these activities on the state of California. The courts are closed the third Wednesday of every month, and clerk staff has been cut to the bones. Public schools and universities are cutting both staff and course options as well as increasing tuition. The roads and bridges are in disrepair. Record foreclosures have caused record joblessness and record inflation. And meanwhile, MERS’ participation in the subprime securitized mortgage scheme was essential to the volume of bad loans being made, to the alacrity with which Wall Street was jamming these pools down our throats, and to the vigor with which mortgage brokers working for yield spread premiums were cold calling and loan flipping.

Clearly MERS was and is conducting business in this state, without paying a dollar on its own tax-free profits, and while aiding its customers in the avoidance of essential property transfer taxes. Its activities not only cost the state in the sheer loss of income, but also in the expense that will go into correcting thousands of real property records which have been deranged by MERS’ wholesale disregard for California law.

California Court Rules: MERS Can’t Foreclose, Citibank Can’t Collect

California Court Rules: MERS Can’t Foreclose, Citibank Can’t Collect

“Any attempt to transfer the beneficial interest of a trust deed without ownership of the underlying note is VOID under California Law.”

If you read that sentence and thought… “MERS,” then you’re already in the club. If you’ve never heard of MERS, and have no idea what is meant by being “in the club,” don’t worry, this is a club that just about every homeowner is invited to join. In fact, you may already be a member and not even know it.
MERS is the acronym used to describe Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. Best I can tell, our friends in the mortgage banking industry created MERS to make it easier for banks and servicers to sell and transfer our mortgages at the speed of light during the real estate bubble. According to the company’s Website:
MERS was created by the mortgage banking industry to streamline the mortgage process by using electronic commerce to eliminate paper. Our mission is to register every mortgage loan in the United States on the MERS®System.
MERS acts as nominee in the county land records for the lender and servicer. Any loan registered on the MERS®System is inoculated against future assignments because MERS remains the nominal mortgagee no matter how many times servicing is traded.

I have to tell you… I hate these guys already. Their attitude alone bothers me. I looked at pictures of their three top executives on their Website and thought to myself… “No way I’d be friends with these guys.” Probably not very fair of me, but as far as I’m concerned, when it comes to anything that talks like that and was created by the mortgage banking industry… “fair,” is where you go on Sunday to have popcorn and cotton candy. Just so we’re clear.
MERS, which is a company that I hear doesn’t even have employees, has been about as controversial as you get ever since houses started dropping like flies into foreclosure back in 2007-08. God forbid you find yourself losing your home to foreclosure, you’ll very likely find a representative from MERS looking smug and acting like the owner of your mortgage. But, MERS is not the owner of your mortgage, of course, and now a bankruptcy court judge in the Eastern District of California has officially said that he agrees.
MERS is a relatively new development in the mortgage world, and as the foreclosure crisis began the courts pretty much let them do whatever they wanted to do, as the party in interest in a foreclosure action.
But, that was before the foreclosures became a full fledged tsunami, and homeowners watched the bankers first get bailed out, and then pay out billions in bonuses before treating every single American homeowner/taxpayer who applied for a loan modification like insignificant garbage.
In response, homeowners, having been trained for over 200 years in the fine art of pushing back when shoved, went to their lawyers, and those lawyers started asking questions, as they are prone to do. Many started with questions like: “Who the heck is this MERS guy and why does he think he has any right to be foreclosing on my client’s home?”
For almost two full years, it seemed to me that judges, who frankly weren’t used to foreclosures being challenged, basically yawned and gave the house back to the bank. Then, starting about a year ago, give or take, things started to change. Judges started to listen to the points being raised as related to MERS showing up as the party in interest ready to foreclose, and the more the judges learned, the more they saw problems with what MERS was doing. As time went on the tide seemed to shift a bit and several decisions weren’t falling as MERS would have liked for one reason or another.
According to the company’s Website, MERS “is a proper party that can lawfully foreclose as the mortgagee and note-holder of a mortgage loan.” Here’s what it says on the MERS Website:
FORECLOSURES
(“MERS”) is In mortgage foreclosure cases, the plaintiff has standing as the holder of the note and the mortgage. When MERS forecloses, MERS is the mortgagee and it is the holder of the note because a MERS officer will be in possession of the original note endorsed in blank, which makes MERS a holder of the bearer paper.

But, in this latest decision, the bankruptcy judge in California didn’t agree, writing in his opinion:
“Since no evidence of MERS’ ownership of the underlying note has been offered, and other courts have concluded that MERS does not own the underlying notes, this court is convinced that MERS had no interest it could transfer to Citibank. Since MERS did not own the underlying note, it could not transfer the beneficial interest of the Deed of Trust to another. Any attempt to transfer the beneficial interest of a trust deed without ownership of the underlying note is void under California law.”

Did you get that? Since MERS didn’t own the underlying note, it couldn’t transfer the beneficial interest of the Deed of Trust to Citibank.

According to several attorneys, this opinion should serve as legal basis to challenge a foreclosure in California that has been based on a MERS assignment. It could also be used when seeking to void any MERS assignment of the Deed of Trust, or the note, to a third party for purposes of foreclosure; and should be sufficient for a borrower to obtain a TRO against a Trustee’s Sale, and a Preliminary Injunction preventing any sale, pending litigation filed by the borrower that challenges a foreclosure based on a MERS assignment.
In this decision the court found that MERS was acting “only as a nominee,” under the Deed of Trust, and that there was no evidence of the note being transferred. The judge’s opinion in this case also said that “several courts have acknowledged that MERS is not the owner of the underlying note and therefore could not transfer the note, the beneficial interest in the deed of trust, or foreclose on the property secured by the deed”, citing cases of: In Re Vargas, California Bankruptcy Court; Landmark v. Kesler, Kansas decision as to lack of authority of MERS; LaSalle Bank v. Lamy, a New York case; and In Re Foreclosure Cases, the “Boyko” decision from Ohio Federal Court.
And the court concluded by stating:
“Since the claimant, Citibank, has not established that it is the owner of the promissory note secured by the trust deed, Citibank is unable to assert a claim for payment in this case.”

Oh my… well, that really is something. MERS can’t foreclose and Citibank can’t collect? I believe you would have to say that MERS and Citibank were already in a hard place when the judge inserted a rock. MERS can’t foreclose and Citi can’t collect… I am absolutely loving this, I have to say, but I suppose giddy would be an inappropriate response, so I’ll just say, “how interesting”.
This decision means that if a foreclosing party in California, that is not the original lender, claims that payment is due under the note, and that they have the right to foreclose on the basis of a MERS assignment, they’re wrong… based on this opinion. The bottom line is that MERS has no authority to transfer the note because it never owned it, and that’s a view that even seems to be supported by MERS’ own contract, which says that “MERS agrees not to assert any rights to mortgage loans or properties mortgaged thereby”.
What this may mean to California’s homeowners in bankruptcy court…
· It should serve as a legal basis to challenge any foreclosure in California based on a MERS assignment.
· It should serve as the legal basis for voiding a MERS assignment of the Deed of Trust, or the note, to a third party for purposes of foreclosure.
· It should be an adequate basis for obtaining a TRO against a Trustee’s Sale
· It should be the basis for a Preliminary Injunction barring any sale pending litigation filed by the borrower that challenges a foreclosure based on a MERS assignment.
In addition, some lawyers believe that this ruling is relevant to borrowers across the country as well, because the court cited non-bankruptcy cases related to the lack of authority of MERS, and because this opinion is consistent with prior rulings in Idaho and Nevada Bankruptcy courts on the same issue.
I don’t know about you, but I feel like watching a marching band. 76 trombones, baby, 76 trombones.
“Any attempt to transfer the beneficial interest of a trust deed without ownership of the underlying note is VOID under California Law.”

The Proof of Claim at issue, listed as claim number 5 on the court’s official
claims registry, asserts a $1,320,650.52 secured claim. The Debtor objects to
the Claim on the basis that the claimant, Citibank, N.A., did not provided any
evidence that Citibank has the authority to bring the claim, as required by
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3001(c), rendering the claim facially
defective.
The court’s review of the claim shows that the Deed of Trust purports to have
been assigned to Citibank, N.A. by Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems,
Inc. as nominee for Bayrock Mortgage Corporation on March 5, 2010. (Proof of
Claim No. 5 p.36-37, Mar. 19, 2010.) Debtor contends that this does not
establish that Citibank is the owner of the underling promissory note since the
assignor, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”), had no
interest in the note to transfer. Debtors loan was originated by Bayrock
Mortgage Corporation and no evidence of the current owner of the promissory
note is attached to the proof of claim. It is well established law in the
Ninth Circuit that the assignment of a trust deed does not assign the
underlying promissory note and right to be paid, and that the security interest
is incident of the debt. 4 WITKIN SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, SECURED TRANSACTIONS IN REAL
PROPERTY §105 (10th ed).

MERS AND CITIBANK ARE NOT THE REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST
Under California law, to perfect the transfer of mortgage paper as collateral
the owner should physically deliver the note to the transferee. Bear v. Golden
Plan of California, Inc., 829 F.2d 705, 709 (9th Cir. 1986). Without physical
transfer, the sale of the note could be invalid as a fraudulent conveyance,
Cal. Civ. Code §3440, or as unperfected, Cal. Com. Code §§9313-9314. See ROGER
BERNHARDT, CALIFORNIA MORTGAGES AND DEEDS OF TRUSTS, AND FORECLOSURE LITIGATION §1.26 (4th
ed. 2009). The note here specifically identified the party to whom it was
payable, Bayrock Mortgage Corporation, and the note therefore cannot be
transferred unless the note is endorsed. See Cal. Com. Code §§3109, 3201, 3203,
3204. The attachments to the claim do not establish that Bayrock Mortgage
Corporation endorsed and sold the note to any other party.
TRANSFER OF AN INTEREST IN THE DEED OF TRUST ALONE IS VOID
MERS acted only as a “nominee” for Bayrock Mortgage under the Deed of Trust.
Since no evidence has been offered that the promissory note has been
transferred, MERS could only transfer what ever interest it had in the Deed of
Trust. However, the promissory note and the Deed of Trust are inseparable.
“The note and the mortgage are inseparable; the former as essential, the later
as an incident. An assignment of the note carries the mortgage with it, while
an assignment of the latter alone is a nullity.” Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S.
271, 274 (1872); accord Henley v. Hotaling, 41 Cal. 22, 28 (1871); Seidell v.
Tuxedo Land Co., 216 Cal. 165, 170 (1932); Cal. Civ. Code §2936. Therefore,
if on party receives the note an another receives the deed of trust, the holder
of the note prevails regardless of the order in which the interests were
transferred. Adler v. Sargent, 109 Cal. 42, 49-50 (1895).

Further, several courts have acknowledged that MERS is not the owner of the
underlying note and therefore could not transfer the note, the beneficial
interest in the deed of trust, or foreclose upon the property secured by the
deed. See In re Foreclosure Cases, 521 F. Supp. 2d 650, 653 (S.D. Oh. 2007);
In re Vargas, 396 B.R. 511, 520 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2008); Landmark Nat’l Bank
v. Kesler, 216 P.3d 158 (Kan. 2009); LaSalle Bank v. Lamy, 824 N.Y.S.2d 769
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006). Since no evidence of MERS’ ownership of the underlying
note has been offered, and other courts have concluded that MERS does not own
the underlying notes, this court is convinced that MERS had no interest it
could transfer to Citibank.
Since MERS did not own the underling note, it could not transfer the beneficial
interest of the Deed of Trust to another. Any attempt to transfer the
beneficial interest of a trust deed with out ownership of the underlying note
is void under California law. Therefore Citibank has not established that it
is entitled to assert a claim in this case.
MULTIPLE CLAIMS TO THE BENEFICIAL INTEREST IN THE DEED OF TRUST AND OWNERSHIP
OF PROMISSORY NOTE SECURED THEREBY
Debtor also points out that four separate entities have claimed beneficial
ownership of the deed of trust. (Obj. to Claim 3-5, Apr. 6, 2010.) The true
owner of the underling promissory note needs to step forward to settle the
cloud that has been created surrounding the relevant parties rights and
interests under the trust deed.
DECISION
11 U.S.C. §502(a) provides that a claim supported by a Proof of Claim is
allowed unless a party in interest objects. Once an objection has been filed,
the court may determine the amount of the claim after a noticed hearing. 11
U.S.C. §502(b). Since the claimant, Citibank, has not established that it is
the owner of the promissory note secured by the trust deed, Citibank is unable
to assert a claim for payment in this case. The objection is sustained and
Claim Number 5 on the court’s official register is disallowed in its entirety,
with leave for the owner of the promissory note to file a claim in this case
by June 18, 2010.
The court disallowing the proof of claim does not alter or modify the trust
deed or the fact that someone has an interest in the property which can be
subject thereto. The order disallowing the proof of claim shall expressly so
provide.
The court shall issue a minute order consistent with this ruling.

Bombshell – Judge Orders Injunction Stopping ALL Foreclosure Proceedings by Bank of America; Recontrust; Home Loan Servicing; MERS et al

June 7, 2010 by TheWryEye
Filed under New World order

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Posted by Foreclosure Fraud on June 6, 2010
(St. George, UT) June 5, 2010 – A court order issued by Fifth District Court Judge James L. Shumate May 22, 2010 in St. George, Utah has stopped all foreclosure proceedings in the State of Utah by Bank of America Corporation, ; Recontrust Company, N.A; Home Loans Servicing, LP; Bank of America, FSB; http://www.envisionlawfirm.com. The Court Order if allowed to become permanent will force Bank of America and other mortgage companies with home loans in Utah to adhere to the Utah laws requiring lenders to register in the state and have offices where home owners can negotiate face-to-face with their lenders as the state lawmakers intended (Utah Code ‘ 57-1-21(1)(a)(i).). Telephone calls by KCSG News for comment to the law office of Bank of America counsel Sean D. Muntz and attorney Amir Shlesinger of Reed Smith, LLP, Los Angeles, CA and Richard Ensor, Esq. of Vantus Law Group, Salt Lake City, UT were not returned.

The lawsuit filed by John Christian Barlow, a former Weber State University student who graduated from Loyola University of Chicago and receive his law degree from one of the most distinguished private a law colleges in the nation, Willamette University founded in 1883 at Salem, Oregon has drawn the ire of the high brow B of A attorney and those on the case in the law firm of Reed Smith, LLP, the 15th largest law firm in the world.

Barlow said Bank of America claims because it’s a national chartered institution, state laws are trumped, or not applicable to the bank. That was before the case was brought before Judge Shumate who read the petition, supporting case history and the state statute asking for an injunctive relief hearing filed by Barlow. The Judge felt so strong about the case before him, he issued the preliminary injunction order without a hearing halting the foreclosure process. The attorney’s for Bank of America promptly filed to move the case to federal court to avoid having to deal with the Judge who is not unaccustomed to high profile cases and has a history of watching out for the “little people” and citizen’s rights.

The legal gamesmanship has begun with the case moved to federal court and Barlow’s motion filed to remand the case to Fifth District Court. Barlow said is only seems fair the Bank be required to play by the rules that every mortgage lender in Utah is required to adhere; Barlow said, “can you imagine the audacity of the Bank of America and other big mortgage lenders that took billions in bailout funds to help resolve the mortgage mess and the financial institutions now are profiting by kicking people out of them homes without due process under the law of the State of Utah.

Barlow said he believes his client’s rights to remedies were taken away from her by faceless lenders who continue to overwhelm home owners and the judicial system with motions and petitions as remedies instead of actually making a good-faith effort in face-to-face negotiations to help homeowners. “The law is clear in Utah,” said Barlow, “and Judge Shumate saw it clearly too. Mortgage lender are required by law to be registered and have offices in the State of Utah to do business, that is unless you’re the Bank of America or one of their subsidiary company’s who are above the law in Utah.”

Barlow said the Bank of America attorneys are working overtime filing motions to overwhelm him and the court. “They simply have no answer for violating the state statutes and they don’t want to incur the wrath of Judge Shumate because of the serious ramifications his finding could have on lenders in Utah and across the nation where Bank of America and other financial institutions, under the guise of a mortgage lender have trampled the rights of citizens,” he said.

“Bank of America took over the bankrupt Countrywide Home Loan portfolio June 3, 2009 in a stock deal that has over 1100 home owners in foreclosure in Utah this month alone, and the numbers keep growing,” Barlow said.

The second part of the motion, Barlow filed, claims that neither the lender, nor MERS*, nor Bank of America, nor any other Defendant, has any remaining interest in the mortgage Promissory Note. The note has been bundled with other notes and sold as mortgage-backed securities or otherwise assigned and split from the Trust Deed. When the note is split from the trust deed, “the note becomes, as a practical matter, unsecured.” Restatement (Third) of Property (Mortgages) § 5.4 cmt. a (1997). A person or entity only holding the trust deed suffers no default because only the Note holder is entitled to payment. Basically, “[t]he security is worthless in the hands of anyone except a person who has the right to enforce the obligation; it cannot be foreclosed or otherwise enforced.” Real Estate Finance Law (Fourth) § 5.27 (2002).

*MERS is a process that is designed to simplifies the way mortgage ownership and servicing rights are originated, sold and tracked. Created by the real estate finance industry, MERS eliminates the need to prepare and record assignments when trading residential and commercial mortgage loans. http://www.mersinc.org

Does MERS Registration and Mortgage Fractionalization Extinguish Mortgage Rights?

By: Cynthia Kouril Wednesday September 30, 2009 5:00 pm

Mortgage – Rev Dan Catt

The Kansas Court of Appeals has issued a decision that is both stunning in its own right, but also demonstrates the trend in courts all over this nation which spells HUGE changes in the real estate and mortgage landscape. Realtors and banksters take note:

In a long and thoughtful decision in the case of Landmark Nat’l Bank v. Kessler the Kansas Court of Appeals has held that MERS (Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.) does not have standing to bring foreclosure actions on behalf of the owners of mortgage notes archived in its system.

Some background:

In the good old days, the legislatures of the various states set up a system for recording mortgages, usually in the County Clerk’s Office. Anyone wishing to know what obligations were imposed upon the real estate, like for instance a title search company, could go to the County Clerk’s Office and look up the block and lot number of the property and know who owned what, who owed what and to whom and whether there were any liens or mortgages on the property and who had what priority.

If you took out a mortgage from bank A, and A later resold your mortgage to refinance company B, well B would go to the County Clerk’s Office and record the transfer of the mortgage. Are you following me so far? B would also receive the original signature copy-the one where you wrote your name in blue ink-of the mortgage paperwork. In order to foreclose, the mortgagee/creditor is supposed to present the original documents in court as one way of proving that it is the true party to whom the debt is own and for whom the mortgage trust (the interest in the real estate) exists.

There are filing fees and costs to have a person go down to the County Clerk’s Office to record the mortgage transfer.

Some “genius” got the bright idea of forming a private entity to circumvent the government filing system; and “poof” MERS was born.

Banks pay a fee to “join” MERS. They then send all their mortgage records or at least their mortgage record information (MERS is very secretive about just how they do what they do) to MERS. MERS is supposed to keep track of the information about each mortgage. Then the mortgage gets split. The Promissory Note, that is the right to receive payments from the borrower, gets either sold or farmed out to a servicer who is paid “fees” to collect the payments and do other administrative tasks like manage any payments for taxes and the like out of escrow funds.

The mortgage deed or mortgage trust, that is the legal interest in the real estate that would normally give a lender the right to foreclose in the event of non-payment-may be sold to someone else. The payments themselves are “securitized” that is bundled with other mortgages and sold as Credit Backed Securities, which we now know as Wall Street Toxic Assets.

Up until recently when a homeowner fell behind in the mortgage payments and the it came time to foreclose, the servicer – who owned no interest whatsoever in the real estate – would appear as plaintiff and the lawyer would fill out an affidavit saying that the actual, blue ink signature, original copy of the mortgage documents were lost, or destroyed, but that the court should waive that requirement because MERS can appear on behalf of the owner of the right to foreclose and certify that the owner is somewhere in the MERS system. The transfers are not recorded in the County Clerk’s Office and all you will see is the transfer to MERS, if that, but not any subsequent transfers within MERS.

In the beginning, homeowners did not realize and often stipulated to waive presentation of the original documents. STUPID, STUPID, STUPID. Then a few wised up and found that their cases got postponed indefinitely. Not a “win” but at least they still had a roof over their heads for the time being.

Then banks got the bright idea of saying that MERS was the agent for the true owner. The Kansas decision says that won’t fly either.

BUT, now for the good part:

The court opined that

Indeed, an assignment of a mortgage without the debt transfers nothing. 55 Am. Jur. 2d, Mortgages § 1002. Thus, the mortgagee, who must have an interest in the debt, is the lender in a typical home mortgage.

Understand the possible implications of this. If other states take the same approach as Kansas, that means the splitting of the debt from the mortgage note effectively cancels the “mortgage interest” that is the power over the real property and converts the debt to a simple unsecured personal debt just on a promissory note. Which means they couldn’t take your house in foreclosure, though they can sue you personally on the debt, just like any other unsecured creditor can. I am assuming, without going to deep into it today, that as a personal debt, it may be dischargeable in bankruptcy. But we will have to wait for a few test cases to prove this.

What this also means is, that in the meantime, if you are trying to buy a house, you have to find out if your seller has a mortgage that may have been repackaged and lodged in MERS because you will have no way of knowing – since your title company cannot tell who actually might own the mortgage interest in your real estate if all the County Clerk’s records say is “MERS”.

This makes for a scary time for title insurers, I’m guessing.

There will be more on this case, I’m sure, it will just take some time to suss out all the ramifications.

Update: The NYTimes take on it.

MERS’s Authority to Operate in California CARTER v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY (N.D.Cal. 1-27-2010)

2. MERS’s Authority to Operate in California
The FAC fleetingly alleges that “MERS [is] not registered to do
business in California.” FAC ¶ 9. While MERS’s registration
status receives no other mention in the complaint, plaintiff’s
opposition memorandum purports to support several of plaintiff’s
claims with this allegation, and defendant’s reply discusses it
on the merits. The court therefore discusses this issue here.
The California Corporations Code requires entities that
“transact[] intrastate business” in California to acquire a
“certificate of qualification” from the California Secretary of
State. Cal. Corp. Code § 2105(a). MERS argues that its activities
fall within exceptions to the statutory definition of transacting
intrastate business, such that these requirement does not apply.
See Cal. Corp. Code § 191. It is not clear to the court that
MERS’s activity is exempt.
Page 23
MERS primarily relies on Cal. Corp. Code § 191(d)(3). Cal.
Corp. Code § 191(d) enumerates various actions that do not
trigger the registration requirement when performed by “any
foreign lending institution.” Because neither the FAC nor the
exhibits indicate that MERS is such an institution, MERS cannot
protect itself under this exemption at this stage. The statute
defines “foreign lending institution” as “including, but not
limited to: [i] any foreign banking corporation, [ii] any foreign
corporation all of the capital stock of which is owned by one or
more foreign banking corporations, [iii] any foreign savings and
loan association, [iv] any foreign insurance company or [v] any
foreign corporation or association authorized by its charter to
invest in loans secured by real and personal property[.]” Cal.
Corp. Code § 191(d). Neither any published California decision
nor any federal decision has interpreted these terms. Because
plaintiff alleges that MERS does not itself invest in loans or
lend money, it appears that [i], [iii], and [v] do not apply.
MERS does not claim to be an insurance company under [ii].
Finally, it is certainly plausible that not all of MERS’s owners
are foreign corporations. At this stage of litigation, the court
cannot conclude that MERS falls within any of the five enumerated
examples of “foreign lending institutions,” and the court
declines to address sua sponte whether MERS otherwise satisfies
subsection (d).
Corp. Code § 191(d). Neither any published California decision
nor any federal decision has interpreted these terms. Because
plaintiff alleges that MERS does not itself invest in loans or
lend money, it appears that [i], [iii], and [v] do not apply.
MERS does not claim to be an insurance company under [ii].
Finally, it is certainly plausible that not all of MERS’s owners
are foreign corporations. At this stage of litigation, the court
cannot conclude that MERS falls within any of the five enumerated
examples of “foreign lending institutions,” and the court
declines to address sua sponte whether MERS otherwise satisfies
subsection (d).
Defendants also invoke a second exemption, Cal. Corp. Code
§ 191(c)(7). While section 191(c) is not restricted to “lending
institutions,” MERS’s acts do not fall into the categories
Page 24
enumerated under the section, including subsection (c)(7).
Plaintiff alleges that MERS directed the trustee to initiate
nonjudicial
foreclosure on the property. Section 191(c)(7)
provides that “[c]reating evidences of debt or mortgages, liens
or security interests on real or personal property” is not
intrastate business activity. Although this language is
unexplained, directing the trustee to initiate foreclosure
proceedings appears to be more than merely creating evidence of a
mortgage. This is supported by the fact that a separate statutory
section, § 191(d)(3) (which MERS cannot invoke at this time, see
supra), exempts “the enforcement of any loans by trustee’s sale,
judicial process or deed in lieu of foreclosure or otherwise.”
Interpreting section (c)(7) to include these activities would
render (d)(3) surplusage, and such interpretations of California
statutes are disfavored under California law. People v. Arias,
45 Cal. 4th 169, 180 (2008), Hughes v. Bd. of Architectural
Examiners, 17 Cal. 4th 763, 775 (1998). Accordingly,
section 191(c)(7) does not exempt MERS’s activity.[fn12]
For these reasons, plaintiff’s argument that MERS has acted
Page 25
in violation of Cal. Corp. Code § 2105(a) is plausible, and
cannot be rejected at this stage in the litigation.
3. Whether MERS Has Acted UltraVires
Plaintiff separately argues that MERS has acted in violation of
its own “terms and conditions.” These “terms” allegedly provide
that
MERS shall serve as mortgagee of record with respect to
all such mortgage loans solely as a nominee, in an
administrative capacity, for the beneficial owner or
owners thereof from time to time. MERS shall have no
rights whatsoever to any payments made on account of
such mortgage loans, to any servicing rights related to
such mortgage loans, or to any mortgaged properties
securing such mortgage loans. MERS agrees not to assert
any rights (other than rights specified in the
Governing Documents) with respect to such mortgage
loans or mortgaged properties. References herein to
“mortgage(s)” and “mortgagee of record” shall include
deed(s) of trust and beneficiary under a deed of trust
and any other form of security instrument under
applicable state law.”
FAC ¶ 10. The FAC does not specify the source of these “terms and
conditions.” Plaintiff’s opposition memorandum states that they
are taken from MERS’s corporate charter, implying that an action
in violation thereof would be ultra vires. Opp’n at 4. Plaintiff
then alleges that these terms do not permit MERS to “act as a
nominee or beneficiary of any of the Defendants.” FAC ¶ 32.
However, the terms explicitly permit MERS to act as nominee.
Plaintiff has not alleged a violation of these terms.
4. Defendants’ Authority to Foreclose
Another theme underlying many of plaintiff’s claims is that
defendants have attempted to foreclose or are foreclosing on the
Page 26
property without satisfying the requirements for doing so.
Plaintiff argues that foreclosure is barred because no defendant
is a person entitled to enforce the deed of trust under the
California Commercial Code and because defendants failed to issue
a renewed notice of default after the initial trustee’s sale was
4. Defendants’ Authority to Foreclose
Another theme underlying many of plaintiff’s claims is that
defendants have attempted to foreclose or are foreclosing on the
Page 26
property without satisfying the requirements for doing so.
Plaintiff argues that foreclosure is barred because no defendant
is a person entitled to enforce the deed of trust under the
California Commercial Code and because defendants failed to issue
a renewed notice of default after the initial trustee’s sale was
rescinded.

The Trouble with MERS

As a homeowner begins research into the lending and foreclosure crisis, there will be many unfamiliar terms, names and companies that come to their attention. Chief among these will be MERS.

MERS is the acronym for Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems. It is a national electronic registration and tracking system that tracks the beneficial ownership interests and servicing rights in mortgage loans. The MERS website says:

“MERS is an innovative process that simplifies the way mortgage ownership and servicing rights are originated, sold and tracked. Created by the real estate finance industry, MERS eliminates the need to prepare and record assignments when trading residential and commercial mortgage loans. “

In simple language, MERS is an on-line computer software program for tracking ownership.

MERS was conceived in the early 1990’s by numerous lenders and other entities. Chief among the entities were Bank of America, , Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and a host of other such entities. The stated purpose was that the creation of MERS would lead to “consumers paying less” for mortgage loans. Obviously, that did not happen.

This article will attempt to explain MERS in very general detail. It will cover a few issues related to MERS and foreclosure, in order to introduce the reader to the issue of MERS. It is not meant to be a complete discussion of MERS, nor of the legal complexities regarding the arguments for and against MERS. For a more in depth reading of MERS and findings coming out of courts, it is recommended that the reader look at Hawkins, Case No. BK-S-07-13593-LBR (Bankr. Nev. 3/31/2009) (Bankr. Nev., 2009) . It gives a good reading of the issues related to MERS, at least for that particular case. Though in Nevada, it is relevant for California.

(Please note. I am not an attorney and am not giving legal advice. I am just reporting arguments being made against MERS, and also certain case law and applicable statutes in California.

The MERS Process

Traditionally, when a loan was executed, the beneficiary of the loan on the Deed of Trust was the lender. Once the loan was funded, the Deed of Trust and the Note would be recorded with the local County Recorder’s office. The recording of the Deed and the Note created a Public Record of the transaction. All future Assignments of the Note and Deed of Trust were expected to be recorded as ownership changes occurred. The recording of the Assignments created a “Perfected Chain of Title” of ownership of the Note and the Deed of Trust. This allowed interested or affected parties to be able to view the lien holders and if necessary, be able to contact the parties. The recording of the document also set the “priority” of the lien. The priority of the lien would be dependent upon the date that the recording took place. For example, a lien recorded on Jan 1, 2007 for $20,000 would be the first mortgage, and a lien recorded on Jan 2, 2007, for $1,500,000 would be a second mortgage, even though it was a higher amount.

Recordings of the document also determined who had the “beneficial interest” in the Note. An interested party simple looked at the Assignments, and knew who held the Note and who was the legal party of beneficial interest.

(For traditional lending prior to Securitization, the original Deed recording was usually the only recorded document in the Chain of Title. That is because banks kept the loans, and did not sell the loan, hence, only the original recording being present in the banks name.

The advent of Securitization, especially through “Private Investors” and not Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, involved an entirely new process in mortgage lending. With Securitization, the Notes and Deeds were sold once, twice, three times or more. Using the traditional model would involve recording new Assignments of the Deed and Note as each transfer of the Note or Deed of Trust occurred. Obviously, this required time and money for each recording.

(The selling or transferring of the Note is not to be confused with the selling of Servicing Rights, which is simply the right to collect payments on the Note, and keep a small portion of the payment for Servicing Fees. Usually, when a homeowner states that their loan was sold, they are referring to Servicing Rights.)

The creation of MERS changed the process. Instead of the lender being the Beneficiary on the Deed of Trust, MERS was now named as either the “Beneficiary” or the “Nominee for the Beneficiary” on the Deed of Trust. This meant that MERS was simply acting as an Agent for the true beneficiary. The concept was that with MERS assuming this role, there would be no need for Assignments of the Deed of Trust, since MERS would be given the “power of sale” through the Deed of Trust.

Black’s Law Dictionary defines a nominee as “[a] person designated to act in place of another, usually in a very limited way” and as “[a] party who holds bare legal title for the benefit of others or who receives and distributes funds for the benefit of others.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1076 (8th ed. 2004). This definition suggests that a nominee possesses few or no legally enforceable rights beyond those of a principal whom the nominee serves……..The legal status of a nominee, then, depends on the context of the relationship of the nominee to its principal. Various courts have interpreted the relationship of MERS and the lender as an agency relationship.

The naming of MERS as the Beneficiary meant that certain other procedures had to change. This was a result of the Note actually being made out to the lender, and not to MERS. Before explaining this change, it would be wise to explain the Securitization process.

Securitizing a Loan

Securitizing a loan is the process of selling a loan to Wall Street and private investors. It is a method with many issues to be considered, especially tax issues, which is beyond the purview of this article. The methodology of securitizing a loan generally followed these steps:

· A Wall Street firm would approach other entities about issuing a “Series of Bonds” for sell to investors and would come to an agreement. In other words, the Wall Street firm “pre-sold” the bonds.

· The Wall Street firm would approach a lender and usually offer them a Warehouse Line of Credit. The Warehouse Credit Line would be used to fund the loans. The Warehouse Line would be covered by restrictions resulting from the initial Pooling & Servicing Agreement Guidelines and the Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement. These documents outlined the procedures for creation of the loans and the administering of the loans prior to, and after, the sale of the loans to Wall Street.

· The Lender, with the guidelines, essentially went out and found “buyers” for the loans, people who fit the general characteristics of the Purchase Agreement,. (Guidelines were very general and most people could qualify.” The Lender would execute the loan and fund it, collecting payments until there were enough loans funded to sell to the Wall Street firm who could then issue the bonds.

· Once the necessary loans were funded, the lender would then sell the loans to the “Sponsor”, usually either a subsidiary of the Wall Street firm, of a specially created Corporation of the lender. At this point, the loans are separated into “tranches” of loans, where they will be eventually turned into bonds.

Next, the loans were “sold” to the “Depositor”. This was a “Special Purpose Vehicle” designed with one purpose in mind. That was to create a “bankruptcy remote vehicle” where the lender or other entities are protected from what might happen to the loans, and/or the loans are “protected” from the lender. The “Depositor” would have once again been created by the Wall Street firm or the Lender.

Then, the “Depositor” places the loans into the Issuing Entity, which is another created entity solely used for the purpose of selling the bonds.

Finally, the bonds would be sold, with a Trustee appointed to ensure that the bondholders received their monthly payments.

As can be seen, each Securitized Loan has had the ownership of the Note transferred two to three times at a minimum, but, no Assignments of Beneficiary are executed under most circumstances. If such an Assignment occurs, it will usually occur after a Notice of Default was filed.

(Note: This is a VERY simplified version of the process, but it gives the general idea. Depending upon the lender, it could change to some degree, especially if Fannie Mae bought the loans. The purpose of such a convoluted process was so that the entities selling the bonds could become a “bankruptcy remote” vehicle, protecting lenders and Wall Street from harm, and also creating a “Tax Favorable” investment entity known as an REIMC. An explanation of this process would be cumbersome at this time.)

New Procedures

As mentioned previously, Securitization and MERS required many changes in established practices. These practices were not and have not been codified, so they are major points of contention today. I will only cover a few important issues which are now being fought out in the courts.

One of the first issues to be addressed was how MERS might foreclose on a property. This was “solved” through an “unusual” practice.

· MERS has only 44 employees. They are all “overhead”, administrative or legal personnel. How could they handle the load of foreclosures, Assignments, etc to be expected of a company with their duties and obligations?

When a lender, title company, foreclosure company or other firm signed up to become a member of MERS, one or more of their people were designated as “Corporate Officers” of MERS and given the title of either Assistant Secretary or Vice President. These personnel were not employed by MERS, nor received income from MERS. They were named “Certify Officers” solely for the purpose of signing foreclosure and other legal documents in the name of MERS. (Apparently, there are some agreements which “authorize” these people to act in an Agency manner for MERS.)

This “solved” the issue of not having enough personnel to conduct necessary actions. It would be the Servicers, Trustees and Title Companies conducting the day-to-day operations needed for MERS to function.

As well, it was thought that this would provide MERS and their “Corporate Officers” with the “legal standing” to foreclose.

However, this brought up another issue that now needed addressing:

* When a Note is transferred, it must be endorsed and signed, in the manner of a person signing his paycheck over to another party. Customary procedure was to endorse it as “Pay to the Order of” and the name of the party taking the Note and then signed by the endorsing party. With a new party holding the Note, there would now need to be an Assignment of the Deed. This could not work if MERS was to be the foreclosing party.

Once a name is placed into the endorsement of the Note, then that person has the beneficial interest in the Note. Any attempt by MERS to foreclose in the MERS name would result in a challenge to the foreclosure since the Note was owned by “ABC” and MERS was the “Beneficiary”. MERS would not have the legal standing to foreclose, since only the “person of interest” would have such authority. So, it was decided that the Note would be endorsed “in blank”, which effectively made the Note a “Bearer Bond”, and anyone holding the Note would have the “legal standing” to enforce the Note under Uniform Commercial Code. This would also suggest to the lenders that Assignments would not be necessary.

MERS has recognized the Note Endorsement problem and on their website, stated that they could be the foreclosing party only if the Note was endorsed in blank. If it was endorsed to another party, then that party would be the foreclosing party.

As a result, most Notes are endorsed in blank, which purportedly allows MERS to be the foreclosing party. However, CA Civil Code 2932.5 has a completely different say in the matter. It requires that the Assignment of the Deed to the Beneficial Interest Holder of the Note.

CA Civil Code 2932.5 – Assignment

Where a power to sell real property is given to a mortgagee, or other encumbrancer, in an instrument intended to secure the payment of money, the power is part of the security and vests in any person who by assignment becomes entitled to payment of the money secured by the instrument. The power of sale may be exercised by the assignee if the assignment is duly acknowledged and recorded.

As is readily apparent, the above statute would suggest that Assignment of the Deed to the Note Holder is a requirement for enforcing foreclosure.

The question now becomes as to whether a Note Endorsed in Blank and transferred to different entities as indicated previously does allow for foreclosure. If MERS is the foreclosing authority but has no entitlement to payment of the money, how could they foreclose? This is especially important if the true beneficiary is not known. Why do I raise the question of who the true beneficiary is? Again, from the MERS website……..

* “On MERS loans, MERS will show as the beneficiary of record. Foreclosures should be commenced in the name of MERS. To effectuate this process, MERS has allowed each servicer to choose a select number of its own employees to act as officers for MERS. Through this process, appropriate documents may be executed at the servicer’s site on behalf of MERS by the same servicing employee that signs foreclosure documents for non-MERS loans.

Until the time of sale, the foreclosure is handled in same manner as non-MERS foreclosures. At the time of sale, if the property reverts, the Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale will follow a different procedure. Since MERS acts as nominee for the true beneficiary, it is important that the Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale be made in the name of the true beneficiary and not MERS. Your title company or MERS officer can easily determine the true beneficiary. Title companies have indicated that they will insure subsequent title when these procedures are followed.”

There, you have it. Direct from the MERS website. They admit that they name people to sign documents in the name of MERS. Often, these are Title Company employees or others that have no knowledge of the actual loan and whether it is in default or not.

Even worse, MERS admits that they are not the true beneficiary of the loan. In fact, it is likely that MERS has no knowledge of the true beneficiary of the loan for whom they are representing in an “Agency” relationship. They admit to this when they say “Your title company or MERS officer can easily determine the true beneficiary.

To further reinforce that MERS is not the true beneficiary of the loan, one need only look at the following Nevada Bankruptcy case, Hawkins, Case No. BK-S-07-13593-LBR (Bankr.Nev. 3/31/2009) (Bankr.Nev., 2009) – ”A “beneficiary” is defined as “one designated to benefit from an appointment, disposition, or assignment . . . or to receive something as a result of a legal arrangement or instrument.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 165 (8th ed. 2004). But it is obvious from the MERS’ “Terms and Conditions” that MERS is not a beneficiary as it has no rights whatsoever to any payments, to any servicing rights, or to any of the properties secured by the loans. To reverse an old adage, if it doesn’t walk like a duck, talk like a duck, and quack like a duck, then it’s not a duck.”

If one accepts the above ruling, which MERS does not agree with, MERS would not have the ability to foreclose on a property for lack of being a true Beneficiary. This leads us back to the MERS as “Nominee for the Beneficiary” and foreclosing as Agent for the Beneficiary. There may be pitfalls with this argument.

When the initial Deed of Trust is made out in the name of MERS as Nominee for the Beneficiary and the Note is made to ABC Lender, there should be no issues with MERS acting as an Agent for ABC Lender. Hawkins even recognizes this as fact.

The issue does arise when the Note transfers possession. Though the Deed of Trust states “beneficiary and/or successors”, the question can arise as to who the successor is, and whether Agency is any longer in effect. MERS makes the argument that the successor Beneficiary is a MERS member and therefore Agency is still effective. But does this argument hold up under scrutiny?

The original Note Holder, AB Lender, no longer holds the note, nor is entitled to payment.

Furthermore, the Note is endorsed in blank, and no Assignment of the Deed has been made to any other entity, so who is the true beneficiary and Note Holder?

It is now the contention of many that the Agency/Nominee relationship has been completely terminated between MERS and the original lender, so MERS has no authority to foreclose, or even to Assign the Deed.

In Vargas, 396 B.R. 511, 517 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2008) (”[I]f FHM has transferred the note, MERS is no longer an authorized agent of the holder unless it has a separate agency contract with the new undisclosed principal. MERS presents no evidence as to who owns the note, or of any authorization to act on behalf of the present owner.”);

Saxon Mortgage Services, Inc. v. Hillery, 2008 WL 5170180 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (unpublished opinion) (”[F]or there to be a valid assignment, there must be more than just assignment of the deed alone; the note must also be assigned. . . . MERS purportedly assigned both the deed of trust and the promissory note. . . . However, there is no evidence of record that establishes that MERS either held the promissory note or was given the authority . . . to assign the note.”).

Separation of the Note and the Deed

In the case of MERS, the Note and the Deed of Trust are held by separate entities. This can pose a unique problem dependent upon the court. There are many court rulings based upon the following:

“The Deed of Trust is a mere incident of the debt it secures and an assignment of the debt carries with it the security instrument. Therefore, a Deed Of Trust is inseparable from the debt and always abides with the debt. It has no market or ascertainable value apart from the obligation it secures.

A Deed of Trust has no assignable quality independent of the debt, it may not be assigned or transferred apart from the debt, and an attempt to assign the Deed Of Trust without a transfer of the debt is without effect. “

This very “simple” statement poses major issues. To easily understand, if the Deed of Trust and the Note are not together with the same entity, then there can be no enforcement of the Note. The Deed of Trust enforces the Note. It provides the capability for the lender to foreclose on a property. If the Deed is separate from the Note, then enforcement, i.e. foreclosure cannot occur.

MERS, actually the servicer, will Assign the Deed to the Note Holder, almost always after the Notice of Default has been filed. This will be an attempt to reunite the Deed and Note. But, as noted previously, MERS would likely no longer have the ability to Assign the Deed, since the Agency/Nominee status has been terminated. This could pose major issues, especially if the original lender is no longer in business.

When viewing a MERS loan, the examiner or attorney must pay careful attention to the following issues.

* The recorded history of the Deed to determine not just the current Deed Holder, but also who the Note Holder is. Are they one and the same, or are they separated, leading to an inability to foreclose unless reunited.

* When the Notice of Default was filed, were the Note and Deed separated, which would suggest that the Notice of Default was potentially unlawful.

* Did MERS have the authority to Foreclose, or even to make Assignments? There are a number of court cases suggesting otherwise.

* Who is signing for MERS? Is it a person with the Title Company, Trustee, or Servicer?

* Does the signer have legitimate authority to sign? Is the person holding factual knowledge of the homeowner being in default?

The entire subject of MERS is fraught with controversy and questions. Certainly, at the very least, MERS actions pose legal issues that are still being addressed each and every day. As to where these actions will ultimate lead, it is anybody’s guess. With some courts, the court sides with the lender, and others side with the homeowner. However, there does appear to be a trend developing that suggests, at least in Bankruptcy Courts, MERS is losing support.

Update:

I would like to point out that there is significant case law developing in other states regarding MERS. However, these are actions in other jurisdictions that do not necessarily apply in California. As a matter of fact, these arguments are generally not being accepted by most judges.
Currently, the state of California litigation is confused to say the least. Most judges are accepting the the California Foreclosure Statutes, Civil Code 2924, is all encompassing with regards to foreclosures. But 2924 only covers the procedural process. It does not take into account other relevant statutes related to Assignments of Beneficiary and Substitution of Trustee. Until such concerns are addressed and there is effective case law to cite, there will continue to be issues.

Mers

MERS

Basic Corporate Information
• MERS is incorporated within the State of Delaware.
• MERS was first incorporated in Delaware in 1999.
• The total number of shares of common stock authorized by MERS’ articles of incorporation is 1,000.
• The total number of shares of MERS common stock actually issued is 1,000.
• MERS is a wholly owned subsidiary of MERSCorp, Inc.
• MERS’ principal place of business at 1595 Spring Hill Road, Suite 310, Vienna, Virginia 22182
• MERS’ national data center is located in Plano, Texas.
• MERS’ serves as a “nominee” of mortgages and deeds of trust recorded in all fifty states.
• Over 50 million loans have been registered on the MERS system.
• MERS’ federal tax identification number is “541927784”.
The Nature of MERS’ Business
• MERS does not take applications for, underwrite or negotiate mortgage loans.
• MERS does not make or originate mortgage loans to consumers.
• MERS does not extend any credit to consumers.
• MERS has no role in the origination or original funding of the mortgages or deeds of trust for which it serves as “nominee”.
• MERS does not service mortgage loans.
• MERS does not sell mortgage loans.
• MERS is not an investor who acquires mortgage loans on the secondary market.
• MERS does not ever receive or process mortgage applications.
• MERS simply holds mortgage liens in a nominee capacity and through its electronic registry, tracks changes in the ownership of mortgage loans and servicing rights related thereto.
• MERS© System is not a vehicle for creating or transferring beneficial interests in mortgage loans.
• MERS is not named as a beneficiary of the alleged promissory note.
Ownership of Promissory Notes or Mortgage Indebtedness
• MERS is never the owner of the promissory note for which it seeks foreclosure.
• MERS has no legal or beneficial interest in the promissory note underlying the security instrument for which it serves as “nominee”.
• MERS has no legal or beneficial interest in the loan instrument underlying the security instrument for which it serves as “nominee”
• MERS has no legal or beneficial interest in the mortgage indebtedness underlying the security instrument for which it serves as “nominee”.
• MERS has no interest at all in the promissory note evidencing the mortgage indebtedness.
• MERS is not a party to the alleged mortgage indebtedness underlying the security instrument for which it serves as “nominee”.
• MERS has no financial or other interest in whether or not a mortgage loan is repaid.
• MERS is not the owner of the promissory note secured by the mortgage and has no rights to the payments made by the debtor on such promissory note.
• MERS does not make or acquire promissory notes or debt instruments of any nature and therefore cannot be said to be acquiring mortgage loans.
• MERS has no interest in the notes secured by mortgages or the mortgage servicing rights related thereto.
• MERS does not acquire any interest (legal or beneficial) in the loan instrument (i.e., the promissory note or other debt instrument).
• MERS has no rights whatsoever to any payments made on account of such mortgage loans, to any servicing rights related to such mortgage loans, or to any mortgaged properties securing such mortgage loans.
• The note owner appoints MERS to be its agent to only hold the mortgage lien interest, not to hold any interest in the note.
• MERS does not hold any interest (legal or beneficial) in the promissory notes that are secured by such mortgages or in any servicing rights associated with the mortgage loan.
• The debtor on the note owes no obligation to MERS and does not pay MERS on the note.
MERS’ Accounting of Mortgage Indebtedness / MERS Not At Risk
• MERS is not entitled to receive any of the payments associated with the alleged mortgage indebtedness.
• MERS is not entitled to receive any of the interest revenue associated with mortgage indebtedness for which it serves as “nominee”.
• Interest revenue related to the mortgage indebtedness for which MERS serves as “nominee” is never reflected within MERS’ bookkeeping or accounting records nor does such interest influence MERS’ earnings.
• Mortgage indebtedness for which MERS serves as the serves as “nominee” is not reflected as an asset on MERS’ financial statements.
• Failure to collect the outstanding balance of a mortgage loan will not result in an accounting loss by MERS.
• When a foreclosure is completed, MERS never actually retains or enjoys the use of any of the proceeds from a sale of the foreclosed property, but rather would remit such proceeds to the true party at interest.
• MERS is not actually at risk as to the payment or nonpayment of the mortgages or deeds of trust for which it serves as “nominee”.
• MERS has no pecuniary interest in the promissory notes or the mortgage indebtedness for which it serves as “nominee”.
• MERS is not personally aggrieved by any alleged default of a promissory note for which it serves as “nominee”.
• There exists no real controversy between MERS and any mortgagor alleged to be in default.
• MERS has never suffered any injury by arising out of any alleged default of a promissory note for which it serves as “nominee”.
MERS’ Interest in the Mortgage Security Instrument
• MERS holds the mortgage lien as nominee for the owner of the promissory note.
• MERS, in a nominee capacity for lenders, merely acquires legal title to the security instrument (i.e., the deed of trust or mortgage that secures the loan).
• MERS simply holds legal title to mortgages and deeds of trust as a nominee for the owner of the promissory note.
• MERS immobilizes the mortgage lien while transfers of the promissory notes and servicing rights continue to occur.
• The investor continues to own and hold the promissory note, but under the MERS® System, the servicing entity only holds contractual servicing rights and MERS holds legal title to the mortgage as nominee for the benefit of the investor (or owner and holder of the note) and not for itself.
• In effect, the mortgage lien becomes immobilized by MERS continuing to hold the mortgage lien when the note is sold from one investor to another via an endorsement and delivery of the note or the transfer of servicing rights from one MERS member to another MERS member via a purchase and sale agreement which is a non-recordable contract right.
• Legal title to the mortgage or deed of trust remains in MERS after such transfers and is tracked by MERS in its electronic registry.
Beneficial Interest in the Mortgage Indebtedness
• MERS holds legal title to the mortgage for the benefit of the owner of the note.
• The beneficial interest in the mortgage (or person or entity whose interest is secured by the mortgage) runs to the owner and holder of the promissory note and/or servicing rights thereunder.
• MERS has no interest at all in the promissory note evidencing the mortgage loan.
• MERS does not acquire an interest in promissory notes or debt instruments of any nature.
• The beneficial interest in the mortgage (or the person or entity whose interest is secured by the mortgage) runs to the owner and holder of the promissory note (NOT MERS).
MERS As Holder
• MERS is never the holder of a promissory note in the ordinary course of business.
• MERS is not a custodian of promissory notes underlying the security instrument for which it serves as “nominee”.
• MERS does not even maintain copies of promissory notes underlying the security instrument for which it serves as “nominee”.
• Sometimes when an investor or servicer desires to foreclose, the servicer obtains the promissory note from the custodian holding the note on behalf of the mortgage investor and places that note in the hands of a servicer employee who has been appointed as an officer (vice president and assistant secretary) of MERS by corporate resolution.
• When a promissory note is placed in the hands of a servicer employee who is also an MERS officer, MERS asserts that this transfer of custody into the hands of this nominal officer (without any transfer of ownership or beneficial interest) renders MERS the holder.
• No consideration or compensation is exchanged between the owner of the promissory note and MERS in consideration of this transfer in custody.
• Even when the promissory note is physically placed in the hands of the servicer’s employee who is a nominal MERS officer, MERS has no actual authority to control the foreclosure or the legal actions undertaken in its name.
• MERS will never willingly reveal the identity of the owner of the promissory note unless ordered to do so by the court.
• MERS will never willingly reveal the identity of the prior holders of the promissory note unless ordered to do so by the court.
• Since the transfer in custody of the promissory note is not for consideration, this transfer of custody is not reflected in any contemporaneous accounting records.
• MERS is never a holder in due course when the transfer of custody occurs after default.
• MERS is never the holder when the promissory note is shown to be lost or stolen.
MERS’ Role in Mortgage Servicing
• MERS does not service mortgage loans.
• MERS is not the owner of the servicing rights relating to the mortgage loan and MERS does not service loans.
• MERS does not collect mortgage payments.
• MERS does not hold escrows for taxes and insurance.
• MERS does not provide any servicing functions on mortgage loans, whatsoever.
• Those rights are typically held by the servicer of the loan, who may or may not also be the holder of the note.
MERS’ Rights To Control the Foreclosure
• MERS must all times comply with the instructions of the holder of the mortgage loan promissory notes.
• MERS only acts when directed to by its members and for the sole benefit of the owners and holders of the promissory notes secured by the mortgage instruments naming MERS as nominee owner.
• MERS’ members employ and pay the attorneys bringing foreclosure actions in MERS’ name.
MERS’ Access To or Control Over Records or Documents
• MERS has never maintained archival copies of any mortgage application for which it serves as “nominee”.
• In its regular course of business, MERS as a corporation does not maintain physical possession or custody of promissory notes, deeds of trust or other mortgage security instruments on behalf of its principals.
• MERS as a corporation has no archive or repository of the promissory notes secured by deeds of trust or other mortgage security instruments for which it serves as nominee.
• MERS as a corporation is not a custodian of the promissory notes secured by deeds of trust or other mortgage security instruments for which it serves as nominee.
• MERS as a corporation has no archive or repository of the deeds of trust or other mortgage security instruments for which it serves as nominee.
• In its regular course of business, MERS as a corporation does not routinely receive or archive copies of the promissory notes secured by the mortgage security instruments for which it serves as nominee.
• In its regular course of business, MERS as a corporation does not routinely receive or archive copies of the mortgage security instruments for which it serves as nominee.
• Copies of the instruments attached to MERS’ petitions or complaints so not come from MERS’ corporate files or archives.
• In its regular course of business, MERS as a corporation does not input the promissory note or mortgage security instrument ownership registration data for new mortgages for which it serves as nominee, but rather the registration information for such mortgages are entered by the “member” mortgage lenders, investors and/or servicers originating, purchasing, and/or selling such mortgages or mortgage servicing rights.
• MERS does not maintain a central corporate archive of demands, notices, claims, appointments, releases, assignments, or other files, documents and/or communications relating to collections efforts undertaken by MERS officers appointed by corporate resolution and acting under its authority.
Management and Supervision
• In preparing affidavits and certifications, officers of MERS, including Vice Presidents and Assistant Secretaries, making representations under MERS’ authority and on MERS’ behalf, are not primarily relying upon books of account, documents, records or files within MERS’ corporate supervision, custody or control.
• Officers of MERS preparing affidavits and certifications, including Vice Presidents and Assistant Secretaries, and otherwise making representations under MERS’ authority and on MERS’ behalf, do not routinely furnish copies of these affidavits or certifications to MERS for corporate retention or archival.
• Officers of MERS preparing affidavits and certifications, including Vice Presidents and Assistant Secretaries, and otherwise making representations under MERS’ authority and on MERS’ behalf are not working under the supervision or direction of senior MERS officers or employees, but rather are supervised by personnel employed by mortgage investors or mortgage servicers.

This should be a pretty good start for those of you faced with a foreclosure in which MERS is falsely asserting that it is the owner of the promissory note. Whether MERS is or was ever the holder is a FACT QUESTION which can be determined only by ascertain the chain of custody of the promissory note. When the promissory note is lost, missing or stolen, MERS is NOT the holder.

New Jersy on MERS standing and lost note

This case wrestles with all issues of MERS and standing read it it is insightful its long but focused upon the MERS and lost note argument. And by the way in this case they did find the note.
nycasewin

no recoded asignment no power of sale (foreclosure)2932.5

Mortgages with a power of sale as a form of security, although such powers of sale are strictly construed (Savings & Loan Soc. v. Burnett, 106 Cal. 514 [39 P. 922]), are not looked upon with disfavor in California. (Godfrey v. Monroe, 101 Cal. 224 [35 P. 761].) Indeed, such powers of sale are expressly permitted by section 2932 of the Civil Code, and since July 27, 1917, the exercise of such powers has been carefully regulated. (Civ. Code, sec. 2924.) In this connection we should also bear in mind section 858 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows: “Where a power to sell real property is given to a mortgagee, or other encumbrancer, in an instrument intended to secure the payment of money, the power is to be deemed a part of the security, and vests in any person who, by assignment, becomes entitled to the money so secured to be paid, and may be executed by him whenever the assignment is duly acknowledged and recorded.” This indicates to some extent that California intended that such a power of sale survives until the debt is paid or barred by the statute of limitations. [13 Cal.App.2d 239]

unperfected mortgage goes away in Bankruptcy and here is how it was done

Yes in San Jose an unperfected Mortgage was don away with the perfect storm.
1. COMPLAINT2. MEMOR. IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR RESTRAINING ORDER3. APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER4. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE5. OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM THE AUTOMATIC STAY6. DECLARATION OF ISABEL7. NOTICE OF HEARING

discovery to mers

PROPOUND TO MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC (2)

mers-explained-by-aurora-lawyers.pdf

mers-explained-by-aurora-lawyers

How to Use MERS on Deed of Trust or Mortgage

It is time to use the presence of MERS on the originating loan paperwork as an OFFENSIVE TACTIC. Most states have some version of the statute below. It is simply common sense. A creditor is not a creditor unless they are owed something. A beneficiary is not a beneficiary unless they are a creditor. In the case of a mortgage note, a beneficiary is not a creditor unless it is the obligee on the note (i.e., the one to whom the note directs payment). There is no escaping this logic.

The point is that designating MERS as beneficiary or mortgagee is the same as designating nobody at all. The range of options for the Judge include several possibilities. But the one I think we should concentrate on is that an ambiguity has been raised on the face of every Deed of Trust or Mortgage Deed naming MERS as the beneficiary or mortgagee. That being the case, it MUST BE JUDICIALLY DETERMINED by a trier of fact (Judge or Jury)in judicial foreclosure states.

In California there is legislation being proposed that would require mandatory mediation before a foreclosure can be initiated. The provisions the California Foreclosure prevention act of 2008 are just not working. Judges don’t uphold what the law says civil code 2023.6 and 2923.6 when the attorneys for the publicly funded Banks (our tax dollars 17.1 Trillion before it all over) oppose individual debtors and claim federal preemption. Our legal system is a rigged game favoring the capital of a capitalist system. In California a nonjudicial state a foreclosure can occur on the mere word of a lender without the original note or assignment of the original deed of trust. A then former homeowner can then be evicted by giving notice to vacate constructively (without notice) have a summons “Posted and Mailed” (again no actual notice) a default judgment taken (no trial) and a writ issued and the Sheriff’s instruction to evict issued and enforced.

In Non Judicial an action should be filed for declaratory relief that the foreclosure is invalid and void this is the problem in the non Judicial states. See state bar president article No Lawyer No Law Without having a beneficiary or mortgagee identified, there obviously can be no enforcement. The power off sale is contained in Civil 2932 and in California there must be a valid assignment civil code 2932.5 to have the power to foreclose.

So the strategy here would be to force the would-be forecloser (pretender lender) to file a lawsuit establishing the note and mortgage (or deed of trust) by identifying the beneficiary or mortgagee. It would also enable you, in the face of a reluctant judge, to press for expedited discovery for information that the would-be foreclosing trustee or attorney should have had before they started. And this leads to a request for an evidentiary hearing — the kiss of death for pretender lenders unless you don’t know your rules of evidence

California Mortgage and Deed of Trust Practice § 1.39 (3d ed Cal CEB 2008)

§ 1.39 (1) Must Be Obligee

The beneficiary must be an obligee of the secured obligation (usually the payee of a note), because otherwise the deed of trust in its favor is meaningless. Watkins v Bryant (1891) 91 C 492, 27 P 775; Nagle v Macy (1858) 9 C 426. See §§ 1.8-1.19 on the need for an obligation. The deed of trust is merely an incident of the obligation and has no existence apart from it. Goodfellow v Goodfellow (1933) 219 C 548, 27 P2d 898; Adler v Sargent (1895) 109 C 42, 41
P 799; Turner v Gosden (1932) 121 CA 20, 8 P2d 505. The holder of the note, however, can enforce the deed of trust
whether or not named as beneficiary or mortgagee. CC § 2936;

How to Stop Foreclosure

This is general information and assumes that you have access to the rest of the material on the blog. Foreclosures come in various flavors.

First of all you have non-judicial and judicial foreclosure states. Non-judicial basically means that instead of signing a conventional mortgage and note, you signed a document that says you give up your right to a judicial proceeding. So the pretender lender or lender simply instructs the Trustee to sell the property, giving you some notice. Of course the question of who is the lender, what is a beneficiary under a deed of trust, what is a creditor and who owns the loan NOW (if anyone) are all issues that come into play in litigation.

In a non-judicial state you generally are required to bring the matter to court by filing a lawsuit. In states like California, the foreclosers usually do an end run around you by filing an unlawful detainer as soon as they can in a court of lower jurisdiction which by law cannot hear your claims regarding the illegality of the mortgage or foreclosure.

In a judicial state the forecloser must be the one who files suit and you have considerably more power to resist the attempt to foreclose.

Then you have stages:

STAGE 1: No notice of default has been sent.

In this case you want to get a forensic analysis that is as complete as humanly possible — TILA, RESPA, securitization, title, chain of custody, predatory loan practices, fraud, fabricated documents, forged documents etc. I call this the FOUR WALL ANALYSIS, meaning they have no way to get out of the mess they created. Then you want a QWR (Qualified Written Request) and DVL (Debt Validation Letter along with complaints to various Federal and State agencies. If they fail to respond or fail to answer your questions you file a suit against the party who received the QWR, the party who originated the loan (even if they are out of business), and John Does 1-1000 being the owners of mortgage backed bonds that are evidence of the investors ownership in the pool of mortgages, of which yours is one. The suit is simple — it seeks to stop the servicer from receiving any payments, install a receiver over the servicer’s accounts, order them to answer the simple question “Who is my creditor and how do I get a full accounting FROM THE CREDITOR? Alternative counts would be quiet title and damages under TILA, RESPA, SEC, etc.

Tactically you want to present the forensic declaration and simply say that you have retained an expert witness who states in his declaration that the creditor does not include any of the parties disclosed to you thus far. This [prevents you from satisfying the Federal mandate to attempt modification or settlement of the loan. You’ve asked (QWR and DVL) and they won’t tell. DON’T GET INTO INTRICATE ARGUMENTS CONCERNING SECURITIZATION UNTIL IT IS NECESSARY TO DO SO WHICH SHOULD BE AFTER A FEW HEARINGS ON MOTIONS TO COMPEL THEM TO ANSWER.

IN OTHER WORDS YOU ARE SIMPLY TELLING THE JUDGE THAT YOUR EXPERT HAS PRESENTED FACTS AND OPINION THAT CONTRADICT AND VARY FROM THE REPRESENTATIONS OF COUNSEL AND THE PARTIES WHO HAVE BEEN DISCLOSED TO YOU THUS FAR.

YOU WANT TO KNOW WHO THE OTHER PARTIES ARE, IF ANY, AND WHAT MONEY EXCHANGED HANDS WITH RESPECT TO YOUR LOAN. YOU WANT EVIDENCE, NOT REPRESENTATIONS OF COUNSEL. YOU WANT DISCOVERY OR AN ORDER TO ANSWER THE QWR OR DVL. YOU WANT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING IF IT IS NECESSARY.

Avoid legal argument and go straight for discovery saying that you want to be able to approach the creditor, whoever it is, and in order to do that you have a Federal Statutory right (RESPA) to the name of a person, a telephone number and an address of the creditor — i.e., the one who is now minus money as a result of the funding of the loan. You’ve asked, they won’t answer.

Contemporaneously you want to get a temporary restraining order preventing them from taking any further action with respect to transferring, executing documents, transferring money, or collecting money until they have satisfied your demand for information and you have certified compliance with the court. Depending upon your circumstances you can offer to tender the monthly payment into the court registry or simply leave that out.

You can also file a bankruptcy petition especially if you are delinquent in payments or are about to become delinquent.

STAGE 2: Notice of Default Received

Believe it or not this is where the errors begin by the pretender lenders. You want to challenge authority, authenticity, the amount claimed due, the signatory, the notary, the loan number and anything else that is appropriate. Then go back to stage 1 and follow that track. In order to effectively do this you need to have that forensic analysis and I don’t mean the TILA Audit that is offered by so many companies using off the shelf software. You could probably buy the software yourself for less money than you pay those companies. I emphasize again that you need a FOUR WALL ANALYSIS.

Stage 3 Non-Judicial State, Notice of Sale received:

State statutes usually give you a tiny window of opportunity to contest the sale and the statute usually contains exact provisions on how you can do that or else your objection doesn’t count. At this point you need to secure the services of competent, knowledgeable, experienced legal counsel — professionals who have been fighting with these pretender lenders for a while. Anything less and you are likely to be sorely disappointed unless you landed, by luck of the draw, one of the increasing number of judges you are demonstrating their understanding and anger at this fraud.

Stage 4: Judicial State: Served with Process:

You must answer usually within 20 days. Failure to do so, along with your affirmative defenses and counterclaims, could result in a default followed by a default judgment followed by a Final Judgment of Foreclosure. See above steps.

Stage 5: Sale already occurred

You obviously need to reverse that situation. Usually the allegation is that the sale should be vacated because of fraud on the court (judicial) or fraudulent abuse of non-judicial process. This is a motion or Petitioner but it must be accompanied by a lawsuit, properly served and noticed to the other side. You probably need to name the purchaser at sale, and ask for a TRO (Temporary Restraining Order) that stops them from moving the property or the money around any further until your questions are answered (see above). At the risk of sounding like a broken record, you need a good forensic analyst and a good lawyer.

Stage 6: Eviction (Unlawful Detainer Filed or Judgment entered:

Same as Stage 5.

The lawyer is not competend to testify

If the lawyer is not a competent witness with personal knowledge, then he should shut up and sit down.

So you sent a QWR and you know the loan is securitized. The orignating lender says talk to the servicer and the servicer declines to answer all the questions because they didn’t originate the loan. Or you are in court and the lawyer is trying to finesse his way past basic rules of evidence and due process by making representations to the Judge as an officer of the court.

He’s lying of course and if you let it go unchallenged, you will lose the case. Basically opposing counsel is saying “trust me Judge I wouldn’t say it if it wasn’t so.” And your answer is that the lawyer is not a witness, that you don’t trust the lawyer or what he has to say, that if he is a witness he should be sworn in and subject to cross examaintion and if he is not a witness you are entitled to be confronted with a real witness with real testimony based upon real knowledge.

First Questions: When did you first learn of this case? What personal knowledge do you have concerning the payments received from the homeowner or third parties? What personal knowledge do you have as to who providing the actual cash from which the subject loan was funded?

Only when pressed relentlessly by the homeowner, the servicer comes up with a more and more restrictive answer as to what role they play. But they always start with don’t worry about a thing we control everything. Not true. Then later after you thought you worked out a modification they tell the deal is off because the investor declined. The investor is and always was the lender. That is the bottom line and any representation to the contrary is a lie and a fraud upon the court.

So whoever you sent the QWR to, always disclaims your right to ask, or tells you the name of the investor (i.e., your lender) is confidential, or that they have authority (but they won’t show it to you). That doesn’t seem to be a lender, does it? In fact they disclaim even knowing enough to answer your questions.

So AFTER THEY SERVE YOU with something file a motion to compel an immediate full answer to your QWR since under TILA service on the servicer is the same as service on the lender. You argue that everyone seems to be claiming rights to be paid under the original obligation, everyone seems to be claiming the right to enforce the note and mortgage, but nobody is willing to state unequivocally that they are the lender.

You are stuck in the position of being unable to seek modification under federal and State rules, unable to sell the property because you don’t know who can sign a satisfaction of mortgage or a release and reconveyance, unable to do a short-sale, and unable to refinance — all because they won’t give a simple answer to a simple question: who is the lender and what is the balance claimed by the real lender on the obligation? At this point you don’t even know that any of the real lenders wish to make a claim.

This is probably because they received TARP funds and insurance proceeds on defaults of pools that they had purchased multiple insurance policies (credit default swaps). But whether they are paid by someone who acquired rights of subrogation or they were not paid, you have a right to a FULL accounting and to know who they are and whether they received any third party money. If they were paid in part or otherwise sold their interest, then you have multiple additional unknown parties.

The reason is simple. They are not the lender and they know it. The lender is a group of investors who funded the transaction with Petitioner/Homeowner and others who purchased similar financial products from the same group of participants in the securitization chain relating to the subject loan.

The people currently in court do not include all the real parties in interest for you to make claims against the lender. Cite to the Massachusetts case where Wells Fargo and its lawyer were subject to an $850,000 sanction for misrepresenting its status to the court.

It is not enough for them to bluff their way by saying that they have already answered the interrogatories. When they lost and it came time to allocate damages and attorneys fees, Wells suddenly said they were NOT the lender, beneficiary or current holder and that therefore the damages and attorneys fees should be assessed against the real lender — who was not a party to the pending litigation and whom they refused to disclose along with their misrepresentation that they were the true lender.

It is not enough that the lawyer makes a representation to the court as an officer of the court. That is not how evidence works. If the lawyer wants to represent facts, then he/she should be sworn in and be subject to (1) voir dire to establish that he/she is opposing counsel that it came from some company.

The witness must be a competent witness who takes an oath, has personal knowledge regarding the content of the document, states that personal knowledge and whose testimony conforms to what is on the document.

There is no such thing as foundation without a witness. There is no such thing as foundation without a competent witness. So if the lawyer tries to finesse the subject by making blanket representations to the court(e.g. the property is “underwater” by $xxx,xxx and we need a lift of stay…yet, there is no certified appraisal entered into evidence with a certified appraiser that can be cross examined…just a statement from opposing counsel) point to Wells, or even point to other inconsistencies between what counsel has represented and what now appears to be the truth, and demand an evidentiary hearing. If the lawyer is not a competent witness with personal knowledge, then he should shut up and sit down.

File a motion to extend time to file adversary proceeding(in BK situation), answer, affirmative defenses and counterclaim UNTIL YOU GET A FULL AND COMPLETE ANSWER TO YOUR QWR so you can determine the real parties in interest and serve them with process. Otherwise, we will have a partial result wherein the real owner of the loan can and will claim damages and injunctive relief probably against all the current parties to this action including the Homeowner.

In short, the opposing counsel cannot just make statements of “fact” and have them accepted by the court as “fact” if they don’t pass the sniff test of real evidence corroborated by a competent witness. …and with every pleading ask for an evidentiary hearing and attorneys fees. Follow rule 11 procedure in Federal Court or the state law counterpart so you can get them later.

The case is lost when you stip to the commissioner

remember this if you forget everything else you don’t have to agree to take a commissioner in your eviction case he has thirty or so cases per day and therefore does not have time to listen to your defenses to the foreclosure or that the sale was not dully perfected . He will politely say I do not have  jurisdiction to hear these defenses. if they present the Trustees deed,

Trustees Fleming and Huff
Trustees Fleming and Huff (Photo credit: dave.cournoyer)

its over.
See Cal. Const. Article 6, §§21; 22
CCP § 259(e)

Usury is comming back as a viable cause of action

Loans
Loans (Photo credit: zingbot)

USURY: The trial court improperly granted a motion for summary judgment on the basis that the loan was exempt from the usury law.

1. The common law exception to the usury law known as the “interest contingency rule” provides that interest that exceeds the legal maximum is not usurious when its payment is subject to a contingency so that the lender’s profit is wholly or partially put in hazard. The hazard in question must be something over and above the risk which exists with all loans – that the borrower will be unable to pay.
2. The court held that the interest contingency rule did not apply to additional interest based on a percentage of the sale price of completed condominium units because the lender was guaranteed additional interest regardless of whether the project generated rents or profits.
3. The loan did not qualify as a shared appreciation loan, permitted under Civil Code Sections 1917-1917.006, because the note guaranteed the additional interest regardless of whether the property appreciated in value or whether the project generated profits.
4. The usury defense may not be waived by guarantor of a loan. (No other published case has addressed this issue.)wri_opportunityloans_v_cooper

Charged minorities thousands of dollars more Hispanic’s borrower charges 55% more

GreenPoint Brokers Targeted by New York
HCI Mortgage, Consumer One Mortgage settle with attorney general
January 5, 2009

Two New York mortgage brokers have settled charges that they charged minorities thousands of dollars more in fees, while a third broker faces a lawsuit by the state and more brokers face investigations. The actions were prompted by an investigation into defunct wholesaler GreenPoint Mortgage Funding Inc.
HCI Mortgage and Consumer One Mortgage have entered an agreement with New York’s attorney general, a press release today said. Between the two companies, there are more than 20 branches throughout the state.
The two brokers will pay $665,000 in restitution to around 455 black and Hispanic borrowers, according to the announcement. The also agreed to establish a standard fee schedule, monitor pricing to minorities and report lending details to the state.
Both brokers are accused of charging minorities higher fees than similarly-situated White borrowers.
The attorney general conducted an investigation with the New York State Department of Banking into discriminatory practices by mortgage brokers. The investigation was triggered by the state’s investigation into GreenPoint Mortgage Funding Inc. after it found that Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data indicated discrimination had occurred on GreenPoint mortgages. GreenPoint, which was shut down by parent Capital One in August 2007, settled the charges in July for $1 million.
Statistical analyses conducted on loans originated by HCI found that black borrowers were charged around 46 percent more than similarly situated whites, which worked out to around $2,260. Hispanic borrowers saw fees that were an average of 55 percent higher, which worked out to $2,280.
“These customers were charged significantly higher fees for no reason other than being a minority — something that is explicitly against the law in New York State,” Attorney General Andrew Cuomo said in the statement.
In addition, the attorney general has filed a lawsuit in federal district court against U.S. Capital Funding LLC. A state investigation also found discriminatory practices at U.S. Capital, but the company refused to provide restitution to more than 100 minority borrowers — prompting the lawsuit by the attorney general.
U.S. Capital reportedly brokered 300 loans between January 2006 and July 2007, including around 100 mortgages for black and Hispanic borrowers. Minorities were allegedly charged 58 percent more than whites, costing them an average of $3,500 each.
“HCI Mortgage, Consumer One, and U.S. Capital Funding all did substantial business with GreenPoint,” the statement said. “The office is continuing its investigation into potential discriminatory pricing by other mortgage brokers.